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G.R. No.

83820 May 25, 1990


JOSE B. AZNAR (as Provincial Chairman of PDP Laban in Cebu), petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS and EMILIO MARIO RENNER OSMEA, respondents.
Ponente: J. Paras
Facts:
Private respondent Emilio "Lito" Osmea filed his certificate of candidacy with the COMELEC for
the position of Provincial Governor of Cebu Province in the January 18, 1988 local elections. On
January 22, 1988, the Cebu PDP-Laban Provincial Council (Cebu-PDP Laban, for short), as
represented by petitioner Jose B. Aznar in his capacity as its incumbent Provincial Chairman,
filed with the COMELEC a petition for the disqualification of private respondent on the ground
that he is allegedly not a Filipino citizen, being a citizen of the United States of America.
On January 27, 1988, petitioner filed a Formal Manifestation submitting a Certificate issued by
the then Immigration and Deportation Commissioner Miriam Defensor Santiago certifying that
private respondent is an American and is a holder of Alien Certificate of Registration (ACR) No.
B-21448 and Immigrant Certificate of Residence (ICR) No. 133911, issued at Manila on March
27 and 28, 1958, respectively. (Annex "B-1").
The petitioner also filed a Supplemental Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for the Issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order to temporarily enjoin the Cebu Provincial Board of Canvassers
from tabulating/canvassing the votes cast in favor of private respondent and proclaiming him
until the final resolution of the main petition.Thus, on January 28, 1988, the COMELEC en banc
resolved to order the Board to continue canvassing but to suspend the proclamation.
Private respondent, on the other hand, maintained that he is a Filipino citizen, alleging: that he
is the legitimate child of Dr. Emilio D. Osmea, a Filipino and son of the late President Sergio
Osmea, Sr.; that he is a holder of a valid and subsisting Philippine Passport No. 0855103 issued
on March 25, 1987; that he has been continuously residing in the Philippines since birth and has
not gone out of the country for more than six months; and that he has been a registered voter
in the Philippines since 1965.
On March 3, 1988, COMELEC (First Division) directed the Board of Canvassers to proclaim the
winning candidates. Having obtained the highest number of votes, private respondent was
proclaimed the Provincial Governor of Cebu. Thereafter, on June 11, 1988, COMELEC (First
Division) dismissed the petition for disqualification for not having been timely filed and for lack
of sufficient proof that private respondent is not a Filipino citizen. Hence, the present petition
for certiorari.
Issue: won the respondent is an alien
Ruling:
The records show that private respondent filed his certificate of candidacy on November 19,
1987 and that the petitioner filed its petition for disqualification of said private respondent on
January 22, 1988. Since the petition for disqualification was filed beyond the twenty five-day
period required in Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, it is clear that said petition was
filed out of time.
However, We deem it is a matter of public interest to ascertain the respondent's citizenship and
qualification to hold the public office to which he has been proclaimed elected. There is enough
basis for us to rule directly on the merits of the case, as the COMELEC did below.
Petitioner's contention that private respondent is not a Filipino citizen and, therefore,
disqualified from running for and being elected to the office of Provincial Governor of Cebu, is
not supported by substantial and convincing evidence.
In the proceedings before the COMELEC, the petitioner failed to present direct proof that
private respondent had lost his Filipino citizenship by any of the modes provided for under C.A.
No. 63. Among others, these are: (1) by naturalization in a foreign country; (2) by express
renunciation of citizenship; and (3) by subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the
Constitution or laws of a foreign country. From the evidence, it is clear that private respondent
Osmea did not lose his Philippine citizenship by any of the three mentioned hereinabove or by
any other mode of losing Philippine citizenship.
Parenthetically, the statement in the 1987 Constitution that "dual allegiance of citizens is
inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law"(Art. IV, Sec. 5) has no
retroactive effect. And while it is true that even before the 1987 Constitution, Our country had
already frowned upon the concept of dual citizenship or allegiance, the fact is it actually existed.
Be it noted further that under the aforecited proviso, the effect of such dual citizenship or
allegiance shall be dealt with by a future law. Said law has not yet been enacted.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED and the Resolution of the
COMELEC is hereby AFFIRMED.

