4th Ammendment Research

1197
FOURTH AMENDMENT
SEARCH AND SEIZURE
CONTENTS
Page
Search and Sei zure .................................................................................................................... 1199
Hi story and Scope of the Amendment .............................................................................. 1199
Hi story .......................................................................................................................... 1199
Scope of the Amendment ............................................................................................ 1200
The I nterest Protected ................................................................................................ 1205
Arrests and Other Detenti ons .................................................................................... 1209
Searches and I nspecti ons i n Noncri mi nal Cases ...................................................... 1211
Searches and Sei zures Pursuant to Warrant ................................................................... 1215
I ssuance by Neutral Magi strate ................................................................................. 1216
Probabl e Cause ............................................................................................................ 1217
Parti cul ari ty ................................................................................................................. 1220
Fi rst Amendment Beari ng on Probabl e Cause and Parti cul ari ty ........................... 1221
Property Subject to Sei zure ........................................................................................ 1223
Executi on of Warrants ................................................................................................ 1226
Val i d Searches and Sei zures Wi thout Warrants ............................................................. 1228
Detenti on Short of Arrest: Stop-and-Fri sk ................................................................ 1229
Search I nci dent to Arrest ........................................................................................... 1234
Vehi cul ar Searches ...................................................................................................... 1238
Vessel Searches ........................................................................................................... 1241
Consent Searches ........................................................................................................ 1242
Border Searches ........................................................................................................... 1243
Open Fi el ds ............................................................................................................... 1245
Pl ai n Vi ew ................................................................................................................. 1246
Publ i c School s .............................................................................................................. 1246
Government Offi ces ..................................................................................................... 1247
Pri sons and Regul ati on of Probati on ......................................................................... 1247
Drug Testi ng ................................................................................................................ 1248
El ectroni c Survei l l ance and the Fourth Amendment ...................................................... 1250
The Olmstead Case ..................................................................................................... 1250
Federal Communi cati ons Act ..................................................................................... 1251
Nontel ephoni c El ectroni c Survei l l ance ...................................................................... 1251
The Berger and Katz Cases ........................................................................................ 1252
Warrantl ess Nati onal Securi ty El ectroni c Survei l l ance ........................................ 1255
Enforci ng the Fourth Amendment: The Excl usi onary Rul e ............................................ 1257
Al ternati ves to the Excl usi onary Rul e ....................................................................... 1257
Devel opment of the Excl usi onary Rul e ...................................................................... 1258
The Foundati ons of the Excl usi onary Rul e ............................................................... 1262
Narrowi ng Appl i cati on of the Excl usi onary Rul e ..................................................... 1264
Operati on of the Rul e: Standi ng ................................................................................ 1269
1199
1
Apparentl y the fi rst statement of freedom from unreasonabl e searches and sei -
zures appeared i n The Ri ghts of the Col oni sts and a Li st of I nfri ngements and Vi o-
l ati ons of Ri ghts, 1772, i n the drafti ng of whi ch Samuel Adams took the l ead. 1 B.
SCHWARTZ, THE BI LL OF RI GHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HI STORY 199, 20506 (1971).
2
5 Cokes Rep. 91a, 77 Eng. Rep. 194 (K.B. 1604). One of the most forceful ex-
pressi ons of the maxi m was that of Wi l l i am Pi tt i n Parl i ament i n 1763: The poorest
man may i n hi s cottage bi d defi ance to al l the force of the crown. I t may be frai l
i ts roof may shake the wi nd may bl ow through i t the storm may enter, the rai n
may enter but the Ki ng of Engl and cannot enter al l hi s force dares not cross the
threshol d of the rui ned tenement.
3
19 Howel l s State Tri al s 1029, 95 Eng. 807 (1705).
SEARCH AND SEIZURE
FOURTH AMENDMENT
The ri ght of the peopl e to be secure i n thei r persons,
houses, papers, and effects, agai nst unreasonabl e searches and
sei zures, shal l not be vi ol ated; and no Warrants shal l i ssue but
upon probabl e cause, supported by Oath or affi rmati on, and
parti cul arl y descri bi ng the pl ace to be searched, and the per-
sons or thi ngs to be sei zed.
SEARCH AND SEIZURE
History and Scope of the Amendment
Hi story. Few provi si ons of the Bi l l of Ri ghts grew so di rectl y
out of the experi ence of the col oni al s as the Fourth Amendment,
embodyi ng as i t di d the protecti on agai nst the uti l i zati on of the
wri ts of assi stance. But whi l e the i nsi stence on freedom from un-
reasonabl e searches and sei zures as a fundamental ri ght gai ned ex-
pressi on i n the Col oni es l ate and as a resul t of experi ence,
1
there
was al so a ri ch Engl i sh experi ence to draw on. Every mans house
i s hi s castl e was a maxi m much cel ebrated i n Engl and, as was
demonstrated i n Semaynes Case, deci ded i n 1603.
2
A ci vi l case of
executi on of process, Semaynes Case nonethel ess recogni zed the
ri ght of the homeowner to defend hi s house agai nst unl awful entry
even by the Ki ngs agents, but at the same ti me recogni zed the au-
thori ty of the appropri ate offi cers to break and enter upon noti ce
i n order to arrest or to execute the Ki ngs process. Most famous of
the Engl i sh cases was Entick v. Carrington,
3
one of a seri es of ci vi l
acti ons agai nst state offi cers who, pursuant to general warrants,
had rai ded many homes and other pl aces i n search of materi al s
1200
AMENDMENT 4 SEARCHES AND SEI ZURES
4
See also Wi l kes v. Wood, 98 Eng. 489 (C.P. 1763); Huckl e v. Money, 95 Eng.
Rep. 768 (K.B. 1763), affd 19 Howel l s State Tri al s 1002, 1028; 97 Eng. Rep. 1075
(K.B. 1765).
5
5 Eng. Rep. 817, 818.
6
Boyd v. Uni ted States, 116 U.S. 616, 626 (1886).
7
The arguments of Oti s and others as wel l as much background materi al are
contai ned i n Qui ncys MASSACHUSETTS REPORTS, 17611772, App. I , pp. 395540,
and i n 2 LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS 10647 (Wroth & Zobel eds., 1965). See
also Di ckerson, Writs of Assistance as a Cause of the American Revolution, i n THE
ERA OF THE AMERI CAN REVOLUTI ON: STUDI ES I NSCRI BED TO EVARTS BOUTELL
GREENE 40 (R. Morri s, ed., 1939).
connected wi th John Wi l kes pol emi cal pamphl ets attacki ng not
onl y governmental pol i ci es but the Ki ng hi msel f.
4
Enti ck, an associ ate of Wi l kes, sued because agents had forc-
i bl y broken i nto hi s house, broken i nto l ocked desks and boxes, and
sei zed many pri nted charts, pamphl ets and the l i ke. I n an opi ni on
sweepi ng i n terms, the court decl ared the warrant and the behavi or
i t authori zed subversi ve of al l the comforts of soci ety, and the i s-
suance of a warrant for the sei zure of al l of a persons papers rath-
er than onl y those al l eged to be cri mi nal i n nature contrary to the
geni us of the l aw of Engl and.
5
Besi des i ts general character, sai d
the court, the warrant was bad because i t was not i ssued on a
showi ng of probabl e cause and no record was requi red to be made
of what had been sei zed. Entick v. Carrington, the Supreme Court
has sai d, i s a great judgment, one of the l andmarks of Engl i sh
l i berty, one of the permanent monuments of the Bri ti sh Consti tu-
ti on, and a gui de to an understandi ng of what the Framers meant
i n wri ti ng the Fourth Amendment.
6
I n the col oni es, smuggl i ng rather than sedi ti ous l i bel afforded
the l eadi ng exampl es of the necessi ty for protecti on agai nst unrea-
sonabl e searches and sei zures. I n order to enforce the revenue
l aws, Engl i sh authori ti es made use of wri ts of assi stance, whi ch
were general warrants authori zi ng the bearer to enter any house
or other pl ace to search for and sei ze prohi bi ted and uncustomed
goods, and commandi ng al l subjects to assi st i n these endeavors.
The wri ts once i ssued remai ned i n force throughout the l i feti me of
the soverei gn and si x months thereafter. When, upon the death of
George I I i n 1760, the authori ti es were requi red to obtai n the i ssu-
ance of new wri ts, opposi ti on was l ed by James Oti s, who attacked
such wri ts on l i bertari an grounds and who asserted the i nval i di ty
of the authori zi ng statutes because they confl i cted wi th Engl i sh
consti tuti onal i sm.
7
Oti s l ost and the wri ts were i ssued and uti -
l i zed, but hi s arguments were much ci ted i n the col oni es not onl y
on the i mmedi ate subject but al so wi th regard to judi ci al revi ew.
Scope of the Amendment. The l anguage of the provi si on
whi ch became the Fourth Amendment underwent some modest
1201
8
1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 43435 (June 8, 1789).
9
The word secured was changed to secure and the phrase agai nst unrea-
sonabl e searches and sei zures was rei nstated. I d. at 754 (August 17, 1789).
10
I d. I t has been theori zed that the author of the defeated revi si on, who was
chai rman of the commi ttee appoi nted to arrange the amendments pri or to House
passage, si mpl y i nserted hi s provi si on and that i t passed unnoti ced. N. LASSON, THE
HI STORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNI TED STATES
CONSTI TUTI ON 10103 (1937).
11
The amendment was ori gi nal l y i n one cl ause as quoted above; i t was the i n-
serti on of the defeated amendment to the l anguage whi ch changed the text i nto two
cl auses and arguabl y had the effect of extendi ng the protecti on agai nst unreason-
abl e searches and sei zures beyond the requi rements i mposed on the i ssuance of war-
rants. I t i s al so possi bl e to read the two cl auses together to mean that some sei zures
even under warrants woul d be unreasonabl e, and thi s readi ng has i ndeed been ef-
fectuated i n certai n cases, al though for i ndependent reasons. Boyd v. Uni ted States,
116 U.S. 616 (1886); Goul ed v. Uni ted States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921), overrul ed by
Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967); but see i d. at 303 (reservi ng the questi on
whether there are i tems of evi denti al val ue whose very nature precl udes them from
bei ng the object of a reasonabl e search and sei zure.)
changes on i ts passage through the Congress, and i t i s possi bl e
that the changes refl ected more than a modest si gni fi cance i n the
i nterpretati on of the rel ati onshi p of the two cl auses. Madi sons i n-
troduced versi on provi ded The ri ghts to be secured i n thei r per-
sons, thei r houses, thei r papers, and thei r other property, from al l
unreasonabl e searches and sei zures, shal l not be vi ol ated by war-
rants i ssued wi thout probabl e cause, supported by oath or affi rma-
ti on, or not parti cul arl y descri bi ng the pl aces to be searched, or the
persons or thi ngs to be sei zed.
8
As reported from commi ttee, wi th
an i nadvertent omi ssi on corrected on the fl oor,
9
the secti on was al -
most i denti cal to the i ntroduced versi on, and the House defeated a
moti on to substi tute and no warrant shal l i ssue for by warrants
i ssui ng i n the commi ttee draft. I n some fashi on, the rejected
amendment was i nserted i n the l anguage before passage by the
House and i s the l anguage of the rati fi ed consti tuti onal provi -
si on.
10
As noted above, the noteworthy di sputes over search and sei -
zure i n Engl and and the col oni es revol ved about the character of
warrants. There were, however, l awful warrantl ess searches, pri -
mari l y searches i nci dent to arrest, and these apparentl y gave ri se
to no di sputes. Thus, the questi on ari ses whether the Fourth
Amendments two cl auses must be read together to mean that the
onl y searches and sei zures whi ch are reasonabl e are those whi ch
meet the requi rements of the second cl ause, that i s, are pursuant
to warrants i ssued under the prescri bed safeguards, or whether the
two cl auses are i ndependent, so that searches under warrant must
compl y wi th the second cl ause but that there are reasonabl e
searches under the fi rst cl ause whi ch need not compl y wi th the sec-
ond cl ause.
11
Thi s i ssue has di vi ded the Court for some ti me, has
1202
12
Approval of warrantl ess searches pursuant to arrest fi rst appeared i n di cta
i n several cases. Weeks v. Uni ted States, 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914); Carrol l v. Uni ted
States, 267 U.S. 132, 158 (1925); Agnel l o v. Uni ted States, 269 U.S. 20, 30 (1925).
Whether or not there i s to be a rul e or a pri nci pl e general l y preferri ng or requi ri ng
searches pursuant to warrant to warrantl ess searches, however, has rami fi cati ons
far beyond the i ssue of searches pursuant to arrest. Uni ted States v. Uni ted States
Di stri ct Court, 407 U.S. 297, 320 (1972).
13
Compare Marron v. Uni ted States, 275 U.S. 192 (1927), with Go-Bart I mport-
i ng Co. v. Uni ted States, 282 U.S. 344 (1931), and Uni ted States v. Lefkowi tz, 285
U.S. 452 (1932).
14
331 U.S. 145 (1947).
15
Trupi ano v. Uni ted States, 334 U.S. 699, 705 (1948). See also McDonal d v.
Uni ted States, 335 U.S. 451 (1948).
16
Uni ted States v. Rabi nowi tz, 339 U.S. 56, 66 (1950).
17
Chi mel v. Cal i forni a, 395 U.S. 752, 761 (1969).
18
Terry v. Ohi o, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968). I n Uni ted States v. Uni ted States Di s-
tri ct Court, 407 U.S. 297, 321 (1972), Justi ce Powel l expl ai ned that the very heart
of the Amendments mandate i s that where practi cal , a governmental search and
sei zure shoul d represent both the efforts of the offi cer to gather evi dence of wrongful
seen several reversal s of precedents, and i s i mportant for the reso-
l uti on of many cases. I t i s a di spute whi ch has run most consi st-
entl y throughout the cases i nvol vi ng the scope of the ri ght to
search i nci dent to arrest.
12
Whi l e the ri ght to search the person of
the arrestee wi thout a warrant i s unquesti oned, how far afi el d i nto
areas wi thi n and wi thout the control of the arrestee a search may
range i s an i nteresti ng and cruci al matter.
The Court has drawn a waveri ng l i ne.
13
I n Harris v. United
States,
14
i t approved as reasonabl e the warrantl ess search of a
four-room apartment pursuant to the arrest of the man found
there. A year l ater, however, a reconsti tuted Court majori ty set
asi de a convi cti on based on evi dence sei zed by a warrantl ess search
pursuant to an arrest and adopted the cardi nal rul e that, i n sei z-
i ng goods and arti cl es, l aw enforcement agents must secure and
use search warrants wherever reasonabl y practi cabl e.
15
Thi s rul e
was set asi de two years l ater by another reconsti tuted majori ty
whi ch adopted the premi se that the test i s not whether i t i s rea-
sonabl e to procure a search warrant, but whether the search was
reasonabl e. Whether a search i s reasonabl e, the Court sai d, must
fi nd resol uti on i n the facts and ci rcumstances of each case.
16
How-
ever, the Court soon returned to i ts emphasi s upon the warrant.
The [Fourth] Amendment was i n l arge part a reacti on to the gen-
eral warrants and warrantl ess searches that had so al i enated the
col oni sts and had hel ped speed the movement for i ndependence. I n
the scheme of the Amendment, therefore, the requi rement that no
Warrants shal l i ssue, but upon probabl e cause, pl ays a cruci al
part.
17
Therefore, the pol i ce must, whenever practi cabl e, obtai n
advance judi ci al approval of searches and sei zures through a war-
rant procedure.
18
Excepti ons to searches under warrants were to
1203
acts and the judgment of the magi strate that the col l ected evi dence i s suffi ci ent to
justi fy i nvasi on of a ci ti zens pri vate premi ses or conversati on. Thus, what i s rea-
sonabl e i n terms of a search and sei zure deri ves content and meani ng through ref-
erence to the warrant cl ause. Cool i dge v. New Hampshi re, 403 U.S. 443, 47384
(1971). See also Davi s v. Mi ssi ssi ppi , 394 U.S. 721, 728 (1969); Katz v. Uni ted
States, 389 U.S. 347, 35658 (1967); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 299 (1967).
19
Chi mel v. Cal i forni a, 395 U.S. 752, 76264 (1969) (l i mi ti ng scope of search
i nci dent to arrest). See also Uni ted States v. Uni ted States Di stri ct Court, 407 U.S.
297 (1972) (rejecti ng argument that i t was reasonabl e to al l ow Presi dent through
Attorney General to authori ze warrantl ess el ectroni c survei l l ance of persons thought
to be endangeri ng the nati onal securi ty); Katz v. Uni ted States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967)
(al though offi cers acted wi th great sel f-restrai nt and reasonabl y i n engagi ng i n el ec-
troni c sei zures of conversati ons from tel ephone booth, sel f-i mposi ti on was not
enough and magi strates judgment requi red); Preston v. Uni ted States, 376 U.S. 364
(1964) (warrantl ess search of sei zed automobi l e not justi fi ed because not wi thi n ra-
ti onal e of excepti ons to warrant cl ause). There were excepti ons, e.g., Cooper v. Cal i -
forni a, 386 U.S. 58 (1967) (warrantl ess search of i mpounded car was reasonabl e);
Uni ted States v. Harri s, 390 U.S. 234 (1968) (warrantl ess i nventory search of auto-
mobi l e).
20
See, e.g., Al mei da-Sanchez v. Uni ted States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973), Justi ces
Stewart, Dougl as, Brennan, and Marshal l adhered to the warrant-based rul e, whi l e
Justi ces Whi te, Bl ackmun, and Rehnqui st, and Chi ef Justi ce Burger pl aced greater
emphasi s upon the questi on of reasonabl eness wi thout necessary regard to the war-
rant requi rement. I d. at 285. Justi ce Powel l general l y agreed wi th the former group
of Justi ces, i d. at 275 (concurri ng).
21
E.g., G.M. Leasi ng Corp. v. Uni ted States, 429 U.S. 338, 35253 (1977) (unan-
i mous); Marshal l v. Barl ows, I nc., 436 U.S. 307, 312 (1978); Mi chi gan v. Tyl er, 436
U.S. 499, 506 (1978); Mi ncey v. Ari zona, 437 U.S. 385, 390 (1978) (unani mous); Ar-
kansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 743, 758 (1979); Uni ted States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798,
82425 (1982).
22
E.g., Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970) (warrantl ess search of auto-
mobi l e taken to pol i ce stati on); Texas v. Whi te, 423 U.S. 67 (1975) (same); New York
v. Bel ton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981) (search i nci dent to arrest); Uni ted States v. Ross, 456
U.S. 798 (1982) (automobi l e search at scene). On the other hand, the warrant-based
standard di d precl ude a number of warrantl ess searches. E.g., Al mei da-Sanchez v.
Uni ted States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973) (warrantl ess stop and search of auto by rovi ng
patrol near border); Marshal l v. Barl ows, I nc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978) (warrantl ess ad-
mi ni strati ve i nspecti on of busi ness premi ses); Mi ncey v. Ari zona, 437 U.S. 385
(1978) (warrantl ess search of home that was homi ci de scene).
23
Of the 1992 Justi ces, onl y Justi ce Stevens has frequentl y si ded wi th the war-
rants-wi th-narrow-excepti ons approach. See, e.g., I l l i noi s v. Rodri guez, 497 U.S. 177,
be cl osel y contai ned by the rati onal e undergi rdi ng the necessi ty for
the excepti on, and the scope of a search under one of the excepti ons
was si mi l arl y l i mi ted.
19
Duri ng the 1970s the Court was cl osel y di vi ded on whi ch
standard to appl y.
20
For a whi l e, the bal ance ti pped i n favor of the
vi ew that warrantl ess searches are per se unreasonabl e, wi th a few
careful l y prescri bed excepti ons.
21
Gradual l y, gui ded by the vari abl e
expectati on of pri vacy approach to coverage of the Fourth Amend-
ment, the Court broadened i ts vi ew of permi ssi bl e excepti ons and
of the scope of those excepti ons.
22
By 1992, i t was no l onger the case that the warrants-wi th-
narrow-excepti ons standard normal l y prevai l s over a reasonabl e-
ness approach.
23
Excepti ons to the warrant requi rement have
1204
189 (Justi ce Stevens joi ni ng Justi ce Marshal l s di ssent); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469
U.S. 325, 370 (1985) (Justi ce Stevens di ssenti ng); Cal i forni a v. Acevedo, 500 U.S.
565, 585 (1991) (Justi ce Stevens di ssenti ng).
24
See vari ous headi ngs infra under the general headi ng Val i d Searches and
Sei zures Wi thout Warrants.
25
New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987).
26
I l l i noi s v. Rodri guez, 497 U.S. 177 (1990).
27
Maryl and v. Bui e, 494 U.S. 325 (1990).
28
Uni ted States v. Verdugo-Urqui dez, 494 U.S. 259, 265 (1990).
mul ti pl i ed, tendi ng to confi ne appl i cati on of the requi rement to
cases that are excl usi vel y cri mi nal i n nature. And even wi thi n
that core area of cri mi nal cases, some excepti ons have been
broadened. The most i mportant category of excepti on i s that of ad-
mi ni strati ve searches justi fi ed by speci al needs beyond the normal
need for l aw enforcement. Under thi s general rubri c the Court has
uphel d warrantl ess searches by admi ni strati ve authori ti es i n publ i c
school s, government offi ces, and pri sons, and has uphel d drug test-
i ng of publ i c and transportati on empl oyees.
24
I n al l of these i n-
stances the warrant and probabl e cause requi rements are di s-
pensed wi th i n favor of a reasonabl eness standard that bal ances
the governments regul atory i nterest agai nst the i ndi vi dual s pri -
vacy i nterest; i n al l of these i nstances the governments i nterest
has been found to outwei gh the i ndi vi dual s. The broad scope of the
admi ni strati ve search excepti on i s evi denced by the fact that an
overl ap between l aw enforcement objecti ves and admi ni strati ve
speci al needs does not resul t i n appl i cati on of the warrant re-
qui rement; i nstead, the Court has uphel d warrantl ess i nspecti on of
automobi l e junkyards and di smantl i ng operati ons i n spi te of the
strong l aw enforcement component of the regul ati on.
25
I n the l aw
enforcement context, where search by warrant i s sti l l the general
rul e, there has al so been some l ooseni ng of the requi rement. For
exampl e, the Court has shi fted focus from whether exi gent ci r-
cumstances justi fi ed fai l ure to obtai n a warrant, to whether an offi -
cer had a reasonabl e bel i ef that an excepti on to the warrant re-
qui rement appl i ed;
26
i n another case the scope of a val i d search
i nci dent to arrest, once l i mi ted to areas wi thi n the i mmedi ate
reach of the arrested suspect, was expanded to a protecti ve sweep
of the enti re home i f arresti ng offi cers have a reasonabl e bel i ef that
the home harbors an i ndi vi dual who may pose a danger.
27
Another matter of scope recentl y addressed by the Court i s the
category of persons protected by the Fourth Amendment who con-
sti tutes the peopl e. Thi s phrase, the Court determi ned, refers to
a cl ass of persons who are part of a nati onal communi ty or who
have otherwi se devel oped suffi ci ent connecti on wi th [the Uni ted
States] to be consi dered part of that communi ty.
28
The Fourth
Amendment therefore does not appl y to the search and sei zure by
1205
29
19 Howel l s State Tri al s 1029, 1035, 95 Eng. Reg. 807, 81718 (1765).
30
Boyd v. Uni ted States, 116 U.S. 616, 627 (1886); Adams v. New York, 192
U.S. 585, 598 (1904).
31
Thus, the rul e that mere evi dence coul d not be sei zed but rather onl y the
frui ts of cri me, i ts i nstrumental i ti es, or contraband, turned upon the questi on of the
ri ght of the publ i c to possess the materi al s or the pol i ce power to make possessi on
by the possessor unl awful . Goul ed v. Uni ted States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921), overrul ed
by Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967). See also Davi s v. Uni ted States, 328
U.S. 582 (1946). Standi ng to contest unl awful searches and sei zures was based upon
property i nterests, Uni ted States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951); Jones v. Uni ted
States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960), as wel l as deci si on upon the val i di ty of a consent to
search. Chapman v. Uni ted States, 365 U.S. 610 (1961); Stoner v. Cal i forni a, 376
U.S. 483 (1964); Frazi er v. Cul p, 394 U.S. 731, 740 (1969).
32
277 U.S. 438 (1928). See also Gol dman v. Uni ted States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942)
(detectaphone pl aced agai nst wal l of adjoi ni ng room; no search and sei zure).
Uni ted States agents of property that i s owned by a nonresi dent
al i en and l ocated i n a forei gn country. The communi ty of protected
peopl e i ncl udes U.S. ci ti zens who go abroad, and al i ens who have
vol untari l y entered U.S. terri tory and devel oped substanti al con-
necti ons wi th thi s country. There i s no resul ti ng broad pri nci pl e,
however, that the Fourth Amendment constrai ns federal offi ci al s
wherever and agai nst whomever they act.
The I nterest Protected. For the Fourth Amendment to be
appl i cabl e to a parti cul ar set of facts, there must be a search and
a sei zure, occurri ng typi cal l y i n a cri mi nal case, wi th a subse-
quent attempt to use judi ci al l y what was sei zed. Whether there
was a search and sei zure wi thi n the meani ng of the Amendment,
whether a compl ai nants i nterests were consti tuti onal l y i nfri nged,
wi l l often turn upon consi derati on of hi s i nterest and whether i t
was offi ci al l y abused. What does the Amendment protect? Under
the common l aw, there was no doubt. Sai d Lord Camden i n Entick
v. Carrington:
29
The great end for whi ch men entered i n soci ety
was to secure thei r property. That ri ght i s preserved sacred and i n-
communi cabl e i n al l i nstances where i t has not been taken away
or abri dged by some publ i c l aw for the good of the whol e. . . . By
the l aws of Engl and, every i nvasi on of pri vate property, be i t ever
so mi nute, i s a trespass. No man can set foot upon my ground wi th-
out my l i cense but he i s l i abl e to an acti on though the damage be
nothi ng . . . . Protecti on of property i nterests as the basi s of the
Fourth Amendment found easy acceptance i n the Supreme Court
30
and that acceptance control l ed deci si on i n numerous cases.
31
For
exampl e, i n Olmstead v. United States,
32
one of the two premi ses
underl yi ng the hol di ng that wi retappi ng was not covered by the
Amendment was that there had been no actual physi cal i nvasi on
of the defendants premi ses; where there had been an i nvasi on, a
techni cal trespass, el ectroni c survei l l ance was deemed subject to
1206
33
Si l verman v. Uni ted States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961) (spi ke mi ke pushed through
a party wal l unti l i t hi t a heati ng duct).
34
Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 304 (1967).
35
Katz v. Uni ted States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967). But see Cal i forni a v. Hodari
D., 499 U.S. 621, 626 (1991) (Fourth Amendment sei zure of the person i s the same
as a common l aw arrest; there must be ei ther appl i cati on of physi cal force or sub-
mi ssi on to the asserti on of authori ty).
36
389 U.S. at 353. Justi ce Harl an, concurri ng, formul ated a two pronged test
for determi ni ng whether the pri vacy i nterest i s paramount: fi rst that a person have
exhi bi ted an actual (subjecti ve) expectati on of pri vacy and, second, that the expecta-
ti on be one that soci ety i s prepared to recogni ze as reasonabl e. I d. at 361.
37
I d. at 35152.
38
Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364, 368 (1968) (offi ci al had a reasonabl e expec-
tati on of pri vacy i n an offi ce he shared wi th others, al though he owned nei ther the
premi ses nor the papers sei zed). Mi nnesota v. Ol son, 495 U.S. 91 (1990) (overni ght
guest i n home has a reasonabl e expectati on of pri vacy). Cf. Rakas v. I l l i noi s, 439
U.S. 128 (1978).
39
Justi ce Harl ans opi ni on has been much rel i ed upon. E.g., Terry v. Ohi o, 392
U.S. 1, 19 (1968); Rakas v. I l l i noi s, 439 U.S. 128, 143144 n.12 (1978); Smi th v.
Maryl and, 442 U.S. 735, 74041 (1979); Uni ted States v. Sal vucci , 448 U.S. 83, 91
92 (1980); Rawl i ngs v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 10506 (1980).
Fourth Amendment restri cti ons.
33
The Court l ater rejected thi s ap-
proach, however. The premi se that property i nterests control the
ri ght of the Government to search and sei ze has been di scredi ted.
. . . We have recogni zed that the pri nci pal object of the Fourth
Amendment i s the protecti on of pri vacy rather than property, and
have i ncreasi ngl y di scarded fi cti onal and procedural barri ers rested
on property concepts.
34
Thus, because the Amendment protects
peopl e, not pl aces, the requi rement of actual physi cal trespass i s
di spensed wi th and el ectroni c survei l l ance was made subject to the
Amendments requi rements.
35
The test propounded i n Katz i s whether there i s an expectati on
of pri vacy upon whi ch one may justi fi abl y rel y.
36
What a person
knowi ngl y exposes to the publ i c, even i n hi s own home or offi ce, i s
not a subject of Fourth Amendment protecti on. But what he seeks
to preserve as pri vate, even i n an area accessi bl e to the publ i c, may
be consti tuti onal l y protected.
37
That i s, the capaci ty to cl ai m the
protecti on of the Amendment depends not upon a property ri ght i n
the i nvaded pl ace but upon whether the area was one i n whi ch
there was reasonabl e expectati on of freedom from governmental i n-
trusi on.
38
The two-part test that Justi ce Harl an suggested i n Katz
39
has
purported to gui de the Court i n i ts del i berati ons, but i ts con-
sequences are uncl ear. On the one hand, there i s no di fference i n
resul t between many of the ol d cases premi sed on property con-
cepts and more recent cases i n whi ch the reasonabl e expectati on of
1207
40
E.g., Al derman v. Uni ted States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969) (home owner coul d ob-
ject to el ectroni c survei l l ance of conversati ons emanati ng from hi s home, even
though he was not party to the conversati ons).
41
E.g., Rakas v. I l l i noi s, 439 U.S. 128 (1978) (414 deci si on: passengers i n
automobi l e who own nei ther the car nor the property sei zed had no l egi ti mate ex-
pectati on of pri vacy i n areas searched).
42
Uni ted States v. Whi te, 401 U.S. 745, 786 (1971). See Smi th v. Maryl and, 442
U.S. 735, 740 n.5 (1979) (government coul d not condi ti on subjecti ve expectati ons
by, say, announci ng that henceforth al l homes woul d be subject to warrantl ess
entry, and thus destroy the l egi ti mate expectati on of pri vacy).
43
Rakas v. I l l i noi s, 439 U.S. 128, 144 n.12 (1978).
44
E.g., Al derman v. Uni ted States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969); Mi ncey v. Ari zona, 437
U.S. 385 (1978); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980).
45
E.g., Uni ted States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982). See also Donovan v. Dewey,
452 U.S. 594 (1981) (commerci al premi ses); Maryl and v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463 (1985)
(no l egi ti mate expectati on of pri vacy i n denyi ng to undercover offi cers al l egedl y ob-
scene materi al s offered to publ i c i n bookstore).
46
E.g., Uni ted States v. Chadwi ck, 433 U.S. 1, 11 (1977); Katz v. Uni ted States,
389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967). But cf. South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976)
(no l egi ti mate expectati on of pri vacy i n automobi l e l eft wi th doors l ocked and wi n-
dows rol l ed up). I n Rawl i ngs v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98 (1980), the fact that defend-
ant had dumped a cache of drugs i nto hi s compani ons purse, havi ng known her for
onl y a few days and knowi ng others had access to the purse, was taken to establ i sh
that he had no l egi ti mate expectati on the purse woul d be free from i ntrusi on.
47
E.g., Uni ted States v. Mi l l er, 425 U.S. 435 (1976) (bank records); Smi th v.
Maryl and, 442 U.S. 735 (1979) (numbers di al ed from ones tel ephone); Hudson v.
Pal mer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984) (pri son cel l ); I l l i noi s v. Andreas, 463 U.S. 765 (1983)
(shi ppi ng contai ner opened and i nspected by customs agents and reseal ed and del i v-
pri vacy fl ows from ownershi p concepts.
40
On the other hand, many
other cases have presented cl ose questi ons that have sharpl y di -
vi ded the Court.
41
The fi rst el ement, the subjecti ve expectati on
of pri vacy, has l argel y dwi ndl ed as a vi abl e standard, because, as
Justi ce Harl an noted i n a subsequent case, our expectati ons, and
the ri sks we assume, are i n l arge part refl ecti ons of l aws that
transl ate i nto rul es the customs and val ues of the past and
present.
42
As for the second el ement, whether one has a l egi ti -
mate expectati on of pri vacy that soci ety fi nds reasonabl e to rec-
ogni ze, the Court has sai d that [l ]egi ti mati on of expectati ons of
pri vacy by l aw must have a source outsi de of the Fourth Amend-
ment, ei ther by reference to concepts of real or personal property
l aw or to understandi ngs that are recogni zed and permi tted by so-
ci ety.
43
Thus, protecti on of the home i s at the apex of Fourth
Amendment coverage because of the ri ght associ ated wi th owner-
shi p to excl ude others;
44
but ownershi p of other thi ngs, i .e., auto-
mobi l es, does not carry a si mi l ar hi gh degree of protecti on.
