1

What is China hoping to achieve with its peaceful development slogan? Does it
reflect superficial foreign policy adaptation or a genuine shift in Chinese strategic
thinking?
ABSTRACT - This essay engages in a discussion on the logic of promoting its
peaceful development' concept, arguing that China's primary aim in its
grand strategy is to further trade and investment. As the Chinese Communist
Party's main form of legitimacy depends upon maintaining high levels of
economic growth, they will strongly pursue foreign policies that facilitate this.
China has decided to portray itself as a peaceful, non-threatening actor in
order to reassure the US and its neighbours that it has no ambitions of
dominating the region. China did this with good reason - in the 1990s, the US
and others were very much worried about a China threat' and discussing
policy options including attempting to contain or constrain China. China's
official foreign policies since the mid-1990s have attempted to address this
issue and resolve it favourably - peaceful development' being one that
follows on from the same logic as the new security concept - the need to
reassure its major trading partners and investors of China's benign intentions
and its willingness to cooperate with others in win-win' situations. This essay
also highlights the insecure foundations that peaceful development' lies on -
first, should China's high levels of economic growth become unsustainable, it
is probable that nationalism would be invoked to replace economic growth in
acting as the dominant Chinese Communist Party (CCP) legitimacy.
Second, the major threat to peace for China is in volatile China-Taiwan
relations - and China's leaders have explicitly excluded Taiwan from its
peaceful development' notion, rendering its commitment to peace less
sincere. Third, the pressure the CCP is under to secure more and more
resources for its population has larger consequences for international and
regional stability - leaders may become tempted to explore natural resources
in the disputed Islands of the South China Sea, and will continue to exploit its
position on the United Nations Security Council in order to satisfy the needs
of its population. This essay argues that the dominant motivation of Chinese
leaders in their interactions with other states is that of maintaining China's
high level of economic growth rather than a shift in morals to become more
peaceful and interactive toward its trading partners and neighbors.
Domestic and International Motivations for Embracing Peaceful Development
Domestic and international motivations for embracing peaceful development are
based on the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) wishing to maintain as much legitimacy as
possible in the absence of liberal democracy. After Mao Zedong died and the Cultural

2
Revolution abruptly ended, Maoist ideology gradually became implicitly replaced bythe
ability to project sustained economic growth as the main form of legitimacy for the CCP.
The CCP isessentially now dependent upon sustaining high levels of economic growth to
remain in power unless it developsanother dominant source of legitimacy. At the same
time, the strong sense of nationalism embedded in the Chinese since the century of
shame and humiliation has not gone away. While Mao satisfied his populations
nationalist sentiment by announcing on the same day as the founding of the new Republic,
that China has stood up, and building a large symbolic army; Maos successor, Deng
Xiaoping, focused on economic growth in order to make China glorious once more
1
.
Dengs successors have continued to focus on the economy. With impressive growth
rates resulting from market reforms, the Chinese people increasingly view the CCPs
primary role as that of furthering economic growth, raising living standards and
spreading prosperity.
The post-Mao CCP has not renounced popular nationalism while Mao focused on
a more radical nationalism inspired by fervent ideological doctrine, post-Mao, the CCP
has encouraged a more conservative nationalism based on commanding respect
internationally
2
. Indeed, the Chinese school curriculum devotes two semesters of history
classes to analyzingthe humiliation of China by Britain, France, Germany, J apan, Russia,
and the US
3
. Given this environment, one can be forgiven for deducing that nationalism,
and the CCPs actions inslowly reclaiming its position in the world, has the potential to
replace economic growth as the CCPs new legitimacy if China finds it cannot sustain its
high levels of economic growth. This increase in importance internationally has brought
confidence and dignity to the Chinese people although the Olympic Torch relays in the
lead-up to the 2008 Beijing Olympics have highlighted the dangers of promoting, even
tacitly, nationalism.
Given Chinas growing strength, one would expect a reduction in the likelihood of
being forced to capitulate to the demands of other international actors. However, by the

1
J ohn Garver, Interpreting Chinas Grand Strategy, The Jamestown Foundation China Brief, 5: 15 (J uly 5
,
2005)
2
Phil Deans, State Patriotism versus Popular Nationalism in the Peoples Republic of China, Article
emerging from the IIAS workshop, Emerging National Self-Assertion in East Asia, held in Amsterdam,
25
th
May 2004.
3
April Rabkin, Chinas Inside Game, The New York Times, J uly 2
nd
2008.

