Augustine's Account of Evil As Privation of Good

Jurnal Teologi Reformed Indonesia 4/1 (Januari 2014): 43-55
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Augustines Account of Evil as Privation of Good

Philip Kheng Hong Djung
Abstract
This article examines St. Augustines concept of evil as privation of good. The goal is to clear up
misunderstandings of this concept and to defend its adequacy. The goal shall be attained by
analyzing Augustines concept of evil in relation to his understanding of good, which is
inseparable from the relationship between the Creator and the creatures. Seen from this
perspective, a created thing is said to be good because (1) it is created by God who is supremely
good; (2) it perpetually depends on God as the source of its goodness; and (3) it keeps the order
or form which God has established for it. On the contrary, (1) evil is not created by God, hence
it is not a substance; (2) a thing is said to be evil when it does not depend on God as its source
of goodness; and (3) when it perverts the order or form which God has established for it.
A privation theory of evil contends that
evil is a privation of good. Evil is thus seen
as deficiency, lack, or loss of good as sickness
is the loss of health or war the loss of peace.
Though Augustine was not the originator of
this theory,
1
he was certainly a prominent
propagator of it.
2
Many discussions on this
topic will eventually lead back to Augustines
account of this theory.
3

There are various responses towards this
theory. Some accept it wholeheartedly,
4
some

1
John Hick notes that prior to Augustine, this theory
has been discussed by Origen, Athanasius, Basil the Great,
and Gregory of Nyssa. John Hick, Evil and the God of Love
(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 47.
2
Besides Augustine, Thomas Aquinas was also a well
known proponent of this theory. For discussions of Aquinas
account of this theory, see e.g., Hick, Evil and God, 93-106.
3
For the discussion of Augustines account of this
theory, see e.g., G. R. Evans, Augustine on Evil (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1982), 1-6; Hick, Evil and God,
37-89; Adam Swenson, Privation Theories of Pain,
International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 66 (2009): 139-
154.
4
For the proponents of the privation theory of evil, see
e.g., Bill Anglin and Stewart Goetz, Evil is Privation,
International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 13/1 (1982): 3-12;
Donald A. Cress, Augustines Privation Account of Evil: A
Defense, Augustinian Studies 20 (1989): 109-128; Austin
Farrer, Love Almighty and Ills Unlimited (London: Collins,
1940); Cornelius Plantinga, Jr., Not the Way Its Supposed to
object to it,
5
and others partially accept it.
6

Those who oppose this theory raise two main
objections. First, they argue that evil as
privation of good is a denial of the reality of

Be: A Breviary of Sin (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1995), 87-89;
C. S. Lewis, Mere Christianity (New York: HarperCollins,
1980), 44; Rowan Williams, Insubstantial Evil, in Augustine
and His Critics: Essays in Honour of Gerald Bonner, ed. Robert
Dodaro and George Lawless (London/New York: Routledge,
2000), 105-124.
5
For the opponents of the privation theory of evil, see
e.g., M. B. Ahern, The Problem of Evil (New York: Schocken
Books, 1971), 1-21; Peter A. Angeles, The Problem of God: A
Short Introduction (Columbus: Charles E. Merrill, 1974), 131-
148; Robert F. Brown, The First Evil Will Must Be
Incomprehensible: A Critique of Augustine, Journal of the
American Academy of Religion 46 (1978): 315-329; Todd C.
Calder, Is the Privation Theory of Evil Dead? American
Philosophical Quarterly 44, no. 4 (October 2007): 317-381; G.
Stanley Kane, Evil and Privation, International Journal for
Philosophy of Religion 11/1 (1980): 43-58; John Hospers, An
Introduction to Philosophical Analysis (Upper Saddle River, NJ:
Prentice Hall, 1997), 221-222; Wallace I. Matson, The
Existence of God (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1965), 141-
144; H. J. McCloskey, God and Evil, The Philosophical
Quarterly 10/39 (April 1960), 97-114; The Problem of Evil,
Journal of Bible and Religion 30/3 (July 1962): 187-197; Nelson
Pike, God and Evil: A Consideration, Ethics 68, no. 2 (Jan
1958): 116-124.
6
See Hick, Evil and God, 37-58; Lars Fr. H. Svendsen, A
Philosophy of Evil, trans. Kerri A. Pierce (Champaign, IL:
Dalkey Archive Press, 2010), 48; Williams, Insubstantial
Evil, 105-124.
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evil. Peter Angeles, for example, argues that
evil as lack of good implies evil as an illusion,
not real.
7
Again, Wallace Matson says that to
assert evil as non-being is to say that evil does
not exist.
8
In line with Angeles and Matson,
H. J. McCloskey contends that the privation
theory of evil is a mere tactic to avoid giving a
solution to the problem of evil by a mere
changing of name.
9
In his later publication,
McCloskey slightly alters his view, saying that
the privation theory is a middle course
between saying that it is a mere illusion and
that it is fully real.
10
Second, others reject this
theory due to its failure to explain the reality
of pain and sin. They argue that pain is not a
mere lack of pleasure. There is a difference
between lacking a healthy body and feeling
pain. The same thing can be said of moral
evil, that is, sin. There is a difference, they
argue, between sin due to the failure to help
those who are starving and sin due to
homicide. In G. Stanley Kanes words, there
is a familiar distinction, one of great moral
importance, between the failure to perform
loving acts on the one hand and the
performance of hateful or murderous acts on
the other.
11
The privation meaning of evil
seems inadequate to account for those
differences. Also, it is argued that in both
pains and sins, one may find some positive
character of evil, not in the sense that there
is something good in pains or sins, but in the
sense that both appear to create a powerful
effect on those who experience them.
McCloskey gives an example as follows: the
act of the cold-blooded, sadistic murderer who
kills not for gain but from hatred has a
positively evil nature, and just as positive a
nature as the act of the benevolent man who
helps all those who seek his help because he
knows it to be right so to act.
12
Hence Kanes
conclusion: There are thus at least two sorts