G.R. No. L-83882 January 24, 1989
IN RE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF WILLIE YU, petitioner,
vs. MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO, BIENVENIDO P. ALANO, JR., MAJOR PABALAN, DELEO
HERNANDEZ, BLODDY HERNANDEZ, BENNY REYES and JUN ESPIRITU SANTO, respondent.
Ponente: J. Padilla
Facts:
In the case at bar, herein petitioner, despite his naturalization as a Philippine citizen, applied
and renewed his Portuguese passport. Moreover, while still a citizen of the Philippines,
petitioner also declared his nationality as Portuguese in commercial documents he signed.
Issue: Whether or not the acts of applying for a foreign passport and declaration of foreign
nationality in commercial documents, constitute an expressrenunciation of ones Philippine
citizenship acquired through naturalization.
Ruling:
While still a citizen of the Philippineswho had renounced, upon his naturalization, "absolutely
and forever all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince,potentate, state or sovereignty" and
pledged to "maintain true faith and allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines," 19 he
declared his nationality as Portuguese in commercialdocuments he signed, specifically, the
Companies registry of Tai Shun Estate Ltd. 20 filed in Hongkong sometime in April 1980.
To the mind of the Court, the foregoing acts considered together constitute an express
renunciation of petitioner's Philippine citizenship acquired through naturalization.
Petitioner, with full knowledge, and legal capacity, after having renounced Portuguese
citizenship upon naturalization as a Philippine citizen 22 resumed or reacquired his prior status
as a Portuguese citizen, applied for a renewal of his Portuguese passport 23 and represented
himself as such in official documents even after he had become a naturalized Philippine citizen.
Such resumption or reacquisition of Portuguese citizenship is grossly inconsistent with his
maintenance of Philippine citizenship.

ANTONIO BENGSON III, petitioner, vs . HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and
TEODORO C. CRUZ, respondents
[G.R. No. 142840. May 7, 2001
Ponente: J. Kapunan
Facts:
Respondent Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born in San Clemente,
Tarlac, on April 27, 1960, of Filipino parents. The fundamental law then applicable was the 1935
Constitution.On November 5, 1985, however, respondent Cruz enlisted in the United States
Marine Corps and, without the consent of the Republic of the Philippines, took an oath of
allegiance to the United States. As a consequence, he lost his Filipino citizenship for under
Commonwealth Act No. 63, Section 1(4), a Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship by, among
others, "rendering service to or accepting commission in the armed forces of a foreign country."
On March 17, 1994, respondent Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship through repatriation
under Republic Act No. 2630. [3] He ran for and was elected as the Representative of the
Second District of Pangasinan in the May 11, 1998 elections. He won by a convincing margin of
26,671 votes over petitioner Antonio Bengson III, who was then running for reelection.
Subsequently, petitioner filed a case for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam with respondent House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) claiming that respondent Cruz was not qualified to
become a member of the House of Representatives since he is not a natural-born citizen as
required under Article VI, Section 6 of the Constitution.
On March 2, 2000, the HRET rendered its decision [5] dismissing the petition for quowarranto
and declaring respondent Cruz the duly elected Representative of the Second District of
Pangasinan in the May 1998 elections. The HRET likewise denied petitioner's motion for
reconsideration of the decision in its resolution dated April 27, 2000. [6] Petitioner thus filed
the present petition for certiorari.
Issue: WON Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who became an American citizen, can still be
considered a natural-born Filipino upon his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.
Ruling:
As respondent Cruz was not required by law to go through naturalization proceedings in order
to reacquire his citizenship, he is perforce a natural- born Filipino. As such, he possessed all the
necessary qualifications to be elected as member of the House of Representatives.
A final point. The HRET has been empowered by the Constitution to be the "sole judge" of all
contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the House. [29]
The Court's jurisdiction over the HRET is merely to check "whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction" on the part of the latter.
[30] In the absence thereof, there is no occasion for the Court to exercise its corrective power
and annul the decision of the HRET nor to substitute the Court's judgment for that of the latter
for the simple reason that it is not the office of a petition for certiorari to inquire into the
correctness of the assailed decision. [31] There is no such showing of grave abuse of discretion
in this case.