3
mid-1990s, it had become clear that Chinas rising economy was not accompanied by a
rise in security. Rather than states becoming more enthusiastic over trading opportunities
with China, or being increasingly willing to please or even appease China, international
actors became more and more hostileand increasinglyanxious to mitigate the so-called
dangers of what had becomeknown as the China threat. Discussion of this so-called
China threat became frequently accompaniedby discussions of how to deal with this
threat and proposals for this often included containing or constraining China
4
.
Chinas rise has become accompanied with growing fears internally on states
reactions to its rising economic power, future potential power, and, with this rising power,
the ability to shape events within its region and even attempt to become a regional
hegemon, rewriting the rules to suit its own interests rather than those of the United
States. The CCP was becoming increasingly aware and anxious of the potential for its
most important trading partners to bandwagon against China to constrain its economic
growth and influence. Considering that the CCPs legitimacy and thus survival
required continuously improving GDP and improving living standards for its citizens, the
potential effects of an international coalition bandwagoning with the only remaining
superpower against Chinas rise made Party leaders understandably worried.
China has not had an easy transition from the Cold War era in its international
relations. During the Cold War, China benefited from siding with the US in securing US
support for its economic growth through access to US markets, technology, investment,
and advanced scientific knowledge
5
. In the post-Cold War era, however, the CCP
miscalculated in assuming bipolarity would give way to an era of multipolarity and
China has not had easy relations with the only superpower left standing in the years
immediately following the end of the Cold War. The Tiananmen Square Massacre had
major public relations (PR) repercussions for Beijing in terms of suspicion and distaste
towards what was then perceived as a bloodthirsty regime.
Although China eventually recovered from this, perceptions of aggressive Chinese
behaviour in the South China Seain the mid-1990s among its neighbours, many of whom

4
Avery Goldstein, Chinas Grand Strategy and US Foreign Policy, Foreign Policy Research Institute, E-
Notes, September 27 2005; J oseph Y.S. Cheng, China's Peaceful Rise--Speeches of Zheng Bijian, 1997-
2005 Zheng Bijian (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2005), Journal of Contemporary Asia,
February 2007
5
J ohn Garver, Interpreting Chinas Grand Strategy

4
had completing claims, had reached an all-time low. China was taken aback with the
hostility and degree of unity ASEAN member states possessed towards China over its
activities in Mischief Reef, soon after agreeing to avoid military solutions to the regions
security issues. This led many to increase their bilateral security ties, for example,
conducting military exercises with the US.
6
Concerns about a rising Chinas international behaviour had successively
antagonized the ASEAN statescrystallized the view of an important segment
of the US foreign policy elite that China represented anemerging challenge
to American interests in Asia, and even aroused J apans fearsabout the
PRCs future role in the region. Thus, although China was increasing its
capabilities, as others reacted to what Beijing believed were simply
necessarysteps to ensure its own interests, greater capabilities were clearly
not enhancingthe countrys security.
7
After trying and failing to find a cohesive foreign policy which reassured Chinas
neighbours and the United States that they were not a threat and that Chinas economic
growth had positive effects in neighbouring states, Beijings leaders came up with a new
approach to international relations, the new security concept, first articulated at an
Association of South East Asian Nations Regional Forum (ARF). This new security
concept carries forwardthe Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence: mutual respect for
sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each
other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit and peaceful coexistence. The new
security concept encourages states to engage in mutually beneficial economic co-
operation, and an opening up of their economies in order to create common prosperity,
while decrying hegemonism and power politics as the main threat to global peace and
security.
8
There were two main motivations for officially and diplomatically attempting to
convince international actors that Chinais a peaceful nationwishing only to further
develop its economy: first, to reassure the United States and its neighbours that it did not

6
Avery Goldstein, The Diplomatic Face of Chinas Grand Strategy: A Rising Powers Emerging Choice,
The China Quarterly, No.168 (December 2001), pp.835-864, p.841.
7
Avery Goldstein, The Diplomatic Face of Chinas Grand Strategy , p.839.
8
I The International Security Situation, Chinas National Defense, Chinas Defense White Paper 1998,
http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/china/doctrine/cnd9807/index.html