45
That
a person has taken normal precauti ons to mai ntai n hi s pri vacy,
that i s, precauti ons customari l y taken by those seeki ng to excl ude
others, i s usual l y a si gni fi cant factor i n determi ni ng l egi ti macy of
expectati on.
46
Some expectati ons, the Court has hel d, are si mpl y
not those whi ch soci ety i s prepared to accept.
47
Whi l e perhaps not
1208
ered to the addressee); Cal i forni a v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988) (garbage i n
seal ed pl asti c bags l eft at curb for col l ecti on).
48
Uni ted States v. Whi te, 401 U.S. 745, 78687 (1971) (Justi ce Harl an di ssent-
i ng).
49
E.g., Robbi ns v. Cal i forni a, 453 U.S. 420, 429, 43334 (1981) (Justi ce Powel l
concurri ng), quoted approvi ngl y i n Uni ted States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 81516 &
n.21 (1982).
50
Katz v. Uni ted States, 389 U. S. 347, 35152 (1967).
51
Terry v. Ohi o, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968).
52
The pri me exampl e i s the home, so that for entri es ei ther to search or to ar-
rest, the Fourth Amendment has drawn a fi rm l i ne at the entrance to the house.
Absent exi gent ci rcumstances, that threshol d may not reasonabl y be crossed wi thout
a warrant. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 590 (1980); Steagal d v. Uni ted
States, 451 U.S. 204, 212 (1981). And see Mi ncey v. Ari zona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978).
53
One has a di mi ni shed expectati on of pri vacy i n automobi l es. Arkansas v.
Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 761 (1979) (col l ecti ng cases); Uni ted States v. Ross, 456 U.S.
798, 80409 (1982). A persons expectati on of pri vacy i n personal l uggage and other
cl osed contai ners i s substanti al l y greater than i n an automobi l e, Uni ted States v.
Chadwi ck, 433 U.S. 1, 13 (1977); Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979), al -
though i f the l uggage or contai ner i s found i n an automobi l e as to whi ch there exi sts
probabl e cause to search, the l egi ti mate expectancy di mi ni shes accordi ngl y. United
States v. Ross, supra. There i s al so a di mi ni shed expectati on of pri vacy i n a mobi l e
home parked i n a parki ng l ot and l i censed for vehi cul ar travel . Cal i forni a v. Carney,
471 U.S. 386 (1985) (l eavi ng open the questi on of whether the automobi l e excepti on
cl earl y expressed i n the opi ni ons, what seems to have emerged i s
a bal anci ng standard, whi ch requi res an assessi ng of the nature
of a parti cul ar practi ce and the l i kel y extent of i ts i mpact on the
i ndi vi dual s sense of securi ty bal anced agai nst the uti l i ty of the
conduct as a techni que of l aw enforcement. As the i ntrusi ons grow
more extensi ve and si gni fi cantl y jeopardi ze the sense of securi ty of
the i ndi vi dual , greater restrai nt of pol i ce offi cers through the war-
rant requi rement may be deemed necessary.
48
On the other hand,
the Courts sol i ci tude for l aw enforcement objecti ves may ti l t the
bal ance i n the other di recti on.
Appl i cati on of thi s bal anci ng test, because of the Courts wei gh-
i ng i n of l aw enforcement i nvesti gati ve needs
49
and the Courts
subjecti ve eval uati on of pri vacy needs, has l ed to the creati on of a
two-ti er or sl i di ng-ti er scal e of pri vacy i nterests. The pri vacy test
was ori gi nal l y desi gned to permi t a determi nati on that a Fourth
Amendment protected i nterest had been i nvaded.
50
I f i t had been,
then ordi nari l y a warrant was requi red, subject onl y to the nar-
rowl y defi ned excepti ons, and the scope of the search under those
excepti ons was stri ctl y ti ed to and justi fi ed by the ci rcumstances
whi ch rendered i ts i ni ti ati on permi ssi bl e.
51
But the Court now
uses the test to determi ne whether the i nterest i nvaded i s i mpor-
tant or persuasi ve enough so that a warrant i s requi red to justi fy
i t;
52
i f the i ndi vi dual has a l esser expectati on of pri vacy, then the
i nvasi on may be justi fi ed, absent a warrant, by the reasonabl eness
of the i ntrusi on.
53
Excepti ons to the warrant requi rement are no
1209
al so appl i es to a mobi l e home bei ng used as a resi dence and not adapted for i mme-
di ate vehi cul ar use).
54
E.g., Texas v. Whi te, 423 U.S. 67 (1975) (i f probabl e cause to search auto-
mobi l e exi sted at scene, i t can be removed to stati on and searched wi thout warrant);
Uni ted States v. Robi nson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973) (once an arrest has been val i dl y
made, search pursuant thereto i s so mi ni mal l y i ntrusi ve i n addi ti on that scope of
search i s not l i mi ted by necessi ty of securi ty of offi cer); Uni ted States v. Edwards,
415 U.S. 800 (1974) (i ncarcerated suspect; offi cers need no warrant to take hi s
cl othes for test because l i ttl e addi ti onal i ntrusi on). But see Ybarra v. I l l i noi s, 444
U.S. 85 (1979) (offi cers on premi ses to execute search warrant of premi ses may not
wi thout more search persons found on premi ses).
55
Ex parte Burford, 7 U.S. (3 Cr.) 448 (1806).
56
Gi ordenel l o v. Uni ted States, 357 U.S. 480, 48586 (1958); Uni ted States v.
Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 41618 (1976); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 58386
(1980); Steagal d v. Uni ted States, 451 U.S. 204, 21113 (1981).
57
1 J. STEPHEN, A HI STORY OF THE CRI MI NAL LAW OF ENGLAND 193 (1883).
58
Uni ted States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976). See also Uni ted States v.
Santana, 427 U.S. 38 (1976) (sustai ni ng warrantl ess arrest of suspect i n her home
when she was i ni ti al l y approached i n her doorway and then retreated i nto house).
However, a suspect arrested on probabl e cause but wi thout a warrant i s enti tl ed to
a prompt, nonadversary heari ng before a magi strate under procedures desi gned to
provi de a fai r and rel i abl e determi nati on of probabl e cause i n order to keep the ar-
restee i n custody. Gerstei n v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975).
59
Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980) (voi di ng state l aw authori zi ng pol i ce
to enter pri vate resi dence wi thout a warrant to make an arrest); Steagal d v. Uni ted
States, 451 U.S. 204 (1981) (offi cers wi th arrest warrant for A entered Bs home
wi thout search warrant and di scovered i ncri mi nati ng evi dence; vi ol ated Fourth
Amendment i n absence of warrant to search the home); Hayes v. Fl ori da, 470 U.S.
811 (1985) (offi cers went to suspects home and took hi m to pol i ce stati on for
fi ngerpri nti ng).
60
Uni ted States v. Mendenhal l , 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980) (opi ni on of Justi ce
Stewart) ([A] person has been sei zed wi thi n the meani ng of the Fourth Amend-
l onger eval uated sol el y by the justi fi cati ons for the excepti on, e.g.,
exi gent ci rcumstances, and the scope of the search i s no l onger ti ed
to and l i mi ted by the justi fi cati on for the excepti on.
54
The resul t
has been a consi derabl e expansi on, beyond what exi sted pri or to
Katz, of the power of pol i ce and other authori ti es to conduct
searches.
Arrests and Other Detenti ons. That the Fourth Amend-
ment was i ntended to protect agai nst arbi trary arrests as wel l as
agai nst unreasonabl e searches was earl y assumed by Chi ef Justi ce
Marshal l
55
and i s now establ i shed l aw.
56
At the common l aw, i t
was proper to arrest one who had commi tted a breach of the peace
or a fel ony wi thout a warrant,
57
and thi s hi story i s refl ected i n the
fact that the Fourth Amendment i s sati sfi ed i f the arrest i s made
i n a publ i c pl ace on probabl e cause, regardl ess of whether a war-
rant has been obtai ned.
58
However, i n order to effectuate an arrest
i n the home, absent consent or exi gent ci rcumstances, pol i ce offi -
cers must have a warrant.
59
The Fourth Amendment appl i es to
sei zures and i t i s not necessary that a detenti on be a formal ar-
rest i n order to bri ng to bear the requi rements of warrants or prob-
abl e cause i n i nstances i n whi ch warrants may be forgone.
60
Some
1210
ment onl y i f, i n vi ew of al l the ci rcumstances surroundi ng the i nci dent, a reasonabl e
person woul d have bel i eved that he was not free to l eave). See also Rei d v. Georgi a,
448 U.S. 438 (1980); Uni ted States v. Bri gnoni -Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975);
Terry v. Ohi o, 392 U.S. 1, 1619 (1968). Apprehensi on by the use of deadl y force
i s a sei zure subject to the Fourth Amendments reasonabl eness requi rement. See,
e.g., Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985) (pol i ce offi cers fatal shooti ng of a fl ee-
i ng suspect); Brower v. County of I nyo, 489 U.S. 593 (1989) (pol i ce roadbl ock de-
si gned to end car chase wi th fatal crash).
61
Adams v. Wi l l i ams, 407 U.S. 143, 14649 (1972); Del aware v. Prouse, 440
U.S. 648, 661 (1979); Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51 (1979); Rei d v. Georgi a, 448
U.S. 438, 440 (1980); Mi chi gan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692 (1981).
62
Ker v. I l l i noi s, 119 U.S. 436, 440 (1886); see also Al brecht v. Uni ted States,
273 U.S. 1 (1927); Fri sbi e v. Col l i ns, 342 U.S. 519 (1952).
63
Wong Sun v. Uni ted States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963). Such evi dence i s the frui t
of the poi sonous tree, Nardone v. Uni ted States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939), that i s,
evi dence deri ved from the ori gi nal i l l egal i ty. Previ ousl y, i f confessi ons were vol -
untary for purposes of the sel f-i ncri mi nati on cl ause, they were admi ssi bl e notwi th-
standi ng any pri or offi ci al i l l egal i ty. Col ombe v. Connecti cut, 367 U.S. 568 (1961).
64
Al though there i s a presumpti on that the i l l egal arrest i s the cause of the
subsequent confessi on, the presumpti on i s rebuttabl e by a showi ng that the confes-
si on i s the resul t of an i nterveni ng . . . act of free wi l l . Wong Sun v. Uni ted
States, 371 U.S. 471, 486 (1963). The factors used to determi ne whether the tai nt
has been di ssi pated are the ti me between the i l l egal arrest and the confessi on,
whether there were i nterveni ng ci rcumstances (such as consul tati on wi th others,
Miranda warni ngs, etc.), and the degree of fl agrancy and purposeful ness of the offi -
ci al conduct. Brown v. I l l i noi s, 422 U.S. 590 (1975) (Miranda warni ngs al one i nsuffi -
ci ent); Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979); Tayl or v. Al abama, 457 U.S. 687
(1982). I n Johnson v. Loui si ana, 406 U.S. 356 (1972), the fact that the suspect had
been taken before a magi strate who advi sed hi m of hi s ri ghts and set bai l , after
whi ch he confessed, establ i shed a suffi ci ent i nterveni ng ci rcumstance.
65
Davi s v. Mi ssi ssi ppi , 394 U.S. 721 (1969); Tayl or v. Al abama, 457 U.S. 687
(1982). I n Uni ted States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463 (1980), the Court, unani mousl y but
objecti ve justi fi cati on must be shown to val i date al l sei zures of the
person, i ncl udi ng sei zures that i nvol ve onl y a bri ef detenti on short
of arrest, al though the nature of the detenti on wi l l determi ne
whether probabl e cause or some reasonabl e and arti cul abl e sus-
pi ci on i s necessary.
61
Unti l rel ati vel y recentl y, the l egal i ty of arrests was sel dom l i ti -
gated i n the Supreme Court because of the rul e that a person de-
tai ned pursuant to an arbi trary sei zure unl i ke evi dence obtai ned
as a resul t of an unl awful search remai ns subject to custody and
presentati on to court.
62
But the appl i cati on of sel f-i ncri mi nati on
and other excl usi onary rul es to the States and the hei ghteni ng of
thei r scope i n state and federal cases al i ke brought forth the rul e
that verbal evi dence, confessi ons, and other admi ssi ons, l i ke al l de-
ri vati ve evi dence obtai ned as a resul t of unl awful sei zures, coul d be
excl uded.
63
Thus, a confessi on made by one i l l egal l y i n custody
must be suppressed, unl ess the causal connecti on between the i l l e-
gal arrest and the confessi on had become so attenuated that the
l atter shoul d not be deemed tai nted by the former.
64
Si mi l arl y,
fi ngerpri nts and other physi cal evi dence obtai ned as a resul t of an
unl awful arrest must be suppressed.
65
1211
for a vari ety of reasons, hel d proper the i denti fi cati on i n court of a defendant, who
had been wrongl y arrested wi thout probabl e cause, by the cri me vi cti m. The court
i denti fi cati on was not tai nted by ei ther the arrest or the subsequent i n-custody i den-
ti fi cati on. See also Hayes v. Fl ori da, 470 U.S. 811, 815 (1985), suggesti ng i n di ctum
that a narrowl y ci rcumscri bed procedure for fi ngerpri nti ng detenti ons on l ess than
probabl e cause may be permi ssi bl e.
66
I n re Strouse, 23 Fed. Cas. 261 (No. 13,548) (D. Nev. 1871); I n re Meador,
16 Fed. Cas. 1294, 1299 (No. 9375) (N.D. Ga. 1869).
67
Abel v. Uni ted States, 362 U.S. 217 (1960); Frank v. Maryl and, 359 U.S. 360
(1959); Okl ahoma Press Pub. Co. v. Wal l i ng, 327 U.S. 186 (1946).
68
Camara v. Muni ci pal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967) (home); See v. Ci ty of Se-
attl e, 387 U.S. 541 (1967) (commerci al warehouse).
69
Camara v. Muni ci pal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 530 (1967).
70
Col onnade Cateri ng Corp. v. Uni ted States, 397 U.S. 72 (1970); Uni ted States
v. Bi swel l , 406 U.S. 311 (1972). Colonnade, i nvol vi ng l i quor, was based on the l ong
hi story of cl ose supervi si on of the i ndustry. Biswell, i nvol vi ng fi rearms, i ntroduced
factors that were subsequentl y to prove si gni fi cant. Thus, whi l e the statute was of
recent enactment, fi rearms consti tuted a pervasi vel y regul ated i ndustry, so that
deal ers had no reasonabl e expectati on of pri vacy, i nasmuch as the l aw provi des for
regul ar i nspecti ons. Further, warrantl ess i nspecti ons were needed for effecti ve en-
forcement of the statute.
71
436 U.S. 307 (1978). Di ssenti ng, Justi ce Stevens, wi th Justi ces Rehnqui st and
Bl ackmun, argued that not the warrant cl ause but the reasonabl eness cl ause shoul d
govern admi ni strati ve i nspecti ons. I d. at 325.
Searches and I nspecti ons i n Noncri mi nal Cases. Certai n
earl y cases hel d that the Fourth Amendment was appl i cabl e onl y
when a search was undertaken for cri mi nal i nvesti gatory pur-
poses,
66
and the Supreme Court unti l recentl y empl oyed a reason-
abl eness test for such searches wi thout requi ri ng ei ther a warrant
or probabl e cause i n the absence of a warrant.
67
But i n 1967, the
Court hel d i n two cases that admi ni strati ve i nspecti ons to detect
bui l di ng code vi ol ati ons must be undertaken pursuant to warrant
i f the occupant objects.
68
We may agree that a routi ne i nspecti on
of the physi cal condi ti on of pri vate property i s a l ess hosti l e i ntru-
si on than the typi cal pol i cemans search for the frui ts and i nstru-
mental i ti es of cri me. . . . But we cannot agree that the Fourth
Amendment i nterests at stake i n these i nspecti on cases are merel y
peri pheral . I t i s surel y anomal ous to say that the i ndi vi dual and
hi s pri vate property are ful l y protected by the Fourth Amendment
onl y when the i ndi vi dual i s suspected of cri mi nal behavi or.
69
Cer-
tai n admi ni strati ve i nspecti ons uti l i zed to enforce regul atory
schemes wi th regard to such i tems as al cohol and fi rearms are,
however, exempt from the Fourth Amendment warrant requi re-
ment and may be authori zed si mpl y by statute.
70
Camara and See were reaffi rmed i n Marshall v. Barlows,
I nc.,
71
i n whi ch the Court hel d vi ol ati ve of the Fourth Amendment
a provi si on of the Occupati onal Safety and Heal th Act whi ch au-
thori zed federal i nspectors to search the work area of any empl oy-
ment faci l i ty covered by the Act for safety hazards and vi ol ati ons
of regul ati ons, wi thout a warrant or other l egal process. The l i quor
1212
72
Admi ni strati ve warrants i ssued on the basi s of l ess than probabl e cause but
onl y on a showi ng that a speci fi c busi ness had been chosen for i nspecti on on the
basi s of a general admi ni strati ve pl an woul d suffi ce. Even wi thout a necessi ty for
probabl e cause, the requi rement woul d assure the i nterposi ti on of a neutral offi cer
to establ i sh that the i nspecti on was reasonabl e and was properl y authori zed. I d. at
321, 323. The di ssenters objected that the warrant cl ause was bei ng consti tuti onal l y
di l uted. I d. at 325. Admi ni strati ve warrants were approved al so i n Camara v. Mu-
ni ci pal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 538 (1967). Previ ousl y, one of the reasons gi ven for fi nd-
i ng admi ni strati ve and noncri mi nal i nspecti ons not covered by the Fourth Amend-
ment was the fact that the warrant cl ause woul d be as ri gorousl y appl i ed to them
as to cri mi nal searches and sei zures. Frank v. Maryl and, 359 U.S. 360, 373 (1959).
See also Al mei da-Sanchez v. Uni ted States, 413 U.S. 266, 275 (1973) (Justi ce Powel l
concurri ng) (suggesti ng a si mi l ar admi ni strati ve warrant procedure empoweri ng po-
l i ce and i mmi grati on offi cers to conduct rovi ng searches of automobi l es i n areas near
the Nati ons borders); i d. at 270 n.3 (i ndi cati ng that majori ty Jusi tces were di vi ded
on the val i di ty of such area search warrants); i d. at 288 (di ssenti ng Justi ce Whi te
i ndi cati ng approval ); Uni ted States v. Marti nez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 547 n.2, 562
n.15 (1976).
73
452 U.S. 594 (1981).
74
There i s no suggesti on that warrantl ess i nspecti ons of homes i s broadened.
I d. at 598, or that warrantl ess entry under exi gent ci rcumstances i s curtai l ed. See,
e.g., Mi chi gan v. Tyl er, 436 U.S. 499 (1978) (no warrant requi red for entry by fi re-
fi ghters to fi ght fi re; once there, fi refi ghters may remai n for reasonabl e ti me to i n-
vesti gate the cause of the fi re).
and fi rearms excepti ons were di sti ngui shed on the basi s that those
i ndustri es had a l ong tradi ti on of cl ose government supervi si on, so
that a person i n those busi nesses gave up hi s pri vacy expectati ons.
But OSHA was a rel ati vel y recent statute and i t regul ated prac-
ti cal l y every busi ness i n or affecti ng i nterstate commerce; i t was
not open to a l egi sl ature to extend regul ati on and then fol l ow i t
wi th warrantl ess i nspecti ons. Addi ti onal l y, OSHA i nspectors had
unbounded di screti on i n choosi ng whi ch busi nesses to i nspect and
when to do so, l eavi ng busi nesses at the mercy of possi bl y arbi trary
acti ons and certai nl y wi th no assurances as to l i mi tati on on scope
and standards of i nspecti ons. Further, warrantl ess i nspecti ons
were not necessary to serve an i mportant governmental i nterest,
i nasmuch as most busi nesses woul d consent to i nspecti on and i t
was not i nconveni ent to requi re OSHA to resort to an admi ni stra-
ti ve warrant i n order to i nspect si tes where consent was refused.
72
I n Donovan v. Dewey,
73
however, Barlows was substanti al l y
l i mi ted and a new standard emerged permi tti ng extensi ve govern-
mental i nspecti on of commerci al property,
74
absent warrants.
Under the Federal Mi ne Safety and Heal th Act, governi ng under-
ground and surface mi nes (i ncl udi ng stone quarri es), federal offi -
cers are di rected to i nspect underground mi nes at l east four ti mes
a year and surface mi nes at l east twi ce a year, pursuant to exten-
si ve regul ati ons as to standards of safety. The statute speci fi cal l y
provi des for absence of advanced noti ce and requi res the Secretary
of Labor to i nsti tute court acti ons for i njuncti ve and other rel i ef i n
1213
75
Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 59899 (1981).
76
I d. at 59697, 60405. Pursuant to the statute, however, the Secretary has
promul gated regul ati ons provi di ng for the assessment of ci vi l penal ti es for deni al of
entry and Dewey had been assessed a penal ty of $1,000. I d. at 597 n.3. I t was al so
true i n Barlows that the Government resorted to ci vi l process upon refusal to
admi t. 436 U.S. at 317 & n.12.
77
Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 606 (1981). Durati on of regul ati on wi l l now
be a factor i n assessi ng the l egi ti mate expectati on of pri vacy of a busi ness. I bi d. Ac-
cord, New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987) (al though durati on of regul ati on of
vehi cl e di smantl i ng was rel ati vel y bri ef, hi story of regul ati on of junk busi ness gen-
eral l y was l engthy, and current regul ati on of di smantl i ng was extensi ve).
78
482 U.S. 691 (1987).
cases i n whi ch i nspectors are deni ed admi ssi on. Sustai ni ng the
statute, the Court procl ai med that government had a greater l ati -
tude to conduct warrantl ess i nspecti ons of commerci al property
than of homes, because of the fact that the expectati on of pri vacy
that the owner of commerci al property enjoys i n such property di f-
fers si gni fi cantl y from the sancti ty accorded an i ndi vi dual s home,
and that thi s pri vacy i nterest may, i n certai n ci rcumstances, be
adequatel y protected by regul atory schemes authori zi ng
warrantl ess i nspecti ons.
75
Dewey was di sti ngui shed from Barlows i n several ways. Fi rst,
Dewey i nvol ved a si ngl e i ndustry, unl i ke the broad coverage i n Bar-
lows. Second, the OSHA statute gave mi ni mal di recti on to i nspec-
tors as to ti me, scope, and frequency of i nspecti ons, whi l e FMSHA
speci fi ed a regul ar number of i nspecti ons pursuant to standards.
Thi rd, deference was due Congress determi nati on that unan-
nounced i nspecti ons were necessary i f the safety l aws were to be
effecti vel y enforced. Fourth, FMSHA provi ded busi nesses the op-
portuni ty to contest the search by resi sti ng i n the ci vi l proceedi ng
the Secretary had to bri ng i f consent was deni ed.
76
The standard
of a l ong tradi ti on of government supervi si on permi tti ng
warrantl ess i nspecti ons was di spensed wi th, because i t woul d l ead
to absurd resul ts, i n that new and emergi ng i ndustri es posi ng
great hazards woul d escape regul ati on.
77
Dewey suggests, there-
fore, that warrantl ess i nspecti ons of commerci al establ i shments are
permi ssi bl e so l ong as the l egi sl ature careful l y drafts i ts statute.
Dewey was appl i ed i n New York v. Burger
78
to i nspecti on of
automobi l e junkyards and vehi cl e di smantl i ng operati ons, a si tua-
ti on where there i s consi derabl e overl ap between admi ni strati ve
and penal objecti ves. Appl yi ng the Dewey three-part test, the Court
concl uded that New York has a substanti al i nterest i n stemmi ng
the ti de of automobi l e thefts, that regul ati on of vehi cl e di smantl i ng
reasonabl y serves that i nterest, and that statutory safeguards pro-
vi ded adequate substi tute for a warrant requi rement. The Court re-
jected the suggesti on that the warrantl ess i nspecti on provi si ons
1214
79
482 U.S. at 712 (emphasi s ori gi nal ).
80
436 U.S. 499 (1978).
81
The Court al so hel d that, after the fi re was exti ngui shed, i f fi re i nvesti gators
were unabl e to proceed at the moment, because of dark, steam, and smoke, i t was
proper for them to l eave and return at dayl i ght wi thout any necessi ty of compl yi ng
wi th i ts mandate for admi ni strati ve or cri mi nal warrants. I d. at 51011. But cf.
Mi chi gan v. Cl i fford, 464 U.S. 287 (1984) (no such justi fi cati on for search of pri vate
resi dence begun at 1:30 p.m. when fi re had been exti ngui shed at 7 a.m.).
82
Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971). I t i s not cl ear what rati onal e the ma-
jori ty uti l i zed. I t appears to have proceeded on the assumpti on that a home vi si t
was not a search and that the Fourth Amendment does not appl y when cri mi nal
prosecuti on i s not threatened. Nei ther premi se i s val i d under Camara and i ts prog-
eny, al though Camara preceded Wyman. Presumabl y, the case woul d today be ana-
l yzed under the expectati on of pri vacy/need/structural protecti on theory of the more
recent cases.
83
Gri ffi n v. Wi sconsi n, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987) (admi ni strati ve needs of proba-
ti on system justi fy warrantl ess searches of probati oners homes on l ess than prob-
were desi gned as an expedi ent means of enforci ng the penal l aws,
and i nstead saw narrower, val i d regul atory purposes to be served:
e.g., establ i shi ng a system for tracki ng stol en automobi l es and
parts, and enhanci ng the abi l i ty of l egi ti mate busi nesses to com-
pete. [A] State can address a major soci al probl em both by way of
an admi ni strati ve scheme and through penal sancti ons, the Court
decl ared; i n such ci rcumstances warrantl ess admi ni strati ve
searches are permi ssi bl e i n spi te of the fact that evi dence of cri mi -
nal acti vi ty may wel l be uncovered i n the process.
79
I n other contexts, the Court has al so el aborated the consti tu-
ti onal requi rements affecti ng admi ni strati ve i nspecti ons and
searches. Thus, i n Michigan v. Tyler,
80
i t subdi vi ded the process by
whi ch an i nvesti gati on of the cause of a fi re may be conducted.
Entry to fi ght the fi re i s, of course, an excepti on based on exi gent
ci rcumstances, and no warrant or consent i s needed; fi remen on the
scene may sei ze evi dence rel ati ng to the cause under the pl ai n vi ew
doctri ne. Addi ti onal entri es to i nvesti gate the cause of the fi re must
be made pursuant to warrant procedures governi ng admi ni strati ve
searches. Evi dence of arson di scovered i n the course of such an ad-
mi ni strati ve i nspecti on i s admi ssi bl e at tri al , but i f the i nvesti gator
fi nds probabl e cause to bel i eve that arson has occurred and re-
qui res further access to gather evi dence for a possi bl e prosecuti on,
he must obtai n a cri mi nal search warrant.
81
One curi ous case has approved a system of home vi si ts by
wel fare caseworkers, i n whi ch the reci pi ents are requi red to admi t
the worker or l ose el i gi bi l i ty for benefi ts.
82
I n addi ti on, there are now a number of si tuati ons, some of
them anal ogous to admi ni strati ve searches, where speci al needs
beyond normal l aw enforcement . . . justi fy departures from the
usual warrant and probabl e cause requi rements.
83
I n one of these
1215
abl e cause); Hudson v. Pal mer, 468 U.S. 517, 526 (1984) (no Fourth Amendment
protecti on from search of pri son cel l ); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985)
(si mpl e reasonabl eness standard governs searches of students persons and effects
by publ i c school authori ti es); OConnor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987) (reasonabl e-
ness test for work-rel ated searches of empl oyees offi ces by government empl oyer);
Ski nner v. Rai l way Labor Executi ves Assn, 489 U.S. 602 (1989) (nei ther probabl e
cause nor i ndi vi dual i zed suspi ci on i s necessary for mandatory drug testi ng of rai l -
way empl oyees i nvol ved i n acci dents or safety vi ol ati ons). Al l of these cases are di s-
cussed infra under the general headi ng Val i d Searches and Sei zures Wi thout War-
rants.
84
Skinner, supra n.83, 489 U.S. at 627.
85
Del aware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979). Standards appl i ed i n thi s case had
been devel oped i n the contexts of automobi l e stops at fi xed poi nts or by rovi ng pa-
trol s i n border si tuati ons. Al mei da-Sanchez v. Uni ted States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973);
Uni ted States v. Bri gnoni -Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975); Uni ted States v. Orti z, 422
U.S. 891 (1975); Uni ted States v. Marti nez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976).
86
428 U.S. 364 (1976). See also Cady v. Dombrowski , 413 U.S. 433 (1973) (sus-
tai ni ng admi ssi on of cri mi nal evi dence found when pol i ce conducted a warrantl ess
search of an out-of-state pol i cemans automobi l e fol l owi ng an acci dent, i n order to
fi nd and safeguard hi s servi ce revol ver). The Court i n both cases emphasi zed the
reduced expectati on of pri vacy i n automobi l es and the noncri mi nal purposes of the
searches.
cases the Court, wi thout acknowl edgi ng the magni tude of the l eap
from one context to another, has taken the Dewey/ Burger rati on-
al e devel oped to justi fy warrantl ess searches of busi ness estab-
l i shments and appl i ed i t to justi fy the si gni fi cant i ntrusi on i nto
personal pri vacy represented by uri nal ysi s drug testi ng. Because of
the hi story of pervasi ve regul ati on of the rai l road i ndustry, the
Court reasoned, rai l road empl oyees have a di mi ni shed expectati on
of pri vacy that makes mandatory uri nal ysi s l ess i ntrusi ve and
more reasonabl e.
84
Wi th respect to automobi l es, the hol di ngs are mi xed. Random
stops of automobi l es to check dri vers l i censes, vehi cl e regi strati ons,
and safety condi ti ons were condemned as too i ntrusi ve; the degree
to whi ch random stops woul d advance the l egi ti mate governmental
i nterests i nvol ved di d not outwei gh the i ndi vi dual s l egi ti mate ex-
pectati ons of pri vacy.
85
On the other hand, i n South Dakota v.
Opperman,
86
the Court sustai ned the admi ssi on of evi dence found
when pol i ce i mpounded an automobi l e from a publ i c street for mul -
ti pl e parki ng vi ol ati ons and entered the car to secure and i nventory
val uabl es for safekeepi ng. Mari juana was di scovered i n the gl ove
compartment.
Searches and Seizures Pursuant to Warrant
Emphasi s upon the necessi ty of warrants pl aces the judgment
of an i ndependent magi strate between l aw enforcement offi cers and
the pri vacy of ci ti zens, authori zes i nvasi on of that pri vacy onl y
upon a showi ng that consti tutes probabl e cause, and l i mi ts that i n-
vasi on by speci fi cati on of the person to be sei zed, the pl ace to be
1216
87
Whi l e the excepti ons may be di fferent as between arrest warrants and search
warrants, the requi rements for the i ssuance of the two are the same. Agui l ar v.
Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 112 n.3 (1964). Al so, the standards by whi ch the val i di ty of
warrants are to be judged are the same, whether federal or state offi cers are i n-
vol ved. Ker v. Cal i forni a, 374 U.S. 23 (1963).
88
Most often, i n the suppressi on heari ngs, the defendant wi l l chal l enge the suf-
fi ci ency of the evi dence presented to the magi strate to consti tute probabl e cause.
Spi nel l i v. Uni ted States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969); Uni ted States v. Harri s, 403 U.S. 573
(1971). He may chal l enge the veraci ty of the statements used by the pol i ce to pro-
cure the warrant and otherwi se contest the accuracy of the al l egati ons goi ng to es-
tabl i sh probabl e cause, but the Court has careful l y hedged hi s abi l i ty to do so.
Franks v. Del aware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978). He may al so questi on the power of the
offi ci al i ssui ng the warrant, Cool i dge v. New Hampshi re, 403 U.S. 443, 44953
(1971), or the speci fi ci ty of the parti cul ari ty requi red. Marron v. Uni ted States, 275
U.S. 192 (1927).
89
Uni ted States v. Lefkowi tz, 285 U.S. 452, 464 (1932); Gi ordenel l o v. Uni ted
States, 357 U.S. 480, 486 (1958); Jones v. Uni ted States, 362 U.S. 257, 270 (1960);
Katz v. Uni ted States, 389 U.S. 347, 356 (1967); Uni ted States v. Uni ted States Di s-
tri ct Court, 407 U.S. 297, 321 (1972); Uni ted States v. Chadwi ck, 433 U.S. 1, 9
(1977); Lo-Ji Sal es v. New York, 442 U.S. 319, 326 (1979).
90
Johnson v. Uni ted States, 333 U.S. 10, 1314 (1948).
91
Shadwi ck v. Ci ty of Tampa, 407 U.S. 345, 354 (1972).
92
Cool i dge v. New Hampshi re, 403 U.S. 443, 44951 (1971) (warrant i ssued by
state attorney general who was l eadi ng i nvesti gati on and who as a justi ce of the
peace was authori zed to i ssue warrants); Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364, 370
72 (1968) (subpoena i ssued by di stri ct attorney coul d not qual i fy as a val i d search
searched, and the evi dence to be sought.
87
Whi l e a warrant i s i s-
sued ex parte, i ts val i di ty may be contested i n a subsequent sup-
pressi on heari ng i f i ncri mi nati ng evi dence i s found and a prosecu-
ti on i s brought.
