Perelman's Theory of Argumentation and Natural Law

Francis J. Mootz III

Philosophy and Rhetoric, Volume 43, Number 4, 2010, pp. 383-402 (Article)
Published by Penn State University Press
DOI: 10.1353/par.2010.0006
For additional information about this article
Access provided by UFRJ-Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro (18 Jan 2014 20:03 GMT)
http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/par/summary/v043/43.4.mootz.html
Philosophy and Rhetoric, \ol. , No. , ac.c
Copyright ac.c Tc Pcnnsylvania Statc Univcrsity, Univcrsity Park, PA
Pcrclmans Tcory ol Argumcntation
and Natural Law
Francis J. Mootz III
Cham Pcrclman rcsuscitatcd thc rhctorical tradition by dcvcloping an
clcgant and dctailcd thcory ol argumcntation. Rcjccting thc singlcmindcd
Cartcsian locus on rational truth, Pcrclman rccovcrcd thc ancicnt wisdom
that wc can arguc rcasonably about mattcrs that admit only ol probabil
ity. From this onc would concludc that Pcrclmans argumcntation thcory
is inaltcrably opposcd to natural law, and thcrclorc that ! would havc donc
bcttcr to havc writtcn an articlc titlcd Pcrclmans Tcory ol Argumcntation
as a Rejection of Natural Law.
Howcvcr, my thcsis is prcciscly that Pcrclmans thcory ol argumcn
tation connccts to thc natural law tradition in intcrcsting and produc
tivc ways. Pcrclman rclcrrcd to natural law in a numbcr ol his cssays as
an cxamplc ol thc cxccssivcly rational locus that hc sought to corrcct
with his thcory ol argumcntation, but hc also notcd thc powcr ol natural
law claims in lcgal argumcntation. To my knowlcdgc, hc ncvcr ocrcd
a dctailcd account ol thc conncctions bctwccn his thcory ol argumcn
tation and natural law. Howcvcr, Pcrclmans dccp and abiding conccrn
with justicc suggcsts that hc could not hclp but bc intcrcstcd in lincs ol
argumcntation that challcngc positivc laws lrom somc othcr standpoint
that, in somc manncr, hc must cmbracc somc clcmcnts ol thc natural law
tradition.
PR 43.4_05.indd 383 10/28/10 10:17:03 AM
vv~xcis ,. :oo:z iii

! wish to outlinc thc ways that a natural law account can t with
Pcrclmans thcory ol argumcntation in ordcr to addrcss an ontological crisis
that grips contcmporary lcgal thcory. Stcvcn Smith (acc) has pcrsuasivcly
dcscribcd laws quandary now that lcgal practicc purports to bc divorccd
lrom thc natural law contcxts in which it dcvclopcd. Smith provocativcly
contcnds that thcrc is at lcast a strong prima facie casc that modcrn lcgal
discoursc is opcrating in a sort ol ontological gap that dividcs our cxplicit
or owncd ontological commitmcnts (which prccludc us lrom rccognizing
thc rcality ol thc law |that stands distinct lrom cmpirical lcgal practiccs|)
lrom thc ontological assumptions not only implicit in but csscntial to
our discoursc and practicc (which sccm to prcsupposc thc rcality ol thc
law) (., 6).
1
!n a similar vcin, Pctcr Goodrich dcscribcs thc plight ol
contcmporary lcgal thcory with concisc accuracy, obscrving that wc havc
abandoncd natural law loundations originally constructcd in ccclcsiastical
vcnucs only to nd that thc projcct ol dcvcloping a sccular lcgal languagc
capablc ol translorming thc managcmcnt ol social conict into qucstions
ol tcchnical rationality is doomcd to lailurc (.6, .6c6.).
! contcnd that by working through a conccption ol natural law that ts
with Pcrclmans philosophy ol argumcntation wc can nd a promising way
to addrcss laws ontological crisis. Tc philosophy ol thc ncw rhctoric is a
rich rcsourcc lor dcscribing thc ontological spacc in which law opcratcs and
also lor providing normativc guidancc to thosc cngagcd in lcgal practicc.
:nv x~:uv~i i~w :v~bi:iox
Tc tcrm natural law gcncrally calls to mind a philosophical account
that bloomcd in ancicnt Romc, was absorbcd into thc Christian tradition,
rcachcd lull cxprcssion in Aquinas, and thcn was sccularizcd and rational
izcd as a philosophy ol natural rights. Ciccro ocrcd a succinct dcnition ol
prcChristian natural law bascd on thc Stoic tradition, arguing that natural
law is univcrsal, ctcrnal, and unchanging and that thcsc charactcristics ol
rcality lollow lrom thc lact that natural law is authorcd and administcrcd
by a dcity.
Truc law is right rcason in agrccmcnt with Naturc, it is ol univcrsal
application, unchanging and cvcrlasting. . . . |V|c nccd not look
outsidc oursclvcs lor an cxpoundcr or intcrprctcr ol it. And thcrc
will not bc dicrcnt laws at Romc and at Athcns, or dicrcnt laws
now and in thc luturc, but onc ctcrnal and unchangcablc law will
PR 43.4_05.indd 384 10/28/10 10:17:03 AM
pcrclmans thcory ol argumcntation and natural law

bc valid lor all nations and lor all timcs, and thcrc will bc onc
mastcr and onc rulcr, that is, God, ovcr us all, lor Hc is thc author
ol this law, its promulgator, and its cnlorcing judgc. (.a, .aa.)
Ciccros account was casily accommodatcd to Christian principlcs that wcrc
cmbraccd and propagatcd by thc Roman mpirc. Ccnturics latcr, Aquinas
dicrcntiatcd ctcrnal law, natural law and positivc law, arguing that Gods
divinc will is bcyond our kcn but that wc arc capablc ol dctcrmining thc
conditions undcr which humans ourish through usc ol our rcason bccausc,
to borrow St. Pauls words, thc natural law has bccn writtcn in our hcarts.
2

