LAWYERS LEAGUE FOR A BETTER PHILIPPINES vs.

AQUINO
G.R. No. 73748
May 22, 1986

FACTS:
1. On February 25, 1986, President Corazon Aquino issued
Proclamation No. 1 announcingthat she and Vice President Laurel were
taking power.2.On March 25, 1986, proclamation No.3 was issued
providing the basi s of the Aquinogovernment assumption of power by
stating that the "new government was installed througha direct exercise of the
power of the Filipino people assisted by units of the New ArmedForces of the
Philippines."
ISSUE:
Whether or not the government of Corazon Aquino is legitimate.
HELD:
Yes.The legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter but
belongs to the realmof politics where only the people are the judge.The Court further
held that:
1. The people have accepted the Aquino government whi ch is in
effective control of the entirecountry;
2. It is not merely a de facto government but in fact and law a de jure
government; and
3. The community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of the new
government.


























IN RE: SATURNINO V. BERMUDEZ, petitioner
G.R. No. 76180
October 24, 1986

FACTS:
Bermudez as a lawyer, quotes the first paragraph of Section 5 (not Section 7
as erroneously stated) of Article XVIII of the proposed 1986 Constitution, which
provides in full as follows:
Sec. 5. The six-year term of the incumbent President and Vice-President
elected in the February 7, 1986 election is, for purposes of synchronization of
elections, hereby extended to noon of June 30, 1992.
The first regular elections for the President and Vice-President under this
Constitution shall be held on the second Monday of May, 1992.
Bermudez claims that the said provision is not clear as to whom it refers, he
then asks the Court to declare and answer the question of the construction and
definiteness as to who, among the present incumbent President Corazon Aquino and
Vice President Salvador Laurel and the elected President Ferdinand E. Marcos and
Vice President Arturo M. Tolentino being referred to under the said Section 7 (sic) of
ARTICLE XVIII of the TRANSITORY PROVISIONS of the proposed 1986
Constitution refers to, . . .

ISSUE:
Whether or not said provision is ambiguous.

HELD:
No. Petitioners allegation of ambiguity or vagueness of the aforequoted
provision is manifestly gratuitous, it being a matter of public record and common
public knowledge that the Constitutional Commission refers therein to incumbent
President Aquino and Vice-President Laurel, and to no other persons, and provides
for the extension of their term to noon of June 30, 1992 for purposes of
synchronization of elections. Hence, the second paragraph of the cited section
provides for the holding on the second Monday of May, 1992 of the first regular
elections for the President and Vice-President under said 1986 Constitution. In
previous cases, the legitimacy of the government of President Aquino was likewise
sought to be questioned with the claim that it was not established pursuant to the
1973 Constitution. The said cases were dismissed outright by this court which held
that: Petitioners have no personality to sue and their petitions state no cause of
action. For the legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter. It
belongs to the realm of politics where only the people of the Philippines are the
judge. And the people have made the judgment; they have accepted the government
of President Corazon C. Aquino which is in effective control of the entire country so
that it is not merely a de facto government but in fact and in law a de jure
government. Moreover, the community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of
the present government.



DE LEON vs. ESGUERRA
GR No. L-78059
August 31, 1987

FACTS:
On May 17, 1982, Alfredo De Leon won as Brgy. Captain and other
petitioners won as Councilmen of Brgy. Dolores, Taytay, Rizal. Under the Barangay
Election Act of 1982, their terms of office shall be six years, which commenced on
June 7, 1982 up to June 7, 1988. On Feb. 8, 1987, while the petitioners still have
one year and four months, Gov. Benjamin Esguerra of Rizal Province, issued a
memorandum designating Florentino Magno as the new Brgy. Captain and other
respondents as the new Councilmen of the said barrangay. The respondents relied
on the Provisional Constitution of 1986, which grants the governor to appoint or
designate new successors within the one year period which ended on Feb. 25 1987.
They also contended that the terms of office of the petitioners were already been
abolished and that they continued in office simply because no new successors were
appointed yet; and that the provision in the Barangay Election Act fixing the term of
office of Barangay officials up to six years must have been deemed repealed for
being inconsistent with the Provisional Constitution. Petitioners instituted an original
action for prohibition to review the order of the governor.

ISSUE:
Whether the designation was valid?

