EN BANC

[G.R. No. 163256. November 10, 2004]

CICERON P. ALTAREJOS, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, JOSE ALMIE and VERNON
VERSOZA, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
AZCUNA, J .:
This is a petition for certiorari, with prayer for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order and/or a writ of prohibitory and mandatory injunction, to set
aside the Resolution promulgated by the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC), First Division, on March 22, 2004 disqualifying petitioner
Ciceron P. Altarejos from running as mayor of San Jacinto, Masbate, and
another resolution of the COMELEC en banc promulgated on May 7, 2004
denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.
The factual antecedents are as follows:
Petitioner Altarejos was a candidate for mayor in the Municipality of San
Jacinto, Masbate in the May 10, 2004 national and local elections.
On January 15, 2004, private respondents Jose Almie Altiche and
Vernon Versoza, registered voters of San Jacinto, Masbate, filed with the
COMELEC, a petition to disqualify and to deny due course or cancel the
certificate of candidacy of petitioner on the ground that he is not a Filipino
citizen and that he made a false representation in his certificate of
candidacy that [he] was not a permanent resident of or immigrant to a foreign
country.
Private respondents alleged that based on a letter
[1]
from the Bureau of
Immigration dated June 25, 2001, petitioner was a holder of a permanent U.S.
resident visa, an Alien Certificate of Registration No. E139507 issued on
November 3, 1997, and an Immigration Certificate of Residence No. 320846
issued on November 3, 1997 by the Bureau of Immigration.
[2]

On January 26, 2004, petitioner filed an Answer
[3]
stating, among others,
that he did not commit false representation in his application for candidacy as
mayor because as early as December 17, 1997, he was already issued a
Certificate of Repatriation by the Special Committee on Naturalization, after
he filed a petition for repatriation pursuant to Republic Act No. 8171. Thus,
petitioner claimed that his Filipino citizenship was already restored, and he
was qualified to run as mayor in the May 10, 2004 elections. Petitioner sought
the dismissal of the petition.
On the date of the hearing, the parties were required to submit their
Memoranda within three days. Private respondents filed their Memorandum,
while petitioner did not file one within the required period.
[4]
Petitioner,
however, filed a Reply Memorandum
[5]
subsequently.
Atty. Zacarias C. Zaragoza, Jr., regional election director for Region V and
hearing officer of this case, recommended that petitioner Altarejos be
disqualified from being a candidate for the position of mayor of San Jacinto,
Masbate in the May 10, 2004 national and local elections. He found, thus:
x x x
The provisions of law governing the qualifications and disqualifications of elective
local officials are found in Sections 39 and 40 of Republic Act No. 7160 otherwise
known as the Local Government Code of 1991, which provide as follows:
SEC. 39. Qualifications. (a) An elective local official must be a citizen of the
Philippines; a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city or province or, in
the case of member of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, or
sangguniang bayan, the district where he intends to be elected; a resident therein for at
least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election; and able to read and
write Filipino or any other local language or dialect.
xxx.
(c) Candidates for the position of mayor or vice-mayor of independent
component cities, component cities or municipalities must be at least twenty-one (21)
years of age on election day.
[SEC. 40. Disqualifications. The following persons are disqualified from running
for any elective position:]
xxx.
(d) Those with dual citizenship.
xxx.
(f) Permanent residents in a foreign country or those who have acquired the
right to reside abroad and continue to avail of the same right after the effectivity of
this Code; xxx
Under the terms of the above quoted statutory provisions, it is required that an
elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines, and he must not have a dual
citizenship; must not be a permanent resident in a foreign country or must not have
acquired the right to reside abroad.
In the present case, it has been established by clear and convincing evidence that
respondent is a citizen of the United States of America. Such fact is proven by his
Alien Certificate of Registration (ACR) No. E139507 issued on 3 November 1997 and
Immigration Certificate of Residence (ICR) with No. 320846 issued on 3 November
1997 by the Alien Registration Division, Bureau of Immigration and
Deportation. This was further confirmed in a letter dated 25 June 2001 of then
Commissioner ANDREA D. DOMINGO of the Bureau of Immigration and
Deportation.
Although respondent had petitioned for his repatriation as a Filipino citizen under
Republic Act No. 8171 on 17 December 1997, this did not restore to respondent his
Filipino citizenship, because Section 2 of the aforecited Republic Act No. 8171
specifically provides that repatriation shall be effected by taking the necessary
oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registration in the
proper civil registry and in the Bureau of Immigration.
It appears from the records of this case that respondent failed to prove that he has fully
complied with requirements of the above-quoted Section 2 of Republic Act 8171 to
perfect his repatriation and reacquire his Filipino citizenship. Respondent has not
submitted any document to prove that he has taken his oath of allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines and that he has registered his fact of repatriation in the
proper civil registry and in the Bureau of Immigration. In fact, in a letter date 25 June
2001, Commissioner ANDREA DOMINGO stated that RESPONDENT is still a
holder of visa under Section 13 (g) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940 as
amended, with an indefinite authorized stay in the Philippines, implying that
respondent did not register his supposed Certificate of Repatriation with the Bureau of
Immigration otherwise his Alien Visa would have already been cancelled. The rule is
that in case of doubt concerning the grant of citizenship, such doubt should be
resolved in favor of the State and against the applicant (Cheng vs. Republic, L-16999,
22 June 1965).
x x x
Not having been able to prove that he has fully reacquired his Filipino citizenship
after being naturalized as a citizen of the United States, it is clear that respondent is
not qualified to be candidate for the position of Mayor of San Jacinto, Masbate, in the
10 May 2004 National and Local Elections, pursuant to the aforequoted Sections 39
and 40 of the Local Government Code of 1991.
As a further consequence of his not being a Filipino citizen, respondent has also
committed false representation in his certificate of candidacy by stating therein that he
is a natural-born Filipino citizen, when in fact, he has not yet even perfected the
reacquisition of Filipino citizenship. Such false representation constitutes a material
misrepresentation as it relates to his qualification as a candidate for public office,
which could be a valid ground for the cancellation of his certificate of candidacy
under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code x x x.
[6]

In its Resolution promulgated on March 22, 2004, the COMELEC, First
Division, adopted the findings and recommendation of Director Zaragoza. The
dispositive portion of said Resolution stated, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent CICERON PEREZ ALTAREJOS
is hereby disqualified to run as Mayor of San Jacinto, Masbate. Accordingly, his
certificate of candidacy for the position of Municipal Mayor of San Jacinto, Masbate
is denied due course and cancelled and his name deleted from the certified list of
candidates for the May 10, 2004 elections.
[7]

On March 25, 2004, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration and
attached the following documents to prove that he had completed all the
requirements for repatriation which thus entitled him to run for an elective
office, viz:
(1) Oath of Allegiance dated December 17, 1997;
(2) Identification Certificate No. 116543 issued by the Bureau of
Immigration on March 1, 2004;
(3) Certification from the City Civil Registration Office, Makati City,
that the Certificate of Repatriation and Oath of Allegiance of petitioner was
received by said office and registered, with the corresponding fee paid, on
February 18, 2004;
(4) A letter dated December 17, 1997 from the Special Committee
on Naturalization to the Bureau on Immigration and Deportation that it was
furnishing said office with the Oath of Allegiance and Certificate of
Repatriation of petitioner for the cancellation of petitioners registration in said
office as an alien, and the issuance to him of the corresponding Identification
Card as Filipino citizen;
(5) A letter dated December 17, 1997 from the Special Committee
on Naturalization to the Local Registrar of San Jacinto, Masbate that it was
sending petitioners Oath of Allegiance and Certificate of Repatriation for
registration in their records and for petitioners reacquisition of his former
Philippine citizenship.
On May 7, 2004, the COMELEC en banc promulgated a resolution
denying the motion for reconsideration, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission (En Banc) RESOLVED as it
hereby RESOLVES to DENY the Motion for Reconsideration for UTTER LACK
OF MERIT and AFFIRMS the Resolution of the First Division.
[8]

The Comelec en banc held, thus:
The Comelec Rules of Procedure provides that insufficiency of evidence to justify the
decision is a ground for a motion for reconsideration (Rule 19, Section 1). The
evidence referred to in the above provision and to be considered in the Motion for
Reconsideration are those which were submitted during the hearing and attached to
the respective Memoranda of the parties which are already part of the records of the
case. In this regard, the evidence of the respondent were not able to overcome the
evidence of the petitioners.
When the entire records of the case was forwarded to the Commission (First Division)
the respondents only evidence was his Certificate of Repatriation dated 17 December
1977 and marked as Annex 1 of his answer. This piece of evidence was not enough to
controvert the evidence of the petitioners which consist of the letter of the then Bureau
of Immigration Commissioner Andrea Domingo dated 25 June 2001 which stated that
as of the even date respondent is a holder of permanent resident visa (page 15 of the
records) and the certification of Josephine C. Camata dated 28 January 2004
certifying, that the name of the respondent could not be found in the records of
repatriation. (page 42 of the records) The questioned resolution, is therefore, in
order as the evidence submitted by the respondent were insufficient to rebut the
evidence of the petitioner.
Now, the respondent, in his Motion for Reconsideration, attempted to introduce to the
record new pieces of evidence, which introduction is not anymore allowed in a
Motion for Reconsideration. These are the following a) Annex 2 Oath of
Allegiance; b) Annex 3 Bureau of Immigration Identification Certificate; c)
Annex 4 Certification of the City Civil Registrar of Makati City; d) Annex 5
Letter addressed to the Local Civil Registrar of San Jacinto, Masbateby Aurora P.
Cortes of Special Committee on Naturalization; and e) Annex 6 Letter addressed
to the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation by Aurora P. Cortes of Special
Committee on Naturalization.
Assuming that the new evidence of the respondent are admitted, with more reason
should we cancel his certificate of candidacy for his act of [misrepresenting] himself
as a Filipino citizen when at the time he filed his certificate of candidacy, he has not
yet perfected the process of repatriation. He failed to comply with the requirements
under Section 2 of [Republic Act No.] 8171 which provides that repatriation shall be
effected by taking the necessary oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines and registration in the proper civil registry and in the Bureau of
Immigration.
The certification was issued by the same Ms. Josephine C. Camata, City Civil
Registrar, dated February 18, 2004. This time, she certifies that Ciceron Perez
Altarejos was registered under Registry No. 1, Page 19, Book No. 1, Series of 2004
and paid under OR nos. 88325/8833256 dated February 18, 2004. (page 65 of the
records). Obviously, he was able to register in the proper civil registry only on
February 18, 2004.
The respondent was able to register with the Bureau of Immigration only on March 1,
2004 as evidenced by the Bureau of Immigration Identification Certificate attached to
the Motion as Annex 3.
This fact confirms the finding of the Commission (First Division) that at the time
respondent filed his certificate of candidacy he is yet to complete the requirement
under section two (2) of RA 8171.
As a consequence of not being a Filipino citizen, he has committed false
representation in his certificate of candidacy. Such false representation constitutes a
material misrepresentation as it relates to his qualification as a candidate. As such the
certificate of candidacy may be cancelled on such ground. (Ycain vs. Caneja, 18
Phil. 778)
[9]

On May 10, 2004, the election day itself, petitioner filed this petition
praying that: (1) The petition be given due course and a temporary restraining
order and/or writ of preliminary injunction be issued ex parte restraining the
respondents and all persons acting on their behalf, from fully implementing the
questioned COMELEC Resolutions promulgated on March 22, 2004 and May
7, 2004; (2) a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction be issued ordering the
COMELEC and all persons acting on its behalf to allow petitioner to run as
Mayor of San Jacinto, Masbate in the May 10, 2004 elections, and to count
and canvass the votes cast in his favor and to proclaim him as the winning
mayor of San Jacinto, Masbate; and (3) after proper proceedings, judgment
be rendered declaring null and void and setting aside the COMELEC
Resolutions promulgated on March 22, 2004 and May 7, 2004 and other
related Orders of the COMELEC or its representatives which have the effect
of illegally preventing petitioner from running as Mayor of San Jacinto,
Masbate.
In its Comment,
[10]
the Office of the Solicitor General stated that, based on
the information relayed to it by the COMELEC, petitioners name, as a
mayoralty candidate in San Jacinto, Masbate, was retained in the list of
candidates voted upon by the electorate in the said municipality. Hence, the
cancellation of petitioners certificate of candidacy was never
implemented. The COMELEC also informed the Office of the Solicitor
General that petitioners opponent, Dr. Emilio Aris V. Espinosa, was already
proclaimed duly elected Mayor of San Jacinto, Masbate.
The Office of the Solicitor General contends that said supervening event
has rendered the instant petition moot and academic, and it prayed for the
dismissal of the petition.
In his Reply,
[11]
petitioner opposed the dismissal of his petition. He claims
that the COMELEC resolutions disqualifying him from running as a mayoralty
candidate adversely affected his candidacy, since his supporters were made
to believe that his votes would not be counted. Moreover, he stated that said
COMELEC resolutions cast a doubt on his Philippine citizenship.
Petitioner points out that he took his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of
the Philippines on December 17, 1997. In view thereof, he ran and was even
elected as Mayor of San Jacinto, Masbate during the 1998 elections. He
argues that if there was delay in the registration of his Certificate of
Repatriation with the Bureau of Immigration and with the proper civil registry,
the same was brought about by the inaction on the part of said offices since
the records of the Special Committee on Naturalization show that his
Certificate of Repatriation and Oath of Allegiance have long been transmitted
to said offices.
Petitioner also asserts that the subsequent registration of his Certificate of
Repatriation with the Bureau of Immigration and with the Civil Registry of
Makati City prior to the May 10, 2004 elections has the effect of curing the
defect, if any, in the reacquisition of his Filipino citizenship as his repatriation
retroacted to the date of his application for repatriation as held in Frivaldo v.
Comelec.
The pertinent issues raised are the following: (1) Is the registration of
petitioners repatriation with the proper civil registry and with the Bureau of
Immigration a prerequisite in effecting repatriation; and (2) whether or not the
COMELEC en banc committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess
or lack of jurisdiction in affirming the Resolution of the COMELEC, First
Division.
As stated by the Office of the Solicitor General, where the issues have
become moot and academic, there is no justiciable controversy, thereby
rendering the resolution of the same of no practical use or
value.
[12]
Nonetheless, courts will decide a question otherwise moot and
academic if it is capable of repetition, yet evading review.
[13]

First Issue: Is the registration of petitioners repatriation
with the proper civil registry and with the Bureau of
Immigration a prerequisite in effecting repatriation?
The provision of law applicable in this case is Section 2 of Republic Act
No. 8171,
[14]
thus:
SEC. 2. Repatriation shall be effected by taking the necessary oath of allegiance to
the Republic of the Philippines and registration in the proper civil registry and in the
Bureau of Immigration. The Bureau of Immigration shall thereupon cancel the
pertinent alien certificate of registration and issue the certificate of identification as
Filipino citizen to the repatriated citizen.
The law is clear that repatriation is effected by taking the oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registration in the proper civil
registry and in the Bureau of Immigration. Hence, in addition to taking the
Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, the registration of the
Certificate of Repatriation in the proper civil registry and the Bureau of
Immigration is a prerequisite in effecting the repatriation of a citizen.
In this case, petitioner took his Oath of Allegiance on December 17, 1997,
but his Certificate of Repatriation was registered with the Civil Registry of
Makati City only after six years or on February 18, 2004, and with the Bureau
of Immigration on March 1, 2004. Petitioner, therefore, completed all the
requirements of repatriation only after he filed his certificate of candidacy for a
mayoralty position, but before the elections.
When does the citizenship qualification of a candidate for an elective office
apply?
In Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections,
[15]
the Court ruled that the
citizenship qualification must be construed as applying to the time of
proclamation of the elected official and at the start of his term. The Court,
through Justice Artemio V. Panganiban, discussed, thus:
Under Sec. 39 of the Local Government Code, (a)n elective local official
must be:
* a citizen of the Philippines;
* a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province x x x where he
intends to be elected;
* a resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the
election;
* able to read and write Filipino or any other local language or dialect.
* In addition, candidates for the position of governor x x x must be at least twenty-
three (23) years of age on election day.
From the above, it will be noted that the law does not specify any particular date or
time when the candidate must possess citizenship, unlike that for residence (which
must consist of at least one years residency immediately preceding the day of
election) and age (at least twenty three years of age on election day).
Philippine citizenship is an indispensable requirement for holding an elective public
office, and the purpose of the citizenship qualification is none other than to ensure that
no alien, i.e., no person owing allegiance to another nation, shall govern our people
and our country or a unit of territory thereof. Now, an official begins to govern or to
discharge his functions only upon his proclamation and on the day the law mandates
his term of office to begin. Since Frivaldo re-assumed his citizenship on June 30,
1995the very day the term of office of governor (and other elective officials)
beganhe was therefore already qualified to be proclaimed, to hold such office and to
discharge the functions and responsibilities thereof as of said date. In short, at that
time, he was already qualified to govern his native Sorsogon. This is the liberal
interpretation that should give spirit, life and meaning to our law on qualifications
consistent with the purpose for which such law was enacted. x x x Paraphrasing this
Courts ruling in Vasquez v. Giap and Li Seng Giap & Sons, if the purpose of the
citizenship requirement is to ensure that our people and country do not end up being
governed by aliens, i.e., persons owing allegiance to another nation, that aim or
purpose would not be thwarted but instead achieved by construing the citizenship
qualification as applying to the time of proclamation of the elected official and at
the start of his term.
[16]
(Emphasis supplied.)
Moreover, in the case of Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections, the Court
ruled that the repatriation of Frivaldo RETROACTED to the date of the filing
of his application. In said case, the repatriation of Frivaldo was by virtue of
Presidential Decree No. 725, which took effect on June 5, 1975. The Court
therein declared that Presidential Decree No. 725 was a curative statute,
which is retroactive in nature. The retroactivity of Frivaldos repatriation to the
date of filing of his application was justified by the Court, thus:
x x x
The reason for this is simply that if, as in this case, it was the intent of the
legislative authority that the law should apply to past eventsi.e., situations and
transactions existing even before the law came into beingin order to benefit the
greatest number of former Filipinos possible thereby enabling them to enjoy and
exercise the constitutionally guaranteed right of citizenship, and such legislative
intention is to be given the fullest effect and expression, then there is all the more
reason to have the law apply in a retroactive or retrospective manner to situations,
events and transactions subsequent to the passage of such law. That is, the
repatriation granted to Frivaldo x x x can and should be made to take effect as of date
of his application. As earlier mentioned, there is nothing in the law that would bar
this or would show a contrary intention on the part of the legislative authority; and
there is no showing that damage or prejudice to anyone, or anything unjust or
injurious would result from giving retroactivity to his repatriation. Neither has Lee
shown that there will result the impairment of any contractual obligation, disturbance
of any vested right or breach of some constitutional guaranty.
x x x
Another argument for retroactivity to the date of filing is that it would prevent
prejudice to applicants. If P.D. 725 were not to be given retroactive effect, and the
Special Committee decides not to act, i.e., to delay the processing of applications for
any substantial length of time, then the former Filipinos who may be stateless, as
Frivaldohaving already renounced his American citizenshipwas, may be
prejudiced for causes outside their control. This should not be. In case of doubt in the
interpretation or application of laws, it is to be presumed that the law-making body
intended right and justice to prevail.
[17]

Republic Act No. 8171
[18]
has impliedly repealed Presidential `Decree No.
725. They cover the same subject matter: Providing for the repatriation of
Filipino women who have lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens
and of natural-born Filipinos. The Courts ruling inFrivaldo v. Commission on
Elections that repatriation retroacts to the date of filing of ones application for
repatriation subsists for the same reasons quoted above.
Accordingly, petitioners repatriation retroacted to the date he filed his
application in 1997. Petitioner was, therefore, qualified to run for a mayoralty
position in the government in the May 10, 2004 elections. Apparently, the
COMELEC was cognizant of this fact since it did not implement the assailed
Resolutions disqualifying petitioner to run as mayor of San Jacinto, Masbate.
Second Issue: Whether or not the COMELEC en banc
gravely abused its discretion in affirming the
Resolution of the COMELEC, First Division?
The Court cannot fault the COMELEC en banc for affirming the decision of
the COMELEC, First Division, considering that petitioner failed to prove before
the COMELEC that he had complied with the requirements of repatriation.
Petitioner submitted the necessary documents proving compliance with the
requirements of repatriation only during his motion for reconsideration, when
the COMELEC en banc could no longer consider said evidence. As the
COMELEC en banc correctly stated:
The Comelec Rules of Procedure provides that insufficiency of evidence to justify the
decision is a ground for a motion for reconsideration (Rule 19, Section 1). The
evidence referred to in the above provision and to be considered in the Motion for
Reconsideration are those which were submitted during the hearing and attached to
the respective Memoranda of the parties which are already part of the records of the
case. In this regard, the evidence of the respondent were not able to overcome the
evidence of the petitioners.
[19]

It is, therefore, incumbent upon candidates for an elective office, who are
repatriated citizens, to be ready with sufficient evidence of their repatriation in
case their Filipino citizenship is questioned to prevent a repetition of this case.
WHEREFORE, the petition seeking the nullification of the Resolution of
the COMELEC en banc of May 7, 2004, affirming the Resolution of its First
Division dated March 22, 2004, is hereby DENIED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.











EN BANC
[G.R. No. 142840. May 7, 2001]
ANTONIO BENGSON III, petitioner, vs. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and TEODORO C. CRUZ, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
KAPUNAN, J .:
The citizenship of respondent Teodoro C. Cruz is at issue in this case, in view of the
constitutional requirement that "no person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives
unless he is a natural-born citizen."
[1]

Respondent Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born in San
Clemente, Tarlac, on April 27, 1960, of Filipino parents. The fundamental law then applicable
was the 1935 Constitution.
[2]

On November 5, 1985, however, respondent Cruz enlisted in the United States Marine
Corps and, without the consent of the Republic of the Philippines, took an oath of allegiance to
the United States. As a consequence, he lost his Filipino citizenship for under Commonwealth
Act No. 63, Section 1(4), a Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship by, among others, "rendering
service to or accepting commission in the armed forces of a foreign country." Said provision of
law reads:
Section 1. How citizenship may be lost. -- A Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship
in any of the following ways and/or events:
x x x
(4) By rendering services to, or accepting commission in, the armed forces of a
foreign country: Provided, That the rendering of service to, or the acceptance of such
commission in, the armed forces of a foreign country, and the taking of an oath of
allegiance incident thereto, with the consent of the Republic of the Philippines, shall
not divest a Filipino of his Philippine citizenship if either of the following
circumstances is present:
(a) The Republic of the Philippines has a defensive and/or offensive pact of alliance
with said foreign country; or
(b) The said foreign country maintains armed forces on Philippine territory with the
consent of the Republic of the Philippines: Provided, That the Filipino citizen
concerned, at the time of rendering said service, or acceptance of said commission,
and taking the oath of allegiance incident thereto, states that he does so only in
connection with his service to said foreign country; And provided, finally, That any
Filipino citizen who is rendering service to, or is commissioned in, the armed forces
of a foreign country under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph (a) or (b),
shall not be permitted to participate nor vote in any election of the Republic of the
Philippines during the period of his service to, or commission in, the armed forces of
said country. Upon his discharge from the service of the said foreign country, he shall
be automatically entitled to the full enjoyment of his civil and political rights as a
Filipino citizen x x x.
Whatever doubt that remained regarding his loss of Philippine citizenship was erased by his
naturalization as a U.S. citizen on June 5, 1990, in connection with his service in the U.S. Marine
Corps.
On March 17, 1994, respondent Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship through
repatriation under Republic Act No. 2630.
[3]
He ran for and was elected as the Representative of
the Second District of Pangasinan in the May 11, 1998 elections. He won by a convincing
margin of 26,671 votes over petitioner Antonio Bengson III, who was then running for
reelection.
Subsequently, petitioner filed a case for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam with respondent House
of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) claiming that respondent Cruz was not qualified to
become a member of the House of Representatives since he is not a natural-born citizen as
required under Article VI, Section 6 of the Constitution.
[4]

On March 2, 2000, the HRET rendered its decision
[5]
dismissing the petition for quo
warranto and declaring respondent Cruz the duly elected Representative of the Second District
of Pangasinan in the May 1998 elections. The HRET likewise denied petitioner's motion for
reconsideration of the decision in its resolution dated April 27, 2000.
[6]

Petitioner thus filed the present petition for certiorari assailing the HRET's decision on the
following grounds:
1. The HRET committed serious errors and grave abuse of discretion, amounting to
excess of jurisdiction, when it ruled that private respondent is a natural-born citizen of
the Philippines despite the fact that he had ceased being such in view of the loss and
renunciation of such citizenship on his part.
2. The HRET committed serious errors and grave abuse of discretion, amounting to
excess of jurisdiction, when it considered private respondent as a citizen of the
Philippines despite the fact that he did not validly acquire his Philippine citizenship.
3. Assuming that private respondent's acquisition of Philippine citizenship was
invalid, the HRET committed serious errors and grave abuse of discretion, amounting
to excess of jurisdiction, when it dismissed the petition despite the fact that such
reacquisition could not legally and constitutionally restore his natural-born status.
[7]

The issue now before us is whether respondent Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who became an
American citizen, can still be considered a natural-born Filipino upon his reacquisition of
Philippine citizenship.
Petitioner asserts that respondent Cruz may no longer be considered a natural-born Filipino
since he lost his Philippine citizenship when he swore allegiance to the United States in 1995,
and had to reacquire the same by repatriation. He insists that Article IV, Section 2 of the
Constitution expressly states that natural-born citizens are those who are citizens from birth
without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect such citizenship.
Respondent on the other hand contends that he reacquired his status as a natural-born citizen
when he was repatriated since the phrase "from birth" in Article IV, Section 2 refers to the
innate, inherent and inborn characteristic of being a natural-born citizen.
The petition is without merit.
The 1987 Constitution enumerates who are Filipino citizens as follows:
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution;
(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;
(3) Those born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship
upon reaching the age of majority, and
(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
[8]

There are two ways of acquiring citizenship: (1) by birth, and (2) by naturalization. These
ways of acquiring citizenship correspond to the two kinds of citizens: the natural-born citizen,
and the naturalized citizen. A person who at the time of his birth is a citizen of a particular
country, is a natural-born citizen thereof.
[9]

As defined in the same Constitution, natural-born citizens "are those citizens of the
Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine
citizenship."
[10]

On the other hand, naturalized citizens are those who have become Filipino citizens through
naturalization, generally under Commonwealth Act No. 473, otherwise known as the Revised
Naturalization Law, which repealed the former Naturalization Law (Act No. 2927), and by
Republic Act No. 530.
[11]
To be naturalized, an applicant has to prove that he possesses all the
qualifications
[12]
and none of the disqualifications
[13]
provided by law to become a Filipino citizen.
The decision granting Philippine citizenship becomes executory only after two (2) years from its
promulgation when the court is satisfied that during the intervening period, the applicant has (1)
not left the Philippines; (2) has dedicated himself to a lawful calling or profession; (3) has not
been convicted of any offense or violation of Government promulgated rules; or (4) committed
any act prejudicial to the interest of the nation or contrary to any Government announced
policies.
[14]

Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however reacquire the same in the
manner provided by law. Commonwealth Act. No. 63 (C.A. No. 63), enumerates the three modes
by which Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by a former citizen: (1) by naturalization, (2)
by repatriation, and (3) by direct act of Congress.
[15]