Following ccnturics ol war and violcncc wagcd on bchall ol rcligious
bclicl, nlightcnmcnt scholars sought to ground thc pcrsistcnt dcmand lor
human rights in univocal rcason rathcr than a rcligious cosmology. !n this
account, human naturc givcs risc to ccrtain moral prcccpts rathcr than a
lawgiving dcity, morc prcciscly, thc intcgrity and intrinsic worth ol human
lilc givcs risc to a varicty ol moral dictatcs. Tis shilt in cmphasis is notcd in
thc tcrm natural rights, which a pcrson bcars, as opposcd to natural law,
to which a pcrson is subjcct.
Most rcccntly, Gcrmain Griscz, John Finnis, and Robcrt P. Gcorgc
havc argucd lor a ncw natural law that purports to rcjuvcnatc Aquinass
approach in tcrms that arc suitablc to our sccular and rationalist agc. Put
simply, thcy contcnd that a numbcr ol incommcnsurablc human goods
simply arc givcn as clcmcnts ol human ourishing and that thcsc human
goods providc a dctcrminatc basis lor cthical dccision making through thc
cxcrcisc ol a noncalculativc and nonutilitarian practical rcasoning.
Tcorics ol natural law rccct critical accounts ol thc constitutivc
aspccts ol thc wcllbcing and lulllmcnt ol human pcrsons and thc com
munitics thcy lorm. Tc propositions that pick out lundamcntal aspccts ol
human ourishing arc dircctivc (that is, prcscriptivc) in our thinking about
what to do and what to rclrain lrom doing (our practical rcason)that is,
thcy arc, or providc, morc than mcrcly instrumcntal rcasons lor action and
scllrcstraint (Gcorgc acc,, , Finnis acc).
Gcorgc cmphasizcs thc chastcncd charactcr ol thc ncw natural law by
rcjccting thc idca that judgcs may dircctly acccss its principlcs in dcciding
cascs, rathcr, positivc law always impcrlcctly implcmcnts natural law, and
thcrclorc a commitmcnt to thc rulc ol law is a critical lcaturc ol modcrn
constitutional dcmocracics (acc,, ,.,).
Tis longstanding, but constantly cvolving, tradition ol natural law
thinking docs not casily conncct with Pcrclmans thcory ol argumcntation
PR 43.4_05.indd 385 10/28/10 10:17:03 AM
vv~xcis ,. :oo:z iii
6
lor thc simplc rcason that gcnuinc argumcntation plays no rolc in thc
cxistcncc or claboration ol this tradition. Tc positing ol an abiding critc
rion that cxists outsidc ol timc or placc lcavcs no room lor argumcntation,
instcad, thcrc is simply validity or nonvalidity. vcn thc ncw natural law is
at odds with Pcrclmans philosophy bccausc it prcsumcs that thcrc arc cor
rcct answcrs to moral qucstionscvcn though pcoplc acting in good laith
can disagrcc about which answcr is corrcctand also insists that rcaching
thc corrcct answcr is a mattcr ol rcning our abilitics to rcason practically.
For cxamplc, Anthony Lisska accuscs Finniss ncw natural law ol pro
moting thc cxcrcisc ol thcorctical rcason in thc guisc ol practical rcason
(.6, .6). As ! cxplain, Lisskas rcconstruction ol Aquinass philosophy
in tcrms ol Aristotclian practical rcasoning providcs a plausiblc thcorctical
starting point lor concciving natural law in tcrms ol Pcrclmans thcory ol
argumcntation.
Givcn its historical trajcctory, it should comc as no surprisc that
Pcrclman roundly criticizcs natural law. Hc rcjccts thc sccular, rationalist
incarnation ol thc tradition bccausc it prcsumcs that rcason can dctcrminc
not only what is truc in thc world ol cmpirical lact but also what is just in thc
social world (.c, aa, a, ..). His lricnd and collcaguc Micczyslaw
Mancli argucs that thc ncw rhctoric rcjccts any traditionalist rcliancc on a
natural statc ol aairs (.6, 6.6a). As Pcrclman notcs, thc traditional
approach to natural law continually runs aground on thc shoals ol cxpcri
cncc, as dcmonstratcd by thc lact that rcason has lailcd to scttlc dcbatcs
rcgarding justicc that rcach back at lcast as lar as Sophoclcs (.c, .6).
3

Hc concludcs that justicc is not univocal, instcad, it always rcquircs making
choiccs bctwccn justiablc tcncts that arc in conict. Law must opcratc in
thc rcalm ol thc rcasonablc as wcll as thc rational il it is to do justicc.
Howcvcr, Pcrclmans philosophy also is dccply indcbtcd to Aristotlc,
and Pcrclman rccognizcs that thcrc may bc room lor a vcry dicrcnt undcr
standing ol natural law by drawing on Aristotlc. !n a dictionary cntry on
thc tcrm, Pcrclman cautions that combining two polyscmic words such
as naturc and law yiclds myriad dcnitions, and so onc must think
contcxtually and historically rathcr than conccptually (Foricrs and Pcrclman
.,, ..). Aristotlc ocrs a countcrpoint to modcrn rationalist conccp
tions ol natural law bccausc hc was too wcddcd to thc ncccssity ol an cqui
tablc lcavcning ol thc law to cndorsc a thoroughly rationalizcd approach to
lcgal practicc. !n rcsponsc to a qucstion at a scminar, Pcrclman criticizcd
thc alignmcnt ol natural law with thc rationalrcgardcd in tcrms ol thc
PR 43.4_05.indd 386 10/28/10 10:17:03 AM
pcrclmans thcory ol argumcntation and natural law
,
mathcmatical modcl ol moral rcasoningbut hc cmphasizcd that thcrc
was a linc ol thinking lrom Aristotlc to Aquinas that cmbraccd a morc
cxiblc account. ! dont scc cithcr Aristotlc or Tomas Aquinas saying as
Grotius says, that thcrc arc ctcrnal laws ol justicc, just as ctcrnal as thc laws
ol mathcmatics. !t is impossiblc (.,a, aa.). As Jan 8rockman summarizcs,
Natural law and positivc law arc both historical and subjcct to changc. !t
is prcciscly this dimcnsion that dcncs thc inquiry ol Pcrclman (.6, ).
Tis gcsturc by Pcrclman toward thc classical undcrstanding ol natural law
as a lcaturc ol thc intcrplay bctwccn thc hypothcsizcd rational lcgal systcm
and thc rcasonablc rcsolution ol spccic cascs providcs thc starting point
lor my inquiry.
! usc thc tcrm natural law gcncrally to rclcr to thc tradition ol natural
law thinking, but in this articlc ! proposc a ncw undcrstanding ol natural
law. Tc tcrm natural law combincs two clcmcnts: naturc and law. ! arguc
that thc naturc undcr considcration is human naturcmorc spccically,
our naturc as nitc, hcrmcncutical, and rhctorical bcings. Tc law to
which ! rclcr is not givcn in thc natural world nor promulgatcd by a dcity,
rathcr, it is thc social activity ol lcgal rcgulation. ! concludc that natural
law is bcst undcrstood as a naturalizcd rhctoric, by which ! mcan that
thc manncr in which wc cngagc in lcgal rcgulation is rootcd in our intcr
prctivc and rhctorical naturc. cncd in this manncr, natural law ts with
Pcrclmans thcory ol argumcntation, although it is ncccssary to draw thcsc
conncctions vcry carclully.
vvvvi:~xs :nvovv ov ~vcu:vx:~:iox ~xb x~:uv~i i~w
Tcrc arc at lcast thrcc dicrcnt ways to think about natural law in conjunc
tion with Pcrclmans thcory ol argumcntation. First, wc can rcgard natural
law as a linc ol argumcnt, a rclatcd lamily ol commonplaccs that wc nd
impossiblc to ignorc, dcspitc our ovcrt positivist commitmcnts. Sccond,
wc might conncct Pcrclmans contcstcd (and oltcn misundcrstood) idca ol
a univcrsal audicncc to thc natural law tradition. Finally, and most radi
cally, wc might think ol natural law in morc larrcaching thcorctical tcrms
by concciving Pcrclmans philosophy as propounding a naturalizcd rhcto
ric. 8y connccting with thc natural law tradition in thcsc multiplc ways,
Pcrclmans thcory ol argumcntation dcmonstratcs robust a nitics with
natural law. !n this short articlc ! can only adumbratc thcsc thrcc lincs
ol inquiry.
PR 43.4_05.indd 387 10/28/10 10:17:03 AM
vv~xcis ,. :oo:z iii