7
Angeles, Problem of God, 137.
8
Matson, Existence of God, 142.
9
McCloskey, God and Evil, 100.
10
McCloskey, Problem of Evil, 189.
11
Kane, Evil and Privation, 51-52.
12
of evil - all pains that are evils and all sins of
commission - for which the privation theory
of the nature of evil is unable to give an
adequate account. It is unacceptable,
therefore, as a general theory of the nature of
evil.
13

Still, for some, this theory is only adequate
to account for a certain aspect of evil. John
Hick, for example, sees that this theory is only
adequate in explaining the metaphysical
aspect of evil. Thus, ontologically, it is
plausible to say that evil is non-substance, the
loss of good. Yet, it is less adequate when it is
applied to an empirical aspect of evil, for, he
argues, As an element in human experience,
evil is positive and powerful. Empirically, it is
not merely the absence of something else but
a reality with its own distinctive and often
terrifying quality and power.
14
Rowan
Williams, in contrast to Hick, proposes the
notion of insubstantial evil, in which evil
could not be understood in terms of essence
or substance, but rather of relationship with
God.
15

Thus, it is the intention of this article to
explore further this subject. On the one hand,
it is an attempt to describe Augustines
understanding of evil as privation of good.
On the other hand, through this exposition I
intend to clear up misunderstandings and
answer the objections against Augustines
privative meaning of evil. To explicate this
subject, I will focus on Augustines account
found in his City of God and will refer to his
other works when it is necessary.
16
The choice

13
Kane, Evil and Privation, 48-52; see also Calder,
Privation Theory of Evil, 372-373.
14
Hick, Evil and God, 181.
15
Williams, Insubstantial Evil, 113.
16
The citations of Augustines City of God are taken
from Augustine, Concerning the City of God Against the Pagans,
trans. Henry Bettenson (London: Penguin Books, 2003).
Other citations of Augustines works are taken from the
following editions: Augustine, The Confessions, trans. Maria
Boulding, ed. John E. Rotelle (New York: New City Press,
1997); Enchiridion, trans. and ed. Albert C. Outler
(Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1955); The Nature of
the Good Against the Manichees, in Augustine: Earlier Writings,
vol. VI of The Library of Christian Classics, trans. John H. S.
Burleigh (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1953).
AUGUSTINES ACCOUNT OF EVIL AS PRIVATION OF GOOD

45
of the City of God is made with the following
considerations. First, theodicy is one of the
major themes of this book in which
Augustine discusses this subject extensively.
Second, since this book is Augustines mature
work, we might expect that his elaboration on
this subject would be fuller than in his
previous works. Finally, in this book
Augustine discusses his theodicy in relation to
the doctrine of creation, which provides a
significant clue for understanding his account
of evil as the privation of good.
17

This article will then argue that
Augustines privation theory of evil is still
adequately applied to explain both the
metaphysical and empirical aspects of evil
when the concept of good is explicated in
relation to his view of Gods creation. Thus
nature, that is, a created thing, is said to be
good because (1) it is created by God who is
supremely good; (2) it perpetually depends on
God as the source of its goodness; and (3) it
keeps the order or form which God has
established for it. On the contrary, (1) evil is
not created by God, hence it is not a
substance; (2) a thing is said to be evil when it
does not depend on God as its source of
goodness; and (3) when it perverts the order
or form which God has established for it. In
the following sections we will see how
Augustine explicates those notions.
Evil as Non-Substance
What is evil? Augustines straightforward
answer is: evil is privation, lack, or loss of
good. Then, what is good? Here, Augustine
does not give us one, but several descriptions
of good. Consequently, Augustines concept
of evil is necessarily understood in relation to
his concept of good. Therefore, we will deal
with his descriptions of good and derive of
them his concept of evil.