Naturalization is a mode for both acquisition and reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. As
a mode of initially acquiring Philippine citizenship, naturalization is governed by
Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended. On the other hand, naturalization as a mode for
reacquiring Philippine citizenship is governed by Commonwealth Act No. 63.
[16]
Under this law,
a former Filipino citizen who wishes to reacquire Philippine citizenship must possess certain
qualifications
[17]
and none of the disqualifications mentioned in Section 4 of C.A. 473.
[18]

Repatriation, on the other hand, may be had under various statutes by those who lost their
citizenship due to: (1) desertion of the armed forces;
[19]
(2) service in the armed forces of the
allied forces in World War II;
[20]
(3) service in the Armed Forces of the United States at any other
time;
[21]
(4) marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien;
[22]
and (5) political and economic
necessity.
[23]

As distinguished from the lengthy process of naturalization, repatriation simply consists of
the taking of an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registering said oath in
the Local Civil Registry of the place where the person concerned resides or last resided.
In Angat v. Republic,
[24]
we held:
xxx. Parenthetically, under these statutes [referring to RA Nos. 965 and 2630], the
person desiring to reacquire Philippine citizenship would not even be required to file a
petition in court, and all that he had to do was to take an oath of allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines and to register that fact with the civil registry in the place
of his residence or where he had last resided in the Philippines. [Italics in the
original.]
[25]

Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality.
[26]
This means
that a naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a
naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen before
he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a natural-born
Filipino.
In respondent Cruz's case, he lost his Filipino citizenship when he rendered service in the
Armed Forces of the United States. However, he subsequently reacquired Philippine citizenship
under R.A. No. 2630, which provides:
Section 1. Any person who had lost his Philippine citizenship by rendering service to,
or accepting commission in, the Armed Forces of the United States, or after separation
from the Armed Forces of the United States, acquired United States citizenship, may
reacquire Philippine citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines and registering the same with Local Civil Registry in the place where he
resides or last resided in the Philippines. The said oath of allegiance shall contain a
renunciation of any other citizenship.
Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the Republic and having registered the
same in the Civil Registry of Magantarem, Pangasinan in accordance with the aforecited
provision, respondent Cruz is deemed to have recovered his original status as a natural-born
citizen, a status which he acquired at birth as the son of a Filipino father.
[27]
It bears stressing that
the act of repatriation allows him to recover, or return to, his original status before he lost his
Philippine citizenship.
Petitioner's contention that respondent Cruz is no longer a natural-born citizen since he had
to perform an act to regain his citizenship is untenable. As correctly explained by the HRET in
its decision, the term "natural-born citizen" was first defined in Article III, Section 4 of the 1973
Constitution as follows:
Sec. 4. A natural-born citizen is one who is a citizen of the Philippines from birth
without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine citizenship.
Two requisites must concur for a person to be considered as such: (1) a person must be a
Filipino citizen from birth and (2) he does not have to perform any act to obtain or perfect his
Philippine citizenship.
Under the 1973 Constitution definition, there were two categories of Filipino citizens which
were not considered natural-born: (1) those who were naturalized and (2) those born before
January 17, 1973,
[28]
of Filipino mothers who, upon reaching the age of majority, elected
Philippine citizenship. Those "naturalized citizens" were not considered natural-born obviously
because they were not Filipinos at birth and had to perform an act to acquire Philippine
citizenship. Those born of Filipino mothers before the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution were
likewise not considered natural-born because they also had to perform an act to perfect their
Philippine citizenship.
The present Constitution, however, now considers those born of Filipino mothers before the
effectivity of the 1973 Constitution and who elected Philippine citizenship upon reaching the
majority age as natural-born. After defining who are natural-born citizens, Section 2 of Article
IV adds a sentence: "Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph (3),
Section 1 hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizens." Consequently, only naturalized Filipinos
are considered not natural-born citizens. It is apparent from the enumeration of who are citizens
under the present Constitution that there are only two classes of citizens: (1) those who are
natural-born and (2) those who are naturalized in accordance with law. A citizen who is not a
naturalized Filipino, i.e., did not have to undergo the process of naturalization to obtain
Philippine citizenship, necessarily is a natural-born Filipino. Noteworthy is the absence in said
enumeration of a separate category for persons who, after losing Philippine citizenship,
subsequently reacquire it. The reason therefor is clear: as to such persons, they would either be
natural-born or naturalized depending on the reasons for the loss of their citizenship and the
mode prescribed by the applicable law for the reacquisition thereof. As respondent Cruz was not
required by law to go through naturalization proceedings in order to reacquire his citizenship, he
is perforce a natural-born Filipino. As such, he possessed all the necessary qualifications to be
elected as member of the House of Representatives.
A final point. The HRET has been empowered by the Constitution to be the "sole judge" of
all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the
House.
[29]
The Court's jurisdiction over the HRET is merely to check "whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction" on the part of the
latter.
[30]
In the absence thereof, there is no occasion for the Court to exercise its corrective power
and annul the decision of the HRET nor to substitute the Court's judgment for that of the latter
for the simple reason that it is not the office of a petition for certiorari to inquire into the
correctness of the assailed decision.
[31]
There is no such showing of grave abuse of discretion in
this case.























G.R. Nos. 92191-92 July 30, 1991
ANTONIO Y. CO, petitioner,
vs.
ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND JOSE ONG,
JR., respondents.
G.R. Nos. 92202-03 July 30, 1991
SIXTO T. BALANQUIT, JR., petitioner,
vs.
ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND JOSE ONG,
JR., respondents.
Hechanova & Associates for petitioner Co.
Brillantes, Nachura, Navarro and Arcilla Law Offices for respondent Ong, Jr.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J .:p
The petitioners come to this Court asking for the setting aside and reversal of a decision of the
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET).
The HRET declared that respondent Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural born Filipino citizen and a resident of
Laoang, Northern Samar for voting purposes. The sole issue before us is whether or not, in making
that determination, the HRET acted with grave abuse of discretion.
On May 11, 1987, the congressional election for the second district of Northern Samar was held.
Among the candidates who vied for the position of representative in the second legislative district of
Northern Samar are the petitioners, Sixto Balinquit and Antonio Co and the private respondent, Jose
Ong, Jr.
Respondent Ong was proclaimed the duly elected representative of the second district of Northern
Samar.
The petitioners filed election protests against the private respondent premised on the following
grounds:
1) Jose Ong, Jr. is not a natural born citizen of the Philippines; and
2) Jose Ong, Jr. is not a resident of the second district of Northern Samar.
The HRET in its decision dated November 6, 1989, found for the private respondent.
A motion for reconsideration was filed by the petitioners on November 12, 1989. This was, however,
denied by the HRET in its resolution dated February 22, 1989.
Hence, these petitions for certiorari.
We treat the comments as answers and decide the issues raised in the petitions.
ON THE ISSUE OF JURISDICTION
The first question which arises refers to our jurisdiction.
The Constitution explicitly provides that the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) and
the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) shall be the sole judges of all contests relating to the election,
returns, and qualificationsof their respective members. (See Article VI, Section 17, Constitution)
The authority conferred upon the Electoral Tribunal is full, clear and complete. The use of the
word soleemphasizes the exclusivity of the jurisdiction of these Tribunals.
The Supreme Court in the case of Lazatin v. HRET (168 SCRA 391 [1988]) stated that under the
1987 Constitution, the jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunal is original and exclusive, viz:
The use of the word "sole" emphasizes the exclusive character of the jurisdiction
conferred (Angara v. Electoral Commission, supra at p. 162). The exercise of power
by the Electoral Commission under the 1935 Constitution has been described as
"intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had originally remained in the
legislature." (id., at p. 175) Earlier this grant of power to the legislature was
characterized by Justice Malcolm as "full, clear and complete; (Veloso v. Board of
Canvassers of Leyte and Samar, 39 Phil. 886 [1919]) Under the amended 1935
Constitution, the power was unqualifiedly reposed upon the Electoral Tribunal and it
remained as full, clear and complete as that previously granted the Legislature and
the Electoral Commission, (Lachica v. Yap, 25 SCRA 140 [1968]) The same may be
said with regard to the jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunal under the 1987
Constitution. (p. 401)
The Court continued further, ". . . so long as the Constitution grants the HRET the power to be the
sole judge of all contests relating to election, returns and qualifications of members of the House of
Representatives, any final action taken by the HRET on a matter within its jurisdiction shall, as a
rule, not be reviewed by this Court . . . the power granted to the Electoral Tribunal is full, clear and
complete and excludes the exercise of any authority on the part of this Court that would in any wise
restrict it or curtail it or even affect the same." (pp. 403-404)
When may the Court inquire into acts of the Electoral Tribunals under our constitutional grants of
power?
In the later case of Robles v. HRET (181 SCRA 780 [1990]) the Supreme Court stated that the
judgments of the Tribunal are beyond judicial interference save only "in the exercise of this Court's
so-called extraordinary jurisdiction, . . . upon a determination that the Tribunal's decision or
resolution was rendered without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion or
paraphrasing Morrero, upon a clear showing of such arbitrary and improvident use by the Tribunal of
its power as constitutes a denial of due process of law, or upon a demonstration of a very clear
unmitigated ERROR, manifestly constituting such GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION that there has
to be a remedy for such abuse." (at pp. 785-786)
In the leading case of Morrero v. Bocar (66 Phil. 429 [1938]) the Court ruled that the power of the
Electoral Commission "is beyond judicial interference except, in any event, upon a clear showing of
such arbitrary and improvident use of power as will constitute a denial of due process." The Court
does not venture into the perilous area of trying to correct perceived errors of independent branches
of the Government, It comes in only when it has to vindicate a denial of due process or correct an
abuse of discretion so grave or glaring that no less than the Constitution calls for remedial action.
The Supreme Court under the 1987 Constitution, has been given an expanded jurisdiction, so to
speak, to review the decisions of the other branches and agencies of the government to determine
whether or not they have acted within the bounds of the Constitution. (See Article VIII, Section 1,
Constitution)
Yet, in the exercise thereof, the Court is to merely check whether or not the governmental branch or
agency has gone beyond the Constitutional limits of its jurisdiction, not that it erred or has a different
view. In the absence of a showing that the HRET has committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction, there is no occasion for the Court to exercise its corrective power; it
will not decide a matter which by its nature is for the HRET alone to decide. (See Marcos v.
Manglapus, 177 SCRA 668 [1989]) It has no power to look into what it thinks is apparent error.
As constitutional creations invested with necessary power, the Electoral Tribunals, although not
powers in the tripartite scheme of the government, are, in the exercise of their functions independent
organs independent of Congress and the Supreme Court. The power granted to HRET by the
Constitution is intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the
legislature. (Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139 [1936])
In passing upon petitions, the Court with its traditional and careful regard for the balance of powers,
must permit this exclusive privilege of the Tribunals to remain where the Sovereign authority has
place it. (See Veloso v. Boards of Canvassers of Leyte and Samar, 39 Phil. 886 [1919])
It has been argued that under Article VI, Section 17 of the present Constitution, the situation may
exist as it exists today where there is an unhealthy one-sided political composition of the two
Electoral Tribunals. There is nothing in the Constitution, however, that makes the HRET because of
its composition any less independent from the Court or its constitutional functions any less exclusive.
The degree of judicial intervention should not be made to depend on how many legislative members
of the HRET belong to this party or that party. The test remains the same-manifest grave abuse of
discretion.
In the case at bar, the Court finds no improvident use of power, no denial of due process on the part
of the HRET which will necessitate the exercise of the power of judicial review by the Supreme
Court.
ON THE ISSUE OF CITIZENSHIP
The records show that in the year 1895, the private respondent's grandfather, Ong Te, arrived in the
Philippines from China. Ong Te established his residence in the municipality of Laoang, Samar on
land which he bought from the fruits of hard work.
As a resident of Laoang, Ong Te was able to obtain a certificate of residence from the then Spanish
colonial administration.
The father of the private respondent, Jose Ong Chuan was born in China in 1905. He was brought
by Ong Te to Samar in the year 1915.
Jose Ong Chuan spent his childhood in the province of Samar. In Laoang, he was able to establish
an enduring relationship with his neighbors, resulting in his easy assimilation into the community.
As Jose Ong Chuan grew older in the rural and seaside community of Laoang, he absorbed Filipino
cultural values and practices. He was baptized into Christianity. As the years passed, Jose Ong
Chuan met a natural born-Filipino, Agripina Lao. The two fell in love and, thereafter, got married in
1932 according to Catholic faith and practice.
The couple bore eight children, one of whom is the private respondent who was born in 1948.
The private respondent's father never emigrated from this country. He decided to put up a hardware
store and shared and survived the vicissitudes of life in Samar.
The business prospered. Expansion became inevitable. As a result, a branch was set-up in Binondo,
Manila. In the meantime, the father of the private respondent, unsure of his legal status and in an
unequivocal affirmation of where he cast his life and family, filed with the Court of First Instance of
Samar an application for naturalization on February 15, 1954.
On April 28, 1955, the CFI of Samar, after trial, declared Jose Ong Chuan a Filipino citizen.
On May 15, 1957, the Court of First Instance of Samar issued an order declaring the decision of
April 28, 1955 as final and executory and that Jose Ong Chuan may already take his Oath of
Allegiance.
Pursuant to said order, Jose Ong Chuan took his Oath of Allegiance; correspondingly, a certificate of
naturalization was issued to him.
At the time Jose Ong Chuan took his oath, the private respondent then a minor of nine years was
finishing his elementary education in the province of Samar. There is nothing in the records to
differentiate him from other Filipinos insofar as the customs and practices of the local populace were
concerned.
Fortunes changed. The house of the family of the private respondent in Laoang, Samar was burned
to the ground.
Undaunted by the catastrophe, the private respondent's family constructed another one in place of
their ruined house. Again, there is no showing other than that Laoang was their abode and home.
After completing his elementary education, the private respondent, in search for better education,
went to Manila in order to acquire his secondary and college education.
In the meantime, another misfortune was suffered by the family in 1975 when a fire gutted their
second house in Laoang, Samar. The respondent's family constructed still another house, this time a
16-door apartment building, two doors of which were reserved for the family.
The private respondent graduated from college, and thereafter took and passed the CPA Board
Examinations.
Since employment opportunities were better in Manila, the respondent looked for work here. He
found a job in the Central Bank of the Philippines as an examiner. Later, however, he worked in the
hardware business of his family in Manila. In 1971, his elder brother, Emil, was elected as a delegate
to the 1971 Constitutional Convention. His status as a natural born citizen was challenged.
Parenthetically, the Convention which in drafting the Constitution removed the unequal treatment
given to derived citizenship on the basis of the mother's citizenship formally and solemnly declared
Emil Ong, respondent's full brother, as a natural born Filipino. The Constitutional Convention had to
be aware of the meaning of natural born citizenship since it was precisely amending the article on
this subject.
The private respondent frequently went home to Laoang, Samar, where he grew up and spent his
childhood days.
In 1984, the private respondent married a Filipina named Desiree Lim.
For the elections of 1984 and 1986, Jose Ong, Jr. registered himself as a voter of Laoang, Samar,
and correspondingly, voted there during those elections.
The private respondent after being engaged for several years in the management of their family
business decided to be of greater service to his province and ran for public office. Hence, when the
opportunity came in 1987, he ran in the elections for representative in the second district of Northern
Samar.
Mr. Ong was overwhelmingly voted by the people of Northern Samar as their representative in
Congress. Even if the total votes of the two petitioners are combined, Ong would still lead the two by
more than 7,000 votes.
The pertinent portions of the Constitution found in Article IV read:
SECTION 1, the following are citizens of the Philippines:
1. Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of the
Constitution;
2. Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;
3. Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and
4. Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
SECTION 2, Natural-born Citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from
birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their citizenship. Those
who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph 3 hereof shall be
deemed natural-born citizens.
The Court interprets Section 1, Paragraph 3 above as applying not only to those who elect Philippine
citizenship after February 2, 1987 but also to those who, having been born of Filipino mothers,
elected citizenship before that date.
The provision in Paragraph 3 was intended to correct an unfair position which discriminates against
Filipino women. There is no ambiguity in the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, viz:
Mr. Azcuna: With respect to the provision of section 4, would this
refer only to those who elect Philippine citizenship after the effectivity
of the 1973 Constitution or would it also cover those who elected it
under the 1973 Constitution?
Fr. Bernas: It would apply to anybody who elected Philippine
citizenship by virtue of the provision of the 1935 Constitution whether
the election was done before or after January 17, 1973. (Records of
the Constitutional Commission, Vol. 1, p. 228; Emphasis supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
Mr. Trenas: The Committee on Citizenship, Bill of Rights, Political
Rights and Obligations and Human Rights has more or less decided
to extend the interpretation of who is a natural-born citizen as
provided in section 4 of the 1973 Constitution by adding that persons
who have elected Philippine Citizenship under the 1935 Constitution
shall be natural-born? Am I right Mr. Presiding Officer?
Fr. Bernas: yes.
xxx xxx xxx
Mr. Nolledo: And I remember very well that in the Reverend Father
Bernas' well written book, he said that the decision was designed
merely to accommodate former delegate Ernesto Ang and that the
definition on natural-born has no retroactive effect. Now it seems that
the Reverend Father Bernas is going against this intention by
supporting the amendment?
Fr. Bernas: As the Commissioner can see, there has been an
evolution in my thinking. (Records of the Constitutional Commission,
Vol. 1, p. 189)
xxx xxx xxx
Mr. Rodrigo: But this provision becomes very important because his
election of Philippine citizenship makes him not only a Filipino citizen
but a natural-born Filipino citizen entitling him to run for Congress. . .
Fr. Bernas: Correct. We are quite aware of that and for that reason
we will leave it to the body to approve that provision of section 4.
Mr. Rodrigo: I think there is a good basis for the provision because it
strikes me as unfair that the Filipino citizen who was born a day
before January 17, 1973 cannot be a Filipino citizen or a natural-born
citizen. (Records of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. 1, p. 231)
xxx xxx xxx
Mr. Rodrigo: The purpose of that provision is to remedy an
inequitable situation. Between 1935 and 1973 when we were under
the 1935 Constitution, those born of Filipino fathers but alien mothers
were natural-born Filipinos. However, those born of Filipino mothers
but alien fathers would have to elect Philippine citizenship upon
reaching the age of majority; and if they do elect, they become
Filipino citizens but not natural-born Filipino citizens. (Records of the
Constitutional Commission, Vol. 1, p. 356)
The foregoing significantly reveals the intent of the framers. To make the provision prospective from
February 3, 1987 is to give a narrow interpretation resulting in an inequitable situation. It must also
be retroactive.
It should be noted that in construing the law, the Courts are not always to be hedged in by the literal
meaning of its language. The spirit and intendment thereof, must prevail over the letter, especially
where adherence to the latter would result in absurdity and injustice. (Casela v. Court of Appeals, 35
SCRA 279 [1970])
A Constitutional provision should be construed so as to give it effective operation and suppress the
mischief at which it is aimed, hence, it is the spirit of the provision which should prevail over the letter
thereof. (Jarrolt v. Mabberly, 103 U.S. 580)
In the words of the Court in the case of J.M. Tuason v. LTA (31 SCRA 413 [1970]:
To that primordial intent, all else is subordinated. Our Constitution, any constitution is
not to be construed narrowly or pedantically for the prescriptions therein contained,
to paraphrase Justice Holmes, are not mathematical formulas having their essence
in their form but are organic living institutions, the significance of which is vital not
formal. . . . (p. 427)
The provision in question was enacted to correct the anomalous situation where one born of a
Filipino father and an alien mother was automatically granted the status of a natural-born citizen
while one born of a Filipino mother and an alien father would still have to elect Philippine citizenship.
If one so elected, he was not, under earlier laws, conferred the status of a natural-born.
Under the 1973 Constitution, those born of Filipino fathers and those born of Filipino mothers with an
alien father were placed on equal footing. They were both considered as natural-born citizens.
Hence, the bestowment of the status of "natural-born" cannot be made to depend on the fleeting
accident of time or result in two kinds of citizens made up of essentially the same similarly situated
members.
It is for this reason that the amendments were enacted, that is, in order to remedy this accidental
anomaly, and, therefore, treat equally all those born before the 1973 Constitution and who elected
Philippine citizenship either before or after the effectivity of that Constitution.
The Constitutional provision in question is, therefore curative in nature. The enactment was meant to
correct the inequitable and absurd situation which then prevailed, and thus, render those acts valid
which would have been nil at the time had it not been for the curative provisions. (See Development
Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 96 SCRA 342 [1980])
There is no dispute that the respondent's mother was a natural born Filipina at the time of her
marriage. Crucial to this case is the issue of whether or not the respondent elected or chose to be a
Filipino citizen.
Election becomes material because Section 2 of Article IV of the Constitution accords natural born
status to children born of Filipino mothers before January 17, 1973, if they elect citizenship upon
reaching the age of majority.
To expect the respondent to have formally or in writing elected citizenship when he came of age is to
ask for the unnatural and unnecessary. The reason is obvious. He was already a citizen. Not only
was his mother a natural born citizen but his father had been naturalized when the respondent was
only nine (9) years old. He could not have divined when he came of age that in 1973 and 1987 the
Constitution would be amended to require him to have filed a sworn statement in 1969 electing
citizenship inspite of his already having been a citizen since 1957. In 1969, election through a sworn
statement would have been an unusual and unnecessary procedure for one who had been a citizen
since he was nine years old.
We have jurisprudence that defines "election" as both a formal and an informal process.
In the case of In Re: Florencio Mallare (59 SCRA 45 [1974]), the Court held that the exercise of the
right of suffrage and the participation in election exercises constitute a positive act of election of
Philippine citizenship. In the exact pronouncement of the Court, we held:
Esteban's exercise of the right of suffrage when he came of age, constitutes a
positive act of election of Philippine citizenship (p. 52; emphasis supplied)
The private respondent did more than merely exercise his right of suffrage. He has established his
life here in the Philippines.
For those in the peculiar situation of the respondent who cannot be expected to have elected
citizenship as they were already citizens, we apply the In Re Mallare rule.
The respondent was born in an outlying rural town of Samar where there are no alien enclaves and
no racial distinctions. The respondent has lived the life of a Filipino since birth. His father applied for
naturalization when the child was still a small boy. He is a Roman Catholic. He has worked for a
sensitive government agency. His profession requires citizenship for taking the examinations and
getting a license. He has participated in political exercises as a Filipino and has always considered
himself a Filipino citizen. There is nothing in the records to show that he does not embrace
Philippine customs and values, nothing to indicate any tinge of alien-ness no acts to show that this
country is not his natural homeland. The mass of voters of Northern Samar are frilly aware of Mr.
Ong's parentage. They should know him better than any member of this Court will ever know him.
They voted by overwhelming numbers to have him represent them in Congress. Because of his acts
since childhood, they have considered him as a Filipino.
The filing of sworn statement or formal declaration is a requirement for those who still have to elect
citizenship. For those already Filipinos when the time to elect came up, there are acts of deliberate
choice which cannot be less binding. Entering a profession open only to Filipinos, serving in public
office where citizenship is a qualification, voting during election time, running for public office, and
other categorical acts of similar nature are themselves formal manifestations of choice for these
persons.
An election of Philippine citizenship presupposes that the person electing is an alien. Or his status is
doubtful because he is a national of two countries. There is no doubt in this case about Mr. Ong's
being a Filipino when he turned twenty-one (21).
We repeat that any election of Philippine citizenship on the part of the private respondent would not
only have been superfluous but it would also have resulted in an absurdity. How can a Filipino
citizen elect Philippine citizenship?
The respondent HRET has an interesting view as to how Mr. Ong elected citizenship. It observed
that "when protestee was only nine years of age, his father, Jose Ong Chuan became a naturalized
Filipino. Section 15 of the Revised Naturalization Act squarely applies its benefit to him for he was
then a minor residing in this country. Concededly, it was the law itself that had already elected
Philippine citizenship for protestee by declaring him as such." (Emphasis supplied)
The petitioners argue that the respondent's father was not, validly, a naturalized citizen because of
his premature taking of the oath of citizenship.
The Court cannot go into the collateral procedure of stripping Mr. Ong's father of his citizenship after
his death and at this very late date just so we can go after the son.
The petitioners question the citizenship of the father through a collateral approach. This can not be
done. In our jurisdiction, an attack on a person's citizenship may only be done through a direct action
for its nullity. (See Queto v. Catolico, 31 SCRA 52 [1970])
To ask the Court to declare the grant of Philippine citizenship to Jose Ong Chuan as null and void
would run against the principle of due process. Jose Ong Chuan has already been laid to rest. How
can he be given a fair opportunity to defend himself. A dead man cannot speak. To quote the words
of the HRET "Ong Chuan's lips have long been muted to perpetuity by his demise and obviously he
could not use beyond where his mortal remains now lie to defend himself were this matter to be
made a central issue in this case."
The issue before us is not the nullification of the grant of citizenship to Jose Ong Chuan. Our
function is to determine whether or not the HRET committed abuse of authority in the exercise of its
powers. Moreover, the respondent traces his natural born citizenship through his mother, not
through the citizenship of his father. The citizenship of the father is relevant only to determine
whether or not the respondent "chose" to be a Filipino when he came of age. At that time and up to
the present, both mother and father were Filipinos. Respondent Ong could not have elected any
other citizenship unless he first formally renounced Philippine citizenship in favor of a foreign
nationality. Unlike other persons faced with a problem of election, there was no foreign nationality of
his father which he could possibly have chosen.
There is another reason why we cannot declare the HRET as having committed manifest grave
abuse of discretion. The same issue of natural-born citizenship has already been decided by the
Constitutional Convention of 1971 and by the Batasang Pambansa convened by authority of the
Constitution drafted by that Convention. Emil Ong, full blood brother of the respondent, was declared
and accepted as a natural born citizen by both bodies.
Assuming that our opinion is different from that of the Constitutional Convention, the Batasang
Pambansa, and the respondent HRET, such a difference could only be characterized as error. There
would be no basis to call the HRET decision so arbitrary and whimsical as to amount to grave abuse
of discretion.
What was the basis for the Constitutional Convention's declaring Emil Ong a natural born citizen?
Under the Philippine Bill of 1902, inhabitants of the Philippines who were Spanish subjects on the
11th day of April 1899 and then residing in said islands and their children born subsequent thereto
were conferred the status of a Filipino citizen.
Was the grandfather of the private respondent a Spanish subject?
Article 17 of the Civil Code of Spain enumerates those who were considered Spanish Subjects, viz:
ARTICLE 17. The following are Spaniards:
1. Persons born in Spanish territory.
2. Children born of a Spanish father or mother, even though they were born out of
Spain.
3. Foreigners who may have obtained naturalization papers.
4. Those without such papers, who may have acquired domicile in any town in the
Monarchy. (Emphasis supplied)
The domicile of a natural person is the place of his habitual residence. This domicile, once
established is considered to continue and will not be deemed lost until a new one is established.
(Article 50, NCC; Article 40, Civil Code of Spain; Zuellig v. Republic, 83 Phil. 768 [1949])
As earlier stated, Ong Te became a permanent resident of Laoang, Samar around 1895.
Correspondingly, a certificate of residence was then issued to him by virtue of his being a resident of
Laoang, Samar. (Report of the Committee on Election Protests and Credentials of the 1971
Constitutional Convention, September 7, 1972, p. 3)
The domicile that Ong Te established in 1895 continued until April 11, 1899; it even went beyond the
turn of the 19th century. It is also in this place were Ong Te set-up his business and acquired his real
property.
As concluded by the Constitutional Convention, Ong Te falls within the meaning of sub-paragraph 4
of Article 17 of the Civil Code of Spain.
Although Ong Te made brief visits to China, he, nevertheless, always returned to the Philippines.
The fact that he died in China, during one of his visits in said country, was of no moment. This will
not change the fact that he already had his domicile fixed in the Philippines and pursuant to the Civil
Code of Spain, he had become a Spanish subject.
If Ong Te became a Spanish subject by virtue of having established his domicile in a town under the
Monarchy of Spain, necessarily, Ong Te was also an inhabitant of the Philippines for an inhabitant
has been defined as one who has actual fixed residence in a place; one who has a domicile in a
place. (Bouvier's Law Dictionary, Vol. II) Apriori, there can be no other logical conclusion but to
educe that Ong Te qualified as a Filipino citizen under the provisions of section 4 of the Philippine
Bill of 1902.
The HRET itself found this fact of absolute verity in concluding that the private respondent was a
natural-born Filipino.
The petitioners' sole ground in disputing this fact is that document presented to prove it were not in
compliance with the best the evidence rule. The petitioners allege that the private respondent failed
to present the original of the documentary evidence, testimonial evidence and of the transcript of the
proceedings of the body which the aforesaid resolution of the 1971 Constitutional Convention was
predicated.
On the contrary, the documents presented by the private respondent fall under the exceptions to the
best evidence rule.
It was established in the proceedings before the HRET that the originals of the Committee Report
No. 12, the minutes of the plenary session of 1971 Constitutional Convention held on November 28,
1972 cannot be found.
This was affirmed by Atty. Ricafrente, Assistant Secretary of the 1971 Constitutional Convention; by
Atty. Nolledo, Delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention; and by Atty. Antonio Santos, Chief
Librarian of the U.P Law Center, in their respective testimonies given before the HRET to the effect
that there is no governmental agency which is the official custodian of the records of the 1971
Constitutional Convention. (TSN, December 12, 1988, pp. 30-31; TSN, January 17, 1989, pp. 34-35;
TSN, February 1, 1989, p. 44; TSN, February 6, 1989, pp. 28-29)
The execution of the originals was established by Atty. Ricafrente, who as the Assistant Secretary of
the 1971 Constitutional Convention was the proper party to testify to such execution. (TSN,
December 12, 1989, pp. 11-24)
The inability to produce the originals before the HRET was also testified to as aforestated by Atty.
Ricafrente, Atty. Nolledo, and Atty. Santos. In proving the inability to produce, the law does not
require the degree of proof to be of sufficient certainty; it is enough that it be shown that after a bona
fide diligent search, the same cannot be found. (see Government of P.I. v. Martinez, 44 Phil. 817
[1918])
Since the execution of the document and the inability to produce were adequately established, the
contents of the questioned documents can be proven by a copy thereof or by the recollection of
witnesses.
Moreover, to erase all doubts as to the authenticity of the documentary evidence cited in the
Committee Report, the former member of the 1971 Constitutional Convention, Atty. Nolledo, when
he was presented as a witness in the hearing of the protest against the private respondent,
categorically stated that he saw the disputed documents presented during the hearing of the election
protest against the brother of the private respondent. (TSN, February 1, 1989, pp. 8-9)
In his concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Sarmiento, a vice-president of the Constitutional Convention,
states that he was presiding officer of the plenary session which deliberated on the report on the
election protest against Delegate Emil Ong. He cites a long list of names of delegates present.
Among them are Mr. Chief Justice Fernan, and Mr. Justice Davide, Jr. The petitioners could have
presented any one of the long list of delegates to refute Mr. Ong's having been declared a natural-
born citizen. They did not do so. Nor did they demur to the contents of the documents presented by
the private respondent. They merely relied on the procedural objections respecting the admissibility
of the evidence presented.
The Constitutional Convention was the sole judge of the qualifications of Emil Ong to be a member
of that body. The HRET by explicit mandate of the Constitution, is the sole judge of the qualifications
of Jose Ong, Jr. to be a member of Congress. Both bodies deliberated at length on the controversies
over which they were sole judges. Decisions were arrived at only after a full presentation of all
relevant factors which the parties wished to present. Even assuming that we disagree with their
conclusions, we cannot declare their acts as committed with grave abuse of discretion. We have to
keep clear the line between error and grave abuse.
ON THE ISSUE OF RESIDENCE
The petitioners question the residence qualification of respondent Ong.
The petitioners lose sight of the meaning of "residence" under the Constitution. The term "residence"
has been understood as synonymous with domicile not only under the previous Constitutions but
also under the 1987 Constitution.
The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission reveal that the meaning of residence vis-a-
vis the qualifications of a candidate for Congress continues to remain the same as that of domicile,
to wit:
Mr. Nolledo: With respect to Section 5, I remember that in the 1971
Constitutional Convention, there was an attempt to require residence
in the place not less than one year immediately preceding the day of
the elections. So my question is: What is the Committee's concept of
residence of a candidate for the legislature? Is it actual residence or
is it the concept of domicile or constructive residence?
Mr. Davide: Madame President, in so far as the regular members of
the National Assembly are concerned, the proposed section merely
provides, among others, and a resident thereof, that is, in the district,
for a period of not less than one year preceding the day of the
election. This was in effect lifted from the 1973 Constitution, the
interpretation given to it was domicile. (Records of the 1987
Constitutional Convention, Vol. 11, July 22, 1986. p. 87)
xxx xxx xxx
Mrs. Rosario Braid: The next question is on Section 7, page 2. I think
Commissioner Nolledo has raised the same point that "resident" has
been interpreted at times as a matter of intention rather than actual
residence.
Mr. De los Reyes: Domicile.
Ms. Rosario Braid: Yes, So, would the gentlemen consider at the
proper time to go back to actual residence rather than mere intention
to reside?
Mr. De los Reyes: But we might encounter some difficulty especially
considering that a provision in the Constitution in the Article on
Suffrage says that Filipinos living abroad may vote as enacted by law.
So, we have to stick to the original concept that it should be by
domicile and not physical and actual residence. (Records of the 1987
Constitutional Commission, Vol. 11, July 22, 1986, p. 110)
The framers of the Constitution adhered to the earlier definition given to the word "residence" which
regarded it as having the same meaning as domicile.
The term "domicile" denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent for business or
pleasure, one intends to return. (Ong Huan Tin v. Republic, 19 SCRA 966 [1967]) The absence of a
person from said permanent residence, no matter how long, notwithstanding, it continues to be the
domicile of that person. In other words, domicile is characterized by animus revertendi (Ujano v.
Republic, 17 SCRA 147 [1966])
The domicile of origin of the private respondent, which was the domicile of his parents, is fixed at
Laoang, Samar. Contrary to the petitioners' imputation, Jose Ong, Jr. never abandoned said
domicile; it remained fixed therein even up to the present.
The private respondent, in the proceedings before the HRET sufficiently established that after the
fire that gutted their house in 1961, another one was constructed.
Likewise, after the second fire which again destroyed their house in 1975, a sixteen-door apartment
was built by their family, two doors of which were reserved as their family residence. (TSN, Jose
Ong, Jr., November 18,1988, p. 8)
The petitioners' allegation that since the private respondent owns no property in Laoang, Samar, he
cannot, therefore, be a resident of said place is misplaced.
The properties owned by the Ong Family are in the name of the private respondent's parents. Upon
the demise of his parents, necessarily, the private respondent, pursuant to the laws of succession,
became the co-owner thereof (as a co- heir), notwithstanding the fact that these were still in the
names of his parents.
Even assuming that the private respondent does not own any property in Samar, the Supreme Court
in the case ofDe los Reyes v. Solidum (61 Phil. 893 [1935]) held that it is not required that a person
should have a house in order to establish his residence and domicile. It is enough that he should live
in the municipality or in a rented house or in that of a friend or relative. (Emphasis supplied)
To require the private respondent to own property in order to be eligible to run for Congress would
be tantamount to a property qualification. The Constitution only requires that the candidate meet the
age, citizenship, voting and residence requirements. Nowhere is it required by the Constitution that
the candidate should also own property in order to be qualified to run. (see Maquera v. Borra, 122
Phil. 412 [1965])
It has also been settled that absence from residence to pursue studies or practice a profession or
registration as a voter other than in the place where one is elected, does not constitute loss of
residence. (Faypon v. Quirino, 96 Phil. 294 [1954])
As previously stated, the private respondent stayed in Manila for the purpose of finishing his studies
and later to practice his profession, There was no intention to abandon the residence in Laoang,
Samar. On the contrary, the periodical journeys made to his home province reveal that he always
had the animus revertendi.
The Philippines is made up not only of a single race; it has, rather, undergone an interracial
evolution. Throughout our history, there has been a continuing influx of Malays, Chinese, Americans,
Japanese, Spaniards and other nationalities. This racial diversity gives strength to our country.
Many great Filipinos have not been whole-blooded nationals, if there is such a person, for there is
none. To mention a few, the great Jose Rizal was part Chinese, the late Chief Justice Claudio
Teehankee was part Chinese, and of course our own President, Corazon Aquino is also part
Chinese. Verily, some Filipinos of whom we are proud were ethnically more Chinese than the private
respondent.
Our citizens no doubt constitute the country's greatest wealth. Citizenship is a special privilege which
one must forever cherish.
However, in order to truly revere this treasure of citizenship, we do not, on the basis of too harsh an
interpretation, have to unreasonably deny it to those who qualify to share in its richness.
Under the overly strict jurisprudence surrounding our antiquated naturalization laws only the very
affluent backed by influential patrons, who were willing to suffer the indignities of a lengthy,
sometimes humiliating, and often corrupt process of clearances by minor bureaucrats and whose
lawyers knew how to overcome so many technical traps of the judicial process were able to acquire
citizenship. It is time for the naturalization law to be revised to enable a more positive, affirmative,
and meaningful examination of an applicant's suitability to be a Filipino. A more humane, more
indubitable and less technical approach to citizenship problems is essential.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED. The questioned decision of the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal is AFFIRMED. Respondent Jose Ong, Jr. is declared a natural-
born citizen of the Philippines and a resident of Laoang, Northern Samar.
SO ORDERED.