Natural Law as a Commonplace

Pcrclman rccognizcd that natural law plays an important rolc in lcgal
argumcntation, cvcn il wc rcjcct thc claim that thcrc is an objcctivc struc
turc ol justicc that can bc undcrstood through thc usc ol rcason:
Tc idca ol natural law is also misconccivcd whcn it is poscd in
ontological tcrms. . . . Natural law is bcttcr considcrcd as a body ol
gcncral principlcs or loci, consisting ol idcas such as thc naturc ol
things, thc rulc ol law, and ol rulcs such as No onc is cxpcctcd
to pcrlorm impossibilitics, both sidcs should bc hcardall ol
which arc capablc ol bcing applicd in dicrcnt ways. !t is thc task
ol thc lcgislator or judgc to dccidc which ol thc not unrcasonablc
solutions should bccomc a rulc ol positivc law. Such a vicw, accord
ing to Michcl \illcy, corrcsponds to thc idca ol natural law lound
in Aristotlc and St. Tomas Aquinaswhat hc calls thc classical
natural law. (.,b, )
Tc dialcctic ol thc rcasonablc and thc rational in law shows thc nccd lor
a morc cxiblc undcrstanding ol natural law as somcthing othcr than a
rational construct that is timclcss and univcrsal (Pcrclman .,b, .acaa).
Pcrclmans analysis ol thc natural law tradition as a collcction ol com
monplaccs cxcmplics how rhctorical cxchangcs working lrom common
placcs contain a critical bitc. Hc citcs thc dccision by thc Allics to justily
thc Nurcmbcrg trials with appcals to natural law as a conccssion to thc lact
that thc dcmands ol justicc cxcccd thc capacity ol positivc law (.,b, .c).
vcn il thc history ol natural law thought is markcd by authoritarian and
idcological ovcrtoncs, Pcrclman docs not rcgard thc tradition as a mistakc
that shouldor canbc cxorcizcd lrom our vocabulary. Hc ccctivcly strips
natural law prcccpts ol thcir inauthcntic claims to ctcrnal and univcrsal
validity and urgcs lcgal thcorists and practitioncrs to utilizc thc principlcs
as vital (indccd, unavoidablc) rcsourccs lor introducing innovation and lor
critiquing cxisting lcgal rclations.
Pcrclmans approach rccalls Aristotlcs advicc about how to arguc
against application ol a writtcn law that is against oncs intcrcst whcn it
is rcad litcrally rathcr than in an cort to ccctuatc thc purposc ol thc
law. !n thc Rhetoric , Aristotlc rccommcnds arguing that lollowing thc writ
tcn law slavishly would do an injusticc, quoting Antigoncs plcas as a basis
lor this linc ol argumcnt. Hc suggcsts onc should arguc this point rst by
PR 43.4_05.indd 388 10/28/10 10:17:03 AM
pcrclmans thcory ol argumcntation and natural law