88
I ssuance by Neutral Magi strate. I n numerous cases, the
Court has referred to the necessi ty that warrants be i ssued by a
judi ci al offi cer or a magi strate.
89
The poi nt of the Fourth
Amendment, whi ch often i s not grasped by zeal ous offi cers, i s not
that i t deni es l aw enforcement the support of the usual i nferences
whi ch reasonabl e men draw from evi dence. I ts protecti on consi sts
i n requi ri ng that those i nferences be drawn by a neutral and de-
tached magi strate i nstead of bei ng judged by the offi cer engaged i n
the often competi ti ve enterpri se of ferreti ng out cri me. Any as-
sumpti on that evi dence suffi ci ent to support a magi strates di si n-
terested determi nati on to i ssue a search warrant wi l l justi fy the of-
fi cers i n maki ng a search wi thout a warrant woul d reduce the
Amendment to a nul l i ty and l eave the peopl es homes secure onl y
i n the di screti on of pol i ce offi cers.
90
These cases do not mean that
onl y a judge or an offi ci al who i s a l awyer may i ssue warrants, but
they do stand for two tests of the val i di ty of the power of the i ssu-
i ng party to so act. He must be neutral and detached, and he must
be capabl e of determi ni ng whether probabl e cause exi sts for the re-
quested arrest or search.
91
The fi rst test cannot be met when the
i ssui ng party i s hi msel f engaged i n l aw enforcement acti vi ti es,
92
1217
warrant); Lo-Ji Sal es v. New York, 442 U.S. 319 (1979) (justi ce of the peace i ssued
open-ended search warrant for obscene materi al s, accompani ed pol i ce duri ng i ts exe-
cuti on, and made probabl e cause determi nati ons at the scene as to parti cul ar i tems).
93
Jones v. Uni ted States, 362 U.S. 257, 27071 (1960) (approvi ng i ssuance of
warrants by Uni ted States Commi ssi oners, many of whom were not l awyers and
none of whom had any guarantees of tenure and sal ary); Shadwi ck v. Ci ty of
Tampa, 407 U.S. 345 (1972) (approvi ng i ssuance of arrest warrants for vi ol ati on of
ci ty ordi nances by ci ty cl erks who were assi gned to and supervi sed by muni ci pal
court judges). The Court reserved the questi on whether a State may l odge warrant
authori ty i n someone enti rel y outsi de the sphere of the judi ci al branch. Many per-
sons may not qual i fy as the ki nd of publ i c ci vi l offi cers we have come to associ ate
wi th the term magi strate. Had the Tampa cl erk been enti rel y di vorced from a judi -
ci al posi ti on, thi s case woul d have presented di fferent consi derati ons. I d. at 352.
94
I d. at 35054 (pl aci ng on defendant the burden of demonstrati ng that the i s-
sui ng offi ci al l acks capaci ty to determi ne probabl e cause). See also Connal l y v. Geor-
gi a, 429 U.S. 245 (1977) (unsal ari ed justi ce of the peace who recei ves a sum of
money for each warrant i ssued but nothi ng for revi ewi ng and denyi ng a warrant
not suffi ci entl y detached).
95
Dumbra v. Uni ted States, 268 U.S. 435, 439, 441 (1925). [T]he term probabl e
cause. . . means l ess than evi dence whi ch woul d justi fy condemnati on. Lock v.
Uni ted States, 11 U.S. (7 Cr.) 339, 348 (1813). See Steel e v. Uni ted States, 267 U.S.
498, 50405 (1925). I t may rest upon evi dence whi ch i s not l egal l y competent i n a
cri mi nal tri al , Draper v. Uni ted States, 358 U.S. 307, 311 (1959), and i t need not
be suffi ci ent to prove gui l t i n a cri mi nal tri al . Bri negar v. Uni ted States, 338 U.S.
160, 173 (1949). See Uni ted States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 10708 (1965).
96
Bri negar v. Uni ted States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949).
but the Court has not requi red that an i ssui ng party have that
i ndependence of tenure and guarantee of sal ary whi ch character-
i zes federal judges.
93
And i n passi ng on the second test, the Court
has been essenti al l y pragmati c i n assessi ng whether the i ssui ng
party possesses the capaci ty to determi ne probabl e cause.
94
Probabl e Cause. The concept of probabl e cause i s central
to the meani ng of the warrant cl ause. Nei ther the Fourth Amend-
ment nor the federal statutory provi si ons rel evant to the area de-
fi ne probabl e cause; the defi ni ti on i s enti rel y a judi ci al construct.
An appl i cant for a warrant must present to the magi strate facts
suffi ci ent to enabl e the offi cer hi msel f to make a determi nati on of
probabl e cause. I n determi ni ng what i s probabl e cause . . . [w]e
are concerned onl y wi th the questi on whether the affi ant had rea-
sonabl e grounds at the ti me of hi s affi davi t . . . for the bel i ef that
the l aw was bei ng vi ol ated on the premi ses to be searched; and i f
the apparent facts set out i n the affi davi t are such that a reason-
abl y di screet and prudent man woul d be l ed to bel i eve that there
was a commi ssi on of the offense charged, there i s probabl e cause
justi fyi ng the i ssuance of a warrant.
95
Probabl e cause i s to be de-
termi ned accordi ng to the factual and practi cal consi derati ons of
everyday l i fe on whi ch reasonabl e and prudent men, not l egal tech-
ni ci ans, act.
96
Warrants are favored i n the l aw and uti l i zati on of
them wi l l not be thwarted by a hypertechni cal readi ng of the sup-
1218
97
Uni ted States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 10809 (1965).
98
Jones v. Uni ted States, 362 U.S. 257, 27071 (1960).
99
Agui l ar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 111 (1964). I t must be emphasi zed that the
i ssui ng party must judge for hi msel f the persuasi veness of the facts rel i ed on by
a [compl ai nant] to show probabl e cause. Gi ordenel l o v. Uni ted States, 357 U.S. 480,
486 (1958). An i nsuffi ci ent affi davi t cannot be rehabi l i tated by testi mony after i ssu-
ance concerni ng i nformati on possessed by the affi ant but not di scl osed to the mag-
i strate. Whi tel ey v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560 (1971).
100
Byars v. Uni ted States, 273 U.S. 28 (1927) (affi ant stated he has good rea-
son to bel i eve and does bel i eve that defendant has contraband materi al s i n hi s pos-
sessi on); Gi ordenel l o v. Uni ted States, 357 U.S. 480 (1958) (compl ai nant merel y
stated hi s concl usi on that defendant had commi tted a cri me). See also Nathanson
v. Uni ted States, 290 U.S. 41 (1933).
101
380 U.S. 102 (1965).
102
I d. at 109.
103
358 U.S. 307 (1959). For another case appl yi ng essenti al l y the same probabl e
cause standard to warrantl ess arrests as govern arrests by warrant, see McCray v.
I l l i noi s, 386 U.S. 300 (1967) (i nformants statement to arresti ng offi cers met Aguilar
probabl e cause standard). See also Whi tel y v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560, 566 (1971)
(standards must be at l east as stri ngent for warrantl ess arrest as for obtai ni ng
warrant).
porti ng affi davi t and supporti ng testi mony.
97
For the same reason,
revi ewi ng courts wi l l accept evi dence of a l ess judi ci al l y competent
or persuasi ve character than woul d have justi fi ed an offi cer i n act-
i ng on hi s own wi thout a warrant.
98
Courts wi l l sustai n the deter-
mi nati on of probabl e cause so l ong as there was substanti al basi s
for [the magi strate] to concl ude that there was probabl e cause.
99
Much l i ti gati on has concerned the suffi ci ency of the compl ai nt
to establ i sh probabl e cause. Mere concl usory asserti ons are not
enough.
100
I n United States v. Ventresca,
101
however, an affi davi t
by a l aw enforcement offi cer asserti ng hi s bel i ef that an i l l egal di s-
ti l l ery was bei ng operated i n a certai n pl ace, expl ai ni ng that the
bel i ef was based upon hi s own observati ons and upon those of fel -
l ow i nvesti gators, and detai l i ng a substanti al amount of these per-
sonal observati ons cl earl y supporti ng the stated bel i ef, was hel d to
be suffi ci ent to consti tute probabl e cause. Reci tal of some of the
underl yi ng ci rcumstances i n the affi davi t i s essenti al , the Court
sai d, observi ng that where these ci rcumstances are detai l ed,
where reason for credi ti ng the source of the i nformati on i s gi ven,
and when a magi strate has found probabl e cause, the rel i ance on
the warrant process shoul d not be deterred by i nsi stence on too
stri ngent a showi ng.
102
Requi rements for establ i shi ng probabl e cause through rel i ance
on i nformati on recei ved from an i nformant has di vi ded the Court
i n several cases. Al though i nvol vi ng a warrantl ess arrest, Draper
v. United States
103
may be sai d to have begun the l i ne of cases.
A previ ousl y rel i abl e, named i nformant reported to an offi cer that
the defendant woul d arri ve wi th narcoti cs on a parti cul ar trai n,
and descri bed the cl othes he woul d be weari ng and the bag he
1219
104
362 U.S. 257 (1960).
105
378 U.S. 108 (1964).
106
393 U.S. 410 (1969). Both concurri ng and di ssenti ng Justi ces recogni zed ten-
si on between Draper and Aguilar. See i d. at 423 (Justi ce Whi te concurri ng), i d. at
429 (Justi ce Bl ack di ssenti ng and advocati ng the overrul i ng of Aguilar).
107
403 U.S. 573 (1971). See also Adams v. Wi l l i ams, 407 U.S. 143, 147 (1972)
(approvi ng warrantl ess stop of motori st based on i nformants ti p that may have
been i nsuffi ci ent under Aguilar and Spinelli as basi s for warrant).
woul d be carryi ng; the i nformant, however, gave no basi s for hi s i n-
formati on. FBI agents met the trai n, observed that the defendant
ful l y answered the descri pti on, and arrested hi m. The Court hel d
that the corroborati on of part of the i nformers ti p establ i shed prob-
abl e cause to support the arrest. A case i nvol vi ng a search warrant,
J ones v. United States,
104
apparentl y uti l i zed a test of consi deri ng
the affi davi t as a whol e to see whether the ti p pl us the corroborat-
i ng i nformati on provi ded a substanti al basi s for fi ndi ng probabl e
cause, but the affi davi t al so set forth the rel i abi l i ty of the i nformer
and suffi ci ent detai l to i ndi cate that the ti p was based on the i n-
formants personal observati on. Aguilar v. Texas
105
hel d i nsuffi -
ci ent an affi davi t whi ch merel y asserted that the pol i ce had rel i -
abl e i nformati on from a credi bl e person that narcoti cs were i n a
certai n pl ace, and hel d that when the affi ant rel i es on an i nform-
ants ti p he must present two types of evi dence to the magi strate.
Fi rst, the affi davi t must i ndi cate the i nformants basi s of knowl -
edge the ci rcumstances from whi ch the i nformant concl uded that
evi dence was present or that cri mes had been commi tted and, sec-
ond, the affi ant must present i nformati on whi ch woul d permi t the
magi strate to deci de whether or not the i nformant was trust-
worthy. Then, i n Spinelli v. United States,
106
the Court appl i ed
Aguilar i n a si tuati on i n whi ch the affi davi t contai ned both an i n-
formants ti p and pol i ce i nformati on of a corroborati ng nature.
The Court rejected the total i ty test deri ved from J ones and
hel d that the i nformants ti p and the corroborati ng evi dence must
be separatel y consi dered. The ti p was rejected because the affi davi t
contai ned nei ther any i nformati on whi ch showed the basi s of the
ti p nor any i nformati on whi ch showed the i nformants credi bi l i ty.
The corroborati ng evi dence was rejected as i nsuffi ci ent because i t
di d not establ i sh any el ement of cri mi nal i ty but merel y rel ated to
detai l s whi ch were i nnocent i n themsel ves. No addi ti onal corrobo-
rati ng wei ght was due as a resul t of the bal d pol i ce asserti on that
defendant was a known gambl er, al though the ti p rel ated to gam-
bl i ng. Returni ng to the total i ty test, however, the Court i n United
States v. Harris
107
approved a warrant i ssued l argel y on an i n-
formers ti p that over a two-year peri od he had purchased i l l egal
whi skey from the defendant at the defendants resi dence, most re-
1220
108
462 U.S. 213 (1983) (Justi ce Rehnqui sts opi ni on of the Court was joi ned by
Chi ef Justi ce Burger and by Justi ces Bl ackmun, Powel l , and OConnor. Justi ces
Brennan, Marshal l , and Stevens di ssented.
109
462 U.S. at 213.
110
462 U.S. at 238.
111
Marron v. Uni ted States, 275 U.S. 192, 196 (1927). See Stanford v. Texas,
379 U.S. 476 (1965). Of course, pol i ce who are l awful l y on the premi ses pursuant
to a warrant may sei ze evi dence of cri me i n pl ai n vi ew even i f that evi dence i s
not descri bed i n the warrant. Cool i dge v. New Hampshi re, 403, U.S. 443, 46471
(1971).
centl y wi thi n two weeks of the ti p. The affi davi t contai ned rather
detai l ed i nformati on about the conceal ment of the whi skey, and as-
serted that the i nformer was a prudent person, that defendant
had a reputati on as a bootl egger, that other persons had suppl i ed
si mi l ar i nformati on about hi m, and that he had been found i n con-
trol of i l l egal whi skey wi thi n the previ ous four years. The Court de-
termi ned that the detai l ed nature of the ti p, the personal observa-
ti on thus reveal ed, and the fact that the i nformer had admi tted to
cri mi nal behavi or by hi s purchase of whi skey were suffi ci ent to en-
abl e the magi strate to fi nd hi m rel i abl e, and that the supporti ng
evi dence, i ncl udi ng defendants reputati on, coul d suppl ement thi s
determi nati on.
The Court expressl y abandoned the two-part Aguilar-Spinelli
test and returned to the total i ty of the ci rcumstances approach to
eval uate probabl e cause based on an i nformants ti p i n I llinois v.
Gates.
108
The mai n defect of the two-part test, Justi ce Rehnqui st
concl uded for the Court, was i n treati ng an i nformants rel i abi l i ty
and hi s basi s for knowl edge as i ndependent requi rements. I nstead,
a defi ci ency i n one may be compensated for, i n determi ni ng the
overal l rel i abi l i ty of a ti p, by a strong showi ng as to the other, or
by some other i ndi ci a of rel i abi l i ty.
109
I n eval uati ng probabl e
cause, [t]he task of the i ssui ng magi strate i s si mpl y to make a
practi cal , commonsense deci si on whether, gi ven al l the ci r-
cumstances set forth i n the affi davi t before hi m, i ncl udi ng the ve-
raci ty and basi s of knowl edge of persons suppl yi ng hearsay i nfor-
mati on, there i s a fai r probabi l i ty that contraband or evi dence of
a cri me wi l l be found i n a parti cul ar pl ace.
110
Parti cul ari ty. The requi rement that warrants shal l
parti cul ari l y descri be the thi ngs to be sei zed makes general
searches under them i mpossi bl e and prevents the sei zure of one
thi ng under a warrant descri bi ng another. As to what i s to be
taken, nothi ng i s l eft to the di screti on of the offi cer executi ng the
warrant.
111
Thi s requi rement thus acts to l i mi t the scope of the
search, i nasmuch as the executi ng offi cers shoul d be l i mi ted to
1221
112
Thi s Court has hel d i n the past that a search whi ch i s reasonabl e at i ts i n-
cepti on may vi ol ate the Fourth Amendment by vi rtue of i ts i ntol erabl e i ntensi ty and
scope. Kremen v. Uni ted States, 353 U.S. 346 (1957); Go-Bart I mporti ng Co. v. Uni t-
ed States, 282 U.S. 344, 35658 (1931); see Uni ted States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581,
58687 (1948). The scope of the search must be stri ctl y ti ed to and justi fi ed by the
ci rcumstances whi ch rendered i ts i ni ti ati on permi ssi bl e. Warden v. Hayden, 387
U.S. 294, 310 (1967) (Mr. Justi ce Fortas concurri ng); see, e.g., Preston v. Uni ted
States, 376 U.S. 364, 367368 (1964); Agnel l o v. Uni ted States, 296 U.S. 20, 30
31 (1925). Terry v. Ohi o, 392 U.S. 1, 1819, (1968). See also Andresen v. Maryl and,
427 U.S. 463, 47082 (1976), and i d. at 484, 49293 (Justi ce Brennan di ssenti ng).
I n Stanl ey v. Georgi a, 394 U.S. 557, 569 (1969), Justi ces Stewart, Brennan, and
Whi te woul d have based deci si on on the pri nci pl e that a val i d warrant for gambl i ng
paraphernal i a di d not authori ze pol i ce upon di scoveri ng moti on pi cture fi l ms i n the
course of the search to project the fi l ms to l earn thei r contents.
113
Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717, 73031 (1961); Stanford v. Texas,
379 U.S. 476, 485 (1965).
114
367 U.S. 717 (1961). See Ki ngsl ey Books v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436 (1957).
115
Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717, 732 (1961).
l ooki ng i n pl aces where the descri bed object coul d be expected to
be found.
112
Fi rst Amendment Beari ng on Probabl e Cause and Par-
ti cul ari ty. Where the warrant process i s used to authori ze sei -
zure of books and other i tems enti tl ed ei ther to Fi rst Amendment
protecti on or to Fi rst Amendment consi derati on, the Court has re-
qui red government to observe more exacti ng standards than i n
other cases.
113
Sei zure of materi al s arguabl y protected by the Fi rst
Amendment i s a form of pri or restrai nt that requi res stri ct observ-
ance of the Fourth Amendment. At a mi ni mum, a warrant i s re-
qui red, and addi ti onal safeguards may be requi red for l arge-scal e
sei zures. Thus, i n Marcus v. Search Warrant,
114
the sei zure of
11,000 copi es of 280 publ i cati ons pursuant to warrant i ssued ex
parte by a magi strate who had not exami ned any of the publ i ca-
ti ons but who had rel i ed on the concl usory affi davi t of a pol i ceman
was voi ded. Fai l ure to scruti ni ze the materi al s and to parti cul ari ze
the i tems to be sei zed was deemed i nadequate, and i t was further
noted that pol i ce were provi ded wi th no gui de to the exerci se of
i nformed di screti on, because there was no step i n the procedure be-
fore sei zure desi gned to focus searchi ngl y on the questi on of ob-
sceni ty.
115
A state procedure whi ch was desi gned to compl y wi th
Marcus by the presentati on of copi es of books to be sei zed to the
magi strate for hi s scruti ny pri or to i ssuance of a warrant was none-
thel ess found i nadequate by a pl ural i ty of the Court, whi ch con-
cl uded that si nce the warrant here authori zed the sheri ff to sei ze
al l copi es of the speci fi ed ti tl es, and si nce [appel l ant] was not af-
forded a heari ng on the questi on of the obsceni ty even of the seven
novel s [seven of 59 l i sted ti tl es were revi ewed by the magi strate]
before the warrant i ssued, the procedure was . . . consti tuti onal l y
1222
116
A Quanti ty of Books v. Kansas, 378 U.S. 205, 210 (1964).
117
Hel l er v. New York, 413 U.S. 483 (1973).
118
I d. at 49293. But cf. New York v. P.J. Vi deo, I nc., 475 U.S. 868, 875 n.6
(1986), rejecti ng the defendants asserti on, based on Heller, that onl y a si ngl e copy
rather than al l copi es of al l egedl y obscene movi es shoul d have been sei zed pursuant
to warrant.
119
Roaden v. Kentucky, 413 U.S. 496 (1973). See also Lo-Ji Sal es v. New York,
442 U.S. 319 (1979); Wal ter v. Uni ted States, 447 U.S. 649 (1980). These speci al
constrai nts are i nappl i cabl e when obscene materi al s are purchased, and there i s
consequentl y no Fourth Amendment search or sei zure. Maryl and v. Macon, 472 U.S.
463 (1985).
120
Lee Art Theatre, I nc. v. Vi rgi ni a, 392 U.S. 636, 637 (1968) (per curi am).
121
New York v. P.J. Vi deo, I nc., 475 U.S. 868, 87374 (1986) (quoti ng Marcus
v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717, 732 (1961)).
122
New York v. P.J. Vi deo, I nc., 475 U.S. 868, 875 n.6 (1986).
defi ci ent.
116
Confusi on remai ns, however, about the necessi ty for
and the character of pri or adversary heari ngs on the i ssue of ob-
sceni ty. I n a l ater deci si on the Court hel d that, wi th adequate safe-
guards, no pre-sei zure adversary heari ng on the i ssue of obsceni ty
i s requi red i f the fi l m i s sei zed not for the purpose of destructi on
as contraband (the purpose i n Marcus and A Quantity of Books),
but i nstead to preserve a copy for evi dence.
117
I t i s consti tuti onal l y
permi ssi bl e to sei ze a copy of a fi l m pursuant to a warrant as l ong
as there i s a prompt post-sei zure adversary heari ng on the obscen-
i ty i ssue. Unti l there i s a judi ci al determi nati on of obsceni ty, the
Court advi sed, the fi l m may conti nue to be exhi bi ted; i f no other
copy i s avai l abl e ei ther a copy of i t must be made from the sei zed
fi l m or the fi l m i tsel f must be returned.
118
The sei zure of a fi l m wi thout the authori ty of a consti tuti onal l y
suffi ci ent warrant i s i nval i d; sei zure cannot be justi fi ed as i nci den-
tal to arrest, i nasmuch as the determi nati on of obsceni ty may not
be made by the offi cer hi msel f.
119
Nor may a warrant i ssue based
sol el y on the concl usory asserti ons of the pol i ce offi cer wi thout any
i nqui ry by the [magi strate] i nto the factual basi s for the offi cers
concl usi ons.
120
I nstead, a warrant must be supported by affi da-
vi ts setti ng forth speci fi c facts i n order that the i ssui ng magi strate
may focus searchi ngl y on the questi on of obsceni ty.
121
Thi s does
not mean, however, that a hi gher standard of probabl e cause i s re-
qui red i n order to obtai n a warrant to sei ze materi al s protected by
the Fi rst Amendment. Our reference i n Roaden to a hi gher hurdl e
. . . of reasonabl eness was not i ntended to establ i sh a hi gher
standard of probabl e cause for the i ssuance of a warrant to sei ze
books or fi l ms, but i nstead rel ated to the more basi c requi rement,
i mposed by that deci si on, that the pol i ce not rel y on the exi gency
excepti on to the Fourth Amendment warrant requi rement, but i n-
stead obtai n a warrant from a magi strate . . . .
122
1223
123
379 U.S. 476 (1965).
124
I d. at 48586. See also Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717, 723 (1961).
125
Zurcher v. Stanford Dai l y, 436 U.S. 547 (1978). See i d. at 566 (contai ni ng
suggesti on menti oned i n text), and i d. at 566 (Justi ce Powel l concurri ng) (more ex-
pressl y adopti ng that posi ti on). I n the Pri vacy Protecti on Act, Pub. L. No. 96440,
94 Stat. 1879 (1980), 42 U.S.C. 2000aa, Congress provi ded extensi ve protecti on
agai nst searches and sei zures not onl y of the news medi a and news peopl e but al so
of others engaged i n di ssemi nati ng communi cati ons to the publ i c, unl ess there i s
probabl e cause to bel i eve the person protecti ng the materi al s has commi tted or i s
commi tti ng the cri me to whi ch the materi al s rel ate.
126
Uni ted States v. Lefkowi tz, 285 U.S. 452, 46566 (1932). Of course, evi dence
sei zabl e under warrant i s subject to sei zure wi thout a warrant i n ci rcumstances i n
whi ch warrantl ess searches are justi fi ed.
127
255 U.S. 298 (1921). Uni ted States v. Lefkowi tz, 285 U.S. 452 (1932), appl i ed
the rul e i n a warrantl ess search of premi ses. The rul e apparentl y never appl i ed i n
case of a search of the person. Cf. Schmerber v. Cal i forni a, 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
128
Goul ed v. Uni ted States, 255 U.S. 298, 306 (1921).
I n Stanford v. Texas,
123
a sei zure of more than 2,000 books,
pamphl ets, and other documents pursuant to a warrant whi ch
merel y authori zed the sei zure of books, pamphl ets, and other wri t-
ten i nstruments concerni ng the Communi st Party of Texas was
voi ded. [T]he consti tuti onal requi rement that warrants must par-
ti cul arl y descri be the thi ngs to be sei zed i s to be accorded the most
scrupul ous exacti tude when the thi ngs are books, and the basi s for
thei r sei zure i s the i deas whi ch they contai n. . . . No l ess a stand-
ard coul d be fai thful to Fi rst Amendment freedoms.
124
However, the Fi rst Amendment does not bar the i ssuance or
executi on of a warrant to search a newsroom to obtai n photographs
of demonstrators who had i njured several pol i cemen, al though the
Court appeared to suggest that a magi strate asked to i ssue such
a warrant shoul d guard agai nst i nterference wi th press freedoms
through l i mi ts on type, scope, and i ntrusi veness of the search.
125
Property Subj ect to Sei zure. There has never been any
doubt that search warrants coul d be i ssued for the sei zure of con-
traband and the frui ts and i nstrumental i ti es of cri me.
126
But i n
Gouled v. United States,
127
a unani mous Court l i mi ted the cl asses
of property subject to sei zures to these three and refused to permi t
a sei zure of mere evi dence, i n thi s i nstance defendants papers
whi ch were to be used as evi dence agai nst hi m at tri al . The Court
recogni zed that there was no speci al sancti ty i n papers, as di sti n-
gui shed from other forms of property, to render them i mmune from
search and sei zure,
128
but thei r character as evi dence rendered
them i mmune. Thi s i mmuni ty was based upon the dual , rel ated
premi ses that hi stori cal l y the ri ght to search for and sei ze property
depended upon the asserti on by the Government of a val i d cl ai m
of superi or i nterest, and that i t was not enough that the purpose
of the search and sei zure was to obtai n evi dence to use i n appre-
1224
129
Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 303 (1967). See Goul ed v. Uni ted States,
255 U.S. 298, 309 (1921). The hol di ng was deri ved from di cta i n Boyd v. Uni ted
States, 116 U.S. 616, 62429 (1886).
130
Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967). Justi ce Dougl as di ssented, wi shi ng
to retai n the rul e, i d. at 312, and Justi ce Fortas wi th Chi ef Justi ce Warren con-
curred i n the resul t whi l e apparentl y wi shi ng to retai n the rul e i n warrant cases.
I d. at 310, 312.
131
Davi s v. Mi ssi ssi ppi , 394 U.S. 721 (1969).
132
Schmerber v. Cal i forni a, 384 U.S. 757 (1966). Ski nner v. Rai l way Labor Ex-
ecuti ves Assn, 489 U.S. 602 (1989) (warrantl ess bl ood testi ng for drug use by rai l -
road empl oyee i nvol ved i n acci dent).
133
Ski nner v. Rai l way Labor Executi ves Assn, 489 U.S. 602 (1989)
(warrantl ess drug testi ng of rai l road empl oyee i nvol ved i n acci dent).
134
Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291 (1973) (sustai ni ng warrantl ess taki ng of
scrapi ngs from defendants fi ngernai l s at the stati onhouse, on the basi s that i t was
a very l i mi ted i ntrusi on and necessary to preserve evanescent evi dence).
135
Uni ted States v. Di oni si o, 410 U.S. 1 (1973); Uni ted States v. Mara, 410 U.S.
19 (1973) (both sustai ni ng grand jury subpoenas to produce voi ce and handwri ti ng
exempl ars; no reasonabl e expectati on of pri vacy wi th respect to those i tems).
136
Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 44 n.2 (1967). See al so i d. at 97 n.4, 107
08 (Justi ces Harl an and Whi te concurri ng), 67 (Justi ce Dougl as concurri ng).
137
Another i mportant resul t of Warden v. Hayden i s that thi rd parti es not sus-
pected of cul pabi l i ty i n cri me are subject to the i ssuance and executi on of warrants
for searches and sei zures of evi dence. Zurcher v. Stanford Dai l y, 436 U.S. 547, 553
60 (1978). Justi ce Stevens argued for a sti ffer standard for i ssuance of warrants to
nonsuspects, requi ri ng i n order to i nvade thei r pri vacy a showi ng that they woul d
not compl y wi th a l ess i ntrusi ve method, such as a subpoena. I d. at 577 (di ssenti ng).
138
Rochi n v. Cal i forni a, 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
139
Wi nston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753 (1985).
140
Wi nston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 76163 (1985). Chi ef Justi ce Burger concurred
on the basi s of hi s readi ng of the Courts opi ni on as not preventi ng detenti on of
an i ndi vi dual i f there are reasonabl e grounds to bel i eve that natural bodi l y func-
ti ons wi l l di scl ose the presence of contraband materi al s secreted i nternal l y. i d. at
at 767. Cf. Uni ted States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531 (1985).
hendi ng and convi cti ng cri mi nal s.
129
More evaded than fol l owed,
the mere evi dence rul e was overturned i n 1967.
130
I t i s now set-
tl ed that such evi denti ary i tems as fi ngerpri nts,
131
bl ood,
132
uri ne
sampl es,
133
fi ngernai l and ski n scrapi ngs,
134
voi ce and hand-
wri ti ng exempl ars,
135
conversati ons,
136
and other demonstrati ve
evi dence may be obtai ned through the warrant process or wi thout
a warrant where speci al needs of government are shown.
137
However, some medi cal l y assi sted bodi l y i ntrusi ons have been
hel d i mpermi ssi bl e, e.g., forci bl e admi ni strati on of an emeti c to i n-
duce vomi ti ng,
138
and surgery under general anestheti c to remove
a bul l et l odged i n a suspects chest.
139
Factors to be wei ghed i n de-
termi ni ng whi ch medi cal tests and procedures are reasonabl e i n-
cl ude the extent to whi ch the procedure threatens the i ndi vi dual s
safety or heal th, the extent of the i ntrusi on upon the i ndi vi dual s
di gni tary i nterests i n personal pri vacy and bodi l y i ntegri ty, and
the i mportance of the evi dence to the prosecuti ons case.
140
1225
141
387 U.S. 294, 30203 (1967). Sei zure of a di ary was at i ssue i n Hi l l v. Cal i -
forni a, 401 U.S. 797, 805 (1971), but i t had not been rai sed i n the state courts and
was deemed wai ved.
142
116 U.S. 616 (1886).
143
Act of June 22, 1874, 5, 18 Stat. 187.
144
145
Howel l s State Tri al s 1029, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (1765).
146
I n Warden v. Hayden,
141
Justi ce Brennan for the Court cau-
ti oned that the i tems there sei zed were not testi moni al or com-
muni cati ve i n nature, and thei r i ntroducti on therefore di d not com-
pel respondent to become a wi tness agai nst hi msel f i n vi ol ati on of
the Fi fth Amendment. . . . Thi s case thus does not requi re that we
consi der whether there are i tems of evi denti al val ue whose very
nature precl udes them from bei ng the object of a reasonabl e search
and sei zure. Thi s mergi ng of Fourth and Fi fth Amendment consi d-
erati ons deri ved from Boyd v. United States,
142
the fi rst case i n
whi ch the Supreme Court consi dered at l ength the meani ng of the
Fourth Amendment. Boyd was a quasi -cri mi nal proceedi ng for the
forfei ture of goods al l eged to have been i mported i n vi ol ati on of
l aw, and concerned a statute whi ch authori zed court orders to re-
qui re defendants to produce any document whi ch mi ght tend to
prove any al l egati on made by the Uni ted States.
143
That there
was a sel f-i ncri mi nati on probl em the enti re Court was i n agree-
ment, but Justi ce Bradl ey for a majori ty of the Justi ces al so uti -
l i zed the Fourth Amendment.
Whi l e the statute di d not authori ze a search but i nstead com-
pul sory producti on, the Justi ce concl uded that the l aw was wel l
wi thi n the restri cti ons of the search and sei zure cl ause.
144
Wi th
thi s poi nt establ i shed, the Justi ce rel i ed on Lord Camdens opi ni on
i n Entick v. Carrington
145
for the proposi ti on that sei zure of i tems
to be used as evi dence onl y was i mpermi ssi bl e. Justi ce Bradl ey an-
nounced that the essence of the offence commi tted by the Govern-
ment agai nst Boyd i s not the breaki ng of hi s doors, and the rum-
magi ng of hi s drawers . . . but i t i s the i nvasi on of hi s i ndefeasi bl e
ri ght of personal securi ty, personal l i berty and pri vate property.
. . . Breaki ng i nto a house and openi ng boxes and drawers are ci r-
cumstances of aggravati on; but any forci bl e and compul sory extor-
ti on of a mans own testi mony or of hi s pri vate papers to be used
as evi dence to convi ct hi m of cri me or to forfei t hi s goods, i s wi thi n
the condemnati on of that judgment. I n thi s regard the Fourth and
Fi fth Amendments run al most i nto each other.
146
Whi l e i t may be doubtful that the equati on of search warrants
wi th subpoenas and other compul sory process ever real l y amounted
1226
147
E.g., Okl ahoma Press Pub Co. v. Wal l i ng, 327 U.S. 186, 20909 (1946).
148
Andresen v. Maryl and, 427 U.S. 463 (1976); Fi sher v. Uni ted States, 425
U.S. 391, 40514 (1976). Fisher states that the preci se cl ai m sustai ned i n Boyd
woul d now be rejected for reasons not there consi dered. I d. at 408.
