Article VI

Section 21 Legislative Investigation

51. SENATE VS. ERMITA - April 20, 2006
Facts: The Committee of the Senate issued invitations to
various officials of the Executive Department and AFP
officials for them to appear as resource speakers in a
public hearing on the railway project of the North Luzon
Railways Corporation with the China National Machinery
and Equipment Group (North Rail Project). The public
hearing was sparked by a privilege speech of Senator
Juan Ponce Enrile urging the Senate to investigate the
alleged overpricing and other unlawful provisions of the
contract covering the North Rail Project.
Subsequently, the President issued E.O. 464.
Section 1 provides: Appearance by Heads of Departments
Before Congress. In accordance with Article VI, Section
22 of the Constitution and to implement the Constitutional
provisions on the separation of powers between co-equal
branches of the government, all heads of departments of
the Executive Branch of the government shall secure the
consent of the President prior to appearing before either
House of Congress.
Section 3 further provides: Appearance of Other
Public Officials Before Congress. All public officials
enumerated in Section 2 (b) hereof shall secure prior
consent of the President prior to appearing before either
House of Congress to ensure the observance of the
principle of separation of powers, adherence to the rule on
executive privilege and respect for the rights of public
officials appearing in inquiries in aid of legislation.
Then, 3 petitions were filed questioning the
constitutionality of EO 464 which allowed executive
department heads to invoke executive privilege.
Issue: W/N EO 464 is constitutional.
Held: CONSTITUTIONAL FOR SECTION 1 AND 2(a).
The power of inquiry of Congress is expressly recognized
in Section 21 of Article VI of the Constitution. An
exemption to such Congressional power falls under the
rubric of executive privilege, which is also a constitutional
concept. Executive privilege, however, is recognized only
in relation to certain types of information of a sensitive
character. The validity of a claim thereof depends on the
ground invoked to justify it and the context in which it is
made. Executive officials are NOT exempt from the duty to
disclose information by the mere fact of being executive
officials.
Validity of Section 1
The requirement then to secure presidential consent under
Section 1, limited as it is only to appearances in the
question hour, is valid on its face. For under Section 22,
Article VI of the Constitution, the appearance of
department heads in the question hour is discretionary on
their part.
Section 1 cannot, however, be applied to
appearances of department heads in inquiries in aid of
legislation. Congress is not bound in such instances to
respect the refusal of the department head to appear in
such inquiry, unless a valid claim of privilege is
subsequently made, either by the President herself or by
the Executive Secretary.
Validity of Section 2(a)
Section 2(a) merely provides guidelines, binding only on
the heads of office mentioned in Section 2(b), on what is
covered by executive privilege. It does not purport to be
conclusive on the other branches of government. It may
thus be construed as a mere expression of opinion by the
President regarding the nature and scope of executive
privilege.
Unconstitutionality of Section 2(b) and 3
Section 3 of E.O. 464 requires all the public officials
enumerated in Section 2(b) to secure the consent of the
President prior to appearing before either house of
Congress.
Whenever an official invokes E.O. 464 to justify
his failure to be present, such invocation must be
construed as a declaration to Congress that the President,
or a head of office authorized by the President, has
determined that the requested information is privileged,
and that the President has not reversed such
determination. There is an implied claim of privilege, which
implied claim is not accompanied by any specific
allegation of the basis thereof.
Certainly, Congress has the right to know why
the executive considers the requested information
privileged. It does not suffice to merely declare that the
President, or an authorized head of office, has determined
that it is so, and that the President has not overturned that
determination. Such declaration leaves Congress in the
dark on how the requested information could be classified
as privileged. That the message is couched in terms that,
on first impression, do not seem like a claim of privilege
only makes it more pernicious. It threatens to make
Congress doubly blind to the question of why the
executive branch is not providing it with the information
that it has requested.
The claim of privilege under Section 3 of E.O.
464 in relation to Section 2(b) is thus invalid per se. It is
not asserted. It is merely implied. It does not provide for
precise and certain reasons for the claim, which deprives
the Congress to determine whether the withholding of
information is justified under the circumstances of each
case.
Congress undoubtedly has a right to information
from the executive branch whenever it is sought in aid of
legislation. If the executive branch withholds such
information on the ground that it is privileged, it must so
assert it and state the reason therefore and why it must be
respected.
The infirm provisions of E.O. 464, however, allow
the executive branch to evade congressional requests for
information without need of clearly asserting a right to do
so and/or proffering its reasons therefore. By the mere
expedient of invoking said provisions, the power of
Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is
frustrated. That is impermissible.
Resort to any means then by which officials of
the executive branch could refuse to divulge information
cannot be presumed valid. Otherwise, we shall not have
merely nullified the power of our legislature to inquire into
the operations of government, but we shall have given up
something of much greater value our right as a people
to take part in government.
59. NERI V. SENATE COMMITTEE ON
ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS AND
INVESTIGATIONS (March 25, 2008)
- This case is an offshoot of the ZTE scandal, wherein
various resolutions were introduced in Senate to
investigate the said matter.
- Respondent Committees initiated the investigation by
sending invitations to certain personalities and cabinet
Facts:
1. On September 26, 2007, petitioner appeared
before respondent committees and testified
concerning the NBN project, a project awarded
by the DOTC to ZTE.
2. Petitioner disclosed that Comelec chair Abalos
offered him P200M in exchange for his approval
of the NBN project. He informed GMA of the
bribery attempt and that she instructed him not to accept the bribe.
3. However, when probed further on GMA and petitioners discussions,
petitioner refused to answer, invoking executive privilege.
a. Specifically, petitioner refused to answer questions on:
i. w/n GMA followed up the NBN project
ii. w/n she directed him to prioritize it
iii. w/n she directed him to approve it
4. Respondent committees persisted in knowing the
answers and required him to testify on it again on
November 20. On November 15, ExeSec Ermita
wrote to respondent committees and requested
them to dispense with petitioners testimony on
the ground of executive privilege.
5. Petitioner did not appear on November 20 upon
orders of GMA. He said that the reason was he
thought the only remaining questions were those
he claimed to be covered by the executive
privilege.
6. Respondent committees found petitioners
explanations unsatisfactory. Hence, he was cited
in contempt and ordering his arrest and
detention.
7. Petitioner filed his supplemental petition for
certiorari and the court granted it. (see held of
march 2008 decision)
a. It was part of presidential
communications privilege
b. Respondent Committees committed
grave abuse of discretion in issuing
contempt order
Issue: w/n there is a recognized presumptive presidential
communications privilege in our legal system
Held: Yes
1. The presidential communications privilege is
fundamental to the operation of the government
and inextricably rooted in the separation of
powers under the Constitution
2. The court added that in previous jurisprudence
(e.g. Senate v. Ermita) that there are certain
types of information which the government may
withhold from the public, that there us a
governmental privilege against public disclosure
with respect to state secrets regarding military,
diplomatic and other national security matter and
that the right to information does not extend to
matters recognized as privileged information
under the separation of powers, by which the
court meant presidential conversations,
correspondences, and discussions in closed-door
cabinet meetings.
3. Senate vs. Ermita
a. From the above discussion on the
meaning and scope of executive
privilege, both in the United States and
in this jurisprudence, a clear principle
emerges. Executive privilege, whether
asserted against Congress, the courts,
or the public, is recognized only in
relation to certain types of information of
a sensitive character. While executive
privilege is a constitutional concept, a
claim thereof may be valid or not
depending on the ground invoked to
justify it and the context in which it is
made. Noticeably absent is any
recognition that executive officials are
exempt from the duty to disclose
information by the mere fact of being
executive officials. Indeed, the
extraordinary character of the exemptions indicates that the
presumption inclines heavily against executive secrecy and in favor
of disclosure. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
b. Obviously, the last sentence of the
above-quoted paragraph in Senate v.
Ermita refers to the "exemption" being
claimed by the executive officials
mentioned in Section 2(b) of E.O. No.
464, solely by virtue of their positions in
the Executive Branch. This means that
when an executive official, who is one of
those mentioned in the said Sec. 2(b) of
E.O. No. 464, claims to be exempt from
disclosure, there can be no
presumption of authorization to
invoke executive privilege given by
the President to said executive official,
such that the presumption in this
situation inclines heavily against
executive secrecy and in favor of
disclosure.
4. Thus, if what is involved is the presumptive
privilege of presidential communications when
invoked by the President on a matter clearly
within the domain of the Executive, the said
presumption dictates that the same be
recognized and be given preference or priority, in
the absence of proof of a compelling or critical
need for disclosure by the one assailing such
presumption. Any construction to the contrary will
render meaningless the presumption accorded by
settled jurisprudence in favor of executive
privilege. In fact, Senate v. Ermita reiterates
jurisprudence citing "the considerations justifying
a presumptive privilege for Presidential
communications."
Issue: w/n there is factual or legal basis to hold that the
communications elicited by the three questions are
covered by executive privilege
Held:
A. The power to enter into an executive agreement is a
"quintessential and non-delegable presidential
power."
First, respondent Committees contend that the
power to secure a foreign loan does not relate to a
"quintessential and non-delegable presidential power,"
because the Constitution does not vest it in the President
alone, but also in the Monetary Board which is required to
give its prior concurrence and to report to Congress.
This argument is unpersuasive.
The fact that a power is subject to the
concurrence of another entity does not make such power
less executive. "Quintessential" is defined as the most
perfect embodiment of something, the concentrated
essence of substance.24 On the other hand, "nondelegable"
means that a power or duty cannot be
delegated to another or, even if delegated, the
responsibility remains with the obligor.25 The power to
enter into an executive agreement is in essence an
executive power. This authority of the President to enter
into executive agreements without the concurrence of the
Legislature has traditionally been recognized in Philippine
jurisprudence.26 Now, the fact that the President has to
secure the prior concurrence of the Monetary Board,
which shall submit to Congress a complete report of its
decision before contracting or guaranteeing foreign loans,
does not diminish the executive nature of the power.
B. The "doctrine of operational proximity" was laid
down precisely to limit the scope of the presidential
communications privilege but, in any case, it is not
conclusive.
Second, respondent Committees also seek
reconsideration of the application of the "doctrine of
operational proximity" for the reason that "it may be
misconstrued to expand the scope of the presidential
communications privilege to communications between
those who are operationally proximate to the President
but who may have "no direct communications with her."
In the case at bar, the danger of expanding the
privilege "to a large swath of the executive branch" (a fear
apparently entertained by respondents) is absent because
the official involved here is a member of the Cabinet, thus,
properly within the term "advisor" of the President; in fact,
her alter ego and a member of her official family.
Nevertheless, in circumstances in which the official
involved is far too remote, this Court also mentioned in the
Decision the organizational test laid down in Judicial
Watch, Inc. v. Department of Justice.28 This goes to show
that the operational proximity test used in the Decision is
not considered conclusive in every case. In determining
which test to use, the main consideration is to limit the
availability of executive privilege only to officials who stand
proximate to the President, not only by reason of their
function, but also by reason of their positions in the
Executives organizational structure. Thus, respondent
Committees fear that the scope of the privilege would be
unnecessarily expanded with the use of the operational
proximity test is unfounded.
C. The Presidents claim of executive privilege is not
merely based on a generalized interest; and in
balancing respondent Committees and the
Presidents clashing interests, the Court did not
disregard the 1987 Constitutional provisions on
government transparency, accountability and
disclosure of information.
Third, respondent Committees claim that the
Court erred in upholding the Presidents invocation,
through the Executive Secretary, of executive privilege
because (a) between respondent Committees specific
and demonstrated need and the Presidents generalized
interest in confidentiality, there is a need to strike the
balance in favor of the former; and (b) in the balancing of
interest, the Court disregarded the provisions of the 1987
Philippine Constitution on government transparency,
accountability and disclosure of information, specifically,
Article III, Section 7;29 Article II, Sections 2430 and 28;31
Article XI, Section 1;32 Article XVI, Section 10;33 Article VII,
Section 20;34 and Article XII, Sections 9,35 21,36 and 22.37
It must be stressed that the Presidents claim of executive
privilege is not merely founded on her generalized interest
in confidentiality. The Letter dated November 15, 2007 of
Executive Secretary Ermita specified presidential
communications privilege in relation to diplomatic and
economic relations with another sovereign nation as
the bases for the claim.
It is easy to discern the danger that goes with the
disclosure of the Presidents communication with her
advisor. The NBN Project involves a foreign country as a
party to the agreement. It was actually a product of the
meeting of minds between officials of the Philippines and
China. Whatever the President says about the agreement
- particularly while official negotiations are ongoing - are
matters which China will surely view with particular
interest. There is danger in such kind of exposure. It could
adversely affect our diplomatic as well as economic
relations with the Peoples Republic of China.
In the case at bar, this Court, in upholding
executive privilege with respect to three (3) specific
questions, did not in any way curb the publics right to
information or diminish the importance of public
accountability and transparency.
This Court did not rule that the Senate has no
power to investigate the NBN Project in aid of legislation.
There is nothing in the assailed Decision that prohibits
respondent Committees from inquiring into the NBN
Project. They could continue the investigation and even
call petitioner Neri to testify again. He himself has
repeatedly expressed his willingness to do so. Our
Decision merely excludes from the scope of respondents
investigation the three (3) questions that elicit answers
covered by executive privilege and rules that petitioner
cannot be compelled to appear before respondents to
answer the said questions. We have discussed the
reasons why these answers are covered by executive
privilege. That there is a recognized public interest in the
confidentiality of such information is a recognized principle
in other democratic States. To put it simply, the right to
information is not an absolute right.
For clarity, it must be emphasized that the
assailed Decision did not enjoin respondent
Committees from inquiring into the NBN Project. All
that is expected from them is to respect matters that
are covered by executive privilege.
Issue: w/n respondent committees have shown that the
communications elicited by the three questions are critical
to the exercise of their functions
Held: Yes
At the outset, it must be clarified that the Decision did not
pass upon the nature of respondent Committees inquiry
into the NBN Project. To reiterate, this Court recognizes
respondent Committees power to investigate the NBN
Project in aid of legislation. However, this Court cannot
uphold the view that when a constitutionally guaranteed
privilege or right is validly invoked by a witness in the
course of a legislative investigation, the legislative purpose
of respondent Committees questions can be sufficiently
supported by the expedient of mentioning statutes and/or
pending bills to which their inquiry as a whole may have
relevance. The jurisprudential test laid down by this Court
in past decisions on executive privilege is that the
presumption of privilege can only be overturned by a
showing of compelling need for disclosure of the
information covered by executive privilege.
In the case at bar, we are not confronted with a
courts need for facts in order to adjudge liability in a
criminal case but rather with the Senates need for
information in relation to its legislative functions. This
leads us to consider once again just how critical is the
subject information in the discharge of respondent
Committees functions. The burden to show this is on the
respondent Committees, since they seek to intrude into
the sphere of competence of the President in order to
gather information which, according to said respondents,
would "aid" them in crafting legislation.
The presumption in favor of Presidential
communications puts the burden on the respondent
Senate Committees to overturn the presumption by
demonstrating their specific need for the information to be
elicited by the answers to the three (3) questions subject
of this case, to enable them to craft legislation. Here, there
is simply a generalized assertion that the information is
pertinent to the exercise of the power to legislate and a
broad and non-specific reference to pending Senate bills.
It is not clear what matters relating to these bills could not
be determined without the said information sought by the
three (3) questions.
Anent respondent Committees bewailing that
they would have to "speculate" regarding the questions
covered by the privilege, this does not evince a compelling
need for the information sought. Indeed, Senate Select
Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon43
held that while fact-finding by a legislative committee is
undeniably a part of its task, legislative judgments
normally depend more on the predicted consequences of
proposed legislative actions and their political acceptability
than on a precise reconstruction of past events. It added
that, normally, Congress legislates on the basis of
conflicting information provided in its hearings. We cannot
subscribe to the respondent Committees self-defeating
proposition that without the answers to the three (3)
questions objected to as privileged, the distinguished
members of the respondent Committees cannot
intelligently craft legislation.
Anent the function to curb graft and corruption, it
must be stressed that respondent Committees need for
information in the exercise of this function is not as
compelling as in instances when the purpose of the inquiry
is legislative in nature. This is because curbing graft and
corruption is merely an oversight function of Congress.44
And if this is the primary objective of respondent
Committees in asking the three (3) questions covered by
privilege, it may even contradict their claim that their
purpose is legislative in nature and not oversight. In any
event, whether or not investigating graft and corruption is
a legislative or oversight function of Congress, respondent
Committees investigation cannot transgress bounds set
by the Constitution.
The general thrust and the tenor of the three (3)
questions is to trace the alleged bribery to the Office of the
President.48 While it may be a worthy endeavor to
investigate the potential culpability of high government
officials, including the President, in a given government
transaction, it is simply not a task for the Senate to
perform. The role of the Legislature is to make laws, not to
determine anyones guilt of a crime or wrongdoing. Our
Constitution has not bestowed upon the Legislature the
latter role. Just as the Judiciary cannot legislate, neither
can the Legislature adjudicate or prosecute.
At this juncture, it is important to stress that
complaints relating to the NBN Project have already been
filed against President Arroyo and other personalities
before the Office of the Ombudsman. Under our
Constitution, it is the Ombudsman who has the duty "to
investigate any act or omission of any public official,
employee, office or agency when such act or omission
appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient."51
The Office of the Ombudsman is the body properly
equipped by the Constitution and our laws to preliminarily
determine whether or not the allegations of anomaly are
true and who are liable therefore. The same holds true for
our courts upon which the Constitution reposes the duty to
determine criminal guilt with finality. Indeed, the rules of
procedure in the Office of the Ombudsman and the courts
are well-defined and ensure that the constitutionally
guaranteed rights of all persons, parties and
witnesses alike, are protected and safeguarded.
Issue: w/n respondent committees committed grave abuse
of discretion in issuing contempt order
Held: Yes
The legitimacy of the claim of executive privilege having
been fully discussed in the preceding pages, we see no
reason to discuss it once again.
Respondent Committees second argument rests on the
view that the ruling in Senate v. Ermita, requiring
invitations or subpoenas to contain the "possible needed
statute which prompted the need for the inquiry" along with
the "usual indication of the subject of inquiry and the
questions relative to and in furtherance thereof" is not
provided for by the Constitution and is merely an obiter
dictum.
Unfortunately, the Subpoena Ad Testificandum
dated November 13, 2007 made no specific reference to
any pending Senate bill. It did not also inform petitioner of
the questions to be asked. As it were, the subpoena
merely commanded him to "testify on what he knows
relative to the subject matter under inquiry."
Anent the third argument, respondent
Committees contend that their Rules of Procedure
Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation (the "Rules") are
beyond the reach of this Court. While it is true that this
Court must refrain from reviewing the internal processes of
Congress, as a co-equal branch of government, however,
when a constitutional requirement exists, the Court has
the duty to look into Congress compliance therewith. We
cannot turn a blind eye to possible violations of the
Constitution simply out of courtesy.
In the present case, the Courts exercise of its
power of judicial review is warranted because there
appears to be a clear abuse of the power of contempt on
the part of respondent Committees. Section 18 of the
Rules provides that:
"The Committee, by a vote of majority of all its
members, may punish for contempt any witness before it
who disobey any order of the Committee or refuses to be
sworn or to testify or to answer proper questions by the
Committee or any of its members." (Emphasis supplied)
In the assailed Decision, we said that there is a cloud of
doubt as to the validity of the contempt order because
during the deliberation of the three (3) respondent
Committees, only seven (7) Senators were present. This
number could hardly fulfill the majority requirement
needed by respondent Committee on Accountability of
Public Officers and Investigations which has a
membership of seventeen (17) Senators and respondent
Committee on National Defense and Security which has a
membership of eighteen (18) Senators. With respect to
respondent Committee on Trade and Commerce which
has a membership of nine (9) Senators, only three (3)
members were present.57 These facts prompted us to
quote in the Decision the exchanges between Senators
Alan Peter Cayetano and Aquilino Pimentel, Jr. whereby
the former raised the issue of lack of the required majority
to deliberate and vote on the contempt order.
In the present case, it is respondent Committees
contention that their determination on the validity of
executive privilege should be binding on the Executive and
the Courts. It is their assertion that their internal
procedures and deliberations cannot be inquired into by
this Court supposedly in accordance with the principle of
respect between co-equal branches of government.
Interestingly, it is a courtesy that they appear to be
unwilling to extend to the Executive (on the matter of
executive privilege) or this Court (on the matter of judicial
review). It moves this Court to wonder: In respondent
Committees paradigm of checks and balances, what are
the checks to the Legislatures all-encompassing,
awesome power of investigation? It is a power, like any
other, that is susceptible to grave abuse.
MR denied.