17
I am greatly indebted to Professor James K. A. Smith,
whose comments have led me to see a close relationship
between Augustines theodicy and his doctrine of creation.
The first description of good is related to
nature, or created substances. Augustine
contends that nature or substance, insofar as
it is created by God, is good. To some extent
good is identical with substance. Substance is
good, and evil, as opposite to good, is
therefore not a substance.
18
He does not mean
substance as substantia which indicates the
underlying stuff, material or spiritual, of
things, nor does he take it as essentia which
indicates simply what a thing is.
19
Instead,
substance is taken as referring to the first
category of Aristotles Ten Categories,
20
that is,
substance or being in its primary sense, in
which substance indicates a thing which can
stand by itself, in contrast to the other nine
categories, that is, accidents, which cannot
stand alone but predicate a substance.
Therefore, to say that good is a substance is to
indicate that it can exist independently. On
the contrary, evil is not a substance, but like
an accident,
21
and therefore it cannot exist
apart from good. Hence, the ontological
status of good is a substance, and of evil it is
not.
It takes a while for Augustine to come to
this notion of evil as non-substance.
22
In the
past, as he was still a follower of Mani-
cheanism, Augustine used to hold a dualistic
view of ultimate reality, that is, good and evil
which are in constant struggle one with
another eternally.
23
In this scheme, both God
as good and evil are seen as substance in a
materialistic sense, that is, a thing with matter
in it. Augustine said that he could not think
of God otherwise than in terms of bodily

18
See, e.g., City of God, XI.9, 22; Enchiridion III.11,
IV.12.
19
Richard Muller, Dictionary of Latin and Greek
Theological Terms: Drawn Principally from Protestant Scholastic
Theology (Grand Rapids: Baker Book House, 1985), 290.
20
Augustine said that he read and understood
Aristotles Ten Categories when he was just twenty years old.
Augustine, Confessions, IV.16.28.
21
Although evil does not seem to fit anyone of
Aristotles nine categories of accidents, but since evil cannot
be said as substance, then it has to be treated in the same
category as that of accident. See Augustine, Enchiridion, III.11.
22
Augustine, Confessions, IV.15.24.
23
Augustine, Confessions, V.10.20.

46
size.
24
Consistently, evil is thought of in the
same manner. Hence, evil is not only a
substance, but even a bodily substance, that
is, a dark, deformed mass; this was either
gross, and called earth, or ethereal and
rarefied like an airy body.
25
Augustine said
that this materialistic view of substance had
hindered him to know truth, for he was not
able to perceive that God is spirit
26
and that
he is the immutable good.
27
Not until he
encountered Neo-Platonic writings was he
able to think beyond this physical world, and
this philosophical conversion to Platonic
thought has served as a stepping stone for his
spiritual conversion to Christianity. Hence,
after abandoning Manicheanism and
adopting Platonism, he was able to see God as
spirit, that is, immaterial substance, and the
only ultimate reality, from which all things
derive their existence.
28
God is not only the
Creator by whom all things are made, but he
is also the only one Good which will bring
happiness to a rational or intellectual crea-
ture.
29
When there is only one ultimate rea-
lity which is supremely good, one can only
locate evil in the creation. However, does it
mean that things are created evil? Augustines
answer for this question is negative. All things
are created good. Augustine gives two
rationales for this notion.
First, all created substances, or all created
individual things, are good because they are
created by God who is good and has purposed
to create good. Since God is good, so,
whatever this good God created is good.
Augustine succinctly says,
Thus we find a valid and appropriate
explanation of creation in the goodness of God
leading to the creation of good.
30

24
Augustine, Confessions, V.10.19.
25
Augustine, Confessions,V.10.20.
26
Augustine, Confessions, III.7.12.
27
Augustine, Confessions, VII.1.1.
28
Augustine, Confessions, VII.9.13-14.
29
Augustine, City of God, XII.1.
30
Augustine, City of God, XI.22.
Things are good because they are created by
God who is good. Here, Augustine is not
troubled by the Euthyphro dilemma as to
whether a thing is good because it is created
by God, or, it is good, therefore God decides
to create it. For Augustine, it is clear that
there is one ultimate reality which is
supremely good, that is, God, from whom all
other goods come. There is no such thing as
good by itself, except God. Hence, things are
good, because they are created as good by
God.
From this, it follows that God could not be
the author of evil, nor could evil be located as
such in nature, that is, the whole physical
universe. This is contrary to what the
Manicheans believe about nature. They hold
that God has to mingle nature which is good
with evil in order to constrain evil against
him. Thus, to a certain extent God is the
cause of evil being present in the world, and
evil is found mingled with created beings. To
Augustine, such view is absurd, for God is
immutable and incorruptible and thus he
cannot be harmed by evil. God who is
absolutely good does not need to constrain
evil in nature, thus evil is nowhere found as
something in it.
31
Whatsoever is substance,
insofar as it is Gods creation, is therefore
good. So, eternal fire is good, because it is a
substance created by God, even though the
torment itself is evil.
32
Fire is something
praiseworthy, Augustine says, for as Gods
creation, the flames and splendors of fire are
beautiful.
33
Even the Devil itself, insofar as it
pertains to him as substance, is good.
34

Second, even though all created things are
potentially mutable, they are still good.
Augustine reasons that created beings or
things are mutable or corruptible. There is
only one incorruptible substance, that is,
God, who is supremely good. Created beings
are corruptible because they are not supremely