G.R. No. 87193 June 23, 1989
JUAN GALLANOSA FRIVALDO, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND THE LEAGUE OF MUNICIPALITIES, SORSOGON
CHAPTER, HEREIN REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT, SALVADOR NEE
ESTUYE, respondents.
J.L. Misa & Associates for petitioner.
Lladoc, Huab & Associates for private respondent.

CRUZ, J .:
Petitioner Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed governor-elect of the province of Sorsogon on January
22, 1988, and assumed office in due time. On October 27, 1988, the League of Municipalities,
Sorsogon Chapter (hereafter, League), represented by its President, Salvador Estuye, who was also
suing in his personal capacity, filed with the Commission on Elections a petition for the annulment of
Frivaldo; election and proclamation on the ground that he was not a Filipino citizen, having been
naturalized in the United States on January 20, 1983. In his answer dated May 22, 1988, Frivaldo
admitted that he was naturalized in the United States as alleged but pleaded the special and
affirmative defenses that he had sought American citizenship only to protect himself against
President Marcos. His naturalization, he said, was "merely forced upon himself as a means of
survival against the unrelenting persecution by the Martial Law Dictator's agents abroad." He added
that he had returned to the Philippines after the EDSA revolution to help in the restoration of
democracy. He also argued that the challenge to his title should be dismissed, being in reality a quo
warranto petition that should have been filed within ten days from his proclamation, in accordance
with Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code. The League, moreover, was not a proper party
because it was not a voter and so could not sue under the said section.
Frivaldo moved for a preliminary hearing on his affirmative defenses but the respondent Commission
on Elections decided instead by its Order of January 20, 1988, to set the case for hearing on the
merits. His motion for reconsideration was denied in another Order dated February 21, 1988. He
then came to this Court in a petition forcertiorari and prohibition to ask that the said orders be set
aside on the ground that they had been rendered with grave abuse of discretion. Pending resolution
of the petition, we issued a temporary order against the hearing on the merits scheduled by the
COMELEC and at the same time required comments from the respondents.
In their Comment, the private respondents reiterated their assertion that Frivaldo was a naturalized
American citizen and had not reacquired Philippine citizenship on the day of the election on January
18, 1988. He was therefore not qualified to run for and be elected governor. They also argued that
their petition in the Commission on Elections was not really for quo warranto under Section 253 of
the Omnibus Election Code. The ultimate purpose was to prevent Frivaldo from continuing as
governor, his candidacy and election being null and void ab initio because of his alienage. Even if
their petition were to be considered as one for quo warranto, it could not have been filed within ten
days from Frivaldo's proclamation because it was only in September 1988 that they received proof of
his naturalization. And assuming that the League itself was not a proper party, Estuye himself, who
was suing not only for the League but also in his personal capacity, could nevertheless institute the
suit by himself alone.
Speaking for the public respondent, the Solicitor General supported the contention that Frivaldo was
not a citizen of the Philippines and had not repatriated himself after his naturalization as an
American citizen. As an alien, he was disqualified from public office in the Philippines. His election
did not cure this defect because the electorate of Sorsogon could not amend the Constitution, the
Local Government Code, and the Omnibus Election Code. He also joined in the private respondent's
argument that Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code was not applicable because what the
League and Estuye were seeking was not only the annulment of the proclamation and election of
Frivaldo. He agreed that they were also asking for the termination of Frivaldo's incumbency as
governor of Sorsogon on the ground that he was not a Filipino.
In his Reply, Frivaldo insisted that he was a citizen of the Philippines because his naturalization as
an American citizen was not "impressed with voluntariness." In support he cited the Nottebohm
Case, [(1955 I.C.J. 4; 49 A.J.I.L. 396 (1955)] where a German national's naturalization in
Liechtenstein was not recognized because it had been obtained for reasons of convenience only. He
said he could not have repatriated himself before the 1988 elections because the Special Committee
on Naturalization created for the purpose by LOI No. 27C had not yet been organized then. His oath
in his certificate of candidacy that he was a natural-born citizen should be a sufficient act of
repatriation. Additionally, his active participation in the 1987 congressional elections had divested
him of American citizenship under the laws of the United States, thus restoring his Philippine
citizenship. He ended by reiterating his prayer for the rejection of the move to disqualify him for
being time-barred under Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code.
Considering the importance and urgency of the question herein raised, the Court has decided to
resolve it directly instead of allowing the normal circuitous route that will after all eventually end with
this Court, albeit only after a, long delay. We cannot permit this delay. Such delay will be inimical to
the public interest and the vital principles of public office to be here applied.
It is true that the Commission on Elections has the primary jurisdiction over this question as the sole
judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the
Congress and elective provincial and city officials. However, the decision on Frivaldo's citizenship
has already been made by the COMELEC through its counsel, the Solicitor General, who
categorically claims that Frivaldo is a foreigner. We assume this stance was taken by him after
consultation with the public respondent and with its approval. It therefore represents the decision of
the COMELEC itself that we may now review. Exercising our discretion to interpret the Rules of
Court and the Constitution, we shall consider the present petition as having been filed in accordance
with Article IX-A Section 7, of the Constitution, to challenge the aforementioned Orders of the
COMELEC.
The basic question we must resolve is whether or not Juan G. Frivaldo was a citizen of the
Philippines at the time of his election on January 18, 1988, as provincial governor of Sorsogon. All
the other issues raised in this petition are merely secondary to this basic question.
The reason for this inquiry is the provision in Article XI, Section 9, of the Constitution that all public
officials and employees owe the State and the Constitution "allegiance at all times" and the specific
requirement in Section 42 of the Local Government Code that a candidate for local elective office
must be inter alia a citizen of the Philippines and a qualified voter of the constituency where he is
running. Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that a qualified voter must be, among
other qualifications, a citizen of the Philippines, this being an indispensable requirement for suffrage
under Article V, Section 1, of the Constitution.
In the certificate of candidacy he filed on November 19, 1987, Frivaldo described himself as a
"natural-born" citizen of the Philippines, omitting mention of any subsequent loss of such status. The
evidence shows, however, that he was naturalized as a citizen of the United States in 1983 per the
following certification from the United States District Court, Northern District of California, as duly
authenticated by Vice Consul Amado P. Cortez of the Philippine Consulate General in San
Francisco, California, U.S.A.
OFFICE OF THE CLERK
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
September 23, 1988
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
Our records show that JUAN GALLANOSA FRIVALDO, born on October 20, 1915,
was naturalized in this Court on January 20, 1983, and issued Certificate of
Naturalization No. 11690178.
Petition No. 280225.
Alien Registration No. A23 079 270.
Very truly yours,

WILLIAM L. WHITTAKER
Clerk
by:
(Sgd.)

ARACELI V. BAREN
Deputy Clerk
This evidence is not denied by the petitioner. In fact, he expressly admitted it in his
answer. Nevertheless, as earlier noted, he claims it was "forced" on him as a
measure of protection from the persecution of the Marcos government through his
agents in the United States.
The Court sees no reason not to believe that the petitioner was one of the enemies
of the Marcos dictatorship. Even so, it cannot agree that as a consequence thereof
he was coerced into embracing American citizenship. His feeble suggestion that his
naturalization was not the result of his own free and voluntary choice is totally
unacceptable and must be rejected outright.
There were many other Filipinos in the United States similarly situated as Frivaldo,
and some of them subject to greater risk than he, who did not find it necessary nor
do they claim to have been coerced to abandon their cherished status as Filipinos.
They did not take the oath of allegiance to the United States, unlike the petitioner
who solemnly declared "on oath, that I absolutely and entirely renounce and abjure
all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state or sovereignty of
whom or which I have heretofore been a subject or citizen," meaning in his case the
Republic of the Philippines. The martyred Ninoy Aquino heads the impressive list of
those Filipinos in exile who, unlike the petitioner, held fast to their Philippine
citizenship despite the perils of their resistance to the Marcos regime.
The Nottebohm case cited by the petitioner invoked the international law principle of
effective nationality which is clearly not applicable to the case at bar. This principle is
expressed in Article 5 of the Hague Convention of 1930 on the Conflict of Nationality
Laws as follows:
Art. 5. Within a third State a person having more than one nationality
shall be treated as if he had only one. Without prejudice to the
application of its law in matters of personal status and of any
convention in force, a third State shall, of the nationalities which any
such person possesses, recognize exclusively in its territory either
the nationality of the country in which he is habitually and principally
resident or the nationality of the country with which in the
circumstances he appears to be in fact most closely connected.
Nottebohm was a German by birth but a resident of Guatemala for 34 years when he
applied for and acquired naturalization in Liechtenstein one month before the
outbreak of World War II. Many members of his family and his business interests
were in Germany. In 1943, Guatemala, which had declared war on Germany,
arrested Nottebohm and confiscated all his properties on the ground that he was a
German national. Liechtenstein thereupon filed suit on his behalf, as its citizen,
against Guatemala. The International Court of Justice held Nottebohm to be still a
national of Germany, with which he was more closely connected than with
Liechtenstein.
That case is not relevant to the petition before us because it dealt with a conflict
between the nationality laws of two states as decided by a third state. No third state
is involved in the case at bar; in fact, even the United States is not actively claiming
Frivaldo as its national. The sole question presented to us is whether or not Frivaldo
is a citizen of the Philippines under our own laws, regardless of other nationality
laws. We can decide this question alone as sovereign of our own territory,
conformably to Section 1 of the said Convention providing that "it is for each State to
determine under its law who are its nationals."
It is also worth noting that Nottebohm was invoking his naturalization in Liechtenstein
whereas in the present case Frivaldo is rejecting his naturalization in the United
States.
If he really wanted to disavow his American citizenship and reacquire Philippine
citizenship, the petitioner should have done so in accordance with the laws of our
country. Under CA No. 63 as amended by CA No. 473 and PD No. 725, Philippine
citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by naturalization, or by
repatriation.
While Frivaldo does not invoke either of the first two methods, he nevertheless
claims he has reacquired Philippine citizenship by virtue of a valid repatriation. He
claims that by actively participating in the elections in this country, he automatically
forfeited American citizenship under the laws of the United States. Such laws do not
concern us here. The alleged forfeiture is between him and the United States as his
adopted country. It should be obvious that even if he did lose his naturalized
American citizenship, such forfeiture did not and could not have the effect of
automatically restoring his citizenship in the Philippines that he had earlier
renounced. At best, what might have happened as a result of the loss of his
naturalized citizenship was that he became a stateless individual.
Frivaldo's contention that he could not have repatriated himself under LOI 270
because the Special Committee provided for therein had not yet been constituted
seems to suggest that the lack of that body rendered his repatriation unnecessary.
That is far-fetched if not specious Such a conclusion would open the floodgates, as it
were. It would allow all Filipinos who have renounced this country to claim back their
abandoned citizenship without formally rejecting their adoptedstate and reaffirming
their allegiance to the Philippines.
It does not appear that Frivaldo has taken these categorical acts. He contends that
by simply filing his certificate of candidacy he had, without more, already effectively
recovered Philippine citizenship. But that is hardly the formal declaration the law
envisions surely, Philippine citizenship previously disowned is not that cheaply
recovered. If the Special Committee had not yet been convened, what that meant
simply was that the petitioner had to wait until this was done, or seek naturalization
by legislative or judicial proceedings.
The argument that the petition filed with the Commission on Elections should be
dismissed for tardiness is not well-taken. The herein private respondents are seeking
to prevent Frivaldo from continuing to discharge his office of governor because he is
disqualified from doing so as a foreigner. Qualifications for public office are
continuing requirements and must be possessed not only at the time of appointment
or election or assumption of office but during the officer's entire tenure. Once any of
the required qualifications is lost, his title may be seasonably challenged. If, say, a
female legislator were to marry a foreigner during her term and by her act or
omission acquires his nationality, would she have a right to remain in office simply
because the challenge to her title may no longer be made within ten days from her
proclamation? It has been established, and not even denied, that the evidence of
Frivaldo's naturalization was discovered only eight months after his proclamation and
his title was challenged shortly thereafter.
This Court will not permit the anomaly of a person sitting as provincial governor in
this country while owing exclusive allegiance to another country. The fact that he was
elected by the people of Sorsogon does not excuse this patent violation of the
salutary rule limiting public office and employment only to the citizens of this country.
The qualifications prescribed for elective office cannot be erased by the electorate
alone. The will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of
ineligibility, especially if they mistakenly believed, as in this case, that the candidate
was qualified. Obviously, this rule requires strict application when the deficiency is
lack of citizenship. If a person seeks to serve in the Republic of the Philippines, he
must owe his total loyalty to this country only, abjuring and renouncing all fealty and
fidelity to any other state.
It is true as the petitioner points out that the status of the natural-born citizen is
favored by the Constitution and our laws, which is all the more reason why it should
be treasured like a pearl of great price. But once it is surrendered and renounced, the
gift is gone and cannot be lightly restored. This country of ours, for all its difficulties
and limitations, is like a jealous and possessive mother. Once rejected, it is not quick
to welcome back with eager arms its prodigal if repentant children. The returning
renegade must show, by an express and unequivocal act, the renewal of his loyalty
and love.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and petitioner JUAN G. FRIVALDO is
hereby declared not a citizen of the Philippines and therefore DISQUALIFIED from
serving as Governor of the Province of Sorsogon. Accordingly, he is ordered to
vacate his office and surrender the same to the duly elected Vice-Governor of the
said province once this decision becomes final and executory. The temporary
restraining order dated March 9, 1989, is LIFTED.
SO ORDERED.













G.R. No. 195649 April 16, 2013
CASAN MACODE MAQUILING, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ROMMEL ARNADO y CAGOCO, LINOG G.
BALUA, Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
SERENO, CJ .:
THE CASE
This is a Petition for Certiorari ender Rule 64 in conjunction with Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to
review the Resolutions of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC). The Resolution
1
in SPA No.
10-1 09(DC) of the COMELEC First Division dated 5 October 201 0 is being assailed for applying
Section 44 of the Local Government Code while the Resolution
2
of the COMELEC En Banc dated 2
February 2011 is being questioned for finding that respondent Rommel Arnado y Cagoco
(respondent Arnado/Arnado) is solely a Filipino citizen qualified to run for public office despite his
continued use of a U.S. passport.
FACTS
Respondent Arnado is a natural born Filipino citizen.
3
However, as a consequence of his subsequent
naturalization as a citizen of the United States of America, he lost his Filipino citizenship. Arnado
applied for repatriation under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 before the Consulate General of the
Philippines in San Franciso, USA and took the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines
on 10 July 2008.
4
On the same day an Order of Approval of his Citizenship Retention and Re-
acquisition was issued in his favor.
5

The aforementioned Oath of Allegiance states:
I, Rommel Cagoco Arnado, solemnly swear that I will support and defend the Constitution of the
Republic of the Philippines and obey the laws and legal orders promulgated by the duly constituted
authorities of the Philippines and I hereby declare that I recognize and accept the supreme authority
of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; and that I impose this obligation
upon myself voluntarily without mental reservation or purpose of evasion.
6

On 3 April 2009 Arnado again took his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic and executed an Affidavit
of Renunciation of his foreign citizenship, which states:
I, Rommel Cagoco Arnado, do solemnly swear that I absolutely and perpetually renounce all
allegiance and fidelity to the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA of which I am a citizen, and I divest
myself of full employment of all civil and political rights and privileges of the United States of
America.
I solemnly swear that all the foregoing statement is true and correct to the best of my knowledge and
belief.
7

On 30 November 2009, Arnado filed his Certificate of Candidacy for Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del
Norte, which contains, among others, the following statements:
I am a natural born Filipino citizen / naturalized Filipino citizen.
I am not a permanent resident of, or immigrant to, a foreign country.
I am eligible for the office I seek to be elected to.
I will support and defend the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and will maintain true
faith and allegiance thereto. I will obey the laws, legal orders and decrees promulgated by the duly
constituted authorities.
I impose this obligation upon myself voluntarily without mental reservation or purpose of evasion.
8

On 28 April 2010, respondent Linog C. Balua (Balua), another mayoralty candidate, filed a petition to
disqualify Arnado and/or to cancel his certificate of candidacy for municipal mayor of Kauswagan,
Lanao del Norte in connection with the 10 May 2010 local and national elections.
9

Respondent Balua contended that Arnado is not a resident of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte and that
he is a foreigner, attaching thereto a certification issued by the Bureau of Immigration dated 23 April
2010 indicating the nationality of Arnado as "USA-American."
10
To further bolster his claim of
Arnados US citizenship, Balua presented in his Memorandum a computer-generated travel
record
11
dated 03 December 2009 indicating that Arnado has been using his US Passport No.
057782700 in entering and departing the Philippines. The said record shows that Arnado left the
country on 14 April 2009 and returned on 25 June 2009, and again departed on 29 July 2009,
arriving back in the Philippines on 24 November 2009.
Balua likewise presented a certification from the Bureau of Immigration dated 23 April 2010,
certifying that the name "Arnado, Rommel Cagoco" appears in the available Computer
Database/Passenger manifest/IBM listing on file as of 21 April 2010, with the following pertinent
travel records:
DATE OF Arrival : 01/12/2010
NATIONALITY : USA-AMERICAN
PASSPORT : 057782700
DATE OF Arrival : 03/23/2010
NATIONALITY : USA-AMERICAN
PASSPORT : 057782700
12

On 30 April 2010, the COMELEC (First Division) issued an Order
13
requiring the respondent to
personally file his answer and memorandum within three (3) days from receipt thereof.
After Arnado failed to answer the petition, Balua moved to declare him in default and to present
evidence ex-parte.
Neither motion was acted upon, having been overtaken by the 2010 elections where Arnado
garnered the highest number of votes and was subsequently proclaimed as the winning candidate
for Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte.
It was only after his proclamation that Arnado filed his verified answer, submitting the following
documents as evidence:
14