149
427 U.S. 463 (1976).
150
I d. at 47077.
151
I d. at 47884.
152
I d. at 482 n.11. Mi ni mi zati on, as requi red under federal l aw, has not proved
to be a si gni fi cant l i mi tati on. Scott v. Uni ted States, 425 U.S. 917 (1976).
153
E.g., Uni ted States v. Mi l l er, 425 U.S. 435, 440, 444 (1976); Fi sher v. Uni ted
States, 425 U.S. 391, 401 (1976); Cal i forni a Bankers Assn v. Shul tz, 416 U.S. 21,
7879 (1974) (Justi ce Powel l concurri ng).
154
See Note, Formalism, Legal Realism, and Constitutionally Protected Privacy
Under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, 90 HARV. L. REV. 945 (1977).
155
Rul e 41(c), Federal Rul es of Cri mi nal Procedure, provi des, i nter al i a, that
the warrant shal l command i ts executi on i n the dayti me, unl ess the magi strate for
reasonabl e cause shown di rects i n the warrant that i t be served at some other ti me.
to much of a l i mi tati on,
147
the present anal ysi s of the Court di s-
penses wi th any theory of convergence of the two Amend-
ments.
148
Thus, i n Andresen v. Maryland,
149
pol i ce executed a
warrant to search defendants offi ces for speci fi ed documents per-
tai ni ng to a fraudul ent sal e of l and, and the Court sustai ned the
admi ssi on of the papers di scovered as evi dence at hi s tri al . The
Fi fth Amendment was i nappl i cabl e, the Court hel d, because there
had been no compul si on of defendant to produce or to authenti cate
the documents.
150
As for the Fourth Amendment, i nasmuch as the
busi ness records sei zed were evi dence of cri mi nal acts, they were
properl y sei zabl e under the rul e of Warden v. Hayden; the fact that
they were testi moni al i n nature, records i n the defendants hand-
wri ti ng, was i rrel evant.
151
Acknowl edgi ng that there are grave
dangers i nherent i n executi ng a warrant authori zi ng a search and
sei zure of a persons papers, the Courts response was to observe
that whi l e some i nnocuous documents woul d have to be exami ned
to ascertai n whi ch papers were to be sei zed, authori ti es, just as
wi th el ectroni c sei zures of conversati ons, must take care to as-
sure that they are conducted i n a manner that mi ni mi zes unwar-
ranted i ntrusi ons upon pri vacy.
152
Al though Andresen was concerned wi th busi ness records, i ts
di scussi on seemed equal l y appl i cabl e to personal papers, such as
di ari es and l etters, as to whi ch a much greater i nterest i n pri vacy
most certai nl y exi sts. The questi on of the propri ety of sei zure of
such papers conti nues to be the subject of reservati on i n opi n-
i ons,
153
but i t i s far from cl ear that the Court woul d accept any
such excepti on shoul d the i ssue be presented.
154
Executi on of Warrants. The manner of executi on of war-
rants i s general l y governed by statute and rul e, as to ti me of execu-
ti on,
155
method of entry, and the l i ke. I t was a rul e at common l aw
1227
See Jones v. Uni ted States, 357 U.S. 493, 498500 (1958); Goodi ng v. Uni ted States,
416 U.S. 430 (1974). The rul e i s more rel axed for narcoti cs cases. 21 U.S.C. 879(a).
156
Semaynes Case, 5 Cokes Rep. 91a, 77 Eng. Rep. 194 (K.B. 1604).
157
18 U.S.C. 3109. See Mi l l er v. Uni ted States, 357 U.S. 301 (1958); Wong Sun
v. Uni ted States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
158
374 U.S. 23 (1963). Ker was an arrest warrant case, but no reason appears
for di fferenti ati ng search warrants. Ei ght Justi ces agreed that federal standards
shoul d govern and that the rul e of announcement was of consti tuti onal stature, but
they di vi ded 4-to4 whether entry i n thi s case had been pursuant to a val i d excep-
ti on. Justi ce Harl an who had di ssented from the federal standards i ssue joi ned the
four fi ndi ng a justi fi abl e excepti on to carry the resul t.
159
I n narcoti cs cases, magi strates are authori zed to i ssue no-knock warrants
i f they fi nd there i s probabl e cause to bel i eve (1) the property sought may, and i f
noti ce i s gi ven, wi l l be easi l y and qui ckl y destroyed or (2) gi vi ng noti ce wi l l endan-
ger the l i fe or safety of the executi ng offi cer or another person. 21 U.S.C. 879(b).
See also D.C. Code, 23591.
160
Sgro v. Uni ted States, 287 U.S. 206 (1932).
161
I d.
162
Ybarra v. I l l i noi s, 444 U.S. 85 (1979) (patron i n a bar), rel yi ng on and
reaffi rmi ng Uni ted States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581 (1948) (occupant of vehi cl e may
not be searched merel y because there are grounds to search the automobi l e).
163
452 U.S. 692 (1981).
that before an offi cer coul d break and enter he must gi ve noti ce of
hi s offi ce, authori ty, and purpose and must i n effect be refused ad-
mi ttance,
156
and unti l recentl y thi s has been a statutory requi re-
ment i n the federal system
157
and general l y i n the States. I n Ker
v. California,
158
the Court consi dered the rul e of announcement as
a consti tuti onal requi rement, al though a majori ty there found ci r-
cumstances justi fyi ng entry wi thout announcement. Recent federal
l aws provi di ng for the i ssuance of warrants authori zi ng i n certai n
ci rcumstances no-knock entri es to execute warrants wi l l no doubt
present the Court wi th opportuni ti es to expl ore the confi gurati ons
of the rul e of announcement.
159
A statute regul ati ng the expi rati on
of a warrant and i ssuance of another shoul d be l i beral l y construed
i n favor of the i ndi vi dual .
160
Si mi l arl y, i nasmuch as the exi stence
of probabl e cause must be establ i shed by fresh facts, so the execu-
ti on of the warrant shoul d be done i n ti mel y fashi on so as to ensure
so far as possi bl e the conti nued exi stence of probabl e cause.
161
I n executi ng a warrant for a search of premi ses and of named
persons on the premi ses, pol i ce offi cers may not automati cal l y
search someone el se found on the premi ses.
162
I f they can arti cu-
l ate some reasonabl e basi s for feari ng for thei r safety they may
conduct a patdown of the person, but i n order to search they
must have probabl e cause parti cul ari zed wi th respect to that per-
son. However, i n Michigan v. Summers,
163
the Court hel d that offi -
cers arri vi ng to execute a warrant for the search of a house coul d
detai n, wi thout bei ng requi red to arti cul ate any reasonabl e basi s
and necessari l y therefore wi thout probabl e cause, the owner or oc-
cupant of the house, whom they encountered on the front porch
1228
164
Supra, p. 1208. See Mi chi gan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 696701 (1981).
165
I d. at 70106. Ybarra was di sti ngui shed on the basi s of i ts greater i ntrusi ve-
ness and the l ack of suffi ci ent connecti on wi th the premi ses. I d. at 695 n.4. By the
ti me Summers was searched, pol i ce had probabl e cause to do so. I d. at 695. The
warrant here was for contraband, i d. at 701, and a di fferent rul e possi bl y may appl y
wi th respect to warrants for other evi dence.
166
Maryl and v. Garri son, 480 U.S. 79 (1987) (offi cers reasonabl y bel i eved there
was onl y one thi rd fl oor apartment i n ci ty row house when i n fact there were two).
167
Steagal d v. Uni ted States, 451 U.S. 204 (1981). An arrest warrant i s a nec-
essary and suffi ci ent authori ty to enter a suspects home to arrest hi m. Payton v.
New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980).
1
E.g., Johnson v. Uni ted States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948); McDonal d v. Uni ted
States, 335 U.S. 451, 453 (1948); Camara v. Muni ci pal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528
29 (1967); G.M. Leasi ng Corp. v. Uni ted States, 429 U.S. 338, 35253, 355 (1977).
2
Ameri can Law I nsti tute, A Model Code of Pre-Arrai gnment Procedure, Tent.
Draft No. 3 (Phi l adel phi a: 1970), xi x.
l eavi ng the premi ses. Appl yi ng i ts i ntrusi veness test,
164
the Court
determi ned that such a detenti on, whi ch was substanti al l y l ess i n-
trusi ve than an arrest, was justi fi ed because of the l aw enforce-
ment i nterests i n mi ni mi zi ng the ri sk of harm to offi cers, faci l i tat-
i ng entry and conduct of the search, and preventi ng fl i ght i n the
event i ncri mi nati ng evi dence i s found.
165
Al so, under some ci r-
cumstances offi cers may search premi ses on the mi staken but rea-
sonabl e bel i ef that the premi ses are descri bed i n an otherwi se val i d
warrant.
166
Al though for purposes of executi on, as for many other matters,
there i s l i ttl e di ffence between search warrants and arrest war-
rants, one notabl e di fference i s that the possessi on of a val i d arrest
warrant cannot authori ze authori ti es to enter the home of a thi rd
party l ooki ng for the person named i n the warrant; i n order to do
that, they need a search warrant si gni fyi ng that a magi strate has
determi ned that there i s probabl e cause to bel i eve the person
named i s on the premi ses.
167
Valid Searches and Seizures Without Warrants
Whi l e the Supreme Court stresses the i mportance of warrants
and has repeatedl y referred to searches wi thout warrants as ex-
cepti onal ,
1
i t appears that the greater number of searches, as wel l
as the vast number of arrests, take pl ace wi thout warrants. The
Reporters of the Ameri can Law I nsti tute Project on a Model Code
of Pre-Arrai gnment Procedure have noted thei r convi cti on that, as
a practi cal matter, searches wi thout warrant and i nci dental to ar-
rest have been up to thi s ti me, and may remai n, of greater prac-
ti cal i mportance than searches pursuant to warrants. [T]he evi -
dence on hand . . . compel [s] the concl usi on that searches under
warrants have pl ayed a comparati vel y mi nor part i n l aw enforce-
ment, except i n connecti on wi th narcoti cs and gambl i ng l aws.
2
1229
3
Cool i dge v. New Hampshi re, 403 U.S. 443, 45455 (1971) (quoti ng Katz v.
Uni ted States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967)); G.M. Leasi ng Corp. v. Uni ted States, 429
U.S. 338, 35253, 358 (1977).
4
Jones v. Uni ted States, 357 U.S. 493, 499 (1958).
5
McDonal d v. Uni ted States, 335 U.S. 451, 456 (1948). I n general , wi th regard
to excepti ons to the warrant cl ause, conduct must be tested by the reasonabl eness
standard enunci ated by the fi rst cl ause of the Amendment, Terry v. Ohi o, 392 U.S.
1, 20 (1968), and the Courts devel opment of i ts pri vacy expectati on tests, supra,
pp. 120609, substanti al l y changed the content of that standard.
6
Uni ted States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976). See supra, p. 1209.
7
Henry v. Uni ted States, 361 U.S. 98 (1959); Johnson v. Uni ted States, 333 U.S.
10, 1617 (1948); Si bron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 6263 (1968).
8
The pol i ce may not arrest upon mere suspi ci on but onl y on probabl e cause.
Mal l ory v. Uni ted States, 354 U.S. 449, 454 (1957).
9
392 U.S. 1 (1968). Onl y Justi ce Dougl as di ssented. I d. at 35.
Neverthel ess, the Court frequentl y asserts that the most basi c
consti tuti onal rul e i n thi s area i s that searches conducted outsi de
the judi ci al process, wi thout pri or approval by judge or magi strate,
are per se unreasonabl e under the Fourth Amendment subject
onl y to a few speci al l y establ i shed and wel l -del i neated excep-
ti ons.
3
The excepti ons are sai d to be jeal ousl y and careful l y
drawn,
4
and there must be a showi ng by those who seek exemp-
ti on . . . that the exi genci es of the si tuati on made that course i m-
perati ve.
5
Whi l e the record does i ndi cate an effort to categori ze
the excepti ons, the number and breadth of those excepti ons have
been growi ng.
Detenti on Short of Arrest: Stop-and-Fri sk. Arrests are
subject to the requi rements of the Fourth Amendment, but the
courts have fol l owed the common l aw i n uphol di ng the ri ght of po-
l i ce offi cers to take a person i nto custody wi thout a warrant i f they
have probabl e cause to bel i eve that the person to be arrested has
commi tted a fel ony or has commi tted a mi sdemeanor i n thei r pres-
ence.
6
The probabl e cause i s, of course, the same standard requi red
to be met i n the i ssuance of an arrest warrant, and must be sati s-
fi ed by condi ti ons exi sti ng pri or to the pol i cemans stop, what i s
di scovered thereafter not suffi ci ng to establ i sh retroacti vel y reason-
abl e cause.
7
There are, however, i nstances when a pol i cemans sus-
pi ci ons wi l l have been aroused by someones conduct or manner,
but probabl e cause for pl aci ng such a person under arrest wi l l be
l acki ng.
8
I n Terry v. Ohio,
9
the Court al most unani mousl y ap-
proved an on-the-street i nvesti gati on by a pol i ce offi cer whi ch i n-
vol ved patti ng down the subject of the i nvesti gati on for weapons.
The case arose when a pol i ce offi cer observed three i ndi vi dual s
engagi ng i n conduct whi ch appeared to hi m, on the basi s of trai n-
i ng and experi ence, to be the casi ng of a store for a l i kel y armed
robbery; upon approachi ng the men, i denti fyi ng hi msel f, and not
recei vi ng prompt i denti fi cati on, the offi cer sei zed one of the men,
1230
10
I d. at 16. See i d. at 1620.
11
I d. at 20, 21, 22.
12
I d. at 2327, 29. See also Si bron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968) (after pol i ce-
man observed defendant speak wi th several known narcoti cs addi cts, he approached
hi m and pl aced hi s hand i n defendants pocket, thus di scoveri ng narcoti cs; i mper-
mi ssi bl e, because he l acked reasonabl e basi s for fri sk and i n any event hi s search
exceeded permi ssi bl e scope of weapons fri sk); Adams v. Wi l l i ams, 407 U.S. 143
(1972) (acti ng on ti p that defendant was si tti ng i n hi s car wi th narcoti cs and fi re-
arm, pol i ce approached, asked defendant to step out, and i ni ti ated fri sk and di scov-
ered weapon when he merel y rol l ed wi ndow down; justi fi abl e); Pennsyl vani a v.
Mi mms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977) (after val i dl y stoppi ng car, offi cer requi red defendant
to get out of car, observed bul ge under hi s jacket, and fri sked hi m and sei zed weap-
on; whi l e offi cer di d not suspect dri ver of cri me or have an arti cul abl e basi s for safe-
ty fears, safety consi derati ons justi fi ed hi s requi ri ng dri ver to l eave car).
patted the exteri or of hi s cl othes, and di scovered a gun. Chi ef Jus-
ti ce Warren for the Court wrote that the Fourth Amendment was
appl i cabl e to the si tuati on, appl i cabl e whenever a pol i ce offi cer ac-
costs an i ndi vi dual and restrai ns hi s freedom to wal k away.
10
Si nce the warrant cl ause i s necessari l y and practi cal l y of no appl i -
cati on to the type of on-the-street encounter present i n Terry, the
Chi ef Justi ce conti nued, the questi on was whether the pol i cemans
acti ons were reasonabl e. The test of reasonabl eness i n thi s sort of
si tuati on i s whether the pol i ce offi cer can poi nt to speci fi c and
arti cul abl e facts whi ch, taken together wi th rati onal i nferences
from those facts, woul d l ead a neutral magi strate on revi ew to
concl ude that a man of reasonabl e cauti on woul d be warranted i n
bel i evi ng that possi bl e cri mi nal behavi or was at hand and that
both an i nvesti gati ve stop and a fri sk was requi red.
11
I nasmuch
as the conduct wi tnessed by the pol i ceman reasonabl y l ed hi m to
bel i eve that an armed robbery was i n prospect, he was as reason-
abl y l ed to bel i eve that the men were armed and probabl y dan-
gerous and that hi s safety requi red a fri sk. Because the object of
the fri sk i s the di scovery of dangerous weapons, i t must there-
fore be confi ned i n scope to an i ntrusi on reasonabl y desi gned to di s-
cover guns, kni ves, cl ubs, or other hi dden i nstruments for the as-
saul t of the pol i ce offi cer.
12
Terry di d not pass on a host of probl ems, i ncl udi ng the grounds
that coul d permi ssi bl y l ead an offi cer to momentari l y stop a person
on the street or el sewhere i n order to ask questi ons rather than
fri sk for weapons, the ri ght of the stopped i ndi vi dual to refuse to
cooperate, and the permi ssi bl e response of the pol i ce to that re-
fusal . Fol l owi ng that deci si on, the standard for stops for i nvesti ga-
ti ve purposes evol ved i nto one of reasonabl e suspi ci on of cri mi nal
acti vi ty. That test permi ts some stops and questi oni ng wi thout
probabl e cause i n order to al l ow pol i ce offi cers to expl ore the foun-
1231
13
I n Uni ted States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411 (1981), a unani mous Court at-
tempted to capture the el usi ve concept of the basi s for permi tti ng a stop. Offi cers
must have arti cul abl e reasons or founded suspi ci ons, deri ved from the total i ty
of the ci rcumstances. Based upon that whol e pi cture the detai ni ng offi cer must
have a parti cul ari zed and objecti ve basi s for suspecti ng the parti cul ar person
stopped of cri mi nal acti vi ty. I d. at 41718. The i nqui ry i s thus qui te fact-speci fi c.
I n the anonymous ti p context, the same basi c approach requi ri ng some corroborati on
appl i es regardl ess of whether the standard i s probabl e cause or reasonabl e sus-
pi ci on; the di fference i s that l ess i nformati on, or l ess rel i abl e i nformati on, can sat-
i sfy the l ower standard. Al abama v. Whi te, 496 U.S. 325 (1990).
14
E.g., Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979) (i ndi vi dual s presence i n hi gh cri me
area gave offi cer no arti cul abl e basi s to suspect hi m of cri me); Del aware v. Prouse,
440 U.S. 648 (1979) (reasonabl e suspi ci on of a l i cense or regi strati on vi ol ati on i s
necessary to authori ze automobi l e stop; random stops i mpermi ssi bl e); Uni ted States
v. Bri gnoni -Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975) (offi cers coul d not justi fy random automobi l e
stop sol el y on basi s of Mexi can appearance of occupants); Rei d v. Georgi a, 448 U.S.
438 (1980) (no reasonabl e suspi ci on for ai rport stop based on appearance that sus-
pect and another passenger were tryi ng to conceal the fact that they were travel l i ng
together). But cf. Uni ted States v. Marti nez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976) (hal ti ng ve-
hi cl es at fi xed checkpoi nts to questi on occupants as to ci ti zenshi p and i mmi grati on
status permi ssi bl e, even i f offi cers shoul d act on basi s of appearance of occupants).
15
Davi s v. Mi ssi ssi ppi , 394 U.S. 721 (1969); Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S.
200 (1979).
16
See, e.g., Uni ted States v. Hensl ey, 469 U.S. 221 (1985) (reasonabl e suspi ci on
to stop a motori st may be based on a wanted fl yer as l ong as i ssuance of the fl yer
has been based on reasonabl e suspi ci on); Uni ted States v. Sokol ow, 490 U.S. 1,
(1989) (ai rport stop based on drug couri er profi l e may rel y on a combi nati on of fac-
tors that i ndi vi dual l y may be qui te consi stent wi th i nnocent travel ).
17
392 U.S. at 19, n.16.
18
Uni ted States v. Mendenhal l , 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980).
dati ons of thei r suspi ci ons.
13
Whi l e not el aborati ng a set of rul es
governi ng the appl i cati on of the tests, the Court was i ni ti al l y re-
stri cti ve i n recogni zi ng permi ssi bl e bases for reasonabl e sus-
pi ci on.
14
Extensi ve i nstrusi ons on i ndi vi dual pri vacy, e.g., trans-
portati on to the stati onhouse for i nterrogati on and fi ngerpri nti ng,
were i nval i dated i n the absence of probabl e cause.
15
More recentl y,
however, the Court has taken l ess restri cti ve approaches.
16
I t took the Court some ti me to settl e on a test for when a sei -
zure has occurred, and the Court has recentl y modi fi ed i ts ap-
proach. The i ssue i s of some i mportance, si nce i t i s at thi s poi nt
that Fourth Amendment protecti ons take hol d. The Terry Court
recogni zed i n di ctum that not al l personal i ntercourse between po-
l i cemen and ci ti zens i nvol ves sei zures of persons, and suggested
that [o]nl y when the offi cer, by means of physi cal force or show
of authori ty, has i n some way restrai ned the l i berty of a ci ti zen
may we concl ude that a sei zure has occurred.
17
Years l ater Jus-
ti ce Stewart proposed a si mi l ar standard, that a person has been
sei zed onl y i f, i n vi ew of al l of the ci rcumstances surroundi ng the
i nci dent, a reasonabl e person woul d have bel i eved that he was not
free to l eave.
18
Thi s reasonabl e percepti on standard was subse-
1232
19
See, e.g., Fl ori da v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983), i n whi ch there was no opi ni on
of the Court, but i n whi ch the test was used by the pl ural i ty of four, i d. at 502,
and al so endorsed by di ssenti ng Justi ce Bl ackmun, i d. at 514.
20
I NS v. Del gado, 466 U.S. 210 (1984).
21
I d. at 221.
22
Mi chi gan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 575 (1988).
23
499 U.S. 621, 628 (1991). As i n Michigan v. Chesternut, supra n.22, the sus-
pect dropped i ncri mi nati ng evi dence whi l e bei ng chased.
24
Adherence to thi s approach woul d effecti vel y nul l i fy the Courts earl i er posi -
ti on that Fourth Amendment protecti ons extend to sei zures that i nvol ve onl y a
bri ef detenti on short of tradi ti onal arrest. Uni ted States v. Bri gnoni -Ponce, 422
U.S. 873, 878 (1975), quoted in I NS v. Del gado, 466 U.S., 210, 215 (1984).
quentl y endorsed by a majori ty of Justi ces,
19
and was appl i ed i n
several cases i n whi ch admi ssi bi l i ty of evi dence turned on whether
a sei zure of the person not justi fi ed by probabl e cause or reason-
abl e suspi ci on had occurred pri or to the uncoveri ng of the evi dence.
No sei zure occurred, for exampl e, when I NS agents seeki ng to i den-
ti fy i l l egal al i ens conducted work force surveys wi thi n a garment
factory; whi l e some agents were posi ti oned at exi ts, others system-
ati cal l y moved through the factory and questi oned empl oyees.
20
Thi s bri ef questi oni ng, even wi th bl ocked exi ts, amounted to cl as-
si c consensual encounters rather than Fourth Amendment sei -
zures.
21
The Court al so rul ed that no sei zure had occurred when
pol i ce i n a squad car drove al ongsi de a suspect who had turned and
run down the si dewal k when he saw the squad car approach.
Under the ci rcumstances (no si ren, fl ashi ng l i ghts, di spl ay of a
weapon, or bl ocki ng of the suspects path), the Court concl uded, the
pol i ce conduct woul d not have communi cated to the reasonabl e
person an attempt to capture or otherwi se i ntrude upon [ones]
freedom of movement.
22
Soon thereafter, however, the Court departed from the
Mendenhall reasonabl e percepti on standard and adopted a more
formal i sti c approach, hol di ng that an actual chase wi th evi dent i n-
tent to capture di d not amount to a sei zure because the suspect
di d not compl y wi th the offi cers order to hal t. Mendenhall, sai d the
Court i n California v. Hodari D., stated a necessary but not a
suffi ci ent condi ti on for a sei zure of the person through show of
authori ty.
23
A Fourth Amendment sei zure of the person, the
Court determi ned, i s the same as a common l aw arrest; there must
be ei ther appl i cati on of physi cal force (or the l ayi ng on of hands),
or submi ssi on to the asserti on of authori ty.
24
I ndi cati ons are, how-
ever, that Hodari D. does not si gnal the end of the reasonabl e per-
cepti on standard, but merel y carves an excepti on appl i cabl e to
chases and perhaps other encounters between suspects and pol i ce.
Later i n the same term the Court rul ed that the Mendenhall
free-to-l eave i nqui ry was mi spl aced i n the context of a pol i ce
1233
25
Fl ori da v. Bosti ck, (1991).
26
I d. at 2387.
27
I d. The Court asserted that the case was anal yti cal l y i ndi sti ngui shabl e from
Delgado. Li ke the workers i n that case [subjected to the I NS survey at thei r work-
pl ace], Bosti cks freedom of movement was restri cted by a factor i ndependent of po-
l i ce conduct i .e., by hi s bei ng a passenger on a bus. I d.
28
Mi chi gan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983) (suspect appeared to be under the i n-
fl uence of drugs, offi cer spi ed hunti ng kni fe exposed on fl oor of front seat and
searched remai nder of passenger compartment). Si mi l ar reasoni ng has been appl i ed
to uphol d a protecti ve sweep of a home i n whi ch an arrest i s made i f arresti ng
offi cers have a reasonabl e bel i ef that the area swept may harbor another i ndi vi dual
posi ng a danger to the offi cers or to others. Maryl and v. Bui e, 494 U.S. 325 (1990).
29
Uni ted States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686 (1985). A more rel axed standard
has been appl i ed to detenti on of travel ers at the border, the Court testi ng the rea-
sonabl eness i n terms of the peri od of ti me necessary to ei ther veri fy or di spel the
suspi ci on. Uni ted States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 544 (1985) (ap-
provi ng warrantl ess detenti on for more than 24 hours of travel er suspected of al i -
mentary canal drug smuggl i ng).
sweep of a bus, but that a modi fi ed reasonabl e percepti on approach
sti l l governed.
25
I n conducti ng a bus sweep, ai med at detecti ng i l l e-
gal drugs and thei r couri ers, pol i ce offi cers typi cal l y board a bus
duri ng a stopover at a termi nal and ask to i nspect ti ckets, i denti -
fi cati on, and someti mes l uggage of sel ected passengers. The Court
di d not focus on whether an arrest had taken pl ace, as adherence
to the Hodari D. approach woul d have requi red, but i nstead sug-
gested that the appropri ate i nqui ry i s whether a reasonabl e per-
son woul d feel free to decl i ne the offi cers requests or otherwi se ter-
mi nate the encounter.
26
When the person i s seated on a bus and
has no desi re to l eave, the Court expl ai ned, the degree to whi ch
a reasonabl e person woul d feel that he or she coul d l eave i s not an
accurate measure of the coerci ve effect of the encounter.
27
A Terry search need not be l i mi ted to a stop and fri sk of the
person, but may extend as wel l to a protecti ve search of the pas-
senger compartment of a car i f an offi cer possesses a reasonabl e
bel i ef, based on speci fi c and arti cul abl e facts . . . that the suspect
i s dangerous and . . . may gai n i mmedi ate control of weapons.
28
How l engthy a Terry detenti on may be vari es wi th the ci r-
cumstances. I n approvi ng a 20-mi nute detenti on of a dri ver made
necessary by the dri vers own evasi on of drug agents and a state
pol i ce deci si on to hol d the dri ver unti l the agents coul d arri ve on
the scene, the Court i ndi cated that i t i s appropri ate to exami ne
whether the pol i ce di l i gentl y pursued a means of i nvesti gati on that
was l i kel y to confi rm or di spel thei r suspi ci ons qui ckl y, duri ng
whi ch ti me i t was necessary to detai n the defendant.
29
Si mi l ar pri nci pl es govern detenti on of l uggage at ai rports i n
order to detect the presence of drugs; Terry l i mi tati ons appl i cabl e
to i nvesti gati ve detenti ons of the person shoul d defi ne the permi s-
si bl e scope of an i nvesti gati ve detenti on of the persons l uggage on
1234
30
Uni ted States v. Pl ace, 462 U.S. 696, 709 (1983).
31
I d. at 706.
32
462 U.S. at 707. However, the search i n Place was not expedi ti ous, and hence
exceeded Fourth Amendment bounds, when agents took 90 mi nutes to transport l ug-
gage to another ai rport for admi ni strati on of the cani ne sni ff.
33
Fl ori da v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983). On thi s much the pl ural i ty opi ni on of
Justi ce Whi te (i d. at 503), joi ned by three other Justi ces, and the concurri ng opi ni on
of Justi ce Brennan (i d. at 509) were i n agreement.
34
Uni ted States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531 (1985).
35
Weeks v. Uni ted States, 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914); Carrol l v. Uni ted States,
267 U.S. 132, 158 (1925); Agnel l o v. Uni ted States, 269 U.S. 20, 30 (1925).
36
Terry v. Ohi o, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968); Chi mel v. Cal i forni a, 395 U.S. 752, 762,
763 (1969).
l ess than probabl e cause.
30
The general rul e i s that when an offi -
cers observati ons l ead hi m reasonabl y to bel i eve that a travel er i s
carryi ng l uggage that contai ns narcoti cs, the pri nci pl es of Terry
. . . woul d permi t the offi cer to detai n the l uggage bri efl y to i nves-
ti gate the ci rcumstances that aroused hi s suspi ci on, provi ded that
the i nvesti gati ve detenti on i s properl y l i mi ted i n scope.
31
Sei zure
of l uggage for an expedi ti ous cani ne sni ff by a dog trai ned to de-
tect narcoti cs can sati sfy thi s test even though sei zure of l uggage
i s i n effect detenti on of the travel er, si nce the procedure resul ts i n
l i mi ted di scl osure, i mpi nges onl y sl i ghtl y on a travel ers pri vacy
i nterest i n the contents of personal l uggage, and does not consti tute
a search wi thi n the meani ng of the Fourth Amendment.
32
By con-
trast, taki ng a suspect to an i nterrogati on room on grounds short
of probabl e cause, retai ni ng hi s ai r ti cket, and retri evi ng hi s l ug-
gage wi thout hi s permi ssi on tai nts consent gi ven under such ci r-
cumstances to open the l uggage, si nce by then the detenti on had
exceeded the bounds of a permi ssi bl e Terry i nvesti gati ve stop and
amounted to an i nval i d arrest.
33
But the same requi rements for
brevi ty of detenti on and l i mi ted scope of i nvesti gati on are appar-
entl y i nappl i cabl e to border searches of i nternati onal travel ers, the
Court havi ng approved a 24-hour detenti on of a travel er suspected
of smuggl i ng drugs i n her al i mentary canal .
34
Search I nci dent to Arrest. The common-l aw rul e permi tti ng
searches of the person of an arrestee as an i nci dent to the arrest
has occasi oned l i ttl e controversy i n the Court.
35
The di spute has
centered around the scope of the search. Si nce i t was the stated
general rul e that the scope of a warrantl ess search must be stri ctl y
ti ed to and justi fi ed by the ci rcumstances whi ch rendered i ts jus-
ti fi cati on permi ssi bl e, and si nce i t was the rul e that the justi fi ca-
ti on of a search of the arrestee was to prevent destructi on of evi -
dence and to prevent access to a weapon,
36
i t was argued to the
court that a search of the person of the defendant arrested for a
traffi c offense, whi ch di scovered heroi n i n a crumpl ed ci garette
package, was i mpermi ssi bl e, i nasmuch as there coul d have been no
1235
37
Uni ted States v. Robi nson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973). See also i d. at 23738
(Justi ce Powel l concurri ng). The Court appl i ed the same rul e i n Gustafson v. Fl or-
i da, 414 U.S. 260 (1973), i nvol vi ng a search of a motori sts person fol l owi ng hi s cus-
todi al arrest for an offense for whi ch a ci tati on woul d normal l y have i ssued. Unl i ke
the si tuati on i n Robinson, pol i ce regul ati ons di d not requi re the Gustafson offi cer
to take the suspect i nto custody, nor di d a departmental pol i cy gui de the offi cer as
to when to conduct a ful l search. The Court found these di fferences i nconsequenti al ,
and l eft for another day the probl em of pretextual arrests i n order to obtai n basi s
to search. Soon thereafter, the Court uphel d conduct of a si mi l ar search at the pl ace
of detenti on, even after a ti me l apse between the arrest and search. Uni ted States
v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800 (1974).
38
Compare Marron v. Uni ted States, 275 U.S. 192 (1927), with Go-Bart I mport-
i ng Co. v. Uni ted States, 282 U.S. 344 (1931), and Uni ted States v. Lefkowi tz, 285
U.S. 452 (1932).
39
331 U.S. 145 (1947).
40
334 U.S. 699 (1948).
41
I d. at 708.
42
339 U.S. 56 (1950).
43
I d. at 64.
destructi bl e evi dence rel ati ng to the offense for whi ch he was ar-
rested and no weapon coul d have been conceal ed i n the ci garette
package. The Court rejected thi s argument, rul i ng that no addi -
ti onal justi fi cati on i s requi red for a custodi al arrest of a suspect
based on probabl e cause.