obscrving that it is cvidcnt that il thc writtcn law is contrary to thc lacts,
onc must usc common law and argumcnts bascd on lairncss as bcing morc
just. Ncxt, hc says, onc should point out that to usc bcst undcrstanding is
not to lollow thc writtcn law cxclusivcly and that lairncss always rcmains
and ncvcr changcs nor docs thc common law (lor it is in accordancc with
naturc) but writtcn laws oltcn changc (.., ..c). Aristotlc cmphasizcs that
thc advocatc should arguc that not all writtcn laws arc just, and so thc pcr
son sccking justicc should conlorm to thc unwrittcn law (.., 66,).
Tony 8urns (acca) cxplains why Aristotlc includcs this linc ol argu
mcntation in thc Rhetoric . First, 8urns argucs that Aristotlc miscasts
Sophoclcs as a dclcndcr ol a univcrsal and ctcrnal natural law. !t is morc
likcly that Antigonc is appcaling to traditionbound and parochial rcligious
custom rathcr than invoking abstract and ctcrnal principlcs. !n othcr words,
Antigonc invokcs a prcmodcrn natural law argumcnt that too oltcn is lost
in our rationalist rcadings ol Aristotlc, providing additional support lor thc
idca that thc natural law is a conluscd conccpt that has bccn invokcd as
part ol argumcnts within dicring contcxts ovcr thc millcnnia.
Morc important, 8urns contcnds that Aristotlc did not cndorsc this
linc ol argumcnt, although by including it in thc Rhetoric hc acknowlcdgcd
that thcsc typcs ol argumcntmost vividly advanccd by sophistic chal
lcngcs to slavcry as an unnatural practicchad lound currcncy among his
contcmporarics (acc, a).
4
To thc cxtcnt that Aristotlc cvcntually did
cndorsc natural law argumcnts, 8urns contcnds that hc did so in ordcr to
justify thc status quo against radical attacks (acc, ). 8urns cxplains:
Aristotlcs trcatmcnt ol thc conccpt ol natural justicc or law . . . in
thc Nicomachean Ethics , in striking contrast to what hc says about
natural law argumcnts in thc Rhetoric , might bc sccn as a classic
illustration ol such a rhctorical manocuvrc. Tc irony ol Aristotlcs
suggcstion that it is his radical political opponcnts such as Alcidimas
who cmploy thc conccpt ol natural law in a mcrcly rhctorical man
ncr whcrcas hc himscll cmploys thc samc conccpt in thc pursuit
ol objcctivc cthical truth is rcadily apparcntcspccially (but not
only) to thosc ol a Nictzschcan or poststructuralist philosophical
pcrsuasion. (acc, )
Natural law has a complcx valcncc in Aristotlcs usagc, but Pcrclman
would ccrtainly concludc that thcsc dicrcnt uscs ol natural law by
Aristotlc lollow lrom thc lact that it is an csscntially contcstcd conccpt
PR 43.4_05.indd 389 10/28/10 10:17:04 AM
vv~xcis ,. :oo:z iii
c
that is closcly conncctcd to justicc. !l natural law is an ontological lcaturc
ol thc world, it must bc thc casc that whcn both partics in a dcbatc invokc
natural law onc ol thcm must bc wrong. Howcvcr, whcn natural law is
undcrstood as a commonplacc lrom which onc may arguc many points
in dicrcnt ways, onc must rcgard it as a supplc and polyscmic conccpt
that docs not yicld singular answcrs to social and lcgal disputcs. vcn thc
highly rationalistic notions ol natural rights that arosc in thc nlightcn
mcnt pcriod can bc vicwcd as lincs ol critical argumcntation against thc
status quo that provcd to bc incrcdibly productivc rhctorical stratcgics cvcn
though thcy lackcd thc ccrtainty an ontological backing could providc. As
Michcl Foucault rcminds us, critiquc might bc sccn as thc art ol not bcing
govcrncd quitc so much, and hc highlights thc historical cmcrgcncc ol
natural law argumcnts in lavor ol human rights as onc ol thrcc historical
points in thc cmcrgcncc ol critiquc as an clcmcnt ol thc nlightcnmcnt
(acc,, ). Natural law can bc sccn as an idcological commitmcnt to thc
status quo or as libcrating critiquc, which is prcciscly its importancc as a
linc ol argumcntation.
Lawycrs cncountcr cxamplcs ol thc polyscmic charactcr ol common
placcs on a daily basis, this is thc sourcc ol thc cncrgy and innovation ol
lcgal argumcntation. Considcr thc issucs raiscd by thc collcction ol policics
and practiccs known collcctivcly as a rmativc action. Tc law is quitc
clcar that statcs may not dcny to any citizcn cqual protcction undcr thc
law. 8ut what docs this commonplacc mcan in thc contcxt ol dctcrmining
which cmployccs will bc promotcd in a ccrtain workplacc: ocs cquality
mcan subjccting cvcry cmploycc to thc cxact samc tcsting critcria, or docs
it mcan asscssing thc mcrits ol cach individual cmploycc to pcrlorm thc job
lunctions whilc also attcnding to thc cccts ol past discrimination on ccr
tain cmployccs ability to compctc according to supposcd ncutral critcria:
!t is a curious, but not altogcthcr uncommon, lcaturc ol lcgal practicc that
opposing sidcs in a contcntious lcgal disputc can appcal to thc samc lcgal
principlcs and rulcs in support ol thcir rcspcctivc positions. Tcsc localizcd
doctrinal disputcs rccct thc samc dynamic that has bccn at work in thc usc
ol natural law argumcnts sincc thc dawn ol Vcstcrn civilization.
Natural Law as the Construction of a Universal Legal Audience
Pcrclmans dcvclopmcnt ol thc ancicnt attcntion to audicncc is onc ol his
signaturc contributions to rhctorical thcory. Noting that thc audicncc cnvi
sioncd by thc spcakcr is always a morc or lcss systcmatizcd construction,
PR 43.4_05.indd 390 10/28/10 10:17:04 AM
pcrclmans thcory ol argumcntation and natural law
.
Pcrclman placcs cmphasis on thc spcakcrs goal ol crcating hcr audicncc
in thc coursc ol addrcssing it (Pcrclman and lbrcchtsTytcca .6, .).
!n somc circumstanccs, a spcakcr will aspirc to morc than pcrsuading thc
audicncc to which thc spccch is immcdiatcly dircctcd and will claim to
ocr rcasons that would bc convincing to all rcasonablc pcrsons. Tis
rclcrs ol coursc, in this casc, not to an cxpcrimcntally provcn lact, but to a
univcrsality and unanimity imagincd by thc spcakcr, to thc agrccmcnt ol
an audicncc which should bc univcrsal, sincc, lor lcgitimatc rcasons, wc
nccd not takc into considcration thosc |who| arc not part ol it (Pcrclman
and lbrcchtsTytcca .6, .). Spcakcrs construct a univcrsal audicncc
not only to shapc thcir discoursc but also to cntrcat thc concrctc audicncc
bclorc thcmwhich can ncvcr amount to morc than oating incarnations
ol this univcrsal audicncc (Pcrclman and lbrcchtsTytcca .6, .)to
imaginc thcmsclvcs as part ol such an audicncc. As Pcrclman cmphasizcs,
thc actual audicncc hclps to validatc thc spcakcrs construction ol thc uni
vcrsal audicncc, cvcn as thc univcrsal audicncc scrvcs as a chcck on thc
parochial conccrns ol thc actual audicncc (Pcrclman and lbrcchtsTytcca
.6, ).
All lincs ol argumcntation arc shapcd to thc audicncc to which thcy
arc addrcsscd, and natural law argumcnts arc no dicrcnt. ! bclicvc that it
makcs good scnsc to rcgard natural law argumcnts as addrcssing a particu
lar audicncc in thcir capacity as a contingcnt cxamplc ol a hypothcsizcd
univcrsal audicncc. Vhcn somc sophists argucd that slavcry was an aront
to thc natural dignity and cquality ol all mcn thcy appcalcd to a spccic
Grcck audicncc rootcd in customary practiccs ol slavcry, but thcy sought to
provokc this audicncc to rccognizc its mcmbcrship in a broadcr univcrsal
audicncc. Arguing that slavcry is a violation ol univcrsal norms that arc part
ol thc structurc ol rcality docs not call lor an invcstigation ol thc natural
world, rathcr, it calls lor a rcconguration ol thc scllundcrstanding ol thc
audicncc.
As a lawycr and law prolcssor, ! havc no doubt that natural law argu
mcnts (cvcn il not cxprcssly charactcrizcd as such) arc ubiquitous and pcr
haps unavoidablc in lcgal practicc. !l wc agrcc with Pcrclman that thcrc is
no abiding structurc ol rcality that grounds thcsc argumcnts ontologically,
wc must scck to undcrstand thcm by cxploring thc charactcr ol thc audi
cncc that thc lcgal orator sccks to construct and thc manncr by which thc
orator sccks to motivatc an actual audicncc to act in rcsponsc to thcm.
! rcgard it as impossiblc to carry out this task without cmploying a con
ccption ol thc univcrsal audicncc, which suggcsts that thc notion ol thc
PR 43.4_05.indd 391 10/28/10 10:17:04 AM
vv~xcis ,. :oo:z iii
a
univcrsal audicncc is critical to Pcrclmans philosophical clarication ol
lcgal argumcntation, a practicc that hc rcgardcd as cxcmplary lor moral
argumcntation (.c, ..., .6, .,). Tis lcads mc to concludc that thc
idca ol natural law claims as commonplaccs that scck rcsonancc with an
audicncc inspircd to rcconstitutc itscll as thc univcrsal audicncc rcsidcs at
thc ccntcr ol Pcrclmans thcory ol argumcntation and is not just an obscurc
dctail in Pcrclman scholarship.
8y cxploring natural law argumcnts madc within thc contcxt ol thc
lcgal systcm wc can avoid somc ol thc many misundcrstandings that havc
ariscn lrom Pcrclmans usc ol thc tcrm univcrsal audicncc to rclcr to a
hypothcsizcd audicncc ol all rcasonablc pcrsons to whom a philosophical
claim to truth is addrcsscd. A natural law argumcnt is dircctcd to a univcrsal
audicncc lor whom thc actual audicnccwhcthcr a jury, judgc, or appcl
latc panclscrvcs as a standin. 8ut this is not to say that thc audicncc is
hypothcsizcd to bc gcncrically rational or philosophical. Claims in this
sctting arc pcculiarly lcgal in naturc and arc bcst paraphrascd as No rca
sonablc pcrson sccking to implcmcnt thc valucs ol our lcgal systcm could
concludc that slavcry is lcgitimatc, notwithstanding our custom and writtcn
laws to thc contrary. Argumcnts traditionally couchcd in natural law tcrms
arc not argumcnts madc to a timclcss and dccontcxtualizcd rational bcing,
rathcr, thcsc argumcnts arc dcsigncd to provokc thc actual audicncc to risc
abovc thcir parochial intcrcsts and to conccivc ol thcmsclvcs as cmpowcrcd
to articulatc truth, justicc, and othcr conluscd notions in a manncr that all
mcmbcrs ol thc community should nd pcrsuasivc. Using thc tcrminology
ol contcmporary rhctorical criticism, wc can say that natural law argumcnts
addrcss a particular audicncc ol intcndcd rcadcrs with thc goal ol invoking
an idcalizcd (univcrsal) audicncc (scc Sclzcr .a).
Trial lawycrs cmphasizc thc importancc ol dcvcloping a thcory ol thc
casc, which is to say that thcy try to construct a narrativc that thc jury
will cndorsc as its own rccounting ol what happcncd and what should bc
donc. Tc thcory ol thc casc is in lact a lactual narrativc rathcr than a
thcorctical construct. Tc goal is to pcrsuadc thc jury that justicc dcmands
a vcrdict in lavor ol oncs clicnt, litcrally, thc lacts arc prcscntcd so that
thcy appcar to spcak lor thcmsclvcs. Pcrhaps thc most lamous, and most
mimickcd, thcory ol thc casc was ocrcd by vctcran trial lawycr Johnnic
Cochran in his dclcnsc ol . J. Simpson lor thc murdcr ol his cxwilc
and hcr companion. Although thc rhyming cadcncc ol !l it docsnt t,
you must acquit provokcd laughs whcn rcpcatcd by latcnight comcdians,
Cochran cmploycd a powcrlul rhctorical dcvicc to summon thc jury to
PR 43.4_05.indd 392 10/28/10 10:17:04 AM
pcrclmans thcory ol argumcntation and natural law

