Informal Logic

First published Mon Nov 25, 1996; substantive revision Mon Nov 28, 2011
Informal logic is an attempt to develop a logic that can assess and analyze the arguments that
occur in natural language (everyday, ordinary language) discourse. Discussions in the
field may address instances of scientific, legal, and other technical forms of reasoning (and
notions like the distinction between science and pseudo-science), but the overriding aim has
been a comprehensive account of argument that can explain and evaluate the arguments found
in discussion, debate and disagreement as they manifest themselves in daily life in social
and political commentary; in news reports and editorials in the mass media (in newspapers,
magazines, television, the World Wide Web, twitter, etc.); in advertising and corporate and
governmental communications; and in personal exchange.
In developing its account of argument, informal logic combines logic's traditional emphasis
on inference with the study of a broad range of topics relevant to informal reasoning. The
latter include, to take only a few examples, competing definitions of argument; argument
identification; burden of proof; the empirical study of argument; diagramming; cognitive bias;
the history of argument analysis; methods of argumentative investigation; the role of emotion
in argument; and the implicit rules that characterize argumentative exchange in different
social contexts. Hansen 2011 provides a good survey of some of the core methods of informal
logic. He emphasizes the study of informal inference. Other discussions in the field range
across a broader territory. In doing so, they frequently intersect with, borrow from, and
contribute to the attempts to understand and/or model natural language reasoning found in
formal logic, cognitive psychology, rhetoric, dialectics, computational modeling, and a range
of other fields. The interdisciplinary study of informal reasoning that the amalgam of these
approaches has given rise to is often called argumentation theory.
In its origins and continued evolution, informal logic has often been allied with educational
goals, with the aim of developing ways of analyzing everyday reasoning that can inform, and
possibly be the foundation for, general education. In North America and other English
speaking countries, such ideals have been associated with the Critical Thinking Movement,
which aims to inform and improve public reasoning and debate by promoting models of
education which emphasize the critical examination of beliefs and decisions, and the
development of the skills that this requires. In this and other regards, informal logic has
significant affinities with the pragamatic logic movement one finds within the Polish logical
tradition (see Koszowy 2010).
Especially in its early formulations, informal logic was sometimes understood as a theoretical
alternative to formal logic. This characterization reflects early battles in philosophy
departments which debated where (or whether) informal logic fit within the study of real
logic. Today, the field enjoys a more conciliatory relationship with formal logic. While its
attempt to understand informal reasoning is usually couched in natural language, research
may employ formal methods and the question whether the accounts of argument which
characterize informal logic can in principle be formalized is a source of active investigation. It
is in this regard significant that recent work in computational modeling attempts to implement
informal logic models of natural-language reasoning. It suggests that defeasible (non-
monotonic) logic, probability theory, and other non-classical formal frameworks may be
suited to this task.
1. History
2. What is argument/ation?
3. An Example: Visual Argument
4. NLD and Beyond
5. Fallacy Theory
6. An Example: Ad Hominem
7. Rhetoric
8. Dialectics
9. Dialogue Theory
10. The Components of Informal Logic
11. New Horizons
12. Informal Logic and Philosophy
Bibliography
Academic Tools
Other Internet Resources
Related Entries

1. History
Though informal logic has a number of historical precedents, its origins are found in North
America in the 1970s. It comes into being as an offshoot of classical logic and might be
described as a child of the 1960s, a time when social and political movements pushed for an
education which was relevant to the issues of the day. In logic, and especially in the
teaching of logic at North American universities, this fostered an interest in the logic of
everyday arguments. The study of such arguments this gave rise to began with an attempt to
replace artificial examples of good and bad argument that characterized early introductory
logic texts (examples like: All men are mortal. Socrates is a man. So Socrates is mortal.)
with instances of reasoning, argument, and debate taken from the social commentary and
debate one finds in newspapers, the mass media, advertisements, and political campaigns.
Kahane 1971 is an early example of this trend (one might contrast Copi 1957).
Though the theoretical interests that this focus on real life examples produced are anticipated
in Hamblin's Fallacies (1970) and Toulmin's The Uses of Argument (1958), informal logic
proper began with the work of Johnson and Blair at the University of Windsor. Their
textbook, Logical Self-Defense (1977), was an early attempt to teach the logic of informal
reasoning. The Informal Logic Newsletter they conceived and edited (now the journal
Informal Logic) successfully established the discipline as a field for theoretical discussion,
development and research. Forty years later, the result is a recognized body of literature that
informs discussions within informal logic, and a standard (but evolving) set of topics,
problems, and issues that define the field. The latter include fallacies; argument schemes; the
rhetorical features of argument; dialectical obligations; dialogue theory; kinds of argument
(deductive, inductive, conductive); the role of images and diagrams in argument; empirical
studies of argument; communication in argumentative contexts; and the history of argument
analysis.
Scholarly journals that have played a significant role in the rise of informal logic include
Informal Logic, Argumentation, Philosophy and Rhetoric, Argumentation and Advocacy
(formerly the Journal of the American Forensic Association), Teaching Philosophy, Inquiry:
Critical Thinking Across the Disciplines and, more recently, Cogency and Argument and
Computation. The journals ProtoSociology (1999) and Studies in Logic, Grammar, and
Rhetoric (2009) have published important special issues on the field. In 2002 Philosophica
devoted a special issue to the implications of Hilary Putnam's philosophy for informal logic.
One early catalyst for work in informal logic was the Critical Thinking Movement (see Siegel
1988, Ennis 2011). It argued that education should be reworked to make the critical scrutiny
of our beliefs and assumptions a fundamental goal of education. While the movement's
implications have sometimes been interpreted in a very broad way (which may incorporate
problem solving in a very generic sense, so called lateral thinking, and information
literacy), a key theme is the importance of argument and argument assessment in educational
curricula. One government decision that promoted the development of informal logic was a
1980 California State University Executive Order that mandated that post secondary
education in the state include formal instruction in critical thinking. According to the order:
Instruction in critical thinking is to be designed to achieve an understanding of the
relationship of language to logic, which should lead to the ability to analyze, criticize, and
advocate ideas, to reason inductively and deductively and to reach factual or judgmental
conclusions based on sound inferences drawn from unambiguous statements of knowledge or
belief (Dumke 1980, Executive Order 338).
In keeping with educational interests of this sort, the development of informal logic has been
intertwined with pedagogical discussions of the ways in which students can best be taught to
reason well. These discussions are reflected in hundreds (perhaps thousands) of textbooks
which have been used to teach informal logic to university and college students in Canada, the
United States, the United Kingdom, and a growing number of other countries. Texts currently
in use take a variety of approaches to the subject. In some cases they are notable for their
theoretical as well as their pedagogical innovations. Current texts include: Woods, Irvine &
Walton 2004; Govier 2006; Groarke & Tindale 2012; Browne & Keeley 2010; Fisher 2004;
Seay & Nuccetelli 2012; Fisher 2004; Battersby 2009; and Hughes, Lavery & Doran 2010.