1. Affidavit of Renunciation and Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines dated
03 April 2009;
2. Joint-Affidavit dated 31 May 2010 of Engr. Virgil Seno, Virginia Branzuela, Leoncio
Daligdig, and Jessy Corpin, all neighbors of Arnado, attesting that Arnado is a long-time
resident of Kauswagan and that he has been conspicuously and continuously residing in his
familys ancestral house in Kauswagan;
3. Certification from the Punong Barangay of Poblacion, Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte dated
03 June 2010 stating that Arnado is a bona fide resident of his barangay and that Arnado
went to the United States in 1985 to work and returned to the Philippines in 2009;
4. Certification dated 31 May 2010 from the Municipal Local Government Operations Office
of Kauswagan stating that Dr. Maximo P. Arnado, Sr. served as Mayor of Kauswagan, from
January 1964 to June 1974 and from 15 February 1979 to 15 April 1986; and
5. Voter Certification issued by the Election Officer of Kauswagan certifying that Arnado has
been a registered voter of Kauswagan since 03 April 2009.
THE RULING OF THE COMELEC FIRST DIVISION
Instead of treating the Petition as an action for the cancellation of a certificate of candidacy based on
misrepresentation,
15
the COMELEC First Division considered it as one for disqualification. Baluas
contention that Arnado is a resident of the United States was dismissed upon the finding that "Balua
failed to present any evidence to support his contention,"
16
whereas the First Division still could "not
conclude that Arnado failed to meet the one-year residency requirement under the Local
Government Code."
17

In the matter of the issue of citizenship, however, the First Division disagreed with Arnados claim
that he is a Filipino citizen.
18

We find that although Arnado appears to have substantially complied with the requirements of R.A.
No. 9225, Arnados act of consistently using his US passport after renouncing his US citizenship on
03 April 2009 effectively negated his Affidavit of Renunciation.
x x x x
Arnados continued use of his US passport is a strong indication that Arnado had no real intention to
renounce his US citizenship and that he only executed an Affidavit of Renunciation to enable him to
run for office. We cannot turn a blind eye to the glaring inconsistency between Arnados unexplained
use of a US passport six times and his claim that he re-acquired his Philippine citizenship and
renounced his US citizenship. As noted by the Supreme Court in the Yu case, "a passport is defined
as an official document of identity and nationality issued to a person intending to travel or sojourn in
foreign countries." Surely, one who truly divested himself of US citizenship would not continue to
avail of privileges reserved solely for US nationals.
19

The dispositive portion of the Resolution rendered by the COMELEC
First Division reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition for disqualification and/or to cancel the
certificate of candidacy of Rommel C. Arnado is hereby GRANTED. Rommel C. Arnados
proclamation as the winning candidate for Municipal Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Nore is hereby
ANNULLED. Let the order of succession under Section 44 of the Local Government Code of 1991
take effect.
20

The Motion for Reconsideration and
the Motion for Intervention
Arnado sought reconsideration of the resolution before the COMELEC En Banc on the ground that
"the evidence is insufficient to justify the Resolution and that the said Resolution is contrary to
law."
21
He raised the following contentions:
22

1. The finding that he is not a Filipino citizen is not supported by the evidence consisting of
his Oath of Allegiance and the Affidavit of Renunciation, which show that he has substantially
complied with the requirements of R.A. No. 9225;
2. The use of his US passport subsequent to his renunciation of his American citizenship is
not tantamount to a repudiation of his Filipino citizenship, as he did not perform any act to
swear allegiance to a country other than the Philippines;
3. He used his US passport only because he was not informed of the issuance of his
Philippine passport, and that he used his Philippine passport after he obtained it;
4. Baluas petition to cancel the certificate of candidacy of Arnado was filed out of time, and
the First Divisions treatment of the petition as one for disqualification constitutes grave
abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction;
23

5. He is undoubtedly the peoples choice as indicated by his winning the elections;
6. His proclamation as the winning candidate ousted the COMELEC from jurisdiction over
the case; and
7. The proper remedy to question his citizenship is through a petition for quo warranto, which
should have been filed within ten days from his proclamation.
Petitioner Casan Macode Maquiling (Maquiling), another candidate for mayor of Kauswagan, and
who garnered the second highest number of votes in the 2010 elections, intervened in the case and
filed before the COMELEC En Banc a Motion for Reconsideration together with an Opposition to
Arnados Amended Motion for Reconsideration. Maquiling argued that while the First Division
correctly disqualified Arnado, the order of succession under Section 44 of the Local Government
Code is not applicable in this case. Consequently, he claimed that the cancellation of Arnados
candidacy and the nullification of his proclamation, Maquiling, as the legitimate candidate who
obtained the highest number of lawful votes, should be proclaimed as the winner.
Maquiling simultaneously filed his Memorandum with his Motion for Intervention and his Motion for
Reconsideration. Arnado opposed all motions filed by Maquiling, claiming that intervention is
prohibited after a decision has already been rendered, and that as a second-placer, Maquiling
undoubtedly lost the elections and thus does not stand to be prejudiced or benefitted by the final
adjudication of the case.
RULING OF THE COMELEC EN BANC
In its Resolution of 02 February 2011, the COMELEC En Banc held that under Section 6 of Republic
Act No. 6646, the Commission "shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or
protest even after the proclamation of the candidate whose qualifications for office is questioned."
As to Maquilings intervention, the COMELEC En Banc also cited Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 which
allows intervention in proceedings for disqualification even after elections if no final judgment has
been rendered, but went on further to say that Maquiling, as the second placer, would not be
prejudiced by the outcome of the case as it agrees with the dispositive portion of the Resolution of
the First Division allowing the order of succession under Section 44 of the Local Government Code
to take effect.
The COMELEC En Banc agreed with the treatment by the First Division of the petition as one for
disqualification, and ruled that the petition was filed well within the period prescribed by law,
24
having
been filed on 28 April 2010, which is not later than 11 May 2010, the date of proclamation.
However, the COMELEC En Banc reversed and set aside the ruling of the First Division and granted
Arnados Motion for Reconsideration, on the following premises:
First:
By renouncing his US citizenship as imposed by R.A. No. 9225, the respondent embraced his
Philippine citizenship as though he never became a citizen of another country. It was at that time,
April 3, 2009, that the respondent became a pure Philippine Citizen again.
x x x x
The use of a US passport does not operate to revert back his status as a dual citizen prior to his
renunciation as there is no law saying such. More succinctly, the use of a US passport does not
operate to "un-renounce" what he has earlier on renounced. The First Divisions reliance in the case
of In Re: Petition for Habeas Corpus of Willy Yu v. Defensor-Santiago, et al. is misplaced. The
petitioner in the said case is a naturalized citizen who, after taking his oath as a naturalized Filipino,
applied for the renewal of his Portuguese passport. Strict policy is maintained in the conduct of
citizens who are not natural born, who acquire their citizenship by choice, thus discarding their
original citizenship. The Philippine State expects strict conduct of allegiance to those who choose to
be its citizens. In the present case, respondent is not a naturalized citizen but a natural born citizen
who chose greener pastures by working abroad and then decided to repatriate to supposedly help in
the progress of Kauswagan. He did not apply for a US passport after his renunciation. Thus the
mentioned case is not on all fours with the case at bar.
x x x x
The respondent presented a plausible explanation as to the use of his US passport. Although he
applied for a Philippine passport, the passport was only issued on June 18, 2009. However, he was
not notified of the issuance of his Philippine passport so that he was actually able to get it about
three (3) months later. Yet as soon as he was in possession of his Philippine passport, the
respondent already used the same in his subsequent travels abroad. This fact is proven by the
respondents submission of a certified true copy of his passport showing that he used the same for
his travels on the following dates: January 31, 2010, April 16, 2010, May 20, 2010, January 12,
2010, March 31, 2010 and June 4, 2010. This then shows that the use of the US passport was
because to his knowledge, his Philippine passport was not yet issued to him for his use. As probably
pressing needs might be undertaken, the respondent used whatever is within his control during that
time.
25

In his Separate Concurring Opinion, COMELEC Chairman Sixto Brillantes cited that the use of
foreign passport is not one of the grounds provided for under Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No.
63 through which Philippine citizenship may be lost.
"The application of the more assimilative principle of continuity of citizenship is more appropriate in
this case. Under said principle, once a person becomes a citizen, either by birth or naturalization, it
is assumed that he desires to continue to be a citizen, and this assumption stands until he voluntarily
denationalizes or expatriates himself. Thus, in the instant case respondent after reacquiring his
Philippine citizenship should be presumed to have remained a Filipino despite his use of his
American passport in the absence of clear, unequivocal and competent proof of expatriation.
Accordingly, all doubts should be resolved in favor of retention of citizenship."
26

On the other hand, Commissioner Rene V. Sarmiento dissented, thus:
Respondent evidently failed to prove that he truly and wholeheartedly abandoned his allegiance to
the United States. The latters continued use of his US passport and enjoyment of all the privileges
of a US citizen despite his previous renunciation of the afore-mentioned citizenship runs contrary to
his declaration that he chose to retain only his Philippine citizenship. Respondents submission with
the twin requirements was obviously only for the purpose of complying with the requirements for
running for the mayoralty post in connection with the May 10, 2010 Automated National and Local
Elections.
Qualifications for elective office, such as citizenship, are continuing requirements; once any of them
is lost during his incumbency, title to the office itself is deemed forfeited. If a candidate is not a
citizen at the time he ran for office or if he lost his citizenship after his election to office, he is
disqualified to serve as such. Neither does the fact that respondent obtained the plurality of votes for
the mayoralty post cure the latters failure to comply with the qualification requirements regarding his
citizenship.
Since a disqualified candidate is no candidate at all in the eyes of the law, his having received the
highest number of votes does not validate his election. It has been held that where a petition for
disqualification was filed before election against a candidate but was adversely resolved against him
after election, his having obtained the highest number of votes did not make his election valid. His
ouster from office does not violate the principle of vox populi suprema est lex because the
application of the constitutional and statutory provisions on disqualification is not a matter of
popularity. To apply it is to breath[e] life to the sovereign will of the people who expressed it when
they ratified the Constitution and when they elected their representatives who enacted the law.
27

THE PETITION BEFORE THE COURT
Maquiling filed the instant petition questioning the propriety of declaring Arnado qualified to run for
public office despite his continued use of a US passport, and praying that Maquiling be proclaimed
as the winner in the 2010 mayoralty race in Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte.
Ascribing both grave abuse of discretion and reversible error on the part of the COMELEC En Banc
for ruling that Arnado is a Filipino citizen despite his continued use of a US passport, Maquiling now
seeks to reverse the finding of the COMELEC En Banc that Arnado is qualified to run for public
office.
Corollary to his plea to reverse the ruling of the COMELEC En Banc or to affirm the First Divisions
disqualification of Arnado, Maquiling also seeks the review of the applicability of Section 44 of the
Local Government Code, claiming that the COMELEC committed reversible error in ruling that "the
succession of the vice mayor in case the respondent is disqualified is in order."
There are three questions posed by the parties before this Court which will be addressed seriatim as
the subsequent questions hinge on the result of the first.
The first question is whether or not intervention is allowed in a disqualification case.
The second question is whether or not the use of a foreign passport after renouncing foreign
citizenship amounts to undoing a renunciation earlier made.
A better framing of the question though should be whether or not the use of a foreign passport after
renouncing foreign citizenship affects ones qualifications to run for public office.
The third question is whether or not the rule on succession in the Local Government Code is
applicable to this case.
OUR RULING
Intervention of a rival candidate in a
disqualification case is proper when
there has not yet been any
proclamation of the winner.
Petitioner Casan Macode Maquiling intervened at the stage when respondent Arnado filed a Motion
for Reconsideration of the First Division Resolution before the COMELEC En Banc. As the candidate
who garnered the second highest number of votes, Maquiling contends that he has an interest in the
disqualification case filed against Arnado, considering that in the event the latter is disqualified, the
votes cast for him should be considered stray and the second-placer should be proclaimed as the
winner in the elections.
It must be emphasized that while the original petition before the COMELEC is one for cancellation of
the certificate of candidacy and / or disqualification, the COMELEC First Division and the COMELEC
En Banc correctly treated the petition as one for disqualification.
The effect of a disqualification case is enunciated in Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646:
Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. - Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to
be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any
reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is
voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall
continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the
complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the
proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.
Mercado v. Manzano
28

clarified the right of intervention in a disqualification case. In that case, the Court said:
That petitioner had a right to intervene at that stage of the proceedings for the disqualification
against private respondent is clear from Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646, otherwise known as the
Electoral Reforms Law of 1987, which provides: Any candidate who has been declared by final
judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If
for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and
he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission
shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the
complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the
proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of guilt is strong. Under this provision,
intervention may be allowed in proceedings for disqualification even after election if there has yet
been no final judgment rendered.
29

Clearly then, Maquiling has the right to intervene in the case. The fact that the COMELEC En Banc
has already ruled that Maquiling has not shown that the requisites for the exemption to the second-
placer rule set forth in Sinsuat v. COMELEC
30
are present and therefore would not be prejudiced by
the outcome of the case, does not deprive Maquiling of the right to elevate the matter before this
Court.
Arnados claim that the main case has attained finality as the original petitioner and respondents
therein have not appealed the decision of the COMELEC En Banc, cannot be sustained. The
elevation of the case by the intervenor prevents it from attaining finality. It is only after this Court has
ruled upon the issues raised in this instant petition that the disqualification case originally filed by
Balua against Arnado will attain finality.
The use of foreign passport after renouncing ones foreign citizenship is a positive and
voluntary act of representation as to ones nationality and citizenship; it does not divest
Filipino citizenship regained by repatriation but it recants the Oath of Renunciation required
to qualify one to run for an elective position.
Section 5(2) of The Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003 provides:
Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political
rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the
Philippines and the following conditions:
x x x x
(2)Those seeking elective public in the Philippines shall meet the qualification for holding such public
office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate
of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign before any public
officer authorized to administer an oath.
x x x
31

Rommel Arnado took all the necessary steps to qualify to run for a public office. He took the Oath of
Allegiance and renounced his foreign citizenship. There is no question that after performing these
twin requirements required under Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225 or the Citizenship Retention and Re-
acquisition Act of 2003, he became eligible to run for public office.
Indeed, Arnado took the Oath of Allegiance not just only once but twice: first, on 10 July 2008 when
he applied for repatriation before the Consulate General of the Philippines in San Francisco, USA,
and again on 03 April 2009 simultaneous with the execution of his Affidavit of Renunciation. By
taking the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic, Arnado re-acquired his Philippine citizenship. At the
time, however, he likewise possessed American citizenship. Arnado had therefore become a dual
citizen.
After reacquiring his Philippine citizenship, Arnado renounced his American citizenship by executing
an Affidavit of Renunciation, thus completing the requirements for eligibility to run for public office.
By renouncing his foreign citizenship, he was deemed to be solely a Filipino citizen, regardless of
the effect of such renunciation under the laws of the foreign country.
32

However, this legal presumption does not operate permanently and is open to attack when, after
renouncing the foreign citizenship, the citizen performs positive acts showing his continued
possession of a foreign citizenship.
33

Arnado himself subjected the issue of his citizenship to attack when, after renouncing his foreign
citizenship, he continued to use his US passport to travel in and out of the country before filing his
certificate of candidacy on 30 November 2009. The pivotal question to determine is whether he was
solely and exclusively a Filipino citizen at the time he filed his certificate of candidacy, thereby
rendering him eligible to run for public office.
Between 03 April 2009, the date he renounced his foreign citizenship, and 30 November 2009, the
date he filed his COC, he used his US passport four times, actions that run counter to the affidavit of
renunciation he had earlier executed. By using his foreign passport, Arnado positively and voluntarily
represented himself as an American, in effect declaring before immigration authorities of both
countries that he is an American citizen, with all attendant rights and privileges granted by the United
States of America.
The renunciation of foreign citizenship is not a hollow oath that can simply be professed at any time,
only to be violated the next day. It requires an absolute and perpetual renunciation of the foreign
citizenship and a full divestment of all civil and political rights granted by the foreign country which
granted the citizenship.
Mercado v. Manzano
34
already hinted at this situation when the Court declared:
His declarations will be taken upon the faith that he will fulfill his undertaking made under oath.
Should he betray that trust, there are enough sanctions for declaring the loss of his Philippine
citizenship through expatriation in appropriate proceedings. In Yu v. Defensor-Santiago, we
sustained the denial of entry into the country of petitioner on the ground that, after taking his oath as
a naturalized citizen, he applied for the renewal of his Portuguese passport and declared in
commercial documents executed abroad that he was a Portuguese national. A similar sanction can
be taken against anyone who, in electing Philippine citizenship, renounces his foreign nationality, but
subsequently does some act constituting renunciation of his Philippine citizenship.
While the act of using a foreign passport is not one of the acts enumerated in Commonwealth Act
No. 63 constituting renunciation and loss of Philippine citizenship,
35
it is nevertheless an act which
repudiates the very oath of renunciation required for a former Filipino citizen who is also a citizen of
another country to be qualified to run for a local elective position.
When Arnado used his US passport on 14 April 2009, or just eleven days after he renounced his
American citizenship, he recanted his Oath of Renunciation
36
that he "absolutely and perpetually
renounce(s) all allegiance and fidelity to the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA"
37
and that he
"divest(s) himself of full employment of all civil and political rights and privileges of the United States
of America."
38

We agree with the COMELEC En Banc that such act of using a foreign passport does not divest
Arnado of his Filipino citizenship, which he acquired by repatriation. However, by representing
himself as an American citizen, Arnado voluntarily and effectively reverted to his earlier status as a
dual citizen. Such reversion was not retroactive; it took place the instant Arnado represented himself
as an American citizen by using his US passport.
This act of using a foreign passport after renouncing ones foreign citizenship is fatal to Arnados bid
for public office, as it effectively imposed on him a disqualification to run for an elective local position.
Arnados category of dual citizenship is that by which foreign citizenship is acquired through a
positive act of applying for naturalization. This is distinct from those considered dual citizens by
virtue of birth, who are not required by law to take the oath of renunciation as the mere filing of the
certificate of candidacy already carries with it an implied renunciation of foreign citizenship.
39
Dual
citizens by naturalization, on the other hand, are required to take not only the Oath of Allegiance to
the Republic of the Philippines but also to personally renounce foreign citizenship in order to qualify
as a candidate for public office.
By the time he filed his certificate of candidacy on 30 November 2009, Arnado was a dual citizen
enjoying the rights and privileges of Filipino and American citizenship. He was qualified to vote, but
by the express disqualification under Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code,
40
he was not
qualified to run for a local elective position.
In effect, Arnado was solely and exclusively a Filipino citizen only for a period of eleven days, or
from 3 April 2009 until 14 April 2009, on which date he first used his American passport after
renouncing his American citizenship.
This Court has previously ruled that:
Qualifications for public office are continuing requirements and must be possessed not only at the
time of appointment or election or assumption of office but during the officer's entire tenure. Once
any of the required qualifications is lost, his title may be seasonably challenged. x x x.
41

The citizenship requirement for elective public office is a continuing one. It must be possessed not
just at the time of the renunciation of the foreign citizenship but continuously. Any act which violates
the oath of renunciation opens the citizenship issue to attack.
We agree with the pronouncement of the COMELEC First Division that "Arnados act of consistently
using his US passport effectively negated his "Affidavit of Renunciation."
42
This does not mean, that
he failed to comply with the twin requirements under R.A. No. 9225, for he in fact did.
It was after complying with the requirements that he performed positive acts which effectively
disqualified him from running for an elective public office pursuant to Section 40(d) of the Local
Government Code of 1991.
The purpose of the Local Government Code in disqualifying dual citizens from running for any
elective public office would be thwarted if we were to allow a person who has earlier renounced his
foreign citizenship, but who subsequently represents himself as a foreign citizen, to hold any public
office.
Arnado justifies the continued use of his US passport with the explanation that he was not notified of
the issuance of his Philippine passport on 18 June 2009, as a result of which he was only able to
obtain his Philippine passport three (3) months later.
43

The COMELEC En Banc differentiated Arnado from Willy Yu, the Portuguese national who sought
naturalization as a Filipino citizen and later applied for the renewal of his Portuguese passport. That
Arnado did not apply for a US passport after his renunciation does not make his use of a US
passport less of an act that violated the Oath of Renunciation he took. It was still a positive act of
representation as a US citizen before the immigration officials of this country.
The COMELEC, in ruling favorably for Arnado, stated "Yet, as soon as he was in possession of his
Philippine passport, the respondent already used the same in his subsequent travels abroad."
44
We
cannot agree with the COMELEC. Three months from June is September. If indeed, Arnado used
his Philippine passport as soon as he was in possession of it, he would not have used his US
passport on 24 November 2009.
Besides, Arnados subsequent use of his Philippine passport does not correct the fact that after he
renounced his foreign citizenship and prior to filing his certificate of candidacy, he used his US
passport. In the same way that the use of his foreign passport does not undo his Oath of
Renunciation, his subsequent use of his Philippine passport does not undo his earlier use of his US
passport.
Citizenship is not a matter of convenience. It is a badge of identity that comes with attendant civil
and political rights accorded by the state to its citizens. It likewise demands the concomitant duty to
maintain allegiance to ones flag and country. While those who acquire dual citizenship by choice are
afforded the right of suffrage, those who seek election or appointment to public office are required to
renounce their foreign citizenship to be deserving of the public trust. Holding public office demands
full and undivided allegiance to the Republic and to no other.
We therefore hold that Arnado, by using his US passport after renouncing his American citizenship,
has recanted the same Oath of Renunciation he took. Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code
applies to his situation. He is disqualified not only from holding the public office but even from
becoming a candidate in the May 2010 elections.
We now resolve the next issue.
Resolving the third issue necessitates revisiting Topacio v. Paredes
45
which is the jurisprudential
spring of the principle that a second-placer cannot be proclaimed as the winner in an election
contest. This doctrine must be re-examined and its soundness once again put to the test to address
the ever-recurring issue that a second-placer who loses to an ineligible candidate cannot be
proclaimed as the winner in the elections.
The Facts of the case are as follows:
On June 4, 1912, a general election was held in the town of Imus, Province of Cavite, to fill the office
of municipal president. The petitioner, Felipe Topacio, and the respondent, Maximo Abad, were
opposing candidates for that office. Topacio received 430 votes, and Abad 281. Abad contested the
election upon the sole ground that Topacio was ineligible in that he was reelected the second time to
the office of the municipal president on June 4, 1912, without the four years required by Act No.
2045 having intervened.
46

Abad thus questioned the eligibility of To p a c i o on the basis of a statutory prohibition for seeking a
second re-election absent the four year interruption.
The often-quoted phrase in Topacio v. Paredes is that "the wreath of victory cannot be transferred
from an ineligible candidate to any other candidate when the sole question is the eligibility of the one
receiving a plurality of the legally cast ballots."
47

This phrase is not even the ratio decidendi; it is a mere obiter dictum. The Court was comparing "the
effect of a decision that a candidate is not entitled to the office because of fraud or irregularities in
the elections x x x with that produced by declaring a person ineligible to hold such an office."
The complete sentence where the phrase is found is part of a comparison and contrast between the
two situations, thus:
Again, the effect of a decision that a candidate is not entitled to the office because of fraud or
irregularities in the elections is quite different from that produced by declaring a person ineligible to
hold such an office. In the former case the court, after an examination of the ballots may find that
some other person than the candidate declared to have received a plurality by the board of
canvassers actually received the greater number of votes, in which case the court issues its
mandamus to the board of canvassers to correct the returns accordingly; or it may find that the
manner of holding the election and the returns are so tainted with fraud or illegality that it cannot be
determined who received a plurality of the legally cast ballots. In the latter case, no question as to
the correctness of the returns or the manner of casting and counting the ballots is before the
deciding power, and generally the only result can be that the election fails entirely. In the former, we
have a contest in the strict sense of the word, because of the opposing parties are striving for
supremacy. If it be found that the successful candidate (according to the board of canvassers)
obtained a plurality in an illegal manner, and that another candidate was the real victor, the former
must retire in favor of the latter. In the other case, there is not, strictly speaking, a contest, as the
wreath of victory cannot be transferred from an ineligible candidate to any other candidate when the
sole question is the eligibility of the one receiving a plurality of the legally cast ballots. In the one
case the question is as to who received a plurality of the legally cast ballots; in the other, the
question is confined to the personal character and circumstances of a single individual.
48
(Emphasis
supplied)
Note that the sentence where the phrase is found starts with "In the other case, there is not, strictly
speaking, a contest" in contrast to the earlier statement, "In the former, we have a contest in the
strict sense of the word, because of the opposing parties are striving for supremacy."
The Court in Topacio v. Paredes cannot be said to have held that "the wreath of victory cannot be
transferred from an ineligible candidate to any other candidate when the sole question is the
eligibility of the one receiving a plurality of the legally cast ballots."
A proper reading of the case reveals that the ruling therein is that since the Court of First Instance is
without jurisdiction to try a disqualification case based on the eligibility of the person who obtained
the highest number of votes in the election, its jurisdiction being confined "to determine which of the
contestants has been duly elected" the judge exceeded his jurisdiction when he "declared that no
one had been legally elected president of the municipality of Imus at the general election held in that
town on 4 June 1912" where "the only question raised was whether or not Topacio was eligible to be
elected and to hold the office of municipal president."
The Court did not rule that Topacio was disqualified and that Abad as the second placer cannot be
proclaimed in his stead. The Court therein ruled:
For the foregoing reasons, we are of the opinion and so hold that the respondent judge exceeded his
jurisdiction in declaring in those proceedings that no one was elected municipal president of the
municipality of Imus at the last general election; and that said order and all subsequent proceedings
based thereon are null and void and of no effect; and, although this decision is rendered on
respondents' answer to the order to show cause, unless respondents raised some new and
additional issues, let judgment be entered accordingly in 5 days, without costs. So ordered.
49

On closer scrutiny, the phrase relied upon by a host of decisions does not even have a legal basis to
stand on. It was a mere pronouncement of the Court comparing one process with another and
explaining the effects thereof. As an independent statement, it is even illogical.
Let us examine the statement:
"x x x the wreath of victory cannot be transferred from an ineligible candidate to any other candidate
when the sole question is the eligibility of the one receiving a plurality of the legally cast ballots."
What prevents the transfer of the wreath of victory from the ineligible candidate to another
candidate?
When the issue being decided upon by the Court is the eligibility of the one receiving a plurality of
the legally cast ballots and ineligibility is thereafter established, what stops the Court from adjudging
another eligible candidate who received the next highest number of votes as the winner and
bestowing upon him that "wreath?"
An ineligible candidate who receives the highest number of votes is a wrongful winner. By express
legal mandate, he could not even have been a candidate in the first place, but by virtue of the lack of
material time or any other intervening circumstances, his ineligibility might not have been passed
upon prior to election date. Consequently, he may have had the opportunity to hold himself out to the
electorate as a legitimate and duly qualified candidate. However, notwithstanding the outcome of the
elections, his ineligibility as a candidate remains unchanged. Ineligibility does not only pertain to his
qualifications as a candidate but necessarily affects his right to hold public office. The number of
ballots cast in his favor cannot cure the defect of failure to qualify with the substantive legal
requirements of eligibility to run for public office.
The popular vote does not cure the
ineligibility of a candidate.
The ballot cannot override the constitutional and statutory requirements for qualifications and
disqualifications of candidates. When the law requires certain qualifications to be possessed or that
certain disqualifications be not possessed by persons desiring to serve as elective public officials,
those qualifications must be met before one even becomes a candidate. When a person who is not
qualified is voted for and eventually garners the highest number of votes, even the will of the
electorate expressed through the ballot cannot cure the defect in the qualifications of the candidate.
To rule otherwise is to trample upon and rent asunder the very law that sets forth the qualifications
and disqualifications of candidates. We might as well write off our election laws if the voice of the
electorate is the sole determinant of who should be proclaimed worthy to occupy elective positions in
our republic.
This has been, in fact, already laid down by the Court in Frivaldo v. COMELEC
50
when we
pronounced:
x x x. The fact that he was elected by the people of Sorsogon does not excuse this patent violation
of the salutary rule limiting public office and employment only to the citizens of this country. The
qualifications prescribed for elective office cannot be erased by the electorate alone.
The will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility, especially
if they mistakenly believed, as in this case, that the candidate was qualified. Obviously, this rule
requires strict application when the deficiency is lack of citizenship. If a person seeks to serve in the
Republic of the Philippines, he must owe his total loyalty to this country only, abjuring and
renouncing all fealty and fidelity to any other state.
51
(Emphasis supplied)
This issue has also been jurisprudentially clarified in Velasco v. COMELEC
52
where the Court ruled
that the ruling in Quizon and Saya-ang cannot be interpreted without qualifications lest "Election
victory x x x becomes a magic formula to bypass election eligibility requirements."
53