assumc its rolc as thc guarantors ol justicc. Tc cvidcncc against Simpson

was powcrlul and comprchcnsivc, and yct thc prosccutions casc was llcd
with various holcs, inconsistcncics, and gacs. Cochrans thcory ol thc casc
was simplc: dcspitc ovcrwhclming lorcnsic cvidcncc, thc govcrnmcnts
actions and rcprcscntations cvidcnccd a malicious, or at lcast incompc
tcnt, approach to thc prosccution that should not bc tolcratcd by a jury
cmpanclcd to do justicc.
Vc can scc in thc cvcryday practicc ol trial lawycrs thc rhctorical call lor
a spccic audicncc to act as a univcrsal audicncc. Tc cntirc trial proccss is
suuscd with proccdural clcmcnts that pcrmit thc compcting rhctorsthc
opposcd lawycrsto construct thc audicncc thcy will addrcss in thc closing
argumcnt. From jury sclcction, to thc narrativc drama ol thc prcscntation
ol thc cvidcncc, to thc lormulation ol jury chargcs, and through thc closing
argumcnts, thc trial is a sustaincd cort to construct thc jury in such a way
that it assumcs its rolc as an incarnation ol thc univcrsal audicncc that riscs
abovc thc immcdiacy ol thc individual conccrns ol thc jurors. !n A Teory
of the Trial , Robcrt 8urns argucs that a trial structurcs compcting linguistic
practiccs and pcrlormanccs to cnablc thc tricr to makc practical judgmcnts
about what is to bc donc in rcsponsc to complcx and compcting accounts
ol lacts and norms (.). Tis lcads 8urns to charactcrizc judgmcnt as
thc strilc ol compcting claims to truth (., ..a). Tc advocatcs call
on thc jury to act as a univcrsal audicncc capablc ol working through this
unavoidablc strilc in rcasonablc lashion.
Tc jury rcsponds to thc compcting narrativcs rst by dctcrmining thc
important issucs at stakc and thcn by rcsolving thcm in a practical man
ncr that rca rms thc intcgrity ol both gcncral principlcs and thc spccic
lactual circumstanccs. 8urns concludcs:
! havc argucd that a grcat advantagc ol thc contcmporary trial
is its intcrnal complcxity, comprising cmpirical, moral, political,
and strictly lcgal languagc and valucs. !t is su cicntly cxiblc
to allow, indccd to rcquirc, that thc jury dctcrminc what thc most
important aspcct ol thc casc is. . . .
. . . Tc trials constitutivc rulcs and practiccs allow lor dclicatc
choiccs about thc incvitablc mctalcvcl qucstions wovcn into thc tri
als dicrcnt linguistic practiccs. !l thcsc incommcnsurablc sphcrcs
cxhaust our social pcrspcctivcs, il thcrc is no Platonic pcrspcctivc
lrom which onc might dctcrminc which sphcrc is ultimatcly dom
inant, lrom which (partial) pcrspcctivc ought thc jury to dccidc
PR 43.4_05.indd 393 10/28/10 10:17:04 AM
vv~xcis ,. :oo:z iii

which pcrspcctivc is thc right onc: Tc answcr sccms to mc clcar.

Tc jury dccidcs thc mctalcvcl qucstions lrom thc pcrspcctivc ol
commonscnsc morality, rigorously applicd, criticizcd, and somc
timcs challcngcd by thc dcviccs ol thc trial. Tc cxistcncc ol such a
lorum is a challcngc to any lorm ol social ordcring that cannot jus
tily its distinctivc principlcs in thc languagc ol ordinary morality.
(., a, a)
Tc thcory ol thc casc, thc artlul construction ol past lactual cvcnts during
thc trial, is morc than a basc appcal to individual jurors to display thcir mor
alistic biascs. Tc jurors arc challcngcd to act in conccrt, altcr dclibcration,
to rcpair a brcach ol social tics. Sitting in judgmcnt ovcr thc strilc ol incom
mcnsurablc claims, thcy collcctivcly act as a transitory incarnation ol thc
univcrsal audicncc.
Naturalizing Rhetoric
Tcrc is a nal, and morc radical, scnsc in which wc can conncct natural law
with Pcrclmans thcory ol argumcntation. ! tcrm this approach, naturaliz
ing rhctoric. Tis is a potcntially mislcading tcrm, and so ! want to unpack
my mcaning carclully. As uscd in contcmporary philosophical discoursc,
naturalism rclcrs gcncrally to a philosophy that sccs itscll as clarilying thc
cmpirical dimcnsions ol rcality rathcr than cngaging in spcculativc mcta
physics. Tc assumption is that naturc is just cmpirical rcality, subjcct to
scicntic invcstigation as supplcmcntcd by philosophical rccction. ! usc
thc tcrm naturalizcd rhctoric as a provocation to challcngc this prcjudicc:
wc naturalizc rhctoric whcn wc rcgard human naturc as a dccply rhctori
cal condition. Simply put, it is our pcrsistcnt human condition to continu
ously rccrcatc oursclvcs and our socicty through rhctorical cxchangcs with
othcrs. A naturalizcd rhctoric cmbraccs thc paradox that noncsscntialism
is csscntial to our bcing, that wc can nd a loundation lor rccction in
antiloundationalism.
5

A naturalizcd rhctoric has both cxplanatory and normativc lorcc. n
thc onc hand, a naturalizcd rhctoric undcrwritcs Pcrclmans thcory ol argu
mcntation by cmphasizing that it is an a rmativc account ol our naturc
as rcasoning bcings rathcr than a rcluctant conccssion to thc limitations ol
our rational capacity. Pcrclman is lcss vigorous in his critiquc ol Cartcsian
rationalism than \ico, who argucd against thc incipicnt rationalism ol thc
PR 43.4_05.indd 394 10/28/10 10:17:04 AM
pcrclmans thcory ol argumcntation and natural law

