G.R. No. 88113 October 23, 1992 SPOUSES TITUS L. ENDAYA and GLENDA TRINIDAD; SPOUSES RICO L. ENDAYA and NANETTE AQUINO; and SPOUSES JOSEPHINE L. ENDAYA and LEANDRO BANTUG, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PEDRO FIDELI, respondents.
Facts of the Case: Spouses Natividad Trinidad and Cesar San Diego owned a piece of agricultural land consisting of 20,200 square meters situated in Batangas, devoted to rice and corn. As far back as 1934, private respondent Fideli has been cultivating this land as a tenant of the Spouses San Diego under a fifty-fifty (50-50) sharing agreement. On May 1974, a lease contract was executed between the spouses San Diego and one Regino Cassanova. Cassanova was obliged to pay P400.00 per hectare per annum and was given the authority to oversee the planting of crops. On 1980, the spouses sold the land to petitioners. Private respondent continued to farm the land although petitioners claim that private respondent was told immediately after the sale to vacate the land. On April 1985, private respondent filed a complaint with the RTC of Batangas, praying that he be declared the agricultural tenant of petitioners. The trial court decided in favor of petitioners by holding that private respondent is not an agricultural lessee of the land now owned by petitioners. Issue: Whether or not the agricultural leasehold agreement was extinguished due to: a.) the lease contract b.) waiver of the right of respondent as an agricultural lessee by consenting to and signing the lease agreement and the renewal of contract as a witness c.) the subsequent sale and the failure of respondent to secure the permission of the petitioner (buyer-owners) to cultivate the land as agricultural lessee
Decision of the Court: a) NO. Republic Act No. 3844 (1963), as amended By R.A. No. 6839 (1971), abolished share tenancy throughout the Philippines from 1971 and established the agricultural leasehold system by operation of law. Section 7 of the said law gave agricultural lessees security of tenure. The fact that the landowner entered into a civil lease contract over the subject landholding and gave the lessee the authority to oversee the farming of the land, as was done in this case, is not among the causes provided by law for the extinguishment of the agricultural leasehold relation. Hence, transactions involving the agricultural land over which an agricultural leasehold subsists resulting in change of ownership, e.g., sale, or transfer of legal possession, such as lease, will not terminate the right of the agricultural lessee. b) NO. The passage of R.A. 6839 in 1971, amending R.A. 3844 (1963), secured to private respondent all the rights pertaining to an agricultural lessee. The execution of a lease agreement between the Spouses San Diego and Regino Cassanova in 1974 did not terminate private respondent's status as an agricultural lessee. The fact that private respondent knew of, and consented to, the said lease contract by signing as witness to the agreement may not be construed as a waiver of his rights. c) NO. In the case at bar, the petitioners are successors-in-interest to a tenanted land over which an agricultural leasehold has long been established. The consent given by the original owners to constitute private respondent as the agricultural lessee of the subject landholding binds petitioners who are successors-in-interest of the Spouses San Diego. They are considered to have stepped into the latter's shoes, acquiring not only their rights but also their obligations. Petition is DISMISSED and the decision of the Court of Appeals AFFIRMED. G.R. No. 132767 January 18, 2000 PHILIPPINE VETERANS BANK, petitioner, vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. SECRETARY OF THE DEPT. OF AGRARIAN REFORM, DEPT. OF AGRARIAN REFORM ADJUDICATION BOARD, DAVAO CITY and LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Facts of the Case: Petitioner Philippine Veterans Bank owned four parcels of land in Tagum, Davao which were taken by the Department of Agrarian Reform for distribution to landless farmers pursuant to the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (R.A. No. 6657). Dissatisfied with the valuation of the Land Bank of the Philippines and the DARAB, petitioner filed a petition for determination of the just compensation for its property with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 2, Tagum, Davao on January 26, 1994. The RTC dismissed the petition on the ground that it was filed beyond the 15-day reglamentary period for filing appeals from the orders of the DARAB. The Decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Hence, this Petition for Review. Issue: Whether or not the Special Agrarian Courts are considered appellate courts in the determination of just compensation Decision of the Court: No. Under R.A. No. 6657, Section 50, Rule XIII, Section11 of the DARAB Rules of Procedure provides: " Land Valuation and Preliminary Determination and Payment of Just Compensation. The decision of the adjudicator on land valuation and preliminary determination and payment of just compensation shall not be appealable to the Board but shall be brought directly to the Regional Trial Courts designated as Special Agrarian Courts within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the notice thereof. Any party shall be entitled to only one motion for reconsideration." In Republic vs. Court of Appeals, this Rule is an acknowledgement by the DARAB that the power to decide just compensation cases for the taking of lands under R.A. No. 6657 is vested in the Courts. It is error to think that, because of Rule XIII, Sec. 11, the original and exclusive jurisdiction given to the courts to decide petitions for determination of just compensation has thereby been transformed into an appellate jurisdiction. It only means that, in accordance with settled principles of administrative law, primary jurisdiction is vested in the DAR as an administrative agency to determine in a preliminary manner the reasonable compensation to be paid for the lands taken under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program, but such determination is subject to challenge in the courts. The jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts is not any less "original and exclusive" because the question is first passed upon by the DAR, as the judicial proceedings are not a continuation of the administrative determination. Nevertheless, resort to the courts cannot be foreclosed on the theory that courts are the guarantors of the legality of administrative action. Accordingly, as the petition in the Regional Trial Court was filed beyond the 15-day period provided in Rule XIII, 11 of the Rules of Procedure of the DARAB, the trial court correctly dismissed the case and the Court of Appeals correctly affirmed the order of dismissal.