60. ARNAULT VS. NAZARENO

from confinement at Bilibid
refusal to name
the person to whom he gave P440,000, and to
answer some questions.

(BUENAVISTA & TAMBOBONG) worth P5M total.
-in-fact Arnault, P500K
also paid to Burt, thru Arnault (total P1.5M)

Juan De Dios Hospital under a contract with the
government for 25 years lease.

down payment.
for only
P3M, and the Tambobong Estate should have been
free, because it was practically owned by the govt!
(when the installments were not paid, it was sold to
Rural Progress Admin.

special committee to investigate the estate deals.
why
did govt have to pay P1.5M to Burt when his interest
was only P20K, which was forfeited anyway?

opened an account in the name of his principal Burt to
deposit the P1.5M. He later withdrew them P500K for
Assoc Agencies, and P440K payable to cash.

determine who the ultimate recipient was.

person, but whose NAME HE CANT REMEMBER.

recipient, the Senate cited Arnault for CONTEMPT
and thus he was confined

him were incriminatory.
that the Senate has no power to punish
him for contempt for refusing to reveal the name of
the beneficiary, because such information is
immaterial and will not serve any intended or
purported legislation, and that his refusal to answer
does not obstruct the legislative process.
ISSUE: Whether the Senate has the power to cite Arnault
for contempt?
SC: Yes. Once inquiry admitted or established to be within
the jurisdiction of a legislative body to make, then the
investigating committee has the POWER TO REQUIRE A
WITNESS to answer any question pertinent to that inquiry,
subject to the consti right against self-incrimination.
However, the question must be MATERIAL OR
PERTINENT O THE SUBJECT OF INQUIRY OR
INVESTIGATION. The test of materiality is: direct relation
to the subject matter of inquiry and not by indirect relation
to any proposed or possible legislation.
RATIONALE: necessity of legislative action
determined by the information gathered as a whole.
The power of inquiry is an ESSENTIAL AND
APPROPRIATE AUXILIARY to the legislative function.
Legislature cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the
absence of information about the conditions which the
legislation is intended to affect or change.
When legislative body does not itself possess the
requisite information, recourse must be had to others who
do possess it. So the means of COMPULSION is essential
to obtain what is needed.
The fact that the Consti expressly gives
Congress the power to punish members, does not
necessarily imply exclusion of the power to punish nonmembers
for contempt.
But note that, no person can be punished for
contumacy as a witness, unless testimony required in a
matter over which Congress had jurisdiction to inquire.
Further, the Court has NO POWER TO
INTERFERE WITH LEGISLATIVE ACTION. It has no
power to determine what to approve or not to approve, the
court cannot say what information is material to the
subject matter of inquiry. It is not within the Courts power
to determine what legislative measures Congress may
take after completion of legislative inquiry.
Senate is also a continuing body; NO TIME LIMIT
AS TO ITS POWER TO PUNISH FOR CONTEMPT.

61. SABIO VS GORDON
In 1986, former President Cory Aquino issued EO No. 1,
creating the Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG). She entrusted upon this
Commission the herculean task of recovering the ill-gotten
wealth accumulated by the deposed President Ferdinand
E. Marcos, his family, relatives, subordinates and close
associates. Section 4 (b) of E.O. No. 1 provides that: "No
member or staff of the Commission shall be required to
testify or produce evidence in any judicial, legislative or
administrative proceeding concerning matters within its
official cognizance." Apparently, the purpose is to ensure
PCGG's unhampered performance of its task. The
constitutionality of this provision is being questioned on
the ground that it tramples upon the Senates power to
conduct legislative inquiry under Article VI, Section 21 of
the Constitution.
Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago introduced
Senate Res 455, directing an inquiry in aid of legislation
on the anomalous losses incurred by the Philippines
Overseas Telecommunications Corporation (POTC),
Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation
(PHILCOMSAT) and PHILCOMSAT Holdings Corporation
(PHC). Charmain Camilo L. Sabio of the PCGG was
invited to be one of the resource persons in the public
meeting to deliberate on Senate Res 455. Sabio declined
and invoked Section 4(b) of EO 1.
Senator Gordon issued a subpoena ad
testificandum requiring Sabio and other PCGG
commissioners to appear in the public hearing and testify
to what they know relative to matters in Senate Res 455.
Sabio did not comply. Sabio was then arrested and
brought to the Senate premises where he was detained.
Issue: Is EO No. 1 constitutional? Was it repealed by the
1987 Constitution?
Held:
- American courts have considered the power of inquiry
as inherent in the power to legislate. The right to
pass laws, necessarily implies the right to obtain
information upon any matter which may become the
subject of a law. It is essential to the full and
intelligent exercise of the legislative function.
Notably, the 1987 Constitution recognizes the power
of investigation, not just of Congress, but also of "any
of its committee." This is significant because it
constitutes a direct conferral of investigatory power
upon the committees and it means that the
mechanisms which the Houses can take in order to
effectively perform its investigative function are also
available to the committees.
- It can be said that the Congress' power of inquiry has
gained more solid existence and expansive construal.
The Court's high regard to such power is rendered
more evident in Senate v. Ermita, where it
categorically ruled that "the power of inquiry is broad
enough to cover officials of the executive branch."
Verily, the Court reinforced the doctrine in Arnault that
"the operation of government, being a legitimate
subject for legislation, is a proper subject for
investigation" and that "the power of inquiry is coextensive
with the power to legislate."
- Considering these jurisprudential instructions, we find
Section 4(b) directly repugnant with Article VI, Section
21. Section 4(b) exempts the PCGG members and
staff from the Congress' power of inquiry. This cannot
be countenanced. Nowhere in the Constitution is any
provision granting such exemption. The Congress'
power of inquiry, being broad, encompasses
everything that concerns the administration of existing
laws as well as proposed or possibly needed statutes.
It even extends "to government agencies created by
Congress and officers whose positions are within the
power of Congress to regulate or even abolish."
PCGG belongs to this class.
- Furthermore, Section 4(b) is also inconsistent with
Article XI, Section 1 of the Constitution stating that:
"Public office is a public trust. Public officers and
employees must at all times be accountable to the
people, serve them with utmost responsibility,
integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism
and justice, and lead modest lives."
- The provision presupposes that since an incumbent of
a public office is invested with certain powers and
charged with certain duties pertinent to sovereignty,
the powers so delegated to the officer are held in trust
for the people and are to be exercised in behalf of the
government or of all citizens who may need the
intervention of the officers. Such trust extends to all
matters within the range of duties pertaining to the
office. In other words, public officers are but the
servants of the people, and not their rulers.
- Section 4(b), being in the nature of an immunity, is
inconsistent with the principle of public accountability.
It places the PCGG members and staff beyond the
reach of courts, Congress and other administrative
bodies.

Sec. 23 War and Emergency Powers
64.Sanlakas vs. Exec Sec (2004)
FACTS: July 27, 2003-Oakwood mutiny -Pres GMA
issued Proclamation no 47 declaring a "state of rebellion" & General
Order No. 4 directing AFP & PNP to supress the rebellion. -by evening,
soldiers agreed to return to barracks. GMA, however, did not
immediately lift the declaration of a state of rebellion, only doing so on
August 1, 2003 thru Proc NO. 435.

Petitioners:
1. Sanlakas & PM; standing as "petitioners committed to assert, defend,
protect, uphold, and promote the rights, interests, and welfare of the
people, especially the poor and marginalized classes and sectors of
Philippine society. Petitioners are committed to defend and assert human
rights, including political and civil rights, of the citizens freedom of
speech and of expression under Section 4, Article III of the 1987
Constitution, as a vehicle to publicly ventilate their grievances and
legitimate demands and to mobilize public opinion to support the same;
assert that S18, Art7 of the Consti does not require the declaration of state
of rebellion to call out AFP;assert further that there exists no factual basis
for the declaration, mutiny having ceased.
2. SJS; standing as "Filipino citizens, taxpayers, law profs & bar
reviewers"; assert thatS18, Art7 of the Consti does not require the
declaration of the state of rebellion, declaration a "constitutional
anomaly" that misleads because "overzealous public officers, acting
pursuant to such proclamation or general order, are liable to violate the
constitutional right of private citizens"; proclamation is a circumvention
of the report requirement under the same S18, Art7, commanding the
President to submit a report to Congress within 48 hours from the
proclamation of martial law; presidential issuances cannot be construed
as an exercise of emergency powers as Congress has not delegated any
such power to the President
3. members of House; standing as citizens and as Members of the House
of Representatives whose rights, powers and functions were allegedly
affected by the declaration of a state of rebellion; the declaration of a
state of rebellion is a "superfluity," and is actually an exercise of
emergency powers, such exercise, it is contended, amounts to a
usurpation of the power of Congress granted by S23 (2), Art6 of the
Constitution
4. Pimentel; standing as Senator; assails the subject presidential issuances
as "an unwarranted, illegal and abusive exercise of a martial law power
that has no basis under the Constitution; petitioner fears that the
declaration of a state of rebellion "opens the door to the unconstitutional
implementation of warrantless arrests" for the crime of rebellion

Respondents: SolGen; petitions have been rendered moot by the lifitng of
the proclamation; questions standing of petitioners

ISSUES:
1. whether or not petitioners have standing
2. whether or not case has been rendered moot by the lifting of the
proclamation 3. whether or not the proclamation calling the state of
rebellion is proper

RULING: 1. NOT EVERY PETITIONER. only members of the House
and Sen Pimentel have standing. Sanlakas & PM have no standing by
analogy with LDP in Lacson v Perez" petitioner has not demonstrated
any injury to itself which would justify the resort to the Court. Petitioner
is a juridical person not subject to arrest. Thus, it cannot claim to be
threatened by a warrantless arrest. Nor is it alleged that its leaders,
members, and supporters are being threatened with warrantless arrest and
detention for the crime of rebellion." At best they seek for declaratory
relief, which is not in the original jurisdiction of SC. Even assuming that
Sanlakas & PM are "people's organizations" in the language ofSs15-16,
Art13 of the Consti, they are still not endowed with standing for as
in Kilosbayan v Morato "These provisions have not changed the
traditional rule that only real parties in interest or those with standing, as
the case may be, may invoke the judicial power. The jurisdiction of this
Court, even in cases involving constitutional questions, is limited by the
"case and controversy" requirement of S5,Art8. This requirement lies at
the very heart of the judicial function." SJS, though alleging to be
taxpayers, is not endowed with standing since "A taxpayer may bring suit
where the act complained of directly involves the illegal disbursement of
public funds derived from taxation.No such illegal disbursement is
alleged." Court has ruled out the doctrine of "transcendental importance"
regarding constitutional questions in this particular case. Only members
of Congress, who's (?) powers as provided in the Consti on giving the
Pres emergency powers are allegedly being impaired, can question the
legality of the proclamation of the state of rebellion.

2. YES. As a rule, courts do not adjudicate moot cases, judicial power
being limited to the determination of "actual controversies."
Nevertheless, courts will decide a question, otherwise moot, if it is
"capable of repetition yet evading review."19 The case at bar is one such
case, since prior events (the May 1, 2001 incident when the Pres also
declared a state of rebellion) prove that it can be repeated. 3. YES. S18,
Art 7 grants the President, as Commander-in-Chief, a "sequence" of
"graduated power[s]." From the most to the least benign, these are: the
calling out power, the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus, and the power to declare martial law. In the exercise of
the latter two powers, the Constitution requires the concurrence of two
conditions, namely, an actual invasion or rebellion, and that public safety
requires the exercise of such power. However, as we observed in
Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora, "[t]hese conditions are not
required in the exercise of the calling out power. The only criterion is
that 'whenever it becomes necessary,' the President may call the armed
forces 'to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or
rebellion.'"Nevertheless, it is equally true that S18, Art7 does not
expressly prohibit the President from declaring a state of rebellion. Note
that the Constitution vests the President not only with Commander-in-
Chief powers but, first and foremost, with Executive powers. The
ponencia then traced the evolution of executive power in the US (Jackson
and the South Carolina situation, Lincoln and teh 'war powers', Cleveland
in In re: Eugene Debs) in an effort to show that "the Commander-in-
Chief powers are broad enough as it is and become more so when taken
together with the provision on executive power and the presidential oath
of office. Thus, the plenitude of the powers of the presidency equips the
occupant with the means to address exigencies or threats which
undermine the very existence of government or the integrity of the
State." This, plusMarcos v Manglapus on residual powers, the Rev Admin
Code S4, Ch2, Bk3 on the executive power of the Pres to declare a certain
status, argue towards the validity of the proclamation. However, the
Court maintains that the declaration is devoid of any legal significance
for being superflous. Also, the mere declaration of a state of rebellion
cannot diminish or violate constitutionally protected rights. if a state of
martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution or
automatically suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus,61 then
it is with more reason that a simple declaration of a state of rebellion
could not bring about these conditions. Apprehensions that the military
and police authorities may resort to warrantless arrests are likewise
unfounded. In Lacson vs. Perez, supra, majority of the Court held that
"[i]n quelling or suppressing the rebellion, the authorities may only resort
to warrantless arrests of persons suspected of rebellion, as provided
under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court,63 if the circumstances
so warrant. The warrantless arrest feared by petitioners is, thus, not based
on the declaration of a 'state of rebellion.'"64 In other words, a person
may be subjected to a warrantless arrest for the crime of rebellion
whether or not the President has declared a state of rebellion, so long as
the requisites for a valid warrantless arrest are present. The argument that
the declaration of a state of rebellion amounts to a declaration of martial
law and, therefore, is a circumvention of the report requirement, is a leap
of logic. There is no illustration that the President has attempted to
exercise or has exercised martial law powers. Finally, Nor by any stretch
of the imagination can the declaration constitute an indirect exercise of
emergency powers, which exercise depends upon a grant of Congress
pursuant to S23 (2), Art6 of the Constitution. The petitions do not cite a
specific instance where the President has attempted to or has exercised
powers beyond her powers as Chief Executive or as Commander-in-
Chief. The President, in declaring a state of rebellion and in calling out
the armed forces, was merely exercising a wedding of her Chief
Executive and Commander-in-Chief powers. These are purely executive
powers, vested on the President by S1 & 18, Art7, as opposed to the
delegated legislative powers contemplated by Section 23 (2), Article VI.

65. Ampatuan v Hon DILG Sec. Puno
FACTS:
On 24 Nov. 2009, the day after the Maguindanao Massacre, then Pres.
Arroyo issuedProclamation 1946, placing theProvinces of Maguindanao
and Sultan Kudarat and the City ofCotabato under a state ofemergency.
She directed the AFP and the PNP to undertake such measures as may
be allowed by the Constitution and by law to prevent and suppressall
incidents of lawless violence in the named places.

Three days later, she also issued AO 273 transferring supervision of
the ARMM from the Office of the President to the DILG. She
subsequently issued AO 273-A, which amended the former AO (the term
transfer used in AO 273 was amended to delegate, referring to the
supervision of the ARMM by the DILG).

Claiming that the Presidents issuances encroached on the ARMMs
autonomy, petitioners Datu Zaldy Uy Ampatuan, Ansaruddin Adiong,
and Regie Sahali-Generale, all ARMM officials, filed this petition for
prohibition under Rule 65. The alleged that the
Presidents proclamation and orders encroached on the ARMMs
autonomy as these issuances empowered the DILG Secretary to take over
ARMMs operations and to seize the regional governments powers.
They also claimed that the President had no factual basis for declaring
a state ofemergency, especially in the Province of Sultan Kudarat and the
City of Cotabato, where no critical violent incidents occurred. The
deployment of troops and the taking over of the ARMM constitutes an
invalid exercise of the Presidents emergency powers. Petitioners asked
that Proclamation 1946 as well as AOs 273 and 273-A be declared
unconstitutional.


ISSUE/HELD:

1. Whether Proclamation 1946 and AOs 273 and 273-A violate the
principle of local autonomy under Sec. 16 Art. X of the
Constitution and Sec. 1 Art. V of RA 9054 (The Expanded ARMM
Act)

NO. The DILG Secretary did not take over control of the powers of the
ARMM. After law enforcement agents took the respondent Governor of
ARMM into custody for alleged complicity in the Maguindanao
Massacre, the ARMM ViceGovernor, petitioner Adiong, assumed the
vacated post on 10 Dec. 2009 pursuant to the rule on succession found in
Sec. 12 Art.VII of RA 9054. In turn, Acting Governor Adiong named the
then Speaker of the ARMM Regional Assembly, petitioner Sahali
Generale, Acting ARMM Vice-Governor. The DILG Secretary therefore
did not take over the administration or the operations of the ARMM.


2. Whether or not President Arroyo invalidly exercised emergency
powers when she called out the AFP and the PNP to prevent
and suppress all incidents of lawless violence in Maguindanao,
Sultan Kudarat, and Cotabato City

The deployment is not by itself an exercise of emergency powers as
understood under Section 23 (2), Article VI of the Constitution, which
provides:

SECTION 23. x x x (2) In times of war or other national emergency,
the Congress may, by law, authorize the President, for a limited
period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to
exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared
national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution of the
Congress, such powers shall cease upon the next adjournment
thereof.

The President did not proclaim a national emergency, only a state
of emergency in the three places mentioned. And she did not act
pursuant to any law enacted by Congress that authorized her to exercise
extraordinary powers. The calling out of the armed forces to prevent
or suppress lawless violence in such places is a power that the
Constitution directly vests in the President. She did not need a
congressional authority to exercise the same.


3. Whether or not the President had factual bases for her actions.

The Presidents call on the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless
violence springs from the power vested in her under Section 18, Article
VII of the Constitution, which provides:

Section 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed
forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call
out such armed forces to prevent orsuppress lawless violence, invasion or
rebellion. x x x

While it is true that the Court may inquire into the factual bases for the
Presidents exercise of the above power, it would generally defer to
her judgmenton the matter. As the Court acknowledged in Integrated Bar
of the Philippines v. Hon. Zamora, it is clearly to the President that the
Constitution entrusts the determination of the need for calling out the
armed forces to prevent andsuppress lawless violence. Unless it is shown
that such determination was attended by grave abuse of discretion, the
Court will accord respect to the Presidents judgment. Thus, the Court
said:

If the petitioner fails, by way of proof, to support the assertion that the
President acted without factual basis, then this Courtcannot undertake an
independent investigation beyond the pleadings. The factual necessity of
calling out the armed forces is not easily quantifiable and cannot be
objectively established since matters considered for satisfying the same is
a combination of several factors which are not always accessible to the
courts. Besides the absence of textual standards that the court may use to
judge necessity, information necessary to arrive at suchjudgment might
also prove unmanageable for the courts. Certain pertinent information
might be difficult to verify, or wholly unavailable to the courts. In many
instances, the evidence upon which the President might decide that there
is a need to call out the armed forces may be of a nature not constituting
technical proof.