Said provision of law reads: Section 1. How citizenship may be lost. -- A Filipino citizen may lose
his citizenship in any of the following ways and/or events:
x x x
(4) By rendering services to, or accepting commission in, the armed forces of a foreign country:
Provided, That the rendering of service to, or the acceptance of such commission in, the armed
forces of a foreign country, and the taking of an oath of allegiance incident thereto, with the
consent of the Republic of the Philippines, shall not divest a Filipino of his Philippine citizenship
if either of the following circumstances is present:
(a) The Republic of the Philippines has a defensive and/or offensive pact of alliance with said
foreign country; or
(b) The said foreign country maintains armed forces on Philippine territory with the consent of
the Republic of the Philippines: Provided, That the Filipino citizen concerned, at the time of
rendering said service, or acceptance of said commission, and taking the oath of allegiance
incident thereto, states that he does so only in connection with his service to said foreign
country; And provided, finally, That any Filipino citizen who is rendering service to, or is
commissioned in, the armed forces of a foreign country under any of the circumstances
mentioned in paragraph (a) or (b), shall not be permitted to participate nor vote in any election
of the Republic of the Philippines during the period of his service to, or commission in, the
armed forces of said country. Upon his discharge from the service of the said foreign country,
he shall be automaticallyentitled to the full enjoyment of his civil and political rights as a
Filipino citizen x x x.

To be naturalized, an applicant has to prove that he possesses all the qualifications 12] and
none of the disqualifications [13] provided by law to become a Filipino citizen. The decision
granting Philippine citizenship becomes executory only after two (2) years from its
promulgation when the court is satisfied that during thei ntervening period, the applicant has (1)
not left the Philippines; (2) has dedicated himself to a lawful calling or profession; (3) has not
been convicted of any offense or violation of Government promulgated rules; or (4)
committedany act prejudicial to the interest of the nation or contrary to any Government
announced policies.
[ 14] Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however reacquire the same in the
manner provided by law. Commonwealth Act. No. 63 (C.A. No. 63), enumerates the three
modes by which Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by a former citizen: (1) by
naturalization, (2) by repatriation, and (3) by direct act of Congress.
Naturalization is a mode for both acquisition and reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.
Repatriation, on the other hand, may be had under various statutes by those who lost their
citizenship due to: (1) desertion of the armed forces; [19] (2) service in the armed forces of the
allied forces in World War II; [20] (3) service in the Armed Forces of the United States at any
other time; [21] (4) marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien; [22] and (5) political and economic
necessity. 23]
As distinguished from the lengthy process of naturalization, repatriation simply consists of the
taking of an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registering said oath in the
Local Civil Registry of the place where the person concerned resides or last resided.
Repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality.
R.A. No. 2630, which provides:
Section 1. Any person who had lost his Philippine citizenship by rendering service to, or
accepting commission in, the Armed Forces of the United States, or after separation from the
Armed Forces of the United States, acquired United States citizenship, may reacquire Philippine
citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registering the
same with Local Civil Registry in the place where he resides or last resided in the Philippines.
The said oath of allegiance shall contain a renunciation of any other citizenship.

[G.R. No. 132244. September 14, 1999]
GERARDO ANGAT, petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
Ponente: J. Vitug
Facts:
Petitioner Gerardo Angat was a natural born citizen of the Philippines until he lost his
citizenship by naturalization in the United States of America. Now residing at No. 69 New York
Street, Provident Village, Marikina City, Angat filed on 11 March 1996 before the RTC of
Marikina City, Branch 272, a petition to regain his status as a citizen of the Philippines under
Commonwealth Act No. 63, Republic Act No. 965 and Republic Act No. 2630 (docketed as N-96-
03-MK).
He has resided in the Philippines at least six months immediately preceding the date of this
petition, to wit: since 1991. He has conducted himself in a proper and irreproachable manner
during the entire period of his residence in the Philippines, in his relations with the constituted
government as well as with the community in which he is living.It is his intention to reacquire
Philippine citizenship and to renounce absolutely and forever all allegiance and fidelity to any
foreign prince, potentate, state, or sovereignty, and particularly to the United State of America
to which at this time he is a citizen.