31
Augustine, City of God, 11.22.
32
Augustine, Nature of Good, xxxviii.
33
34

47
good. They are created not out of Gods own
being which is incorruptible, but out of
nothing (creatio ex nihilo). It is beyond our
limit to discuss Augustines concept of nihil.
Suffice it to say that Augustine never
entertains a notion of nothing as something.
35

If God is the ultimate, the only, and the
necessary being, and he did not create this
world out of his own essence, but out of
nothing, then nothing could not mean some-
thing, but absolute nothingness. So, because
of creatio ex nihilo, all creatures have their
beings inferior to Gods being, yet they are
still good. Although they have potency to be
corruptible, they are nevertheless good.
Augustine applies this mutability to rational
beings, that is, human beings and angels,
which by their own choice they could either
remain at or fall away from the relationship
with God. Therefore, they may either stay in
the state of blessedness or fall into the state of
wretchedness. Yet, despite their mutability
and fall into wretchedness, they are still
superior to those irrational beings. He says,
A sentient nature, when suffering, is better than
a stone which is quite incapable of suffering; and
in the same way the rational creature, even in
wretchedness, is superior to the nature which is
bereft both of reason and sense and therefore
cannot be the victim of misery.
36

Through these arguments, Augustine
excludes the possibility of locating evil in God
or in created beings. Evil cannot be associated
with God, for he is supremely good, nor can it
be with created beings or substances, for they
are created by a good God. Evil is therefore
not a thing; it is not a substance, for all
substances, except that of God, are created by
God, and they are therefore good by virtue of
creation. Evil is not a substance, but corrup-
tion, or defect, of a substance. Corruption of
a substance is not a substance, for it cannot
exist on its own. Hence, creation is good.
Augustine argues,

35
Augustine, Nature of Good, xxv.
36
if no one had sinned in the world, the world
would have been furnished and fitted only with
things naturally good.
37

The first sin of human beings was not caused
by the fruits of the tree, but humans will have
sinned prior to their eating of the forbidden
fruits.
38

In this point, we need to answer the charge
against this notion, namely, that evil as non-
being or non-substance is identical with the
denial of the reality of evil. Here we assert that
to say evil as non-substance is by no means to
deny the reality of evil, for when Augustine
says that evil is nothing, it is not in the
sense that it does not exist, but that it is not a
thing, not a substance which is created by
God. To say that evil is not a positive
substance is not to say that evil does not exist
at all, but rather that it cannot exist apart
from nature or created substance. Evil can
only exist in a good nature, in which it exists
parasitically. It corrupts a good nature, but
even a corrupted nature insofar as it is nature,
is still good. So, as long as there is still nature,
evil exists; yet, if nothing is left, evil also
ceases to be. Hence, evil is self-destructive.
39

Nevertheless, we may not think of evil as a
parasite that lives in a living organism and
corrupting its host, because a parasite, albeit
small, is still a substance. It is better to
understand the relationship of evil to nature
or substance as the relationship of an accident
or attribute of a thing to the thing itself, such
as the greenness of a leaf to the leaf itself.
Greenness as such cannot exist apart from the
leaf, just as evil never exists apart from good
nature. Thus, to say that the greenness of a
leaf is nothing is to say that it has no
substance by itself, for it cannot exist apart
from the leaf; but it is by no means to deny
the reality of that greenness.
40
Other similar
analogies are plentiful. Augustine likens evil

37
38
Augustine, City of God, XIV.13.
39
Augustine, City of God, XII.6; Confessions, VII.12.18.
40
This analogy came to my mind as I was looking at a
pot of an evergreen plant in my office. Insofar as my reading
goes, I am not aware that anybody has ever used this analogy.

48
to a defect of nature, such as a crack in a
vessel.
41
Another contemporary writer uses an
analogy of the hole in a donut.
42
Having said
this, we do not mean that evil is a quality of a
substance, nor is it one of the accidents in
Aristotles categories. What we want to
emphasize is that even though evil exists, it
exists not as a substance, but like accidents of
a substance, it exists inseparably from a
substance. Hence, in all cases, the point is
clear: evil is as real as the greenness in a leaf, a
crack in a vessel, or the hole in a donut; yet,
as the greenness of a leaf cannot exist apart
from it, or a crack apart from a vessel, and a
hole apart from a doughnut, so evil cannot
exist apart from a substance. It is thus
sufficient to show that the charge that the
privation theory of evil denies the reality of
evil is untenable. This charge is due rather to
a misunderstanding than to a real case to
answer.
43

Evil as Lack of Participation in God
Augustines second description of good
pertains to the creatures relationship with
God. Good is thus seen as a participation in
God, and evil is thus the deprivation or lack
of this participation. The angels were created
good, as the angels of light, because they were
illuminated by that light by which they were
created. Therefore, they
became light . . . by participation in the
changeless light and day, which is the Word of
God, but when they turned away from God, they
have become in themselves darkness, deprived of
participation in the eternal light [italics added].
44