We have ruled in the past that a candidates victory in the election may be considered a sufficient
basis to rule in favor of the candidate sought to be disqualified if the main issue involves defects in
the candidates certificate of candidacy. We said that while provisions relating to certificates of
candidacy are mandatory in terms, it is an established rule of interpretation as regards election laws,
that mandatory provisions requiring certain steps before elections will be construed as directory after
the elections, to give effect to the will of the people. We so ruled in Quizon v. COMELEC and Saya-
ang v. COMELEC:
The present case perhaps presents the proper time and opportunity to fine-tune our above ruling.
We say this with the realization that a blanket and unqualified reading and application of this ruling
can be fraught with dangerous significance for the rule of law and the integrity of our elections. For
one, such blanket/unqualified reading may provide a way around the law that effectively negates
election requirements aimed at providing the electorate with the basic information to make an
informed choice about a candidates eligibility and fitness for office.
The first requirement that may fall when an unqualified reading is made is Section 39 of the LGC
which specifies the basic qualifications of local government officials. Equally susceptive of being
rendered toothless is Section 74 of the OEC that sets out what should be stated in a COC. Section
78 may likewise be emasculated as mere delay in the resolution of the petition to cancel or deny due
course to a COC can render a Section 78 petition useless if a candidate with false COC data wins.
To state the obvious, candidates may risk falsifying their COC qualifications if they know that an
election victory will cure any defect that their COCs may have. Election victory then becomes a
magic formula to bypass election eligibility requirements. (Citations omitted)
What will stop an otherwise disqualified individual from filing a seemingly valid COC, concealing any
disqualification, and employing every strategy to delay any disqualification case filed against him so
he can submit himself to the electorate and win, if winning the election will guarantee a disregard of
constitutional and statutory provisions on qualifications and disqualifications of candidates?
It is imperative to safeguard the expression of the sovereign voice through the ballot by ensuring that
its exercise respects the rule of law. To allow the sovereign voice spoken through the ballot to trump
constitutional and statutory provisions on qualifications and disqualifications of candidates is not
democracy or republicanism. It is electoral anarchy. When set rules are disregarded and only the
electorates voice spoken through the ballot is made to matter in the end, it precisely serves as an
open invitation for electoral anarchy to set in.1wphi 1
Maquiling is not a second-placer as
he obtained the highest number of
votes from among the qualified
candidates.
With Arnados disqualification, Maquiling then becomes the winner in the election as he obtained the
highest number of votes from among the qualified candidates.
We have ruled in the recent cases of Aratea v. COMELEC
54
and Jalosjos v. COMELEC
55
that a void
COC cannot produce any legal effect.
Thus, the votes cast in favor of the ineligible candidate are not considered at all in determining the
winner of an election.
Even when the votes for the ineligible candidate are disregarded, the will of the electorate is still
respected, and even more so. The votes cast in favor of an ineligible candidate do not constitute the
sole and total expression of the sovereign voice. The votes cast in favor of eligible and legitimate
candidates form part of that voice and must also be respected.
As in any contest, elections are governed by rules that determine the qualifications and
disqualifications of those who are allowed to participate as players. When there are participants who
turn out to be ineligible, their victory is voided and the laurel is awarded to the next in rank who does
not possess any of the disqualifications nor lacks any of the qualifications set in the rules to be
eligible as candidates.
There is no need to apply the rule cited in Labo v. COMELEC
56
that when the voters are well aware
within the realm of notoriety of a candidates disqualification and still cast their votes in favor said
candidate, then the eligible candidate obtaining the next higher number of votes may be deemed
elected. That rule is also a mere obiter that further complicated the rules affecting qualified
candidates who placed second to ineligible ones.
The electorates awareness of the candidates disqualification is not a prerequisite for the
disqualification to attach to the candidate. The very existence of a disqualifying circumstance makes
the candidate ineligible. Knowledge by the electorate of a candidates disqualification is not
necessary before a qualified candidate who placed second to a disqualified one can be proclaimed
as the winner. The second-placer in the vote count is actually the first-placer among the qualified
candidates.
That the disqualified candidate has already been proclaimed and has assumed office is of no
moment. The subsequent disqualification based on a substantive ground that existed prior to the
filing of the certificate of candidacy voids not only the COC but also the proclamation.
Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 provides:
Section 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. - Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment
to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any
reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is
voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall
continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the
complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the
proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.
There was no chance for Arnados proclamation to be suspended under this rule because Arnado
failed to file his answer to the petition seeking his disqualification. Arnado only filed his Answer on 15
June 2010, long after the elections and after he was already proclaimed as the winner.
The disqualifying circumstance surrounding Arnados candidacy involves his citizenship. It does not
involve the commission of election offenses as provided for in the first sentence of Section 68 of the
Omnibus Election Code, the effect of which is to disqualify the individual from continuing as a
candidate, or if he has already been elected, from holding the office.
The disqualifying circumstance affecting Arnado is his citizenship. As earlier discussed, Arnado was
both a Filipino and an American citizen when he filed his certificate of candidacy. He was a dual
citizen disqualified to run for public office based on Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code.
Section 40 starts with the statement "The following persons are disqualified from running for any
elective local position." The prohibition serves as a bar against the individuals who fall under any of
the enumeration from participating as candidates in the election.
With Arnado being barred from even becoming a candidate, his certificate of candidacy is thus
rendered void from the beginning. It could not have produced any other legal effect except that
Arnado rendered it impossible to effect his disqualification prior to the elections because he filed his
answer to the petition when the elections were conducted already and he was already proclaimed
the winner.
To hold that such proclamation is valid is to negate the prohibitory character of the disqualification
which Arnado possessed even prior to the filing of the certificate of candidacy. The affirmation of
Arnado's disqualification, although made long after the elections, reaches back to the filing of the
certificate of candidacy. Arnado is declared to be not a candidate at all in the May 201 0 elections.
Arnado being a non-candidate, the votes cast in his favor should not have been counted. This leaves
Maquiling as the qualified candidate who obtained the highest number of votes. Therefore, the rule
on succession under the Local Government Code will not apply.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is GRANTED. The Resolution of the COMELEC
En Bane dated 2 February 2011 is hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Respondent ROMMEL
ARNADO y CAGOCO is disqualified from running for any local elective position. CASAN MACODE
MAQUILING is hereby DECLARED the duly elected Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte in the 10
May 2010 elections.
This Decision is immediately executory.
Let a copy of this Decision be served personally upon the parties and the Commission on Elections.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 135083. May 26, 1999]
ERNESTO S. MERCADO, petitioner, vs. EDUARDO BARRIOS MANZANO
and the COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,respondents.
D E C I S I O N
MENDOZA, J .:
Petitioner Ernesto S. Mercado and private respondent Eduardo B. Manzano were candidates
for vice mayor of the City of Makati in the May 11, 1998 elections. The other one was Gabriel
V. Daza III. The results of the election were as follows:
Eduardo B. Manzano 103,853
Ernesto S. Mercado 100,894
Gabriel V. Daza III 54,275
[1]

The proclamation of private respondent was suspended in view of a pending petition for
disqualification filed by a certain Ernesto Mamaril who alleged that private respondent was not a
citizen of the Philippines but of the United States.
In its resolution, dated May 7, 1998,
[2]
the Second Division of the COMELEC granted the
petition of Mamaril and ordered the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy of private
respondent on the ground that he is a dual citizen and, under 40(d) of the Local Government
Code, persons with dual citizenship are disqualified from running for any elective position. The
COMELECs Second Division said:
What is presented before the Commission is a petition for disqualification of Eduardo
Barrios Manzano as candidate for the office of Vice-Mayor of Makati City in the May
11, 1998 elections. The petition is based on the ground that the respondent is an
American citizen based on the record of the Bureau of Immigration and
misrepresented himself as a natural-born Filipino citizen.
In his answer to the petition filed on April 27, 1998, the respondent admitted that he is
registered as a foreigner with the Bureau of Immigration under Alien Certificate of
Registration No. B-31632 and alleged that he is a Filipino citizen because he was born
in 1955 of a Filipino father and a Filipino mother. He was born in the United States,
San Francisco, California, on September 14, 1955, and is considered an American
citizen under US Laws. But notwithstanding his registration as an American citizen,
he did not lose his Filipino citizenship.
Judging from the foregoing facts, it would appear that respondent Manzano is both a
Filipino and a US citizen. In other words, he holds dual citizenship.
The question presented is whether under our laws, he is disqualified from the position
for which he filed his certificate of candidacy. Is he eligible for the office he seeks to
be elected?
Under Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code, those holding dual citizenship
are disqualified from running for any elective local position.
WHEREFORE, the Commission hereby declares the respondent Eduardo Barrios
Manzano DISQUALIFIED as candidate for Vice-Mayor of Makati City.
On May 8, 1998, private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration.
[3]
The motion
remained pending even until after the election held on May 11, 1998.
Accordingly, pursuant to Omnibus Resolution No. 3044, dated May 10, 1998, of the
COMELEC, the board of canvassers tabulated the votes cast for vice mayor of Makati City but
suspended the proclamation of the winner.
On May 19, 1998, petitioner sought to intervene in the case for
disqualification.
[4]
Petitioners motion was opposed by private respondent.
The motion was not resolved. Instead, on August 31, 1998, the COMELEC en banc
rendered its resolution. Voting 4 to 1, with one commissioner abstaining, the COMELEC en
banc reversed the ruling of its Second Division and declared private respondent qualified to run
for vice mayor of the City of Makati in the May 11, 1998 elections.
[5]
The pertinent portions of
the resolution of the COMELEC en banc read:
As aforesaid, respondent Eduardo Barrios Manzano was born in San Francisco,
California, U.S.A. He acquired US citizenship by operation of the United States
Constitution and laws under the principle of jus soli.
He was also a natural born Filipino citizen by operation of the 1935 Philippine
Constitution, as his father and mother were Filipinos at the time of his birth. At the
age of six (6), his parents brought him to the Philippines using an American passport
as travel document. His parents also registered him as an alien with the Philippine
Bureau of Immigration. He was issued an alien certificate of registration. This,
however, did not result in the loss of his Philippine citizenship, as he did not renounce
Philippine citizenship and did not take an oath of allegiance to the United States.
It is an undisputed fact that when respondent attained the age of majority, he
registered himself as a voter, and voted in the elections of 1992, 1995 and 1998,
which effectively renounced his US citizenship under American law. Under
Philippine law, he no longer had U.S. citizenship.
At the time of the May 11, 1998 elections, the resolution of the Second Division,
adopted on May 7, 1998, was not yet final. Respondent Manzano obtained the highest
number of votes among the candidates for vice-mayor of Makati City, garnering one
hundred three thousand eight hundred fifty three (103,853) votes over his closest rival,
Ernesto S. Mercado, who obtained one hundred thousand eight hundred ninety four
(100,894) votes, or a margin of two thousand nine hundred fifty nine (2,959)
votes. Gabriel Daza III obtained third place with fifty four thousand two hundred
seventy five (54,275) votes. In applying election laws, it would be far better to err in
favor of the popular choice than be embroiled in complex legal issues involving
private international law which may well be settled before the highest court
(Cf. Frivaldo vs. Commission on Elections, 257 SCRA 727).
WHEREFORE, the Commission en banc hereby REVERSES the resolution of the
Second Division, adopted on May 7, 1998, ordering the cancellation of the
respondents certificate of candidacy.
We declare respondent Eduardo Luis Barrios Manzano to be QUALIFIED as a
candidate for the position of vice-mayor of Makati City in the May 11, 1998,
elections.
ACCORDINGLY, the Commission directs the Makati City Board of Canvassers,
upon proper notice to the parties, to reconvene and proclaim the respondent Eduardo
Luis Barrios Manzano as the winning candidate for vice-mayor of Makati City.
Pursuant to the resolution of the COMELEC en banc, the board of canvassers, on the
evening of August 31, 1998, proclaimed private respondent as vice mayor of the City of Makati.
This is a petition for certiorari seeking to set aside the aforesaid resolution of the
COMELEC en banc and to declare private respondent disqualified to hold the office of vice
mayor of Makati City. Petitioner contends that
[T]he COMELEC en banc ERRED in holding that:
A. Under Philippine law, Manzano was no longer a U.S. citizen when he:
1. He renounced his U.S. citizenship when he attained the age of majority when he
was already 37 years old; and,
2. He renounced his U.S. citizenship when he (merely) registered himself as a
voter and voted in the elections of 1992, 1995 and 1998.
B. Manzano is qualified to run for and or hold the elective office of Vice-Mayor of the
City of Makati;
C. At the time of the May 11, 1998 elections, the resolution of the Second Division
adopted on 7 May 1998 was not yet final so that, effectively, petitioner may not be
declared the winner even assuming that Manzano is disqualified to run for and hold
the elective office of Vice-Mayor of the City of Makati.
We first consider the threshold procedural issue raised by private respondent
Manzano whether petitioner Mercado has personality to bring this suit considering that he
was not an original party in the case for disqualification filed by Ernesto Mamaril nor was
petitioners motion for leave to intervene granted.
I. PETITIONER'S RIGHT TO BRING THIS SUIT

Private respondent cites the following provisions of Rule 8 of the Rules of Procedure of the
COMELEC in support of his claim that petitioner has no right to intervene and, therefore, cannot
bring this suit to set aside the ruling denying his motion for intervention:
Section 1. When proper and when may be permitted to intervene. Any person
allowed to initiate an action or proceeding may, before or during the trial of an action
or proceeding, be permitted by the Commission, in its discretion to intervene in such
action or proceeding, if he has legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the
success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or when he is so situated as
to be adversely affected by such action or proceeding.
. . . .
Section 3. Discretion of Commission. In allowing or disallowing a motion for
intervention, the Commission or the Division, in the exercise of its discretion, shall
consider whether or not the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the
adjudication of the rights of the original parties and whether or not the intervenors
rights may be fully protected in a separate action or proceeding.
Private respondent argues that petitioner has neither legal interest in the matter in litigation nor
an interest to protect because he is a defeated candidate for the vice-mayoralty post of Makati
City [who] cannot be proclaimed as the Vice-Mayor of Makati City even if the private
respondent be ultimately disqualified by final and executory judgment.
The flaw in this argument is it assumes that, at the time petitioner sought to intervene in the
proceedings before the COMELEC, there had already been a proclamation of the results of the
election for the vice mayoralty contest for Makati City, on the basis of which petitioner came out
only second to private respondent. The fact, however, is that there had been no proclamation at
that time. Certainly, petitioner had, and still has, an interest in ousting private respondent from
the race at the time he sought to intervene. The rule in Labo v. COMELEC,
[6]
reiterated in
several cases,
[7]
only applies to cases in which the election of the respondent is contested, and the
question is whether one who placed second to the disqualified candidate may be declared the
winner. In the present case, at the time petitioner filed a Motion for Leave to File Intervention
on May 20, 1998, there had been no proclamation of the winner, and petitioners purpose was
precisely to have private respondent disqualified from running for [an] elective local position
under 40(d) of R.A. No. 7160. If Ernesto Mamaril (who originally instituted the
disqualification proceedings), a registered voter of Makati City, was competent to bring the
action, so was petitioner since the latter was a rival candidate for vice mayor of Makati City.
Nor is petitioners interest in the matter in litigation any less because he filed a motion for
intervention only on May 20, 1998, after private respondent had been shown to have garnered
the highest number of votes among the candidates for vice mayor. That petitioner had a right to
intervene at that stage of the proceedings for the disqualification against private respondent is
clear from 6 of R.A. No. 6646, otherwise known as the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987, which
provides:
Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be
voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a
candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and
he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or
Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest
and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency
thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the
evidence of guilt is strong.
Under this provision, intervention may be allowed in proceedings for disqualification even
after election if there has yet been no final judgment rendered.
The failure of the COMELEC en banc to resolve petitioners motion for intervention was
tantamount to a denial of the motion, justifying petitioner in filing the instant petition for
certiorari. As the COMELEC en banc instead decided the merits of the case, the present petition
properly deals not only with the denial of petitioners motion for intervention but also with the
substantive issues respecting private respondents alleged disqualification on the ground of dual
citizenship.
This brings us to the next question, namely, whether private respondent Manzano possesses
dual citizenship and, if so, whether he is disqualified from being a candidate for vice mayor of
Makati City.
II. DUAL CITIZENSHIP AS A GROUND FOR DISQUALIFICATION

The disqualification of private respondent Manzano is being sought under 40 of the Local
Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160), which declares as disqualified from running for
any elective local position: . . . (d) Those with dual citizenship. This provision is incorporated
in the Charter of the City of Makati.
[8]

Invoking the maxim dura lex sed lex, petitioner, as well as the Solicitor General, who sides
with him in this case, contends that through 40(d) of the Local Government Code, Congress has
command[ed] in explicit terms the ineligibility of persons possessing dual allegiance to hold
local elective office.
To begin with, dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises when, as
a result of the concurrent application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is
simultaneously considered a national by the said states.
[9]
For instance, such a situation may arise
when a person whose parents are citizens of a state which adheres to the principle of jus
sanguinis is born in a state which follows the doctrine of jus soli. Such a person, ipso facto and
without any voluntary act on his part, is concurrently considered a citizen of both
states. Considering the citizenship clause (Art. IV) of our Constitution, it is possible for the
following classes of citizens of the Philippines to possess dual citizenship:
(1) Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in foreign countries which follow the
principle of jus soli;
(2) Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien fathers if by the laws of their
fathers country such children are citizens of that country;
(3) Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latters country the former are considered
citizens, unless by their act or omission they are deemed to have renounced Philippine
citizenship.
There may be other situations in which a citizen of the Philippines may, without performing
any act, be also a citizen of another state; but the above cases are clearly possible given the
constitutional provisions on citizenship.
Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a person simultaneously
owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary,
dual allegiance is the result of an individuals volition.
With respect to dual allegiance, Article IV, 5 of the Constitution provides: Dual allegiance
of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law. This provision was
included in the 1987 Constitution at the instance of Commissioner Blas F. Ople who explained
its necessity as follows:
[10]

. . . I want to draw attention to the fact that dual allegiance is not dual citizenship. I
have circulated a memorandum to the Bernas Committee according to which a dual
allegiance and I reiterate a dual allegiance is larger and more threatening than that
of mere double citizenship which is seldom intentional and, perhaps, never
insidious. That is often a function of the accident of mixed marriages or of birth on
foreign soil. And so, I do not question double citizenship at all.
What we would like the Committee to consider is to take constitutional cognizance of
the problem of dual allegiance. For example, we all know what happens in the
triennial elections of the Federation of Filipino-Chinese Chambers of Commerce
which consists of about 600 chapters all over the country. There is a Peking ticket, as
well as a Taipei ticket. Not widely known is the fact that the Filipino-Chinese
community is represented in the Legislative Yuan of the Republic of China in
Taiwan. And until recently, the sponsor might recall, in Mainland China in the
Peoples Republic of China, they have the Associated Legislative Council for
overseas Chinese wherein all of Southeast Asia including some European and Latin
countries were represented, which was dissolved after several years because of
diplomatic friction. At that time, the Filipino-Chinese were also represented in that
Overseas Council.
When I speak of double allegiance, therefore, I speak of this unsettled kind of
allegiance of Filipinos, of citizens who are already Filipinos but who, by their acts,
may be said to be bound by a second allegiance, either to Peking or Taiwan. I also
took close note of the concern expressed by some Commissioners yesterday, including
Commissioner Villacorta, who were concerned about the lack of guarantees of
thorough assimilation, and especially Commissioner Concepcion who has always
been worried about minority claims on our natural resources.
Dual allegiance can actually siphon scarce national capital to Taiwan, Singapore,
China or Malaysia, and this is already happening. Some of the great commercial
places in downtown Taipei are Filipino-owned, owned by Filipino-Chinese it is of
common knowledge in Manila. It can mean a tragic capital outflow when we have to
endure a capital famine which also means economic stagnation, worsening
unemployment and social unrest.
And so, this is exactly what we ask that the Committee kindly consider
incorporating a new section, probably Section 5, in the article on Citizenship which
will read as follows: DUAL ALLEGIANCE IS INIMICAL TO CITIZENSHIP AND
SHALL BE DEALT WITH ACCORDING TO LAW.
In another session of the Commission, Ople spoke on the problem of these citizens with dual
allegiance, thus:
[11]

. . . A significant number of Commissioners expressed their concern about dual
citizenship in the sense that it implies a double allegiance under a double sovereignty
which some of us who spoke then in a freewheeling debate thought would be
repugnant to the sovereignty which pervades the Constitution and to citizenship itself
which implies a uniqueness and which elsewhere in the Constitution is defined in
terms of rights and obligations exclusive to that citizenship including, of course, the
obligation to rise to the defense of the State when it is threatened, and back of this,
Commissioner Bernas, is, of course, the concern for national security. In the course of
those debates, I think some noted the fact that as a result of the wave of
naturalizations since the decision to establish diplomatic relations with the Peoples
Republic of China was made in 1975, a good number of these naturalized Filipinos
still routinely go to Taipei every October 10; and it is asserted that some of them do
renew their oath of allegiance to a foreign government maybe just to enter into the
spirit of the occasion when the anniversary of the Sun Yat-Sen Republic is
commemorated. And so, I have detected a genuine and deep concern about double
citizenship, with its attendant risk of double allegiance which is repugnant to our
sovereignty and national security. I appreciate what the Committee said that this
could be left to the determination of a future legislature. But considering the scale of
the problem, the real impact on the security of this country, arising from, let us say,
potentially great numbers of double citizens professing double allegiance, will the
Committee entertain a proposed amendment at the proper time that will prohibit, in
effect, or regulate double citizenship?
Clearly, in including 5 in Article IV on citizenship, the concern of the Constitutional
Commission was not with dual citizens per se but with naturalized citizens who maintain their
allegiance to their countries of origin even after their naturalization. Hence, the phrase dual
citizenship in R.A. No. 7160, 40(d) and in R.A. No. 7854, 20 must be understood as referring
to dual allegiance. Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this
disqualification. Unlike those with dual allegiance, who must, therefore, be subject to strict
process with respect to the termination of their status, for candidates with dual citizenship, it
should suffice if, upon the filing of their certificates of candidacy, they elect Philippine
citizenship to terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship considering that their
condition is the unavoidable consequence of conflicting laws of different states. As Joaquin G.
Bernas, one of the most perceptive members of the Constitutional Commission, pointed out:
[D]ual citizenship is just a reality imposed on us because we have no control of the laws on
citizenship of other countries. We recognize a child of a Filipino mother. But whether or not she
is considered a citizen of another country is something completely beyond our control.
[12]

By electing Philippine citizenship, such candidates at the same time forswear allegiance to
the other country of which they are also citizens and thereby terminate their status as dual
citizens. It may be that, from the point of view of the foreign state and of its laws, such an
individual has not effectively renounced his foreign citizenship. That is of no moment as the
following discussion on 40(d) between Senators Enrile and Pimentel clearly shows:
[13]

SENATOR ENRILE. Mr. President, I would like to ask clarification of line 41, page 17: Any person
with dual citizenship is disqualified to run for any elective local position. Under the present
Constitution, Mr. President, someone whose mother is a citizen of the Philippines but his father is
a foreigner is a natural-born citizen of the Republic. There is no requirement that such a natural
born citizen, upon reaching the age of majority, must elect or give up Philippine citizenship.
On the assumption that this person would carry two passports, one belonging to the country of his or
her father and one belonging to the Republic of the Philippines, may such a situation disqualify
the person to run for a local government position?
SENATOR PIMENTEL. To my mind, Mr. President, it only means that at the moment when he
would want to run for public office, he has to repudiate one of his citizenships.
SENATOR ENRILE. Suppose he carries only a Philippine passport but the country of origin or the
country of the father claims that person, nevertheless, as a citizen? No one can renounce. There
are such countries in the world.
SENATOR PIMENTEL. Well, the very fact that he is running for public office would, in effect, be an
election for him of his desire to be considered as a Filipino citizen.
SENATOR ENRILE. But, precisely, Mr. President, the Constitution does not require an
election. Under the Constitution, a person whose mother is a citizen of the Philippines is, at birth,
a citizen without any overt act to claim the citizenship.
SENATOR PIMENTEL. Yes. What we are saying, Mr. President, is: Under the Gentlemans
example, if he does not renounce his other citizenship, then he is opening himself to
question. So, if he is really interested to run, the first thing he should do is to say in the
Certificate of Candidacy that: I am a Filipino citizen, and I have only one citizenship.
SENATOR ENRILE. But we are talking from the viewpoint of Philippine law, Mr. President. He
will always have one citizenship, and that is the citizenship invested upon him or her in the
Constitution of the Republic.
SENATOR PIMENTEL. That is true, Mr. President. But if he exercises acts that will prove that he
also acknowledges other citizenships, then he will probably fall under this disqualification.
This is similar to the requirement that an applicant for naturalization must renounce all
allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state, or sovereignty
[14]
of which at the
time he is a subject or citizen before he can be issued a certificate of naturalization as a citizen of
the Philippines. In Parado v. Republic,
[15]
it was held:
[W]hen a person applying for citizenship by naturalization takes an oath that he
renounces his loyalty to any other country or government and solemnly declares that
he owes his allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, the condition imposed by
law is satisfied and complied with. The determination whether such renunciation is
valid or fully complies with the provisions of our Naturalization Law lies within the
province and is an exclusive prerogative of our courts. The latter should apply the law
duly enacted by the legislative department of the Republic. No foreign law may or
should interfere with its operation and application. If the requirement of the Chinese
Law of Nationality were to be read into our Naturalization Law, we would be
applying not what our legislative department has deemed it wise to require, but what a
foreign government has thought or intended to exact. That, of course, is absurd. It
must be resisted by all means and at all cost. It would be a brazen encroachment upon
the sovereign will and power of the people of this Republic.
III. PETITIONER'S ELECTION OF PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP

The record shows that private respondent was born in San Francisco, California on
September 4, 1955, of Filipino parents. Since the Philippines adheres to the principle of jus
sanguinis, while the United States follows the doctrine of jus soli, the parties agree that, at birth
at least, he was a national both of the Philippines and of the United States. However, the
COMELEC en banc held that, by participating in Philippine elections in 1992, 1995, and 1998,
private respondent effectively renounced his U.S. citizenship under American law, so that now
he is solely a Philippine national.
Petitioner challenges this ruling. He argues that merely taking part in Philippine elections is
not sufficient evidence of renunciation and that, in any event, as the alleged renunciation was
made when private respondent was already 37 years old, it was ineffective as it should have been
made when he reached the age of majority.
In holding that by voting in Philippine elections private respondent renounced his American
citizenship, the COMELEC must have in mind 349 of the Immigration and Nationality Act of
the United States, which provided that A person who is a national of the United States, whether
by birth or naturalization, shall lose his nationality by: . . . (e) Voting in a political election in a
foreign state or participating in an election or plebiscite to determine the sovereignty over foreign
territory. To be sure this provision was declared unconstitutional by the U.S. Supreme Court
in Afroyim v. Rusk
[16]
as beyond the power given to the U.S. Congress to regulate foreign
relations. However, by filing a certificate of candidacy when he ran for his present post, private
respondent elected Philippine citizenship and in effect renounced his American
citizenship. Private respondents certificate of candidacy, filed on March 27, 1998, contained the
following statements made under oath:
6. I AM A FILIPINO CITIZEN (STATE IF NATURAL-BORN OR
NATURALIZED) NATURAL-BORN
. . . .
10. I AM A REGISTERED VOTER OF PRECINCT NO. 747-A, BARANGAY SAN
LORENZO, CITY/MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI, PROVINCE OF NCR .
11. I AM NOT A PERMANENT RESIDENT OF, OR IMMIGRANT TO, A FOREIGN
COUNTRY.
12. I AM ELIGIBLE FOR THE OFFICE I SEEK TO BE ELECTED. I WILL
SUPPORT AND DEFEND THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES AND WILL
MAINTAIN TRUE FAITH AND ALLEGIANCE THERETO; THAT I WILL OBEY THE
LAWS, LEGAL ORDERS AND DECREES PROMULGATED BY THE DULY
CONSTITUTED AUTHORITIES OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES; AND
THAT I IMPOSE THIS OBLIGATION UPON MYSELF VOLUNTARILY, WITHOUT
MENTAL RESERVATION OR PURPOSE OF EVASION. I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT
THE FACTS STATED HEREIN ARE TRUE AND CORRECT OF MY OWN PERSONAL
KNOWLEDGE.
The filing of such certificate of candidacy sufficed to renounce his American citizenship,
effectively removing any disqualification he might have as a dual citizen. Thus, in Frivaldo v.
COMELEC it was held:
[17]

It is not disputed that on January 20, 1983 Frivaldo became an American. Would the
retroactivity of his repatriation not effectively give him dual citizenship, which under
Sec. 40 of the Local Government Code would disqualify him from running for any
elective local position? We answer this question in the negative, as there is cogent
reason to hold that Frivaldo was really STATELESS at the time he took said oath of
allegiance and even before that, when he ran for governor in 1988. In his Comment,
Frivaldo wrote that he had long renounced and had long abandoned his American
citizenshiplong before May 8, 1995. At best, Frivaldo was stateless in the
interimwhen he abandoned and renounced his US citizenship but before he was
repatriated to his Filipino citizenship.
On this point, we quote from the assailed Resolution dated December 19, 1995:
By the laws of the United States, petitioner Frivaldo lost his American citizenship
when he took his oath of allegiance to the Philippine Government when he ran for
Governor in 1988, in 1992, and in 1995. Every certificate of candidacy contains an
oath of allegiance to the Philippine Government.
These factual findings that Frivaldo has lost his foreign nationality long before the
elections of 1995 have not been effectively rebutted by Lee. Furthermore, it is basic
that such findings of the Commission are conclusive upon this Court, absent any
showing of capriciousness or arbitrariness or abuse.
There is, therefore, no merit in petitioners contention that the oath of allegiance contained
in private respondents certificate of candidacy is insufficient to constitute renunciation of his
American citizenship. Equally without merit is petitioners contention that, to be effective, such
renunciation should have been made upon private respondent reaching the age of majority since
no law requires the election of Philippine citizenship to be made upon majority age.
Finally, much is made of the fact that private respondent admitted that he is registered as an
American citizen in the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation and that he holds an American
passport which he used in his last travel to the United States on April 22, 1997. There is no merit
in this. Until the filing of his certificate of candidacy on March 21, 1998, he had dual
citizenship. The acts attributed to him can be considered simply as the assertion of his American
nationality before the termination of his American citizenship. What this Court said in Aznar v.
COMELEC
[18]
applies mutatis mutandis to private respondent in the case at bar:
. . . Considering the fact that admittedly Osmea was both a Filipino and an
American, the mere fact that he has a Certificate stating he is an American does not
mean that he is not still a Filipino. . . . [T]he Certification that he is an American does
not mean that he is not still a Filipino, possessed as he is, of both nationalities or
citizenships. Indeed, there is no express renunciation here of Philippine citizenship;
truth to tell, there is even no implied renunciation of said citizenship. When We
consider that the renunciation needed to lose Philippine citizenship must be express,
it stands to reason that there can be no such loss of Philippine citizenship when there
is no renunciation, either express or implied.
To recapitulate, by declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen; that
he is not a permanent resident or immigrant of another country; that he will defend and support
the Constitution of the Philippines and bear true faith and allegiance thereto and that he does so
without mental reservation, private respondent has, as far as the laws of this country are
concerned, effectively repudiated his American citizenship and anything which he may have said
before as a dual citizen.
On the other hand, private respondents oath of allegiance to the Philippines, when
considered with the fact that he has spent his youth and adulthood, received his education,
practiced his profession as an artist, and taken part in past elections in this country, leaves no
doubt of his election of Philippine citizenship.
His declarations will be taken upon the faith that he will fulfill his undertaking made under
oath. Should he betray that trust, there are enough sanctions for declaring the loss of his
Philippine citizenship through expatriation in appropriate proceedings. In Yu v. Defensor-
Santiago,
[19]
we sustained the denial of entry into the country of petitioner on the ground that,
after taking his oath as a naturalized citizen, he applied for the renewal of his Portuguese
passport and declared in commercial documents executed abroad that he was a Portuguese
national. A similar sanction can be taken against any one who, in electing Philippine citizenship,
renounces his foreign nationality, but subsequently does some act constituting renunciation of his
Philippine citizenship.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.




























G.R. No. 153883 January 13, 2004
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
CHULE Y. LIM, respondent.
D E C I S I O N
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J .:
This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court stemmed from a petition for
correction of entries under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court filed by respondent Chule Y. Lim with the
Regional Trial Court of Lanao del Norte, Branch 4, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 4933.
In her petition, respondent claimed that she was born on October 29, 1954 in Buru-an, Iligan City.
Her birth was registered in Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte but the Municipal Civil Registrar of
Kauswagan transferred her record of birth to Iligan City. She alleged that both her Kauswagan and
Iligan City records of birth have four erroneous entries, and prays that they be corrected.
The trial court then issued an Order,
1
which reads:
WHEREFORE, finding the petition to be sufficient in form and substance, let the hearing of
this case be set on December 27, 1999 before this Court, Hall of Justice, Rosario Heights,
Tubod, Iligan City at 8:30 oclock in the afternoon at which date, place and time any
interested person may appear and show cause why the petition should not be granted.
Let this order be published in a newspaper of general circulation in the City of Iligan and the
Province of Lanao del Norte once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks at the expense of
the petitioner.
Furnish copies of this order the Office of the Solicitor General at 134 Amorsolo St., Legaspi
Vill., Makati City and the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Iligan City at Quezon Ave.,
Pala-o, Iligan City.
SO ORDERED.
During the hearing, respondent testified thus:
First, she claims that her surname "Yu" was misspelled as "Yo". She has been using "Yu" in
all her school records and in her marriage certificate.
2
She presented a clearance from the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)
3
to further show the consistency in her use of the
surname "Yu".
Second, she claims that her fathers name in her birth record was written as "Yo Diu To (Co
Tian)" when it should have been "Yu Dio To (Co Tian)."
Third, her nationality was entered as Chinese when it should have been Filipino considering that her
father and mother never got married. Only her deceased father was Chinese, while her mother is
Filipina. She claims that her being a registered voter attests to the fact that she is a Filipino citizen.
Finally, it was erroneously indicated in her birth certificate that she was a legitimate child when she
should have been described as illegitimate considering that her parents were never married.
Placida Anto, respondents mother, testified that she is a Filipino citizen as her parents were both
Filipinos from Camiguin. She added that she and her daughters father were never married because
the latter had a prior subsisting marriage contracted in China.
In this connection, respondent presented a certification attested by officials of the local civil registries
of Iligan City and Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte that there is no record of marriage between Placida
Anto and Yu Dio To from 1948 to the present.
The Republic, through the City Prosecutor of Iligan City, did not present any evidence although it
actively participated in the proceedings by attending hearings and cross-examining respondent and
her witnesses.
On February 22, 2000, the trial court granted respondents petition and rendered judgment as
follows:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, to set the records of the petitioner
straight and in their proper perspective, the petition is granted and the Civil Registrar of Iligan
City is directed to make the following corrections in the birth records of the petitioner, to wit:
1. Her family name from "YO" to "YU";
2. Her fathers name from "YO DIU TO (CO TIAN)" to "YU DIOTO (CO TIAN)";
3. Her status from "legitimate" to "illegitimate" by changing "YES" to "NO" in answer
to the question "LEGITIMATE?"; and,
4. Her citizenship from "Chinese" to "Filipino".
SO ORDERED.
4

The Republic of the Philippines appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the
trial courts decision.
5

Hence, this petition on the following assigned errors:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ORDERING THE CORRECTION OF THE
CITIZENSHIP OF RESPONDENT CHULE Y. LIM FROM "CHINESE" TO "FILIPINO"
DESPITE THE FACT THAT RESPONDENT NEVER DEMONSTRATED ANY
COMPLIANCE WITH THE LEGAL REQUIREMENTS FOR ELECTION OF CITIZENSHIP.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ALLOWING RESPONDENT TO CONTINUE USING
HER FATHERS SURNAME DESPITE ITS FINDING THAT RESPONDENT IS AN
ILLEGITIMATE CHILD.
6

To digress, it is just as well that the Republic did not cite as error respondents recourse to Rule 108
of the Rules of Court to effect what indisputably are substantial corrections and changes in entries in
the civil register. To clarify, Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court provides the procedure for
cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry. The proceedings under said rule may either
be summary or adversary in nature. If the correction sought to be made in the civil register is clerical,
then the procedure to be adopted is summary. If the rectification affects the civil status, citizenship or
nationality of a party, it is deemed substantial, and the procedure to be adopted is adversary. This is
our ruling in Republic v. Valencia
7
where we held that even substantial errors in a civil registry may
be corrected and the true facts established under Rule 108 provided the parties aggrieved by the
error avail themselves of the appropriate adversary proceeding. An appropriate adversary suit or
proceeding is one where the trial court has conducted proceedings where all relevant facts have
been fully and properly developed, where opposing counsel have been given opportunity to
demolish the opposite partys case, and where the evidence has been thoroughly weighed and
considered.
8

As likewise observed by the Court of Appeals, we take it that the Republics failure to cite this error
amounts to a recognition that this case properly falls under Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court
considering that the proceeding can be appropriately classified as adversarial.
Instead, in its first assignment of error, the Republic avers that respondent did not comply with the
constitutional requirement of electing Filipino citizenship when she reached the age of majority. It
cites Article IV, Section 1(3) of the 1935 Constitution, which provides that the citizenship of a
legitimate child born of a Filipino mother and an alien father followed the citizenship of the father,
unless, upon reaching the age of majority, the child elected Philippine citizenship.
9
Likewise, the
Republic invokes the provision in Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 625, that legitimate children
born of Filipino mothers may elect Philippine citizenship by expressing such intention "in a statement
to be signed and sworn to by the party concerned before any officer authorized to administer oaths,
and shall be filed with the nearest civil registry. The said party shall accompany the aforesaid
statement with the oath of allegiance to the Constitution and the Government of the Philippines."
10

Plainly, the above constitutional and statutory requirements of electing Filipino citizenship apply only
to legitimatechildren. These do not apply in the case of respondent who was concededly an
illegitimate child, considering that her Chinese father and Filipino mother were never married. As
such, she was not required to comply with said constitutional and statutory requirements to become
a Filipino citizen. By being an illegitimate child of a Filipino mother, respondent automatically
became a Filipino upon birth. Stated differently, she is a Filipino since birth without having to elect
Filipino citizenship when she reached the age of majority.
In Ching, Re: Application for Admission to the Bar,
11
citing In re Florencio Mallare,
12
we held:
Esteban Mallare, natural child of Ana Mallare, a Filipina, is therefore himself a Filipino, and
no other act would be necessary to confer on him all the rights and privileges attached to
Philippine citizenship (U.S. vs. Ong Tianse, 29 Phil. 332; Santos Co vs. Government of the
Philippine Islands, 42 Phil. 543; Serra vs. Republic, L-4223, May 12, 1952; Sy Quimsuan vs.
Republic, L-4693, Feb. 16, 1953; Pitallano vs. Republic, L-5111, June 28, 1954). Neither
could any act be taken on the erroneous belief that he is a non-Filipino divest him of the
citizenship privileges to which he is rightfully entitled.
13

This notwithstanding, the records show that respondent elected Filipino citizenship when she
reached the age of majority. She registered as a voter in Misamis Oriental when she was 18 years
old.
14
The exercise of the right of suffrage and the participation in election exercises constitute a
positive act of election of Philippine citizenship.
15

In its second assignment of error, the Republic assails the Court of Appeals decision in allowing
respondent to use her fathers surname despite its finding that she is illegitimate.
The Republics submission is misleading. The Court of Appeals did not allow respondent to use her
fathers surname. What it did allow was the correction of her fathers misspelled surname which she
has been using ever since she can remember. In this regard, respondent does not need a court
pronouncement for her to use her fathers surname.
We agree with the Court of Appeals when it held:
Firstly, Petitioner-appellee is now 47 years old. To bar her at this time from using her fathers
surname which she has used for four decades without any known objection from anybody,
would only sow confusion. Concededly, one of the reasons allowed for changing ones name
or surname is to avoid confusion.
Secondly, under Sec. 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 142, the law regulating the use of aliases,
a person is allowed to use a name "by which he has been known since childhood."
Thirdly, the Supreme Court has already addressed the same issue. In Pabellar v. Rep. of the
Phils.,
16
we held:
Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 142, which regulates the use of aliases, allows a person
to use a name "by which he has been known since childhood" (Lim Hok Albano v. Republic,
104 Phil. 795; People v. Uy Jui Pio, 102 Phil. 679; Republic v. Taada, infra). Even legitimate
children cannot enjoin the illegitimate children of their father from using his surname (De
Valencia v. Rodriguez, 84 Phil. 222).
17

While judicial authority is required for a change of name or surname,
18
there is no such requirement
for the continued use of a surname which a person has already been using since childhood.
19

The doctrine that disallows such change of name as would give the false impression of family
relationship remains valid but only to the extent that the proposed change of name would in great
probability cause prejudice or future mischief to the family whose surname it is that is involved or to
the community in general.
20
In this case, the Republic has not shown that the Yu family in China
would probably be prejudiced or be the object of future mischief. In respondents case, the change in
the surname that she has been using for 40 years would even avoid confusion to her community in
general.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition for review is DENIED. The decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 68893 dated May 29, 2002, is AFFIRMED. Accordingly, the
Civil Registrar of Iligan City is DIRECTED to make the following corrections in the birth record of
respondent Chule Y. Lim, to wit:
1. Her family name from "YO" to "YU";
2. Her fathers name from "YO DIU TO (CO TIAN)" to "YU DIOTO (CO TIAN)";
3. Her status from "legitimate" to "illegitimate" by changing "YES" to "NO" in answer to the
question "LEGITIMATE?"; and,
4. Her citizenship from "Chinese" to "Filipino".
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 104654 June 6, 1994
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. ROSALIO G. DE LA ROSA, PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,
BRANCH 28, MANILA and JUAN G. FRIVALDO, respondents.
G.R. No. 105715 June 6, 1994
RAUL R. LEE, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JUAN G. FRIVALDO, respondents.
G.R. No. 105735 June 6, 1994
RAUL R. LEE, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JUAN G. FRIVALDO, respondents.
The Solicitor General for petitioner in G.R. No. 104654.
Yolando F. Lim counsel for private respondent.