Historical precedents for the pedagogical and research interests that characterize informal
logic include Aristotle's rhetorical and logical works, which have been a touchstone for much
discussion. One already finds a significant analogue of today's approaches to informal
reasoning in nineteenth century texts which aim to raise general standards of reasoning
through public education in logic. Whatley 1830 and 1844 are notable in this regard. More
recently, the informal logic movement has been compared to a Polish tradition in pragmatic
logic, which promotes the notion that the tools of logic can be used to educate people to (i)
think more clearly and consistently, (ii) express their thoughts precisely and systematically,
and (ii) justify their claims with proper inferences (see Koszowy 2010 and Ajdukiewicz, K.
1974).
Today, the continued development of informal logic increasingly incorporates approaches to
discourse and argumentation found in cognate disciplines and fields like Speech
Communication, Rhetoric, Linguistics, Artificial Intelligence, Cognitive Psychology, and
Computational Modeling. Considered from this perspective, informal logic has become an
integral aspect of a much broader multi-disciplinary attempt to develop an argumentation
theory that can provide a comprehensive account of informal reasoning.
In the course of their development, informal logic and argumentation theory have been
highlighted and nurtured at a number of conferences. The most notable are nine biannual
University of Windsor conferences hosted by the Ontario Society for the Study of
Argumentation (OSSA), and six multi-disciplinary Amsterdam conferences hosted at four-
year intervals by the International Society for the Study of Argumentation (ISSA), beginning
in 1986. A tenth OSSA conference and a seventh Amsterdam conference are already planned.
Other significant initiatives include four Tokyo Conferences on Argumentation hosted by the
Japanese Debate Association in 2000, 2004, 2008 and 2012; a series of ArgDiaP workshops
(dealing with argumentation, critical thinking, dialogue and persuasion) held in Poland; and
the Symposium on Argument and Computation held in Perthshire, Scotland in 2000.
2.What is argument/ation?
Like classical logic, most work in informal logic has understood an argument as an attempt to
present evidence for a conclusion. It does so by providing premises (propositions or claims
or some sort) that support the conclusion. Hitchcock 2006 provides a precise account of this
conception, defining an argument as a claim-reason complex consisting of (i) an act of
concluding, (ii) one or more acts of premising (which assert propositions in favour of the
conclusion), and (iii) a stated or implicit inference word that indicates that the conclusion
follows from the premises.
A simple example that can illustrate this notion is the following excerpt from an opinion
article in the Western Courier (25/10/08), which criticized conservative groups unwilling to
support any kind of embryonic research.
EXAMPLE 1: This [opposition to embryonic research] is shortsighted and stubborn. The fact
is, fetuses are being aborted whether conservatives like it or not. Post-abortion, the embryos
are literally being thrown away when they could be used in lifesaving medical research. It has
become a matter of religious and personal beliefs, and misguided ones at that. Lives could be
saved and vastly improved if only scientists were allowed to use embryos that are otherwise
being tossed in the garbage.
We may summarize this argument as the following claim-reason complex.
Premise: Fetuses are being aborted anyway and lives could be saved and vastly improved if
only scientists were allowed to use embryos that are otherwise being tossed in the garbage.
Inference Indicator (implicit, unstated): (...hence...)
Conclusion: The conservative position is shortsighted and stubborn.
This is an argument that might be analyzed and assessed in a number of ways, in terms of
general criteria for good argument or as an instance of a particular scheme of argument (in
this case the scheme two wrongs reasoning or argument from waste).
In some significant ways, Hitchcock's account of argument is purposely broad. It allows
premises and conclusions to be any speech acts which assert the truth of a proposition
(including acts like suggesting, hypothesizing, boasting, and deducing), and recognizes that
arguments in natural language frequently occur without an explicit inference indicator like
since or therefore. In addition, his account recognizes that arguments can incorporate
drawings in a geometric proof, diagrams or pictures (as Hitchcock puts it: a poster with a
giant photograph of a starving emaciated child and the words make poverty history can
reasonably be construed as an argument).
When images are employed in these and many other contexts of dispute, they are clearly
argumentative, both in the sense that a potential difference of opinion is addressed, and in the
sense that some sort of evidence is provided for some conclusion. The evidence in question
may be conveyed by the different lengths of the bars on a graph, shown via a step by step
demonstration, or communicated through an image that evokes some moral judgment. The
use of images in argumentative contexts is increasingly prevalent as technology makes the
production and reproduction of images easier.
This use of images challenges the account of argument first assumed by informal logic, which
understood arguments as collections of sentences and did not recognize arguments expressed
in non-verbal ways. Visual arguments have been defined as arguments which are conveyed,
at least in part, through non-verbal visual images. The latter may include graphs, photographic
evidence (used in courts, for example), documentary films, art, cartoons, and architecture. In a
manner that might be compared to the attempt to expand formal logic to allow for non-verbal
visual deductions (see Barwise and Etchemendy 1998), informal logicians have proposed that
we analyze and assess visual arguments in a manner similar to the way in which we
understand and assess verbal arguments (see Birdsell and Groarke 1996 and 2007, Blair 1996,
Collins and Schmid 1999, Lunsford, Ruszkiewicz and Walters 2001, Groarke 2002, Shelley
2003, Feteris et. al. 2011, Dove 2012).
Argument-1 and Argument-2
Recognizing visual (and other kinds of non-verbal) arguments significantly broadens the
scope of informal argument, but does so in a manner that is motivated by the same desire that
has motivated its development in the first place: the desire to have some theoretical means for
understanding and assessing informal arguments (which are replete with images). For the
same reason, many informal logicians now distinguish between two senses of argument
which are commonly designated argument-1 and argument-2.
Argument-1 is argument in the traditional premise and conclusion sense. Argument-2 is
argument understood as the disagreement and/or exchange in which argument-1 is typically
embedded. Sometimes the difference between these two kinds of argument is expressed by
describing argument-2 as process or transaction, and argument-1 as the product that results
from it (see Goodwin 2001). In natural language, the word argument can be used in either
sense. We may say that The arguments outlined for the new legislation on immigration are
not convincing, meaning that the premises offered do not successfully establish the
conclusion, or that Sarah and Sami had a heated argument, meaning no more than they
vehemently disagreed. In the first case, we are speaking of argument-1, in the second of
argument-2.
Informal logic has paid increasing attention to argument-2 as discussions in the field have
evolved, for the simple reason that the assessment and analysis of argument-1 often requires
an understanding of argument in this broader sense. In judging the reasonableness of a
particular example of argument-1, and the extent to which it is appropriate or convincing, we
must frequently consider the argument-2 that gives rise to it. A convincing argument in
personal exchange may not meet the standards required to resolve a disagreement in
parliament, and one that meets these standards may not meet others required by the law of
torts.
The significance of argument-2 need not deflect one from a focus on argument-1 (on
arguments in the premise-and-conclusion sense), but it does mean that one must pay close
attention, in the course of analyzing and assessing instances of argument-1, to
argumentation understood in the argument-2 sense. Among other things, this suggests that
the comprehensive account of informal reasoning which is its goal should include an account
of a variety of speech acts that play a key role in argumentation (including questions and
commands), the dynamics of disagreement, and contexts of argument. This broadening of the
horizons of informal logic is in keeping with the intuition that they too can be judged against
standards of rationality.