Vcstcrn tradition by dclcnding thc priority ol rhctoric and its conncctions

to our imaginativc capacitics and thc mctaphoric structurc ol human
undcrstanding (Mootz accb, Mootz acc). 8y naturalizing rhctoric in thc
humanist tradition cxcmplicd by \ico wc can claboratc thc ontological
claims that subtcnd Pcrclmans thcory ol argumcntation.
HansGcorg Gadamcrs philosophical hcrmcncutics pcrlorms thc ncc
cssary task ol providing an ontological grounding ol Pcrclmans rhctorical
philosophy in a manncr that connccts with \icos morc radical rhctorical
insights. Tc ccntcrpiccc ol Gadamcrs account ol thc naturc ol human
undcrstanding is thc mctaphor ol a convcrsation that yiclds an ongoing
which is to say a ncvcr complctcdlusion ol horizons. !l our naturc is dccply
hcrmcncutical, it is also dccply rhctorical. Vc cngagc othcrs rhctorically,
wc cxpcricncc this cngagcmcnt hcrmcncutically. Gadamcr providcs guid
ancc in thc lacc ol Cartcsian anxicty by providing an ontological account
ol thc social naturc ol undcrstanding (8incham .). Pcrclmans dcscrip
tion ol rhctorical movcs can bc misintcrprctcd as a rclativistic rcsponsc
to thc Cartcsian modcl ol knowlcdgc, but Gadamcrs ontological account
grounds Pcrclmans rhctorical philosophy in a way that prcvcnts this mis
rcading (Mootz acc6, ca). !n othcr words, Gadamcrs philosophical
hcrmcncutics cnsurcs that wc apprcciatc Pcrclmans work as a dcscription
ol thc human condition, not as a handbook ol argumcntativc stratcgics.
!mportant normativc implications lollow lrom a naturalizcd rhctoric.
!l it is our naturc to bc rhctorical, an cthical systcm oricntcd toward pro
moting human ourishing would rcquirc that wc cnsurc thc social and lcgal
contcxt lor thc dcvclopmcnt ol this capacity. Tis rccognition would not
lcad to spccic policy prcscriptions nor providc dcnitivc answcrs to spc
cic lcgal dilcmmas, but it would gcncrally point us in thc dircction ol
maximizing human communication and cxchangc. Morcovcr, a naturalizcd
rhctoric suggcsts a basis lrom which wc might approach onc ol thc ccntral
qucstions in rhctorical thcorywhcthcr thcrc is a basis lor distinguishing
good rhctoric lrom bad rhctoricin a morc productivc manncr.
Jcrcy Macicjcwski (acc, acc6) makcs just this claim by connccting
thc basic good ol social lilc to thc natural lact that rhctoric is ncccssary to
lashion a community. Although ovcrly wcddcd to nonrhctorical lcaturcs
ol Aquinass natural law philosophy, Macicjcwski aligns himscll with thc
notion ol an cvolving human naturc that is rhctorically sccurcd in social
intcrcoursc. Hc propcrly concludcs that thcrc is a natural rhctoric csscntial
to thc dcvclopmcnt ol thc pcrson.
PR 43.4_05.indd 395 10/28/10 10:17:04 AM
vv~xcis ,. :oo:z iii
6
Vhcn cxamincd morc acutcly using a moral thcory attuncd to
human bchavior such as natural law, it sccms that dcclaring pcr
suasion immoral as a violation ol autonomy bclics thc human
pcnchant lor cmploying rhctoric as part ol living in socicty. As
rhctoric scrviccs rcason, which in turn scrviccs thc dispositions, it
can bc sccn as a natural, morally praiscworthy concomitant ol thc
cxcrcising ol rcason which hclps to rcvcal thc potcntiality ol rcason
itscll. Morcovcr, ! bclicvc it possiblc to rclcr to such rhctoric as
natural. (acc, a6)
Howcvcr, whcn cxploring thcsc thcmcs it is crucial to avoid thc tcmpta
tion to csscntializc our rhctorical naturc by supposing that it includcs morc
substantivc agrccmcnt on sharcd norms than can bc sccurcd in dialoguc
and argumcntation. !n othcr words, it is always illcgitimatc to rccognizc
our rhctorical naturc but thcn to prcscribc ccrtain natural law claims that
must bc acccptcd by all rational pcrsons and that thcrclorc can bc coercively
imposed .
Pcrclmans cautions about thc dangcrs ol invoking thc univcrsal audi
cncc spcak to thcsc potcntial abuscs ol natural law claims. Pcrclman warns
ol thc dangcr ol clitism that rcsults in charactcrizing disscntcrs as irrational
or hcrctics or that lcads thc spcakcr to constrict thc actual audicncc to a
small vanguard that alrcady agrccs with thc claims put lorward (Pcrclman
and lbrcchtsTytcca .6, ). Tcsc idcological tcndcncics arc closcly
associatcd with natural law argumcntation through thc agcs, but it is prc
ciscly by naturalizing rhctoric that wc havc thc bcst chancc ol avoiding this
misusc ol natural law commonplaccs. 8y rccognizing that it is our naturc to
bc rhctorical, and that thc varicty ol lcgal systcms rcst on this naturalizcd
rhctoric rathcr than on an objcctivc statc ol aairs that can bc disccrncd by
rcason alonc, wc can undcrstand how natural law argumcntation works to
construct a univcrsal audicncc through rhctorical mcans.
! am not writing on a complctcly blank slatc in lcgal thcory to suggcst
this rcading ol thc natural law tradition. vcn thc rcsolutc analytical lcgal
positivist, H. L. A. Hart, conccdcs that it madc scnsc to acknowlcdgc that
thcrc is a minimal natural law rcquircmcnt that shapcs a lcgal systcm in
light ol our human naturc and thc barc nccd lor survival (., .acc).
Hart argucs that thc naturc ol human cxistcnccour vulncrability to cach
othcr, our approximatc cquality in cndowmcnts, and our not bcing cithcr
wholly altruistic or cvilprovidcs thc contcxt in which ccrtain sociolc
gal conditions must bc prcscnt to pcrmit survival. Hart suggcsts that this
rccognition shows a way to do justicc to both thc natural law and positivc
PR 43.4_05.indd 396 10/28/10 10:17:04 AM
pcrclmans thcory ol argumcntation and natural law
,
law traditions: Vc shall no longcr havc to choosc bctwccn two unsuitablc
altcrnativcs which arc oltcn takcn as cxhaustivc: on thc onc hand, that ol
saying that this is rcquircd by thc mcaning ol thc words law or lcgal
systcm, and on thc othcr, that ol saying that it is just a lact that most lcgal
systcms do providc lor sanctions (., .).
Rathcr than dcbating whcthcr sanctions arc an csscntial lcaturc ol thc
conccpt ol lcgality, Hart suggcsts that wc arc bcttcr scrvcd by rcgarding
thcm as a natural ncccssity in light ol thc human condition. Nccdlcss to
say, this conccssion has sparkcd spiritcd dcbatc.
6

Tcrc arc scvcral productivc points ol rclcrcncc in rcccnt lcgal thcory
that dcvclop altcrnativc accounts ol natural law in a manncr congcnial to
my thcsis. !n contrast to Harts minimal conccssion, Lon Fullcr argucd that
moral commitmcnts gcncratcd in communicativc cxchangc cxtcnd bcyond,
and somctimcs ovcrridc, thc biologically drivcn strugglc to survivc (.6,
.6). !n his nal rcsponsc to thc criticisms ol his proccduralist approach
to natural law, Fullcr rcvcalcd that hc was a gcnuinc natural law thcorist.
lscwhcrc ! havc argucd that thcsc bricl and ovcrlookcd rcmarks rcvcal
that Fullcr is bcst undcrstood as a proponcnt ol thc stylc ol natural law
that rcsonatcs with Pcrclmans rhctorical philosophy (., ). Fullcrs
dramatic nal plca on bchall ol natural law calls lor what ! havc tcrmcd a
naturalizcd rhctoric: !l ! wcrc askcd, thcn, to disccrn onc ccntral indis
putablc principlc ol what may bc callcd substantivc natural lawNatural
Law with capital lcttcrs! would nd it in thc injunction: pcn up, main
tain, and prcscrvc thc intcgrity ol thc channcls ol communication by which
mcn convcy to onc anothcr what thcy pcrccivc, lccl, and dcsirc (.6, .6).
Morc rcccntly, Lloyd Vcinrcb (.,, .) has movcd bcyond Fullcrs tcnta
tivc suggcstion and argucd in lavor ol natural law undcrstood as thc cort
to work out thc normativc kosmos in which wc nd oursclvcs as crcativc
participants.
Tc work by Fullcr and Vcinrcb providcs cxccllcnt starting points
in lcgal thcory lor undcrstanding thc conccpt ol a naturalizcd rhctoric as
a productivc dcvclopmcnt ol thc natural law tradition. Fullcr paid scant
attcntion to thcsc dimcnsions ol his work, providing only a gcsturc at thc
cnd ol his carccr toward this typc ol analysis. Vcinrcb has morc thoroughly
cmbraccd nomos as thc ground ol natural law, thcrcby bringing himscll
within thc rhctorical tradition dclcndcd by \ico and rcvivcd by Pcrclman.
Howcvcr, Vcinrcbs approach is on thc lringc ol Amcrican jurisprudcn
tial writing, his singular voicc has not rcsonatcd in a positivist cra during
which thc natural law tradition has wancd into virtual irrclcvancc. Rcading
Pcrclmans philosophy as a naturalizcd rhctoric providcs vital contcxt and
PR 43.4_05.indd 397 10/28/10 10:17:04 AM
vv~xcis ,. :oo:z iii