QUIASON, J .:
In Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections, 174 SCRA 245 (1989), this Court declared private
respondent, Juan G. Frivaldo, an alien and therefore disqualified from serving as Governor of the
Province of Sorsogon.
Once more, the citizenship of private respondent is put in issue in
these petitions docketed as G.R. No.104654 and G.R. No. 105715 and G.R. No. 105735. The
petitions were consolidated since they principally involve the same issues and parties.
I
G.R. No. 104654
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court in relation to R.A. No.
5440 and Section 25 of the Interim Rules, filed by the Republic of the Philippines: (1) to annul the
Decision dated February 27, 1992 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 28, Manila, in SP Proc. No.
91-58645, which re-admitted private respondent as a Filipino citizen under the Revised
Naturalization Law (C.A. No. 63 as amended by C.A. No. 473); and (2) to nullify the oath of
allegiance taken by private respondent on February 27, 1992.
On September 20, 1991, petitioner filed a petition for naturalization captioned: "In the Matter of
Petition of Juan G. Frivaldo to be Re-admitted as a Citizen of the Philippines under Commonwealth
Act No. 63" (Rollo, pp. 17-23).
In an Order dated October 7, 1991 respondent Judge set the petition for hearing on March 16, 1992,
and directed the publication of the said order and petition in the Official Gazette and a newspaper of
general circulation, for three consecutive weeks, the last publication of which should be at least six
months before the said date of hearing. The order further required the posting of a copy thereof and
the petition in a conspicuous place in the Office of the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court,
Manila (Rollo, pp. 24-26).
On January 14, 1992, private respondent filed a "Motion to Set Hearing Ahead of Schedule," where
he manifested his intention to run for public office in the May 1992 elections. He alleged that the
deadline for filing the certificate of candidacy was March 15, one day before the scheduled hearing.
He asked that the hearing set on March 16 be cancelled and be moved to January 24 (Rollo, pp. 27-
28).
The motion was granted in an Order dated January 24, 1992, wherein the hearing of the petition was
moved to February 21, 1992. The said order was not published nor a copy thereof posted.
On February 21, the hearing proceeded with private respondent as the sole witness. He submitted
the following documentary evidence: (1) Affidavit of Publication of the Order dated October 7, 1991
issued by the publisher of The Philippine Star (Exh. "A"); (2) Certificate of Publication of the order
issued
by the National Printing Office (Exh. "B"); (3) Notice of Hearing of Petition (Exh. "B-1"); (4)
Photocopy of a Citation issued by the National Press Club with private respondents picture (Exhs.
"C" and "C-2"); (5) Certificate of Appreciation issued by the Rotary Club of Davao (Exh. "D"); (6)
Photocopy
of a Plaque of Appreciation issued by the Republican College, Quezon City (Exh. "E"); (7) Photocopy
of a Plaque of Appreciation issued by the Davao-Bicol Association (Exh. "F"); (8) Certification issued
by the Records Management and Archives Office that the record of birth of private respondent was
not on file (Exh. "G"); and (8) Certificate of Naturalization issued by the United States District Court
(Exh. "H").
Six days later, on February 27, respondent Judge rendered the assailed Decision, disposing as
follows:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Petitioner JUAN G. FRIVALDO, is re-
admitted as a citizen of the Republic of the Philippines by naturalization, thereby
vesting upon him, all the rights and privileges of a natural born Filipino citizen (Rollo,
p. 33).
On the same day, private respondent was allowed to take his oath of allegiance before respondent
Judge (Rollo, p. 34).
On March 16, a "Motion for Leave of Court to Intervene and to Admit Motion for Reconsideration"
was filed by Quiterio H. Hermo. He alleged that the proceedings were tainted with jurisdictional
defects, and prayed for a new trial to conform with the requirements of the Naturalization Law.
After receiving a copy of the Decision on March 18, 1992, the Solicitor General interposed a timely
appeal directly with the Supreme Court.
G.R. No. 105715
This is a petition for certiorari, mandamus with injunction under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of
Court in relation to Section 5(2) of Article VIII of the Constitution with prayer for temporary restraining
order filed by Raul R. Lee against the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) and private
respondent, to annul the en banc Resolution of the COMELEC, which dismissed his petition
docketed as SPC Case No. 92-273. The said petition sought to annul the proclamation of private
respondent as Governor-elect of the Province of Sorsogon.
Petitioner was the official candidate of the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) for the position of
governor of the Province of Sorsogon in the May 1992 elections. Private respondent was the official
candidate of the Lakas-National Union of Christian Democrats (Lakas-NUCD) for the same position.
Private respondent was proclaimed winner on May 22, 1992.
On June 1, petitioner filed a petition with the COMELEC to annul the proclamation of private
respondent as Governor-elect of the Province of Sorsogon on the grounds: (1) that the proceedings
and composition of the Provincial Board of Canvassers were not in accordance with law; (2) that
private respondent is an alien, whose grant of Philippine citizenship is being questioned by the State
in G.R. No. 104654; and (3) that private respondent is not a duly registered voter. Petitioner further
prayed that the votes case in favor of private respondent be considered as stray votes, and that he,
on the basis of the remaining valid votes cast, be proclaimed winner.
On June 10, the COMELEC issued the questioned en banc resolution which dismissed the petition
for having been filed out of time, citing Section 19 of R.A. No. 7166. Said section provides that the
period to appeal a ruling of the board of canvassers on questions affecting its composition or
proceedings was three days.
In this petition, petitioner argues that the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion when it
ignored the fundamental issue of private respondents disqualification in the guise of technicality.
Petitioner claims that the inclusion of private respondents name in the list of registered voters in Sta.
Magdalena, Sorsogon was invalid because at the time he registered as a voter in 1987, he was as
American citizen.
Petitioner further claims that the grant of Filipino citizenship to private respondent is not yet
conclusive because the case is still on appeal before us.
Petitioner prays for: (1) the annulment of private respondents proclamation as Governor of the
Province of Sorsogon; (2) the deletion of private respondents name from the list of candidates for
the position of governor; (3) the proclamation of the governor-elect based on the remaining votes,
after the exclusion of the votes for private respondent; (4) the issuance of a temporary restraining
order to enjoin private respondent from taking his oath and assuming office; and (5) the issuance of
a writ of mandamus to compel the COMELEC to resolve the pending disqualification case docketed
as SPA Case No. 92-016, against private respondent.
G.R. No. 105735
This is a petition for mandamus under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court in relation to Section
5(2) of Article VIII of the Constitution, with prayer for temporary restraining order. The parties herein
are identical with the parties in G.R. No. 105715.
In substance, petitioner prays for the COMELECs immediate resolution of SPA Case No. 92-016,
which is a petition for the cancellation of private respondents certificate of candidacy filed on March
23, 1992 by Quiterio H. Hermo, the intervenor in G.R. No. 104654 (Rollo, p. 18).
The petition for cancellation alleged: (1) that private respondent is an American citizen, and therefore
ineligible to run as candidate for the position of governor of the Province of Sorsogon; (2) that the
trial courts decision
re-admitting private respondent as a Filipino citizen was fraught with legal infirmities rendering it null
and void; (3) that assuming the decision to be valid, private respondents oath of allegiance, which
was taken on the same day the questioned decision was promulgated, violated Republic Act No.
530, which provides for a two-year waiting period before the oath of allegiance can be taken by the
applicant; and (4) that the hearing of the petition on February 27, 1992, was held less than four
months from the date of the last publication of the order and petition. The petition prayed for the
cancellation of private respondents certificate of candidacy and the deletion of his name from the list
of registered voters in Sta. Magdalena, Sorsogon.
In his answer to the petition for cancellation, private respondent denied the allegations therein and
averred: (1) that Quiterio H. Hermo, not being a candidate for the same office for which private
respondent was aspiring, had no standing to file the petition; (2) that the decision re-admitting him to
Philippine citizenship was presumed to be valid; and (3) that no case had been filed to exclude his
name as a registered voter.
Raul R. Lee intervened in the petition for cancellation of private respondents certificate of candidacy
(Rollo, p. 37.).
On May 13, 1992, said intervenor urged the COMELEC to decide the petition for cancellation, citing
Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, which provides that all petitions on matters involving the
cancellation of a certificate of candidacy must be decided "not later than fifteen days before
election," and the case of Alonto v. Commission on Election, 22 SCRA 878 (1968), which ruled that
all pre-proclamation controversies should be summarily decided (Rollo,
p. 50).
The COMELEC concedes that private respondent has not yet reacquired his Filipino citizenship
because the decision granting him the same is not yet final and executory (Rollo, p. 63). However, it
submits that the issue of disqualification of a candidate is not among the grounds allowed in a
pre-proclamation controversy, like SPC Case No. 92-273. Moreover, the said petition was filed out of
time.
The COMELEC contends that the preparation for the elections occupied much of its time, thus its
failure to immediately resolve SPA Case No. 92-016. It argues that under Section 5 of Rule 25 of the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure, it is excused from deciding a disqualification case within the period
provided by law for reasons beyond its control. It also assumed that the same action was
subsequently abandoned by petitioner when he filed before it a petition for quo warranto docketed as
EPC No. 92-35. The quo warranto proceedings sought private respondents disqualification because
of his American citizenship.
II
G.R. No. 104654
We shall first resolve the issue concerning private respondents citizenship.
In his comment to the States appeal of the decision granting him Philippine citizenship in G.R. No.
104654, private respondent alleges that the precarious political atmosphere in the country during
Martial Law compelled him to seek political asylum in the United States, and eventually to renounce
his Philippine citizenship.
He claims that his petition for naturalization was his only available remedy for his reacquisition of
Philippine citizenship. He tried to reacquire his Philippine citizenship through repatriation and direct
act of Congress. However, he was later informed that repatriation proceedings were limited to army
deserters or Filipino women who had lost their citizenship by reason of their marriage to foreigners
(Rollo, pp. 49-50). His request to Congress for sponsorship of a bill allowing him to reacquire his
Philippine citizenship failed to materialize, notwithstanding the endorsement of several members of
the House of Representatives in his favor (Rollo, p. 51). He attributed this to the maneuvers of his
political rivals.
He also claims that the re-scheduling of the hearing of the petition to an earlier date, without
publication, was made without objection from the Office of the Solicitor General. He makes mention
that on the date of the hearing, the court was jam-packed.
It is private respondents posture that there was substantial compliance with the law and that the
public was well-informed of his petition for naturalization due to the publicity given by the media.
Anent the issue of the mandatory two-year waiting period prior to the taking of the oath of allegiance,
private respondent theorizes that the rationale of the law imposing the waiting period is to grant the
public an opportunity to investigate the background of the applicant and to oppose the grant of
Philippine citizenship if there is basis to do so. In his case, private respondent alleges that such
requirement may be dispensed with, claiming that his life, both private and public, was well-known.
Private respondent cites his achievement as a freedom fighter and a former Governor of the
Province of Sorsogon for six terms.
The appeal of the Solicitor General in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines is meritorious. The
naturalization proceedings in SP Proc. No. 91-58645 was full of procedural flaws, rendering the
decision an anomaly.
Private respondent, having opted to reacquire Philippine citizenship thru naturalization under the
Revised Naturalization Law, is duty bound to follow the procedure prescribed by the said law. It is
not for an applicant to decide for himself and to select the requirements which he believes, even
sincerely, are applicable to his case and discard those which be believes are inconvenient or merely
of nuisance value. The law does not distinguish between an applicant who was formerly a Filipino
citizen and one who was never such a citizen. It does not provide a special procedure for the
reacquisition of Philippine citizenship by former Filipino citizens akin to the repatriation of a woman
who had lost her Philippine citizenship by reason of her marriage to an alien.
The trial court never acquired jurisdiction to hear the petition for naturalization of private respondent.
The proceedings conducted, the decision rendered and the oath of allegiance taken therein, are null
and void for failure to comply with the publication and posting requirements under the Revised
Naturalization Law.
Under Section 9 of the said law, both the petition for naturalization and the order setting it for hearing
must be published once a week for three consecutive weeks in the Official Gazette and a newspaper
of general circulation respondent cites his achievements as a freedom fighter and a former Governor
of the Province of Sorsogon for six terms.
The appeal of the Solicitor General in behalf of the Republic of
the Philippines is meritorious. The naturalization proceedings in SP Proc.
No. 91-58645 was full of procedural flaws, rendering the decision an anomaly.
Private respondent, having opted to reacquire Philippine citizenship thru naturalization under the
Revised Naturalization Law, is duty bound to follow the procedure prescribed by the said law. It is
not for an applicant to decide for himself and to select the requirements which he believes, even
sincerely, are applicable to his case and discard those which he believes are inconvenient or merely
of nuisance value. The law does not distinguish between an applicant who was formerly a Filipino
citizen and one who was never such a citizen. It does not provide a special procedure for the
reacquisition of Philippine citizenship by former Filipino citizens akin to the repatriation of a woman
who had lost her Philippine citizenship by reason of her marriage to an alien.
The trial court never acquired jurisdiction to hear the petition for naturalization of private respondent.
The proceedings conducted, the decision rendered and the oath of allegiance taken therein, are null
and void for failure to comply with the publication and posting requirements under the Revised
Naturalization Law.
Under Section 9 of the said law, both the petition for naturalization and the order setting it for hearing
must be published once a week for three consecutive weeks in the Official Gazette and a newspaper
of general circulation. Compliance therewith is jurisdictional (Po Yi Bo v. Republic, 205 SCRA 400
[1992]). Moreover, the publication and posting of the petition and the order must be in its full test for
the court to acquire jurisdiction (Sy v. Republic, 55 SCRA 724 [1974]).
The petition for naturalization lacks several allegations required by Sections 2 and 6 of the Revised
Naturalization Law, particularly: (1) that the petitioner is of good moral character; (2) that he resided
continuously in the Philippines for at least ten years; (3) that he is able to speak and write English
and any one of the principal dialects; (4) that he will reside continuously in the Philippines from the
date of the filing of the petition until his admission to Philippine citizenship; and (5) that he has filed a
declaration of intention or if he is excused from said filing, the justification therefor.
The absence of such allegations is fatal to the petition (Po Yi Bi v. Republic, 205 SCRA 400 [1992]).
Likewise, the petition is not supported by the affidavit of at least two credible persons who vouched
for the good moral character of private respondent as required by Section 7 of the Revised
Naturalization Law. Private respondent also failed to attach a copy of his certificate of arrival to the
petition as required by Section 7 of the said law.
The proceedings of the trial court was marred by the following irregularities: (1) the hearing of the
petition was set ahead of the scheduled date of hearing, without a publication of the order advancing
the date of hearing, and the petition itself; (2) the petition was heard within six months from the last
publication of the petition; (3) petitioner was allowed to take his oath of allegiance before the finality
of the judgment; and (4) petitioner took his oath of allegiance without observing the two-year waiting
period.
A decision in a petition for naturalization becomes final only after 30 days from its promulgation and,
insofar as the Solicitor General is concerned, that period is counted from the date of his receipt of
the copy of the decision (Republic v. Court of First Instance of Albay, 60 SCRA 195 [1974]).
Section 1 of R.A. No. 530 provides that no decision granting citizenship in naturalization proceedings
shall be executory until after two years from its promulgation in order to be able to observe if: (1) the
applicant has left the country; (2) the applicant has dedicated himself continuously to a lawful calling
or profession; (3) the applicant has not been convicted of any offense or violation of government
promulgated rules; and (4) the applicant has committed any act prejudicial to the interest of the
country or contrary to government announced policies.
Even discounting the provisions of R.A. No. 530, the courts cannot implement any decision granting
the petition for naturalization before its finality.
G.R. No. 105715
In view of the finding in G.R. No. 104654 that private respondent is not yet a Filipino citizen, we have
to grant the petition in G.R. No. 105715 after treating it as a petition for certiorari instead of a petition
for mandamus. Said petition assails the en banc resolution of the COMELEC, dismissing SPC Case
No. 92-273, which in turn is a petition to annul private respondents proclamation on three grounds:
1) that the proceedings and composition of the Provincial Board of Canvassers were not in
accordance with law; 2) that private respondent is an alien, whose grant of Filipino citizenship is
being questioned by the State in G.R. No. 104654; and 3) that private respondent is not a duly
registered voter. The COMELEC dismissed the petition on the grounds that it was filed outside the
three-day period for questioning the proceedings
and composition of the Provincial Board of Canvassers under Section 19 of R.A. No. 7166.
The COMELEC failed to resolve the more serious issue the disqualification of private respondent
to be proclaimed Governor on grounds of lack of Filipino citizenship. In this aspect, the petition is
one for quo warranto. In Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections, 174 SCRA 245 (1989), we held that a
petition for quo warranto, questioning the respondents title and seeking to prevent him from holding
office as Governor for alienage, is not covered by the ten-day period for appeal prescribed in Section
253 of the Omnibus Election Code. Furthermore, we explained that "qualifications for public office
are continuing requirements and must be possessed not only at the time of appointment or election
or assumption of office but during the officers entire tenure; once any of the required qualification is
lost, his title may be seasonably challenged."
Petitioners argument, that to unseat him will frustrate the will of the electorate, is untenable. Both
the Local Government Code and the Constitution require that only Filipino citizens can run and be
elected to public office. We can only surmise that the electorate, at the time they voted for private
respondent, was of the mistaken belief that he had legally reacquired Filipino citizenship.
Petitioner in G.R. No. 105715, prays that the votes cast in favor of private respondent be considered
stray and that he, being the candidate obtaining the second highest number of votes, be declared
winner. In Labo, Jr. v. COMELEC, 176 SCRA 1 (1989), we ruled that where the candidate who
obtained the highest number of votes is later declared to be disqualified to hold the office to which he
was elected, the candidate who garnered the second highest number of votes is not entitled to be
declared winner (See also Geronimo v. Ramos, 136 SCRA 435 [1985]; Topacio v. Paredes, 23 Phil.
238 [1912]).
G.R. No. 105735
In view of the discussions of G.R. No. 104654 and G.R. No. 105715, we find the petition in G.R. No.
105735 moot and academic.
WHEREFORE, the petitions in G.R. No. 104654 and G.R. No. 105715 are both GRANTED while the
petition in G.R. No. 105735 is DISMISSED. Private respondent is declared NOT a citizen of the
Philippines and therefore DISQUALIFIED from continuing to serve as GOVERNOR of the Province
of Sorsogon. He is ordered to VACATE his office and to SURRENDER the same to the Vice-
Governor of the Province of Sorsogon once this decision becomes final and executory. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 161434. March 3, 2004]
MARIA JEANETTE C. TECSON and FELIX B. DESIDERIO,
JR., petitioners, vs. The COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, RONALD
ALLAN KELLY POE (a.k.a. FERNANDO POE, JR.) and
VICTORINO X. FORNIER,respondents.
[G.R. No. 161634. March 3, 2004]
ZOILO ANTONIO VELEZ, petitioner, vs. RONALD ALLAN KELLEY
POE, a.k.a. FERNANDO POE, JR.,respondent.
[G. R. No. 161824. March 3, 2004]
VICTORINO X. FORNIER, petitioner, vs. HON. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS and RONALD ALLAN KELLEY POE, ALSO KNOWN
AS FERNANDO POE JR., respondents.
D E C I S I O N
VITUG, J .:
Citizenship is a treasured right conferred on those whom the state
believes are deserving of the privilege. It is a precious heritage, as well
as an inestimable acquisition,
[1]
that cannot be taken lightly by anyone -
either by those who enjoy it or by those who dispute it.
Before the Court are three consolidated cases, all of which raise a single
question of profound importance to the nation. The issue of citizenship is
brought up to challenge the qualifications of a presidential candidate to hold
the highest office of the land. Our people are waiting for the judgment of the
Court with bated breath. Is Fernando Poe, Jr., the hero of silver screen, and
now one of the main contenders for the presidency, a natural-born Filipino or
is he not?
The moment of introspection takes us face to face with Spanish and
American colonial roots and reminds us of the rich heritage of civil law and
common law traditions, the fusion resulting in a hybrid of laws and
jurisprudence that could be no less than distinctly Filipino.
Antecedent Case Settings
On 31 December 2003, respondent Ronald Allan Kelly Poe, also known as
Fernando Poe, Jr. (hereinafter "FPJ"), filed his certificate of candidacy for the
position of President of the Republic of the Philippines under the Koalisyon ng
Nagkakaisang Pilipino (KNP) Party, in the forthcoming national elections. In
his certificate of candidacy, FPJ, representing himself to be a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines, stated his name to be "Fernando Jr.," or "Ronald
Allan" Poe, his date of birth to be 20 August 1939 and his place of birth to
be Manila.
Victorino X. Fornier, petitioner in G.R. No. 161824, entitled "Victorino X.
Fornier, Petitioner, versus Hon. Commission on Elections and Ronald Allan
Kelley Poe, also known as Fernando Poe, Jr., Respondents," initiated, on 09
January 2004, a petition docketed SPA No. 04-003 before the Commission on
Elections ("COMELEC") to disqualify FPJ and to deny due course or to cancel
his certificate of candidacy upon the thesis that FPJ made a material
misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by claiming to be a natural-
born Filipino citizen when in truth, according to Fornier, his parents were
foreigners; his mother, Bessie Kelley Poe, was an American, and his father,
Allan Poe, was a Spanish national, being the son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish
subject. Granting, petitioner asseverated, that Allan F. Poe was a Filipino
citizen, he could not have transmitted his Filipino citizenship to FPJ, the latter
being an illegitimate child of an alien mother. Petitioner based the allegation
of the illegitimate birth of respondent on two assertions - first, Allan F. Poe
contracted a prior marriage to a certain Paulita Gomez before his marriage to
Bessie Kelley and, second, even if no such prior marriage had existed, Allan
F. Poe, married Bessie Kelly only a year after the birth of respondent.
In the hearing before the Third Division of the COMELEC on 19 January
2004, petitioner, in support of his claim, presented several documentary
exhibits - 1) a copy of the certificate of birth of FPJ, 2) a certified photocopy of
an affidavit executed in Spanish by Paulita Poe y Gomez attesting to her
having filed a case for bigamy and concubinage against the father of
respondent, Allan F. Poe, after discovering his bigamous relationship with
Bessie Kelley, 3) an English translation of the affidavit aforesaid, 4) a certified
photocopy of the certificate of birth of Allan F. Poe, 5) a certification issued by
the Director of the Records Management and Archives Office, attesting to the
fact that there was no record in the National Archives that a Lorenzo Poe or
Lorenzo Pou resided or entered the Philippines before 1907, and 6) a
certification from the Officer-In-Charge of the Archives Division of the National
Archives to the effect that no available information could be found in the files
of the National Archives regarding the birth of Allan F. Poe.
On his part, respondent, presented twenty-two documentary pieces of
evidence, the more significant ones being - a) a certification issued by Estrella
M. Domingo of the Archives Division of the National Archives that there
appeared to be no available information regarding the birth of Allan F. Poe in
the registry of births for San Carlos, Pangasinan, b) a certification issued by
the Officer-In-Charge of the Archives Division of the National Archives that no
available information about the marriage of Allan F. Poe and Paulita Gomez
could be found, c) a certificate of birth of Ronald Allan Poe, d) Original
Certificate of Title No. P-2247 of the Registry of Deeds for the Province of
Pangasinan, in the name of Lorenzo Pou, e) copies of Tax Declaration No.
20844, No. 20643, No. 23477 and No. 23478 in the name of Lorenzo Pou, f) a
copy of the certificate of death of Lorenzo Pou, g) a copy of the purported
marriage contract between Fernando Pou and Bessie Kelley, and h) a
certification issued by the City Civil Registrar of San Carlos City, Pangasinan,
stating that the records of birth in the said office during the period of from
1900 until May 1946 were totally destroyed during World War II.
On 23 January 2004, the COMELEC dismissed SPA No. 04-003 for lack
of merit. Three days later, or on 26 January 2004, Fornier filed his motion for
reconsideration. The motion was denied on 06 February 2004 by the
COMELEC en banc. On 10 February 2004, petitioner assailed the decision of
the COMELEC before this Court conformably with Rule 64, in relation to Rule
65, of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. The petition, docketed G. R. No.
161824, likewise prayed for a temporary restraining order, a writ of preliminary
injunction or any other resolution that would stay the finality and/or execution
of the COMELEC resolutions.
The other petitions, later consolidated with G. R. No. 161824, would
include G. R. No. 161434, entitled "Maria Jeanette C. Tecson, and Felix B.
Desiderio, Jr., vs. The Commission on Elections, Ronald Allan Kelley Poe
(a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr.), and Victorino X. Fornier," and the other, docketed
G. R. No. 161634, entitled "Zoilo Antonio G. Velez, vs. Ronald Allan Kelley
Poe, a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr.," both challenging the jurisdiction of the
COMELEC and asserting that, under Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of the
1987 Constitution, only the Supreme Court had original and exclusive
jurisdiction to resolve the basic issue on the case.
Jurisdiction of the Court
In G. R. No. 161824
In seeking the disqualification of the candidacy of FPJ and to have the
COMELEC deny due course to or cancel FPJs certificate of candidacy for
alleged misrepresentation of a material fact (i.e., that FPJ was a natural-born
citizen) before the COMELEC, petitioner Fornier invoked Section 78 of the
Omnibus Election Code
Section 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. --- A
verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy
may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that any material representation
contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false
in consonance with the general powers of COMELEC expressed in Section 52
of the Omnibus Election Code -
Section 52. Powers and functions of the Commission on Elections. In addition to
the powers and functions conferred upon it by the Constitution, the Commission shall
have exclusive charge of the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the
conduct of elections for the purpose of ensuring free, orderly and honest elections -
and in relation to Article 69 of the Omnibus Election Code which would
authorize "any interested party" to file a verified petition to deny or cancel the
certificate of candidacy of any nuisance candidate.
Decisions of the COMELEC on disqualification cases may be reviewed by
the Supreme Court per Rule 64
[2]
in an action for certiorari under Rule 65
[3]
of
the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. Section 7, Article IX, of the 1987
Constitution also reads
"Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its Members any case or
matter brought before it within sixty days from the date of its submission for decision
or resolution. A case or matter is deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon
the filing of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum, required by the rules of the
Commission or by the Commission itself. Unless otherwise provided by this
Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be
brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days
from receipt of a copy thereof."
Additionally, Section 1, Article VIII, of the same Constitution provides that
judicial power is vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as
may be established by law which power includes the duty of the courts of
justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been
a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
It is sufficiently clear that the petition brought up in G. R. No. 161824 was
aptly elevated to, and could well be taken cognizance of by, this Court. A
contrary view could be a gross denial to our people of their fundamental right
to be fully informed, and to make a proper choice, on who could or should be
elected to occupy the highest government post in the land.
In G. R. No. 161434 and G. R. No. 161634
Petitioners Tecson, et al., in G. R. No. 161434, and Velez, in G. R. No.
161634, invoke the provisions of Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of the
1987 Constitution in assailing the jurisdiction of the COMELEC when it took
cognizance of SPA No. 04-003 and in urging the Supreme Court to instead
take on the petitions they directly instituted before it. The Constitutional
provision cited reads:
"The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to
the election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and may
promulgate its rules for the purpose."
The provision is an innovation of the 1987 Constitution. The omission in the
1935 and the 1973 Constitution to designate any tribunal to be the sole judge
of presidential and vice-presidential contests, has constrained this Court to
declare, in Lopez vs. Roxas,
[4]
as not (being) justiciable controversies or
disputes involving contests on the elections, returns and qualifications of the
President or Vice-President. The constitutional lapse prompted Congress, on
21 June 1957, to enact Republic Act No. 1793, "An Act Constituting an
Independent Presidential Electoral Tribunal to Try, Hear and Decide Protests
Contesting the Election of the President-Elect and the Vice-President-Elect of
the Philippines and Providing for the Manner of Hearing the Same." Republic
Act 1793 designated the Chief Justice and the Associate Justices of the
Supreme Court to be the members of the tribunal. Although the subsequent
adoption of the parliamentary form of government under the 1973 Constitution
might have implicitly affected Republic Act No. 1793, the statutory set-up,
nonetheless, would now be deemed revived under the present Section 4,
paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution.
Ordinary usage would characterize a "contest" in reference to a post-
election scenario. Election contests consist of either an election protest or
a quo warranto which, although two distinct remedies, would have one
objective in view, i.e., to dislodge the winning candidate from office. A perusal
of the phraseology in Rule 12, Rule 13, and Rule 14 of the "Rules of the
Presidential Electoral Tribunal," promulgated by the Supreme Court en
banc on 18 April 1992, would support this premise -
Rule 12. Jurisdiction. - The Tribunal shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to
the election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-President of
the Philippines.
Rule 13. How Initiated. - An election contest is initiated by the filing of an election
protest or a petition for quo warranto against the President or Vice-President. An
election protest shall not include a petition for quo warranto. A petition for quo
warranto shall not include an election protest.
Rule 14. Election Protest. - Only the registered candidate for President or for Vice-
President of the Philippines who received the second or third highest number of votes
may contest the election of the President or the Vice-President, as the case may be, by
filing a verified petition with the Clerk of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal within
thirty (30) days after the proclamation of the winner.
The rules categorically speak of the jurisdiction of the tribunal over
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the "President" or
"Vice-President", of the Philippines, and not of "candidates" for President or
Vice-President. A quo warranto proceeding is generally defined as being an
action against a person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or
exercises a public office.
[5]
In such context, the election contest can only
contemplate a post-election scenario. In Rule 14, only a registered candidate
who would have received either the second or third highest number of votes
could file an election protest. This rule again presupposes a post-
election scenario.
It is fair to conclude that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, defined by
Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution, would not include cases
directly brought before it, questioning the qualifications of a candidate for the
presidency or vice-presidency before the elections are held.
Accordingly, G. R. No. 161434, entitled "Maria Jeanette C. Tecson, et al.,
vs. Commission on Elections et al.," and G. R. No. 161634, entitled "Zoilo
Antonio Velez vs. Ronald Allan Kelley Poe a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr." would
have to be dismissed for want of jurisdiction.
The Citizenship Issue
Now, to the basic issue; it should be helpful to first give a brief historical
background on the concept of citizenship.
Perhaps, the earliest understanding of citizenship was that given by
Aristotle, who, sometime in 384 to 322 B.C., described the "citizen" to refer to
a man who shared in the administration of justice and in the holding of an
office.
[6]
Aristotle saw its significance if only to determine the constituency of
the "State," which he described as being composed of such persons who
would be adequate in number to achieve a self-sufficient existence.
[7]
The
concept grew to include one who would both govern and be governed, for
which qualifications like autonomy, judgment and loyalty could be
expected. Citizenship was seen to deal with rights and entitlements, on the
one hand, and with concomitant obligations, on the other.
[8]
In its ideal setting,
a citizen was active in public life and fundamentally willing to submit his
private interests to the general interest of society.
The concept of citizenship had undergone changes over the centuries. In
the 18th century, the concept was limited, by and large, to civil citizenship,
which established the rights necessary for individual freedom, such as rights
to property, personal liberty and justice.
[9]
Its meaning expanded during the
19th century to include political citizenship, which encompassed the right to
participate in the exercise of political power.
[10]
The 20th century saw the next
stage of the development of social citizenship, which laid emphasis on the
right of the citizen to economic well-being and social security.
[11]
The idea of
citizenship has gained expression in the modern welfare state as it so
developed in Western Europe. An ongoing and final stage of development, in
keeping with the rapidly shrinking global village, might well be
the internationalization of citizenship.
[12]

The Local Setting - from Spanish
Times to the Present
There was no such term as "Philippine citizens" during the Spanish regime
but "subjects of Spain" or "Spanish subjects."
[13]
In church records, the natives
were called 'indios', denoting a low regard for the inhabitants of the
archipelago. Spanish laws on citizenship became highly codified during the
19th century but their sheer number made it difficult to point to one
comprehensive law. Not all of these citizenship laws of Spain however, were
made to apply to the Philippine Islands except for those explicitly extended by
Royal Decrees.
[14]

Spanish laws on citizenship were traced back to the Novisima
Recopilacion, promulgated in Spain on 16 July 1805 but as to whether the law
was extended to the Philippines remained to be the subject of differing views
among experts;
[15]
however, three royal decrees were undisputably made
applicable to Spaniards in the Philippines - the Order de la Regencia of 14
August 1841,
[16]
the Royal Decree of 23 August 1868 specifically defining the
political status of children born in the Philippine Islands,
[17]
and finally, the Ley
Extranjera de Ultramar of 04 July 1870, which was expressly made applicable
to the Philippines by the Royal Decree of 13 July 1870.
[18]

The Spanish Constitution of 1876 was never extended to the Philippine
Islands because of the express mandate of its Article 89, according to which
the provisions of the Ultramar among which this country was included, would
be governed by special laws.
[19]

It was only the Civil Code of Spain, made effective in this jurisdiction on 18
December 1889, which came out with the first categorical enumeration of who
were Spanish citizens. -
(a) Persons born in Spanish territory,
(b) Children of a Spanish father or mother, even if they were born outside
of Spain,
(c) Foreigners who have obtained naturalization papers,
(d) Those who, without such papers, may have become domiciled
inhabitants of any town of the Monarchy.
[20]

The year 1898 was another turning point in Philippine history. Already in
the state of decline as a superpower, Spain was forced to so cede her sole
colony in the East to an upcoming world power, the United States. An
accepted principle of international law dictated that a change in sovereignty,
while resulting in an abrogation of all political laws then in force, would have
no effect on civil laws, which would remain virtually intact.
The Treaty of Paris was entered into on 10 December 1898 between
Spain and the United States.
[21]
Under Article IX of the treaty, the civil rights
and political status of the native inhabitants of the territories ceded to the
United States would be determined by its Congress -
"Spanish subjects, natives of the Peninsula, residing in the territory over which Spain
by the present treaty relinquishes or cedes her sovereignty may remain in such
territory or may remove therefrom, retaining in either event all their rights of property,
including the right to sell or dispose of such property or of its proceeds; and they shall
also have the right to carry on their industry, commerce, and professions, being
subject in respect thereof to such laws as are applicable to foreigners. In case they
remain in the territory they may preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain by
making, before a court of record, within a year from the date of the exchange of
ratifications of this treaty, a declaration of their decision to preserve such allegiance;
in default of which declaration they shall be held to have renounced it and to have
adopted the nationality of the territory in which they reside.
Thus
"The civil rights and political status of the native inhabitants of the territories hereby
ceded to the United States shall be determined by the Congress."
[22]

Upon the ratification of the treaty, and pending legislation by the United States
Congress on the subject, the native inhabitants of the Philippines ceased to
be Spanish subjects. Although they did not become American citizens, they,
however, also ceased to be "aliens" under American laws and were thus
issued passports describing them to be citizens of the Philippines entitled to
the protection of the United States.
The term "citizens of the Philippine Islands" appeared for the first time in
the Philippine Bill of 1902, also commonly referred to as the Philippine
Organic Act of 1902, the first comprehensive legislation of the Congress of the
United States on the Philippines -
".... that all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands continuing to reside therein, who
were Spanish subjects on the 11th day of April, 1891, and then resided in said Islands,
and their children born subsequent thereto, shall be deemed and held to be citizens of
the Philippine I slands and as such entitled to the protection of the United States,
except such as shall have elected to preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in
accordance with the provisions of the treaty of peace between the United States and
Spain, signed at Paris, December tenth eighteen hundred and ninety eight."
[23]

Under the organic act, a citizen of the Philippines was one who was an
inhabitant of the Philippines, and a Spanish subject on the 11
th
day of April
1899. The term inhabitant was taken to include 1) a native-born inhabitant,
2) an inhabitant who was a native of Peninsular Spain, and 3) an inhabitant
who obtained Spanish papers on or before 11 April 1899.
[24]

Controversy arose on to the status of children born in the Philippines from
11 April 1899 to 01 July 1902, during which period no citizenship law was
extant in the Philippines. Weight was given to the view, articulated in
jurisprudential writing at the time, that the common law principle ofjus soli,
otherwise also known as the principle of territoriality, operative in the United
States and England, governed those born in the Philippine Archipelago within
that period.
[25]
More about this later.
In 23 March 1912, the Congress of the United States made the following
amendment to the Philippine Bill of 1902 -
"Provided, That the Philippine Legislature is hereby authorized to provide by law for
the acquisition of Philippine citizenship by those natives of the Philippine Islands who
do not come within the foregoing provisions, the natives of other insular possession of
the United States, and such other persons residing in the Philippine Islands who would
become citizens of the United States, under the laws of the United States, if residing
therein."
[26]

With the adoption of the Philippine Bill of 1902, the concept of "Philippine
citizens" had for the first time crystallized. The word "Filipino" was used by
William H. Taft, the first Civil Governor General in the Philippines when he
initially made mention of it in his slogan, "The Philippines for the Filipinos." In
1916, the Philippine Autonomy Act, also known as the Jones Law restated
virtually the provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902, as so amended by the Act
of Congress in 1912 -
That all inhabitants of the Philippine I slands who were Spanish subjects on the
eleventh day of April, eighteen hundred and ninety-nine, and then resided in said
I slands, and their children born subsequently thereto, shall be deemed and held to
be citizens of the Philippine I slands, except such as shall have elected to preserve
their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance with the provisions of the treaty
of peace between the United States and Spain, signed at Paris December tenth,
eighteen hundred and ninety-eight and except such others as have since become
citizens of some other country; Provided, That the Philippine Legislature, herein
provided for, is hereby authorized to provide for the acquisition of Philippine
citizenship by those natives of the Philippine Islands who do not come within the
foregoing provisions, the natives of the insular possessions of the United States, and
such other persons residing in the Philippine Islands who are citizens of the United
States, or who could become citizens of the United States under the laws of the United
States, if residing therein."
Under the Jones Law, a native-born inhabitant of the Philippines was
deemed to be a citizen of the Philippines as of 11 April 1899 if he was 1) a
subject of Spain on 11 April 1899, 2) residing in the Philippines on said date,
and, 3) since that date, not a citizen of some other country.
While there was, at one brief time, divergent views on whether or not jus
soli was a mode of acquiring citizenship, the 1935 Constitution brought to an
end to any such link with common law, by adopting, once and for all, jus
sanguinis or blood relationship as being the basis of Filipino citizenship -
Section 1, Article III, 1935 Constitution. The following are citizens of the
Philippines -
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of
this Constitution
(2) Those born in the Philippines Islands of foreign parents who, before the
adoption of this Constitution, had been elected to public office in the Philippine
Islands.
(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.
(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and upon reaching the age
of majority, elect Philippine citizenship.
(5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
Subsection (4), Article III, of the 1935 Constitution, taken together with
existing civil law provisions at the time, which provided that women would
automatically lose their Filipino citizenship and acquire that of their foreign
husbands, resulted in discriminatory situations that effectively incapacitated
the women from transmitting their Filipino citizenship to their legitimate
children and required illegitimate children of Filipino mothers to still elect
Filipino citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. Seeking to correct this
anomaly, as well as fully cognizant of the newly found status of Filipino
women as equals to men, the framers of the 1973 Constitution crafted the
provisions of the new Constitution on citizenship to reflect such concerns -
Section 1, Article III, 1973 Constitution - The following are citizens of the
Philippines:
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this
Constitution.
(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines.
(3) Those who elect Philippine citizenship pursuant to the provisions of the
Constitution of nineteen hundred and thirty-five.
(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
For good measure, Section 2 of the same article also further provided that