G.R. No. 105760 July 7, 1997 PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF GAPAN, NUEVA ECIJA, BR. 34, and NILDEFONSO MONTANO, respondents. Fact of the Case: Spouses Crisanto de la Cruz and Pepita Montano mortgaged two parcels of land to petitioner PNB, in 1978. On October 12, 1984, petitioner PNB extra judicially foreclosed the mortgage and was the only bidder at the public auction sale. On the same day, a Certificate of Sale over said lots was issued in favor of PNB. On September 24, 1986, petitioner PNB filed before the Regional Trial Court of Gapan, Nueva Ecija, a petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Possession. The petition was granted by the RTC. Before implementation of the writ, herein private respondent Montano filed a Motion for the Dissolution of the Writ of Possession on December 9, 1986, alleging that (1) he was instituted as tenant on the subject property even before 1972 by the former owners of the land. The RTC granted private respondent Montano's motion to dissolve the writ of possession in an Order dated August 28, 1990. Issue: Whether or not petitioner PNB is entitled to a Writ of Possession of the land in question? Decision of the Court: Petitioner PNB is not entitled to a Writ of Possession. The Court held that, granting that petitioner PNB's title over the subject property has been consolidated or confirmed in its favor, it is still not entitled to a writ of possession, as the same may be issued in extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage only if the debtor is in possession and no third person had intervened.
Such requisite is evidently lacking in the case at bar, as it has been established that private respondent Montano has been in possession and finally adjudged as the tenant on the landholding in question. Even if the fact of tenancy had not been reflected on the title, petitioner PNB admitted that before they consented to the mortgage, an ocular inspection was conducted on the landholding on the occasion of which, petitioner PNB's Credit Investigator already found private respondent Montano staying on the land and even interviewed the latter. It cannot be denied, therefore, that petitioner PNB had been put on notice by its actual knowledge of another person possessing the land, no matter what the given reason may have been for private respondent Montano's occupancy of the properties in question. Petition is denied.
[G.R. No. 100388. December 14, 2000] SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and CONCHITA AYALDE, respondents.
Facts of the Case:
Margarita Tana, widow of the late Ignacio Tana, Sr., alleged that her husband was, before his demise, an employee of Conchita Ayalde as a farmhand in the two (2) sugarcane plantations she owned. She further alleged that Tana worked continuously six (6) days a week, four (4) weeks a month, and for twelve (12) months every year between January 1961 to April 1979. For his labor, Tana allegedly received a regular salary according to the minimum wage prevailing at the time. She further alleged that throughout the given period, social security contributions, as well as medicare and employees compensation premiums were deducted from Tanas wages. It was only after his death that Margarita discovered that Tana was never reported for coverage, nor were his contributions/premiums remitted to the Social Security System (SSS). Consequently, she was deprived of the burial grant and pension benefits accruing to the heirs of Tana had he been reported for coverage.
Issue: Whether or not an agricultural laborer who was hired on "pakyaw" basis can be considered an employee entitled to compulsory coverage and corresponding benefits under the Social Security Law.
Decision of the Court:
The SSS Law provides for the mandatory coverage (Republic Act No. 1161, as amended by PD 1202 and PD 1636) is premised on the existence of an employer- employee relationship, and Section 8 (d) defines an "employee" as "any person who performs services for an employer in which either or both mental and physical efforts are used and who receives compensation for such services where there is an employer- employee relationship." The essential elements of an employer-employee relationship are: (a) the selection and engagement of the employee; (b) the payment of wages; (c) the power of dismissal; and (d) the power of control with regard to the means and methods by which the work is to be accomplished, with the power of control being the most determinative factor. In the case at bar, there is no question that Tana was selected and his services engaged by either Ayalde herself, or by Antero Maghari, her overseer. Corollarily, they also held the prerogative of dismissing or terminating Tana's employment. The dispute is in the question of payment of wages. Claimant Margarita Tana and her corroborating witnesses testified that her husband was paid daily wages "per quincena" as well as on "pakyaw" basis. Ayalde, on the other hand, insists that Tana was paid solely on "pakyaw" basis. To support her claim, she presented payrolls covering the period January of 1974 to January of 1976 and November of 1978 to May of 1979. No particular form of evidence is required to prove the existence of an employer- employee relationship. Any competent and relevant evidence to prove the relationship may be admitted. The Decision of CA is reversed and the decision of SSS is reinstated.