Argument and Persuasion
A more difficult question for informal logic is the relationship between argument and
persuasion. In his discussion, Hitchcock cites Aristotle's account of persuasion in the
Rhetoric. It distinguishes three aspects of persuasion: character, emotion, and argument
(ethos, pathos, and logos). Like many other commentators, Hitchcock only counts the third of
these as argument. As he puts it: Presentation of oneself as having a certain character may
enhance the credibility of what one says, but it is not an argument in the sense defined in the
present chapter, since it lacks a premise conclusion structure. For the same reason, stirring up
the emotions of one's audience is not in itself an argument, even though it may be more
effective than argument at moving them, and even though it can be combined with argument.
The distinction between argument and persuasion has some historical significance insofar as it
is the basis of the distinction between logic and rhetoric as they are traditionally understood
logic choosing argument as its focus, rhetoric choosing persuasion. This being said, the
distinction between persuasion and argument remains an elusive one when one considers the
arguments one finds in informal discourse. Certainly it must be said that appeals to emotion
and character play a significant role in ordinary arguments that occur in social, moral and
political contexts. In an argument about nuclear policy, for example, it would be artificial to
remove the emotion inherent in a description of the consequences of nuclear war (say, the
dropping of the bomb on Hiroshima), especially as this emotion is likely to play a key role in
the argument. In the case of character, why not interpret a segment of a speech in which a
politician outlines their accomplishments and their record as an ethotic argument which seeks
to establish the conclusion that they are of strong and honest character (and should, therefore,
be supported in an election campaign)?
Endorsing the argument-2 conception of argument, Gilbert 1997 (cf. Carozza 2007) proposes
a radical move in this direction, understanding argumentation as an attempt to overcome
disagreement, propounding a corresponding theory of coalescent argument. According to
this account, arguments manifest clusters of attitudes, beliefs, feelings and intuitions
associated with the arguers. Argumentative exchange is then viewed as an attempt to identify
the points of agreement that can characterize different (and possibly opposed) arguers,
fostering the coalescence of their points of view.
On the basis of this account, Gilbert expands the scope of argument to include whatever can
be used to bring about the coalescence which is its aim. This means that the substance of
argument can be, not only reasons in the traditional sense, but also emotional or physical
means of coalescence. Sometimes, the latter are the more effective than premises as they have
been traditionally understood. While he recognizes the traditional logical mode of
argument, this means that Gilbert adds other modes, proposing that there can be emotional,
intuitive (kisceral), and physical (visceral) modes of argument. According to this account,
a hug, a forlorn look, or tears may count as argument.
Certainly Gilbert's examples show that actions and expressions of emotion often function as a
way to convince an audience of a particular point of view. This suggests that informal
argument must be understood in a way that allows for this. It is less clear that this requires the
radical re-conception of argument he proposes. One might instead attempt to account for the
non-logical arguments he identifies as instances of argument-1 that use non-verbal means of
communicating propositions which function as premises in a relatively standard sense. When
a student (to take one of Gilbert's examples) cries in a professor's office in order to convey the
importance he attaches to an A grade in a course, this might, for example, be understood as a
non-verbal enthymeme which forwards the argument I will be devastated if I do not receive
an A in this course; you should act in a way that doesn't leave me devastated upset; so you
should award me an A grade. As Gilbert proposes, this is an emotional argument, but not
necessarily one that requires fundamentally different criteria of assessment than arguments
traditionally conceived. Once the argument has been recognized, one might instead proceed in
the standard way, by judging whether the premises are plausible or not, and whether they
entail or make probable the conclusion.
3. An Example: Visual Argument
Examples can best illustrate some of the ways in which informal logic has extended the scope
of argument it began with. The advertisement below is an instance of visual argument that can
be used to show how informal logic's analysis of argument can be applied to visual images.
Under the title Just Add Vodka it features a bottle of vodka spilling its contents onto a
village below. The time of day (dusk), the inactivity and the darkness suggest a sleepy hamlet
where there is nothing to do at night. In the image, this contrasts sharply with the bustling
cityscape that has sprung to life where the vodka splashes to the ground a cityscape that
boasts a nightlife among the skyscrapers, nightclubs, bars, and restaurants.
EXAMPLE 2:

If we attempt to understand it literally, the image makes little sense bottles of vodka are
not so absurdly large, do not pour vodka on sleepy villages, and would not create a Manhattan
streetscape if they did. In view of these incongruities (and the fundamental principles that
guide us in the interpretation of speech acts), we do not naturally interpret the image as a
literal depiction of some event, but as a visual metaphor. In this case, the metaphor propounds
a message of transformation to the viewer, the vodka functioning as the catalyst for the
change. One might roughly summarize this message verbally, as the message that: Vodka
can transform your sleepy life into one full of cosmopolitan excitement.
A detailed analysis of the image might analyse its use of colours, its aesthetic qualities, its
relationship to other images, its sexual connotations, and so on. In the context of
argumentation, the key point is that the ad is intended as a way to convince us that we should
add vodka to our lives (and in a real advertisement, a particular brand of vodka). In view of
this, we might express the message as a visual argument, which can be paraphrased as
follows:
Premise: If you add vodka to your life, your sleepy nights will be transformed into nights of
cosmopolitan excitement.
Conclusion: You should add vodka to your life (i.e., purchase vodka).
One might fill out this analysis by noting that the move from the premise to the conclusion
depends on an implicit premise/assumption which we might summarize as the proposition that
A life of cosmopolitan excitement is highly desirable.
Once the image is recognized as an argument, we can assess it in the way that informal logic
assesses verbal arguments. The great advantage of this approach is that it invites a critical
assessment of the argument it forwards. To that end, it can be said that the premise of the
argument is obviously questionable, for it is not clear that the consumption of vodka is a
likely way to transform one's life into an exciting cosmopolitan life (rather than one beset by,
for example, alcohol-related problems).
Once we recognize the argumentative structure of the advertisement, we can go further, and
consider whether it should be understood as an instance of an argument scheme (a standard
pattern of argument). In this case, it can be classified as an instance of a variant of the fallacy
affirming the consequent, albeit a normative variant which does not allow one to infer that
X is desirable from the premises that If X then Y and Y is desirable. The
unacceptability of the inferences that make up such arguments can be demonstrated with
examples, as with the argument, If all sex acts were eliminated, we would eliminate sexually
transmitted diseases. The elimination of sexually transmitted disease is desirable. Therefore
the elimination of all sex acts is desirable.
The key point is that image in question can be recognized as an act of communication with an
implicit premise and conclusion structure. Understanding it in this way as an instance of
visual argument allows us to analyze and evaluate it with the tools of analysis and
assessment that informal logic has developed (whether additional tools are needed to assess
such arguments remains an open question). In this way, the evaluation of argumentative
images can be made a matter of systematic examination and critical inquiry which goes
beyond aesthetic assessment. In the present case, this allows one to describe the image as an
impressive accomplishment from an artistic or aesthetic point of view (which it surely is), but
still criticize it as an image which conveys a fallacious argument with questionable premises
and debatable assumptions.