"A female citizen of the Philippines who marries an alien retains her Philippine
citizenship, unless by her act or omission she is deemed, under the law to have
renounced her citizenship."
The 1987 Constitution generally adopted the provisions of the 1973
Constitution, except for subsection (3) thereof that aimed to correct the
irregular situation generated by the questionable proviso in the 1935
Constitution.
Section I, Article IV, 1987 Constitution now provides:
The following are citizens of the Philippines:
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this
Constitution.
(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines.
(3) Those born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mothers, who elect
Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and
(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
The Case Of FPJ
Section 2, Article VII, of the 1987 Constitution expresses:
"No person may be elected President unless he is a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines, a registered voter, able to read and write, at least forty years of age on the
day of the election, and a resident of the Philippines for at least ten years immediately
preceding such election."
The term "natural-born citizens," is defined to include "those who are
citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to
acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship."
[27]

The date, month and year of birth of FPJ appeared to be 20 August 1939
during the regime of the 1935 Constitution. Through its history, four modes of
acquiring citizenship - naturalization, jus soli, res judicata and jus sanguinis
[28]

had been in vogue. Only two, i.e., jus soli andjus sanguinis, could qualify a
person to being a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. Jus soli, per Roa
vs. Collector of Customs
[29]
(1912), did not last long. With the adoption of the
1935 Constitution and the reversal of Roa in Tan Chong vs. Secretary of
Labor
[30]
(1947), jus sanguinis or blood relationship would now become the
primary basis of citizenship by birth.
Documentary evidence adduced by petitioner would tend to indicate that
the earliest established direct ascendant of FPJ was his paternal grandfather
Lorenzo Pou, married to Marta Reyes, the father of Allan F. Poe. While the
record of birth of Lorenzo Pou had not been presented in evidence, his death
certificate, however, identified him to be a Filipino, a resident of San Carlos,
Pangasinan, and 84 years old at the time of his death on 11 September
1954. The certificate of birth of the father of FPJ, Allan F. Poe, showed that
he was born on 17 May 1915 to an Espaol father, Lorenzo Pou, and a
mestiza Espaol mother, Marta Reyes. Introduced by petitioner was an
uncertified copy of a supposed certificate of the alleged marriage of Allan F.
Poe and Paulita Gomez on 05 July 1936. The marriage certificate of Allan F.
Poe and Bessie Kelley reflected the date of their marriage to be on 16
September 1940. In the same certificate, Allan F. Poe was stated to be
twenty-five years old, unmarried, and a Filipino citizen, and Bessie Kelley to
be twenty-two years old, unmarried, and an American citizen. The birth
certificate of FPJ, would disclose that he was born on 20 August 1939 to Allan
F. Poe, a Filipino, twenty-four years old, married to Bessie Kelly, an American
citizen, twenty-one years old and married.
Considering the reservations made by the parties on the veracity of some
of the entries on the birth certificate of respondent and the marriage certificate
of his parents, the only conclusions that could be drawn with some degree of
certainty from the documents would be that -
1. The parents of FPJ were Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley;
2. FPJ was born to them on 20 August 1939;
3. Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley were married to each other on 16
September, 1940;
4. The father of Allan F. Poe was Lorenzo Poe; and
5. At the time of his death on 11 September 1954, Lorenzo Poe was 84
years old.
Would the above facts be sufficient or insufficient to establish the fact that
FPJ is a natural-born Filipino citizen? The marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe
and Bessie Kelley, the birth certificate of FPJ, and the death certificate of
Lorenzo Pou are documents of public record in the custody of a public
officer. The documents have been submitted in evidence by both contending
parties during the proceedings before the COMELEC.
The birth certificate of FPJ was marked Exhibit "A" for petitioner and
Exhibit "3" for respondent. The marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe to Bessie
Kelley was submitted as Exhibit "21" for respondent. The death certificate of
Lorenzo Pou was submitted by respondent as his Exhibit "5." While the last
two documents were submitted in evidence for respondent, the admissibility
thereof, particularly in reference to the facts which they purported to
show, i.e., the marriage certificate in relation to the date of marriage of Allan
F. Poe to Bessie Kelley and the death certificate relative to the death of
Lorenzo Pou on 11 September 1954 in San Carlos, Pangasinan, were all
admitted by petitioner, who had utilized those material statements in his
argument. All three documents were certified true copies of the originals.
Section 3, Rule 130, Rules of Court states that -
Original document must be produced; exceptions. - When the subject of inquiry is
the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original
document itself, except in the following cases:
x x x x x x x x x
(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public office or is
recorded in a public office.
Being public documents, the death certificate of Lorenzo Pou, the marriage
certificate of Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelly, and the birth certificate of
FPJ, constitute prima facie proof of their contents. Section 44, Rule 130, of
the Rules of Court provides:
Entries in official records. Entries in official records made in the performance of his
duty by a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty
specially enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.
The trustworthiness of public documents and the value given to the entries
made therein could be grounded on 1) the sense of official duty in the
preparation of the statement made, 2) the penalty which is usually affixed to a
breach of that duty, 3) the routine and disinterested origin of most such
statements, and 4) the publicity of record which makes more likely the prior
exposure of such errors as might have occurred.
[31]

The death certificate of Lorenzo Pou would indicate that he died on 11
September 1954, at the age of 84 years, in San Carlos, Pangasinan. It could
thus be assumed that Lorenzo Pou was born sometime in the year 1870 when
the Philippines was still a colony of Spain. Petitioner would argue that
Lorenzo Pou was not in the Philippines during the crucial period of from 1898
to 1902 considering that there was no existing record about such fact in the
Records Management and Archives Office. Petitioner, however, likewise
failed to show that Lorenzo Pou was at any other place during the same
period. In his death certificate, the residence of Lorenzo Pou was stated to be
San Carlos, Pangasinan. In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, it
should be sound to conclude, or at least to presume, that the place of
residence of a person at the time of his death was also his residence before
death. It would be extremely doubtful if the Records Management and
Archives Office would have had complete records of all residents of the
Philippines from 1898 to 1902.
Proof of Paternity and Filiation
Under Civil Law.
Petitioner submits, in any case, that in establishing filiation (relationship or
civil status of the child to the father [or mother]) or paternity (relationship or
civil status of the father to the child) of an illegitimate child, FPJ evidently
being an illegitimate son according to petitioner, the mandatory rules under
civil law must be used.
Under the Civil Code of Spain, which was in force in the Philippines from
08 December 1889 up until the day prior to 30 August 1950 when the Civil
Code of the Philippines took effect, acknowledgment was required to establish
filiation or paternity. Acknowledgment was either judicial (compulsory) or
voluntary. Judicial or compulsory acknowledgment was possible only if done
during the lifetime of the putative parent; voluntary acknowledgment could
only be had in a record of birth, a will, or a public document.
[32]
Complementary
to the new code was Act No. 3753 or the Civil Registry Law expressing in
Section 5 thereof, that -
In case of an illegitimate child, the birth certificate shall be signed and sworn to
jointly by the parents of the infant or only by the mother if the father refuses. In the
latter case, it shall not be permissible to state or reveal in the document the name of
the father who refuses to acknowledge the child, or to give therein any information by
which such father could be identified.
In order that the birth certificate could then be utilized to prove voluntary
acknowledgment of filiation or paternity, the certificate was required to be
signed or sworn to by the father. The failure of such requirement rendered the
same useless as being an authoritative document of recognition.
[33]
In Mendoza
vs. Mella,
[34]
the Court ruled -
"Since Rodolfo was born in 1935, after the registry law was enacted, the question here
really is whether or not his birth certificate (Exhibit 1), which is merely a certified
copy of the registry record, may be relied upon as sufficient proof of his having been
voluntarily recognized. No such reliance, in our judgment, may be placed upon
it. While it contains the names of both parents, there is no showing that they signed
the original, let alone swore to its contents as required in Section 5 of Act No.
3753. For all that might have happened, it was not even they or either of them who
furnished the data to be entered in the civil register. Petitioners say that in any event
the birth certificate is in the nature of a public document wherein voluntary
recognition of a natural child may also be made, according to the same Article 131.
True enough, but in such a case, there must be a clear statement in the document that
the parent recognizes the child as his or her own."
In the birth certificate of respondent FPJ, presented by both parties,
nowhere in the document was the signature of Allan F. Poe found. There
being no will apparently executed, or at least shown to have been executed,
by decedent Allan F. Poe, the only other proof of voluntary recognition
remained to be "some other public document." In Pareja vs. Pareja,
[35]
this
Court defined what could constitute such a document as proof of voluntary
acknowledgment:
"Under the Spanish Civil Code there are two classes of public documents,
those executed by private individuals which must be authenticated by notaries, and
those issued by competent public officials by reason of their office. The public
document pointed out in Article 131 as one of the means by which recognition may be
made belongs to the first class."
Let us leave it at that for the moment.
The 1950 Civil Code categorized the acknowledgment or recognition of
illegitimate children into voluntary, legal or compulsory. Voluntary recognition
was required to be expressedly made in a record of birth, a will, a statement
before a court of record or in any authentic writing. Legal acknowledgment
took place in favor of full blood brothers and sisters of an illegitimate child who
was recognized or judicially declared as natural. Compulsory
acknowledgment could be demanded generally in cases when the child had in
his favor any evidence to prove filiation. Unlike an action to claim legitimacy
which would last during the lifetime of the child, and might pass exceptionally
to the heirs of the child, an action to claim acknowledgment, however, could
only be brought during the lifetime of the presumed parent.
Amicus Curiae Ruben F. Balane defined, during the oral argument,
"authentic writing," so as to be an authentic writing for purposes of voluntary
recognition, simply as being a genuine or indubitable writing of the father. The
term would include a public instrument (one duly acknowledged before a
notary public or other competent official) or a private writing admitted by the
father to be his.
The Family Code has further liberalized the rules; Article 172, Article 173,
and Article 175 provide:
Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the
following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private
handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
Art. 173. The action to claim legitimacy may be brought by the child during his
or her lifetime and shall be transmitted to the heirs should the child die during
minority or in a state of insanity. In these cases, the heirs shall have a period of five
years within which to institute the action.
The action already commenced by the child shall survive notwithstanding the death
of either or both of the parties.
x x x x x x x x x.
Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same
way and on the same, evidence as legitimate children.
The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173, except
when the action is based on the second paragraph of Article 172, in which case the
action may be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent.
The provisions of the Family Code are retroactively applied; Article 256 of
the code reads:
"Art. 256. This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice
or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.
Thus, in Vda. de Sy-Quia vs. Court of Appeals,
[36]
the Court has ruled:
"We hold that whether Jose was a voluntarily recognized natural child should be
decided under Article 278 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Article 2260 of that
Code provides that 'the voluntary recognition of a natural child shall take place
according to this Code, even if the child was born before the effectivity of this body of
laws' or before August 30, 1950. Hence, Article 278 may be given retroactive effect."
It should be apparent that the growing trend to liberalize the
acknowledgment or recognition of illegitimate children is an attempt to break
away from the traditional idea of keeping well apart legitimate and non-
legitimate relationships within the family in favor of the greater interest and
welfare of the child. The provisions are intended to merely govern the private
and personal affairs of the family. There is little, if any, to indicate that the
legitimate or illegitimate civil status of the individual would also affect his
political rights or, in general, his relationship to the State. While, indeed,
provisions on "citizenship" could be found in the Civil Code, such provisions
must be taken in the context of private relations, the domain of civil law;
particularly -
"Civil Law is that branch of law which has for its double purpose the organization of
the family and the regulation of property. It has thus [been] defined as the mass of
precepts which determine and regulate the relations of assistance, authority and
obedience among members of a family, and those which exist among members of a
society for the protection of private interests."
[37]

In Yaez de Barnuevo vs. Fuster,
[38]
the Court has held:
"In accordance with Article 9 of the Civil Code of Spain, x x x the laws relating to
family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons,
govern Spaniards although they reside in a foreign country; that, in consequence, 'all
questions of a civil nature, such as those dealing with the validity or nullity of the
matrimonial bond, the domicile of the husband and wife, their support, as between
them, the separation of their properties, the rules governing property, marital
authority, division of conjugal property, the classification of their property, legal
causes for divorce, the extent of the latter, the authority to decree it, and, in general,
the civil effects of marriage and divorce upon the persons and properties of the
spouses, are questions that are governed exclusively by the national law of the
husband and wife."
The relevance of "citizenship" or "nationality" to Civil Law is best
exemplified in Article 15 of the Civil Code, stating that -
"Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal
capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living
abroad" -
that explains the need to incorporate in the code a reiteration of the
Constitutional provisions on citizenship. Similarly, citizenship is significant in
civil relationships found in different parts of the Civil Code,
[39]
such as on
successional rights and family relations.
[40]
In adoption, for instance, an
adopted child would be considered the child of his adoptive parents and
accorded the same rights as their legitimate child but such legal fiction
extended only to define his rights under civil law
[41]
and not his political status.
Civil law provisions point to an obvious bias against illegitimacy. This
discriminatory attitude may be traced to the Spanish family and property laws,
which, while defining proprietary and successional rights of members of the
family, provided distinctions in the rights of legitimate and illegitimate
children. In the monarchial set-up of old Spain, the distribution and
inheritance of titles and wealth were strictly according to bloodlines and the
concern to keep these bloodlines uncontaminated by foreign blood was
paramount.
These distinctions between legitimacy and illegitimacy were codified in the
Spanish Civil Code, and the invidious discrimination survived when the
Spanish Civil Code became the primary source of our own Civil Code. Such
distinction, however, remains and should remain only in the sphere of civil law
and not unduly impede or impinge on the domain of political law.
The proof of filiation or paternity for purposes of determining his citizenship
status should thus be deemed independent from and not inextricably tied up
with that prescribed for civil law purposes. The Civil Code or Family Code
provisions on proof of filiation or paternity, although good law, do not have
preclusive effects on matters alien to personal and family relations. The
ordinary rules on evidence could well and should govern. For instance, the
matter about pedigree is not necessarily precluded from being applicable by
the Civil Code or Family Code provisions.
Section 39, Rule 130, of the Rules of Court provides -
Act or Declaration about pedigree. The act or declaration of a person deceased, or
unable to testify, in respect to the pedigree of another person related to him by birth or
marriage, may be received in evidence where it occurred before the controversy, and
the relationship between the two persons is shown by evidence other than such act or
declaration. The word `pedigree includes relationship, family genealogy, birth,
marriage, death, the dates when and the places where these facts occurred, and the
names of the relatives. It embraces also facts of family history intimately connected
with pedigree.
For the above rule to apply, it would be necessary that (a) the declarant is
already dead or unable to testify, (b) the pedigree of a person must be at
issue, (c) the declarant must be a relative of the person whose pedigree is in
question, (d) declaration must be made before the controversy has occurred,
and (e) the relationship between the declarant and the person whose pedigree
is in question must be shown by evidence other than such act or declaration.
Thus, the duly notarized declaration made by Ruby Kelley Mangahas,
sister of Bessie Kelley Poe submitted as Exhibit 20 before the COMELEC,
might be accepted to prove the acts of Allan F. Poe, recognizing his own
paternal relationship with FPJ, i.e, living together with Bessie Kelley and his
children (including respondent FPJ) in one house, and as one family -
"I, Ruby Kelley Mangahas, of legal age and sound mind, presently residing in
Stockton, California, U.S.A., after being sworn in accordance with law do hereby
declare that:
1. I am the sister of the late Bessie Kelley Poe.
2. Bessie Kelley Poe was the wife of Fernando Poe, Sr.
3. Fernando and Bessie Poe had a son by the name of Ronald Allan Poe,
more popularly known in the Philippines as `Fernando Poe, Jr., or
`FPJ.
4. Ronald Allan Poe `FPJ was born on August 20, 1939 at St. Luke's
Hospital, Magdalena Street, Manila.
x x x x x x x x x
7. Fernando Poe Sr., and my sister Bessie, met and became engaged while
they were students at the University of the Philippines in 1936. I was
also introduced to Fernando Poe, Sr., by my sister that same year.
8. Fernando Poe, Sr., and my sister Bessie had their first child in 1938.
9. Fernando Poe, Sr., my sister Bessie and their first three children,
Elizabeth, Ronald, Allan and Fernando II, and myself lived together with
our mother at our family's house on Dakota St. (now Jorge Bocobo St.),
Malate until the liberation of Manila in 1945, except for some months
between 1943-1944.
10. Fernando Poe, Sr., and my sister, Bessie, were blessed with four (4)
more children after Ronald Allan Poe.
x x x x x x x x x
18. I am executing this Declaration to attest to the fact that my nephew,
Ronald Allan Poe is a natural born Filipino, and that he is the legitimate
child of Fernando Poe, Sr.
Done in City of Stockton, California, U.S.A., this 12th day of January 2004.
Ruby Kelley Mangahas
Declarant
DNA Testing
In case proof of filiation or paternity would be unlikely to satisfactorily
establish or would be difficult to obtain, DNA testing, which examines genetic
codes obtained from body cells of the illegitimate child and any physical
residue of the long dead parent could be resorted to. A positive match would
clear up filiation or paternity. In Tijing vs. Court of Appeals,
[42]
this Court has
acknowledged the strong weight of DNA testing -
"Parentage will still be resolved using conventional methods unless we adopt the
modern and scientific ways available. Fortunately, we have now the facility and
expertise in using DNA test for identification and parentage testing. The University
of the Philippines Natural Science Research Institute (UP-NSRI) DNA Analysis
Laboratory has now the capability to conduct DNA typing using short tandem repeat
(STR) analysis. The analysis is based on the fact that the DNA of a child/person has
two (2) copies, one copy from the mother and the other from the father. The DNA
from the mother, the alleged father and the child are analyzed to establish
parentage. Of course, being a novel scientific technique, the use of DNA test as
evidence is still open to challenge. Eventually, as the appropriate case comes, courts
should not hesitate to rule on the admissibility of DNA evidence. For it was said, that
courts should apply the results of science when competently obtained in aid of
situations presented, since to reject said result is to deny progress."
Petitioners Argument For
Jurisprudential Conclusiveness
Petitioner would have it that even if Allan F. Poe were a Filipino citizen, he
could not have transmitted his citizenship to respondent FPJ, the latter being
an illegitimate child. According to petitioner, prior to his marriage to Bessie
Kelley, Allan F. Poe, on July 5, 1936, contracted marriage with a certain
Paulita Gomez, making his subsequent marriage to Bessie Kelley bigamous
and respondent FPJ an illegitimate child. The veracity of the supposed
certificate of marriage between Allan F. Poe and Paulita Gomez could be
most doubtful at best. But the documentary evidence introduced by no less
than respondent himself, consisting of a birth certificate of respondent and a
marriage certificate of his parents showed that FPJ was born on 20 August
1939 to a Filipino father and an American mother who were married to each
other a year later, or on 16 September 1940. Birth to unmarried parents
would make FPJ an illegitimate child. Petitioner contended that as an
illegitimate child, FPJ so followed the citizenship of his mother, Bessie Kelley,
an American citizen, basing his stand on the ruling of this Court in Morano vs.
Vivo,
[43]
citing Chiongbian vs. de Leon
[44]
and Serra vs. Republic.
[45]

On the above score, the disquisition made by amicus curiae Joaquin G.
Bernas, SJ, is most convincing; he states -
"We must analyze these cases and ask what the lis mota was in each of them. If the
pronouncement of the Court on jus sanguinis was on the lis mota, the pronouncement
would be a decision constituting doctrine under the rule of stare decisis. But if the
pronouncement was irrelevant to the lis mota, the pronouncement would not be a
decision but a mere obiter dictum which did not establish doctrine. I therefore invite
the Court to look closely into these cases.
First, Morano vs. Vivo. The case was not about an illegitimate child of a Filipino
father. It was about a stepson of a Filipino, a stepson who was the child of a Chinese
mother and a Chinese father. The issue was whether the stepson followed the
naturalization of the stepfather. Nothing about jus sanguinis there. The stepson did
not have the blood of the naturalized stepfather.
Second, Chiongbian vs. de Leon. This case was not about the illegitimate son of a
Filipino father. It was about a legitimate son of a father who had become Filipino by
election to public office before the 1935 Constitution pursuant to Article IV, Section
1(2) of the 1935 Constitution. No one was illegitimate here.
Third, Serra vs. Republic. The case was not about the illegitimate son of a Filipino
father. Serra was an illegitimate child of a Chinese father and a Filipino mother. The
issue was whether one who was already a Filipino because of his mother who still
needed to be naturalized. There is nothing there about invidious jus sanguinis.
Finally, Paa vs. Chan.
[46]
This is a more complicated case. The case was about the
citizenship of Quintin Chan who was the son of Leoncio Chan. Quintin Chan claimed
that his father, Leoncio, was the illegitimate son of a Chinese father and a Filipino
mother. Quintin therefore argued that he got his citizenship from Leoncio, his
father. But the Supreme Court said that there was no valid proof that Leoncio was in
fact the son of a Filipina mother. The Court therefore concluded that Leoncio was not
Filipino. If Leoncio was not Filipino, neither was his son Quintin. Quintin therefore
was not only not a natural-born Filipino but was not even a Filipino.
The Court should have stopped there. But instead it followed with an obiter
dictum. The Court said obiter that even if Leoncio, Quintin's father, were Filipino,
Quintin would not be Filipino because Quintin was illegitimate. This statement about
Quintin, based on a contrary to fact assumption, was absolutely unnecessary for the
case. x x x It was obiter dictum, pure and simple, simply repeating the obiter dictum
in Morano vs. Vivo.
x x x x x x x x x
"Aside from the fact that such a pronouncement would have no textual foundation in
the Constitution, it would also violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution
not once but twice. First, it would make an illegitimate distinction between a
legitimate child and an illegitimate child, and second, it would make an illegitimate
distinction between the illegitimate child of a Filipino father and the illegitimate child
of a Filipino mother.
The doctrine on constitutionally allowable distinctions was established long ago by
People vs. Cayat.
[47]
I would grant that the distinction between legitimate children and
illegitimate children rests on real differences. x x x But real differences alone do not
justify invidious distinction. Real differences may justify distinction for one purpose
but not for another purpose.
x x x What is the relevance of legitimacy or illegitimacy to elective public
service? What possible state interest can there be for disqualifying an illegitimate
child from becoming a public officer. It was not the fault of the child that his parents
had illicit liaison. Why deprive the child of the fullness of political rights for no fault
of his own? To disqualify an illegitimate child from holding an important public
office is to punish him for the indiscretion of his parents. There is neither justice nor
rationality in that. And if there is neither justice nor rationality in the distinction, then
the distinction transgresses the equal protection clause and must be reprobated.
The other amici curiae, Mr. Justice Vicente Mendoza (a former member of
this Court), Professor Ruben Balane and Dean Martin Magallona, at bottom,
have expressed similar views. The thesis of petitioner, unfortunately hinging
solely on pure obiter dicta, should indeed fail.
Where jurisprudence regarded an illegitimate child as taking after the
citizenship of its mother, it did so for the benefit the child. It was to ensure a
Filipino nationality for the illegitimate child of an alien father in line with the
assumption that the mother had custody, would exercise parental authority
and had the duty to support her illegitimate child. It was to help the child, not
to prejudice or discriminate against him.
The fact of the matter perhaps the most significant consideration is
that the 1935 Constitution, the fundamental law prevailing on the day, month
and year of birth of respondent FPJ, can never be more explicit than it
is. Providing neither conditions nor distinctions, the Constitution states that
among the citizens of the Philippines are those whose fathers are citizens of
the Philippines. There utterly is no cogent justification to prescribe conditions
or distinctions where there clearly are none provided.
In Sum
(1) The Court, in the exercise of its power of judicial review,
possesses jurisdiction over the petition in G. R. No. 161824, filed under Rule
64, in relation to Rule 65, of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. G.R. No.
161824 assails the resolution of the COMELEC for alleged grave abuse of
discretion in dismissing, for lack of merit, the petition in SPA No. 04-003 which
has prayed for the disqualification of respondent FPJ from running for the
position of President in the 10
th
May 2004 national elections on the contention
that FPJ has committed material representation in his certificate of candidacy
by representing himself to be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines.
(2) The Court must dismiss, for lack of jurisdiction and prematurity,
the petitions in G. R. No. 161434 and No. 161634 both having been directly
elevated to this Court in the latters capacity as the only tribunal to resolve a
presidential and vice-presidential election contest under the
Constitution. Evidently, the primary jurisdiction of the Court can directly be
invoked only after, not before, the elections are held.
(3) In ascertaining, in G.R. No. 161824, whether grave abuse of
discretion has been committed by the COMELEC, it is necessary to take on
the matter of whether or not respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen, which,
in turn, depended on whether or not the father of respondent, Allan F. Poe,
would have himself been a Filipino citizen and, in the affirmative, whether or
not the alleged illegitimacy of respondent prevents him from taking after the
Filipino citizenship of his putative father. Any conclusion on the Filipino
citizenship of Lorenzo Pou could only be drawn from the presumption that
having died in 1954 at 84 years old, Lorenzo would have been born sometime
in the year 1870, when the Philippines was under Spanish rule, and that San
Carlos, Pangasinan, his place of residence upon his death in 1954, in the
absence of any other evidence, could have well been his place of residence
before death, such that Lorenzo Pou would have benefited from the en
masse Filipinization that the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902. That
citizenship (of Lorenzo Pou), if acquired, would thereby extend to his son,
Allan F. Poe, father of respondent FPJ. The 1935 Constitution, during which
regime respondent FPJ has seen first light, confers citizenship to all persons
whose fathers are Filipino citizens regardless of whether such children are
legitimate or illegitimate.
(4) But while the totality of the evidence may not establish
conclusively that respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines,
the evidence on hand still would preponderate in his favor enough to hold that
he cannot be held guilty of having made a material misrepresentation in his
certificate of candidacy in violation of Section 78, in relation to Section 74, of
the Omnibus Election Code. Petitioner has utterly failed to substantiate his
case before the Court, notwithstanding the ample opportunity given to the
parties to present their position and evidence, and to prove whether or not
there has been material misrepresentation, which, as so ruled in Romualdez-
Marcos vs. COMELEC,
[48]
must not only be material, but also deliberate and
willful.
WHEREFORE, the Court RESOLVES to DISMISS
1. G. R. No. 161434, entitled "Maria Jeanette C. Tecson and Felix B.
Desiderio, Jr., Petitioners, versus Commission on Elections, Ronald Allan
Kelley Poe (a.k.a. "Fernando Poe, Jr.,) and Victorino X. Fornier,
Respondents," and G. R. No. 161634, entitled "Zoilo Antonio Velez,
Petitioner, versus Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr.,
Respondent," for want of jurisdiction.
2. G. R. No. 161824, entitled Victorino X. Fornier, Petitioner, versus Hon.
Commission on Elections and Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, also known as
Fernando Poe, Jr., for failure to show grave abuse of discretion on the part of
respondent Commission on Elections in dismissing the petition in SPA No.
04-003.
No Costs.
SO ORDERED.