5
constitute a threat and did not and never would aspire to become a regional hegemon.
Since the end of the Cold War, Chinas foreign policy had suffered setback after setback
and much international condemnation and fear of what China hoped to achieve with its
rise. Second, it became clear that China needed to make a concerted effort to reassure
other states of its benign intentions. This is particularly important for China, whose
economic growth is the foundation for the CCPs power, and which is dependent upon
importing and exporting large amounts of raw materials and finished products China
needs other states to trade with, and invest in China. Maintaining and increasing trade is
thus Chinas most important strategic goal.
Although Chinas new security concept has already made an impact on other states
perceptions of China as a regional actor, China decided that they needed to further this
concept, and remind states once more of their peaceful intentions and non-threatening
demeanor. The concept of peaceful development (formerly known as Chinas peaceful
rise) emerged, reaffirming Chinas support for multilateralism, their interest in
maintaining a peaceful, stable regional and international order, and their commitment for
solving disputes through dialogue and co-operation rather thanby force.
The peaceful development slogan China assigned itself was more favorable to the
status quo than the new security concept which was in part a veiled attack on the US
through condemnations of hegemonism and power politics which were supposedly the
biggest threats in the world, as opposed to its own path of multilateralism and military
restraint.
9
The following excerpt outlines what the Chinese mean by peaceful
development:
Peace, opening-up, cooperation, harmony and win-win are our policy, our
idea, our principle and our pursuit. To take the road of peaceful development
is to unify domestic development with opening to the outside world, linking
the development of China with that of the rest of the world, and combining
the fundamental interests of the Chinese people with the common interests of
all peoples throughout the world. China persists in its pursuit of harmony and
development internally while pursuing peace and development externally; the
two aspects, closely linked and organically united, are an integrated whole,
and will help to build a harmonious world of sustained peace and common
prosperity.
10

9
Avery Goldstein, The Diplomatic Face of Chinas Grand Strategy, p.845.
10
China's Peaceful Development Road White Paper, 2005,
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200512/22/eng20051222_230059.html

6
Outlined in a White Paper titled China's Peaceful Development Road, consisting
of chapterssuch as Peaceful Development Is the Inevitable Way for China's
Modernization, Promoting World Peace and Development with China's Own Growth,
Seeking Mutual Benefit and Common Development with Other Countries, Building a
Harmonious World of Sustained Peace and Common Prosperity, Peaceful
Development, Chinas peaceful development slogan clearly attempts to further
persuade states of Beijings benign intentions.
The Chinese Practice of Peaceful Development Participating in Multilateral
Institutions as a means of fulfilling Foreign Policy Objectives
Until the mid-1990s, although China was a member of important regional or
international bodies, it was reluctant to participate or play an active role. China decided to
change this only because the CCP believed it was more beneficial to further reassure the
United States and at least appear as though it was heeding US advice, and persuade others
that it had become a responsible stakeholder in the international system. China realized
that it had to further adapt to the post-Cold War unipolar environment and become an
active member of the international society than it was to sit on the sidelines, even if this
meant integrating itself into US-constructed systems of interaction. China has made
symbolic gestures in its regional foreign policy, more actively participating in peaceful
multilateral settings such as Association of South East Asian Nations Plus Three
(ASEAN Plus Three), ASEAN Plus One, and the Shanghai Co-operation Organization
(SCO). Beijing was the first non-ASEAN member state to sign the ASEAN Treaty of
Amity and Cooperation (pledging non-aggression), and efforts are being made to
establish an ASEAN-Chinese Free Trade Area. Furthermore, to persuade states of its
commitment to its non-aggressive behaviour, Beijing has signed a Declaration on the
Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, and also has sided with the majority of
ASEAN members in the Southeast Asian Nuclear Weapons Free Zone Treaty.
11
China
has increasingly been willing to resolve or shelve its territorial disputes with neighbors.
12

11
Yuan-Kang Wang, Chinas Grand Strategy and U.S. Primacy: Is China Balancing American Power?,
Paper prepared for delivery at the Annual Convention of the International Studies Association (ISA), San