On the other hand, the President, as Commander-in-Chief has avast
intelligence network to gather information, some of which may be
classified as highly confidential or affecting the security of the state. In
the exercise of the power to call, on-the-spot decisions may be
imperatively necessary in emergency situations to avert great loss of
human lives and mass destruction of property. Indeed, the decision to call
out the military to prevent or suppress lawless violence must be done
swiftly and decisively if it were to have any effect at all. x x x.

Here, petitioners failed to show that the declaration of a state
of emergency in the Provinces of Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat and
Cotabato City, as well as the Presidents exercise of the calling out
power had no factual basis. They simply alleged that, since not all areas
under the ARMM were placed under a state ofemergency, it follows that
the takeover of the entire ARMM by the DILG Secretary had no basis
too.

The imminence of violence and anarchy at the time the
President issuedProclamation 1946 was too grave to ignore and she had
to act to prevent further bloodshed and hostilities in the places
mentioned. Progress reports also indicated that there was movement in
these places of both high-powered firearms and armed men sympathetic
to the two clans. Thus, to pacify the peoples fears and stabilize the
situation, the President had to take preventive action. She called out the
armed forces to control the proliferation of loose firearms and dismantle
the armed groups that continuously threatened the peace and security in
the affected places.

Since petitioners are not able to demonstrate that
the proclamation of state ofemergency in the subject places and the
calling out of the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence
there have clearly no factual bases, theCourt must respect the Presidents
actions. (Ampatuan vs. Puno, G.R. No. 190259, J une 7, 2011)

Sec 24 Origin of Money Bills, Private Bills and Bills Local
Appication
66. TOLENTINO VS. SOF
unconstitutionality
of R.A. No. 7716, otherwise known as the Expanded Value-Added Tax
Law.
Philippine
Airlines (PAL), Roco, and Chamber of Real
Estate and Builders Association [CREBA]) reiterate previous claims
made by them that R.A. No. 7716 did
not "originate exclusively" in the House of Representatives as required
by Art, VI, 24 of the Constitution.
House of
Representatives where it passed three
readings and that afterward it was sent to the Senate where after first
reading it was referred to the Senate Ways and Means Committee, they
complain that the Senate did not pass it on second and third readings.
version (S. No. 1630)
which it approved on May 24,1994.
dds that what the Senate committee should have
done was to amend H. No.
11197 by striking out the text of the bill and substituting it with the text
of S. No. 1630. That way, it is said, "the bill remains a House bill and the
Senate version just becomes the text (only the text) of the House bill."
Inserted to modify
"originate" and "the words 'as in any other bills' (sic) were eliminated so
as to show that these bills were not to be like other bills but must be
treated as a special kind,.
Constitution
and the decision to drop the phrase "as on other Bills" in the American
version, according to petitioners, shows the intention of the framers of
our Constitution to restrict the Senate's power to propose
amendments to revenue bills.

Issue: Whether the Senate had the power to introduce amendments?
Would it still be considered a bill that originated from the house?
SC: LAW VALID. The enactment of S. No. 1630 is not the only instance
in which the Senate proposed an amendment to a House
revenue bill by enacting its own version of a revenue bill. The power of
the Senate to propose amendments must be understood to be full, plenary
and complete "as on other Bills." Thus, because revenue bills are
required to originate exclusively in the House, the Senate cannot enact
revenue measures of its own without such bills. After a revenue bill is
passed and sent over to it by the

House, however, the Senate certainly can pass its own version on the
same subject matter. This follows from the COEQUALITY OF THE
TWO CHAMBERS of Congress. The power of the Senate to propose or
concur with amendments is apparently without restriction. It would
seem that by virtue of this power, the Senate can practically re-write a
bill required to come from the House
and leave only a trace of the original bill.The above-mentioned bills are
supposed to be initiated by the House of Representatives because it is
more numerous in membership and therefore also more representative of
the people. Moreover, its members are presumed to be more familiar
with the needs of the country in regard to the enactment of the legislation
involved, The Senate is, however, allowed much leeway in the exercise
of its power to propose or concur with amendments to the bills initiated
by the House of Representatives. It is also accepted practice for the
Senate to introduce what is known as an amendment by substitution,
which may entirely replace the bill initiated in the House of
Representatives.

In the exercise of this power, the Senate may propose an entirely new bill
as a substitute measure. As petitioner Tolentino states in a high school
text, a committee to which a bill is referred may do any of the
following:(1) to endorse the bill without changes; (2) to make changes in
the bill emitting or adding sections or altering its language-, (3) to make
and endorse an entirely new bill as a substitute, in which case it ",III be
known as a committee bill, or (4) to make no report at all.

Sec. 25 Appropriations
Limits
67. SIXTO S. BRILLANTES, JR. v.COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS


Facts:
Comelec issued resolutions adopting an Automated Elections System
including the assailed resolution, Resolution 6712, which provides for
the electronic transmission of advanced result of unofficial count.
Petitioners claimed that the resolution would allow the preemption and
usurpation of the exclusive power of Congress to canvass the votes for
President and Vice-President and would likewise encroach upon the
authority of NAMFREL, as the citizens accredited arm, to conduct the
"unofficial" quick count as provided under pertinent election
laws. Comelec contended that the resolution was promulgated in the
exercise of its executive and administrative power "to ensure free,
orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections Comelec added that the
issue is beyond judicial determination.

Issue:
Whether or not Comelec's promulgation of Resolution 6712 was
justified.

Ruling:
The Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in issuing Resolution 6712. The issue squarely fell
within the ambit of the expanded jurisdiction of the court.

Article VII, Section 4 of the Constitution, further bolstered by RA 8436,
vest upon Congress the sole and exclusive authority to officially canvass
the votes for the elections of President and Vice-President. Section 27 of
Rep. Act No. 7166, as amended by Rep. Act No. 8173, and reiterated in
Section 18 of Rep. Act No. 8436, solely authorize NAMFREL, the duly-
accredited citizens arm to conduct the unofficial counting of votes for
the national or local elections. The quick count under the guise of an
unofficial tabulation would not only be preemptive of the authority of
congress and NAMFREL, but would also be lacking constitutional and/or
statutory basis. Moreover, the assailed COMELEC resolution likewise
contravened the constitutional provision that "no money shall be paid out
of the treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law." It
being unofficial, any disbursement of public fund would be contrary to
the provisions of the Constitution and Rep. Act No. 9206, which is the
2003 General Appropriations Act.

The Omnibus Election Code in providing the powers and functions of the
Commission subjects the same to certain conditions with respect to the
adoption of the latest technological and electronic devices, to wit:
(1)consideration of the area and available funds (2) notification to all
political parties and candidates. The aforementioned conditions were
found to have not been substantially met.

Resolution 6712 was null and void.

68. GARCIA VS. MATA
reversed to
inactive status. He filed an action for mandamus to compel the DND and
AFP to reinstate him to active service and readjust his rank and pay
emoluments.
violation of RA
1600 which prohibits the reversion of officers with at least 10 years of
service.
the said provision
of RA 1600 has no relevance or pertinence to the budget in question or to
any
appropriation item therein. (RA 1600 was an appropriation law for 1956-
57).

ISSUE: Whether RA 1600 is valid? Does it contain rider inan
appropriation bill?

SC: The incongruity and irrelevancy are already evident. Section 11 of
RA 1600 fails to disclose the relevance to any appropriation item. RA
1600 is an appropriation law for the operation of government while
Section 11 refers to a fundamental governmental policy of calling to
active duty and the reversion of inactive statute of reserve officers in the
AFP. Hence it was A NON-APPROPRIATION ITEM INSERTED IN
AN APPROPRIATION MEASURE, in violation of the constitutional
prohibition against RIDERS to the general appropriation act. It was
indeed a new and completely unrelated provision attached to the GAA. It
also violates the rule on one-bill, one subject. The subject to be
considered must be expressed in the title of the act. When an act contains
provisions which are clearly not embraced in the subject of the act, as
expressed in the title, such provisions are void, inoperative and without
effect. SECTION 11 is unconstitutional. Garcia cannot compel the AFP
to reinstate him.

Transfer of Funds
69. Demetria v Alba
Demetria et al as taxpayers and members of the Batasan Pambansa
sought to prohibit Alba, then Minister of the Budget, from disbursing
funds pursuant to Presidential Decree 1177 or the Budget Reform Decree
of 1977. Demetria assailed the constitutionality of Section 44 of the said
PD. This Section provides that The President shall have the authority to
transfer any fund, appropriated for the different departments, bureaus,
offices and agencies of the Executive Department, which are included in
the General Appropriations Act, to any program, project or activity of
any department, bureau, or office included in the General Appropriations
Act or approved after its enactment. Demetria averred that this is
unconstitutional for it violates the 1973 Constitution.
ISSUE: Whether or not Par 1, Sec 44, of PD 1177 is constitutional.
HELD: Sec. 16[5]. No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of
appropriations, however, the President, the Prime Minister, the Speaker,
the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of constitutional
commissions may by law be authorized to augment any item in the
general appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in
other items of their respective appropriations.
Par 1 of Sec 44 of PD 1177 unduly overextends the privilege granted
under said Section 16[5]. It empowers the President to indiscriminately
transfer funds from one department, bureau, office or agency of the
Executive Department to any program, project or activity of any
department, bureau or office included in the General Appropriations Act
or approved after its enactment, without regard as to whether or not the
funds to be transferred are actually savings in the item from which the
same are to be taken, or whether or not the transfer is for the purpose of
augmenting the item to which said transfer is to be made. It does not only
completely disregard the standards set in the fundamental law, thereby
amounting to an undue delegation of legislative powers, but likewise
goes beyond the tenor thereof. Indeed, such constitutional infirmities
render the provision in question null and void. HOWEVER, transfers of
savings within one department from one item to another in the GA Act
may be allowed by law in the interest of expediency and efficiency.
There is no transfer from one department to another here.

71. PHILCONSA VS. ENRIQUEZ

Appropriations Act for 1994.

Congress. It allowed any member of congress the
REALIGNMENT OF ALLOCATION FOR
OPERATIONAL EXPENSES, provided that the total
of said allocation is not exceeded.

the Speaker are the ones authorized under the
Constitution to realign savings, not the individual
members of Congress themselves.
igned the law, but VETOED
certain provisions of the law and imposed certain
conditions: That the AFP-Chief of Staff is authorized
to use savings to augment the pension funds under
the Retirement and Separation Benefits System of the
AFP.
ISSUE: Whether RA 7663 is violative of Section 25 Art 6.
Whether the enumeration is exclusive?
SC: YES. Under the special provision applicable to
Congress, the members of Congress are given the power
to determine the necessity of realignment of the savings in
the allotment for their operating expenses. They are in the
best position to do so because they are the ones who
know whether there are savings, or deficiencies in
appropriation. HOWEVER, ONLY THE SENATE
PRESIDENT AND THE SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE ARE
ALLOWED TO APPROVE THE REALIGNMENT.
Further, 2 conditions must be met: 1) the funds to
be realigned are actually savings, and 2) the transfer is for
the purpose of augmenting the items of expenditures to
which said transfer is to be made.
As to the special provision given to the AFP-Chief
of Staff, it is also VOID. The list of those who may be
authorized to transfer funds is exclusive.

72. SANCHEZ V. COMMISSION ON AUDIT
Facts: In 1991, Congress passed Republic Act No. 7180
(R.A. 7180) otherwise known as the General
Appropriations Act of 1992. This law provided an
appropriation for the DILG under Title XIII and set aside
the amount of P75, 000,000.00 for the DILG's Capability
Building Program. The stated purpose for the creation of
thetas force was to design programs, strategize and
prepare modules for an effective program for local
autonomy. The estimated expenses for its operation was
P2, 388,000.00 for a period of six months beginning on 1
December 1991up to 31 May 1992 unless the above
ceiling is sooner expended and/or the project is earlier
pre-terminated. The proposal was accepted by the Deputy
Executive Secretary and attested by then DILG Secretary
Cesar N. Sarino, one of the petitioners herein,
who consequently issued a memorandum for the transfer
and remittance to the Office of the President of the sum of
P300, 000.00 for the operational expenses of the task
force. An additional cash advance of P300, 000.00 was
requested. These amounts were taken from the Fund.
Two (2) cash advances both in the amount of P300,
000.00 were withdrawn from the Fund by the DILG and
transferred to the Cashier of the Office of the President.
The "Particulars of Payment" column of the disbursement
voucher states that the transfer of funds was made "to the
Office of the President for Ad-Hoc Task Force for Inter-
Agency Coordination to Implement Local Autonomy.
The transfer of fund from DILG to the Office of
the President to defray salaries of personnel, office
supplies, office rentals, foods and meals, etc. of an Ad
Hoc Task Force for Inter-Agency Coordination to
Implement Local Autonomy taken from the Capability
Building Program Fund is violative of the Special
Provisions of R.A. 7180. A Notice of Disallowance dated
29 March 1993 was then sent to Mr. Sarino, et al. holding
the latter jointly and severally liable for the amount and
directing them to immediately settle the disallowance.
Issues:
1. Whether there is legal basis for the transfer of
funds of the Capability Building Program Fund
appropriated in the 1992 General Appropriation
Act from the Department of Interior and Local
Government to the Office of the President;
2. Whether the conditions or requisites for
the transfer of funds under the applicable
law were present in this case;
3. Whether the Capability Building Program Fund is
a trust fund, a special fund, a trust receipt or a
regular appropriation; and finally
4. Whether the questioned disallowance by
the Commission on Audit is valid. The parties
were required to simultaneously submit their
memoranda in amplification of their arguments
on the foregoing issues.
Ratio/Doctrine: The transfer of funds from the DILG to
the Office of the President has no legal basis and that
COA's disallowance of the transfer is valid. According to
the OSG, the creation of a task force to implement local
autonomy, if one was necessary, should have been
done through the Local Government Academy with the
approval of its board of trustees in accordance with R.A.
No. 7180.
Moreover, Sec. 25(5), Art. VI of the Constitution
authorizes the transfer of funds within the OP if made by
the President for purposes of augmenting an item in the
Office of the President. In this case, it was not the
President butte Deputy Executive Secretary who caused
the transfers and the latter was not shown to have been
authorized byte President to do soothe COA, in its
Memorandum dated 18 July 2005, reiterates its position
that there is no legal basis for the transfers in question
because the Fund was meant to be implemented by the
Local Government Academy. Further, transfer of funds
under Sec. 25(5), Art. VI of the Constitution may be made
only by the persons mentioned in the section and may not
be re-delegated being already a delegated authority.
Additionally, the funds transferred must come only from
savings of the office in other items of its appropriation and
must be used for other items in the appropriation of the
same office. In this case, there were no savings from
which augmentation can be taken because the releases of
funds to the Office of the President were made at the
beginning of the budget year 1992.The COA also posits
that while the Fund is a regular appropriation, it partakes
the nature of a trust fund because it was allocated for a
specific purpose. Thus, it may be used only for the specific
purpose for which it was created or the fund received. The
COA concludes that petitioners should be held civilly and
criminally liable for the disallowed expenditures.
Held: WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED
and the assailed Decision of the Commission on Audit is
AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.

Sec 26 Subject and Title of Bills
74. PHILCONSA vs. GIMENEZ

allows retirement gratuity and commutation of
vacation and sick leaves to Senators and
Congressmen.

members and officers of Congress was NOT
EXPRESSED IN THE TITLE OF THE BILL. (It was
merely titled as An Act Amending Sec 12 of CA 186
186, as Amended BY Ra 3096)
t and gratuity will be allowed
to members of Congress who have served at least 12
years, regardless of age, of an amount equal to 1
year salary for every 4 years service.

notice to the public about the retirement gratuities and
privileges.
ISSUE; Whether the title of RA 3836 is germane to the
subject matter in the act?
SC:

benefits

GSIS members

members of GSIS who have rendered at least 20 years of service. This is
related and germane to the subject of CA 186.

members of Congress who are NOT MEMBERS OF
THE GSIS. Thus, to provide retirement benefits to
these officials would relate to a subject matter which
is NOT GERMANE TO CA 186.

(retirement benefits for Congress members) is not
related in any manner to the subject of CA 186.

3096 or CA 186.

THE ACT.
The Purpose of the requirement that the subject
of an act should be expressed in its title:
1) to prevent surprise, fraud upon the Legislature,
(because on the 3rd reading, only the title will be heard!!)
2) to fairly appraise the people through such publication of
legislation, (to inform the public of a pending bill, so they
can come forward and object)
3) to prevent a law with several subject matter
The Constitutional requirement is satisfied when:
1) ALL PARTS of the law relate to the subject expressed
in the title AND
2) it is not necessary that the title be a complete index of
the content.
No technical construction is required, only
practical construction.
There is SUFFICIENT COMPLIANCE if the title
expresses the general subject but the provisions of the
statute are germane to the general subject.
RA 3836 NULL and VOID.

75. TIO v Videogram Regulatory Board
Tio is a videogram operator who assailed the constitutionality of PD
1987 entitled An Act Creating the Videogram Regulatory Board with
broad powers to regulate and supervise the videogram industry. The PD
was also reinforced by PD1994 which amended the National Internal
Revenue Code. The amendment provides that there shall be collected on
each processed video-tape cassette, ready for playback, regardless of
length, an annual tax of five pesos; Provided, That locally manufactured
or imported blank video tapes shall be subject to sales tax. The said law
was brought about by the need to regulate the sale of videograms as it has
adverse effects to the movie industry. The proliferation of videograms
has significantly lessen the revenue being acquired from the movie
industry, and that such loss may be recovered if videograms are to be
taxed. Tio countered that there is no factual nor legal basis for the
exercise by the President of the vast powers conferred upon him by the
Amendment and that there is an undue delegation of legislative power to
the President.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is an undue delegation of power.
HELD: It cannot be successfully argued that the PD contains an undue
delegation of legislative power. The grant in Sec 11 of the PD of
authority to the Board to solicit the direct assistance of other agencies
and units of the government and deputize, for a fixed and limited period,
the heads or personnel of such agencies and units to perform enforcement
functions for the Board is not a delegation of the power to legislate but
merely a conferment of authority or discretion as to its execution,
enforcement, and implementation. The true distinction is between the
delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves
discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring authority or discretion as
to its execution to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The
first cannot be done; to the latter, no valid objection can be made.
Besides, in the very language of the decree, the authority of the Board to
solicit such assistance is for a fixed and limited period with the
deputized agencies concerned being subject to the direction and control
of the Board. That the grant of such authority might be the source of
graft and corruption would not stigmatize the PD as unconstitutional.
Should the eventuality occur, the aggrieved parties will not be without
adequate remedy in law.