37
However, the Justi ces have l ong found themsel ves embroi l ed i n
argument about the scope of the search i nci dent to arrest as i t ex-
tends beyond the person to the area i n whi ch the person i s ar-
rested, most commonl y ei ther hi s premi ses or hi s vehi cl e. Certai n
earl y cases went both ways on the basi s of some fi ne di sti ncti ons,
38
but i n Harris v. United States,
39
the Court approved a search of
a four-room apartment pursuant to an arrest under warrant for
one cri me and i n whi ch the search turned up evi dence of another
cri me. A year l ater, i n Trupiano v. United States,
40
a rai d on a di s-
ti l l ery resul ted i n the arrest of a man found on the premi ses and
a sei zure of the equi pment; the Court reversed the convi cti on be-
cause the offi cers had had ti me to obtai n a search warrant and had
not done so. A search or sei zure wi thout a warrant as an i nci dent
to a l awful arrest has al ways been consi dered to be a stri ctl y l i m-
i ted ri ght. I t grows out of the i nherent necessi ti es of the si tuati on
at the ti me of the arrest. But there must be somethi ng more i n the
way of necessi ty than merel y a l awful arrest.
41
Thi s deci si on was
overrul ed i n United States v. Rabinowitz,
42
i n whi ch offi cers ar-
rested defendant i n hi s one-room offi ce pursuant to an arrest war-
rant and proceeded to search the room compl etel y. The Court ob-
served that the i ssue was not whether the offi cers had the ti me
and opportuni ty to obtai n a search warrant but whether the search
i nci dent to arrest was reasonabl e. Though Rabinowitz referred to
searches of the area wi thi n the arrestees i mmedi ate control ,
43
i t
1236
44
Cf. Chi mel v. Cal i forni a, 395 U.S. 752, 76465 & n.10 (1969). But i n Kremen
v. Uni ted States, 353 U.S. 346 (1957), the Court hel d that the sei zure of the enti re
contents of a house and the removal to F.B.I . offi ces 200 mi l es away for exami na-
ti on, pursuant to an arrest under warrant of one of the persons found i n the house,
was unreasonabl e. I n deci si ons contemporaneous to and subsequent to Chimel, ap-
pl yi ng pre-Chimel standards because that case was not retroacti ve, Wi l l i ams v.
Uni ted States, 401 U.S. 646 (1971), the Court has appl i ed Rabinowitz somewhat re-
stri cti vel y. See Von Cl eef v. New Jersey, 395 U.S. 814 (1969), whi ch fol l owed
Kremen; Shi pl ey v. Cal i forni a, 395 U.S. 818 (1969), and Val e v. Loui si ana, 399 U.S.
30 (1970) (both i nvol vi ng arrests outsi de the house wi th subsequent searches of the
house); Cool i dge v. New Hampshi re, 403 U.S. 443, 45557 (1971). Substanti al l y ex-
tensi ve searches were, however, approved i n Wi l l i ams v. Uni ted States, 401 U.S.
646 (1971), and Hi l l v. Cal i forni a, 401 U.S. 797 (1971).
45
395 U.S. 752 (1969).
46
I d. at 76263.
provi ded no standard by whi ch thi s area was to be determi ned, and
extensi ve searches were permi tted under the rul e.
44
I n Chimel v. California,
45
however, a narrower vi ew was as-
serted, the pri macy of warrants was agai n emphasi zed, and a
standard by whi ch the scope of searches pursuant to arrest coul d
be ascertai ned was set out. When an arrest i s made, i t i s reason-
abl e for the arresti ng offi cer to search the person arrested i n order
to remove any weapons that the l atter mi ght seek to use i n order
to resi st arrest or effect hi s escape. Otherwi se, the offi cers safety
mi ght wel l be endangered, and the arrest i tsel f frustrated. I n addi -
ti on, i t i s enti rel y reasonabl e for the arresti ng offi cer to search for
and sei ze any evi dence on the arrestees person i n order to prevent
i ts conceal ment or destructi on. And the area i nto whi ch an arrestee
mi ght reach i n order to grab a weapon or evi denti ary i tems must,
of course, be governed by a l i ke rul e. A gun on a tabl e or i n a draw-
er i n front of one who i s arrested can be as dangerous to the arrest-
i ng offi cer as one conceal ed i n the cl othi ng of the person arrested.
There i s ampl e justi fi cati on, therefore, for a search of the arrestees
person and the area wi thi n hi s i mmedi ate control construi ng
that phrase to mean the area from wi thi n whi ch he mi ght gai n pos-
sessi on of a weapon or destructi bl e evi dence.
There i s no comparabl e justi fi cati on, however, for routi nel y
searchi ng any room other than that i n whi ch an arrest occurs or,
for that matter, for searchi ng through al l the desk drawers or other
cl osed or conceal ed areas i n that room i tsel f. Such searches, i n the
absence of wel l -recogni zed excepti ons, may be made onl y under the
authori ty of a search warrant.
46
Al though the vi abi l i ty of Chimel had been i n doubt for some
ti me as the Court refi ned and appl i ed i ts anal ysi s of reasonabl e
1237
47
Supra, pp. 120609. See, e.g., Cool i dge v. New Hampshi re, 403 U.S. 443, 492,
493, 510 (1971), i n whi ch the four di ssenters advocated the reasonabl eness argu-
ment rejected i n Chimel.
48
437 U.S. 385 (1978). The expectancy di sti ncti on i s at 391.
49
433 U.S. 1 (1977). Defendant and hi s l uggage, a footl ocker, had been removed
to the pol i ce stati on, where the search took pl ace.
50
I f, on the other hand, a seal ed shi ppi ng contai ner had al ready been opened
and reseal ed duri ng a val i d customs i nspecti on, and offi cers had mai ntai ned survei l -
l ance through a control l ed del i very to the suspect, there i s no reasonabl e expecta-
ti on of pri vacy i n the contents of the contai ner and offi cers may search i t, upon the
arrest of the suspect, wi thout havi ng obtai ned a warrant. I l l i noi s v. Andreas, 463
U.S. 765 (1983).
51
I l l i noi s v. LaFayette, 462 U.S. 640, 645 (1983) (i nventory search) (fol l owi ng
South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976)). Si mi l arl y, an i nventory search of
an i mpounded vehi cl e may i ncl ude the contents of a cl osed contai ner. Col orado v.
Berti ne, 479 U.S. 367 (1987). I nventory searches of cl osed contai ners must, however,
be gui ded by a pol i ce pol i cy contai ni ng standardi zed cri teri a for exerci se of di scre-
ti on. Fl ori da v. Wel l s, 495 U.S. 1 (1990).
52
453 U.S. 454 (1981).
53
I d. at 460 (quoti ng Chi mel v. Cal i forni a, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969)). I n thi s
parti cul ar i nstance, Bel ton had been removed from the automobi l e and handcuffed,
but the Court wi shed to create a general rul e removed from the fact-speci fi c nature
and justi fi abl e expectati ons of pri vacy,
47
i t has i n some but not al l
contexts survi ved the changed rati onal e. Thus, i n Mincey v. Ari-
zona,
48
the Court rejected a state effort to create a homi ci de-
scene excepti on for a warrantl ess search of an enti re apartment
extendi ng over four days. The occupant had been arrested and re-
moved and i t was true, the Court observed, that a person l egal l y
taken i nto custody has a l essened ri ght of pri vacy i n hi s person,
but he does not have a l essened ri ght of pri vacy i n hi s enti re house.
And, i n United States v. Chadwick,
49
emphasi zi ng a persons rea-
sonabl e expectati on of pri vacy i n hi s l uggage or other baggage, the
Court hel d that, once pol i ce have arrested and i mmobi l i zed a sus-
pect, val i dl y sei zed bags are not subject to search wi thout a war-
rant.
50
Pol i ce may, however, i n the course of jai l i ng an arrested
suspect conduct an i nventory search of the i ndi vi dual s personal ef-
fects, i ncl udi ng the contents of a shoul der bag, si nce the scope of
a stati on-house search may i n some ci rcumstances be even greater
than those supporti ng a search i mmedi atel y fol l owi ng arrest.
51
Sti l l purporti ng to reaffi rm Chimel, the Court i n New York v.
Belton
52
hel d that pol i ce offi cers who had made a val i d arrest of
the occupant of a vehi cl e coul d make a contemporaneous search of
the enti re passenger compartment of the automobi l e, i ncl udi ng con-
tai ners found therei n. Bel i evi ng that a fai rl y si mpl e rul e under-
standabl e to authori ti es i n the fi el d was desi rabl e, the Court rul ed
that arti cl es i nsi de the rel ati vel y narrow compass of the passenger
compartment of an automobi l e are i n fact general l y, i f not i nevi -
tabl y, wi thi n the area i nto whi ch an arrestee mi ght reach i n order
to grab a weapon or evi denti ary i te[m].
53
1238
of any one case. Contai ner here denotes any object capabl e of hol di ng another ob-
ject. I t thus i ncl udes cl osed or open gl ove compartments, consol es, or other recep-
tacl es l ocated anywhere wi thi n the passenger compartment, as wel l as l uggage,
boxes, bags, cl othi ng, and the l i ke. Our hol di ng encompasses onl y the i nteri or of the
passenger compartment of an automobi l e and does not encompass the trunk. I d.
at 46061 n.4.
54
Maryl and v. Bui e, 494 U.S. 325, 334 (1990). Thi s sweep i s not to be a ful l -
bl own, top-to-bottom search, but onl y a cursory i nspecti on of those spaces where
a person may be found. I d. at 33536.
55
267 U.S. 132 (1925). Carroll was a Prohi bi ti on-era l i quor case, whereas a
great number of modern automobi l e cases i nvol ve drugs.
56
I d. at 153. See also Husty v. Uni ted States, 282 U.S. 694 (1931); Scher v.
Uni ted States, 305 U.S. 251 (1938); Bri negar v. Uni ted States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949).
Al l of these cases i nvol ved contraband, but i n Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42
(1970), the Court, wi thout di scussi on, and over Justi ce Harl ans di ssent, i d. at 55,
62, extended the rul e to evi denti ary searches.
57
Cool i dge v. New Hampshi re, 403 U.S. 443, 45864 (1971). Thi s porti on of the
opi ni on had the adherence of a pl ural i ty onl y, Justi ce Harl an concurri ng on other
grounds, and there bei ng four di ssenters. I d. at 493, 504, 510, 523.
58
Preston v. Uni ted States, 376 U.S. 364 (1964); Dyke v. Tayl or I mpl ement Mfg.
Co., 391 U.S. 216 (1968).
Chimel has, however, been qual i fi ed by another consi derati on.
Not onl y may offi cers search areas wi thi n the arrestees i mmedi ate
control i n order to al l evi ate any threat posed by the arrestee, but
they may extend that search i f there may be a threat posed by un-
seen thi rd parti es i n the house. A protecti ve sweep of the enti re
premi ses (i ncl udi ng an arrestees home) may be undertaken on l ess
than probabl e cause i f offi cers have a reasonabl e bel i ef, based on
arti cul abl e facts, that the area to be swept may harbor an i ndi -
vi dual posi ng a danger to those on the arrest scene.
54
Vehi cul ar Searches. I n the earl y days of the automobi l e the
Court created an excepti on for searches of vehi cl es, hol di ng i n Car-
roll v. United States
55
that vehi cl es may be searched wi thout war-
rants i f the offi cer undertaki ng the search has probabl e cause to
bel i eve that the vehi cl e contai ns contraband. The Court expl ai ned
that the mobi l i ty of vehi cl es woul d al l ow them to be qui ckl y moved
from the juri sdi cti on i f ti me were taken to obtai n a warrant.
56
I ni ti al l y the Court l i mi ted Carrolls reach, hol di ng i mpermi s-
si bl e the warrantl ess sei zure of a parked automobi l e merel y be-
cause i t i s movabl e, and i ndi cati ng that vehi cl es may be stopped
onl y whi l e movi ng or reasonabl y contemporaneousl y wi th move-
ment.
57
Al so, the Court rul ed that the search must be reasonabl y
contemporaneous wi th the stop, so that i t was not permi ssi bl e to
remove the vehi cl e to the stati onhouse for a warrantl ess search at
the conveni ence of the pol i ce.
58
The Court next devel oped a reduced pri vacy rati onal e to sup-
pl ement the mobi l i ty rati onal e, expl ai ni ng that the confi gurati on,
use, and regul ati on of automobi l es often may di l ute the reasonabl e
1239
59
Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 761 (1979).
60
Cardwel l v. Lewi s, 417 U.S. 583, 590 (1974) (pl ural i ty opi ni on), quoted in
Uni ted States v. Chadwi ck, 433 U.S. 1, 12 (1977). See also Uni ted States v. Orti z,
422 U.S. 891, 896 (1975); Uni ted States v. Marti nez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 561
(1976); South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 36768 (1976); Robbi ns v. Cal i for-
ni a, 453 U.S. 420, 42425 (1981); Uni ted States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 807 n.9
(1982).
61
Cal i forni a v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 393 (1985) (l eavi ng open the questi on of
whether the automobi l e excepti on al so appl i es to a mobi l e home bei ng used as a
resi dence and not readi l y mobi l e).
62
Al mei da-Sanchez v. Uni ted States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973) (rovi ng patrol s); Uni t-
ed States v. Orti z, 422 U.S. 891 (1975). Cf. Col orado v. Banni ster, 449 U.S. 1 (1980).
63
Del aware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979) (random stops of motori sts to check
dri vers l i cense and regi strati on papers and safety features of cars); Uni ted States
v. Bri gnoni -Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975) (rovi ng patrol s i n areas near i nternati onal
borders on l ook-out for i l l egal al i ens). I n Prouse, the Court cauti oned that i t was
not precl udi ng the States from devel opi ng methods for spot checks that i nvol ve l ess
i ntrusi on or that do not i nvol ve unconstrai ned exerci se of di screti on. 440 U.S. at
648.
64
Mi chi gan Dept of State Pol i ce v. Si tz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990) (uphol di ng a sobri -
ety checkpoi nt at whi ch al l motori sts are bri efl y stopped for prel i mi nary questi oni ng
and observati on for si gns of i ntoxi cati on). See also Uni ted States v. Marti nez-Fuerte,
428 U.S. 543 (1976) (uphol di ng border patrol checkpoi nt, over 60 mi l es from the bor-
der, for questi oni ng desi gned to apprehend i l l egal al i ens).
65
Mi chi gan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1049 (1983) (hol di ng that contraband found
i n the course of such a search i s admi ssi bl e).
expectati on of pri vacy that exi sts wi th respect to di fferentl y si tu-
ated property.
59
One has a l esser expectati on of pri vacy i n a
motor vehi cl e because i ts functi on i s transportati on and i t sel dom
serves as ones resi dence or as the reposi tory of personal effects.
. . . I t travel s publ i c thoroughfares where both i ts occupants and
i ts contents are i n pl ai n vi ew.
60
Whi l e motor homes do serve as
resi dences and as reposi tori es for personal effects, and whi l e thei r
contents are often shi el ded from publ i c vi ew, the Court extended
the automobi l e excepti on to them as wel l , hol di ng that there i s a
di mi ni shed expectati on of pri vacy i n a mobi l e home parked i n a
parki ng l ot and l i censed for vehi cul ar travel , hence readi l y mo-
bi l e.
61
The reduced expectancy concept has broadened pol i ce powers
to conduct automobi l e searches wi thout warrants, but they sti l l
must have probabl e cause to search a vehi cl e
62
and they must
have some arti cul abl e suspi ci on of cri mi nal acti vi ty i n order to
make random stops of vehi cl es on the roads.
63
By contrast, fi xed-
checkpoi nt stops i n the absence of any i ndi vi dual i zed suspi ci on
have been uphel d.
64
Once pol i ce have val i dl y stopped a vehi cl e,
they may al so, based on arti cul abl e facts warranti ng a reasonabl e
bel i ef that weapons may be present, conduct a Terry-type protecti ve
search of those porti ons of the passenger compartment i n whi ch a
weapon coul d be pl aced or hi dden.
65
And, i n the absence of such
reasonabl e suspi ci on as to weapons, pol i ce may sei ze contraband
1240
66
Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730 (1983). Si mi l arl y, si nce there i s no reasonabl e
pri vacy i nterest i n the vehi cl e i denti fi cati on number, requi red by l aw to be pl aced
on the dashboard so as to be vi si bl e through the wi ndshi el d, pol i ce may reach i nto
the passenger compartment to remove i tems obscuri ng the number and may sei ze
i tems i n pl ai n vi ew whi l e doi ng so. New York v. Cl ass, 475 U.S. 106 (1986).
67
Mi chi gan v. Thomas, 458 U.S. 259, 261 (1982). See also Chambers v.
Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970); Texas v. Whi te, 423 U.S. 67 (1975); Uni ted States v.
Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 807 n.9 (1982).
68
Cardwel l v. Lewi s, 417 U.S. 583 (1974). Justi ce Powel l concurred on other
grounds.
69
Cady v. Dombrowski , 413 U.S. 433 (1973); South Dakota v. Opperman, 428
U.S. 364 (1976). See also Cooper v. Cal i forni a, 386 U.S. 58 (1967); Uni ted States v.
Harri s, 390 U.S. 234 (1968). Pol i ce, i n conducti ng an i nventory search of a vehi cl e,
may open cl osed contai ners i n order to i nventory contents. Col orado v. Berti ne, 479
U.S. 367 (1987).
70
Uni ted States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581 (1948). Whi l e Di Re i s now an ol d case,
i t appears sti l l to control . See Ybarra v. I l l i noi s, 444 U.S. 85, 9496 (1979).
71
Rakas v. I l l i noi s, 439 U.S. 128 (1978).
and suspi ci ous i tems i n pl ai n vi ew i nsi de the passenger compart-
ment.
66
Once pol i ce have probabl e cause to bel i eve there i s contraband
i n a vehi cl e, they may remove i t from the scene to the stati onhouse
i n order to conduct a search, wi thout thereby bei ng requi red to ob-
tai n a warrant. [T]he justi fi cati on to conduct such a warrantl ess
search does not vani sh once the car has been i mmobi l i zed; nor does
i t depend upon a revi ewi ng courts assessment of the l i kel i hood i n
each parti cul ar case that the car woul d have been dri ven away, or
that i ts contents woul d have been tampered wi th, duri ng the peri od
requi red for the pol i ce to obtai n a warrant.
67
The Justi ces were
evenl y di vi ded, however, on the propri ety of warrantl ess sei zure of
an arrestees automobi l e from a publ i c parki ng l ot several hours
after hi s arrest, i ts transportati on to a pol i ce i mpoundment l ot, and
the taki ng of ti re casts and exteri or pai nt scrapi ngs.
68
Because of
the l essened expectati on of pri vacy, i nventory searches of i m-
pounded automobi l es are justi fi abl e i n order to protect publ i c safety
and the owners property, and any evi dence of cri mi nal acti vi ty di s-
covered i n the course of the i nventori es i s admi ssi bl e i n court.
69
I t i s not l awful for the pol i ce i n undertaki ng a warrantl ess
search of an automobi l e to extend the search to the passengers
therei n.
70
But because passengers i n an automobi l e have no rea-
sonabl e expectati on of pri vacy i n the i nteri or area of the car, a
warrantl ess search of the gl ove compartment and the spaces under
the seats, whi ch turned up evi dence i mpl i cati ng the passengers, i n-
vaded no Fourth Amendment i nterest of the passengers.
71
Luggage
and other cl osed contai ners found i n automobi l es may al so be sub-
jected to warrantl ess searches based on probabl e cause, the same
rul e now appl yi ng whether the pol i ce have probabl e cause to search
1241
72
Cal i forni a v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1991) (overrul i ng Arkansas v. Sanders,
442 U.S. 753 (1979).
73
Uni ted States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982). A Ross search of a contai ner
found i n an automobi l e need not occur soon after i ts sei zure. Uni ted States v. Johns,
469 U.S. 478 (1985) (three-day ti me l apse). See also Fl ori da v. Ji meno, 500 U.S. 248
(1991) (consent to search automobi l e for drugs consti tutes consent to open contai n-
ers wi thi n the car that mi ght contai n drugs).
74
462 U.S. 579 (1983). The opi ni on of the Court, wri tten by Justi ce Rehnqui st,
was joi ned by Chi ef Justi ce Burger and by Justi ces Whi te, Bl ackmun, Powel l , and
OConnor. Justi ce Brennans di ssent was joi ned by Justi ce Marshal l and, on
mootness but not on the meri ts, by Justi ce Stevens.
75
19 U.S.C. 1581(a), deri ved from 31 of the Act of Aug. 4, 1790, ch. 35, 1
Stat. 164.
76
462 U.S. at 589. Justi ce Brennans di ssent argued that a fi xed checkpoi nt was
feasi bl e i n thi s case, i nvol vi ng a shi p channel i n an i nl and waterway. i d. at at 608
n.10. The fact that the Courts rati onal e was geared to the di ffi cul ti es of l aw enforce-
ment i n the open seas suggests a rel uctance to make excepti ons to the general rul e.
Note as wel l the Courts l ater reference to thi s case as among those refl ect[i ng]
l ongstandi ng concern for the protecti on of the i ntegri ty of the border. Uni ted States
v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 538 (1985).
77
462 U.S. at 593.
onl y the contai ners
72
or whether they have probabl e cause to
search the automobi l e for somethi ng capabl e of bei ng hel d i n the
contai ner.
73
Vessel Searches. Not onl y i s the warrant requi rement i nap-
pl i cabl e to bri ef stops of vessel s, but al so none of the safeguards ap-
pl i cabl e to stops of automobi l es on l ess than probabl e cause are
necessary predi cates to stops of vessel s. I n United States v.
Villamonte-Marquez,
74
the Court uphel d a random stop and board-
i ng of a vessel by customs agents, l acki ng any suspi ci on of wrong-
doi ng, for purpose of i nspecti ng documentati on. The boardi ng was
authori zed by statute deri ved from an act of the Fi rst Congress,
75
and hence had an i mpressi ve hi stori cal pedi gree carryi ng wi th i t
a presumpti on of consti tuti onal i ty. Moreover, i mportant factual
di fferences between vessel s l ocated i n waters offeri ng ready access
to the open sea and automobi l es on pri nci pal thoroughfares i n the
border area justi fy appl i cati on of a l ess restri cti ve rul e for vessel
searches. The reason why random stops of vehi cl es have been hel d
i mpermi ssi bl e under the Fourth Amendment, the Court expl ai ned,
i s that stops at fi xed checkpoi nts or roadbl ocks are both feasi bl e
and l ess subject to abuse of di screti on by authori ti es. But no rea-
sonabl e cl ai m can be made that permanent checkpoi nts woul d be
practi cal on waters such as these where vessel s can move i n any
di recti on at any ti me and need not fol l ow establ i shed avenues as
automobi l es must do.
76
Because there i s a substanti al govern-
mental i nterest i n enforci ng documentati on l aws, especi al l y i n wa-
ters where the need to deter or apprehend smuggl ers i s great, the
Court found the l i mi ted but not mi ni mal i ntrusi on occasi oned
by boardi ng for documentati on i nspecti on to be reasonabl e.
77
Di s-
1242
78
462 U.S. at 598. Justi ce Brennan contended that al l previ ous cases had re-
qui red some di screti on-l i mi ti ng feature such as a requi rement of probabl e cause,
reasonabl e suspi ci on, fi xed checkpoi nts i nstead of rovi ng patrol s, and l i mi tati on of
border searches to border areas, and that these pri nci pl es set forth i n Delaware v.
Prouse (supra p. 1239, n.63) shoul d govern. 462 U.S. at 599, 601.
79
Amos v. Uni ted States, 255 U.S. 313 (1921); Zap v. Uni ted States, 328 U.S.
624 (1946); Schneckl oth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
80
Bumper v. North Carol i na, 391 U.S. 543 (1968).
81
Johnson v. Uni ted States, 333 U.S. 10, 13 (1948).
82
Schneckl oth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 23133 (1973).
83
Amos v. Uni ted States, 255 U.S. 313 (1921); Johnson v. Uni ted States, 333
U.S. 10 (1948); Bumper v. North Carol i na, 391 U.S. 543 (1968).
84
On Lee v. Uni ted States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952); Lopez v. Uni ted States, 373
U.S. 427 (1963); Hoffa v. Uni ted States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966); Lewi s v. Uni ted States,
385 U.S. 206 (1966); Uni ted States v. Whi te, 401 U.S. 745 (1971). Cf. Osborn v.
Uni ted States, 385 U.S. 323 (1966) (pri or judi ci al approval obtai ned before wi red i n-
former sent i nto defendants presence). Probl ems may be encountered by pol i ce,
however, i n speci al ci rcumstances. See Messi ah v. Uni ted States, 377 U.S. 201
(1964); Uni ted States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264 (1980); Uni ted States v. Karo, 468 U.S.
705 (1984) (i nstal l ati on of beeper wi th consent of i nformer who sol d contai ner wi th
beeper to suspect i s permi ssi bl e wi th pri or judi ci al approval , but use of beeper to
moni tor pri vate resi dence i s not).
senti ng Justi ce Brennan argued that the Court for the fi rst ti me
was approvi ng a compl etel y random sei zure and detenti on of per-
sons and an entry onto pri vate, noncommerci al premi ses by pol i ce
offi cers, wi thout any l i mi tati ons whatever on the offi cers di screti on
or any safeguards agai nst abuse.
78
Consent Searches. Fourth Amendment ri ghts, l i ke other
consti tuti onal ri ghts, may be wai ved, and one may consent to
search of hi s person or premi ses by offi cers who have not compl i ed
wi th the Amendment.
79
The Court, however, has i nsi sted that the
burden i s on the prosecuti on to prove the vol untari ness of the con-
sent
80
and awareness of the ri ght of choi ce.
81
Revi ewi ng courts
must determi ne on the basi s of the total i ty of the ci rcumstances
whether consent has been freel y gi ven or has been coerced. Actual
knowl edge of the ri ght to refuse consent i s not essenti al to the
i ssue of vol untari ness, and therefore pol i ce are not requi red to ac-
quai nt a person wi th hi s ri ghts, as through a Fourth Amendment
versi on of Miranda warni ngs.
82
But consent wi l l not be regarded
as vol untary when the offi cer asserts hi s offi ci al status and cl ai m
of ri ght and the occupant yi el ds to these factors rather than makes
hi s own determi nati on to admi t offi cers.
83
When consent i s ob-
tai ned through the decepti on of an undercover offi cer or an i n-
former gai ni ng admi ssi on wi thout, of course, advi si ng a suspect
who he i s, the Court has hel d that the suspect has si mpl y assumed
the ri sk that an i nvi tee woul d betray hi m, and evi dence obtai ned
through the decepti on i s admi ssi bl e.
84
Addi ti onal i ssues ari se i n determi ni ng the val i di ty of consent
to search when consent i s gi ven not by the suspect but by a thi rd
1243
85
Uni ted States v. Matl ock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 (1974) (val i d consent by woman
wi th whom defendant was l i vi ng and shari ng the bedroom searched). See also Chap-
man v. Uni ted States, 365 U.S. 610 (1961) (l andl ords consent i nsuffi ci ent); Stoner
v. Cal i forni a, 376 U.S. 483 (1964) (hotel desk cl erk l acked authori ty to consent to
search of guests room); Frazi er v. Cul p, 394 U.S. 731 (1969) (joi nt user of duffel
bag had authori ty to consent to search).
86
I l l i noi s v. Rodri guez, 497 U.S. 177 (1990). See also Fl ori da v. Ji meno, 500 U.S.
248, 251 (1991) (i t was objecti vel y reasonabl e for offi cer to bel i eve that suspects
consent to search hi s car for narcoti cs i ncl uded consent to search contai ners found
wi thi n the car).
87
Uni ted States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 616 (1977) (sustai ni ng search of i n-
comi ng mai l ). See also I l l i noi s v. Andreas, 463 U.S. 765 (1983) (openi ng by customs
i nspector of l ocked contai ner shi pped from abroad).
88
Act of Jul y 31, 1789, ch. 5, 23, 24, 1 Stat. 43. See 19 U.S.C. 507, 1581,
1582.
89
Carrol l v. Uni ted States, 267 U.S. 132, 154 (1925); Uni ted States v. Thi rty-
Seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 376 (1971); Al mei da-Sanchez v. Uni ted States,
413 U.S. 266, 272 (1973).
90
Uni ted States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531 (1985) (approvi ng
warrantl ess detenti on i ncommuni cado for more than 24 hours of travel er suspected
of al i mentary canal drug smuggl i ng).
91
I d. A travel er suspected of al i mentary canal drug smuggl i ng was stri p
searched, and then gi ven a choi ce between an abdomi nal x-ray or moni tored bowel
movements. Because the suspect chose the l atter opti on, the court di savowed deci -
si on as to what l evel of suspi ci on, i f any, i s requi red for . . . stri p, body cavi ty, or
i nvol untary x-ray searches. I d. at 541 n.4.
party. I n the earl i er cases, thi rd party consent was deemed suffi -
ci ent i f that party possessed common authori ty over or other suffi -
ci ent rel ati onshi p to the premi ses or effects sought to be i n-
spected.
85
Now, however, actual common authori ty over the prem-
i ses i s no l onger requi red; i t i s enough i f the searchi ng offi cer had
a reasonabl e but mi staken bel i ef that the thi rd party had common
authori ty and coul d consent to the search.
86
Border Searches. That searches made at the border, pursu-
ant to the l ongstandi ng ri ght of the soverei gn to protect i tsel f by
stoppi ng and exami ni ng persons and property crossi ng i nto thi s
country, are reasonabl e si mpl y by vi rtue of the fact that they occur
at the border, shoul d, by now, requi re no extended demonstra-
ti on.
87
Authori zed by the Fi rst Congress,
88
the customs search i n
these ci rcumstances requi res no warrant, no probabl e cause, not
even the showi ng of some degree of suspi ci on that accompani es
even i nvesti gatory stops.
89
Moreover, whi l e prol onged detenti on of
travel ers beyond the routi ne customs search and i nspecti on must
be justi fi ed by the Terry standard of reasonabl e suspi ci on havi ng
a parti cul ari zed and objecti ve basi s,
90
Terry protecti ons as to the
l ength and i ntrusi veness of the search do not appl y.
91
I nl and stoppi ngs and searches i n areas away from the borders
are a di fferent matter al together. Thus, i n Almeida-Sanchez v.
1244
92
413 U.S. 266 (1973). Justi ces Whi te, Bl ackmun, Rehnqui st, and Chi ef Justi ce
Burger woul d have found the search reasonabl e upon the congressi onal determi na-
ti on that searches by such rovi ng patrol s were the onl y effecti ve means to pol i ce bor-
der smuggl i ng. I d. at 285. Justi ce Powel l , concurri ng, argued i n favor of a general ,
admi ni strati ve warrant authori ty not ti ed to parti cul ar vehi cl es, much l i ke the type
of warrant suggested for noncri mi nal admi ni strati ve i nspecti ons of homes and com-
merci al establ i shments for heal th and safety purposes, i d. at 275, but the Court has
not yet had occasi on to pass on a speci fi c case. See Uni ted States v. Marti nez-
Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 547 n.2, 562 n.15 (1976).
93
Uni ted States v. Orti z, 422 U.S. 891 (1975).
94
Uni ted States v. Bri gnoni -Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975). However, stoppi ng of
defendants car sol el y because the offi cers observed the Mexi can appearance of the
occupants was unjusti fi ed. I d. at 886. Contrast Uni ted States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411
(1981), where border agents di d have grounds for reasonabl e suspi ci on that the vehi -
cl e they stopped contai ned i l l egal al i ens.
95
Uni ted States v. Marti nez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976). The Court deemed the
i ntrusi on on Fourth Amendment i nterests to be qui te l i mi ted, even i f offi cers acted
on the basi s of the Mexi can appearance of the occupants i n referri ng motori sts to
a secondary i nspecti on area for questi oni ng, whereas the el i mi nati on of the practi ce
woul d deny to the Government i ts onl y practi cabl e way to apprehend smuggl ed
al i ens and to deter the practi ce. Si mi l arl y, outsi de of the border/al i ens context, the
Court has uphel d use of fi xed sobri ety checkpoi nts at whi ch al l motori sts are bri ef-
l y stopped for prel i mi nary questi oni ng and observati on for si gns of i ntoxi cati on.
Mi chi gan Dept of State Pol i ce v. Si tz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990).
United States,
92
the Court hel d that a warrantl ess stop and search
of defendants automobi l e on a hi ghway some 20 mi l es from the
border by a rovi ng patrol l acki ng probabl e cause to bel i eve that the
vehi cl e contai ned i l l egal al i ens vi ol ated the Fourth Amendment.
Si mi l arl y, the Court i nval i dated an automobi l e search at a fi xed
checkpoi nt wel l removed from the border; whi l e agreei ng that a
fi xed checkpoi nt probabl y gave motori sts l ess cause for al arm than
di d rovi ng patrol s, the Court nonethel ess hel d that the i nvasi on of
pri vacy entai l ed i n a search was just as i ntrusi ve and must be jus-
ti fi ed by a showi ng of probabl e cause or consent.
93
On the other
hand, when motori sts are bri efl y stopped, not for purposes of a
search but i n order that offi cers may i nqui re i nto thei r resi dence
status, ei ther by aski ng a few questi ons or by checki ng papers, di f-
ferent resul ts are achi eved, so l ong as the stops are not trul y ran-
dom. Rovi ng patrol s may stop vehi cl es for purposes of a bri ef i n-
qui ry, provi ded offi cers are aware of speci fi c arti cul abl e facts, to-
gether wi th rati onal i nferences from those facts, that reasonabl y
warrant suspi ci on that an automobi l e contai ns i l l egal al i ens; i n
such a case the i nterference wi th Fourth Amendment ri ghts i s
modest and the l aw enforcement i nterests served are si gni fi -
cant.