Augustine goes on to say: For evil is not a
positive substance: the loss of good has been

41
42
Swenson, Privation Theories of Pain, 139.
43
Although Kane opposes the privation theory of evil,
he is aware of the fact that the denial of the reality of evil is
not a part of this theory. So, this objection is due to a
misunderstanding rather than a real case. Kane, Evil and
Privation, 44.
44
given the name of evil.
45
As they lose their
participation in God, they lose goodness. The
loss of this participation is thus evil.
46

So far Augustine mentions two conditions
by which creatures are said to be good, that is,
by being created good, and by participating in
God. Both conditions are linked with God
who is good as the sole cause of creatures
being good. Augustine explains as follows:
The good, which renders them blessed, is God,
by whom they were created; and the
participation in his life and the contemplation of
his beauty is their never-failing joy.
47

There is also both a natural and a functional
necessity for creatures, as they are created
good, to be participating in God. The
separation is not natural, and therefore
harmful. Augustine explains: that God
created their nature so good that it is harmful
for it to be separated from him.
48
What is
created as good cannot be separated from
God who is the source of its goodness. An
analogy given by Augustine to illustrate this
truth is that of the eyes enjoyment of
light.
49
Naturally, eyes are created for
enjoying light, and functionally, eyes can only
see with light. Without light, a good eye is
blind. As harmful the absence of light is to
the eye, so is the absence of participation in
God harmful to rational beings.
This notion of participation in God is
particularly applied to the rational and
intelligent creatures, by which they enjoy the
felicity or blessedness of God.
50
Augustine
thus speaks of two kinds of good: one by
virtue of creation and another by virtue of
participation. The former belongs to all
created beings, by which nature is good
insofar as it is created by God. The latter is
extended only to rational creatures, that is,

45
46
Augustine has extensively used the language of
participation in God in the City of God. See, e.g., VIII.1;
X.1,2; XII.21; XIV.13.
47
Augustine, City of God, IX.22.
48
49
Augustine, City of God, VIII.8.
50
Augustine, City of God, XII.1; see also VIII.1.

49
angels and humans, by which they are good
insofar as they remain in their participation in
God as the supreme good and the only source
of their goodness. The former is closely
related to, but not identical with, the
existence of nature. So, insofar as nature
exists, it is good, because as long as it exists, it
is still a substance, and it is therefore good.
The latter, however, is dependent on the
creatures relationship with God. This good,
which is also called blessedness or felicity, is
not inherent in its nature, but in its
participation with the supreme Good.
Rational creatures are blessed because of their
participation in Him, and they are wretched
when deprived of participation in Him.
51

The deprivation from this participation of the
Good is thus evil. It is the privation or loss of
good which comes from God as the source of
goodness which the rational creatures
continually receive as they participate in him.
Augustines notion of evil as lack of
participation in God is helpful in explaining
the nature of original sin. For rational
creatures to gain blessedness, or the highest
good, they have to be perpetually and fully
dependent on God as the sole source of good.
This total dependency, by which rational
creatures cling to God as their light, requires
humility and obedience. Therefore, the first
sin is called pride.
52
For by pride they reject to
adhere to God as the supreme and real
ground of their being; instead,
man regards himself as his own light and turns
away from that light which would make man
himself a light if he would set his heart on it.
53

Humility and pride are thus paradoxical, for
humility that abases oneself before God will
result in exaltation, but pride that seeks to
exalt oneself will result in abasement. When
rational beings exalt themselves and turn away

51
Augustine, City of God, IX.16.
52
Brown inaccurately identifies pride as the cause of
the fall. Instead, pride is certainly the first sin, yet it should be
differentiated from the cause of it. Brown, The First Evil,
321.
53
from their dependence on God, they fall.
Failure to remain in this participation has
caused them to fall and to be dragged down
into a lower degree of existence. Though they
do not lose their being, but their being
becomes less real, and nearer to
nothingness.
54
For some, it seems
implausible to imagine a being which is more
or less real, for being is either real or unreal.
55

Either a thing exists or does not exist. A thing
cannot more or less exist. We, however, see
that such a language is plausible, when we
consider two modes of existence of a thing
which Augustine seems to imply in this
discussion. First, a thing exists by virtue of
creation; therefore, so long as it is created by
God, it is what it is, and therefore it exists. In
this aspect, we can say that either a thing
exists or it does not. But, second, a thing also
exists by virtue of its participation in God.
Although by virtue of Gods creation, a thing
exists, it can never exist totally independent
from God. Except for God himself, a being
that can exist absolutely on his own, all
created things have to be dependent on Gods
sustenance for their existence. Augustine
explains as follows:
There can be no being which does not derive its
existence from the most high and true God. All
are not supremely good, but they approximate to
the Supreme good, and even the very lowest
goods, which are far distant from the Supreme
good, can only derive their existence from the
Supreme good.
56

In this manner, it is plausible to talk about
the more or less existence of a thing. As a
rational being draws closer to God, it has a
higher degree of existence, and vice versa. We
can liken this second aspect of existence to an
essential function which constitutes a thing,
that is, a function of calculation in a
calculator. A calculator is defined by its

54
55
Donald Cress suggests that the language of less
being can only be plausible when it is understood in
Platonic context. Cress, Augustines Privation, 110-111.
56
Augustine, Nature of Good, i.