HELD:
The Supreme Court held that the memoranda issued by Gov. Esguerra has
no legal effect. Though the designation was within the one year period which ended
on Feb. 25, 1987, however, it was cut short when the 1987 Constitution took effect
on Feb. 2, 1987. When the 1987 Constitution was in effect, the governor no longer
had the authority to designate successors under the Provisional Constitution which
was deemed to have been superseded. There has been no proclamation or
executive order terminating the term of elective Barangay officials; and the Barangay
Election Act is not inconsistent with the Constitution. The writ of prohibition was
granted and the petitioners have acquired the security of tenure.









THE COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL REVENUE vs. ANTONIO CAMPOS RUEDA
G.R. No. L-13250
October 29, 1971

FACTS:
Maria Cerdeira died in Tangier, (an international zone [foreign country] in
North Africa), on January 2, 1955. At the time of her demise, she was married to a
Spanish Citizen and a permanent resident of Tangier from 1931 up to her death, on
January 2, 1955. She left properties in Tangier as well as in the Philippines. Among
the properties in the Philippines are several parcels of land and many shares of
stock, accounts receivable and other intangible personal properties. On the real
estate the respondent Antonio Campos Rueda, as administrator of her estate, paid
the sum of P111,582.00 as estate tax and the sum of P151,791.48 as inheritance
tax, on the transfer of her real properties in the Philippines, but refused to pay the
corresponding deficiency estate and inheritance taxes due on the transfer of her
intangible personal properties, claiming that the estate is exempt from the payment
of said taxes pursuant to section 122 of the Tax Code and that he could avail of the
reciprocal provisions of our Tax Code. The Collector of Internal Revenue in a
decision assessed the estate of the deceased, as deficiency estate and inheritance
taxes, the sum of P161,874.95 including interest and penalties, on the transfer of
intangible personal properties of Maria Cerdeira..

ISSUE:
Whether or not Rueda is rightfully assessed those taxes.

HELD:
Foreign Country used in Sec 122 of the National Internal Revenue Code,
refers to a government of that foreign power which although not an international
person in the sense of international law, DOES NOT impose transfer of death taxes
upon intangible personal properties of citizens not residing therein. Or whose law
allows a similar exemption from such taxes. It is not necessary that Tangier should
have been recognized by our government in order to entitle the petitioner to the
exemption benefits provided by our Tax Law. But since such law has not been
alleged, this case is to remanded to the lower court for further trial.














MAGALLONA v. ERMITA
G.R. No. 187167
16 July 2011,

FACTS:
R.A. 9522 was enacted by the Congress in March 2009 to comply with
theterms of the United Nations Conventi on on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS III), which the Philippines ratified on February 27, 1984. Such
compliance shortenedone baseline, optimized the location of some basepoints
around the
Philippinear chi pel ago and cl assi f i ed adj acent t er r i t or i es such as t he
Kal ayaan I sl andGround (KIG) and the Scarborough Shoal as regimes of
islands whose islandsgenerate their own applicable maritime zones.Petitioners, in their
capacities as citizens, taxpayers or legislators assailthe constitutionality of R.A.
9522 with one of their arguments contending thatthe law unconstitutionally converts
internal waters into archipelagic waters,thus subjecting these waters to the
ri ght of innocent and sea lanes passageunder UNCLOS III, including
overflight. Petitioners have contended that thesepassage rights will violate the
Constitution as it shall expose Philippine internalwaters to nuclear and maritime pollution
hazard.

ISSUE:
Whether or not R.A. 9522 is unconstitutional for converting internal watersinto archipelagic
waters

HELD:
Petition DISMISSED.
The Court finds R.A. 9522 constitutional and is consistent with thePhilippines
national interest. Aside from being a vital step in safeguarding the
countrys maritime zones, the law also allows an internationall y-
recogni zed delimi tation of the breadth of the Philippine s maritime zones
andcontinental shelf. The Court also finds that the conversion of internal waters into
archipelagic waters will not risk the Philippines as affirmed in the Article 49 of the
UNCLOS III, an archipelagic State has sovereign power that extends to
thewat er s encl osed by t he ar chi pel agi c basel i nes, r egar dl ess of t h
ei r dept h or distance from the coast. It is further stated that the regime of
archipelagic sea lanes passage will not affect the status of its archipelagic waters or
the exercise of sovereignty over waters and air space, bed and subsoil and
the resources therein
.