76. PHIL. JUDGES ASSOCIATION vs. PRADO
Facts: The main target of this petition is Section 35 of
R.A. No. 7354 as implemented by the Philippine Postal
Corporation through its Circular No. 92-28. These
measures withdraw the franking privilege from the SC, CA,
RTC, MTC, MeTC and the Land Registration Commission
and its Registers of Deeds, along with certain other
government offices. The petitioners are members of the
lower courts who feel that their official functions as judges
will be prejudiced by the above-named measures. The
petition assails the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7354.
Issues: (1) whether or not its title embraces more than
one subject and does not express its purpose
(2) whether or not it did not pass the required
readings in both Houses of Congress and printed copies
of the bill in its final form were not distributed among the
members before its passage;
(3) whether or not it is discriminatory and
encroaches on the independence of the Judiciary
Held: (1) Article VI, Sec. 26 (l), of the Constitution
providing that "Every bill passed by the Congress shall
embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the
title thereof." The purposes of this rule are: (1) to prevent
hodge-podge or "log-rolling" legislation; (2) to prevent
surprise or fraud upon the legislature by means of
provisions in bills of which the title gives no intimation, and
which might therefore be overlooked and carelessly and
unintentionally adopted; and (3) to fairly apprise the
people, through such publication of legislative proceedings
as is usually made, of the subject of legislation that is
being considered, in order that they may have opportunity
of being heard thereon, by petition or otherwise, if they
shall so desire.
It is the submission of the petitioners that Section
35 of R.A. No. 7354 which withdrew the franking privilege
from the Judiciary is not expressed in the title of the law,
nor does it reflect its purposes. R.A. No. 7354 is entitled
"An Act Creating the Philippine Postal Corporation,
Defining its Powers, Functions and Responsibilities,
Providing for Regulation of the Industry and for Other
Purposes Connected Therewith." The petitioners'
contention is untenable. The title of the bill is not required
to be an index to the body of the act, or to be as
comprehensive as to cover every single detail of the
measure. It has been held that if the title fairly indicates
the general subject, and reasonably covers all the
provisions of the act, and is not calculated to mislead the
legislature or the people, there is sufficient compliance
with the constitutional requirement. Furthermore, the
repeal of a statute on a given subject is properly
connected with the subject matter of a new statute on the
same subject; and therefore a repealing section in the new
statute is valid, notwithstanding that the title is silent on the
subject. The reason is that where a statute repeals a
former law, such repeal is the effect and not the subject of
the statute; and it is the subject, not the effect of a law,
which is required to be briefly expressed in its title. The
withdrawal of the franking privilege from some agencies is
germane to the accomplishment of the principal objective
of R.A. No. 7354, which is the creation of a more efficient
and effective postal service system.
(2) It is a matter of record that the conference
Committee Report on the bill in question was returned to
and duly approved by both the Senate and the House of
Representatives. Thereafter, the bill was enrolled with its
certification by Senate President Neptali A. Gonzales and
Speaker Ramon V. Mitra of the House of Representatives
as having been duly passed by both Houses of Congress.
It was then presented to and approved by President
Corazon C. Aquino on April 3, 1992. Under the doctrine of
separation powers, the Court may not inquire beyond the
certification of the approval of a bill from the presiding
officers of Congress. The enrolled bill is conclusive upon
the Judiciary (except in matters that have to be entered in
the journals like the yeas and nays on the final reading of
the bill).
(3) It is alleged that R.A. No. 7354 is
discriminatory because while withdrawing the franking
privilege from the Judiciary, it retains the same for the
President of the Philippines, the Vice President of the
Philippines; Senators and Members of the House of
Representatives, the Commission on Elections; former
Presidents of the Philippines; the National Census and
Statistics Office; and the general public in the filing of
complaints against public offices and officers. The
withdrawal of the franking privileges was indeed
discriminatory. If the problem of the respondents is the
loss of revenues from the franking privilege, the remedy is
to withdraw it altogether from all agencies of government,
including those who do not need it. The problem is not
solved by retaining it for some and withdrawing it from
others, especially where there is no substantial distinction
between those favored, which may or may not need it at
all, and the Judiciary, which definitely needs it. The
problem is not solved by violating the Constitution. The
classification was not based on substantial distinctions.


77. FARIAS VS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
FACTS:
SEC. 67 of the Omnibus Election Code reads: Candidates holding
elective office. Any elective official, whether national or local, running
for any office other than the one which he is holding in a permanent
capacity, except for President and Vice-President, shall be considered
ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of
candidacy.

Petitioners alleged that Section 14 of RA 9006 entitled "An Act to
Enhance the Holding of Free, Orderly, Honest, Peaceful and Credible
Elections through Fair Elections Practices, insofar as it repeals Section
67 of the Omnibus Election Code, is unconstitutional for being in
violation of Section 26(1) of the Article VI of the Constitution, requiring
every law to have only one subject which should be in expressed in its
title.

The inclusion of Sec 14 repealing Sec 67 of the Omnibus Election Code
in RA 9006 constitutes a proscribed rider. The Sec 14 of RA 9006
primarily deals with the lifting of the ban on the use of media for election
propaganda and the elimination of unfair election practices. Sec 67 of the
OEC imposes a limitation of officials who run for office other than the
one they are holding in a permanent capacity by considering them as ipso
facto resigned therefrom upon filing of the certificate of candidacy. The
repeal of Sec 67 of the OEC is thus not embraced in the title, nor
germane to the subject matter of RA 9006.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 14 of RA 9006 is a rider.

RULING:
No. The Court is convinced that the title and the objectives of RA 9006
are comprehensive enough to include the repeal of Section 67 of the
Omnibus Election Code within its contemplation. To require that the said
repeal of Section 67 of the Code be expressed in the title is to insist that
the title be a complete index of its content. The purported dissimilarity of
Section 67 of the Code and the Section 14 of the RA 9006 does not
violate "one subject-one title rule." This Court has held that an act having
a single general subject, indicated in the title, may contain any number of
provisions, no matter how diverse they may be, so long as they are not
inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject, and may be considered
in furtherance of such subject by providing for the method and means of
carrying out the general subject.

Section 26(1) of the Constitution provides: Every bill passed by the
Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the
title thereof.

The avowed purpose of the constitutional directive that the subject of a
bill should be embraced in its title is to apprise the legislators of the
purposes, the nature and scope of its provisions, and prevent the
enactment into law of matters which have not received the notice, action
and study of the legislators and the public. In this case, it cannot be
claimed that the legislators were not apprised of the repeal of Section 67
of the Code as the same was amply and comprehensively deliberated
upon by the members of the House. In fact, the petitioners as members of
the House of Representatives, expressed their reservations regarding its
validity prior to casting their votes. Undoubtedly, the legislators were
aware of the existence of the provision repealing Section 67 of the
Omnibus Election Code.
78. TOLENTINO VS. SEC OF FINANCE
-VAT law
(RA 7716)

House of Representatives where it passed three
readings and that afterward it was sent to the Senate
where after first reading it was referred to the Senate
Ways and Means Committee, they complain that the
Senate did not pass it on second and third readings.
Instead what the Senate did was to pass its own
version (S. No. 1630) which it approved on May 24,
1994.

Senate Bill 1630 did not pass 3 READINGS ON
SEPARATE DAYS, as required by the Constitution
because the 2nd and 3rd readings were done on the
same day. March 24, 1994.

President had certified S Bill as urgent. The
presidential certification dispensed with the
requirement not only of printing but also that of the
reading of the bill on separate days.
The phrase except when the President Certifies the
necessity of its immediate enactment qualifies the 2
stated conditions before a bill can become a law:
1)the bill has passed 3 readings on separate days, 2)
it has been printed in its final form and distributed 3
days prior to its final approval.

thinking that House Bill 11197 and Senate Bill 1630
are distinct and unrelated measures also accounts for
the petitioners' (Kilosbayan's and PAL's) contention
that because the President separately certified to the
need for the immediate enactment of these measures,
his certification was ineffectual and void. The
certification had to be made of the version of the
same revenue bill which at the moment was being
considered. Otherwise, to follow petitioners' theory, it
would be necessary for the President to certify as
many bills as are presented in a house of Congress
even though the bills are merely versions of the bill he
has already certified. It is enough that he certifies the
bill which, at the time he makes the certification, is
under consideration. Since on March 22, 1994 the
Senate was considering S. No. 1630, it was that bill
which had to be certified. For that matter on June 1,
1993 the President had earlier certified H. No. 92 10
for immediate enactment because it was the one
which at that time was being considered by the
House. This bill was later substituted, together with
other bills, by H. No. 11197.
dential certification can accomplish,
we have already explained in the main decision that
the phrase 44 except when the President certifies to
the necessity of its immediate enactment, etc." in Art.
VI, 26 (2) qualifies not only the requirement that
"printed copies [of a bill] in its final form [must be]
distributed to the members three days before its
passage" but also the requirement that before a bill
can become a law it must have passed "three
readings on separate days." There is not only textual
support for such construction but historical basis as
well.

consideration that if in all cases three readings on
separate days are required and a bill has to be printed
in final form before it can be passed, the need for a
law may be rendered academic by the occurrence of
the very emergency or public calamity which it is
meant to address.

deficit" is not an emergency, especially in a country
like the Philippines where budget deficit is a chronic
condition. Even if this were the case, an enormous
budget deficit does not make the need for R.A. No.
7716 any less urgent or the situation calling for its
enactment any less an emergency.
Senate (including
some of the petitioners in these cases) believed that
there was an urgent need for consideration of S. No.
1630, because they responded to the call of the
President by voting on the bill on second and third
readings on the same day. While the judicial
department is not bound by the Senate's acceptance
of the President's certification, the respect due
coequal departments of the government in matters
committed to them by the Constitution and the
absence of a clear showing of grave abuse of
discretion caution a stay of the Judicial hand.
At any rate, we are satisfied that S. No. 1630 received
thorough consideration in the Senate where it was
discussed for six days. Only its distribution in advance
in its final printed form was actually dispensed with by
holding the voting on second and third readings on
the same day (March 24, 1994). Otherwise, sufficient
time between the submission of the bill on February 8,
1994 on second reading and its approval on March
24, 1994 elapsed before it was finally voted on by the
Senate on third reading.

days is required is said to be two-fold- (1) to inform
the members of Congress of what. they must vote on
and (2) to give them notice that a measure is
progressing through the enacting process- thus
enabling them and others interested in the measure to
prepare their positions with reference to it. ( J. G.
SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION 10.04, p. 282 [1972]) These
purposes were substantially achieved in the case of
R.A. No. 7716.


79. Tobias vs Abalos
Facts: Complainants, invoking their right as taxpayers and as residents
of Mandaluyong, filed a petition questioning the constitutionality of
Republic Act No. 7675, otherwise known as "An Act Converting the
Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized City to be known
as the City of Mandaluyong." Before the enactment of the law,
Mandaluyong and San Juan belonged to the same legislative district.
The petitioners contended that the act is unconstitutional for violation of
three provisions of the constitution. First, it violates the one subject one
bill rule. The bill provides for the conversion of Mandaluyong to HUC as
well as the division of congressional district of San Juan and
Mandaluyong into two separate district. Second, it also violate Section 5
of Article VI of the Constitution, which provides that the House of
Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and
fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law. The division of San Juan
and Mandaluyong into separate congressional districts increased the
members of the House of Representative beyond that provided by the
Constitution. Third, Section 5 of Article VI also provides that within
three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make
a reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standard provided
in Section 5. Petitioners stated that the division was not made pursuant to
any census showing that the minimum population requirement was
attained.

Issue:
(1) Does RA 7675 violate the one subject one bill rule?
(2) Does it violate Section 5(1) of Article VI of the Constitution on the
limit of number of rep?
(3) Is the inexistence of mention of census in the law show a lack of
constitutional requirement?

Rulings: The Supreme Court ruled that the contentions are devoid of
merit. With regards to the first contention of one subject one bill rule, the
creation of a separate congressional district for Mandaluyong is not a
separate and distinct subject from its conversion into a HUC but is a
natural and logical consequence. In addition, a liberal construction of the
"one title-one subject" rule has been invariably adopted by this court so
as not to cripple or impede legislation.
The second contention that the law violates the present limit of the
number of representatives, the provision of the section itself show that
the 250 limit is not absolute. The Constitution clearly provides that the
House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than 250
members, "unless otherwise provided by law. Therefore, the increase in
congressional representation mandated by R.A. No. 7675 is not
unconstitutional.
With regards, to the third contention that there is no mention in the
assailed law of any census to show that Mandaluyong and San Juan had
each attained the minimum requirement of 250,000 inhabitants to justify
their separation into two legislative districts, unless otherwise proved that
the requirements were not met, the said Act enjoys the presumption of
having passed through the regular congressional processes, including due
consideration by the members of Congress of the minimum requirements
for the establishment of separate legislative district
The petition was dismissed for lack of merit.

80. BANAT V. COMELEC
Facts:
--Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency
(BANAT)filed before the National Board of Canvassers(NBC) a petition
to proclaim the fullnumber of party list representatives provided by the
Constitution. However, the recommendation of the head of the legal
group of COMELECs national board of canvassers to declare the
petition moot and academic was approved by theCOMELEC en banc.
--BANAT filed for petition for certiorari and mandamus assailing the
resolution of COMELEC to their petition to proclaim the full number of
party listrepresentatives provided by the Constitution.
--The COMELEC, sitting as the NBC, promulgated a resolution
proclaimingthirteen (13) parties as winners in the party-list elections in
May 2007. TheCOMELEC announced that, upon completion of the
canvass of the party-listresults, it would determine the total number of
seats of each winning party,organization, or coalition in accordance with
Veterans Federation Party v.COMELEC formula.
--Bayan Muna, Abono, and Advocacy for Teacher Empowerment
Through Action,Cooperation and Harmony Towards Educational
Reforms (A Teacher) asked theCOMELEC, acting as NBC, to reconsider
its decision to use the Veterans formula. COMELEC denied the
consideration.
--Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher filed for certiorari with mandamus
andprohibition assailing the resolution of the COMELEC in its decision
to use theVeterans formula.
ISSUES:
--Whether or not the twenty percent allocation for party-list
representatives in Section5(2), Article VI of the Constitution mandatory
or merely a ceiling
--Whether or not the three-seat limit in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 is
constitutional
--Whether or not the two percent threshold prescribed in Section 11(b) of
RA 7941 toqualify for one seat is constitutional
--How shall the party-list representatives be allocated?
--Does the Constitution prohibit the major political parties from
participating in theparty-list elections? If not, can the major political
parties be barred from participatingin the party-list elections?
RULING:
--The 20% allocation of party-list representatives is merely a ceiling;
party-listrepresentatives cannot be more than 20% of the members of the
House of Representatives.
Yes, it is constitutional. The three-seat cap, as a limitation to the number
of seats that aqualified party-list organization may occupy, remains a
valid statutory device thatprevents any party from dominating the party-
list elections.
--The second clause of Section 11(b) of R. A. 7941 those garnering
more than twopercent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional
seats in proportion to their total number of votes is unconstitutional. The
two percent threshold only in relationto the distribution of the additional
seats presents an unwarranted obstacle to thefull implementation of
Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution and prevents theattainment of
"the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group
interestsin the House of Representatives."
--In determining the allocation of seats for party-list representatives
under Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941, the following procedure shall be
observed:1. The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked
from the highest tothe lowest based on the number of votes they garnered
during the elections.2. The parties, organizations, and coalitions
receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list
system shall be entitled to one guaranteed seateach.3. Those garnering
sufficient number of votes, according to the ranking inparagraph 1, shall
be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes
until all the additional seats are allocated.4. Each party, organization, or
coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3)seats.
--Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 prohibits major political
parties fromparticipating in the party-list system. On the contrary, the
framers of the Constitutionclearly intended the major political parties to
participate in party-list elections throughtheir sectoral wings. Also, in
defining a "party" that participates in party-list elections aseither "a
political party or a sectoral party," R.A. No. 7941 also clearly intended
thatmajor political parties will participate in the party-list elections.
Excluding the major political parties in party-list elections is manifestly
against the Constitution, the intent of the Constitutional Commission, and
R.A. No. 7941. However, by the vote of 8-7, theCourt decided to
continue the ruling in Veterans disallowing major political parties from
participating in the party-list elections, directly or indirectly.


Sec 27 Procedure in Law-Making
Passage of bills
83. Arroyo v De Venecia
Facts: A petition was filed challenging the validity of RA 8240, which
amends certain provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code.
Petitioners, who are members of the House of Representatives, charged
that there is violation of the rules of the House which petitioners claim
are constitutionally-mandated so that their violation is tantamount to a
violation of the Constitution.

The law originated in the House of Representatives. The Senate approved
it with certain amendments. A bicameral conference committee was
formed to reconcile the disagreeing provisions of the House and Senate
versions of the bill. The bicameral committee submitted its report to the
House. During the interpellations, Rep. Arroyo made an interruption and
moved to adjourn for lack of quorum. But after a roll call, the Chair
declared the presence of a quorum. The interpellation then proceeded.
After Rep. Arroyos interpellation of the sponsor of the committee report,
Majority Leader Albano moved for the approval and ratification of the
conference committee report. The Chair called out for objections to the
motion. Then the Chair declared: There being none, approved. At the
same time the Chair was saying this, Rep. Arroyo was asking, What is
thatMr. Speaker? The Chair and Rep. Arroyo were talking
simultaneously. Thus, although Rep. Arroyo subsequently objected to the
Majority Leaders motion, the approval of the conference committee
report had by then already been declared by the Chair.

On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House of
Representatives and the President of the Senate and certified by the
respective secretaries of both Houses of Congress. The enrolled bill was
signed into law by President Ramos.


Issue: Whether or not RA 8240 is null and void because it was passed in
violation of the rules of the House

Held:
Rules of each House of Congress are hardly permanent in character.
They are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of
the body adopting them as they are primarily procedural. Courts
ordinarily have no concern with their observance. They may be waived
or disregarded by the legislative body. Consequently, mere failure to
conform to them does not have the effect of nullifying the act taken if the
requisite number of members has agreed to a particular measure. But this
is subject to qualification. Where the construction to be given to a rule
affects person other than members of the legislative body, the question
presented is necessarily judicial in character. Even its validity is open to
question in a case where private rights are involved.

In the case, no rights of private individuals are involved but only those of
a member who, instead of seeking redress in the House, chose to transfer
the dispute to the Court.

The matter complained of concerns a matter of internal procedure of the
House with which the Court should not be concerned. The claim is not
that there was no quorum but only that Rep. Arroyo was effectively
prevented from questioning the presence of a quorum. Rep. Arroyos
earlier motion to adjourn for lack of quorum had already been defeated,
as the roll call established the existence of a quorum. The question of
quorum cannot be raised repeatedly especially when the quorum is
obviously present for the purpose of delaying the business of the House.

84. Abakada Guro Party List, et al vs Exec. Sec. Ermita
Post under case digests, Political Law at Monday, March 05, 2012 Posted
by Schizophrenic Mind
Facts: On May 24, 2005, the President signed into law Republic Act
9337 or the VAT Reform Act. Before the law took effect on July 1, 2005,
the Court issued a TRO enjoining government from implementing the
law in response to a slew of petitions for certiorari and prohibition
questioning the constitutionality of the new law.

The challenged section of R.A. No. 9337 is the common proviso
inSections 4, 5 and 6: That the President, upon the recommendation of
the Secretary of Finance, shall, effective January 1, 2006, raisethe rate of
value-added tax to 12%, after any of the following conditions has been
satisfied:

(i) Value-added tax collection as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product
(GDP) of the previous year exceeds two and four-fifth percent (2 4/5%);
or (ii) National government deficit as a percentage of GDP of the
previous year exceeds one and one-half percent (1%)

Petitioners allege that the grant of stand-by authority to the President to
increase the VAT rate is an abdication by Congress ofits exclusive power
to tax because such delegation is not covered by Section 28 (2), Article
VI Consti. They argue that VAT is a tax levied on the sale or exchange
of goods and services which cant be included within the purview of
tariffs under the exemption delegation since this refers to customs duties,
tolls or tribute payable upon merchandise to the government and usually
imposed on imported/exported goods. They also said that the
President has powers to cause, influence or create the conditions
provided by law to bring about the conditions precedent. Moreover, they
allege that no guiding standards are made by law as to how the Secretary
of Finance will make the recommendation.