50
function of calculating. When some of its
functions are gone, its existence as a calculator
becomes less. When all functions are gone, it
is no longer a calculator, although in terms of
matter it is there. Augustine certainly does not
identify the existence of rational being with
the functionality of their body or soul, but
with its participation in God their Creator. As
human beings, the bearers of the image of
God, we become more or less human in terms
of our relationship with God. When human
beings fall from their participation in God,
they have sinned. Falling away from the
source of good, they become evil, and
therefore less human. Thus, Augustines less
real being is plausible in this sense.
Williams is correct on this point, that evil
can not merely be seen in terms of time and
space, but in relation between creatures with
their God.
57
However, his opposition to a
substantial view of evil is incorrect.
58

Augustine has certainly included both the
metaphysical and empirical aspects in his
account of evil. As the above explication
makes clear, Augustine not only sees evil in
terms of the creatures relationship with the
Creator, but also evil as non-substance.
Evil as Corruption of the Right Measure,
Order, and Form
Augustines third description of good
pertains to creatures having the right measure,
order, and form that God has established for
it. Every created being is good because it has
the measure, form, and order that God
intends for it. There is no created being
without a certain degree of measure, form, or
order. A completely formless nature is
impossible. Even in the case of hyle, which
some have thought to be a matter completely
without form and quality, it still has a form
that we cannot conceive, and the capacity to
receive form. It is therefore good, not evil.
59

57
58
59
Augustine, Nature of Good, xviii.
Or, eternal fire is good, though the torment
itself is evil, for fire has its own measure,
form, and order.
60
The measure, form, and
order of a thing determine whether it is
superior or inferior to another thing.
All things are good; better in proportion as they
are better measured, formed and ordered, less
good when there is less of measure, form and
order.
61

Thus, due to its measure, order, and form,
gold is superior to silver; and silver to lead. In
this way, the scale of being exists in the
universe and everything has its place
determined by its measure, form, and order.
62

A thing is said to be corrupted when its
measure, form, or order alters or changes to a
lesser degree. However, this corruption does
not alter its place in the scale of being. Hence
corrupted gold is still better than uncorrupted
silver.
63
Corrupted or sinful rational and
spiritual beings are still superior to
uncorrupted non-rational beings.
64

When good is understood in terms of the
proper or right measure, form, and order of
nature, evil is thus nothing else than
corruption, either of the measure, or the
form, or the order, that belong to nature,
65

or
the loss of integrity, beauty, healthy or virtue, or
of goodness in a nature that is . . . liable to
destruction or diminution through perversion.
66

Thus, right and wrong, good and evil, is that
of the rightly ordered and the perverted.
67

Understanding evil as perversion of the
proper measure, form, or order of nature is
helpful in describing moral evil, that is, sin.
Now, when we take this concept of good, that
is, proper measure, form, or order, as a
standard or goal which God intends for a

60
61
Augustine, Nature of Good, iii.
62
63
Augustine, Nature of Good, v.
64
65
Augustine, Enchiridion, 4.
66
67
Augustine, City of God, XIX.12.

51
rational being to keep or to maintain, then sin
is a failure or perversion to keep or to
maintain this goal. The ultimate goal of
human beings as God intends for them is to
be like God. Their goal is God himself. Sin is
therefore a defection from him who
supremely exists to something of a lower
degree of reality.
68
Augustine says, For we
are justified in calling a man good not because
he merely knows what is good, but because he
loves the Good.
69
Sin is thus the failure to
meet this goal. It is to abandon a higher goal
and to turn to a lower one. Augustine gives
examples of greed, lust, boasting, and pride.
There is nothing wrong with gold. Yet when
one abandons justice for the sake of gold, it is
the sin of greed. There is nothing wrong with
an attraction to a beautiful body. Yet it is lust,
when the soul . . . perversely delights in
sensual pleasures. Also, there is nothing
wrong with the praise of men. Yet it is a sin of
boasting, when one loves the praise of others
and cares nothing for the witness of
conscience. Last, power is good, but it is a
sin of pride, when one perversely loves ones
own power, and has no thought for the justice
of the Omnipotent.
70
That a right order of
nature is inseparable from its end is
exemplified in a human beings love of God.
Augustine says, if the Creator is truly loved,
that is, if he himself is loved, and not
something else in his stead, then he cannot be
wrongly loved.
71
Therefore, a rightly ordered
love is nothing but to love God himself. It is
sin when human beings turn their end of love
from God to creatures.
Second, sin as perversion is also
understood as an improper use of temporal
goods or things. Sin occurs when the will
desires the inferior thing in a perverted and
inordinate manner.
72
It is making a bad use
of a good thing.
73
Material goods are not evil