7
Internationally, China has signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in August
1996 and has decided to support the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Additionally,
China has cultivated bilateral partnerships, in order for it to lock in economic
interdependence while highlighting the costs in lost opportunity of not doing business
with China.
13
China is engaging more and more with states and its region, co-operating for win-
win benefits, and China is also portraying itself to be a responsible stakeholder in the
international system, as urged by Robert B. Zoellick (US Deputy Secretary of State)
14
.
Soon after China outlined its new security concept, the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis led
to waves of currency devaluations in the region. China did not devalue its currency due to
the existence of sound economic reasons not to do so. China repackaged its decision to
successfully present this to the region as its refusal to devalue its currency despite others
doing so, the rhetoric being that it sacrificed its own economy for the benefit of the
region. Surprisingly, regional leaders applauded China for doing so; thereafter China was
perceived to be taking more responsible approach to its international relations.
China has become increasingly engaged in international and regional affairs,
signing treaties agreeing with key positions taken by status quo players and major
regional actors. China is going out of its way to reassure the US and its neighbours that it
is friendly, co-operative, and is not going to spend time debating where territorial lines
begin and end when it could be negotiating trade deals. Revealingly, however, much of
this new interest in participating in multilateral bodies has coincided with energy deals
(SCO), or the promise of more trade through free trade agreements (ASEAN). Though
China may have had to sign agreements or treaties that relate to issues other than trade,
China has essentially secured its foreign policy aims to reassure in order to maintain or
expand conditions favorable to Chinese economic growth. China has found an official
grand strategy that both reassures its neighbours and the US and furthers its economic
development. For the CCP, economic growth is not just beneficial, it isthe sine qua non

Diego, March 22-25, 2006,
http://www.allacademic.com//meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/1/0/0/0/8/pages100089/p100089-1.php
12
Avery Goldstein, The Diplomatic Face of Chinas Grand Strategy, p.843.
13
Avery Goldstein, Chinas Grand Strategy and US Foreign Policy
14
Robert B. Zoellick (Deputy Secretary of State), Whither China: From Membership to Responsibility?,
Remarks to National Committee on U.S.-China Relations: New York City, September 21, 2005, As
Prepared for Delivery

8
of their survival. In an anarchic environment where states above all wish to survive,
maintaining economic growth rates of 8% and above is not just an overriding
preoccupation for the CCP
15
, it is the key to domestic stability and regime survival.
External factors are just as important as internal ones in determiningwhether China will
continue to rise at contemporary rates.
By presenting an image of peaceful, responsible behaviour to the world, China
hopes to reassure, and has made an effort to show it is following through on its peaceful
development promises in order to counteract containment impulses among state leaders
towards China and further economic growth through closer economic relations. And
China has been remarkably successful in promoting its new public relations image.
Chinas Foreign Policy is Led by Economic Considerations, Not Moral Ones
Although China is now participating in and even shaping multilateral organizations,
China is still playing by its own rules rather than those set by the international structures
it is a part of. One of the worst examples of this is intellectual property infringement. The
protection of international property rights is a World Trade Organization obligation, yet
China engages in widespread piracy that costs the world economy billions of dollars
every year, and the CCPs efforts to combat this have been modest at best.
16
Chinas leaders claim its foreign policy is led by economic growth which promotes
co-operation and facilitates further regional development through increasing trade and
access to its large domestic market. In reality, however, Chinas foreign policy is led by
attempts to maintain high levels of economic growth with little regard for how this is
achieved. With a rapidly growing economy and over one-sixth of the worlds population,
China is desperately searching for energy and will do just about anything, including
liaising with pariah states such as Sudan and Iran, to do so. Rather than working with
major powers to develop clean, renewable and diverse sources of energy, China acts as
though it can lock up energy supplies worldwide.
17
Worryingly, considerations of how

15
Esther Pan, The Promise and Pitfalls of Chinas Peaceful Rise, Council on Foreign Relations, , April
14, 2006, http://www.cfr.org/publication/10446/
16
Robert B. Zoellick, Whither China: From Membership to Responsibility?
17
Ibid.; China and the West: Dealing with China, The Economist, November 17
th
2005

9
to provide its citizens with sufficient energy to satisfy their needs, China may be tempted
to take action to secure its territorial claims in the South China Sea (believed to contain
large amounts of oil), despite signing a Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South
China Sea.
18
According to China experts;
It seems obvious that China's growing need for energy and raw materials a
cornerstone of its national interest and prerequisite for sustained growth
will stand in the way of its good neighbor policy.
19