Issue: Whether or not the RA 9337's stand-by authority to the Executive
to increase the VAT rate, especially on account of the recommendatory
power granted to the Secretary of Finance, constitutes undue delegation
of legislative power? NO

Held: The powers which Congress is prohibited from delegating are
those which are strictly, or inherently and exclusively, legislative. Purely
legislative power which can never be delegated is the authority to make a
complete law- complete as to the time when it shall take effect and as to
whom it shall be applicable, and to determine the expediency of its
enactment. It is the nature of the power and not the liability of its use or
the manner of its exercise which determines the validity of its delegation.

The exceptions are:
(a) delegation of tariff powers to President under Constitution
(b) delegation of emergency powers to President under Constitution
(c) delegation to the people at large
(d) delegation to local governments
(e) delegation to administrative bodies

For the delegation to be valid, it must be complete and it must fix a
standard. A sufficient standard is one which defines legislative policy,
marks its limits, maps out its boundaries and specifies the public agency
to apply it.

In this case, it is not a delegation of legislative power BUT a delegation
of ascertainment of facts upon which enforcement and administration of
the increased rate under the law is contingent. The legislature has made
the operation of the 12% rate effective January 1, 2006, contingent upon
a specified fact or condition. It leaves the entire operation or non-
operation of the 12% rate upon factual matters outside of the control of
the executive. No discretion would be exercised by the President.
Highlighting the absence of discretion is the fact that the word SHALL is
used in the common proviso. The use of the word SHALL connotes a
mandatory order. Its use in a statute denotes an imperative obligation and
is inconsistent with the idea of discretion.

Thus, it is the ministerial duty of the President to immediately impose the
12% rate upon the existence of any of the conditions specified by
Congress. This is a duty, which cannot be evaded by the President. It is a
clear directive to impose the 12% VAT rate when the specified
conditions are present.

Congress just granted the Secretary of Finance the authority to ascertain
the existence of a fact--- whether by December 31, 2005, the VAT
collection as a percentage of GDP of the previous year exceeds 2 4/5 %
or the national government deficit as a percentage of GDP of the
previous year exceeds one and 1%. If either of these two instances has
occurred, the Secretary of Finance, by legislative mandate, must submit
such information to the President.

In making his recommendation to the President on the existence of either
of the two conditions, the Secretary of Finance is not acting as the alter
ego of the President or even her subordinate. He is acting as the agent of
the legislative department, to determine and declare the event upon
which its expressed will is to take effect. The Secretary of Finance
becomes the means or tool by which legislative policy is determined and
implemented, considering that he possesses all the facilities to gather
data and information and has a much broader perspective to properly
evaluate them. His function is to gather and collate statistical data and
other pertinent information and verify if any of the two conditions laid
out by Congress is present.

Congress does not abdicate its functions or unduly delegate power when
it describes what job must be done, who must do it, and what is the scope
of his authority; in our complex economy that is frequently the only way
in which the legislative process can go forward.

There is no undue delegation of legislative power but only of the
discretion as to the execution of a law. This is constitutionally
permissible. Congress did not delegate the power to tax but the mere
implementation of the law.

Item Veto
85. CIR v Court of Tax Appeals
FACTS:
Manila Golf & Country Club, Inc., a non-stock corporation who
maintains a golf course and operates a clubhouse with a lounge, bar &
dining room exclusively for its members & guests claims that they
should have been exempt from payment of privilege taxes were it not for
the last paragraph of Section 191-A of RA No. 6110, otherwise known as
"Omnibus Tax Law".
By virtue of RA No. 6110, the CIR assessed the Manila Golf and
Country Club fixed taxes as operators of golf links and restaurant, and
also percentage tax (caterer's tax) for its sale of foods and fermented
liquors/wines for the period covering September 1969 to December 1970
in the amount of P32,504.96 in which the club protested claiming the
assessment to be without basis because Section 42 was vetoed by then
President Marcos.
CIR denied the protestation of the club, who maintain that Section 42
was not entirely vetoed but merely the words "hotel, motels, resthouses"
on the ground that it might restrain the development of hotels which is
essential to the tourism industry.

ISSUE: Whether or not the presidential veto referred to the entire section
or merely to the imposition of 20% tax on gross receipt of operators or
proprietors of restaurants, refreshment parlors, bars and other eating
places which are maintained within the premises or compound of a hotel,
motel or resthouses.

DECISION:
The presidential veto referred merely to the inclusion of hotels, motels,
and rest houses in the 20% caterer's tax bracket but not to the whole
section. It was then agreed by the SC with then Solicitor General Estelito
Mendoza and his associates that inclusion of hotels, motels, and rest
houses in the 20% caterer's tax bracket are "items" in themselves within
the meaning of Sec. 20(3), Article VI of the 1935 Constitution.
The Petition is granted. Sec. 191-A of RA 6110 is valid and enforceable,
hence the Manila Golf and Country Club, Inc is liable for the amount
assessed against it.

86. GONZALES VS. MACARAIG
Congress passed the General Appropriations Bill
1989. It eliminated or decreased certain items
included in the proposed budget as submitted by the
president.

was signed but 7 SPECIAL PROVISIONS and Sec 55
(General Provision) were VETOED.

Presidents Veto was unconstitutional.

Restoration or Increase of Recommended
Appropriations / Disapproved or Reduced by
Congress No item of appropriation recommended
by the President in the Budget which has been
disapproved or reduced shall be restored or increased
by the use of appropriations authorized for other
purposes by augmentation. An item for appropriation
for any purpose recommended by the President shall
be deemed to have been disapproved by Congress if
no corresponding appropriation for the specific
purpose is provided in the GAB

was: that it violates Section 25(5) nullifying the
power of the President to augment any item from
savings in other items.
Gonzales et al claim that the Presidents Line-Veto in
appropriation bills is limited to items and does not
cover provisions.
eeded her authority when
she vetoed Sec 55 which are PROVISIONS, such that
when the President objects to a PROVISION of an
appropriation bill, she cannot exercise the ITEMVETO
POWER but should veto the entire bill.
-Veto Power does not
carry with it the power to strike out conditions or
restrictions for that would be legislation.

(which provides for the Presidents Augmentation
Powers) has to be provided for by law thus
Congress has the prerogative to limit the exercise of
the same.

actually a rider because it is extraneous to an
appropriation act, therefore the President validly
vetoed it. Solgen further claims that the constitution
empowers the President to veto PROVISIONS or
other distinct and severable parts of an Appropriations
Bill
ISSUE: Did the President exceeded the item-veto power?
Can the President veto PROVISIONS of an appropriations
bill? What is the scope of item-veto?
SC: VETO WAS VALID. CORY WAS CORRECT.
Sec 27 of the Constitution Paragraph 1 = refers
to the general veto power of the President. If exercised, it
would result to the veto of the ENTIRE BILL.
Sec 27 of the Constitution Paragraph 2 = refers
to the ITEM VETO power or LINE VETO. It allows the
exercise of veto over particular items in an
APPROPRIATION, REVENUE OR TARIFF BILL. The
power given to the President to disapprove any item in an
Appropriations Bill does not grant the authority to veto a
part of an item and to approve the remaining portion of the
same item.
The terms ITEM and PROVISION are different.
An ITEM = refers to the particulars, details, the
distinct and severable parts of the bill. It is the indivisible
sum of money dedicated to a stated purpose. It obviously
means an item which in itself is a SPECIFIC
APPROPRIATION of money, not some general provision
of law, which just happens to be put in an appropriation
bill.
The claim of the petitioners that the President
may not veto a provision without vetoing the entire bill not
only disregards the basic principle that a distinct and
severable part of a bill may be subject of a separate veto,
but also overlooks the constitutional mandate that any
PROVISION in the general appropriations bill shall relate
specifically to some particular provision therein, and that
any such provision shall be limited in its operation to the
appropriation to which it relates.
In short, A PROVISION in an appropriation bill is limited in
its operation to some particular appropriation, and DOES
NOT RELATE TO THE ENTIRE BILL.
(The President may veto provisions.)
Even assuming that provisions are beyond veto powers,
Sec 55 may still be vetoed following the DOCTRINE OF
INAPPROPRIATE PROVISIONS. Sec 55:
1) is a provision that does not relate to any particular
appropriation (violates Sec25)
2) the disapproved or reduced items are nowhere to be
found on the face of the bill
3) the vetoed sections are more an expression of
Congressional policy regarding augmentation powers
rather than a true budgetary appropriation.
Sec 55 is thus an inappropriate provision that
should be treated as ITEMS FOR PURPOSES OF VETO
POWERS.
As to the claim that Congress should be allowed to
impose restrictions or conditions in an appropriations bill
(which they claim is beyond veto-
It cannot be denied that Legislature has the power to
provide qualifications and conditions in Appropriation Bills
as to limit how the money shall be spend, etc. Also, it
cannot be denied that the Executive is not allowed to veto
a condition or qualification but allowing the appropriation
itself to stand.
HOWEVER, for these to apply, THE
RESTRICTIONS SHOULD BE SUCH IN THE REAL
SENSE OF THE TERM, not some matters which are more
properly dealt with in a separate legislation. Restrictions or
Conditions must exhibit a CONNECTION WITH MONEY
ITEMS IN A BUDGETARY SENSE IN THE SCHEDULE
OF EXPENDITURES.
Thus the test is one of APPROPRIATENESS.
Sec 55 appears to be a condition but actually they are
GENERAL LAW MEASURES MORE APPROPRIATE
FOR a substantive, separate legislation.

87. BENGZON VS. DRILON

Presidents Veto of certain provisions of the GAA
1992 relating to the payment of the adjusted pensions
of retired SC and CA justices

pensions of retired SC and CA justices. This was
amended by RA 1797, giving identical benefits to
members of Con-Coms and members of the AFP.
ATIC
ADJUSTMENT for the retirement pensions for
JUSTICES was not restored. (the automatic
adjustment applied only to AFP officials)

justices, Congress approved a bill for the reenactment
of the repealed provisions of RA 1797.
Congress wanted to restore the retirement pensions
of Justices.

appropriations for the Judiciary for the payment of
adjusted pension rates.
to the
court for readjustment of the monthly pensions,
arguing that PD 644 which repealed RA 1797 did not
become law for lack of valid publication. The court
granted the petition.

would erode the very foundation of the Govt
collective effort to adhere faithfully and enforce strictly
the policy on salary standardization. She also claims
that the government should not permit the grant of
distinct privileges to groups already enjoying
preferential treatment.

o 1) the subject veto is not an item veto
o 2) the veto is violative of the doctrine of
separation of powers, there being a SC
decision favorably to them,
SC: INVALID VETO.
The general fund adjustment is an ITEM which
appropriates P500M to enable government to meets its
obligations. The general fund adjustment is the item itself.
This was not vetoed by the President. What were vetoed
were METHODS AND SYSTEMS placed by Congress to
insure that permanent and continuing obligations to certain
officials (such as retirement pensions) would be paid as
they fall due.
The vetoed portions are NOT ITEMS, they were
PROVISIONS. There was no specific appropriation of
money involved. It can be seen that portions of the item
have been chopped up into vetoed and unvetoed parts.
General Rule: The president must veto the bill in its
entirety.
Exception:
-veto allowed
to avoid riders being attached to appropriations measures

particulars, details, the distinct and severable parts)
The constitution provides that only a particular item or
items may be vetoed. The power to disapprove any item
or items in an appropriations bill does not grant the
authority to veto a part of an item and to approve the
remaining portion of the same item.
Additionally, the President cannot set aside or
reverse a final and executory judgment by the Court
through the exercise of veto power.

88. PHILCONSA VS. ENRIQUEZ

appropriated P86.323B for debt servicing but it
appropriated only P37B for education. Petitioners
claim that Congress cannot give debt servicing the
highest priority for it would be violative of the
Constitution requiring education to have the highest
funding.

provides that:
o 1) The Appropriation for Debt Service shall
be used for the payment of principal and
interest of foreign / domestic debts. That any
payment in excess of the amount
appropriated shall be subject to the approval
of the President and with concurrence of
Congress.

the P86B appropriation for debt service.
Petitioners claim that the President cannot veto the
Special provision without vetoing the entire amount of
P86B.

provision did not relate to the item of appropriation for
debt service, and thus could very well be the subject
of an item veto. The President, in his veto message,
said that there is already an automatic provision on
debt servicing provided for under the Foreign
Borrowing Act. The GAA cannot be used to amend to
Foreign Borrowing Act.
ISSUE: is the veto valid?
SC: It is readily apparent that the special provision is an
INAPPROPRIATE PROVISION referring to funds other
than the P86B appropriated in the GAA. The vetoed
provision is clearly an attempt to repeal the Foreign
Borrowing Act and to reverse the debt payment policy.
Thus, the repeal of said law should be done in a separate
law, not in the appropriations law.
The general rule is that the President has to veto
the entire bill, and not merely parts thereof. The exception
is the power of the President to veto any particular item
(item veto) in an appropriations bill. Here, the president
must veto the entire item.
A GAB is a special type of legislation whose
content is limited to specified sums of money. Because the
Constitution requires that provisions in an appropriation bill
must relate specifically to some particular appropriation to
which it relates, any provision which does not relate to any
particular item or which extends its operation beyond the
item will be considered an INAPPROPRIATE
PROVISION, WHICH CAN BE VETOED SEPARATELY.
Thus the scope of this item veto (inappropriate
provision) should be any provision:
1) which does not relate to any particular item
2) which extends the operation beyond the item of
appropriation
3) an unconstitutional provision which are intended to
amend other laws.
Thus, the veto of the special provision on debt
service is VALID. It is an inappropriate provision. It refers
to funds other than the P86B appropriated in the GAA.
This should be the subject of a separate legislation, not
through the GAA.
(this is a complicated case.. read the orig).
There are other vetoes made:
VALID VETOES:
1) the debt servicing
2) the State Univ and Colleges. revolving fund
3) the purchase of military equipment this is an
inappropriate provision. It is a rider. It provided for
Congressional approval..
4) the AFP pension the AFP Chief of Staff has no power
to augment
5) Deactivation of CAFGU another rider, inappropriate
provision.
INVALID VETOES:
1) the 70%-30% (administrative vs. contract) ratio for road
maintenance. Congress provided that only 30% of the total
appropriation for road maintenance should be contracted
out, but the President wanted 70% to be contracted out
because it would be more efficient, economical. When the
president vetoed, he argued that it was inappropriate.
VETO INVALID. The provision is APPROPRIATE. It
specifies how the said item shall be expended, 70%
administrative, 30% contract. This cannot be vetoed
separately from the items to which they relate so long as
they are appropriate in the budgetary sense.
2) purchase of AFP medicines
- this is also APPROPRIATE PROVISION. This is in
compliance with the drug policy of the DOH, it directly
relates and is inseparable from appropriation.

Sec 28 Taxation
Scope and Purpose
89. PLANTERS PRODUCTS V FERTIPHIL
FACTS:

corporations engaged in the fertilizer, pesticide and
agricultural chemical business.

Contribution Component (CCC) equivalent to 10
pesos per bag of fertilizer bought by fertilizer
companies to be collected by the Fertilizer and
Pesticide Authority (FPA) and in favor of petitioner.

fertilizer bag it bought.

Bank and Trust Co., the depositary bank of petitioner.

paying the CCC and sued petitioner for refund.
Respondent claimed that LOI 1465 is unconstitutional
for being unjust, unreasonable, oppressive, invalid
and an unlawful imposition that amounted to a denial
of due process of law. Furthermore, it contends that
the LOI favored petitioner, a private corporation,
which used the CCC to maintain monopoly over the
fertilizer industry.

police power to stabilize the price of fertilizer.
Moreover, it contends that respondent did not suffer
any damage as the levy fell on the ultimate consumer
and not the seller
ISSUE:




suit?
HELD:

itself was explicit in saying that the CCC was to
augment petitioners capital until it becomes
financially viable. Worse, the LOI did not provide any
standard as to when petitioner may be considered
already viable. Thus, the effect is to require payment
of CCC almost indefinitely. Furthermore, the CCC
was to be used for payment of petitioners corporate
debts obviously not public purpose.

operative fact1 be applied. The doctrine is only an
exception to the general rule. The general rule is that
a void law produces no legal effect except when
equity demands. There is nothing iniquitous in
requiring petitioner to make the refund.

burden of the levy. Applying the Direct Injury Test,
there is no doubt that respondent will sustain injury
because of the LOI. Remember that through the LOI,
respondent will be directly liable for the levy. If it does
not pay, it will be punished.

mota of the collection suit. A law that is declared
unconstitutional is a void law. No right or obligation
arises in a void law. Thus if declared unconstitutional,
respondent is not obliged to pay

Limitations on Power
91. Commissioner vs. Lingayen Gulf Electric
Facts: Lingayen Gulf Electric Power operates an electric power plant
serving the municipalities of Lingayen
and Binmaley, Pangaisnan, pursuant to municipal franchise granted it by
the respective municipal councils.
The franchises provided that the grantee shall pay quarterly to the
Provincial Treasury of Pangasinan 1% of
the gross earnings obtained through the privilege for the first 20 years
(from 1946), and 2% during the
remaining 15 years of the life of the franchise. In 1948, the Philippine
President approved the franchise (RA
3843). In 1955, the BIR assessed and demanded against the company
deficiency franchise taxes and
surcharges fro the years 1946 to 1954 applying the franchise tax rate of
5% on gross receipts from 1948 to
1954. The company asked for a reinvestigation, which was denied.
Issue [1]: Whether the Court can inquire into the wisdom of the Act.
Held [1]: The Court does not have the authority to inquire into the
wisdom of the Act. Charters or special
laws granted and enacted by the Legislatur are in the nature of private
contracts. They do not contitute a part
of the machinery of the general government. They are usually adopted
after careful consideration of the
private rights in relation with the resultant benefits of the State. In
passing a special charter, the attention of
the Legislature is directed to the facts and circumstances which the act or
charter is intended to meet. The
Legislature considers and makes provision for all the circumstance of the
particular case. The Court ought not
to disturb the ruling of the Court of Tax Appeals on the constitutionality
of the law in question.
Issue [2]: Whether a rate below 5% on gross income violate the
uniformity of tax clause in the Constitution.
Held [2]: A tax is uniform when it operates with the same force and
effect in every place where the subject of
it is found. Uniformity means that all property belonging to the same
class shall be taxed alike. The legislature
has the inherent power not only to select the subjects of taxation but to
grant exemptions. Tax exemptions
have never been deemed violateve of the equal protection clause. Herein,
the 5% franchise tax rate provided
in Section 259 of the Tax Code was never intended to have a universal
application. Section 259 expressly
allows the payment of taxes at rates lower than 5% when the charter
granting the franchise precludes the
imposition of a higher tax. RA 3843 did not only fix and specify a
franchise tax of 2% on its gross receipts,
but made it in lieu of any and all taxes, all laws to the contrary
notwithstanding.
The company, hence, is not liable for deficiency taxes.

92.TOLENTINO VS. SOF

law.

violates uniformity and equality of taxation because:
o Low income groups would be a higher
proportion from their incomes than payments
made by higher-income groups.
o That a uniform 10% tax is regressive
because when before the tax on
consumption of goods by higher-income
brackets paid a rate higher than 10%, this is
now reduced. Similarly, those from the lower
income brackets used to pay only 3%- 5%,
but now they pay higher.
ISSUE: Is EVAT regressive
SC: IT IS EQUITABLE!!
It distributes the tax burden to as many goods
and services as possible particularly to those which are
within the reach of higher-income groups, even as the law
exempts basic goods and services. The goods and
properties subject to VAT are those used or consumed by
higher-income groups. On the other hand, small
businesses with annual gross sales of less than P500T
are exempt.
Regressivity is not a negative standard for
courts to enforce. What Congress is required by the
Constitution to do is to evolve a progressive system of
taxation. This is a directive to Congress. These provisions
are put in the constitution as MORAL INCENTIVES TO
LEGISLATION, not a judicially enforceable right.