68
69
70
71
Augustine, City of God, XV.22.
72
73
Augustine, Nature of Good, xxxvi.
in themselves, and they contribute to our
benefit, when we make wise and appropriate
use of them. It is like poison. When it is
appropriately applied, it can be a good
medicine. On the other hand, things like
food, if they are improperly used, may be
harmful to the body.
74

McCloskey does not agree with Augustine
on this point. For him, evil cannot be a mere
absence of a right structure. There exists a
presence of evil structure.
75
Yet, he does not
elaborate on what he means by an evil
structure and how this evil structure exists in
this world. However, we could imagine what
he would have meant by it. Suppose that what
he means by an evil structure is that there is a
society or nation which has been so corrupted
to such an extent that all civil and social
structures which is necessary for people to live
together no longer exist. Also suppose that if
such a society ever existed, we still cannot see
how that evil structure could be funda-
mentally different from that of a perverted
structure. What we can conclude is that the
evil structure is none other than a perverted
structure or order in its extreme degree.
By defining evil as perversion Augustine
locates the source of moral evil, that is, sin,
not in nature itself, but in the perverted will
of rational beings. Sin is rather internal than
external. Human character, emotions, and
acts are rather caused by his will than by his
external circumstances.
If the will is wrongly directed, the emotions will
be wrong; if the will is right, the emotions will be
not only blameless, but praiseworthy.
76

Williams is correct to say that evil has affected
us internally, including our perception, that
we are no longer able to see what is good and
what is evil.
77

Augustine also makes clear that the will of
a rational being is good, but the perverted will

74
75
76
77
Williams, Insubstantial Evil, 107-108.

52
is evil. For Augustine, what causes a good will
to become evil is inexplicable. An evil act is
caused by an evil will. Since what is good
cannot cause evil, thus, a good nature cannot
cause a will to turn evil. Evil will is therefore
caused by evil itself. But, evil itself is an effect,
and an effect cannot be a cause. In the final
analysis, an efficient cause of evil is
unknown.
78
He thus concludes: The truth is
that one should not try to find an efficient
cause for a wrong choice. It is not a matter of
efficiency, but of deficiency; the evil will itself
is not effective but defective.
79
Since evil has
only a deficient cause, it is only known by its
absence, as darkness is known by the absence
of light, or silence by the absence of sound.
To look for an efficient cause of evil is like
trying to see darkness or to hear silence.
80
In
this point, Brown has certainly misunderstood
Augustine by asserting that Augustine
maintains no cause for evil.
81
Augustine does
not say that there is no cause of evil, but there
is no efficient cause of evil. Since evil is not
a thing; it is deficiency; it cannot thus have
efficient cause but a deficient one.
At this point we would like to evaluate the
charges made against the privation theory of
evil. Some have argued that this theory fails to
explain the positive character of pain and
sin.
82
What they mean is that both pain and
sin have shown powerful effects. Therefore,
sin is not simply a lack of good, nor is pain
simply a lack of health. We need to treat the
two phenomena separately. First, we shall see
how Augustine explains sin, that is, moral
evil, as a perversion or lack of a proper order
of nature to answer the above charge. It is
plausible to think that a thing, which loses or
lacks a proper order, is yet powerful and
destructive. We can think of a wild and
untamed horse. That horse is powerful, but
since it is untamed, it is dangerous. We can

78
79
80
81
Brown, The First Evil, 324.
82
See, e.g., Kane, Evil and Privation, 51-52;
also imagine a nuclear power plant that has
been damaged by an earthquake, so that its
energy can no longer be controlled. That
uncontrolled power plant does not lose its
energy. Its energy is simply uncontrolled,
therefore it is destructive and dangerous. Sin
is a perversion of a proper order, the loss of
integrity and virtue of a rational being, but it
does not mean a loss of energy. Therefore,
sins as perversion are destructive and harmful
to human nature.
83
Augustine would agree
with what Nelson Pike argues, that intention
is not evil,
84
but he would immediately add
that a perverted intention or will is evil. A
person with a perverted will, such as a mass
murderer or a terrorist, is powerful, yet
destructive. Kane has raised an objection
against this assertion. He argues that privation
theory fails to explain the gradation of evil.
For example, the sin of those who fail to help
people who are starving and the sin of
homicide are not the same.
85
Augustine would
agree with that. When we see sin as
perversion, then the former is certainly less
perverted than the latter.
Augustines treatment of pain, however, is
more complex. In the City of God Augustine
treats the subject of pain under the broader
category of suffering. Here we can say that
Augustine does not sayat least not
explicitlythat all sufferings are categorically
evil. So we need to carefully observe his
treatment on this subject. Augustine reflects
on this particular subject against the
background of the sack of Rome, in which, he
says, all the devastation, the butchery, the
plundering, the conflagrations, and all the
anguish, had occurred.
86
What then is
suffering? Why does it happen even to those
who have put their faith in Christ?
Augustines answer is that sufferings or
temporal ills are the recompense of sin.
87

83
84
Pike, God and Evil, 119.
85
Kane, Evil and Privation, 51-52.
86
Augustine, City of God, I.7.
87