4. NLD and Beyond
One impetus for the development of informal logic has been the view that natural language
arguments do not fit the deductive framework emphasized in traditional logic. The extent to
which informal arguments can be understood as deductive arguments has, therefore, been a
source of significant debate within informal logic. Natural Language Deductivism (NLD) is
the view that all informal arguments should be interpreted as attempts to create deductively
valid inferences.
If the premises of a deductively valid argument are true, its conclusion must be true (i.e.,
cannot be false). Deductive arguments have traditionally been associated with logical and
mathematical reasoning thought to produce certain or necessary conclusions, but good
deductive arguments in informal contexts typically yield conclusions that are reasonable or
plausible because they rely on premises which are reasonable or plausible (rather than
certain). In such cases, a conclusion is as certain as the premises of an argument, but this does
not mean that it is certain. In the valid inference:
EXAMPLE 3: The population of the world will grow from 6 to 9 billion from in the next
fifteen years so we will, if we are to provide sufficient food for everyone, need a way to
provide for an additional 3 billion people.
the premise of the argument is not, for example, certain, but reasonable (on the basis of other
reasoning that extrapolates from current population trends). It follows that the conclusion of
the argument is reasonable rather than certain.
The goal of natural language deductivism is an approach to informal arguments which allows
one to effectively and efficiently assess the support they provide for their conclusions. It
suggests that one should do so by:
(i) interpreting an argument as an attempt to construct a deductively valid inference; and then
(ii) assessing the credibility of the premises of the argument.
Because the conclusion of a deductively valid argument is as certain as its premises, (ii)
provides a gauge of the strength of the evidence an argument provides in favour of its
conclusion. In the case of EXAMPLE 3 above, step (i) in NLD assessment is straightforward
(because the argument is obviously valid). Step (ii) is the judgment that the premise of the
argument is a reasonable conjecture. On the basis of (ii), we have already noted that the
argument establishes its conclusion as a reasonable conjecture.
The major challenge for natural language deductivism is its account of informal arguments
that are not explicitly deductive. In circumstances of this sort, NLD assigns arguments
implicit premises which, once recognized, render such arguments deductively valid. Govier
1987 therefore describes NLD as a theory of reconstructive deductivism). The general
approach to argument reconstruction it proposes can be illustrated with an example.
Consider the following inductive generalization, which would usually be understood as a
paradigm example of an argument which is not deductively valid:
EXAMPLE 4: The French are fastidious about their appearance. I have met many of them in
the course of my work there and this was true of all of them.
Here the claim that The many French I have met in the course of my work there were all
fastidious about their appearance acts as a premise for the conclusion that The French are
fastidious about their appearance. Natural language deductivism suggests that we should
treat this as an attempt to construct a deductive inference by understanding it as an argument
with an implicit premise. It may, for example, assign the argument the implicit premise that
The French have the same attitude to their appearance that I have witnessed in the many
French I have met in the course of my work there. So understood, the argument can be seen
as a deductively valid inference.
According to NLD, we can always assign some implicit premise that will serve the purposes
of deductivist reconstruction. In doing so, the deductivist may note that implicit premises are
a generally accepted feature of natural language arguments, and invoke standard ways of
identifying implicit premises. The pragma-dialectical account of indirect speech acts
(Eemeren and Grootendorst 2002) is, for example, well suited to deductivist reconstruction.
In favour of natural language deductivism, it has been argued that it is an attractive theory of
informal argument because it proposes a theory that analyzes and assesses all arguments as
instances of one well understood form of inference; eliminates difficult distinctions between
deductive, inductive, conductive, abductive, etc. arguments (which are not clearly
distinguished in natural language argumentation); and recognizes implicit premises in a way
that usefully propels dialectical exchange in ordinary argument (see Groarke 1999). Aristotle
has been proposed as a key historical figure who adopts the deductivist approach (Groarke
2009). Those who reject deductivism argue that it is an artificial theory which forces informal
arguments to adhere to an overly restrictive model of argument that is too narrow to account
for the richness of ordinary reasoning (Johnson 2000 and Godden 2004).
Alternative accounts of informal argument grant that deductive reasoning is one component of
informal reasoning, but maintain that many informal arguments do not fit this model of
reasoning. Many accounts of informal logic categorize arguments in terms of the traditional
distinction between deductive and inductive arguments, a distinction which Govier 1987
dubs the great divide, emphasizing the latter over the former. If the premises of an
inductively valid argument are true, the conclusion is only probable or plausible, leaving
open the possibility that the premises are true and the conclusion false.
In classifying the basic forms of inference that characterize natural language arguments, some
countenance other kinds of inferences that are said to be unique: notably conductive and
abductive arguments.
Conductive arguments are instances of argument that provide an accumulation of non-
decisive reasons in favour of a conclusion (see Zenker and Fischer 2010, Other Internet
Resources). Different pieces of evidence may each suggest (but not conclusively prove) that a
defendant charged with murder is guilty. Taken summatively (the witness said he pulled the
trigger, the ballistics report shows that the bullet came from a gun he owned, he was
overheard saying he would get the victim, etc.) these different reasons may provide a strong
(but not conclusive) conductive argument for this conclusion.
Abductive arguments are inferences to the best explanation. They typically recognize some
facts, point out that it is entailed by a certain hypothesis, and conclude that the hypothesis is
true. Taken at face value, abductive arguments appear to be instances of the fallacy affirming
the consequent, and might on these grounds be dismissed, though they play a central role in
medical, scientific and legal reasoning (see Walton 2004).
Gilbert 1997 proposes a more radical recategorization of arguments which would recognize
emotional arguments as a fundamental category which demands its own treatment and
assessment. Visual and non-verbal arguments are other categories that are common. The
extent to which these different categories need to be recognized as distinct forms of inference
(rather than special instances or distinct expressions of more basic categories) remains a
matter of debate.
5. Fallacy Theory
Early work in informal logic favoured fallacies as a way of assessing informal arguments.
Traditional accounts define a fallacy as a pattern of poor reasoning which appears to be (and
in this sense mimics) a pattern of good reasoning (see Hansen 2002). Such accounts are a
problematic basis for a general account of fallacies insofar as what appears to be good
reasoning to one person may not appear so to another. In assessing ordinary arguments, these
issues can be avoided by understanding fallacies more simply, as common patterns of faulty
reasoning which can usefully be identified in the evaluation of informal arguments.
In its treatment of fallacies, informal logic revives a tradition which can be traced to Aristotle.
In the history of logic and philosophy, its significance is reflected in the writings of figures
like Locke, Whately, and Mill. Today, this tradition manifests itself in textbooks and websites
which attempt to teach good informal reasoning by teaching students how to detect the
standard fallacies.