93. SOUTHERN CROSS CEMENT CORPORATION v. CEMENT
MANUFACTURERS, THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF
TRADE
Nowhere in the SMA does it state that the DTI Secretary may impose
general safeguard measures
without a positive final determination by the Tariff Commission, or that
the DTI Secretary may reverse or even
review the factual determination made by the Tariff Commission.
Congress has the putative authority to abolish
the Tariff Commission or the DTI. It is similarly empowered to alter or
expand its functions through modalities
which do not align with established norms in the bureaucratic structure.
The Court is bound to recognize the
legislative prerogative to prescribe such modalities, no matter how
atypical they may be, in affirmation of the
legislative power to restructure the executive branch of government.
The case centers on the interpretation of the provisions of Republic Act
No. 8800, the
Safeguard Measures Act (SMA), which was one of the laws enacted by
Congress soon after the
Philippines ratified the General Agreement on Tariff and Trade (GATT)
and the World Trade
Organization (WTO) Agreement. The SMA provides for the structure
and mechanics for the
imposition of emergency measures, including tariffs, to protect domestic
industries and
producers from increased imports which inflict or could inflict serious
injury on them.
Philcemcor filed with the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) a
petition seeking for the
imposition of safeguard measures on Gray Portland cement, in
accordance with the SMA. After
the DTI issued a provisional safeguard measure, the application was
referred to the Tariff
Commission for a formal investigation pursuant to Section 9 of the SMA
and its Implementing
Rules and Regulations, in order to determine whether or not to impose a
definitive safeguard
measure on imports of gray Portland cement. After public hearings and
conducting its own
investigation, the Tariff Commission came out with a negative finding.
Notwithstanding such
finding, the DTI sought the opinion of the Secretary of Justice whether it
could still impose a
definitive safeguard measure. The Secretary of Justice opined that the
DTI could not do so
under the SMA, and so the DTI Secretary then promulgated a Decision
wherein he expressed the
DTIs disagreement with the conclusions of the Tariff Commission, but
at the same time,
ultimately denying Philcemcors application for safeguard measures on
the ground that the he
was bound to do so in light of the Tariff Commissions negative findings.
Philcemcor filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari,
Prohibition and Mandamus
seeking to set aside the DTI Decision, as well as the Tariff Commissions
Report. Philcemcor
argued that the DTI Secretary, vested as he is under the law with the
power of review, is not
bound to adopt the recommendations of the Tariff Commission; and, that
the Report is void, as
it is predicated on a flawed framework, inconsistent inferences and
erroneous methodology. The
CA held that the DTI Secretary was not bound by the factual findings of
the Tariff Commission
since such findings are merely recommendatory and they fall within the
ambit of the Secretarys
discretionary review. It determined that the legislative intent is to grant
the DTI Secretary the
power to make a final decision on the Tariff Commissions
recommendation.
Southern Cross filed the present petition, arguing that the factual findings
of the Tariff
Commission on the existence or non-existence of conditions warranting
the imposition of general
safeguard measures are binding upon the DTI Secretary.

ISSUE: Whether or not the factual findings of the Tariff Commission on
the existence or nonexistence
of conditions warranting the imposition of safeguard measures are
binding upon the DTI Secretary

HELD: Petition is granted.
The DTI Secretary is barred from imposing a general safeguard measure
absent
a positive final determination rendered by the Tariff Commission. The
required positive
final determination of the Tariff Commission exists as a properly enacted
constitutional
limitation imposed on the delegation of the legislative power to impose
tariffs and imposts to the
President under Section 28(2), Article VI of the Constitution. The
provision states: The
Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within specified
limits, and subject
to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import
and export quotas,
tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the
framework of the national
development program of the Government.
These impositions under Section 28(2), Article VI fall within the realm
of the power of
taxation, a power which is within the sole province of the legislature. But
this provision is also an
exceptional grant of legislative power to the President which is why the
qualifiers mandated by
the Constitution on this presidential authority attains primordial
consideration. First, there must
be a law, such as the SMA. Second, there must be specified limits, a
detail which would be filled in
by the law. And Third, Congress is further empowered to impose
limitations and restrictions on
this presidential authority.
The authority delegated to the President may be exercised by his/her alter
egos, such as
department secretaries. For purposes of the Presidents exercise of power
to impose tariffs under
the above provision, it is generally the Secretary of Finance who acts as
the alter ego of the
President. The SMA provides an exceptional instance wherein it is the
DTI or
Agriculture Secretary who is tasked by Congress, in their capacities as
alter egos of the
President, to impose such measures.
Both the Tariff Commission and the DTI Secretary may be regarded as
agents of
Congress in the implementation of the said law. Indeed, even the
President may be considered as
an agent of Congress for the purpose of imposing safeguard measures
since it is Congress, not
the President, which possesses inherent powers to impose tariffs and
imposts.
The entire SMA provides for a limited framework under which the
President, through
the DTI and Agriculture Secretaries, may impose safeguard measures in
the form of tariffs and
similar imposts. The limitation most relevant to this case is contained in
Section 5 of the SMA,
captioned Conditions for the Application of General Safeguard
Measures, and stating: The Secretary
shall apply a general safeguard measure upon a positive final
determination of the
[Tariff] Commission that a product is being imported into the country in
increased quantities,
whether absolute or relative to the domestic production, as to be a
substantial cause of serious
injury or threat thereof to the domestic industry; however, in the case of
non-agricultural
products, the Secretary shall first establish that the application of such
safeguard measures will be
in the public interest.
Section 5 of the SMA operates as a limitation validly imposed by
Congress on the
presidential authority under the SMA to impose tariffs and imposts. The
positive final determination by the Tariff Commission is plainly required
by the law and so it must be strictly complied with.
Philcemcor raised a question as to whether such requirement run counter
to our legal
order since under the said provision, a body of relative junior competence
as a Tariff
Commission can bind an administrative superior and cabinet officer such
as the DTI Secretary.
No provision in the SMA expressly authorizes the DTI Secretary to
impose a general
safeguard measure despite the absence of a positive final
recommendation of the Tariff
Commission. On the other hand, Section 5 expressly states that the DTI
Secretary shall apply
a general safeguard measure upon a positive final determination of the
Tariff Commission.
Under the SMA, it is the Tariff Commission that conducts an
investigation as to whether
the conditions exist to warrant the imposition of the safeguard measures.
These conditions are
enumerated in Section 5, namely; that a product is being imported into
the country in increased
quantities, whether absolute or relative to the domestic production, as to
be a substantial cause
of serious injury or threat thereof to the domestic industry. After the
investigation of the Tariff
Commission, it submits a report to the DTI Secretary, which states
whether the above-stated
conditions for the imposition of the general safeguard measures exist.
Upon a positive final
determination that these conditions are present, the Tariff Commission
then is mandated to
recommend what appropriate safeguard measures should be undertaken
by the DTI Secretary.
Section 13 of the SMA gives five specific options on the type of
safeguard measures the Tariff
Commission recommends to the DTI Secretary.
At the same time, nothing in the SMA obliges the DTI Secretary to adopt
the
recommendations made by the Tariff Commission. In fact, the SMA
requires that the DTI
Secretary establish that the application of such safeguard measures is in
the public interest,
notwithstanding the Tariff Commissions recommendation on the
appropriate safeguard
measure upon its positive final determination. Thus, even if the Tariff
Commission makes a
positive final determination, the DTI Secretary may opt not to impose a
general safeguard
measure, or choose a different type of safeguard measure other than that
recommended by the Tariff Commission.
It is evident from the text of Section 5 that there must be a positive final
determination by the Tariff Commission that a product is being imported
into the
country in increased quantities (whether absolute or relative to domestic
production), as
to be a substantial cause of serious injury or threat to the domestic
industry. Any
disputation to the contrary is, at best, the product of wishful thinking.
The Tariff Commissions finding is not merely recommendatory. Section
5 bluntly
does require a positive final determination by the Tariff Commission
before the DTI Secretary
may impose a general safeguard measure. This is a duty imposed on a
public officer by the law
itself which must be given a controlling effect. In fact, the Department of
Justice (DOJ)
Secretary himself rendered an Opinion with the same conclusion.
Another issue was raised as to whether the DTI Secretary, acting either
as alter ego of the
President or in his capacity as head of an executive department, may
review, modify or otherwise
alter the final determination of the Tariff Commission under the SMA.
The Court answered in
the negative. Congress in enacting the SMA and prescribing the roles to
be played therein
by the Tariff Commission and the DTI Secretary did not envision that the
President, or
his/her alter ego, could exercise supervisory powers over the Tariff
Commission. If

Congress intended to allow the traditional alter ego principle to be
established by the SMA, it
would have assigned the role now played by the DTI Secretary under the
law instead to the
National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA). The Tariff
Commission is an
attached agency of the NEDA, which in turn is the independent planning
agency of the
government.
The Tariff Commission does not fall under the administrative supervision
of the
DTI. On the other hand, the administrative relationship between the
NEDA and the Tariff
Commission is established not only by the Administrative Code, but
similarly affirmed by the
Tariff and Customs Code.
At the same time, under the Tariff and Customs Code, no similar role or
influence is
allocated to the DTI in the matter of imposing tariff duties. In fact, the
long-standing tradition
has been for the Tariff Commission and the DTI to proceed
independently in the exercise of
their respective functions. Only very recently have our statutes directed
any significant interplay
between the Tariff Commission and the DTI, with the enactment in 1999
of Republic Act No.
8751 on the imposition of countervailing duties and Republic Act No.
8752 on the imposition of
anti-dumping duties, and of course the promulgation a year later of the
SMA. In all these three
laws, the Tariff Commission is tasked, upon referral of the matter by the
DTI, to determine
whether the factual conditions exist to warrant the imposition by the DTI
of a countervailing
duty, an anti-dumping duty, or a general safeguard measure, respectively.
In all three laws, the
determination by the Tariff Commission that these required factual
conditions exist is necessary
before the DTI Secretary may impose the corresponding duty or
safeguard measure. And in all
three laws, there is no express provision authorizing the DTI Secretary to
reverse the
factual determination of the Tariff Commission.
The SMA indubitably establishes that the Tariff Commission is no mere
flunky of the
DTI Secretary when it mandates that the positive final recommendation
of the former be
indispensable to the latters imposition of a general safeguard measure.
What the law indicates
instead is a relationship of interdependence between two bodies
independent of each other
under the Administrative Code and the SMA alike. Indeed, even the
ability of the DTI Secretary
to disregard the Tariff Commissions recommendations as to the
particular safeguard measures
to be imposed evinces the independence from each other of these two
bodies. This is properly
so for two reasons the DTI and the Tariff Commission are independent
of each other
under the Administrative Code; and impropriety is avoided in cases
wherein the DTI
itself is the one seeking the imposition of the general safeguard measures,
pursuant to
Section 6 of the SMA.
Considering that the power to impose tariffs in the first place is not
inherent in the
President but arises only from congressional grant, we should affirm the
congressional
prerogative to impose limitations and restrictions on such powers which
do not normally
belong to the executive in the first place. Nowhere in the SMA does it
state that the DTI
Secretary may impose general safeguard measures without a positive
final determination by the
Tariff Commission, or that the DTI Secretary may reverse or even review
the factual
determination made by the Tariff Commission.
Congress can enact additional tasks or responsibilities on either the Tariff
Commission
or the DTI Secretary, such as their respective roles on the imposition of
general safeguard
measures under the SMA. In doing so, the same Congress, which has the
putative
authority to abolish the Tariff Commission or the DTI, is similarly
empowered to alter or

expand its functions through modalities which do not align with
established norms in
the bureaucratic structure. The Court is bound to recognize the legislative
prerogative to
prescribe such modalities, no matter how atypical they may be, in
affirmation of the legislative
power to restructure the executive branch of government.
Assuming administrative review were available, it is the NEDA that may
conduct such
review following the principles of administrative law, and the NEDAs
decision in turn is
reviewable by the Office of the President. The decision of the Office of
the President then
effectively substitutes as the determination of the Tariff Commission,
which now forms the basis
of the DTI Secretarys decision, which now would be ripe for judicial
review by the CTA under
Section 29 of the SMA. This is the only way that administrative review
of the Tariff
Commissions determination may be sustained without violating the
SMA and its constitutional
restrictions and limitations, as well as administrative law.
In any event, even if we concede the possibility of administrative review
of the Tariff
Commissions final determination by the NEDA, such would not deny
merit to the present
petition. It does not change the fact that the Court of Appeals erred in
ruling that the DTI
Secretary was not bound by the negative final determination of the Tariff
Commission, or that
the DTI Secretary acted without jurisdiction when he imposed general
safeguard measures
despite the absence of the statutory positive final determination of the
Commission.

Exemptions
95. ABRA VALLEY COLLEGE VS. AQUINO
appropriation for public purpose

annulment of a NOTICE OF SEIZURE and NOTICE
OF SALE of its lot and building in Banged Abra for
NON-PAYMENT OF REAL PROPERTY TAXES
(P5140).

courses. It has a population of more than 1000
students, located right in the heart of Bangued. The
structure is
o High school and college at the main building
o Rented to a commercial establishment = 1st
floor
o Director and his family = 2nd floor

building is educational and thus exempt from RPT.
Thus, AVC claims that the seizure and sale are
without legal basis.

and building are used for:
o 1) educational purpose = college
o 2) as permanent residence of the President
and Director and his family, including in laws
and grandchildren
o 3) commercial purpose = 1st floor is rented to
a commercial establishment
ISSUE: Whether the lot and building is exempt from RPT?
Whether it is used exclusively for educational purposes?
SC: The test of exemption from taxation is the USE OF
THE PROPERTY for purposes mentioned in the
Constitution.
It must be stressed however, that while this Court
allows a more liberal and non-restrictive interpretation of
the phrase exclusively used for educational purposes
reasonable emphasis has always been made that
EXEMPTION EXTENDS TO FACILITIES WHICH ARE
INCIDENTAL TO OR REASONABLY NECESSARY FOR
THE ACCOMPLISHMENT OF THE MAIN PURPOSE.
Thus, while the use of the 2nd floor is for
residential purposes (of the Director and President), it
finds justification under the CONCEPT OF INCIDENTAL
USE. Hence, it is complimentary to the main or primary
purpose = educational.
BUT, the lease of the 1st floor to North Marketing
Corporation CANNOT be considered incidental to the
purpose of education.
Hence, the school building and lot should be
taxed BECAUSE THE FIRST FLOOR IS BEING USED
FOR COMMERCIAL PURPOSES. Thus, since only a
portion is used for commerce, it is only fair that HALF OF
THE ASSESSED TAX be returned to the school.


96. Bayan v. Zamora
I. THE FACTS

The Republic of the Philippines and the United States of
America entered into an agreement called the Visiting Forces Agreement
(VFA). The agreement was treated as a treaty by the Philippine
government and was ratified by then-President Joseph Estrada with the
concurrence of 2/3 of the total membership of the Philippine Senate.

The VFA defines the treatment of U.S. troops and personnel
visiting the Philippines. It provides for the guidelines to govern such
visits, and further defines the rights of the U.S. and the Philippine
governments in the matter of criminal jurisdiction, movement of vessel
and aircraft, importation and exportation of equipment, materials and
supplies.

Petitioners argued, inter alia, that the VFA violates 25,
Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution, which provides that foreign
military bases, troops, or facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines
except under a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate . . . and recognized
as a treaty by the other contracting State.

II. THE ISSUE

Was the VFA unconstitutional?

III. THE RULING

[The Court DI SMI SSED the consolidated petitions, held that
the petitioners did not commit grave abuse of discretion, and sustained
the constitutionality of the VFA.]

NO, the VFA is not unconstitutional.

Section 25, Article XVIII disallows foreign military bases,
troops, or facilities in the country, unless the following conditions are
sufficiently met, viz: (a) it must be under a treaty; (b) the treaty must
be duly concurred in by the Senate and, when so required by congress,
ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a national
referendum; and (c) recognized as a treaty by the other contracting
state.

There is no dispute as to the presence of the first two requisites
in the case of the VFA. The concurrence handed by the Senate through
Resolution No. 18 is in accordance with the provisions of the
Constitution . . . the provision in [in 25, Article XVIII] requiring
ratification by a majority of the votes cast in a national referendum being
unnecessary since Congress has not required it.

xxx xxx xxx

This Court is of the firm view that the phrase recognized as a
treaty means that the other contracting party accepts or
acknowledges the agreement as a treaty. To require the other
contracting state, the United States of America in this case, to submit the
VFA to the United States Senate for concurrence pursuant to its
Constitution, is to accord strict meaning to the phrase.

Well-entrenched is the principle that the words used in the
Constitution are to be given their ordinary meaning except where
technical terms are employed, in which case the significance thus
attached to them prevails. Its language should be understood in the sense
they have in common use.

Moreover, it is inconsequential whether the United States treats
the VFA only as an executive agreement because, under international
law, an executive agreement is as binding as a treaty. To be sure, as long
as the VFA possesses the elements of an agreement under international
law, the said agreement is to be taken equally as a treaty.

xxx xxx xxx

The records reveal that the United States Government, through
Ambassador Thomas C. Hubbard, has stated that the United States
government has fully committed to living up to the terms of the
VFA. For as long as the United States of America accepts or
acknowledges the VFA as a treaty, and binds itself further to comply
with its obligations under the treaty, there is indeed marked compliance
with the mandate of the Constitution.