94
Fi xed checkpoi nts provi de addi ti onal safeguards; here offi -
cers may hal t al l vehi cl es bri efl y i n order to questi on occupants
even i n the absence of any reasonabl e suspi ci on that the parti cul ar
vehi cl e contai ns i l l egal al i ens.
95
1245
96
265 U.S. 57 (1924). See also Ai r Pol l uti on Vari ance Bd. v. Western Al fal fa
Corp., 416 U.S. 86 (1974).
97
389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967). Cf. Cady v. Dombrowski , 413 U.S. 433, 450 (1973)
(ci ti ng Hester approvi ngl y).
98
466 U.S. 170 (1984) (approvi ng warrantl ess i ntrusi on past no trespassi ng
si gns and around l ocked gate, to vi ew fi el d not vi si bl e from outsi de property).
99
I d. at 178. See also Cal i forni a v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988) (approvi ng
warrantl ess search of garbage l eft curbsi de readi l y accessi bl e to ani mal s, chi l dren,
scavengers, snoops, and other members of the publ i c).
100
Uni ted States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294 (1987) (space i mmedi atel y outsi de a
barn, accessi bl e onl y after crossi ng a seri es of ranch-styl e fences and si tuated one-
hal f mi l e from the publ i c road, consti tutes unprotected open fi el d).
101
Cal i forni a v. Ci raol o, 476 U.S. 207 (1986). Acti vi ti es wi thi n the curti l age are
nonethel ess sti l l enti tl ed to some Fourth Amendment protecti on. The Court has de-
scri bed four consi derati ons for determi ni ng whether an area fal l s wi thi n the
curti l age: proxi mi ty to the home, whether the area i s i ncl uded wi thi n an encl osure
al so surroundi ng the home, the nature of the uses to whi ch the area i s put, and
the steps taken by the resi dent to shi el d the area from vi ew of passersby. Uni ted
States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294 (1987) (barn 50 yards outsi de fence surroundi ng home,
used for processi ng chemi cal s, and separated from publ i c access onl y by seri es of
l i vestock fences, by chai ned and l ocked dri veway, and by one-hal f mi l es di stance,
i s not wi thi n curti l age).
102
Fl ori da v. Ri l ey, 488 U.S. 445 (1989) (vi ew through parti al l y open roof of
greenhouse).
Open Fi el ds. I n Hester v. United States,
96
the Court hel d
that the Fourth Amendment di d not protect open fi el ds and that,
therefore, pol i ce searches i n such areas as pastures, wooded areas,
open water, and vacant l ots need not compl y wi th the requi rements
of warrants and probabl e cause. The Courts announcement i n Katz
v. United States
97
that the Amendment protects peopl e not pl aces
cast some doubt on the vi tal i ty of the open fi el ds pri nci pl e, but al l
such doubts were cast away i n Oliver v. United States.
98
I nvoki ng
Hesters rel i ance on the l i teral wordi ng of the Fourth Amendment
(open fi el ds are not effects) and di sti ngui shi ng Katz, the Court
rul ed that the open fi el ds excepti on appl i es to fi el ds that are fenced
and posted. [A]n i ndi vi dual may not l egi ti matel y demand pri vacy
for acti vi ti es conducted out of doors i n fi el ds, except i n the area i m-
medi atel y surroundi ng the home.
99
Nor may an i ndi vi dual de-
mand pri vacy for acti vi ti es conducted wi thi n outbui l di ngs and vi si -
bl e by trespassers peeri ng i nto the bui l di ngs from just outsi de.
100
Even wi thi n the curti l age and notwi thstandi ng that the owner has
gone to the extreme of erecti ng a 10-foot hi gh fence i n order to
screen the area from ground-l evel vi ew, there i s no reasonabl e ex-
pectati on of pri vacy from naked-eye i nspecti on from fi xed-wi ng ai r-
craft fl yi ng i n navi gabl e ai rspace.
101
Si mi l arl y, naked-eye i nspec-
ti on from hel i copters fl yi ng even l ower contravenes no reasonabl e
expectati on of pri vacy.
102
And aeri al photography of commerci al fa-
ci l i ti es secured from ground-l evel publ i c vi ew i s permi ssi bl e, the
1246
103
Dow Chemi cal Co. v. Uni ted States, 476 U.S. 227 (1986) (suggesti ng that
aeri al photography of the curti l age woul d be i mpermi ssi bl e).
104
Washi ngton v. Chri sman, 455 U.S. 1 (1982) (offi cer l awful l y i n dorm room
may sei ze mari juana seeds and pi pe i n open vi ew); Uni ted States v. Santana, 427
U.S. 38 (1976) (pl ai n vi ew justi fi cati on for offi cers to enter home to arrest after
observi ng defendant standi ng i n open doorway); Harri s v. Uni ted States, 390 U.S.
234 (1968) (offi cer who opened door of i mpounded automobi l e and saw evi dence i n
pl ai n vi ew properl y sei zed i t); Ker v. Cal i forni a, 374 U.S. 23 (1963) (offi cers entered
premi ses wi thout warrant to make arrest because of exi gent ci rcumstances sei zed
evi dence i n pl ai n si ght). Cf. Cool i dge v. New Hampshi re, 403 U.S. 443, 46473
(1971), and i d. at 510 (Justi ce Whi te di ssenti ng). Maryl and v. Bui e, 494 U.S. 325
(1990) (i tems sei zed i n pl ai n vi ew duri ng protecti ve sweep of home i nci dent to ar-
rest); Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730 (1983) (contraband on car seat i n pl ai n vi ew
of offi cer who had stopped car and asked for dri vers l i cense); New York v. Cl ass,
475 U.S. 106 (1986) (evi dence seen whi l e l ooki ng for vehi cl e i denti fi cati on number).
There i s no requi rement that the di scovery of evi dence i n pl ai n vi ew must be i nad-
vertent. See Horton v. Cal i forni a, 496 U.S. 128 (1990) (i n spi te of Amendments par-
ti cul ari ty requi rement, offi cers wi th warrant to search for proceeds of robbery may
sei ze weapons of robbery i n pl ai n vi ew).
105
Steel e v. Uni ted States, 267 U.S. 498 (1925) (offi cers observed contraband i n
vi ew through open doorway; had probabl e cause to procure warrant). Cf. Tayl or v.
Uni ted States, 286 U.S. 1 (1932) (offi cers observed contraband i n pl ai n vi ew i n ga-
rage, warrantl ess entry to sei ze was unconsti tuti onal ).
106
Ari zona v. Hi cks, 480 U.S. 321 (1987) (pol i ce l awful l y i n apartment to i nves-
ti gate shooti ng l acked probabl e cause to i nspect expensi ve stereo equi pment to
record seri al numbers).
107
I l l i noi s v. Andreas, 463 U.S. 765, 771 (1983) (l ocker customs agents had
opened, and whi ch was subsequentl y traced). Accord, Uni ted States v. Jacobsen, 466
U.S. 109 (1984) (i nspecti on of package opened by pri vate frei ght carri er who noti fi ed
drug agents).
108
469 U.S. 325 (1985).
Court fi ndi ng such spaces more anal ogous to open fi el ds than to
the curti l age of a dwel l i ng.
103
Pl ai n Vi ew. Somewhat si mi l ar i n rati onal e i s the rul e that
objects fal l i ng i n the pl ai n vi ew of an offi cer who has a ri ght to
be i n the posi ti on to have that vi ew are subject to sei zure wi thout
a warrant
104
or that i f the offi cer needs a warrant or probabl e
cause to search and sei ze hi s l awful observati on wi l l provi de
grounds therefor.
105
The pl ai n vi ew doctri ne i s l i mi ted, however,
by the probabl e cause requi rement: offi cers must have probabl e
cause to bel i eve that i tems i n pl ai n vi ew are contraband before
they may search or sei ze them.
106
The Court has anal ogi zed from the pl ai n vi ew doctri ne to hol d
that once offi cers have l awful l y observed contraband, the owners
pri vacy i nterest i n that i tem i s l ost, and offi cers may reseal a con-
tai ner, trace i ts path through a control l ed del i very, and sei ze and
reopen the contai ner wi thout a warrant.
107
Publ i c School s. I n New J ersey v. T.L.O.,
108
the Court set
forth the pri nci pl es governi ng searches by publ i c school authori ti es.
The Fourth Amendment appl i es to searches conducted by publ i c
school offi ci al s because school offi ci al s act as representati ves of the
1247
109
I d. at 336 (1984).
110
I d. at 340.
111
Thi s si ngl e rul e, the Court expl ai ned, wi l l permi t school authori ti es to regu-
l ate thei r conduct accordi ng to the di ctates of reason and common sense. 469 U.S.
at 343. Rejecti ng the suggesti on of di ssenti ng Justi ce Stevens, the Court was un-
wi l l i ng to adopt a standard under whi ch the l egal i ty of a search i s dependent upon
a judges eval uati on of the rel ati ve i mportance of vari ous school rul es. I d. at n.9.
112
469 U.S. at 342.
113
I d.
114
480 U.S. 709 (1987).
115
480 U.S. at 725. Not at i ssue was whether there must be i ndi vi dual i zed sus-
pi ci on for i nvesti gati ons of work-rel ated mi sconduct.
116
Thi s posi ti on was stated i n Justi ce OConnors pl ural i ty opi ni on, joi ned by
Chi ef Justi ce Rehnqui st and by Justi ces Whi te and Powel l .
117
480 U.S. at 732 (Scal i a, J., concurri ng i n judgment).
State, not merel y as surrogates for the parents.
109
However, the
school setti ng requi res some easi ng of the restri cti ons to whi ch
searches by publ i c authori ti es are ordi nari l y subject.
110
Nei ther
the warrant requi rement nor the probabl e cause standard i s appro-
pri ate, the Court rul ed. I nstead, a si mpl e reasonabl eness standard
governs al l searches of students persons and effects by school au-
thori ti es.
111
A search must be reasonabl e at i ts i ncepti on, i .e.,
there must be reasonabl e grounds for suspecti ng that the search
wi l l turn up evi dence that the student has vi ol ated or i s vi ol ati ng
ei ther the l aw or the rul es of the school .
112
School searches must
al so be reasonabl y rel ated i n scope to the ci rcumstances justi fyi ng
the i nterference, and not excessi vel y i ntrusi ve i n l i ght of the age
and sex of the student and the nature of the i nfracti on.
113
I n ap-
pl yi ng these rul es, the Court uphel d as reasonabl e the search of a
students purse to determi ne whether the student, accused of vi o-
l ati ng a school rul e by smoki ng i n the l avatory, possessed ci ga-
rettes. The search for ci garettes uncovered evi dence of drug acti vi ty
hel d admi ssi bl e i n a prosecuti on under the juveni l e l aws.
Government Offi ces. Si mi l ar pri nci pl es appl y to a publ i c
empl oyers work-rel ated search of i ts empl oyees offi ces, desks, or
fi l e cabi nets, except that i n thi s context the Court di sti ngui shed
searches conducted for l aw enforcement purposes. I n OConnor v.
Ortega,
114
a majori ty of Justi ces agreed, al bei t on somewhat di ffer-
i ng rati onal es, that nei ther a warrant nor a probabl e cause requi re-
ment shoul d appl y to empl oyer searches for noni nvesti gatory,
work-rel ated purposes, as wel l as for i nvesti gati ons of work-rel ated
mi sconduct.
115
Four Justi ces woul d requi re a case-by-case i nqui ry
i nto the reasonabl eness of such searches;
116
one woul d hol d that
such searches do not vi ol ate the Fourth Amendment.
117
Pri sons and Regul ati on of Probati on. Searches of pri son
cel l s by pri son admi ni strators are not l i mi ted even by a reasonabl e-
ness standard, the Court havi ng hel d that the Fourth Amendment
1248
118
Hudson v. Pal mer, 468 U.S. 517, 526 (1984).
119
483 U.S. 868 (1987) (search based on i nformati on from pol i ce detecti ve that
there was or mi ght be contraband i n probati oners apartment).
120
483 U.S. at 87374.
121
I d. at 718, 721.
122
489 U.S. 602 (1989).
123
489 U.S. 656 (1989).
proscri pti on agai nst unreasonabl e searches does not appl y wi thi n
the confi nes of the pri son cel l .
118
Thus, pri son admi ni strators may
conduct random shakedown searches of i nmates cel l s wi thout the
need to adopt any establ i shed practi ce or pl an, and i nmates must
l ook to the Ei ghth Amendment or to state tort l aw for redress
agai nst harassment, mal i ci ous property destructi on, and the l i ke.
Nei ther a warrant nor probabl e cause i s needed for an admi n-
i strati ve search of a probati oners home. I t i s enough, the Court
rul ed i n Griffin v. Wisconsin, that such a search was conducted
pursuant to a val i d regul ati on that i tsel f sati sfi es the Fourth
Amendments reasonabl eness standard (e.g., by requi ri ng reason-
abl e grounds for a search).
119
A States operati on of a probati on
system, l i ke i ts operati on of a school , government offi ce or pri son,
or i ts supervi si on of a regul ated i ndustry, . . . presents speci al
needs beyond normal l aw enforcement that may justi fy departures
from the usual warrant and probabl e cause requi rements.
120
Pro-
bati on, l i ke i ncarcerati on, i s a form of cri mi nal sancti on, the Court
noted, and a warrant or probabl e cause requi rement woul d i nter-
fere wi th the ongoi ng [non-adversari al ] supervi sory rel ati onshi p
requi red for proper functi oni ng of the system.
121
Drug Testi ng. I n two 1989 deci si ons the Court hel d that no
warrant, probabl e cause, or even i ndi vi dual i zed suspi ci on i s re-
qui red for mandatory drug testi ng of certai n cl asses of rai l road and
publ i c empl oyees. I n each case, speci al needs beyond the normal
need for l aw enforcement were i denti fi ed as justi fyi ng the drug
testi ng. I n Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Assn,
122
the
Court uphel d regul ati ons requi ri ng rai l roads to admi ni ster bl ood,
uri ne, and breath tests to empl oyees i nvol ved i n certai n trai n acci -
dents or vi ol ati ng certai n safety rul es; uphel d i n National Treasury
Employees Union v. Von Raab
123
was a Customs Servi ce screeni ng
program requi ri ng uri nal ysi s testi ng of empl oyees seeki ng transfer
or promoti on to posi ti ons havi ng di rect i nvol vement wi th drug
i nterdi cti on, or to posi ti ons requi ri ng the i ncumbent to carry fi re-
arms. The Court i n Skinner found a compel l i ng governmental i n-
terest i n testi ng the rai l road empl oyees wi thout any showi ng of i n-
di vi dual i zed suspi ci on, si nce operati on of trai ns by anyone i mpai red
by drugs can cause great human l oss before any si gns of i mpai r-
1249
124
489 U.S. at 628.
125
I d. at 628.
126
I d. at 63132.
127
Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 67071. Di ssenti ng Justi ce Scal i a di scounted the fee-
bl e justi fi cati ons rel i ed upon by the Court, bel i evi ng i nstead that the onl y pl au-
si bl e expl anati on for the drug testi ng program was the symbol i sm of a govern-
ment agency setti ng an exampl e for other empl oyers to fol l ow. 489 U.S. at 68687.
128
I d. at 672.
129
See, e.g., Pol i cemens Benevol ent Assn Local 318 v. Townshi p of Washi ngton,
850 F.2d 133 (3d Ci r. 1988), cert. denied 490 U.S. 1004 (1989) (random uri nal ysi s
testi ng of pol i ce offi cers uphel d); Copel and v. Phi l adel phi a Pol i ce Dept, 840 F.2d
1139 (3d Ci r. 1988), cert. denied 490 U.S. 1004 (uphol di ng testi ng of pol i ce offi cer
based on reasonabl e suspi ci on); Al verado v. WPPSS, 759 P.2d 427 (Wash. 1988),
cert. denied 490 U.S. 1004 (uphol di ng pre-empl oyment drug screeni ng for nucl ear
power pl ant workers); Harmon v. Thornburgh, 878 F.2d 484 (D.C. Ci r. 1989), cert.
denied sub nom. Bel l v. Thornburgh, 493 U.S. 1056 (1990) (approvi ng random test-
i ng of Department of Justi ce empl oyees wi th top secret securi ty cl earances); Na-
ti onal Fedn of Fed. Empl oyees v. Cheney, 892 F.2d 98 (D.C. Ci r. 1989) cert. denied
493 U.S. 1056 (1990) (uphol di ng random testi ng of U.S. Army ci vi l i an empl oyees i n
cri ti cal jobs, e.g., ai rcraft crews and mechani cs, securi ty guards, and drug coun-
sel ors); Gui ney v. Roache, 873 F.2d 1557 (1st Ci r. 1989), cert. denied 493 U.S. 963
(uphol di ng random testi ng of Boston pol i ce offi cers who carry fi rearms or parti ci pate
i n drug i nterdi cti on); AFGE v. Ski nner, 885 F.2d 884 (D.C. Ci r. 1989), cert. denied
493 U.S. 923 (1990) (uphol di ng random drug testi ng of three categori es of DOT em-
pl oyees: motor vehi cl e operators, hazardous materi al i nspectors, and ai rcraft me-
chani cs); Jones v. McKenzi e, 833 F.2d 335 (D.C. Ci r. 1987), vacated and remanded
ment become noti ceabl e.
124
By contrast, the i ntrusi ons on pri vacy
were termed l i mi ted. Bl ood and breath tests were passed off as
routi ne; the uri ne test, whi l e more i ntrusi ve, was deemed permi s-
si bl e because of the di mi ni shed expectati on of pri vacy i n empl oy-
ees havi ng some responsi bi l i ty for safety i n a pervasi vel y regul ated
i ndustry.
125
The l ower courts emphasi s on the l i mi ted effecti ve-
ness of the uri ne test (i t detects past drug use but not necessari l y
the l evel of i mpai rment) was mi spl aced, the Court rul ed. I t i s
enough that the test may provi de some useful i nformati on for an
acci dent i nvesti gati on; i n addi ti on, the test may promote deterrence
as wel l as detecti on of drug use.
126
I n Von Raab the governmental
i nterests underl yi ng the Customs Servi ces screeni ng program were
al so termed compel l i ng: to ensure that persons entrusted wi th a
fi rearm and the possi bl e use of deadl y force not suffer from drug-
i nduced i mpai rment of percepti on and judgment, and that front-
l i ne [drug] i nterdi cti on personnel [be] physi cal l y fi t, and have un-
i mpeachabl e i ntegri ty and judgment.
127
The possi bl y substanti al
i nterference wi th pri vacy i nterests of these Customs empl oyees was
justi fi ed, the Court concl uded, because, [u]nl i ke most pri vate ci ti -
zens or government empl oyees general l y, they have a di mi ni shed
expectati on of pri vacy.
128
So far the Court has not rul ed on a random drug testi ng pro-
gram, havi ng si nce Skinner and Von Raab refused to hear other
chal l enges to drug testi ng.
129
Answers to remai ni ng questi ons, e.g.,
1250
sub nom. J enkins v. J ones, 490 U.S. 1001 (1989) (court of appeal s had uphel d test-
i ng of school bus dri vers onl y i n the context of a routi ne medi cal exam).
130
I n Skinner the Court emphasi zed that the FRA regul ati ons do not requi re
di rect observati on by a moni tor (al though, as the di ssent poi nted out, 489 U.S. at
646, the FRA Fi el d Manual did so requi re) and that the sampl e i s col l ected i n a
medi cal envi ronment (i d. at 626); the Customs screeni ng program at i ssue i n Von
Raab si mi l arl y di d not requi re di rect observati on of uri nati on, and i n addi ti on gave
job appl i cants advance noti ce of testi ng.
131
Ol mstead v. Uni ted States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
132
Among the di ssenters were Justi ce Hol mes, who characteri zed i l l egal wi re-
tappi ng as di rty busi ness, i d. at 470, and Justi ce Brandei s, who contri buted to hi s
opi ni on the famous perorati on about government as the potent, the omni present,
teacher whi ch breeds contempt for l aw among the peopl e by i ts exampl e. I d. at
485. More rel evant here was hi s l engthy argument rejecti ng the premi ses of the ma-
jori ty, an argument whi ch l ater became the l aw of the l and. (1) To protect [the
ri ght to be l eft al one], every unjusti fi abl e i ntrusi on by the Government upon the pri -
vacy of the i ndi vi dual , whatever the means empl oyed, must be deemed a vi ol ati on
of the Fourth Amendment. I d. at 478. (2) There i s, i n essence, no di fference be-
tween the seal ed l etter and the pri vate tel ephone message. . . . The evi l i nci dent
to i nvasi on of the pri vacy of the tel ephone i s far greater than that i nvol ved i n tam-
peri ng wi th the mai l s. Whenever a tel ephone l i ne i s tapped, the pri vacy of the per-
sons at both ends of the l i ne i s i nvaded and al l conversati ons between them upon
any subject . . . may be overheard. I d. at 47576.
whether other drug testi ng programs not so cl osel y ti ed to safety
and securi ty concerns serve compel l i ng governmental i nterests,
whether other cl asses of empl oyees have a di mi ni shed expectati on
of pri vacy, and whether more i ntrusi ve testi ng procedures are per-
mi ssi bl e,
130
must therefore awai t future l i ti gati on.
Electronic Surveillance and the Fourth Amendment
The Olmstead Case. Wi th the i nventi on of the mi crophone,
the tel ephone, and the di ctograph recorder, i t became possi bl e to
eavesdrop wi th much greater secrecy and expedi ency. I nevi tabl y,
the use of el ectroni c devi ces i n l aw enforcement was chal l enged,
and i n 1928 the Court revi ewed convi cti ons obtai ned on the basi s
of evi dence gai ned through taps on tel ephone wi res i n vi ol ati on of
state l aw. On a fi ve-to-four vote, the Court hel d that wi retappi ng
was not wi thi n the confi nes of the Fourth Amendment.
131
Chi ef
Justi ce Taft, wri ti ng the opi ni on of the Court, rel i ed on two l i nes
of argument for the concl usi on. Fi rst, i nasmuch as the Amendment
was desi gned to protect ones property i nterest i n hi s premi ses,
there was no search so l ong as there was no physi cal trespass on
premi ses owned or control l ed by a defendant. Second, al l the evi -
dence obtai ned had been secured by heari ng, and the i ntercepti on
of a conversati on coul d not qual i fy as a sei zure, for the Amendment
referred onl y to the sei zure of tangi bl e i tems. Furthermore, the vi o-
l ati on of state l aw di d not render the evi dence excl udi bl e, si nce the
excl usi onary rul e operated onl y on evi dence sei zed i n vi ol ati on of
the Consti tuti on.
132
1251
133
Ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1103 (1934), provi di ng, i nter al i a, that . . . no person not
bei ng authori zed by the sender shal l i ntercept any communi cati on and di vul ge or
publ i sh the exi stence, contents, purport, effect, or meani ng of such i ntercepted com-
muni cati on to any person. Nothi ng i n the l egi sl ati ve hi story i ndi cated what Con-
gress had i n mi nd i n i ncl udi ng thi s l anguage. The secti on, whi ch appeared at 47
U.S.C. 605, was rewri tten by Ti tl e I I I of the Omni bus Cri me Act of 1968, 82 Stat.
22, 803, so that the regul ati on of the i ntercepti on of wi re or oral communi cati ons
i n the future i s to be governed by the provi si ons of Ti tl e I I I . S. REP. NO. 1097, 90th
Cong., 2d Sess. 10708 (1968).
134
302 U.S. 379 (1937). Deri vati ve evi dence, that i s, evi dence di scovered as a
resul t of i nformati on obtai ned through a wi retap, was si mi l arl y i nadmi ssi bl e,
Nardone v. Uni ted States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939), al though the testi mony of wi tnesses
mi ght be obtai ned through the expl oi tati on of wi retap i nformati on. Gol dstei n v.
Uni ted States, 316 U.S. 114 (1942). Eavesdroppi ng on a conversati on on an exten-
si on tel ephone wi th the consent of one of the parti es di d not vi ol ate the statute.
Rathbun v. Uni ted States, 355 U.S. 107 (1957).
135
Wei ss v. Uni ted States, 308 U.S. 321 (1939).
136
Schwartz v. Texas, 344 U.S. 199 (1952). At thi s ti me, evi dence obtai ned i n
vi ol ati on of the Fourth Amendment coul d be admi tted i n state courts. Wol f v. Col o-
rado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949). Al though Wolf was overrul ed by Mapp v. Ohi o, 367 U.S.
643 (1961), i t was some seven years l ater and after wi retappi ng i tsel f had been
made subject to the Fourth Amendment that Schwartz was overrul ed i n Lee v. Fl or-
i da, 392 U.S. 378 (1968).
137
Bananti v. Uni ted States, 355 U.S. 96 (1957).
138
316 U.S. 129 (1942).
Federal Communi cati ons Act. Si x years after the deci si on
i n the Olmstead case, Congress enacted the Federal Communi ca-
ti ons Act and i ncl uded i n 605 of the Act a broadl y worded pro-
scri pti on on whi ch the Court sei zed to pl ace some l i mi tati on upon
governmental wi retappi ng.
133
Thus, i n Nardone v. United
States,
134
the Court hel d that wi retappi ng by federal offi cers coul d
vi ol ate 605 i f the offi cers both i ntercepted and di vul ged the con-
tents of the conversati on they overheard, and that testi mony i n
court woul d consti tute a form of prohi bi ted di vul gence. Such evi -
dence was therefore excl uded, al though wi retappi ng was not i l l egal
under the Courts i nterpretati on i f the i nformati on was not used
outsi de the governmental agency. Because 605 appl i ed to i ntra-
state as wel l as i nterstate transmi ssi ons,
135
there was no questi on
about the appl i cabi l i ty of the ban to state pol i ce offi cers, but the
Court decl i ned to appl y ei ther the statute or the due process cl ause
to requi re the excl usi on of such evi dence from state cri mi nal
tri al s.
136
State efforts to l egal i ze wi retappi ng pursuant to court or-
ders were hel d by the Court to be precl uded by the fact that Con-
gress i n 605 had i ntended to occupy the fi el d compl etel y to the
excl usi on of the States.
137
Nontel ephoni c El ectroni c Survei l l ance. The trespass ra-
ti onal e of Olmstead was uti l i zed i n cases deal i ng wi th buggi ng of
premi ses rather than wi th tappi ng of tel ephones. Thus, i n Goldman
v. United States,
138
the Court found no Fourth Amendment vi ol a-
ti on when a l i steni ng devi ce was pl aced agai nst a party wal l so
1252
139
Si l verman v. Uni ted States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961). See also Cl i nton v. Vi rgi ni a,
377 U.S. 158 (1964) (physi cal trespass found wi th regard to ampl i fyi ng devi ce stuck
i n a parti ti on wal l wi th a thumb tack).
140
388 U.S. 41 (1967).
141
I d. at 5053.
that conversati ons were overheard on the other si de. But when offi -
cers drove a spi ke mi ke i nto a party wal l unti l i t came i nto con-
tact wi th a heati ng duct and thus broadcast defendants conversa-
ti ons, the Court determi ned that the trespass brought the case
wi thi n the Amendment.
139
I n so hol di ng, the Court, wi thout al l ud-
i ng to the matter, overrul ed i n effect the second rati onal e of
Olmstead, the premi se that conversati ons coul d not be sei zed.
The Berger and Katz Cases. I n Berger v. New York,
140
the
Court confi rmed the obsol esence of the al ternati ve hol di ng i n
Olmstead that conversati ons coul d not be sei zed i n the Fourth
Amendment sense.
141
Berger hel d unconsti tuti onal on i ts face a
state eavesdroppi ng statute under whi ch judges were authori zed to
i ssue warrants permi tti ng pol i ce offi cers to trespass on pri vate
premi ses to i nstal l l i steni ng devi ces. The warrants were to be i s-
sued upon a showi ng of reasonabl e ground to bel i eve that evi dence
of cri me may be thus obtai ned, and parti cul arl y descri bi ng the per-
son or persons whose communi cati ons, conversati ons or di scussi ons
are to be overheard or recorded. For the fi ve-Justi ce majori ty, Jus-
ti ce Cl ark di scerned several consti tuti onal defects i n the l aw.
Fi rst, . . . eavesdroppi ng i s authori zed wi thout requi ri ng bel i ef
that any parti cul ar offense has been or i s bei ng commi tted; nor
that the property sought, the conversati ons, be parti cul arl y de-
scri bed.
The purpose of the probabl e-cause requi rement of the Fourth
Amendment to keep the state out of consti tuti onal l y protected
areas unti l i t has reason to bel i eve that a speci fi c cri me has been
or i s bei ng commi tted i s thereby whol l y aborted. Li kewi se the stat-
utes fai l ure to descri be wi th parti cul ari ty the conversati ons sought
gi ves the offi cer a rovi ng commi ssi on to sei ze any and al l con-
versati ons. I t i s true that the statute requi res the nami ng of the
person or persons whose communi cati ons, conversati ons or di scus-
si ons are to be overheard or recorded. . . . But thi s does no more
than i denti fy the person whose consti tuti onal l y protected area i s to
be i nvaded rather than parti cul arl y descri bi ng the communi ca-
ti ons, conversati ons, or di scussi ons to be sei zed. . . . Secondl y, au-
thori zati on of eavesdroppi ng for a two-month peri od i s the equi va-
l ent of a seri es of i ntrusi ons, searches, and sei zures pursuant to a
si ngl e showi ng of probabl e cause. Prompt executi on i s al so avoi ded.
Duri ng such a l ong and conti nuous (24 hours a day) peri od the con-
1253
142
I d. at 5860. Justi ce Stewart concurred because he thought that the affi da-
vi ts i n thi s case had not been suffi ci ent to show probabl e cause, but he thought the
statute consti tuti onal i n compl i ance wi th the Fourth Amendment. I d. at 68. Justi ce
Bl ack di ssented, argui ng that the Fourth Amendment was not appl i cabl e to el ec-
troni c eavesdroppi ng but that i n any event the search authori zed by the statute
was reasonabl e. I d. at 70. Justi ce Harl an di ssented, argui ng that the statute wi th
i ts judi ci al gl oss was i n compl i ance wi th the Fourth Amendment. I d. 89. Justi ce
Whi te thought both the statute and i ts appl i cati on i n thi s case were consti tuti onal .
I d. at 107.
143
I d. at 71, 113.
144
389 U.S. 347 (1967).
versati ons of any and al l persons comi ng i nto the area covered by
the devi ce wi l l be sei zed i ndi scri mi natel y and wi thout regard to
thei r connecti on wi th the cri me under i nvesti gati on. Moreover, the
statute permi ts. . . extensi ons of the ori gi nal two-month peri od
presumabl y for two months each on a mere showi ng that such ex-
tensi on i s i n the publ i c i nterest.. . . Thi rd, the statute pl aces no
termi nati on date on the eavesdrop once the conversati on sought i s
sei zed. . . . Fi nal l y, the statutes procedure, necessari l y because i ts
success depends on secrecy, has no requi rement for noti ce as do
conventi onal warrants, nor does i t overcome thi s defect by requi r-
i ng some showi ng of speci al facts. On the contrary, i t permi ts
unconsented entry wi thout any showi ng of exi gent ci rcumstances.
Such a showi ng of exi gency, i n order to avoi d noti ce, woul d appear
more i mportant i n eavesdroppi ng, wi th i ts i nherent dangers, than
that requi red when conventi onal procedures of search and sei zure
are uti l i zed. Nor does the statute provi de for a return on the war-
rant thereby l eavi ng ful l di screti on i n the offi cer as to the use of
sei zed conversati ons of i nnocent as wel l as gui l ty parti es. I n short,
the statutes bl anket grant of permi ssi on to eavesdrop i s wi thout
adequate judi ci al supervi si on or protecti ve procedures.
142
Both Justi ces Bl ack and Whi te i n di ssent accused the Berger
majori ty of so construi ng the Fourth Amendment that no wi re-
tappi ng-eavesdroppi ng statute coul d pass consti tuti onal scru-
ti ny,
143
and i n Katz v. United States,
144
the Court i n an opi ni on
by one of the Berger di ssenters, Justi ce Stewart, modi fi ed some of
i ts l anguage and poi nted to Court approval of some types of statu-
tori l y-authori zed el ectroni c survei l l ance. Just as Berger had con-
fi rmed that one rati onal e of the Olmstead deci si on, the i nappl i cabi l -
i ty of sei zure to conversati ons, was no l onger val i d, Katz di sposed
of the other rati onal e. I n the l atter case, offi cers had affi xed a l i s-
teni ng devi ce to the outsi de wal l of a tel ephone booth regul arl y
used by Katz and acti vated i t each ti me he entered; si nce there had
been no physi cal trespass i nto the booth, the l ower courts hel d the
Fourth Amendment not rel evant. The Court di sagreed, sayi ng that
once i t i s recogni zed that the Fourth Amendment protects peo-
1254
145
I d. at 353. We concl ude that the underpi nni ngs of Olmstead and Goldman
have been so eroded by our subsequent deci si ons that the trespass doctri ne there
enunci ated can no l onger be regarded as control l i ng. The Governments acti vi ti es i n
el ectroni cal l y l i steni ng to and recordi ng the peti ti oners words vi ol ated the pri vacy
upon whi ch he justi fi abl y rel i ed whi l e usi ng the tel ephone booth and thus con-
sti tuted a search and sei zure wi thi n the meani ng of the Fourth Amendment. I d.