Theoretical discussions of fallacies have not produced an agreed-upon taxonomy, but there is
a common set of fallacies which are typically used in the analysis of informal arguments.
They include formal fallacies like affirming the consequent and denying the antecedent; and
informal fallacies like ad hominem (against the person), slippery slope, ad bacculum
(appeal to force), ad misericordiam (appeal to pity), hasty generalization, and two
wrongs (as in two wrongs don't make a right). In textbooks, authors may devise their own
nomenclature to highlight the properties of particular kinds of fallacious arguments
(misleading vividness thus designates the misuse of vivid anecdotal evidence, and so on.)
In the research literature, Woods and Walton have discussed the definition, analysis and
assessment of a variety of fallacies in a series of articles and books, first as co-authors and
then individually (see, e.g., Woods and Walton 1989, Walton 1989, Woods 1995, Walton
1992, Walton 2000). Van Eemeren and Grootendorst 1992 have proposed a pragma-
dialectical theory which analyses fallacies as violations of the rules of critical discussion
(discussion which aims to critically resolve a difference of opinion). A good representative
collection of classical and contemporary essays on the fallacies is found in Hansen and Pinto
1995.
Some research in informal logic continues to focus on fallacies, and on the appropriate
understanding of particular fallacies, but the field has evolved in different directions which
place less emphasis on the fallacy approach. In some cases this has been because fallacies can
be subsumed by more general accounts of argument. If one adopts a dialogical approach to
argument, for example, then the crux of one's theory of argument is the implicit rules that
govern various kinds of dialogical exchange. One can then see fallacies, not as a theoretically
distinct notion, but as deviations from these rules. This approach leaves room for fallacies but
makes an account of dialogical exchange, not fallacies, the basis of one's account of
argument.
In other contexts, many have criticized fallacy theory on the grounds that traditional fallacies
are imprecise tools for understanding argument, and because a focus on them inevitably
emphasizes poor reasoning rather than good argument. Hitchcock (1995, 324) has, for
example, written that the claim that we should teach good reasoning by fallacies is like
saying that the best way to teach somebody to play tennis without making the common
mistakes is to demonstrate these faults in action and get him to label and respond to them.
The problems with fallacy theory have been compounded by research which has identified
many instances of traditional fallacies which appear to be reasonable patterns of inference in
day-to-day contexts of argument. In such discussions, commentators point to examples like
the following:
EXAMPLE 5: Martin Luther King Jr., influenced by Gandhi, argued that we can justifiably
break laws in a democratic country if our goal is change which has been unjustly obstructed.
Such arguments play a central role in the American civil rights movement. They are not
obviously fallacious, though they are a case of two wrongs make a right suggesting, as they
do, that we can justifiably do something wrong (break a law) if we are responding to another
wrong (i.e., some law, decision or policy that unjustly obstructs change).
EXAMPLE 6: The argument that The attempt to use military might to put an end to
terrorism is wrong because it will take us down a slippery slope that will end in improper
interference in the affairs of independent states cannot be dismissed as a bad argument
simply by saying that it is an instance of the fallacy slippery slope. If such a slippery slope is
plausible, then the argument has some merit.
EXAMPLE 7: The argument No one with a history of heart disease should take up running,
for running is a strenuous form of exercise, and no one with a history of heart disease should
engage in strenuous exercise is, like many informal arguments, deductively valid. In such
cases, it is impossible for the conclusion of the argument to be false if the premises are true.
Sometimes this relationship is described by saying that the premises of the argument already
contain the conclusion; but this suggests that all deductive arguments commit the fallacy
begging the question, which occurs when an argument assumes what it attempts to prove.
EXAMPLE 8: The argument that we should not listen to the metaphysical arguments of
someone who has accosted us, on the grounds that he is psychotically disturbed and doesn't
know what he is taking about, is an instance of ad hominem, but it is not fallacious. Assuming
these premises true, this is eminently reasonable practical advice.
In the wake of many examples and discussions of this sort, contemporary accounts of fallacies
widely recognize there are arguments which have the form of traditional fallacies, but cannot
be rejected as fallacious. While the field of informal logic still recognizes key fallacies (e.g.,
equivocation and false dilemma) in pedagogical and theoretical discussion, the problems with
fallacy theory have convinced many that theories of informal logic should focus, not on
fallacies, but on general criteria for good reasoning (premise acceptability and relevance,
etc.). The latter is often manifest in the study of structures for good inference (argument
schemes) which set standards for particular kinds of good reasoning.
Grennan 1997 has proposed an approach to informal reasoning which proposes logical
adequacy and pragmatic adequacy as the key criteria for judging and evaluating everyday
inferences. He attempts to build an account of informal logic that extends beyond fallacies
and deductive forms of reasoning by identifying good patterns of reasoning used in successful
everyday contexts. Groarke & Tindale 2012 use traditional fallacies as a basis for the
definition of positive argument schemes, by treating ad hominem, guilt by association, appeals
to ignorance, two wrongs reasoning, etc. as legitimate schemes of argument and by treating
fallacious instances of them as deviations from an (inherently correct) norm.
Other authors do not go this far, but informal logic has, since its inception, evolved in a way
that places less emphasis on the traditional fallacies, and more on the identification of cogent
appeals to authority, arguments by analogy, and other schemes or argument, and on the
general issues that arise in the construction of good arguments.
6. An Example: Ad Hominem
Different approaches to fallacies can be illustrated with the fallacy ad hominem. Consider as a
first example a remark adapted from a Danish television debate over the question whether the
Danish church should be separated from the Danish state (Jorgensen 1995, 369).
EXAMPLE 9: You should not listen to my opponent. He wants to sever the Danish church
from the state for his own personal sake.
This remark attempts to cast doubt on the proposal that the Danish church and state be
seperated by casting doubt on the motivation behind the proposal by alleging that it is
motivated by its proponent's own personal interests (which the speaker goes on to elaborate).
Here we have an attempt to provide a reason (and hence an argument) for the conclusion that
one should not listen to the proposal to separate the Danish church and state.
Looked at from the point of view of fallacy theory, this is a classic case of ad hominem.
Kahane 1995 (p. 65), for example, describes it as a fallacy that occurs when an arguer is
guilty of attacking his opponent rather than his opponent's evidence and arguments. In the
case at hand, this means that the debater constructs an argument which attacks the motivation
and the character of the person promoting the separation of the Danish church and state,
instead of showing what is wrong with the arguments he has provided for his proposal. On
these grounds, the argument can be dismissed as an instance of the fallacy ad hominem.
Consider a second example from Velonews: The Journal of Competitive Cycling. In the wake
of an article on the retirement of Lance Armstrong, the seven-time winner of the Tour de
France (17/02/2011), its website featured an exchange between its readers. In response to a
contributer who argued that Armstrong was a great athlete and that everyone should be happy
for Armstrong and celebrate his accomplishments, one commentator wrote:
He's not a great athlete, he's a fraud, a cheat and a liar. That's why not everybody is happy
for Lance.