97. John Hay Peoples Alternative Coalition vs. Lim
Facts: Republic Act 7227, entitled "An Act Accellerating the Convetsion
of Military Reservations into other Productive uses, Creating the Bases
Conversion and Development Authority for this Purpose, Providing
Funds Therefor and for other purposes," otherwise known as the "Bases
Conversion and Development Act of 1992," was enacted on 13 March
1992. The law set out the policy of the government to accelerate the
sound and balanced conversion into alternative productive uses of the
former military bases under the 1947 Philippines-United States of
America Military Bases Agreement, namely, the Clark and Subic
military reservations as well as their extensions including the John Hay
Station (Camp John Hay) in the City of Baguio. RA 7227 created the
Bases Conversion and Development Authority' (BCDA), vesting it with
powers pertaining to the multifarious aspects of carrying out the ultimate
objective of utilizing the base areas in accordance with the declared
government policy. RA 7227 likewise created the Subic Special
Economic [and Free Port] Zone (Subic SEZ) the metes and bounds of
which were to be delineated in a proclamation to be issued by the
President of the Philippines; and granted the Subic SEZ incentives
ranging from tax and duty-free importations, exemption of businesses
therein from local and national taxes, to other hall-narks of a liberalized
financial and business climate. RA 7227 expressly gave authority to the
President to create through executive proclamation, subject to the
concurrence of the local government units directly affected, other Special
Economic Zones (SEZ) in the areas covered respectively by the Clark
military reservation, the Wallace Air Station in San Fernando, La Union,
and Camp John Hay. On 16 August 1993, BCDA entered into a
Memorandum of Agreement and Escrow Agreement with Tuntex
(B.V.L) Co., Ltd. (TUNTEX) and Asiaworld Internationale Group, Inc.
(ASIAWORLD), private corporations registered under the laws of the
British Virgin Islands, preparatory to the formation of a joint venture for
the development of Poro Point in La Union and Camp John Hay as
premier tourist destinations and recreation centers. 4 months later or on
16 December 16, 1993, BCDA, TUNTEX and ASIAWORLD executed a
Joint Venture Agreements whereby they bound themselves to put up a
joint venture company known as the Baguio International Development
and Management Corporation which would lease areas within Camp
John Hay and Poro Point for the purpose of turning such places into
principal tourist and recreation spots, as originally envisioned by the
parties under their AZemorandmn of Agreement. The Baguio City
government meanwhile passed a number of resolutions in response to the
actions taken by BCDA as owner and administrator of Camp John Hay.
By Resolution of 29 September 1993, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of
Baguio City officially asked BCDA to exclude all the barangays partly or
totally located within Camp John Hay from the reach or coverage of any
plan or program for its development. By a subsequent Resolution dated
19 January 1994, the sanggunian sought from BCDA an abdication,
waiver or quitclaim of its ownership over the home lots being occupied
by residents of 9 barangays surrounding the military reservation. Still by
another resolution passed on 21 February 1994, the sanggunian adopted
and submitted to BCDA a 15-point concept for the development of Camp
John Hay. The sanggunian's vision expressed, among other things, a kind
of development that affords protection to the environment, the making of
a family-oriented type of tourist destination, priority in employment
opportunities for Baguio residents and free access to the base area,
guaranteed participation of the city government in the management and
operation of the camp, exclusion of the previously named nine barangays
from the area for development, and liability for local taxes of businesses
to be established within the camp." BCDA, TUNTEX and ASIAWORLD
agreed to some, but rejected or modified the other proposals of the
sanggunian." They stressed the need to declare Camp John Hay a SEZ as
a condition precedent to its full development in accordance with the
mandate of RA 7227. On 11 May 1994, the sanggunian passed a
resolution requesting the Mayor to order the determination of realty taxes
which may otherwise be collected from real properties of Camp John
Hay. The resolution was intended to intelligently guide the sanggunian in
determining its position on whether Camp John Hay be declared a SEZ,
the sanggunian being of the view that such declaration would exempt the
camp's property and the economic activity therein from local or national
taxation. More than a month later, however, the sanggunian passed
Resolution 255, (Series of 1994)," seeking and supporting, subject to its
concurrence, the issuance by then President Ramos of a presidential
proclamation declaring an area of 285.1 hectares of the camp as a SEZ in
accordance with the provisions of RA 7227. Together with this resolution
was submitted a draft of the proposed proclamation for consideration by
the President. On 5 July 1994 then President Ramos issued Proclamation
420 (series of 1994), "creating and designating a portion of the area
covered by the former Camp John Hay as the John Hay Special
Economic Zone pursuant to Republic Act 7227." The John Hay Peoples
Alternative Coalition, et. al. filed the petition for prohibition, mandamus
and declaratory relief with prayer for a temporary restraining order
(TRO) and/or writ of preliminary injunction on 25 April 1995
challenging, in the main, the constitutionality or validity of Proclamation
420 as well as the legality of the Memorandum of Agreement and Joint
Venture Agreement between the BCDA, and TUNTEX and
ASIAWORLD.
I ssue: Whether the petitioners have legal standing in filing the case
questioning the validity of Presidential Proclamation 420.
Held: It is settled that when questions of constitutional significance are
raised, the court can exercise its power of judicial review only if the
following requisites are present: (1) the existence of an actual and
appropriate case; (2) a personal and substantial interest of the party
raising the constitutional question; (3) the exercise of judicial review is
pleaded at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the constitutional question is
the lis mota of the case." RA 7227 expressly requires the concurrence of
the affected local government units to the creation of SEZs out of all the
base areas in the country.'" The grant by the law on local government
units of the right of concurrence on the bases' conversion is equivalent to
vesting a legal standing on them, for it is in effect a recognition of the
real interests that communities nearby or surrounding a particular base
area have in its utilization. Thus, the interest of petitioners, being
inhabitants of Baguio, in assailing the legality of Proclamation 420, is
personal and substantial such that they have sustained or will sustain
direct injury as a result of the government act being challenged." Theirs
is a material interest, an interest in issue affected by the proclamation and
not merely an interest in the question involved or an incidental interest,"
for what is at stake in the enforcement of Proclamation 420 is the very
economic and social existence of the people of Baguio City. Moreover,
Petitioners Edilberto T. Claravall and Lilia G. Yaranon were duly elected
councilors of Baguio at the time, engaged in the local governance of
Baguio City and whose duties included deciding for and on behalf of
their constituents the question of whether to concur with the declaration
of a portion of the area covered by Camp John Hay as a SEZ. Certainly
then, Claravall and Yaranon, as city officials who voted against" the
sanggunian Resolution No. 255 (Series of 1994) supporting the issuance
of the now challenged Proclamation 420, have legal standing to bring the
present petition.

Sec 29 Control of Public Funds
Fiscal Powers of Congress
98. Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works
Facts:
1. Petitioner was the governor of Rizal, filed a petition assailing the
validity of R.A. 920 which contains an item providing for an
appropriation of P85,000.00 for the construction and repair of a feeder
road in Pasig. The said law was passed in Congress and approved by the
President.

2. The property over which the feeder road will be constructed is
however owned by Sen. Zulueta. The property was to be donated to the
local government, though the donation was made a few months after the
appropriation was included in RA 920. The petition alleged that the said
planned feeder road would relieve Zulueta the responsibility of
improving the road which is inside a private subdivision.

3. The lower court (RTC) ruled that the petitioner has standing to assail
the validity of RA 920, due to the public interest involved in the
appropriation. However, he does not have a standing with respect to the
donation since he does not have an interest that will be injured by said
donation, hence it dismissed the petition.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner has the standing to file the
petition

YES.
1. Petitioner has standing. He is not merely a taxpayer but the governor
of the province of Rizal which is considered one of the most populated
biggest provinces during that time, its taxpayers bear a substantial
portion of the burden of taxation in the country.

2. Public funds can only be appropriated for a public purpose. The test of
the constitutionality of a statute requiring the use of public funds is
whether it is used to promote public interest. Moreover, the validity of a
stature depends on the powers of the Congress at the time of its passage
or approval, not upon events occurring, or acts performed subsequent
thereto, unless it is an amendment of the organic law.

Guingona v Carague
Facts:
Petitioner senators question the constitutionality of the automatic
appropriation for debt service in the 1990 budget which was authorized
by PD 81. Petitioners seek that (1) PD 81, PD 1177 (Sec 31), and PD
1967 be declared unconstitutional, and (2) restrain the disbursement for
debt service under the 1990 budget pursuant to said decrees. While
respondents contend that the petition involves a political question
(repeal/amendment of said laws)

Issue: Whether or not subject laws has been impliedly repealed by
the 1987 Constitution

NO.
(1). Well-known is the rule that repeal or amendment by implication is
frowned upon. Equally fundamental is the principle that construction of
the Constitution and law is generally applied prospectively and not
retrospectively unless it is so clearly stated.

(2) The Court finds that in this case the questioned laws are complete in
all their essential terms and conditions and sufficient standards are
indicated therein.

The legislative intention in R.A. No. 4860, as amended, Section 31 of
P.D. No. 1177 and P.D. No. 1967 is that the amount needed should be
automatically set aside in order to enable the Republic of the Philippines
to pay the principal, interest, taxes and other normal banking charges on
the loans, credits or indebtedness incurred as guaranteed by it when they
shall become due without the need to enact a separate law appropriating
funds therefor as the need arises. The purpose of these laws is to enable
the government to make prompt payment and/or advances for all loans to
protect and maintain the credit standing of the country.

99. GUINGONA, JR. VS. CARAGUE
Facts: The 1990 budget consists of P98.4 Billion in
automatic appropriation (with P86.8 Billion for debt
service) and P155.3 Billion appropriated under RA 6831,
otherwise known as the General Appropriations Act, or a
total of P233.5 Billion, while the appropriations for the
DECS amount to P27,017,813,000.00.
The said automatic appropriation for debt service
is authorized by PD No. 18, entitled Amending Certain
Provisions of Republic Act Numbered Four Thousand
Eight Hundred Sixty, as Amended (Re: Foreign Borrowing
Act), by PD No. 1177, entitled Revising the Budget
Process in Order to Institutionalize the Budgetary
Innovations of the New Society, and by PD No.1967,
entitled An Act Strengthening the Guarantee and
Payment Positions of the Republic of the Philippines on its
Contingent Liabilities Arising out of Relent and
Guaranteed Loans by Appropriating Funds For The
Purpose.
The petitioners were questioning the
constitutionality of the automatic appropriation for debt
service, it being higher than the budget for education,
therefore it is against Section 5(5), Article XIV of the
Constitution which mandates to assign the highest
budgetary priority to education.
Issue: Whether or not the automatic appropriation for
debt service is unconstitutional; it being higher than the
budget for education.
Held: No. While it is true that under Section 5(5), Article
XIV of the Constitution Congress is mandated to assign
the highest budgetary priority to education, it does not
thereby follow that the hands of Congress are so
hamstrung as to deprive it the power to respond to the
imperatives of the national interest and for the attainment
of other state policies or objectives.
Congress is certainly not without any power,
guided only by its good judgment, to provide an
appropriation that can reasonably service our enormous
debt. It is not only a matter of honor and to protect the
credit standing of the country. More especially, the very
survival of our economy is at stake. Thus, if in the process
Congress appropriated an amount for debt service bigger
than the share allocated to education, the Court finds and
so holds that said appropriation cannot be thereby
assailed as unconstitutional.

Special Funds
100. John Osmena vs. Oscar Orbos,
Facts:Pres. Marcos created Special Account in the General Fund (P.D.
1956),designated as the Oil Price Stabilization Fund (OPSF). The OPSF
was designed toreimburse oil companies for cost increases in crude oil
and imported petroleumproducts resulting from exchange rate
adjustments and from increases in the worldmarket prices of crude oil..
Pres. Aquino, amended and promulgated E.O. No. 137,expanding the
grounds for reimbursement to oil companies for possible
costunderrecovery incurred as a result of the reduction of domestic prices
of petroleumproducts, the amount of the underrecovery being left for
determination by the Ministry of Finance. The petition claimed that the
status of the OPSF as of March 31, 1991 showed a Terminal Balance
Deficit of some P12.877 billion and to abate such, the Energy
Regulatory Board issued an Order approving the increase in pump prices
of petroleumproducts. The OPSF deficit should have been fully covered
in a span of 6 months butOscar Orbos, in his capacity as Executive
Secretary;Jesus Estanislao, in his capacity asSecretary of Finance;
Wenceslao de la Paz, in his capacity as Head of the Office of Energy
Affairs; Chairman Rex V. Tantiongco and the Energy Regulatory
Boardarepoised to accept, process and pay claims not authorized under
P.D. 1956.
Issue: What is the purpose of the Oil Price Stabilization Fund?

RULING: The OPSF is a "Trust Account" which was established for
the purpose of minimizing the frequent price changes brought about by
exchange rate adjustment and/or changes in world market prices of crude
oil and imported petroleum products. It is clear that while the funds
collected may be referred to as taxes; they are exacted inthe exercise of
the police power of the State.

Moreover, that the OPSF is a special fundis plain from the special
treatment given it by E.O. 137. It is segregated from the generalfund; and
while it is placed in what the law refers to as a "trust liability account,"
the fundnonetheless remains subject to the scrutiny and review of the
COA. The Court issatisfied that these measures comply with the
constitutional description of a "specialfund."The Court cited Valmonte v.
ERB and Gaston v. Republic Planters Bank,Thetax collected is not in a
pure exercise of the taxing power. It is levied with a regulatorypurpose,
to provide a means for the stabilization of the sugar (petroleum
products)industry. The levy is primarily in the exercise of the police
power of the State.

101. COCOFED vs. Republic,
FACTS:
In 1971, Republic Act No. 6260 was enacted creating the Coconut
InvestmentFund (CIF). The source of the CIF was a P0.55 levy on the
sale of every 100 kg. of copra. The Philippine Coconut Administration
was tasked to collect and administer theFund. Out of the 0.55 levy, P0.02
was placed at the disposition of the COCOFED, therecognized national
association of coconut producers declared by the PCA. Cocofundreceipts
were ought to be issued to every copra seller.During the Martial Law
regime, then President Ferdinand Marcos issued severalPresidential
Decrees purportedly for the improvement of the coconut industry. The
mostrelevant among these is P.D. No. 755 which permitted the use of the
Fund for the
acquisition of a commercial bank for the benefit of coconut farmers
and the distribution of the shares of the stock
of the bank it [PCA] acquired free to the coconut farmers (Sec.2).
Thus, the PCA acquired the First United Bank, later renamed the United
Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB). The PCA bought the 72.2% of PUBs
outstanding capital stock or 137,866 shares at P200 per share (P27,
573,200.00) from Pedro Cojuangco
in behalf of the coconut farmers.
The rest of the Fund was deposited to the UCPB interest free.Farmers
who had paid the CIF and registered their receipts with PCA were
giventheir corresponding UCPB stock certificates. Only 16 million worth
of COCOFUNDreceipts were registered and a large number of the
coconut farmers opted to sell all/partof their UCPB shares to private
individuals.Simply put, parts of the coconut levy funds went directly or
indirectly to variousprojects and/or was converted into different assets or
investments through the years. After the EDSA Revolution, President
Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order 1which created the Presidential
Commission on Good Government (PCGG).The PCGG aimed to assist
the President in the recovery of ill-gotten wealthaccumulated by the
Marcoses and their cronies. PCGG was empowered to file casesfor
sequestration in the Sandiganbayan. Among the sequestered properties
were the shares of stock in the UCPBregistered in the name of over a
million coconut farmers held in trust by the PCA. The Sandiganbayan
allowed the sequestration by ruling in a Partial Summary Judgment
thatthe Coconut Levy Funds are prima facie public funds and that
Section 1 and 2 of PDNo. 755 (and some other PDs) were
unconstitutional.
The COCOFED representing the over a million coconut farmers via
Petition for review under Rule 45 sought the reversal of the ruling
contending among others that the sequestration amounted to taking of
private property without
just compensation and impairment of vested right of ownership.

ISSUE: What is the NATURE of the Coconut Levy Fund?
RULING: The SC ruled in favor of the REPUBLIC. To begin with, the
Coconut Levy was imposed in the exercise of the States inherent power
of taxation. Indeed, the Coconut Levy Funds partake the nature of
TAXES. The Funds were generated by virtue of statutory enactments by
the proper legislative authorities and for public purpose.The Funds were
collected to advance the government avowed policy ofprotecting the
coconut industry.
The SC took judicial notice of the fact that thecoconut industry is one of
the great economic pillars of our nation, and coconuts and their
byproducts occupy a leading position among the countries export
products.Taxation is done not merely to raise revenues to support the
government, but also toprovide means for the rehabilitation and the
stabilization of a threatened industry, which is so affected with public
interest.

Sec 30 Appellate Jurisdiction of the SC
102. First Lepanto Ceramic v CA
Facts:

1. Petitioner assailed the conflicting provisions of B.P. 129, EO 226 (Art.
82) and a circular, 1-91 issued by the Supreme Court which deals with
the jurisdiction of courts for appeal of cases decided by quasi-judicial
agencies such as the Board of Investments (BOI).

2. BOI granted petitioner First Lepanto Ceramics, Inc.'s application to amend
its BOI certificate of registration by changing the scope of its registered
product from "glazed floor tiles" to "ceramic tiles." Oppositor Mariwasa
filed a motion for reconsideration of the said BOI decision while
oppositor Fil-Hispano Ceramics, Inc. did not move to reconsider the
same nor appeal therefrom. Soon rebuffed in its bid for reconsideration,
Mariwasa filed a petition for review with CA.

4. CA temporarily restrained the BOI from implementing its decision. The
TRO lapsed by its own terms twenty (20) days after its issuance, without
respondent court issuing any preliminary injunction.

5. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss and to lift the restraining order
contending that CA does not have jurisdiction over the BOI case, since
the same is exclusively vested with the Supreme Court pursuant to
Article 82 of the Omnibus Investments Code of 1987.

6. Petitioner argued that the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 or B.P.
129 and Circular 1-91, "Prescribing the Rules Governing Appeals to the
Court of Appeals from a Final Order or Decision of the Court of Tax
Appeals and Quasi-Judicial Agencies" cannot be the basis of Mariwasa's
appeal to respondent court because the procedure for appeal laid down
therein runs contrary to Article 82 of E.O. 226, which provides that
appeals from decisions or orders of the BOI shall be filed directly with
the Supreme Court.

7. While Mariwasa maintains that whatever inconsistency there may have
been between B.P. 129 and Article 82 of E.O. 226 on the question of
venue for appeal, has already been resolved by Circular 1-91 of the
Supreme Court, which was promulgated on February 27, 1991 or four (4)
years after E.O. 226 was enacted.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over
the case

YES. Circular 1-91 effectively repealed or superseded Article 82 of E.O.
226 insofar as the manner and method of enforcing the right to appeal
from decisions of the BOI are concerned. Appeals from decisions of the
BOI, which by statute was previously allowed to be filed directly with
the Supreme Court, should now be brought to the Court of Appeals.

103. Diaz vs. Court of Appeals
Facts :Petition for Review of a decision of the Court of Appeals.On 23
January 1991, Davao Light and Power Company, Inc. (DLPC) filed with
the Energy Regulatory Board (ERB) an application for the approval of
the sound value appraisal of its property in service.On 6 July 1992,
petitioners filed a petition for review on certiorari before theCourt
assailing the decision of ERB on the ground of lack of jurisdiction and/or
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.The Court of
Appeals subsequently dismissed the petition on the ground that (1)the
filing of the petition for review with the Supreme Court was a wrong
mode ofappeal, and (2) the petition did not comply with the provisions of
Supreme Court Circular 1-88 in that (a) it did not state the date when the
petitioners received notice of the ERB decision, (b) it did not state the
date when the petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, and (c) it
inconsistently alleged different dates when petitioners supposedly
received the denial of their motion by ERB.on 18 December 1992,
petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration contending that resolution
of 8 September 1992 was a directive for the Court of Appeals todisregard
the circular.In its resolution of 24 March 1993, the Court of Appeals
denied the motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.
Issue :Did the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the petition .
Held :On 2 February 1987, the New Constitution took effect(, with Sec.
30.)On 8 May 1987, the President promulgated E.O. No. 172 creating the
Energy Regulatory Board to replace the Board of Energy.Sec. 10 of E.O.
No. 172 was enacted without the advice and concurrence of the Court,
this provision never became effective, with the result that it cannot be
deemed to have amended the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980.
Consequently, theauthority of the Court of Appeals to decide cases from
the Board of Energy, nowERB, remains (Cf. First Lepanto Ceramics, Inc.
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 110571, 7 October 1994).Hence, the Court
of Appeals was correct when it held Contrary to petitioners' stand, the
Supreme Court's Resolution dated September 8, 1992, referring "this case
to the Court of Appeals for further disposition" was not a directive for
this court to disregard the above circulars and precedents. Rather the said
SC resolution could mean only that this court should dispose of the
subject petition in conformity with, and not in violation of, those
circulars and precedents (Rollo, p.26).Both Circulars Nos. 1-88 and 2-90
were duly published in newspapers of general circulation in the
Philippines. Hence, lawyers are expected to keep themselves abreast with
the decisions of this Court and with its Circulars and other issuances
relating to procedure or affecting their duties and responsibilities as
officers of the court (Teehankee, Jr. v. Hon. Madayag, G.R. No. 102717,
12 December 1992).