On 13 June 1996, petitioner sought to be allowed to take his oath of allegiance to the Republic
of the Philippines pursuant to R.A. 8171 . The motion was denied by the trial judge in his order
of 12 July 1996. Another motion filed by petitioner on 13 August 1996 to have the denial
reconsidered was found to be meritorious by the court a quo in an order, dated 20 September
1996, which stated, among other things, that - A close scrutiny of R.A. 8171 shows that
petitioner is entitled to the benefits of the said law considering that herein petitioner is a
natural born Filipino citizen who lost his citizenship by naturalization in a foreign country. The
petition and motion of the petitioner to take his oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines likewise show that the petitioner possesses all the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications under R.A. 8171.
FACTS:
Petitioner Gerardo Angat was a natural born citizen of the Philippines until he lost his
citizenship by naturalization in the United States of America. On 11 March 1996, he filed before
the RTC of Marikina City, Branch 272, a petition to regain his Status as a citizen of the
Philippines under Commonwealth Act No. 63, Republic Act No. 965 and Republic Act No. 2630.
The case was thereafter set for initial hearing.
On 13 June 1996, petitioner sought to be allowed to take his oath of allegiance to the Republic
of the Philippines pursuant to R.A. 8171. The motion was initially denied by the trial judge but
after a motion for reconsideration, it was granted. The petitioner was ordered to take his oath
of allegiance pursuant to R.A. 8171. After taking his oath of allegiance, the trial court issued an
order repatriating petitioner and declaring him as citizen of the Philippines pursuant to Republic
Act No. 8171. The Bureau of Immigration was ordered to cancel his alien certificate of
registration and issue the certificate of identification as Filipino citizen. On 19 March 1997, the
Office of the Solicitor General filed a Manifestation and Motion (virtually a motion for
reconsideration) asserting that the petition itself should have been dismissed by the court a
quo for lack of jurisdiction because the proper forum for it was the Special Committee on
Naturalization consistently with Administrative Order No. 285 ("AO 285"), dated 22 August
1996, issued by President Fidel V. Ramos. AO 285 had tasked the Special Committee on
Naturalization to be the implementing agency of R.A 8171. The trial court granted the motion
and dismissed the petition. Petitioner appealed contending that the RTC seriously erred in
dismissing the petition by giving retroactive effect to Administrative Order No. 285, absent a
provision on Retroactive Application.
ISSUES:
WON Court erred in dismissing the petition by giving retroactive effect to AO 285, absent a
provision on Retroactive Application
HELD:
No. Under Section 1 of Presidential Decree ("P.D.") No. 725, 8 dated 05 June 1975, amending
Commonwealth Act No. 63, an application for repatriation could be filed by Filipino women
who lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens, as well as by natural born Filipinos
who lost their Philippine citizenship, with the Special Committee on Naturalization. The
committee, chaired by the Solicitor General with the Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs and the
Director of the National Intelligence Coordinating Agency asthe other members, was created
pursuant to Letter of instruction ("LOI") No. 270, dated 11 April 1975, as amended by LOI No.
283 and LOI No. 491 issued, respectively, on 04 June 1975 and on 29 December 1976. Although
the agency was deactivated by virtue of President Corazon C. Aquino's Memorandum of 27
March 1987, it was not however, abrogated. In Frivaldo vs. Commission on Elections, 9 the
Court observed that the aforedated memorandum of President Aquino had merely directed the
Special Committee on Naturalization "to cease and desist from undertaking any and all
proceedings . . . under Letter of Instruction ("LOI") 270." 10 The Court elaborated: This
memorandum dated March 27, 1987 cannot by any stretch of legal hermeneutics be construed
as a law sanctioning or authorizing a repeal of P.D. No. 725. Laws are repealed only by
subsequent ones and a repeal may be express or implied. It is obvious that no express repeal
was made because then President Aquino in her memorandum-based on the copy furnished us
by Lee-did not categorically and/or impliedly state that P.D. 725 was being repealed or was
being rendered without any legal effect. In fact, she did not even mention it specifically by its
number or text. On the other hand, it is a basic rule of statutory construction that repeals by
implication are not favored. An implied repeal will not be allowed "unless it is convincingly
andunambiguously demonstrated that the two laws are clear repugnant and patently
inconsistent that they cannot co-exist."