Here the explanation why not everyone is happy for Lance forwards a reason why one
shouldn't celebrate his career: i.e., because he is a cheater and a liar (because he allegedly
violated doping regulations). In answer to this retort, the initial arguer responded with the
comment:
EXAMPLE 10: Jealousy is a bummer.
Here we have another paradigm example of ad hominem. As in EXAMPLE 9, the arguer
dismisses an argument they oppose, not on the grounds that the premises or inferences it
incorporates are problematic, but by discrediting (and in this and many other cases, insulting)
the arguer who proposes it.
Dialogical approaches to argument have a different theoretical structure than fallacy theory,
but they invite a very similar analysis of these examples. According to Van Eemeren and
Grootendorst 1992, an instance of ad hominem is a violation of the first rule for critical
discussion, which maintains that Parties [to a dispute] must not prevent each other from
advancing standpoints or casting doubts on arguments. Different kinds of ad hominem
(abusive, tu quoque, and circumstantial ad hominem) are different violations of this rule. In
this case, it suffices to say that the debater's attack on his opponent can be seen as an
illegitimate attempt to deny him his right to make a case for his position.
Other approaches to informal arguments are critical of the fallacy approach, proposing a more
sympathetic approach to ad hominem. As they point out, there are circumstances where
criticisms of the person are legitimate grounds for doubting or rejecting their point of view. If
we can demonstrate that a politican has millions of dollars to gain from the passage of a
particular motion, this is a reason to be sceptical of their point of view. If an arguer has
repeatedly shown poor judgment or lacks the requisite knowledge to make reasonable
judgments about some issue, then this may be a good reason to dismiss their point of view.
This is especially true in informal contexts, in which arguers may be inundated with many
more arguments and positions than they can possibly investigate, forcing them to decide
which arguments merit their attention. In such contexts, ad (or pro) hominem considerations
may be the most reasonable way to make these decisions.
Rhetorical approaches to argument invite this approach to ad hominem, which can be
understood in terms of Aristotle's suggestion that the ethos of a speaker plays a crucial role in
determining whether an argument is persuasive or not. In keeping with this, an ad hominem
argument may be understood as an attack on the ethos of an arguer which is in principle
acceptable. This does not mean that every ad hominem is acceptable, but only those which
convincingly undermine the credibility of the arguer who is criticized. In the extreme cases,
where ad hominem attacks tend to be ad hoc insults (as in EXAMPLE 10 above), the
intemperate and arbitrary nature of such attacks is likely to undermine, not the ethos of the
person attacked, but the ethos of the arguer who launches the attack.
One may enshrine the notion that ad hominem moves can be acceptable in different ways
within a theory of informal argument. If one understands ad hominem as a pattern of
argument (providing reasons for the conclusion that one should dismiss or be sceptical of
someone's point of view), then one must find a method for distinguishing between instances
of this pattern which are and are not acceptable. If one analyzes ad hominem as a particular
kind of move in dialectical exchange, then one may develop rules of dialogue which
distinguish circumstances in which such moves are and are not acceptable. Nevetheless, many
of the ad hominem arguments that appear in everyday discourse remain problematic,
notwithstanding such attempts to accommodate them. What is right about the traditional view
that ad hominem arguments are fallacious can still be captured in the observation that such
arguments cannot definitively show that there are flaws in the arguments offered for the
position they dismiss. In order to demonstrate the latter, one must deal directly with these
arguments and not merely the arguers who propound them.
7. Rhetoric
Especially when one considers non-fallacy approaches to informal argument, one might
compare informal logic to classical formal logic. In both cases one finds an attempt to identify
general criteria for good reasoning and argument schemes that incorporate specific forms of
reasoning. In the latter case, this is reflected in a focus on validity and soundness, and on
deductive argument schemes encapsulated in rules of inference like modus ponens
(Affirming the Antecedent), double negation, modus tollens (Denying the Consequent),
etc. In the case of informal logic, the standard criteria for good argument can be reduced to (i)
premise acceptability and (ii) a conclusion that follows from the premises. This second
criterion is typically understood in terms of relevance and sufficiency, making a good
argument an argument with premises that are relevant to the conclusion and sufficient to
establish it as (at least) acceptable. Within informal logic, the key argument schemes
discussed include arguments from authority, causal reasoning, arguments by analogy, and
various forms of moral argument.
In other ways, informal logic might be contrasted with formal logic insofar as it aims to
understand the dynamics of arguments which operate in complex varied social interactions
which serve many different purposes. In a particular circumstance, this may mean that the
success or failure of an argument needs to be understood and assessed in ways that extend
beyond the notions that define classical logic. The latter evaluates arguments in terms of
soundness, defining a sound argument as a deductively valid inference with true premises
that establishes the truth of its conclusion. This is a conception of good argument which can
be applied to many instances of ordinary argument, but there are many situations in which the
success and failure of arguments may be measured in other ways.
Different informal contexts may be characterized by different levels of uncertainty
(sometimes extreme uncertainty); by deep and fundamentally different worldviews; by ethical
and aesthetic judgments which are not easily categorized as true or false (or correct and
incorrect); and by variable social contexts with different aims, in which which particular
assumptions may be accepted, rejected, or reversed (in arguments about international affairs,
in the court room, in alternative dispute mediation, in commentary on the arts, in the
formation of science policy, and so on). Pinto 2001 suggests that the aim of many arguments
does not appear to be assent to the truth of a proposition but the withholding of assent (or full
assent) or a particular attitude. An argument may, for example, function as a means of
instilling fear or hope or disapprobation. In order to leave room for these kinds of examples,
he defines an argument as an invitation to inference (6869) which is not limited to the aim
of establishing the truth of some proposition.
In looking for ways to account for the features of argument that are not captured by traditional
logical conceptions, informal logicians have turned to rhetorical traditions. Insofar as it takes
persuasion to be the goal of argument, it recognizes its social function and the role this must
play in understanding successful argument. Looked at from this point of view, soundness is
not sufficient for successful argument, for there is no guarantee that a (deductively) valid
argument with true premises will convince an audience of its conclusion (or instill in them the
attitude an arguer intends). At the very least, a successful argument must offer premises they
accept (and, ideally, embrace). As successful arguers have always known, this means that the
construction of a successful argument requires, not only a search for true premises, but an
understanding of the members of one's audience (their beliefs, attitudes and values) and the
premises that will consequently speak to them.
Those aspects of argument which play a key role in their success as vehicles of persuasion are
the three components of argument which are the foundation for Aristotelean rhetoric: pathos
(the convictions of the audience to whom an argument is addressed), logos (the logic of the
argument), and ethos (the character of the arguer). Ethos plays a role in persuasion because
we are, as Aristotle suggests, more likely to be convinced by an arguer we believe to be
credible and trustworthy. It is this which explains why arguers who indulge in frequent insult,
exaggeration and other questionable tactics frequently undermine their own use of argument.
The relevance of rhetorical analysis to informal logic is emphasized by Tindale (1999, 2004,
2010), who advocates an approach to informal logic that incorporates traditional rhetoric.