Some Factors that may prompt China to move away from peaceful development PR
strategy
China appears to be following a path that will facilitate its continued economic growth
rates. Thus, a move away from this strategy might occur in one of two circumstances
first, economic growth rates even out, and the CCP will need to find legitimacy elsewhere,
perhaps by reinvigorating nationalism
20
. The other potential is that China may grow so
strong economically and militarily that it desires to have a greater role, perhaps aspiring
to regional hegemony, and will attempt to rewrite the rules of the game to best provide
for its own interests.
21
Chinas peaceful development is unlikely to continue indefinitely
China adopted the peaceful development strategy in order to adapt to its new
geopolitical environment. However, if power relations or Chinas economic growth shift
radically in Chinas favour, China is likely to re-adapt once more, rendering the future of
Chinas peaceful development uncertain.
22
Conclusion
China has embraced peaceful development in order to persuade other states of its
benign intentions a peaceful, stable international order is well and truly in Chinas

18
Ashton B. Carter ; William J . Perry, China on the march, The National Interest, , March 1
st
2007
19
Willy Wo-Lap Lam, China aiming for 'peaceful rise', CNN, February 6, 2004
20
Adam Segal, Maurice R. Greenberg, Encouraging China To Choose a Peaceful Path, Wall Street Journal,
August 3
rd
21
Yuan-Kang Wang, Chinas Grand Strategy and U.S. Primacy: Is China Balancing American Power?.
22
J une Teufel Dreyer, China's Power and Will: The PRC's Military Strength and Grand Strategy, Orbis,
51: 4, 2007, pp. 651-664

10
interests, and so are increasing multilateral and bilateral relations both because they
facilitate Beijings overriding goal sustaining high economic growth rates.
Chinas leadership are rational and calculating. China may be slowly biding their
time until they are so powerful that US threats of constraining or punishing China are
simply unpersuasive indeed, some might say this day has already come. Chinas
peaceful development is unlikely to last forever it is a policy that was entered into due
to considerations of the international circumstances of the time, one based more on
considerations of style and image than substance or a coherent foreign policy which
ultimately takes into account traditional security concerns inherent in realist and
nationalist considerations put simply, there was a good reason Taiwan was excluded
from its peaceful development rhetoric.


11
Bibliography
Carter, Ashton B and Perry, William J ., China on the march, The National Interest,
March 1
st
2007
Cheng, J oseph Y.S., China's Peaceful Rise--Speeches of Zheng Bijian, 1997-2005 Zheng
Bijian (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2005), Journal of Contemporary
Asia, February 2007
China and the West: Dealing with China, The Economist, November 17
th
2005
Chinas National Defense, Chinas Defense White Paper 1998,
http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/china/doctrine/cnd9807/index.html, accessed 1
st
August
2008
China's Peaceful Development Road White Paper, 2005,
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200512/22/eng20051222_230059.html, accessed 1
st
August 2008
Deans, Phil, State Patriotism versus Popular Nationalism in the Peoples Republic of
China, Article emerging from the IIAS workshop, Emerging National Self-Assertion in
East Asia, held in Amsterdam, 25
th
May 2004.
Garver, J ohn, Interpreting Chinas Grand Strategy, The Jamestown Foundation China
Brief, 5: 15 (J uly 5
,
2005)
Goldstein, Avery, The Diplomatic Face of Chinas Grand Strategy: A Rising Powers
Emerging Choice, The China Quarterly, No.168 (December 2001), pp.835-864
Goldstein, Avery, Chinas Grand Strategy and US Foreign Policy: Foreign Policy
Research Institute, E-Notes, September 27 2005
Lam, Willy Wo-Lap, China aiming for 'peaceful rise', CNN, February 6, 2004
Pan, Esther, The Promise and Pitfalls of Chinas Peaceful Rise, Council on Foreign
Relations, , April 14, 2006, http://www.cfr.org/publication/10446/, accessed 1
st
August
2008.
Rabkin, April Chinas Inside Game, The New York Times, J uly 2
nd
2008.
Segal, Adam, and Greenberg, Maurice R., Encouraging China To Choose a Peaceful
Path, Wall Street Journal, August 3
rd

12
Teufel Dreyer, J une, China's Power and Will: The PRC's Military Strength and Grand
Strategy, Orbis, 51: 4, 2007, pp. 651-664
Yuan-Kang Wang, Yuan-Kang Chinas Grand Strategy and U.S. Primacy: Is China
Balancing American Power?, Paper prepared for delivery at the Annual Convention of
the International Studies Association (ISA), San Diego, March 22-25, 2006,
http://www.allacademic.com//meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/1/0/0/0/8/pages100089/
p100089-1.php, accessed 1
st
August 2008
Zoellick, Robert B., Whither China: From Membership to Responsibility?, Remarks to
National Committee on U.S.-China Relations: New York City, September 21, 2005.