146
I d. at 354. The narrowl y ci rcumscri bed nature of the survei l l ance was
made cl ear by the Court i n the i mmedi atel y precedi ng passage. [The Government
agents] di d not begi n thei r el ectroni c survei l l ance unti l i nvesti gati on of the peti ti on-
ers acti vi ti es had establ i shed a strong probabi l i ty that he was usi ng the tel ephone
i n questi on to transmi t gambl i ng i nformati on to persons i n other States, i n vi ol ati on
of federal l aw. Moreover, the survei l l ance was l i mi ted, both i n scope and i n dura-
ti on, to the speci fi c purpose of establ i shi ng the contents of the peti ti oners unl awful
tel ephoni c communi cati ons. The agents confi ned thei r survei l l ance to the bri ef peri -
ods duri ng whi ch he used the tel ephone booth, and they took great care to overhear
onl y the conversati ons of the peti ti oner hi msel f. I d. For si mi l ar emphasi s upon pre-
ci si on and narrow ci rcumscri pti on, see Osborn v. Uni ted States, 385 U.S. 323, 329
30 (1966).
147
A conventi onal warrant ordi nari l y serves to noti fy the suspect of an i n-
tended search . . . . I n omi tti ng any requi rement of advance noti ce, the federal court
. . . si mpl y recogni zed, as has thi s Court, that offi cers need not announce thei r pur-
pose before conducti ng an otherwi se authori zed search i f such an announcement
woul d provoke the escape of the suspect or the destructi on of cri ti cal evi dence. 389
U.S. at 355 n.16.
148
I d. at 35758. Justi ce Bl ack di ssented, feel i ng that the Fourth Amendment
appl i ed onl y to searches for and sei zures of tangi bl e thi ngs and not conversati ons.
I d. at 364. Two beeper deci si ons support the general appl i cabi l i ty of the warrant
requi rement i f el ectroni c survei l l ance wi l l i mpai r l egi ti mate pri vacy i nterests. Com-
pare Uni ted States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983) (no Fourth Amendment vi ol ati on
i n rel yi ng on a beeper, i nstal l ed wi thout warrant, to ai d i n moni tori ng progress of
a car on the publ i c roads, si nce there i s no l egi ti mate expectati on of pri vacy i n des-
ti nati on of travel on the publ i c roads), with Uni ted States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705
(1984) (beeper i nstal l ed wi thout a warrant may not be used to obtai n i nformati on
as to the conti nui ng presence of an i tem wi thi n a pri vate resi dence).
pl e and not si mpl y areas agai nst unreasonabl e searches and
sei zures, i t becomes cl ear that the reach of that Amendment cannot
turn upon the presence or absence of a physi cal i ntrusi on i nto any
gi ven encl osure.
145
Because the survei l l ance of Katzs tel ephone
cal l s had not been authori zed by a magi strate, i t was i nval i d; how-
ever, the Court thought that i t i s cl ear that thi s survei l l ance was
so narrowl y ci rcumscri bed that a dul y authori zed magi strate, prop-
erl y noti fi ed of the need for such i nvesti gati on, speci fi cal l y i n-
formed of the basi s on whi ch i t was to proceed, and cl earl y ap-
pri sed of the preci se i ntrusi on i t woul d entai l , coul d consti tu-
ti onal l y have authori zed, wi th appropri ate safeguards, the very
l i mi ted search and sei zure that the Government asserts i n fact took
pl ace.
146
The noti ce requi rement, whi ch had l oomed i n Berger as
an obstacl e to successful el ectroni c survei l l ance, was summari l y
di sposed of.
147
Fi nal l y, Justi ce Stewart observed that i t was un-
l i kel y that el ectroni c survei l l ance woul d ever come under any of the
establ i shed excepti ons so that i t coul d be conducted wi thout pri or
judi ci al approval .
148
1255
149
Ti tl e I I I of the Omni bus Cri me Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 82 Stat.
211, 18 U.S.C. 251020.
150
The Court has i nterpreted the statute several ti mes wi thout reachi ng the
consti tuti onal questi ons. Uni ted States v. Kahn, 415 U.S. 143 (1974); Uni ted States
v. Gi ordano, 416 U.S. 505 (1974); Uni ted States v. Chavez, 416 U.S. 562 (1974);
Uni ted States v. Donovan, 429 U.S. 413 (1977); Scott v. Uni ted States, 436 U.S. 128
(1978); Dal i a v. Uni ted States, 441 U.S. 238 (1979); Uni ted States v. New York Tel e-
phone Co., 434 U.S. 159 (1977); Uni ted States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741 (1979). Dalia
supra, di d pass on one consti tuti onal i ssue, whether the Fourth Amendment man-
dated speci fi c warrant authori zati on for a surrepti ti ous entry to i nstal l an author-
i zed bug. See also Smi th v. Maryl and, 442 U.S. 735 (1979) (no reasonabl e expecta-
ti on of pri vacy i n numbers di al ed on ones tel ephone, so Fourth Amendment does
not requi re a warrant to i nstal l pen regi ster to record those numbers).
151
389 U.S. 347, 36364 (1967) (concurri ng opi ni on). Justi ces Dougl as and
Brennan rejected the suggesti on. I d. at 35960 (concurri ng opi ni on). When i t en-
acted i ts 1968 el ectroni c survei l l ance statute, Congress al l uded to the probl em i n
ambi guous fashi on, 18 U.S.C. 2511(3), whi ch the Court subsequentl y i nterpreted
as havi ng expressed no congressi onal posi ti on at al l . Uni ted States v. Uni ted States
Di stri ct Court, 407 U.S. 297, 30208 (1972).
152
Uni ted States v. Uni ted States Di stri ct Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972). Chi ef
Justi ce Burger concurred i n the resul t and Justi ce Whi te concurred on the ground
that the 1968 l aw requi red a warrant i n thi s case, and therefore di d not reach the
consti tuti onal i ssue. I d. at 340. Justi ce Rehnqui st di d not parti ci pate. Justi ce Powel l
careful l y noted that the case requi red no judgment on the scope of the Presi dents
Fol l owi ng Katz, Congress enacted i n 1968 a comprehensi ve
statute authori zi ng federal offi cers and permi tti ng state offi cers
pursuant to state l egi sl ati on compl yi ng wi th the federal l aw to seek
warrants for el ectroni c survei l l ance to i nvesti gate vi ol ati ons of pre-
scri bed cl asses of cri mi nal l egi sl ati on.
149
The Court has not yet
had occasi on to pass on the federal statute and to determi ne
whether i ts procedures and authori zati ons comport wi th the stand-
ards sketched i n Osborn, Berger, and Katz or whether those stand-
ards are somewhat more fl exi bl e than they appear to be on the
faces of the opi ni ons.
150
Warrantl ess Nati onal Securi ty El ectroni c Survei l -
l ance. I n Katz v. United States,
151
Justi ce Whi te sought to pre-
serve for a future case the possi bi l i ty that i n nati onal securi ty
cases el ectroni c survei l l ance upon the authori zati on of the Presi -
dent or the Attorney General coul d be permi ssi bl e wi thout pri or ju-
di ci al approval . The Executi ve Branch then asserted the power to
wi retap and to bug i n two types of nati onal securi ty si tuati ons,
agai nst domesti c subversi on and agai nst forei gn i ntel l i gence oper-
ati ons, fi rst basi ng i ts authori ty on a theory of i nherent presi -
denti al power and then i n the Supreme Court wi thdrawi ng to the
argument that such survei l l ance was a reasonabl e search and sei -
zure and therefore val i d under the Fourth Amendment. Unani -
mousl y, the Court hel d that at l east i n cases of domesti c subversi ve
i nvesti gati ons, compl i ance wi th the warrant provi si ons of the
Fourth Amendment was requi red.
152
Whether or not a search was
1256
survei l l ance power wi th respect to the acti vi ti es of forei gn powers, wi thi n or wi thout
thi s country. I d. at 308.
153
The case contai ns a cl ear suggesti on that the Court woul d approve a congres-
si onal provi si on for a di fferent standard of probabl e cause i n nati onal securi ty cases.
We recogni ze that domesti c securi ty survei l l ance may i nvol ve di fferent pol i cy and
practi cal consi derati ons from the survei l l ance of ordi nary cri me. The gatheri ng of
securi ty i ntel l i gence i s often l ong range and i nvol ves the i nterrel ati on of vari ous
sources and types of i nformati on. The exact targets of such survei l l ance may be
more di ffi cul t to i denti fy than i n survei l l ance operati ons agai nst many types of
cri mes speci fi ed i n Ti tl e I I I . Often, too, the emphasi s of domesti c i ntel l i gence gather-
i ng i s on the preventi on of unl awful acti vi ty or the enhancement of the Govern-
ments preparedness for some future cri si s or emergency. . . . Di fferent standards
may be compati bl e wi th the Fourth Amendment i f they are reasonabl e both i n rel a-
ti on to the l egi ti mate need of Government for i ntel l i gence i nformati on and the pro-
tected ri ghts of our ci ti zens. For the warrant appl i cati on may vary accordi ng to the
governmental i nterest to be enforced and the nature of ci ti zen ri ghts deservi ng pro-
tecti on. . . . I t may be that Congress, for exampl e, woul d judge that the appl i cati on
and affi davi t showi ng probabl e cause need not fol l ow the exact requi rements of
2518 but shoul d al l ege other ci rcumstances more appropri ate to domesti c securi ty
cases. . . . I d. at 32223.
154
I d. at 31324.
155
I d. at 320.
156
See Uni ted States v. Butenko, 494 F.2d 593 (3d Ci r.), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
881 (1974); Zwei bon v. Mi tchel l , 516 F.2d 594 (D.C. Ci r. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S.
944 (1976), appeal after remand 565 F.2d 742 (D.C. Ci r. 1977), on remand, 444 F.
Supp. 1296 (D.D.C. 1978), affd. in part, revd. in part, 606 F.2d 1172 (D.C. Ci r.
1979), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 912 (1981); Smi th v. Ni xon, 606 F.2d 1183 (D.C. Ci r.
1979), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 912 (1981); Uni ted States v. Truong Di nh Hung, 629
F.2d 908 (4th Ci r. 1980), after remand, 667 F.2d 1105 (4th Ci r. 1981); Hal ki n v.
Hel ms, 690 F.2d 977 (D.C. Ci r. 1982).
reasonabl e, wrote Justi ce Powel l for the Court, was a questi on
whi ch deri ved much of i ts answer from the warrant cl ause; except
i n a few narrowl y ci rcumscri bed cl asses of si tuati ons, onl y those
searches conducted pursuant to warrants were reasonabl e. The
Governments duty to preserve the nati onal securi ty di d not over-
ri de the gurarantee that before government coul d i nvade the pri -
vacy of i ts ci ti zens i t must present to a neutral magi strate evi dence
suffi ci ent to support i ssuance of a warrant authori zi ng that i nva-
si on of pri vacy.
153
Thi s protecti on was even more needed i n na-
ti onal securi ty cases than i n cases of ordi nary cri me, the Justi ce
conti nued, i nasmuch as the tendency of government so often i s to
regard opponents of i ts pol i ci es as a threat and hence to tread i n
areas protected by the Fi rst Amendment as wel l as by the
Fourth.
154
Rejected al so was the argument that courts coul d not
appreci ate the i ntri caci es of i nvesti gati ons i n the area of nati onal
securi ty nor preserve the secrecy whi ch i s requi red.
155
The questi on of the scope of the Presi dents consti tuti onal pow-
ers, i f any, remai ns judi ci al l y unsettl ed.
156
Congress has acted,
however, provi di ng for a speci al court to hear requests for warrants
for el ectroni c survei l l ance i n forei gn i ntel l i gence si tuati ons, and
permi tti ng the Presi dent to authori ze warrantl ess survei l l ance to
1257
157
Forei gn I ntel l i gence Survei l l ance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95511, 92 Stat.
1797, 50 U.S.C. 18011811. See Uni ted States v. Bel fi el d, 692 F.2d 141 (D.C. Ci r.
1982) (uphol di ng consti tuti onal i ty of di scl osure restri cti ons i n Act).
158
Edwards, Criminal Liability for Unreasonable Searches and Seizures, 41 VA.
L. REV. 621 (1955).
159
Gol dstei n, Police Policy Formulation: A Proposal for I mproving Police Per-
formance, 65 MI CH. L. REV. 1123 (1967).
160
I f there are conti nui ng and recurrent vi ol ati ons, federal i njuncti ve rel i ef
woul d be avai l abl e. Cf. Lankford v. Gel ston, 364 F.2d 197 (4th Ci r. 1966); Wheel er
v. Goodman, 298 F. Supp. 935 (prel i mi nary i njuncti on), 306 F. Supp. 58 (permanent
i njuncti on) (W.D.N.C. 1969), vacated on jurisdictional grounds, 401 U.S. 987 (1971).
161
42 U.S.C. 1983 (1964). See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961). I n some
ci rcumstances, the offi cers l i abi l i ty may be attri buted to the muni ci pal i ty. Monel l
v. New York Ci ty Dept of Soci al Servi ces, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). These cl ai ms that
offi cers have used excessi ve force i n the course of an arrest or i nvesti gatory stop are
to be anal yzed under the Fourth Amendment, not under substanti ve due process.
The test i s whether the offi cers acti ons are objecti vel y reasonabl e under the facts
and ci rcumstances confronti ng them. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989).
acqui re forei gn i ntel l i gence i nformati on provi ded that the commu-
ni cati ons to be moni tored are excl usi vel y between or among forei gn
powers and there i s no substanti al l i kel i hood any Uni ted States
person wi l l be overheard.
157
Enforcing the Fourth Amendment: The Exclusionary Rule
A ri ght to be free from unreasonabl e searches and sei zures i s
decl ared by the Fourth Amendment, but how one i s to transl ate the
guarantee i nto concrete terms i s not speci fi ed. Several possi bl e
methods of enforcement have been suggested over ti me; however,
the Supreme Court has settl ed, not wi thout di ssent, on onl y one as
an effecti ve means to make real the ri ght.
Al ternati ves to the Excl usi onary Rul e. Theoreti cal l y, there
are several al ternati ves to the excl usi onary rul e. An i l l egal search
and sei zure may be cri mi nal l y acti onabl e and offi cers undertaki ng
one thus subject to prosecuti on, but the exampl es when offi cers are
cri mi nal l y prosecuted for overzeal ous l aw enforcement are ex-
tremel y rare.
158
A pol i ceman who makes an i l l egal search and sei -
zure i s subject to i nternal departmental di sci pl i ne whi ch may be
backed up i n the few juri sdi cti ons whi ch have adopted them by the
oversi ght of and parti ci pati on of pol i ce revi ew boards, but agai n the
exampl es of di sci pl i nary acti ons are exceedi ngl y rare.
159
Persons
who have been i l l egal l y arrested or who have had thei r pri vacy i n-
vaded wi l l usual l y have a tort acti on avai l abl e under state statu-
tory or common l aw.
Moreover, pol i ce offi cers acti ng under col or of state l aw who
vi ol ate a persons Fourth Amendment ri ghts are subject to a sui t
for damages and other remedi es
160
under a ci vi l ri ghts statute i n
federal courts.
161
Whi l e federal offi cers and others acti ng under
col or of federal l aw are not subject juri sdi cti onal l y to thi s statute,
1258
162
Bi vens v. Si x Unknown Fed. Narcoti cs Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). The pos-
si bi l i ty had been hi nted at i n Bel l v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 (1946).
163
See, e.g., Chi ef Justi ce Burgers di ssent i n Bi vens v. Si x Unknown Fed. Nar-
coti cs Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 411, 42224 (1971), whi ch suggests sui t agai nst the
Government i n a speci al tri bunal and the abol i ti on of the excl usi onary rul e.
164
Foote, Tort Remedies for Police Violations of I ndividual Rights, 39 MI NN. L.
REV. 493 (1955).
165
Thi s i s the rul e i n acti ons under 42 U.S.C. 1983, Pi erson v. Ray, 386 U.S.
547 (1967), and on remand i n Bivens the Court of Appeal s promul gated the same
rul e to govern tri al of the acti on. Bi vens v. Si x Unknown Named Agents of the Fed-
eral Bureau of Narcoti cs, 456 F.2d 1339 (2d Ci r. 1972).
166
Anderson v. Crei ghton, 483 U.S. 635 (1987). The di ssenti ng Justi ces argued,
i nter al i a, that such a pri nci pl e i s more appropri atel y appl i ed as an affi rmati ve de-
fense, thereby al l owi ng resol uti on of factual di sputes pri or to determi ni ng objecti ve
reasonabl eness of an offi cers acti ons. 483 U.S. at 655 (Stevens, J.). See also Mal l ey
v. Bri ggs, 475 U.S. 335, 345 (1986) (qual i fi ed i mmuni ty protects pol i ce offi cers who
appl i ed for a warrant unl ess a reasonabl y wel l -trai ned offi cer i n [the same] posi ti on
woul d have known that hi s affi davi t fai l ed to establ i sh probabl e cause and that he
shoul d not have appl i ed for a warrant).
167
116 U.S. 616 (1886).
168
We have al ready noti ced the i nti mate rel ati on between the two Amend-
ments. They throw great l i ght on each other. For the unreasonabl e searches and
the Supreme Court has recentl y hel d that a ri ght to damages for
vi ol ati on of Fourth Amendment ri ghts ari ses by i mpl i cati on out of
the guarantees secured and that thi s ri ght i s enforceabl e i n federal
courts.
162
Whi l e a damage remedy mi ght be made more effec-
tual ,
163
a number of l egal and practi cal probl ems stand i n the
way.
164
Pol i ce offi cers have avai l abl e to them the usual common-
l aw defenses, most i mportant of whi ch i s the cl ai m of good fai th.
165
Federal offi cers are enti tl ed to qual i fi ed i mmuni ty based on an ob-
jecti vel y reasonabl e bel i ef that a warrantl ess search l ater deter-
mi ned to vi ol ate the Fourth Amendment was supported by probabl e
cause or exi gent ci rcumstances.
166
And on the practi cal si de, per-
sons subjected to i l l egal arrests and searches and sei zures are often
di sreputabl e persons toward whom juri es are unsympatheti c, or
they are i ndi gent and unabl e to bri ng sui t. The resul t, therefore,
i s that the Court has emphasi zed excl usi on of unconsti tuti onal l y
sei zed evi dence i n subsequent cri mi nal tri al s as the onl y effecti ve
enforcement method.
Devel opment of the Excl usi onary Rul e. Excl usi on of evi -
dence as a remedy for Fourth Amendment vi ol ati ons found i ts be-
gi nni ng i n Boyd v. United States,
167
whi ch, as was noted above, i n-
vol ved not a search and sei zure but a compul sory producti on of
busi ness papers whi ch the Court l i kened to a search and sei zure.
Further, the Court anal ogi zed the Fi fth Amendments sel f-i ncri mi -
nati on provi si on to the Fourth Amendments protecti ons to deri ve
a rul e whi ch requi red excl usi on of the compel l ed evi dence because
the defendant had been compel l ed to i ncri mi nate hi msel f by pro-
duci ng i t.
168
The Boyd case was cl osel y l i mi ted to i ts facts and an
1259
sei zures condemned i n the Fourth Amendment are al most al ways made for the pur-
pose of compel l i ng a man to gi ve evi dence agai nst hi msel f, whi ch i n cri mi nal cases
i s condemned i n the Fi fth Amendment; and compel l i ng a man i n a cri mi nal case
to be a wi tness agai nst hi msel f, whi ch i s condemned i n the Fi fth Amendment,
throws l i ght on the questi on as to what i s an unreasonabl e search and sei zure
wi thi n the meani ng of the Fourth Amendment. And we have been unabl e to percei ve
that the sei zure of a mans pri vate books and papers to be used i n evi dence agai nst
hi m i s substanti al l y di fferent from compel l i ng hi m to be a wi tness agai nst hi msel f.
We thi nk i t i s wi thi n the cl ear i ntent and meani ng of those terms. I d. at 633. I t
was thi s uti l i zati on of the Fi fth Amendments cl earl y requi red excl usi onary rul e,
rather than one i mpl i ed from the Fourth, on whi ch Justi ce Bl ack rel i ed and absent
a Fi fth Amendment sel f-i ncri mi nati on vi ol ati on he di d not appl y such a rul e. Mapp
v. Ohi o, 367 U.S. 643, 661 (1961) (concurri ng opi ni on); Cool i dge v. New Hampshi re,
403 U.S. 443, 493, 496500 (1971) (di ssenti ng opi ni on). The theory of a conver-
gence of the two Amendments has now been di savowed by the Court. Supra,
pp. 122526.
169
Adams v. New York, 192 U.S. 585 (1904). Si nce the case arose from a state
court and concerned a search by state offi cers, i t coul d have been deci ded si mpl y
by hol di ng that the Fourth Amendment was i nappl i cabl e. See Nati onal Safe Deposi t
Co. v. Stead, 232 U.S. 58, 71 (1914).
170
232 U.S. 383 (1914).
171
I d. at 392.
excl usi onary rul e based on Fourth Amendment vi ol ati ons was re-
jected by the Court a few years l ater, wi th the Justi ces adheri ng
to the common-l aw rul e that evi dence was admi ssi bl e however ac-
qui red.
169
Neverthel ess, ten years l ater the common-l aw vi ew was i tsel f
rejected and an excl usi onary rul e propounded i n Weeks v. United
States.
170
Weeks had been convi cted on the basi s of evi dence sei zed
from hi s home i n the course of two warrantl ess searches; some of
the evi dence consi sted of pri vate papers l i ke those sought to be
compel l ed i n the Boyd case. Unani mousl y, the Court hel d that the
evi dence shoul d have been excl uded by the tri al court. The Fourth
Amendment, Justi ce Day sai d, pl aced on the courts as wel l as on
l aw enforcement offi cers restrai nts on the exerci se of power com-
pati bl e wi th i ts guarantees. The tendency of those who execute the
cri mi nal l aws of the country to obtai n convi cti ons by means of un-
l awful searches and enforced confessi ons . . . shoul d fi nd no sanc-
ti on i n the judgment of the courts whi ch are charged at al l ti mes
wi th the support of the Consti tuti on and to whi ch peopl e of al l con-
di ti ons have a ri ght to appeal for the mai ntenance of such fun-
damental ri ghts.
171
The rul i ng i s ambi guousl y based but seems to
have had as i ts foundati on an assumpti on that admi ssi on of i l l e-
gal l y-sei zed evi dence woul d i tsel f vi ol ate the Amendment. I f l et-
ters and pri vate documents can thus be sei zed and hel d and used
i n evi dence agai nst a ci ti zen accused of an offense, the protecti on
of the Fourth Amendment decl ari ng hi s ri ght to be secured agai nst
such searches and sei zures i s of no val ue, and, so far as those thus
pl aced are concerned, mi ght as wel l be stri cken from the Consti tu-
1260
172
I d. at 393.
173
Smi th v. Maryl and, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 71, 76 (1855); Nati onal Safe Deposi t
Co. v. Stead, 232 U.S. 58, 71 (1914). See supra, p. 957.
174
The hi story of the excl usi onary rul e i n the state courts was surveyed by Jus-
ti ce Frankfurter i n Wol f v. Col orado, 338 U.S. 25, 29, 3338 (1949). The matter was
canvassed agai n i n El ki ns v. Uni ted States, 364 U.S. 206, 22432 (1960).
175
Duri ng the peri od i n whi ch the Consti tuti on di d not i mpose any restri cti ons
on state searches and sei zures, the Court permi tted the i ntroducti on i n evi dence i n
federal courts of i tems sei zed by state offi cers whi ch had they been sei zed by federal
offi cers woul d have been i nadmi ssi bl e, Weeks v. Uni ted States, 232 U.S. 383, 398
(1914), so l ong as no federal offi cer parti ci pated i n the search, Byars v. Uni ted
States, 273 U.S. 28 (1927), or the search was not made on behal f of federal l aw en-
forcement purposes. Gambi no v. Uni ted States, 275 U.S. 310 (1927). Thi s rul e be-
came known as the si l ver pl atter doctri ne after the phrase coi ned by Justi ce
Frankfurter i n Lusti g v. Uni ted States, 338 U.S. 74, 7879 (1949): The crux of that
doctri ne i s that a search i s a search by a federal offi ci al i f he had a hand i n i t; i t
i s not a search by a federal offi ci al i f evi dence secured by state authori ti es i s turned
over to the federal authori ti es on a si l ver pl atter. I n El ki ns v. Uni ted States, 364
U.S. 206 (1960), the doctri ne was di scarded by a fi ve-to-four majori ty whi ch hel d
that i nasmuch as Wol f v. Col orado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949), had made state searches and
sei zures subject to federal consti tuti onal restri cti ons through the Fourteenth
Amendments due process cl ause, the si l ver pl atter doctri ne was no l onger con-
sti tuti onal l y vi abl e. Duri ng thi s same peri od, si nce state courts were free to admi t
any evi dence no matter how obtai ned, evi dence i l l egal l y sei zed by federal offi cers
coul d be used i n state courts, Wi l son v. Schnettl er, 365 U.S. 381 (1961), al though
the Supreme Court rul ed out such a course i f the evi dence had fi rst been offered
i n a federal tri al and had been suppressed. Rea v. Uni ted States, 350 U.S. 214
(1956).
176
338 U.S. 25 (1949).
177
The securi ty of ones pri vacy agai nst arbi trary i ntrusi on by the pol i ce
whi ch i s at the core of the Fourth Amendment i s basi c to a free soci ety. I t i s there-
fore i mpl i ci t i n the concept of ordered l i berty and as such enforceabl e agai nst the
States through the Due Process Cl ause. I d. at 2728.
ti on. The efforts of the courts and thei r offi ci al s to bri ng the gui l ty
to puni shment, prai seworthy as they are, are not to be ai ded by the
sacri fi ce of those great pri nci pl es establ i shed by years of endeavor
and sufferi ng whi ch have resul ted i n thei r embodi ment i n the fun-
damental l aw of the l and.
172
Because the Fourth Amendment di d not restri ct the acti ons of
state offi cers,
173
there was no questi on about the appl i cati on of an
excl usi onary rul e i n state courts
174
as a mandate of federal
consi tuti onal pol i cy.
175
But i n Wolf v. Colorado,
176
a unani mous
Court hel d that freedom from unreasonabl e searches and sei zures
was such a fundamental ri ght as to be protected agai nst state vi o-
l ati ons by the due process cl ause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
177
However, the Court hel d that the ri ght thus guaranteed di d not re-
qui re that the excl usi onary rul e be appl i ed i n the state courts,
si nce there were other means to observe and enforce the ri ght.
Granti ng that i n practi ce the excl usi on of evi dence may be an ef-
fecti ve way of deterri ng unreasonabl e searches, i t i s not for thi s
Court to condemn as fal l i ng bel ow the mi ni mal standards assured
1261
178
I d. at 31. Justi ces Dougl as, Murphy, and Rutl edge di ssented wi th regard to
the i ssue of the excl usi onary rul e and Justi ce Bl ack concurred.
179
342 U.S. 165 (1952). The pol i ce had i ni ti al l y entered defendants house wi th-
out a warrant. Justi ces Bl ack and Dougl as concurred i n the resul t on sel f-i ncri mi na-
ti on grounds.
180
I d. at 172.
181
347 U.S. 128 (1954).
182
I d. at 13438. Justi ce Cl ark, concurri ng, announced hi s i ntenti on to vote to
appl y the excl usi onary rul e to the States when the votes were avai l abl e. I d. at 138.
Justi ces Bl ack and Dougl as di ssented on sel f-i ncri mi nati on grounds, i d. at 139, and
Justi ce Dougl as conti nued to urge the appl i cati on of the excl usi onary rul e to the
States. I d. at 149. Justi ces Frankfurter and Burton di ssented on due process
grounds, argui ng the rel evance of Rochin. I d. at 142.
183
Brei thaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432 (1957). Chi ef Justi ce Warren and Justi ces
Bl ack and Dougl as di ssented. Though a due process case, the resul ts of the case
by the Due Process Cl ause a States rel i ance upon other methods
whi ch, i f consi stentl y enforced, woul d be equal l y effecti ve.
178
I t devel oped, however, that the Court had not vested i n the
States total di screti on i n regard to the admi ssi bi l i ty of evi dence, as
the Court proceeded to eval uate under the due process cl ause the
methods by whi ch the evi dence had been obtai ned. Thus, i n Rochin
v. California,
179
evi dence of narcoti cs possessi on had been obtai ned
by forci bl e admi ni strati on of an emeti c to defendant at a hospi tal
after offi cers had been unsuccessful i n preventi ng hi m from swal -
l owi ng certai n capsul es. The evi dence, sai d Justi ce Frankfurter for
the Court, shoul d have been excl uded because the pol i ce methods
were too objecti onabl e. Thi s i s conduct that shocks the consci ence.
I l l egal l y breaki ng i nto the pri vacy of the peti ti oner, the struggl e to
open hi s mouth and remove what was there, the forci bl e extracti on
of hi s stomachs contents . . . i s bound to offend even hardened sen-
si bi l i ti es. They are methods too cl ose to the rack and screw.
180
The Rochin standard was l i mi ted i n I rvine v. California,
181
i n
whi ch defendant was convi cted of bookmaki ng acti vi ti es on the
basi s of evi dence secured by pol i ce who repeatedl y broke i nto hi s
house and conceal ed el ectroni c gear to broadcast every conversati on
i n the house. Justi ce Jacksons pl ural i ty opi ni on asserted that
Rochin had been occasi oned by the el ement of brutal i ty, and that
whi l e the pol i ce conduct i n I rvine was bl atantl y i l l egal the admi ssi -
bi l i ty of the evi dence was governed by Wolf, whi ch shoul d be con-
si stentl y appl i ed for purposes of gui dance to state courts. The Jus-
ti ce al so entertai ned consi derabl e doubts about the effi cacy of the
excl usi onary rul e.
182
Rochin emerged as the standard, however, i n
a l ater case i n whi ch the Court sustai ned the admi ssi bi l i ty of the
resul ts of a bl ood test admi ni stered whi l e defendant was uncon-
sci ous i n a hospi tal fol l owi ng a traffi c acci dent, the Court observi ng
the routi ne nature of the test and the mi ni mal i ntrusi on i nto bodi l y
pri vacy.
183
1262
have been reaffi rmed di rectl y i n a Fourth Amendment case. Schmerber v. Cal i for-
ni a, 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
184
367 U.S. 643 (1961).
185
I d. at 65556. Justi ce Bl ack concurred, doubti ng that the Fourth Amend-
ment i tsel f compel l ed adopti on of an excl usi onary rul e but rel yi ng on the Fi fth
Amendment for authori ty. I d. at 661. Justi ce Stewart woul d not have reached the
i ssue but woul d have reversed on other grounds, i d. at 672, whi l e Justi ces Harl an,
Frankfurter, and Whi ttaker di ssented, preferri ng to adhere to Wolf. I d. at 672. Jus-
ti ce Harl an advocated the overrul i ng of Mapp down to the concl usi on of hi s servi ce
on the Court. See Cool i dge v. New Hampshi re, 403 U.S. 443, 490 (1971) (concurri ng
opi ni on).
186
Ker v. Cal i forni a, 374 U.S. 23 (1963).
187
Boyd v. Uni ted States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
188
232 U.S. 383 (1914). Defendants room had been searched and papers sei zed
by offi cers acti ng wi thout a warrant. I f l etters and pri vate documents can thus be
sei zed and hel d and used i n evi dence agai nst a ci ti zen accused of an offense, the
protecti on of the Fourth Amendment decl ari ng hi s ri ght to be secure agai nst such
searches and sei zures i s of no val ue, and, so far as those thus pl aced are concerned,
mi ght as wel l be stri cken from the Consti tuti on. I d. at 393.
189
E.g., Goul ed v. Uni ted States, 255 U.S. 298, 306, 307 (1921); Amos v. Uni ted
States, 255 U.S. 313, 316 (1921); Agnel l o v. Uni ted States, 269 U.S. 20, 3334
(1925); McGui re v. Uni ted States, 273 U.S. 95, 99 (1927). I n Ol mstead v. Uni ted
Then, i n Mapp v. Ohio,
184
the Court hel d that the excl usi onary
rul e shoul d and di d appl y to the States. I t was l ogi cal l y and con-
sti tuti onal l y necessary, wrote Justi ce Cl ark for the majori ty, that
the excl usi on doctri ne an essenti al part of the ri ght to pri vacy
be al so i nsi sted upon as an essenti al i ngredi ent of the ri ght to be
secure from unreasonabl e searches and sei zures. To hol d other-
wi se i s to grant the ri ght but i n real i ty to wi thhol d i ts pri vi l ege
and enjoyment.
185
Further, the Court then hel d that si nce i l l e-
gal l y-sei zed evi dence was to be excl uded from both federal and
state courts, the standards by whi ch the questi on of l egal i ty was
to be determi ned shoul d be the same, regardl ess of whether the
court i n whi ch the evi dence was offered was state or federal .