8. Dialectics
Other aspects of ordinary argument which extend the scope of informal logic are dialectical.
Dialectics understands argument as a kind of exchange what can roughly be described as
the exchange of positions (theses) and counter-positions. The dialectical approach places
argument within the broader scope of dispute and debate. In contemporary discussions of
argument, the most influential dialectical approach is pragma-dialectics, an approach
developed by Van Eemeren and Grootendorst 1992 (sometimes known as the Amsterdam
School). It sees argumentation as a means of resolving differences of opinion which must
operate within particular rules for critical discussion.
The pragma-dialectical approach incorporates many of the standard features of argument
analysis. Fallacies can, for example, be understood as violations of the rules for critical
discussion, and the development of such discussion incorporates the use of schemes of
argument. Rhetorical influences are incorporated as a form of strategic maneouvring,
understood as the attempt to rhetorically influence the outcome of a dispute (see Tindale
2004, ch. 1 Eemeren & Houtlosser 2002, and Feteris et al. 2011). In understanding strategic
maneouvring, rhetorical considerations are brought to bear in three ways: (i) through topical
potential (the way the topic is framed and presented); (ii) by addressing audience demands (by
communion with the audience); and (iii)through presentational devices (by choosing the
best figure or scheme to achieve one's ends).
Within informal logic, the dialectical aspects of argument have given rise to the notion that
arguers have dialectical obligations which are a key component of proper argument (see
Johnson 2000). As arguers our key dialectical obligation is an obligation to respond to (and
anticipate) objections that might be raised by our opponents in the dispute in which we are
engaged. To emphasize this point, Johnson distinguishes between the illative core of an
argument and its dialectical tier. The illative core is the set of premises offered in support of
the conclusion; the dialectical tier consists of alternative points of view, likely objections to
the conclusion, and the premises and whatever assumptions characterize debate about the
conclusion. This raises the question whether logic as it has been traditionally conceived pays
too much attention to the illative core of arguments, i.e., not recognizing that a rational arguer
must pay as much attention to their dialectical tier.
According to Johnson, all genuine arguments are dialectical and must discharge dialectical
obligations. This suggests that the paradigm example of argument in the history of logic a
giving of reasons for some conclusion can, without elaboration, be classified only as a proto-
argument. Most authors (e.g., Govier 1999 and Hitchcock 2002) have rejected the suggestion
that we should broaden our definitions to make dialectical obligations a necessary component
of an argument, but now grant that some accounting of the dialectical aspects of
argumentative exchange must be an integral part of any comprehensive understanding of
ordinary argument.
9. Dialogue Theory
Dialectical approaches to argument have highlighted the extent to which argumentation is a
dialogue between (real or imagined) interlocutors who argue for different points of view. In
view of this, the structure of the dialogues in which arguments are embedded has become a
major area of research in informal logic. Pragma-dialectics take critical discussion as a model,
distinguishing different stages of such dialogue (confrontation, opening, argumentation, and
closing) and the rules that apply at each stage. Others distinguish different types of dialogues
that are characterized by different goals and structures.
The intuitive basis for the distinction between different types of dialogue is evident if one
compares the norms of argument in different kinds of contexts. In an inquiry, arguments are
used as tools in an attempt to establish what is true. So understood, arguments must adhere to
strict standards that determine what counts as evidence and counter-evidence for some point
of view. In collective bargaining, a form of negotiation dialogue, arguments function in a very
different way. Not as a means for establishing what is true, but as tools in an attempt to find a
negotiated settlement between two parties which have conflicting interests (an employer and
their employees in a union). Rigourous rules govern such exchange (prohibiting bargaining
in bad faith and so on), but they are different rules than those that govern a dialogue which
functions as a search for truth. Collective bargaining is, for example, a kind of dialogue in
which the use of threats (to strike or lock employees out) are a key part of the process. In
contrast, threats have no clear role in critical inquiry, where they would ordinarily be classed
as instances of the fallacy ad bacculum.
Walton 2007 has emerged as one of the most significant proponents of a dialogue approach.
He understands a dialogue as an exchange made up of an opening stage, an argumentation
stage, and a closing stage. In the opening stage, the arguers in the dialogue agree to
participate. The rules for the dialogue define what types of moves are allowed. What kinds of
questions are permitted, for example, and how they can be responded to.
Walton distinguishes seven basic types of dialogue which can be summarized as follows.
Dialogue Type Initial Situation Participant's Goal Goal of Dialogue
Persuasion Conflict of Opinion Persuade Other Party Resolve Issue
Inquiry Need to Have Proof Verify Evidence Prove Hypothesis
Discovery Need for Explanation Find a Hypothesis Support Hypothesis
Negotiation Conflict of Interests Secure Interests Settle Issue
Information Need Information Acquire Information Exchange Information
Deliberation Practical Choice Fit Goals and Actions Decide What to Do
Eristic Personal Conflict Attack an Opponent Reveal Deep Conflict
The dialogue approach provides a clear way to recognize the different norms and expectations
tied to different argumentative context. It raises the question whether the proposed accounts
of particular dialogues are adequate, whether the kinds of dialogues that have been identified
are adequate (or necessary) to explain the different kinds of argumentation that characterize
ordinary discourse, and whether there are types of dialogues that have not yet been identified
(or whether there are kinds of argumentation that resist categorizations of this sort).
10. The Components of Informal Logic
As a field of study and research, informal logic has evolved into a complex attempt to
understand the nature and assessment of informal arguments. Though any list of informal
logic issues cannot be definitive, the current state of the field suggests that a complete theory
of informal logic would have to include:
1. an account of the principles of communication which argumentative exchange
depends upon;
2. a distinction between different kinds of dialogue in which argument may occur, and
the ways in which they determine appropriate and inappropriate moves in
argumentation (e.g., the difference between scientific discussion and negotiation);
3. an account of logical consequence, which explains when it can be said (and what it
means to say) that some claim (or attitude) is a logical consequence of another;
4. a typology of argument which provides a framework of argument and analysis by
indentifying the basic types of argument that need to be distinguished (deductivism is
monistic, hence one of the simplest typologies; others will distinguish between
fundamentally different kinds of argument);
5. an account of good argument which specifies general criteria for deductive, inductive,
and conductive arguments;
6. definitions of positive argument schema which define good patterns of reasoning
(reasonable appeals to authority, reasonable attacks against the person; etc.);
7. some theoretical account of fallacies and the role they can (and cannot) play in
understanding and assessing informal arguments;
8. an account of the role that audience (pathos) and ethos and other rhetorical notions
should play in analysing and assessing argument;
9. an explanation of the dialectical obligations that attach to arguments in particular
kinds of contexts.
Each of these components subsumes more specific issues and questions that would have to be
addressed in a full account of argument. A complete account of the principles of
communication that argumentation depends on must, for example, incorporate principles that
can account for the meaning of images (photographs, graphs, diagrams, illustrations, videos,
specimens, etc.) and other non-verbal elements of argument. In developing a general account
of good argument, a full theory would include an account of the extent to which the criteria
for good argument can be formalized and the best ways of doing so. In the course of the latter,
one might ask whether the account of argument that emerges from informal logic can provide
a basis for computational modeling and attempts to use computers to assist with, or engage in,
the kinds of reasoning that characterize informal contexts (see, e.g., Reed & Norman 2004).