53
The sin he refers to is not necessarily a big sin,
but even that small and trivial one still
deserves punishment. Therefore, he says,
every one of them, however commendable
his life, gives way at times to physical desires,
and, while avoiding monstrous crimes, the
sink of iniquity and the abomination of
godlessness, is yet guilty of some sins,
infrequent sins, perhaps, or more frequent
because more trivial.
88
This suffering starts
from the first sin of Adam and Eve. Hence, as
they fell into sins,
there started a chain of disasters: mankind is led
from that original perversion, a kind of
corruption at the root, right up to the disaster of
the second death, which has no end.
89

Therefore, for Augustine, one needs to
differentiate between sin and suffering as the
punishment of sin. The former is evil, for it
comes from the corruption of humans will.
The latter is not necessarily evil. Suffering as
the punishment which comes from God is
certainly not evil.
90
However, suffering or
torment as something due to sins is evil.
91

Therefore suffering, when it is seen as an
instrument allowed or ordained by God to
punish sin justly, is not evil; but suffering as
experienced by rational beings due to their
sins is evil. Thus suffering can be seen either
as retribution for whatever sins, however
small, they had committed, or as an
instrument to bring their virtue to
perfection.
92

That Augustine differentiates suffering is
also clear in his treatment of death as the
ultimate pain or suffering. Not all deaths are
evil. In general death is evil, because it entails
a heavy burden of suffering.
93
Yet the death
of the martyrs is not evil. It is of high value to
the extent that even if they had not yet
received baptism prior to their death, the

88
89
Augustine, City of God, XIII.14.
90
Augustine, Nature of Good, xxxvii.
91
92
Augustine, City of God, XX.2.
93
death itself is of the same value for the
remission of their sins as if they had been
washed in the sacred font of baptism.
94

Suicide, however, is categorically evil. It is
thus forbidden for Christians to do so.
95

What makes the death of martyrs good and
suicide evil could only be perceived in terms
of existence and good. For Augustine, good
and existence are inseparable. To be good is
to maintain ones existence which God has
bestowed. On the contrary, it is evil to
annihilate ones existence. When Christians
for the sake of their faith in Christ choose to
die, they do so in order to maintain their
existence as God has promised. When some
choose to commit suicide, they have the
intention of annihilating their own existence.
It is therefore evil. Whatsoever is good, it
exists. To exist is thus desirable for every
being.
96
So, even wretched persons, when they
were given choice, would have chosen to exist
even though they had to suffer eternally.
Augustine says, They would certainly be
overjoyed to choose perpetual misery in
preference to complete annihilation.
97
To
strive for existence is therefore natural for
every creature; those plants and animals wish
to exist and to avoid extinction.
98
Augustine
sees that naturally striving for existence is a
proper order of life given by the Creator, who
supremely exists and who is supremely good
and wise. Therefore, to love God is to love
our own existence.
99
It is understandable then
why suicide is seen as abominable, for it
violates the proper order of life. Yet,
martyrdom is seen differently because another
higher order is applied. Our existence is
related to our relationship with God. To exist
is to have a relationship with God. So, when
one is forced to choose between his or her
own existence and the relationship with the
Creator, then the latter is the right choice, for

94
95
Augustine, City of God, I.16-22.
96
97
98
99

54
by choosing the relationship with God, one
has gained his or her existence. Bodily pain is
also a sense of striving against extinction,
100

which is useful to compel the body to become
better. Therefore, a wound which gives pain
is better than a painless festering.
101
The
body of Christ had wounds, but it did not
suffer corruption. So, Augustine does not see
that bodily pains are something evil, but, the
corruption of the body is certainly so.
Conclusion
This article has explicated Augustines
account of evil as the privation of good.
Augustines account is plausible when one
understands the meaning of good. Good for
Augustine is inseparable from God who is the
Good and the source of good for all creation.
In short, there is no good apart from Good,
for all created beings are good because they
are created by God who is good, and they are
good as they stay in participation in Him who
is their source of good, and they are good
when they live according to a proper order of
life established by their Creator. Augustines
account of evil as the privation of good needs
to be understood as inseparable from his
explication of good. Evil is non-substance for
it is not created. It is also the lack of
participation in God and the perversion of a
proper order of life.
Some features can be said of Augustines
account of evil. First, it is a totally theistic
view of the nature of evil. Augustine leaves no
hole in which evil, either moral or natural,
could be discussed without somehow relating
to God. Second, Augustine makes sin as the
primary evil. In other words, sin is
categorically evil. All sins are evil, however
small they are. The so-called natural evils, e.g.,
sufferings, disasters, pains, are not necessarily
evil. When they are seen as Gods righteous
punishment for sins, they are good, because
they are instrumental to bring about good.

100
Augustine, Nature of Good, xx.
101
Augustine, Nature of Good, xx.
On the other hand, they are evil as
experienced by those who suffer. Third,
Augustine locates the source of evil in the free
will of rational beings. Though he falls short
of explaining how a good will could turn into
an evil one, evil could be found from nowhere
else but from human free will, which is
created good, yet changeable.
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