backing lor Vcinrcbs work, pcrmitting morc dctailcd claborations ol thc

hcrmcncuticalrhctorical charactcr ol lcgal practicc.
coxciusiox
Vc can makc signicant hcadway in providing a practical and thcorctical
rcsponsc to thc ontological quandary lacing contcmporary lcgal thcory il wc
rcconsidcr thc natural law tradition by connccting it to Pcrclmans thcory
ol argumcntation in thc thrcc ways that ! havc dcscribcd. Stcvcn Smiths
incisivc dcscription ol laws quandary paralyzcs thc rcadcr by ocring an
cithcror proposition: cithcr thc Law rclcrs to somcthing outsidc lcgal
practicc that can dircct it, or it is just a nonscnsical rclcrcncc that cxposcs
an ontological gap in which our discoursc opcratcs. Tcsc unsatislactory
altcrnativcs obscurc thc lact that thc rhctorical appcal to thc Law is not
an appcal to somcthing that cxists outsidc thc practicc ol law. 8y attcnding
morc carclully to lcgal practicc wc can cxplain and justily our rclcrcnccs to
thc Law as part ol thc rhctorical clcmcnts ol lcgal practicc. Lcgal practicc
has historical and normativc dcpth that always vastly cxcccds any particular
lcgal argumcnt.
Considcr thc situation lacing lawycrs who arc litigating a casc ol rst
imprcssion rcgarding cntcrprisc liability lor drug manulacturcrs whcn thc
makcr ol thc drug that was ingcstcd by thc plainti cannot bc dctcrmincd.
Lawycrs lrom both sidcs will arguc strcnuously that thc law rcquircs a vcr
dict in lavor ol thcir clicnt, which mcans that thcrc is an appcal to somc
thing bcyond thc cquitics attcndant to thc particular casc bclorc thcm. Tc
bcyond, howcvcr, just is thc historical trajcctory ol thc ongoing practicc
brought to bcar on thc casc bclorc thc partics. Lawycrs cannot gcncratc a
uniqucly corrcct rcsult lor thc casc at hand by mcans ol dialcctical rcason
ing (dcspitc thc rhctorical convcntions ol lcgal argumcntation that purport
to accomplish this impossiblc lcat), but in thcir appcals to thc lcgal tradi
tion thcy can gcncratc plausiblc argumcnts lor a rhctorical claboration ol
what thc Law rcquircs in thc casc at hand.
!n Pcrclmans account, thc Law is bcst conccptualizcd as a sct ol com
monplaccs lrom which onc can draw in making an argumcnt in a particular
casc and by which onc invokcs a univcrsal audicncc that is compctcnt to do
justicc (.c). Tc topoi that lorm thc Law arc rcal and providc guidancc,
cvcn il thcy cannot rcsolvc spccic lcgal disputcs dcnitivcly. Rclcrring to
thc Law is just to makc a gcncral rclcrcncc to thc topoi lrom which onc
can arguc lor a spccic rcsult, conscqucntly, thc Law is ncithcr cmpty nor
a mcans ol answcring lcgal qucstions lrom thc outsidc.
PR 43.4_05.indd 398 10/28/10 10:17:04 AM
pcrclmans thcory ol argumcntation and natural law