11. New Horizons
Informal logic continues to extend its scope as it evolves. One area of development combines
the theory of informal argument and computational modeling. Informal logic models of
argument have informed the attempt to model interactions between agents in multi-agent
systems, and the attempt to mimic or assist human reasoning. Computational applications
include systems that involve the development of large-scale webs of inter-connected
arguments, reasoning about medical decisions, legal decision making, chemical properties and
other complex systems, and general models of argument (see, e.g., Rahwana et al. 2007,
Carbogim et al. 2000, Prakken and Vreeswijk 2001, Reed 1997, Reed and Long 1998, and
Prakken 2011). Verheij 1999 has developed systems of automated argument assistance which
function as computational aids that can assist in the generation of an argument (a link to his
Automated Argument Assistance web site is included in Other Internet Resources below).
Reed and Norman 2003 have published a pioneering collection of essays which attempt to
look at argument machines and the ways they might be conceptualized and developed.
Insofar as informal logic remains an attempt to develop a logic that is accessible to the
everyday reasoner, it and computational modeling will remain separate theoretical
endeavours. That said, both depend on a theoretical understanding of the way in which
informal reasoning works and should be assessed. In the long run, the formal modeling this
inspires may reestablish stronger links between formal and informal logic (links that will
depend on logics which are more sensitive to the different facets of ordinary reasoning than
classical logic). The results may foster the development of informal logic within a more
integrated logic (or argumentation theory) that recognizes the differences between formal and
informal logic, but recognizes an overarching model of reasoning that can explain both
endeavours.
As informal logic has extended its scope, some researchers have looked for empirical ways to
test it. To this end, they have looked for evidence that can show that the teaching of informal
logic improves (or does not improve) informal reasoning skills. Questions about the efficacy
of informal logic in the classroom are, however, inherently complex. Among other things, a
careful attempt to test its effects would have to distinguish between very different approaches
to the teaching of informal reasoning. One cannot assume that approaches which emphasize
fallacies will, for example, have the same results as those which emphasize argument schemes
or rules of dialogue. Ideally, the collection of the empirical evidence would, if it could be
collected on the basis of a convincing testing regime, help settle continuing disputes about the
relative efficacy of theoretically distinct approaches to teaching.
Empirical testing has been complicated by debates about the adequacy of the tests that have
been used to measure informal reasoning skills. Creating a valid test is a complex endeavor
because good informal reasoning is an inherently complex phenomenon which subsumes
many specific skills. While some of these are not difficult to measure e.g., the ability of
students to make straightforward deductions and distinguish between necessary and sufficient
conditions it is not clear that these are the most important skills in reasoning that requires
that one adeptly weave one's way through the enormous web of debate and discussion that
characterizes ordinary discourse (in, to take one example, global debates about what should be
done about government debts and deficits).
What counts as good reasoning or, critical thinking (or, even more so, creative thinking),
tends to be open ended and unpredictable, dialectical, and influenced by pragmatic and
contextual considerations which are not easily assessed using the standard means of large
scale testing, i.e., multiple choice tests. Instruments like the California Critical Thinking Test
have therefore been criticized (see Groarke 2007 and Sobocan et al. 2007). This does not
mean that good testing is in principle impossible, but it does suggest that the discussion and
development of methods of assessment needs to be one aspect of the future development of
informal logic.
The assumptions of informal logic are being tested in another way by commentators who
study argument corpora large collections of argument drawn from natural language
discourse. Jorgenson, Kock and Rorbech 1991 studied a series of 37 one-hour televised
debates from Danish public TV which featured well-known public figures arguing for and
against current policy proposal. A representative audience of 100 voters voted before and
after the debate, in an attempt to statistically establish what moves and properties are likely to
win votes in a representative audience. These conclusions were then compared with
commonly held notions about proper or valid argumentation. Other studies are
considering corpora made up of large databases of selected written texts (see, e.g., Goodwin
& Cortes 2010, and Mochales & Ieven 2009). In principle, corpora made up of whole libraries
are possible in the future.
12. Informal Logic and Philosophy
Philosophy's association with theories of argument is already evident in ancient times. The
relationship flows both ways, philosophy requiring an account of argument as it assembles
evidence for particular philosophical perspectives, the theory of argument raising fundamental
questions about the nature of reason, rationality and what counts as evidence. In keeping with
this association, philosophy and philosophers have played, and continue to play, the defining
role in the evolution of informal logic, though work in the field often overlaps with
developments in cognate disciplines such as Communication Studies, Rhetoric, and Artificial
Intelligence.
Within informal logic, one finds two distinct attitudes to philosophical considerations. The
work of some sees philosophy as the core element of informal logic. The paradigm example
of such a view is found in Johnson 2000, who argues that a comprehensive account of
argument must be built upon a philosophical account of rationality. An alternative view
suggests that informal logic's relationship to philosophy is more comparable to the
relationship that exists between the latter and formal logic, and that developments in the
means of analyzing and assessing ordinary argument can (at least in many instances) take
place independently of a consideration of the philosophical questions which may be raised
about its ultimate justification and its philosophical implications. Such a view suggests that
we might distinguish between informal logic and the philosophy of informal logic i.e.,
between the development of our understanding of day-to-day reasoning and the attempt to
provide a philosophical account of it. Even on this view, these two endeavours are closely
related and likely to cross-fertilize each other.
However one understands the role of philosophy within informal logic, its investigation of
standards of argument and reason has obvious ties to a variety of philosophical concerns
about truth, justification and knowledge. The natural connections between informal logic and
epistemology are evident in Goldman 1999, who attempts to defend an account of knowledge
and the acquisition of knowledge which situates knowledge within social interactions that
take place within interpersonal exchange and knowledge institutions. This allows him to
evaluate social practices in terms of their veritistic value (i.e., their tendency to produce states
like knowledge, error and ignorance). In the process, his account devotes considerable
attention to the practice of argumentation, and the constraints which make it a practice which
is to be valued because it produces positive veritistic results. In doing so, he draws on work in
informal logic and reflects its interest in both monological and dialogical argumentation, and
in a broad understanding of argument that incorporates rhetorical and dialectical
responsibilities.
In this and other ways, informal logic's attempt to model reasoning reflects, and has important
implications for, philosophical concerns about the nature of rationality, the nature of the mind
and its processes, the standards of good reasoning, the value of logic and rhetoric, and the
social, political and epistemological role of reasoning and argument. In many ways, the
discussion of informal logic's ties to philosophy of mind, ethics and epistemology has just
begun. A more extensive exploration of these ties is likely to be one significant aspect of
discussion in the future.
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Acknowledgments
The editors would like to thank Roger Knights for pointing out a significant number of
typographical errors in an earlier version.
Copyright 2011 by
Leo Groarke <groarke@uwindsor.ca>