186
The Foundati ons of the Excl usi onary Rul e. I mportant to
determi nati on of such questi ons as the appl i cati on of the excl usi on-
ary rul e to the States and the abi l i ty of Congress to abol i sh or to
l i mi t i t i s the fi xi ng of the consti tuti onal source and the basi s of
the rul e. For some ti me, i t was not cl ear whether the excl usi onary
rul e was deri ved from the Fourth Amendment, from some uni on of
the Fourth and Fi fth Amendments, or from the Courts supervi sory
power over the l ower federal courts. I t wi l l be recal l ed that i n
Boyd
187
the Court fused the search and sei zure cl ause wi th the
provi si on of the Fi fth Amendment protecti ng agai nst compel l ed
sel f-i ncri mi nati on. Weeks v. United States,
188
though the Fi fth
Amendment was menti oned, seemed to be cl earl y based on the
Fourth Amendment. Neverthel ess, i n opi ni ons fol l owi ng Weeks the
Court cl earl y i denti fi ed the basi s for the excl usi onary rul e as the
sel f-i ncri mi nati on cl ause of the Fi fth Amendment.
189
Then i n
1263
States, 277 U.S. 438, 462 (1928), Chi ef Justi ce Taft ascri bed the rul e both to the
Fourth and the Fi fth Amendments, whi l e i n di ssent Justi ces Hol mes and Brandei s
took the vi ew that the Fi fth Amendment was vi ol ated by the admi ssi on of evi dence
sei zed i n vi ol ati on of the Fourth. I d. at 469, 47879. Justi ce Bl ack was the onl y
modern proponent of thi s vi ew. Mapp v. Ohi o, 367 U.S. 643, 661 (1961) (concurri ng
opi ni on); Cool i dge v. New Hampshi re, 403 U.S. 443, 493, 496500 (1971) (di ssenti ng
opi ni on). See, however, Justi ce Cl arks pl ural i ty opi ni on i n Ker v. Cal i forni a, 374
U.S. 23, 30 (1963), i n whi ch he brought up the sel f-i ncri mi nati on cl ause as a suppl e-
mentary source of the rul e, a posi ti on whi ch he had di scarded i n Mapp.
190
367 U.S. 643, 656 (1961). Wol f v. Col orado, 338 U.S. 25, 28 (1949), al so as-
cri bed the rul e to the Fourth Amendment excl usi vel y.
191
Mapp v. Ohi o, 367 U.S. 643, 648 (1961) (emphasi s suppl i ed).
192
An exampl e of an excl usi onary rul e not based on consti tuti onal grounds may
be found i n McNabb v. Uni ted States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943), and Mal l ory v. Uni ted
States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957), i n whi ch the Court enforced a requi rement that
arrestees be promptl y presented to a magi strate by hol di ng that i ncri mi nati ng ad-
mi ssi ons obtai ned duri ng the peri od beyond a reasonabl e ti me for presentati on
woul d be i nadmi ssi bl e. The rul e was not extended to the States, cf. Cul ombe v. Con-
necti cut, 367 U.S. 568, 598602 (1961), but the Courts resort to the sel f-i ncri mi na-
ti on cl ause i n revi ewi ng confessi ons made such appl i cati on i rrel evant i n most cases
i n any event. For an exampl e of a transmutati on of a supervi sory rul e i nto a con-
sti tuti onal rul e, see McCarthy v. Uni ted States, 394 U.S. 459 (1969), and Boyki n
v. Al abama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969).
193
Weeks was not deri ved from the expl i ci t requi rements of the Fourth Amend-
ment; . . . The deci si on was a matter of judi ci al i mpl i cati on. 338 U.S. 25, 28 (1949).
Justi ce Bl ack was more expl i ci t. I agree wi th what appears to be a pl ai n i mpl i ca-
ti on of the Courts opi ni on that the federal excl usi onary rul e i s not a command of
the Fourth Amendment but i s a judi ci al l y created rul e of evi dence whi ch Congress
mi ght negate. I d. at 3940. He conti nued to adhere to the supervi sory power basi s
i n stri ctl y search-and-sei zure cases, Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 76 (1967) (di s-
senti ng), except where sel f-i ncri mi nati on val ues were present. Mapp v. Ohi o, 367
U.S. 643, 661 (1961) (concurri ng). And see i d. at 678 (Justi ce Harl an di ssenti ng);
El ki ns v. Uni ted States, 364 U.S. 206, 216 (1960) (Justi ce Stewart for the Court).
Mapp v. Ohio,
190
the Court ti ed the rul e stri ctl y to the Fourth
Amendment, fi ndi ng excl usi on of evi dence sei zed i n vi ol ati on of the
Amendment to be the most i mportant consti tuti onal pri vi l ege of
the ri ght to be free from unreasonabl e searches and sei zures, fi nd-
i ng that the rul e was an essenti al part of the ri ght of pri vacy pro-
tected by the Amendment.
Thi s Court has ever si nce [Weeks was deci ded i n 1914] re-
qui red of federal l aw offi cers a stri ct adherence to that command
whi ch thi s Court has hel d to be a cl ear, speci fi c, and constitu-
tionally required even i f judi ci al l y i mpl i ed deterrent safeguard
wi thout i nsi stence upon whi ch the Fourth Amendment woul d have
been reduced to a form of words.
191
I t was a necessary step i n
the appl i cati on of the rul e to the States to fi nd that the rul e was
of consti tuti onal ori gi n rather than a resul t of an exerci se of the
Courts supervi sory power over the l ower federal courts, i nasmuch
as the l atter coul d not consti tuti onal l y be extended to the state
courts.
192
I n fact, Justi ce Frankfurter seemed to fi nd the excl usi on-
ary rul e to be based on the Courts supervi sory powers i n Wolf v.
Colorado
193
i n decl i ni ng to extend the rul e to the States. That the
1264
194
The tendency of those who execute the cri mi nal l aws of the country to ob-
tai n convi cti ons by means of unl awful searches and enforced confessi ons . . . shoul d
fi nd no sancti on i n the judgment of the courts whi ch are charged at al l ti mes wi th
the support of the Consti tuti on . . . . Weeks v. Uni ted States, 232 U.S. 383, 392
(1914). I n Mapp v. Ohi o, 367 U.S. 643, 655, 657 (1961), Justi ce Cl ark mai ntai ned
that the Fourth Amendment i ncl ude[s] the excl usi on of the evi dence sei zed i n vi ol a-
ti on of i ts provi si ons and that i t, and the Fi fth Amendment wi th regard to confes-
si ons assures . . . that no man i s to be convi cted on unconsti tuti onal evi dence. I n
Terry v. Ohi o, 392 U.S. 1, 12, 13 (1968), Chi ef Justi ce Warren wrote: Courts whi ch
si t under our Consti tuti on cannot and wi l l not be made party to l awl ess i nvasi ons
of the consti tuti onal ri ghts of ci ti zens by permi tti ng unhi ndered governmental use
of the frui ts of such i nvasi ons. . . . A rul i ng admi tti ng evi dence i n a cri mi nal tri al
. . . has the necessary effect of l egi ti mi zi ng the conduct whi ch produced the evi -
dence.
195
El ki ns v. Uni ted States, 364 U.S. 206, 22223 (1960); Mapp v. Ohi o, 367 U.S.
643, 660 (1961). See McNabb v. Uni ted States, 318 U.S. 332, 33940 (1943).
196
I nfra, pp. 126970.
197
Li nkl etter v. Wal ker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
198
El ki ns v. Uni ted States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960).
199
Li nkl etter v. Wal ker, 381 U.S. 618, 63637 (1965). The Court advanced other
reasons for i ts deci si on as wel l . I d. at 63640.
200
Among the earl y cri ti cs were Judge Cardozo, Peopl e v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13,
21, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (1926) (the cri mi nal wi l l go free because the constabl e has
bl undered); and Dean Wi gmore. 8 J. WI GMORE, A TREATI SE ON THE ANGLO-AMER-
I CAN SYSTEM OF EVI DENCE 218384 (3d ed. 1940). For extensi ve di scussi on of cri ti -
rul e i s of consti tuti onal ori gi n Mapp establ i shes, but thi s does not
necessari l y establ i sh that i t i s i mmune to statutory revi si on.
Suggesti ons appear i n a number of cases, i ncl udi ng Weeks, to
the effect that admi ssi on of i l l egal l y-sei zed evi dence i s i tsel f uncon-
sti tuti onal .
194
These were often combi ned wi th a rati onal e empha-
si zi ng judi ci al i ntegri ty as a reason to reject the proffer of such
evi dence.
195
Yet the Court permi tted such evi dence to be i ntro-
duced i nto tri al courts, when the defendant l acked standi ng to ob-
ject to the search and sei zure whi ch produced the evi dence
196
or
when the search took pl ace before the announcement of the deci -
si on extendi ng the excl usi onary rul e to the States.
197
At these
ti mes, the Court turned to the basi c postul ate of the excl usi onary
rul e i tsel f. The rul e i s cal cul ated to prevent, not to repai r. I ts pur-
pose i s to deter to compel respect for the consti tuti onal guaranty
i n the onl y effecti vel y avai l abl e way by removi ng the i ncenti ve to
di sregard i t.
198
Mapp had as i ts pri me purpose the enforcement
of the Fourth Amendment through the i ncl usi on of the excl usi onary
rul e wi thi n i ts ri ghts. Thi s, i t was found, was the onl y effecti ve de-
terrent to l awl ess pol i ce acti on. I ndeed, al l of the cases si nce Wolf
requi ri ng the excl usi on of i l l egal evi dence have been based on the
necessi ty for an effecti ve deterrent to i l l egal pol i ce acti on.
199
Narrowi ng Appl i cati on of the Excl usi onary Rul e. For as
l ong as we have had the excl usi onary rul e, cri ti cs have attacked i t,
chal l enged i ts premi ses, di sputed i ts moral i ty.
200
By the earl y
1265
ci sm and support, wi th ci tati on to the l i terature, see 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH
AND SEI ZURE A TREATI SE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 1.2 (2d ed. 1987).
201
E.g., Stone v. Powel l , 428 U.S. 465, 496 (1976) (Chi ef Justi ce Burger: rul e
ought to be di scarded now, rather than wai t for a repl acement as he argued earl i er);
i d. at 536 (Justi ce Whi te: modi fy rul e to admi t evi dence sei zed i l l egal l y, but i n good
fai th); Schneckl oth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 261 (1973) (Justi ce Powel l ); Brown
v. I l l i noi s, 422 U.S. 590, 609 (1975) (Justi ce Powel l ); Robbi ns v. Cal i forni a, 453 U.S.
420, 437 (1981) (Justi ce Rehnqui st); Cal i forni a v. Mi njares, 443 U.S. 916 (1979)
(Justi ce Rehnqui st joi ned by Chi ef Justi ce Burger); Cool i dge v. New Hampshi re, 403
U.S. 443, 510 (1971) (Justi ce Bl ackmun joi ni ng Justi ce Bl acks di ssent that the
Fourth Amendment supports no excl usi onary rul e).
202
E.g., Uni ted States v. Jani s, 428 U.S. 433, 446 (1976) (deterrence i s the
pri me purpose of the rul e, i f not the sol e one.); Uni ted States v. Cal andra, 414
U.S. 338, 34748 (1974); Uni ted States v. Pel ti er, 422 U.S. 531, 53639 (1975);
Stone v. Powel l , 428 U.S. 465, 486 (1976); Rakas v. I l l i noi s, 439 U.S. 128, 134 n.3,
13738 (1978); Mi chi gan v. DeFi l l i ppo, 443 U.S. 31, 38 n.3 (1979). Thus, admi ssi on
of the frui ts of an unl awful search or sei zure work[s] no new Fourth Amendment
wrong, the wrong bei ng ful l y accompl i shed by the unl awful search or sei zure i t-
sel f, Uni ted States v. Cal andara, supra, 354, and the excl usi onary rul e does not
cure the i nvasi on of the defendants ri ghts whi ch he has al ready suffered. Stone
v. Powel l , supra, 540 (Justi ce Whi te di ssenti ng). Judi ci al i ntegri ty i s not i nfri nged
by the mere admi ssi on of evi dence sei zed wrongful l y. [T]he courts must not commi t
or encourage vi ol ati ons of the Consti tuti on, and the i ntegri ty i ssue i s answered by
whether excl usi on woul d deter vi ol ati ons by others. Uni ted States v. Jani s, supra,
at 458 n.35; Uni ted States v. Cal andra, supra, at 347, 354; Uni ted States v. Pel ti er,
supra, at 538; Mi chi gan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 450 n.25 (1974).
203
Uni ted States v. Jani s, 428 U.S. 433, 44854 (1976), contai ns a l engthy re-
vi ew of the l i terature on the deterrent effect of the rul e and doubts about that effect.
See also Stone v. Powel l , 428 U.S. 465, 492 n.32 (1976).
204
Stone v. Powel l , 428 U.S. at 490, 491.
205
Bi vens v. Si x Unknown Fed. Narcoti cs Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 416 (1971)
(Chi ef Justi ce Burger di ssenti ng).
206
Si l verthorne Lumber Co. v. Uni ted States 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920).
1980s a majori ty of Justi ces had stated a desi re ei ther to abol i sh
the rul e or to sharpl y curtai l i ts operati on,
201
and numerous opi n-
i ons had rejected al l doctri nal bases save that of deterrence.
202
At
the same ti me, these opi ni ons voi ced strong doubts about the effi -
cacy of the rul e as a deterrent, and advanced publ i c i nterest val ues
i n effecti ve l aw enforcement and publ i c safety as reasons to di scard
the rul e al together or curtai l i ts appl i cati on.
203
Thus, the Court
emphasi zed the hi gh costs of enforci ng the rul e to excl ude rel i abl e
and trustworthy evi dence, even when vi ol ati ons have been tech-
ni cal or i n good fai th, and suggested that such use of the rul e may
wel l generat[e] di srespect for the l aw and admi ni strati on of jus-
ti ce,
204
as wel l as free gui l ty defendants.
205
No l onger does the
Court decl are that [t]he essence of a provi si on forbi ddi ng the ac-
qui si ti on of evi dence i n a certai n way i s that not merel y evi dence
so acqui red shal l not be used before the Court but that i t shal l not
be used at al l .
206
Al though the excl usi onary rul e has not been compl etel y repudi -
ated, i ts uti l i zati on has been substanti al l y curbed. I ni ti al deci si ons
chi pped away at the rul es appl i cati on. Defendants who themsel ves
1266
207
E.g., Rakas v. I l l i noi s, 439 U.S. 128 (1978); Uni ted States v. Sal vucci , 448
U.S. 83 (1980); Rawl i ngs v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98 (1980). I n Uni ted States v.
Payner, 447 U.S. 727 (1980), the Court hel d i t i mpermi ssi bl e for a federal court to
exerci se i ts supervi sory power to pol i ce the admi ni strati on of justi ce i n the federal
system to suppress otherwi se admi ssi bl e evi dence on the ground that federal agents
had fl agrantl y vi ol ated the Fourth Amendment ri ghts of thi rd parti es i n order to
obtai n evi dence to use agai nst others when the agents knew that the defendant
woul d be unabl e to chal l enge thei r conduct under the Fourth Amendment.
208
Uni ted States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620 (1980); Wal der v. Uni ted States, 347
U.S. 62 (1954). Cf. Agnel l o v. Uni ted States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925) (now vi ti ated by
Havens). The i mpeachment excepti on appl i es onl y to the defendants own testi mony,
and may not be extended to use i l l egal l y obtai ned evi dence to i mpeach the testi -
mony of other defense wi tnesses. James v. I l l i noi s, 493 U.S. 307 (1990).
209
Stone v. Powel l , 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
210
Wong Sun v. Uni ted States, 371 U.S. 471, 48788 (1963); Al derman v. Uni t-
ed States, 394 U.S. 165, 18085 (1969); Brown v. I l l i noi s, 422 U.S. 590 (1975); Tay-
l or v. Al abama, 457 U.S. 687 (1982). Uni ted States v. Ceccol i ni , 435 U.S. 268 (1978),
refused to excl ude the testi mony of a wi tness di scovered through an i l l egal search.
Because a wi tness was freel y wi l l i ng to testi fy and therefore more l i kel y to come
forward, the appl i cati on of the excl usi onary rul e was not to be tested by the stand-
ard appl i ed to excl usi on of i nani mate objects. Deterrence woul d be l i ttl e served and
rel evant and materi al evi dence woul d be l ost to the prosecuti on. I n New York v.
Harri s, 495 U.S. 14 (1990), the Court refused to excl ude a stati on-house confessi on
made by a suspect whose arrest at hi s home had vi ol ated the Fourth Amendment
because, even though probabl e cause had exi sted, no warrant had been obtai ned.
And i n Segura v. Uni ted States, 468 U.S. 796 (1984), evi dence sei zed pursuant to
warrant obtai ned after an i l l egal entry was admi tted because there had been an
i ndependent basi s for i ssuance of a warrant. Thi s rul e appl i es as wel l to evi dence
observed i n pl ai n vi ew duri ng the i ni ti al i l l egal search. Murray v. Uni ted States,
487 U.S. 533 (1988). See also Uni ted States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984) (excl udi ng
consi derati on of tai nted evi dence, there was suffi ci ent untai nted evi dence i n affi da-
vi t to justi fy fi ndi ng of probabl e cause and i ssuance of search warrant).
211
Mi chi gan v. DeFi l l i ppo, 443 U.S. 31 (1979) (statute creati ng substanti ve
cri mi nal offense). Statutes that authori ze unconsti tuti onal searches and sei zures but
whi ch have not yet been voi ded at the ti me of the search or sei zure may not create
were not subjected to i l l egal searches and sei zures may not object
to the i ntroducti on agai nst themsel ves of evi dence i l l egal l y ob-
tai ned from co-conspi rators or codefendants,
207
and even a defend-
ant whose ri ghts have been i nfri nged may fi nd the evi dence comi ng
i n, not as proof of gui l t, but to i mpeach hi s testi mony.
208
Defend-
ants who have been convi cted after tri al s i n whi ch they were gi ven
a ful l and fai r opportuni ty to rai se cl ai ms of Fourth Amendment
vi ol ati ons may not subsequentl y rai se those cl ai ms on federal ha-
beas corpus because of the costs overwei ghi ng the mi ni mal deter-
rent effect.
209
Evi dence obtai ned through a wrongful search and
sei zure may someti mes be used i n the cri mi nal tri al , i f the prosecu-
ti on can show a suffi ci ent attenuati on of the l i nk between pol i ce
mi sconduct and obtai ni ng of the evi dence.
210
I f an arrest or a
search whi ch was val i d at the ti me i t was effectuated becomes bad
through the subsequent i nval i dati on of the statute under whi ch the
arrest or search was made, evi dence obtai ned thereby i s nonethe-
l ess admi ssi bl e.
211
A grand jury wi tness was not permi tted to
1267
thi s effect, however, Torres v. Puerto Ri co, 442 U.S. 465 (1979); Ybarra v. I l l i noi s,
444 U.S. 85 (1979). Thi s aspect of Torres and Ybarra was to a l arge degree nul l i fi ed
by I l l i noi s v. Krul l , 480 U.S. 340 (1987), rejecti ng a di sti ncti on between substanti ve
and procedural statutes and hol di ng the excl usi onary rul e i nappl i cabl e i n the case
of a pol i ce offi cers objecti vel y reasonabl e rel i ance on a statute l ater hel d to vi ol ate
the Fourth Amendment.
212
Uni ted States v. Cal andra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
213
Uni ted States v. Jani s, 428 U.S. 433 (1976). Si mi l arl y, the rul e i s i nappl i ca-
bl e i n ci vi l proceedi ngs for deportati on of al i ens. I NS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S.
1032 (1984).
214
468 U.S. 897 (1984). The same objecti vel y reasonabl e good-fai th rul e now
appl i es i n determi ni ng whether offi cers obtai ni ng warrants are enti tl ed to qual i fi ed
i mmuni ty from sui t. Mal l ey v. Bri ggs, 475 U.S. 335 (1986).
215
The opi ni on was joi ned by Chi ef Justi ce Burger, and by Justi ces Bl ackmun,
Powel l , Rehnqui st, and OConnor. Justi ce Bl ackmun al so added a separate concur-
ri ng opi ni on. Di ssents were fi l ed by Justi ce Brennan, joi ned by Justi ce Marshal l ,
and by Justi ce Stevens.
216
468 U.S. at 907.
217
468 U.S. at 91617.
218
468 U.S. at 919, 921.
refuse to answer questi ons on the ground that they were based on
evi dence obtai ned from an unl awful search and sei zure,
212
and fed-
eral tax authori ti es were permi tted to use i n a ci vi l proceedi ng evi -
dence found to have been unconsti tuti onal l y sei zed from defendant
by state authori ti es.
213
The most severe curtai l ment of the rul e came i n 1984 wi th
adopti on of a good fai th excepti on. I n United States v. Leon,
214
the Court created an excepti on for evi dence obtai ned as a resul t of
offi cers objecti ve, good-fai th rel i ance on a warrant, l ater found to
be defecti ve, i ssued by a detached and neutral magi strate. Justi ce
Whi tes opi ni on for the Court
215
coul d fi nd l i ttl e benefi t i n appl yi ng
the excl usi onary rul e where there has been good-fai th rel i ance on
an i nval i d warrant. Thus, there was nothi ng to offset the substan-
ti al soci al costs exacted by the [rul e].
216
The excl usi onary rul e i s
desi gned to deter pol i ce mi sconduct rather than to puni sh the er-
rors of judges and magi strates, and i n any event the Court consi d-
ered i t unl i kel y that the rul e coul d have much deterrent effect on
the acti ons of trul y neutral magi strates.
217
Moreover, the Court
thought that the rul e shoul d not be appl i ed to deter objecti vel y
reasonabl e l aw enforcement acti vi ty, and that [p]enal i zi ng the of-
fi cer for the magi strates error . . . cannot l ogi cal l y contri bute to
the deterrence of Fourth Amendment vi ol ati ons.
218
The Court al so
suggested some ci rcumstances i n whi ch courts woul d be unabl e to
fi nd that offi cers rel i ance on a warrant was objecti vel y reasonabl e:
i f the offi cers have been di shonest or reckl ess i n prepari ng thei r
affi davi t, i f i t shoul d have been obvi ous that the magi strate had
whol l y abandoned hi s neutral rol e, or i f the warrant was obvi -
ousl y defi ci ent on i ts face (e.g., l acki ng i n parti cul ari ty). The Court
1268
219
468 U.S. 981 (1984).
220
I l l i noi s v. Krul l , 480 U.S. 340 (1987). The same di ffi cul t-to-establ i sh qual i -
fi cati ons appl y: there can be no objecti vel y reasonabl e rel i ance i f, i n passi ng the
statute, the l egi sl ature whol l y abandoned i ts responsi bi l i ty to enact consti tuti onal
l aws, or i f a reasonabl e offi cer shoul d have known that the statute was unconsti tu-
ti onal . 480 U.S. at 355.
221
Di ssenti ng Justi ce OConnor di sagreed wi th thi s second concl usi on, suggest-
i ng that the grace peri od duri ng whi ch the pol i ce may freel y perform unreasonabl e
searches . . . creates a posi ti ve i ncenti ve [for l egi sl atures] to promul gate unconsti tu-
ti onal l aws, and that the Courts rul i ng destroys al l i ncenti ve on the part of i ndi -
vi dual cri mi nal defendants to l i ti gate the vi ol ati on of thei r Fourth Amendment
ri ghts and thereby obtai n a rul i ng on the val i di ty of the statute. 480 U.S. at 366,
369.
222
The whol e thrust of anal ysi s i n Leon deal t wi th reasonabl eness of rel i ance
on a warrant. The Court several ti mes, however, used l anguage broad enough to
appl y to warrantl ess searches as wel l . See, e.g., 468 U.S. at 909 (quoti ng Justi ce
Whi tes concurrence i n I llinois v. Gates): the bal anci ng approach that has evol ved
. . . forceful l y suggest[s] that the excl usi onary rul e be more general l y modi fi ed to
permi t the i ntroducti on of evi dence obtai ned i n the reasonabl e good-fai th bel i ef that
a search or sei zure was i n accord wi th the Fourth Amendment; and i d. at at 919:
[the rul e] cannot be expected, and shoul d not be appl i ed, to deter objecti vel y rea-
sonabl e l aw enforcement acti vi ty.
223
See Yal e Kami sar, Gates, Probable Cause, Good Faith, and Beyond, 69
I OWA L. REV. 551, 589 (1984) (i mposi ti on of a good-fai th excepti on on top of the al -
ready di l uted standard for val i di ty of a warrant woul d amount to doubl e di l uti on).
appl i ed the Leon standard i n Massachusetts v. Sheppard,
219
hol d-
i ng that an offi cer possessed an objecti vel y reasonabl e bel i ef that
he had a val i d warrant after he had poi nted out to the magi strate
that he had not used the standard form, and the magi strate had
i ndi cated that the necessary changes had been i ncorporated i n the
i ssued warrant.
The Court then extended Leon to hol d that the excl usi onary
rul e i s i nappl i cabl e to evi dence obtai ned by an offi cer acti ng i n ob-
jecti vel y reasonabl e rel i ance on a statute l ater hel d vi ol ati ve of the
Fourth Amendment.
220
Justi ce Bl ackmuns opi ni on for the Court
reasoned that appl i cati on of the excl usi onary rul e i n such ci r-
cumstances woul d have no more deterrent effect on offi cers than i t
woul d when offi cers reasonabl y rel y on an i nval i d warrant, and no
more deterrent effect on l egi sl ators who enact i nval i d statutes than
on magi strates who i ssue i nval i d warrants.
221
I t i s uncl ear from the Courts anal ysi s i n Leon and i ts progeny
whether a majori ty of the Justi ces woul d al so support a good-fai th
excepti on for evi dence sei zed wi thout a warrant, al though there i s
some l anguage broad enough to appl y to warrantl ess sei zures.
222
I t i s al so uncl ear what a good-fai th excepti on woul d mean i n the
context of a warrantl ess search, si nce the objecti ve reasonabl eness
of an offi cers acti on i n proceedi ng wi thout a warrant i s al ready
taken i nto account i n determi ni ng whether there has been a Fourth
Amendment vi ol ati on.
223
The Courts i ncreasi ng wi l l i ngness to up-
hol d warrantl ess searches as not unreasonabl e under the Fourth
1269
224
See, e.g., I l l i noi s v. Rodri guez, 497 U.S. 177 (1990) (uphol di ng search pre-
mi sed on offi cers reasonabl e but mi staken bel i ef that a thi rd party had common au-
thori ty over premi ses and coul d consent to search); Schneckl oth v. Bustamonte, 412
U.S. 218 (1973) (no requi rement of knowi ng and i ntel l i gent wai ver i n consenti ng to
warrantl ess search); New York v. Bel ton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981) (uphol di ng
warrantl ess search of enti re i nteri or of passenger car, i ncl udi ng cl osed contai ners,
as i nci dent to arrest of dri ver); Uni ted States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982) (uphol d-
i ng warrrantl ess search of movabl e contai ner found i n a l ocked car trunk).
225
Jones v. Uni ted States, 362 U.S. 257, 261 (1960). That i s, the movant must
show that he was a vi cti m of search or sei zure, one agai nst whom the search was
di rected, as di sti ngui shed from one who cl ai ms prejudi ce onl y through the use of
evi dence gathered as a consequence of search or sei zure di rected at someone el se.
I d. See Al derman v. Uni ted States, 394 U.S. 165, 174 (1969).
226
Rakas v. I l l i noi s, 439 U.S. 128, 139 (1978).
227
I d. at 140.
Amendment, however, may reduce the frequency wi th whi ch the
good-fai th i ssue ari ses i n the context of the excl usi onary rul e.
224
Operati on of the Rul e: Standi ng. The Court for a l ong pe-
ri od fol l owed a rul e of standi ng by whi ch i t determi ned whether
a party was the appropri ate person to move to suppress al l egedl y
i l l egal evi dence. Aki n to Arti cl e I I I justi ci abi l i ty pri nci pl es, whi ch
emphasi ze that one may ordi nari l y contest onl y those government
acti ons that harm hi m, the standi ng pri nci pl e i n Fourth Amend-
ment cases requi re[d] of one who seeks to chal l enge the l egal i ty
of a search as the basi s for suppressi ng rel evant evi dence that he
al l ege, and i f the al l egati on be di sputed that he establ i sh, that he
hi msel f was the vi cti m of an i nvasi on of pri vacy.
225
The Court re-
centl y has departed from the concept of standi ng to tel escope the
i nqui ry i nto one i nqui ry rather than two. Fi ndi ng that standi ng
served no useful anal yti cal purpose, the Court has hel d that the
i ssue of excl usi on i s to be determi ned sol el y upon a resol uti on of
the substanti ve questi on whether the cl ai mants Fourth Amend-
ment ri ghts have been vi ol ated. We can thi nk of no deci ded cases
of thi s Court that woul d have come out di fferentl y had we con-
cl uded . . . that the type of standi ng requi rement . . . reaffi rmed
today i s more properl y subsumed under substanti ve Fourth
Amendment doctri ne. Ri gorous appl i cati on of the pri nci pl e that the
ri ghts secured by thi s Amendment are personal , i n pl ace of a no-
ti on of standi ng, wi l l produce no addi ti onal si tuati ons i n whi ch
evi dence must be excl uded. The i nqui ry under ei ther approach i s
the same.
226
One must therefore show that the di sputed search
and sei zure has i nfri nged an i nterest of the defendant whi ch the
Fourth Amendment was desi gned to protect.
227
The Katz reasonabl e expectati on of pri vacy rati onal e has now
di spl aced property-ownershi p concepts whi ch previ ousl y mi ght
have supported ei ther standi ng to suppress or the establ i shment of
an i nterest that has been i nvaded. Thus, i t i s no l onger suffi ci ent
1270
228
Previ ousl y, when ownershi p or possessi on was the i ssue, such as a charge
of possessi ng contraband, the Court accorded automati c standi ng to one on the
basi s, fi rst, that to requi re hi m to assert ownershi p or possessi on at the suppressi on
heari ng woul d be to cause hi m to i ncri mi nate hi msel f wi th testi mony that coul d
l ater be used agai nst hi m, and, second, that the government coul d not si mul ta-
neousl y assert that defendant was i n possessi on of the i tems and deny that i t had
i nvaded hi s i nterests. Jones v. Uni ted States, 362 U.S. 257, 261265 (1960). See also
Uni ted States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951). But i n Si mmons v. Uni ted States, 390
U.S. 377 (1968), the Court hel d i nadmi ssi bl e at the subsequent tri al admi ssi ons
made i n suppressi on heari ngs. When i t then hel d that possessi on al one was i nsuffi -
ci ent to gi ve a defendant the i nterest to move to suppress, because he must show
that the search i tsel f i nvaded hi s i nterest, the second consi derati on was mooted as
wel l , and thus the automati c standi ng rul e was overturned. Uni ted States v.
Sal vucci , 448 U.S. 83 (1980) (stol en checks found i n i l l egal search of apartment of
the mother i n defendant, i n whi ch he had no i nterest; defendant coul d not move to
suppress on the basi s of the i l l egal search); Rawl i ngs v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98
(1980) (drugs bel ongi ng to defendant di scovered i n i l l egal search of fri ends purse,
i n whi ch he had no pri vacy i nterest; admi ssi on of ownershi p i nsuffi ci ent to enabl e
hi m to move to suppress).
229
Rakas v. I l l i noi s, 439 U.S. 128 (1978) (passengers i n automobi l e had no pri -
vacy i nterest i n i nteri or of the car; coul d not object to i l l egal search). Jones v. Uni t-
ed States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960), had establ i shed rul e that anyone l egi ti matel y on the
premi ses coul d object; the rati onal e was di scarded but the resul t i n J ones was mai n-
tai ned because he was there wi th permi ssi on, he had hi s own key, hi s l uggage was
there, he had the ri ght to excl ude and therefore a l egi ti mate expectati on of pri vacy.
Si mi l arl y mai ntai ned were the resul ts i n Uni ted States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48
(1951) (hotel room rented by defendants aunts to whi ch he had a key and permi s-
si on to store thi ngs); Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364 (1968) (defendant shared of-
fi ce wi th several others; though he had no reasonabl e expectati on of absol ute pri -
vacy, he coul d reasonabl y expect to be i ntruded on onl y by other occupants and not
by pol i ce).
230
E.g., Rawl i ngs v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98 (1980) (feari ng i mmi nent pol i ce
search, defendant deposi ted drugs i n compani ons purse where they were di scovered
i n course of i l l egal search; defendant had no l egi ti mate expectati on of pri vacy i n her
purse, so that his Fourth Amendment ri ghts were not vi ol ated, al though hers were).
to al l ege possessi on or ownershi p of sei zed goods to establ i sh the
i nterest, i f a justi fi abl e expectati on of pri vacy of the defendant was
not vi ol ated i n the sei zure.
228
Al so, i t i s no l onger suffi ci ent that
one merel y be l awful l y on the premi ses i n order to be abl e to object
to an i l l egal search; rather, one must show some l egi ti mate i nterest
i n the premi ses that the search i nvaded.
229
The same i l l egal search
mi ght, therefore, i nvade the ri ghts of one person and not of an-
other.
230
Agai n, the effect of the appl i cati on of the pri vacy rati on-
al e has been to narrow consi derabl y the number of peopl e who can
compl ai n of an unconsti tuti onal search.

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