Vc invokc thc Law as a call lor a rcsponsc lrom thc audicncc. Tc call
asks thc audicncc to rcspond by assuming thc rolc ol an idcalizcd audicncc
that is compctcnt to do justicc. Tc ubiquitous commonplaccs ol natural
law argumcntation in contcmporary lcgal practicc arc not simply movcs
within thc logic ol doctrinal claboration, rathcr, thcsc commonplaccs arc
locuscd on shaping thc audicnccs scllundcrstanding. Natural law com
monplaccs scrvc an cpidcictic rolc as much as a lorcnsic or logical rolc, and
Pcrclman graspcd thc signicancc ol this rolc in his much misundcrstood,
and much maligncd, notion ol thc univcrsal audicncc.
Finally, thc activity ol appcaling to thc Law is a lcaturc ol our naturc
as hcrmcncutical and rhctorical bcings, a naturc that wc can cxplorc by
pursuing a naturalizcd rhctoric. Pcrclman docs not simply cataloguc argu
mcnts that may bc dcploycd in rhctorical situations, hc providcs a window
to human naturc. Pcrclman is bcst rcad as pursuing a naturalizcd rhctoric,
and lrom this undcrstanding important implications lor thc natural law tra
dition lollow. 8y rcading Pcrclman in this morc radical manncr wc not only
rccognizc thc lull scopc ol his ingcnuity and originality but also makc hcad
way in onc ol thc most important dcbatcs in political and lcgal philosophy.
Smith has argucd that law is in a mctaphysical quandary, scparatcd lrom
its natural law roots with no viablc substitutc to sustain lcgal lcgitimacy.
Vith Pcrclmans guidancc, wc nd a natural law solution to laws quandary
in thc account ocrcd by contcmporary rhctorical philosophy, cvcn il it is
vcry dicrcnt lrom thc traditional natural law accounts that shapc Smiths
anticipation ol a suitablc rcsolution ol thc quandary. Pcrclmans thcory ol
argumcntation providcs a way to rcsuscitatc natural law thcorizing whilc
at thc samc timc moving rmly bcyond thc lalsc ccrtaintics that Pcrclman
kncw only impcdc our qucst lor justicc.
William S. Boyd School of Law
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
xo:vs
An carlicr vcrsion ol this articlc was prcscntcd at Tc Promisc ol Rcason, convcncd at
thc Univcrsity ol rcgon in May acc. ! thank Jim Crosswhitc, avid Frank, and John
Gagc lor putting togcthcr an cxccllcnt conlcrcncc and lor inviting mc to attcnd. ! cxtcnd
spccial thanks to Jim Crosswhitc lor organizing this symposium and lor providing such
hclplul lccdback to mc as ! dcvclopcd my talk into an articlc. ! dcdicatc this articlc to
Jan M. 8rockman, dcan cmcritus ol thc Faculty ol Law at thc Katholickc Univcrsitcit
Lcuvcn, 8clgium, and distinguishcd visiting prolcssor at Pcnn Statcs ickinson School
PR 43.4_05.indd 399 10/28/10 10:17:04 AM
vv~xcis ,. :oo:z iii
cc
ol Law, in gratitudc lor a vibrant intcllcctual cxchangc whosc mark cxtcnds wcll bcyond
this papcr and lor a warm, pcrsonal lricndship. Prolcssor 8rockman docs not ncccssarily
cndorsc my thcmcin lact, hc rcmains quitc skcptical about thc utility ol natural law
nor is hc to blamc lor thc dccicncics that rcmain in my argumcnt.
. . ! havc rcvicwcd Smiths book in somc dctail clscwhcrc (Mootz acca).
a. !n his lcttcr to thc Romans, St. Paul writcs: For whcn Gcntilcs who do not havc
thc Law do instinctivcly thc things ol thc Law, thcsc, not having thc Law, arc a law unto
thcmsclvcs, in that thcy show thc work ol thc Law writtcn in thcir hcarts, thcir conscicncc
bcaring witncss and thcir thoughts altcrnatcly accusing or clsc dclcnding thcm, on thc day
whcn, according to my gospcl, God will judgc thc sccrcts ol mcn through Jcsus Christ
( New American Standard Bible ., Romans a:..6).
. Robcrt Gcorgc conccdcs that thc truths ol natural law oltcn arc obscurcd by socially
constructcd idcologics, as whcn southcrncrs in thc antcbcllum Amcrican South dclcndcd
slavcry (acc,, 6a). Hcncc, his conclusion: So, il thcrc is a sct ol moral norms, including
norms ol justicc and human rights, that can bc known by rational inquiry, undcrstanding,
and judgmcnt cvcn apart lrom any spccial rcvclation, thcn thcsc norms ol natural law can
providc thc basis lor an intcrnational rcgimc ol human rights. l coursc, wc should not
cxpcct conscnsus (acc,, 6).
. 8urns challcngcs thc convcntional attribution to thc sophists ol radically rclativist
bclicls, concluding that at lcast somc ol thc sophists wcrc not rclativists but objcctivists
so lar as qucstions ol cthics arc conccrncd and that thc critical attitudc ol this group ol
thinkcrs towards thc institution ol slavcry indicatcs thc prcscncc in lthccntury Athcns
ol a univcrsalist, cosmopolitan, rationalist and humanitarian approach to qucstions ol
cthics and politics (8urns acc, a, a6). Tc primary cxamplc is Alcidimas,
who maintaincd that thc institution ol slavcry contradicts rathcr than conlorms
to thc principlc ol cquity, which is thc most lundamcntal principal ol natural
justicc. Tis principlc statcs that thosc who arc cqual ought to bc trcatcd cqually
in rclcvantly similar circumstanccs. Tc dicrcncc bctwccn Alcidimas and
Aristotlc is that Alcidimas took thc vicw that all human bcings are by naturc
cqual, and thcrclorc that slavcry is cthically unjustiablc, whcrcas Aristotlc did
not. (acca, c)
. Naturalizing rhctoric docs not rcst on thcological commitmcnts, but ncithcr is it
ncccssarily at odds with rcligious bclicl. John Macquarric contcnds that a viablc account
ol natural law can scrvc as a bridgc bctwccn laith and morality il it takcs account ol thc
changc and dcvclopmcnt which . . . arc charactcristic not only ol mans imagcs ol himscll
but ol his vcry naturc and ol thc world around him (.., aa). Macquarric cxplains:
8ut il wc acknowlcdgc . . . that mans naturc is opcn, and that hc is always
going bcyond or transccnding any givcn statc ol himscll, and il wc acknowlcdgc
lurthcr that this opcn naturc ol man is sct in thc midst ol a cosmos which is
likcwisc on thc movc and is charactcrizcd by an cvolving rathcr than a static
PR 43.4_05.indd 400 10/28/10 10:17:04 AM
pcrclmans thcory ol argumcntation and natural law
c.
ordcr, thcn wc must say that thc natural law itscll, not just its lormulations, is
on thc movc and cannot havc thc immutability oncc ascribcd to it. 8ut what has
pcrhaps morc than anything clsc discrcditcd thc natural law conccpt is thc tacit
assumption that thcrc was a kind ol original human naturc to which cvcrything
subscqucnt is an accrction. . . . Mans vcry naturc is to cxist, that is to say, to go
out ol himscll, and in thc coursc ol this hc lcarns to takc ovcr lrom crudc naturc
and to do in a human (and humanc) way what was oncc accomplishcd by blind
natural lorccs (both in man and outsidc ol him) working in a rough and rcady
manncr. (.., a.)
My notion ol a naturalizcd rhctoric would bc onc manncr ol dcaling with thc dynamic
rcality ol mans naturc and could bc accommodatcd to rcligious bclicl, as Macquarric sug
gcsts, without bcing dcpcndcnt on any such bclicl.
6. Richard pstcin (acc) has argucd that wc ought to inatc Harts natural ncccs
sity to a morc robust, yct still libcrtarian, notion ol human wcllarc. !n rcsponsc, Jamcs
Allan (acc,) argucs that it is a mistakc to cxpand Harts minimalist approach.
wovxs ci:vb
Allan, Jamcs. acc,. !s You !s or !s You Aint Harts 8aby: pstcins Minimum Contcnt ol
Natural Law. Ratio Juris ac (a): a. a.
Aristotlc. ... On Rhetoric: A Teory of Civic Discourse. Trans. and cd. Gcorgc A. Kcnncdy.
xlord: xlord Univcrsity Prcss.
8incham, Jccry L. .. Tc Hcrmcncutic Mcdium. Philosophy and Rhetoric a (.): . .6.
8rockman, Jan M. .6. Justicc as quilibrium. Law and Philosophy (): 6 ..
8urns, Robcrt P. .. A Teory of the Trial. Princcton, NJ: Princcton Univcrsity Prcss.
8urns, Tony. acca. Sophoclcs Antigone and thc History ol thc Conccpt ol Natural Law.
Political Studies c (): ,.
. acc. Tc Tragcdy ol Slavcry: Aristotlcs Rhetoric and thc History ol thc Conccpt
ol Natural Law. History of Political Tought a (.): .6 6.
Ciccro. .a. De re publica. Trans. Clinton Valkcr Kcycs. Cambridgc, MA: Harvard
Univcrsity Prcss.
pstcin, Richard. acc. Tc Not So Minimal Contcnt ol Natural Law. Oxford Journal of
Legal Studies a (a): a. .
Finnis, John. acc. Foundations ol Practical Rcason Rcvisitcd. American Journal of
Jurisprudence c: .c ..
Foricrs, Paul, and Cham Pcrclman. .,,. Natural Law and Natural Rights. !n
Dictionary of the History of Ideas, cd. Philip P. Vicncr, : . a,. Ncw York:
Scribncr and Sons.
Foucault, Michcl. acc,. Vhat !s Critiquc: Trans. Lysa Hoshroth. Te Politics of Truth.
d. Sylvrc Lotringcr. Los Angclcs: Scmiotcxt(c).
Fullcr, Lon L. .6. Te Morality of Law. Rcv. cd. Ncw Havcn, CT: Yalc Univcrsity Prcss.
Gcorgc, Robcrt P. acc,. Natural Law. American Journal of Jurisprudence a: ,.
Goodrich, Pctcr. .6. Law in the Courts of Love: Literature and Other Minor Jurisprudences.
London: Routlcdgc.
PR 43.4_05.indd 401 10/28/10 10:17:04 AM
vv~xcis ,. :oo:z iii
ca
Hart, H. L. A. .. Te Concept of Law. and cd. xlord: xlord Univcrsity Prcss.
Lisska, Anthony J. .6. Aquinas Teory of Natural Law: An Analytic Reconstruction.
xlord: xlord Univcrsity Prcss.
Macicjcwski, Jcrcy J. acc. Rcason as a Ncxus ol Natural Law and Rhctoric. Journal of
Business Ethics (): a, ,.
. acc6. Natural Law, Natural Rhctoric, and Rhctorical Pcrvcrsions. Proceedings of
the American Catholic Philosophical Association ,: ., ,.
Macquarric, John. ... Rcthinking Natural Law. !n Natural Law and Teology, cd.
Charlcs . Curran and Richard A. McCormick, aa. 6. Ncw York: Paulist
Prcss.
Mancli, Micczyslaw. .6. Pcrlcmans Achicvcmcnt 8cyond Traditional Philosophy and
Politics. Law and Philosophy (): . 6,.
Mootz, Francis J., !!!. .. Law in Flux: Philosophical Hcrmcncutics, Lcgal Argumcn
tation, and thc Natural Law Tradition. Yale Journal of Law and the Humanities
.. (a): .. a.
. acc6. Rhetorical Knowledge in Legal Practice and Critical Legal Teory. Tuscaloosa:
Univcrsity ol Alabama Prcss.
. acca. Altcr Natural Law: A Hcrmcncutical Rcsponsc to Laws Quandary.
Journal of Law and Religion (a): . .a.
. accb. \icos !ngcnious Mcthod and Lcgal ducation. Chicago-Kent Law
Review (): .a6. .ca.
. acc. \ico and !magination: An !ngcnious Approach to ducating Lawycrs with
Scmiotic Scnsibility. International Journal of Semiotics and Law aa (.): .. aa.
New American Standard Bible. .. La Habra, CA: Lockman Foundation.
Pcrclman, Cham. .,a. Tc Rational and thc Rcasonablc. !n Rationality To-day, cd.
Tcodorc F. Gcracts, a. a. ttawa: Univcrsity ol ttawa Prcss.
. .,b. Te New Rhetoric and the Humanities: Essays on Rhetoric and Its Applications.
Trans. Villiam Kluback. 8oston: Rcidcl.
. .c. Justice, Law, and Argument: Essays on Moral and Legal Reasoning. Trans.
Villiam Kluback ct al. 8oston: Rcidcl.
Pcrclman, Cham, and Lucic lbrcchtsTytcca. .6. Te New Rhetoric: A Treatise on
Argumentation. Trans. John Vilkinson and Purccll Vcavcr. Notrc amc, !N:
Univcrsity ol Notrc amc Prcss.
Sclzcr, Jack. .a. Morc Mcanings ol Audicncc. !n A Rhetoric of Doing: Essays on Written
Discourse in Honor of James L. Kinneavy, cd. Stcphcn Vittc, Ncil Nakadatc, and
Rogcr Chcrry, .6. ,,. Carbondalc: Southcrn !ndiana Univcrsity Prcss.
Smith, Stcvcn . acc. Laws Quandary. Cambridgc, MA: Harvard Univcrsity Prcss.
Vcinrcb, Lloyd L. .,. Natural Law and Natural Justice. Cambridgc, MA: Harvard
Univcrsity Prcss.
. .. Oedipus at Fenway Park: What Rights Are and Why Tere Are Any. Cambridgc,
MA: Harvard Univcrsity Prcss.
PR 43.4_05.indd 402 10/28/10 10:17:04 AM