104. FABIAN vs DESIERTO
FACTS:
Fabian was the major stock holder and president ofof PROMAT
Construction Development Corporation(PROMAT) who participated in
the bidding forgovernment construction project including thoseunder the
FMED. Agustin had an affair withFabianthst resulted in the former
giving public workscontracts and for it in problems concerning thesame
in his office as his gift. Due to someunpleasant incidents between the
two, Fabian triedbreaking up with Agustin but the latter refused andeven
employed acts of harassment, intimidation,and threats. Thus Fabian filed
an administrativecase wherein the Office of the Ombudsman ruledin
favor of Fabian resulting to the dismissal ofAgustin. A motion for
reconsideration was filed;however, Desierto inhibited himself as the
newcounsel of the former is his associate. The case was transferred to
Guerrero who set aside Desiertos order and exonerated Agustin from the
case.Fabian, then, appealed with the argument anchored in Sec 27 of RA
6770 which states that: In all administrative disciplinary cases,
orders,directives or decisions of the Office of theOmbudsman may be
appealed to theSupreme Court by filing apetition for certiorari
within ten (10) days fromreceipt of the written notice of the order,
directiveor decision or denial of the motion for reconsideration in
accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

ISSUE:
-- Whether or not Section 27 of Republic ActNo. 6770 is valid
-- Whether Section 27 of Republic Act No.6770 is substantive or
procedural

HELD:
Taking all the foregoing circumstances in their truelegal roles and
effects, therefore, Section 27 ofRepublic Act No. 6770 cannot validly
authorize anappeal to this Court from decisions of the Office ofthe
Ombudsman in administrative disciplinarycases. It consequently violates
the proscription inSection 30, Article VI of the Constitution against alaw
which increases the Appellate jurisdiction of thisCourt.

In determining whether a rule prescribed by theSupreme Court, for the
practice and procedure ofthe lower courts, abridges, enlarges, or modifies
anysubstantive right, the test is whether the rule reallyregulates
procedure, that is, the judicial process forenforcing rights and duties
recognized bysubstantive law and for justly administering remedyand
redress for a disregard or infraction of them. Ifthe rule takes away a
vested right, it is notprocedural. If the rule creates a right such as theright
to appeal, it may be classified as a substantivematter; but if it operates as
a means ofimplementing an existing right then the rule dealsmerely with
procedure.

Thus, it has been generally held that rules or statutesinvolving a transfer
of cases from one court toanother, are procedural and remedial merely
andthat, as such, they are applicable to actionspending at the time the
statute went into effect or,in the case at bar, when its invalidity
wasdeclared. Accordingly, even from the standpointof jurisdiction ex
hypothesis the validity of thetransfer of appeals in said cases to the Court
ofAppeals can be sustained.WHEREFORE, Section 27 of Republic Act
No. 6770(Ombudsman Act of 1989), together with Section 7,Rule III of
Administrative Order No. 07 (Rules ofProcedure of the Office of the
Ombudsman), andany other provision of law or issuance
implementingthe aforesaid Act and insofar as they provide forappeals in
administrative disciplinary cases from theOffice of the Ombudsman to
the Supreme Court,are hereby declared INVALID and of no furtherforce
and effect.

Sec 32 Initiative and Referendum
105. SUBIC BAY METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY vs. COMELEC
FACTS:
--On March 13, 1992, Congress enacted RA. 7227 (The Bases
Conversionand Development Act of 1992), which created the Subic
EconomicZone. RA 7227 likewise created SBMA to implement the
declarednational policy of converting the Subic military reservation
intoalternative productive uses.
--On November 24, 1992, the American navy turned over the
Subicmilitary reservation to the Philippines government.
Immediately,petitioner commenced the implementation of its task,
particularly thepreservation of the sea-ports, airport, buildings, houses
and otherinstallations left by the American navy.
--On April 1993, the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong, Bataan passed
Pambayang Kapasyahan Bilang 10 ,Serye 1993, expressing therein
itsabsolute concurrence, as required by said Sec. 12 of RA 7227, to
jointhe Subic Special Economic Zone and submitted such to the Office
of the President.
--On May 24, 1993, respondents Garcia filed a petition with
theSangguniang Bayan of Morong to annul Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg.10,
Serye 1993.
-- The petition prayed for the following: a) to nullify
PambayangKapasyang Blg. 10 for Morong to join the Subic Special
Economi Zone,b) to allow Morong to join provided conditions are met.
--The Sangguniang Bayan ng Morong acted upon the petition
bypromulgating Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 18, Serye 1993,
requestingCongress of the Philippines so amend certain provisions of RA
7227.
--Not satisfied, respondents resorted to their power initiative under
theLGC of 1991.
--On July 6, 1993, COMELEC denied the petition for local initiative on
theground that the subject thereof was merely a resolution and not
anordinance.
--On February 1, 1995, the President issued Proclamation No. 532 defining
the metes and bounds of the SSEZ including therein theportion of the
former naval base within the territorial jurisdiction of theMunicipality of
Morong.
--On June 18, 19956, respondent Comelec issued Resolution No. 2845and
2848, adopting a "Calendar of Activities for local referendum
andproviding for "the rules and guidelines to govern the conduct of
thereferendum
-- On July 10, 1996, SBMA instituted a petition for certiorari
contestingthe validity of Resolution No. 2848 alleging that public
respondent isintent on proceeding with a local initiative that
proposes anamendment of a national law

ISSUE:
1.WON Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in
promulgatingResolution No. 2848 which governs the conduct of the
referendum
proposing to annul or repeal Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10
2.WON the questioned local initiative covers a subject within
the powersof the people of Morong to enact; ie., whether such initiative
"seeksthe amendment of a national law."

HELD:
1.YES. COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion.FIRST. The
process started by private respondents was an INITIATIVE
butrespondent Comelec made preparations for a REFERENDUM only.In
fact, in the body of the Resolution as reproduced in the footnote
below,the word "referendum" is repeated at least 27 times,
but "initiative" is notmentioned at all. The Comelec labeled the exercise
as a "Referendum"; thecounting of votes was entrusted to a "Referendum
Committee"; thedocuments were called "referendum returns"; the
canvassers, "ReferendumBoard of Canvassers" and the ballots
themselves bore the description"referendum". To repeat, not once was
the word "initiative" used in saidbody of Resolution No. 2848. And yet,
this exercise is unquestionably anINITIATIVE.As defined, Initiative is
the power of the people to propose bills and laws,and to enact or reject
them at the polls independent of the legislativeassembly. On the other
hand, referendum is the right reserved to the peopleto adopt or reject
any act or measure which has been passed by a legislativebody and
which in most cases would without action on the part of electorsbecome a
law.In initiative and referendum, the Comelec exercises administration
andsupervision of the process itself, akin to its powers over the conduct
of elections.
These law-making powers belong to the people, hence therespondent
Commission cannot control or change the substance or thecontent
of legislation.
2.The local initiative is NOT ultra vires because the municipal resolution
isstill in the proposal stage and not yet an approved law.The municipal
resolution is still in the proposal stage. It is not yet anapproved law.
Should the people reject it, then there would be nothing tocontest and to
adjudicate. It is only when the people have voted for it and ithas become
an approved ordinance or resolution that rights and obligationscan be
enforced or implemented thereunder. At this point, it is merely aproposal
and the writ or prohibition cannot issue upon a mere conjecture
orpossibility. Constitutionally speaking, courts may decide
only actualcontroversies, not hypothetical questions or cases.In the
present case, it is quite clear that the Court has authority to
reviewComelec Resolution No. 2848 to determine the commission
of grave abuse of discretion. However, it does not have the
same authority in regard to theproposed initiative since it has not
been promulgated or approved, or passedupon by any "branch
or instrumentality" or lower court, for that matter. TheCommission on
Elections itself has made no reviewable pronouncementsabout the issues
brought by the pleadings. The Comelec simply includedverbatim the
proposal in its questioned Resolution No. 2848. Hence, there isreally no
decision or action made by a branch, instrumentality or court whichthis
Court could take cognizance of and acquire jurisdiction over, in
theexercise of its review powers.



106. DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO vs. COMELEC
Facts:
P r i v a t e r e s p o n d e n t A t t y . J e s u s D e l f i n , p r e s i d
e n t o f P e o p l e s I n i t i a t i v e f o r R e f o r m s , Moderniza
tion and Action (PIRMA), filed with COMELEC a petition to amend the
constitution to liftthe term limits of elective officials, through Peoples
Initiative. He based this petition on Article XVII,Sec. 2 of the 1987
Constitution, whi ch provides for the ri ght of the people
to exercise the power todirectl y propose amendments to the
Constitution. Subsequentl y the COMELEC issued an
order directing the publicati on of the petit ion and of the
notice of hearing and thereaft er set the case for hearing. At the
hearing, Senator Roco, the IBP, Demokrasya-Ipagtanggol ang
Konstitusyon, PublicInterest Law Cent er, and Laban ng
Demokrati kong Pilipino appeared as intervenors-
oppositors. Senator Roco filed a motion to dismiss the Delfin petition
on the ground that one which is cognizableby the COMELEC.
The petitioners herein Senat or Santiago, Al exander Padilla,
and Isabel Ongpinfi led this civi l action for prohibition under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court against COMELEC and
theDelfin petition rising the several arguments, such as the following:
(1) The constitutional provision onp e o p l e s i n i t i a t i v e t o
a me n d t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n c a n o n l y b e i mp l e me n t e d b y
l a w t o b e p a s s e d b y Congress. No such law has been passed; (2)
The peoples initiative is limited to amendments to theConstitution,
not to revision thereof. Li fti ng of the t erm l i mit s constit utes
a revi sion, therefore it i soutside the power of peoples initiative.
The Supreme Court granted the Motions for Intervention.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not Sec. 2, Art. XVII of the 1987 Constitution is a self-
executing provision.(2) Whether or not COMELEC Resoluti on
No. 2300 regarding the conduct of initi ati ve onamendments to
the Constitution is valid, considering the absence in the law of specific
provisions onthe conduct of such initiative.(3) Whether the li ft i ng
of t erm li mit s of el ective offi cials would consti tute a
revision or anamendment of the Constitution.
Held:
S e c . 2 , Ar t XVI I o f t h e Co n s t i t u t i o n i s n o t s e l f e x e c
u t o r y , t h u s , wi t h o u t i mp l e me n t i n g legislation the same
cannot operate. Although the Constitution has recognized or granted the
right,the people cannot exercise it if Congress does not provide for its
implementation.The portion of COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 which
prescribes rules and regulations on theconduct of initiative on
amendments to the Constitution, is void. It has been an established rule
thatwh a t h a s b e e n d e l e g a t e d , c a n n o t b e d e l e g a t e d ( p o
t e s t a s d e l e g a t a n o n d e l e g a r i p o t e s t ) . Th e delegat i on of
the power to the COMELEC being invalid, the l att er cannot
validl y promul gate rul esand regulations to implement the
exercise of the right to peoples initiative.Th e l i f t i n g o f t h e t e r m
l i mi t s wa s h e l d t o b e t h a t o f a r e v i s i o n , a s i t wo u l d
a f f e c t o t h e r provisions of the Constitution such as the
synchronization of elections, the constitutional guaranteeof equal
access to opportunities for public servi ce, and prohibiting
political dynasti es. A revi si oncannot be done by initiative.
However, considering the Courts decision in the above Issue, the issueof
whether or not the petition is a revision or amendment has become
academic.

107. LAMBINO vs. COMELEC
Requirements for Initiative Petition
Constitutional Amendment vs. Constitutional Revision
Tests to determine whether amendment or revision

FACTS:
The Lambino Group commenced gathering signatures for
an initiative petition to change the 1987 Constitution and then filed a
petition with COMELEC to hold a plebiscite for ratification under Sec.
5(b) and (c) and Sec. 7 of RA 6735. The proposed changes under the
petition will shift the present Bicameral-Presidential system to a
Unicameral-Parliamentary form of government. COMELEC did not give
it due course for lack of an enabling law governing initiative petitions to
amend the Constitution, pursuant to Santiago v. Comelec ruling.

I SSUES:
Whether or not the proposed changes constitute an
amendment or revision
Whether or not the initiative petition is sufficient
compliance with the constitutional requirement on direct
proposal by the people

RULI NG:
Initiative petition does not comply with Sec. 2, Art. XVII on direct
proposal by people
Sec. 2, Art. XVII...is the governing provision that allows a
peoples initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution. While this
provision does not expressly state that the petition must set forth the full
text of the proposed amendments, the deliberations of the framers of our
Constitution clearly show that: (a) the framers intended to adopt relevant
American jurisprudence on peoples initiative; and (b) in particular, the
people must first see the full text of the proposed amendments before
they sign, and that the people must sign on a petition containing such full
text.

The essence of amendments directly proposed by the people
through initiative upon a petition is that the entire proposal on its face is
a petition by the people. This means two essential elements must be
present.

2 elements of initiative
1. First, the people must author and thus sign the entire proposal.
No agent or representative can sign on their behalf.
2. Second, as an initiative upon a petition, the proposal must be
embodied in a petition.

These essential elements are present only if the full text of the proposed
amendments is first shown to the people who express their assent by
signing such complete proposal in a petition. The full text of
the proposed amendments may be either written on the face of the
petition, or attached to it. If so attached, the petition must stated the fact
of such attachment. This is an assurance that everyone of the several
millions of signatories to the petition had seen the full textof
the proposed amendments before not after signing.

Moreover, an initiative signer must be informed at the time of signing of
the nature and effect of that which is proposed and failure to do so is
deceptive and misleading which renders the initiative void.

In the case of the Lambino Groups petition, theres not a single word,
phrase, or sentence of text of the proposedchanges in the signature sheet.
Neither does the signature sheet state that the text of the
proposed changes is attached to it. The signature sheet merely asks a
question whether the people approve a shift from the Bicameral-
Presidential to the Unicameral- Parliamentary system
of government. The signature sheet does not show to the people the draft
of the proposed changes before they are asked to sign the signature sheet.
This omission is fatal.

An initiative that gathers signatures from the people without first
showing to the people the full text of the proposed amendments is most
likely a deception, and can operate as a gigantic fraud on the people.
Thats why the Constitutionrequires that an initiative must be directly
proposed by the people x x x in a petition - meaning that the people
must sign on a petition that contains the full text of the proposed
amendments. On so vital an issue as amending the nations fundamental
law, the writing of the text of the proposed amendments cannot be hidden
from the people under a general or special power of attorney to unnamed,
faceless, and unelected individuals.

The initiative violates Section 2, Article XVII of the
Constitution disallowing revision through initiatives
Article XVII of the Constitution speaks of three modes of amending the
Constitution. The first mode is through Congress upon three-fourths vote
of all its Members. The second mode is through
a constitutional convention. The third mode is through a
peoples initiative.

Section 1 of Article XVII, referring to the first and second modes, applies
to any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution. In contrast,
Section 2 of Article XVII, referring to the third mode, applies only to
amendments to this Constitution. This distinction was intentional as
shown by the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission. A
peoplesinitiative to change the Constitution applies only to an
amendment of the Constitution and not to its revision. In contrast,
Congress or a constitutional convention can propose both amendments
and revisions to the Constitution.

Does the Lambino Groups initiative constitute a revision of the
Constitution?
Yes. By any legal test and under any jurisdiction, a shift from a
Bicameral-Presidential to a Unicameral-Parliamentary system, involving
the abolition of the Office of the President and the abolition of one
chamber of Congress, is beyond doubt a revision, not a mere amendment.

Amendment vs. Revision
Courts have long recognized the distinction between an amendment and a
revision of a constitution. Revision broadly implies a change that alters a
basic principle in the constitution, like altering the principle of separation
of powers or the system of checks-and-balances. There is also revision if
the change alters the substantial entirety of the constitution, as when the
change affects substantial provisions of the constitution. On the other
hand, amendment broadly refers to a change that adds, reduces, or deletes
without altering the basic principle involved. Revision generally affects
several provisions of the constitution, while amendment generally affects
only the specific provision being amended.

Where the proposed change applies only to a specific provision of the
Constitution without affecting any other section or article, the change
may generally be considered an amendment and not a revision. For
example, a change reducing the voting age from 18 years to 15 years is
an amendment and not a revision. Similarly, a change reducing Filipino
ownership of mass media companies from 100% to 60% is an
amendment and not a revision. Also, a change requiring a college degree
as an additional qualification for election to the Presidency is an
amendment and not a revision.

The changes in these examples do not entail any modification of sections
or articles of the Constitution other than the specific provision being
amended. These changes do not also affect the structure
of government or the system of checks-and-balances among or within the
three branches.

However, there can be no fixed rule on whether a change is an
amendment or a revision. A change in a single word of one sentence
of the Constitution may be a revision and not an amendment. For
example, the substitution of the word republican with monarchic or
theocratic in Section 1, Article II of the Constitution radically
overhauls the entire structure of government and the fundamental
ideological basis of the Constitution. Thus, each specific change will
have to be examined case-by-case, depending on how it affects other
provisions, as well as how it affects the structure ofgovernment, the
carefully crafted system of checks-and-balances, and the underlying
ideological basis of the existing Constitution.

Since a revision of a constitution affects basic principles, or several
provisions of a constitution, a deliberative body with recorded
proceedings is best suited to undertake a revision. A revision requires
harmonizing not only several provisions, but also the altered principles
with those that remain unaltered. Thus, constitutions normally authorize
deliberative bodies like constituent assemblies
or constitutional conventions to undertake revisions. On the other hand,
constitutions allow peoples initiatives, which do not have fixed and
identifiable deliberative bodies or recorded proceedings, to undertake
only amendments and not revisions.

Tests to determine whether amendment or revision
In California where the initiative clause allows amendments but not
revisions to the constitution just like in our Constitution, courts have
developed a two-part test: the quantitative test and the qualitative test.
The quantitative test asks whether the proposed change is so extensive in
its provisions as to change directly the substantial entirety of the
constitution by the deletion or alteration of numerous existing provisions.
The court examines only the number of provisions affected and does not
consider the degree of the change.

The qualitative test inquires into the qualitative effects of the proposed
change in the constitution. The main inquiry is whether the change will
accomplish such far reaching changes in the nature of our basic
governmental plan as to amount to a revision. Whether there is an
alteration in the structure of government is a proper subject of inquiry.
Thus, a change in the nature of [the] basic governmental plan includes
change in its fundamental framework or the fundamental powers of its
Branches. A change in the nature of the basic governmental plan also
includes changes that jeopardize the traditional form of government and
the system of check and balances.

Under both the quantitative and qualitative tests, the Lambino Groups
initiative is a revision and not merely an amendment. Quantitatively, the
Lambino Groups proposed changes overhaul two articles - Article VI on
the Legislature and Article VII on the Executive - affecting a total of 105
provisions in the entire Constitution. Qualitatively, the proposed changes
alter substantially the basic plan of government, from presidential to
parliamentary, and from a bicameral to a unicameral legislature.

A change in the structure of government is a revision
A change in the structure of government is a revision of the Constitution,
as when the three great co-equal branches of government in the present
Constitution are reduced into two. This alters the separation of powers in
the Constitution. A shift from the present Bicameral-Presidential system
to a Unicameral-Parliamentary system is a revision of the Constitution.
Merging the legislative and executive branches is a radical change in the
structure of government. The abolition alone of the Office of the
President as the locus of Executive Power alters the separation of powers
and thus constitutes a revision of the Constitution. Likewise, the abolition
alone of one chamber of Congress alters the system of checks-and-
balances within the legislature and constitutes a revision of the
Constitution.

The Lambino Group theorizes that the difference between amendment
and revision is only one of procedure, not of substance. The Lambino
Group posits that when a deliberative body drafts and proposes changes
to the Constitution, substantive changes are called revisions because
members of the deliberative body work full-time on the changes. The
same substantive changes, when proposed through an initiative, are
called amendments because the changes are made by ordinary people
who do not make an occupation, profession, or vocation out of such
endeavor. The SC, however, ruled that the express intent of the framers
and the plain language of the Constitution contradict the Lambino
Groups theory. Where the intent of the framers and the language of the
Constitution are clear and plainly stated, courts do not deviate from such
categorical intent and language.