Indeed, the Committee was reactivated on 08 June 1995 ; hence, when petitioner filed his
petition on 11 March 1996, the Special Committee on Naturalization constituted pursuant to
LOI No. 270 under P.D. No. 725 was in place. Administrative Order 285, promulgated on 22
August 1996 relative to R.A. No. 8171, in effect, was merely then a confirmatory issuance.
The Office of the Solicitor General was right in maintaining that Angat's petition should have
been filed with the Committee, aforesaid, and not with the RTC which had no jurisdiction
thereover. The court's order of 04 October 1996 was thereby null and void, and it did not
acquire finality nor could be a source of right on the part of petitioner. It should also be
noteworthy that the was one for repatriation, and it was thus incorrect for petitioner to initially
invoke Republic Act No. 965 and R.A. No. 2630 since these laws could only apply to persons
who had lost their citizenship by rendering service to, or accepting commission in, the armed
forces of an allied foreign country or the armed forces of the United States of America, a factual
matter not alleged in the petition, Parenthetically, under these statutes,the person desiring to
re-acquire Philippine citizenship would not even be required to file a petition in court , and all
that he had to do was to take an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and to
register that fact with the civil registry in the place of his residence or where he had last resided
in the Philippines.

[G.R. No. 161434. March 3, 2004]
MARIA JEANETTE C. TECSON and FELIX B. DESIDERIO, JR., petitioners, vs. The COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, RONALD ALLAN KELLY POE (a.k.a. FERNANDO POE, JR.) and VICTORINO X. FORNIER,
respondents.
Ponente: J. Vitug
Petitioners sought for respondent Poes disqualification in the presidential elections for having
allegedly misrepresented material facts in his (Poes) certificate of candidacy by claiming that
he is a natural Filipino citizen despite his parents both being foreigners. Comelec dismissed the
petition, holding that Poe was a Filipino Citizen. Petitioners assail the jurisdiction of the
Comelec, contending that only the Supreme Court may resolve the basic issue on the case
under Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution.
Issue:
Whether or not it is the Supreme Court which had jurisdiction.
Whether or not Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that Poe was a Filipino
citizen.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court had no jurisdiction on questions regarding qualification of a candidate for
the presidency or vice-presidency before the elections are held. "Rules of the Presidential
Electoral Tribunal" in connection with Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution, refers to
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the "President" or "Vice-
President", of the Philippines which the Supreme Court may take cognizance, and not of
"candidates" for President or Vice-President before the elections. Comelec committed no grave
abuse of discretion in holding Poe as a Filipino Citizen. The 1935 Constitution on Citizenship, the
prevailing fundamental law on respondents birth, provided that among the citizens of the
Philippines are "those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines."
Tracing respondents paternal lineage, his grandfather Lorenzo, as evidenced by the latters
death certificate was identified as a Filipino Citizen. His citizenship was also drawn from the
presumption that having died in 1954 at the age of 84, Lorenzo would have been born in 1980.
In the absence of any other evidence, Lorenzos place of residence upon his death in 1954 was
presumed to be the place of residence prior his death, such that Lorenzo Pou would have
benefited from the "en masse Filipinization" that the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902. Being
so, Lorenzos citizenship would have extended to his son, Allan--- respondents
father.Respondent, having been acknowledged as Allans son to Bessie, though an American
citizen, was a Filipino citizen by virtue of paternal filiation as evidenced by the respondents
birth certificate. The 1935 Constitution on citizenship did not make a distinction on the
legitimacy or illegitimacy of the child, thus, the allegation of bigamous marriage and the
allegation that respondent was born only before the assailed marriage had no bearing on
respondents citizenship in view of the established paternal filiation evidenced by the public
documents presented.
But while the totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively that respondent FPJ is a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines, the evidence on hand still would preponderate in his
favor enough to hold that he cannot be held guilty of having made a material misrepresentation
in his certificate of candidacy in violation of Section 78, in relation to Section 74 of the Omnibus
Election Code.