Autocracy by Democratic Rules:

The Dynamics of Competitive Authoritarianism in the Post-Cold War Era

Steven Levitsky
Department of Government
Harvard University
Levitsky@cfia.harvard.edu

Lucan A. Way
Department of Political Science
Temple University
Lway@temple.edu



March 25, 2003





Paper Prepared for the Conference, Mapping the Great Zone: Clientelism and the Boundary
between Democratic and Democratizing, Columbia University, April 4-5, 2003. [This is a revised


1
version of a paper prepared for the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association,
Boston, MA, August 28-31, 2002.]


2
Notwithstanding the extensive literature on the spread of democratic regimes during the
1980s and 1990s, one aspect of the third wave of democratization has received less scholarly
attention: the emergence and persistence of mixed or hybrid regimes. In much of Africa, post-
communist Eurasia, Asia, and Latin America, political regimes combined meaningful democratic and
authoritarian features during the 1990s. Though not a new phenomenon, hybrid regimes
proliferated after the end of the Cold War. In 2002, they easily outnumbered democracies among
developing countries (Diamond 2002: 30-31; Schedler 2002: 47). In light of this proliferation,
scholars created a variety of new regime subtypes, including hybrid regime (Karl 1995), semi-
democracy (Case 1996), electoral democracy (Diamond 1999), illiberal democracy (Zakaria
1997), semi-authoritarianism, (Olcott and Ottaway 1999), semi-dictatorship (Brooker 2000),
soft authoritarianism (Means 1996), and electoral authoritarianism (Schedler 2002b).

Nevertheless, the literature on these regimes remains underdeveloped.

Two weaknesses
are worth noting. First, scholars frequently place mixed cases in residual categories (such as semi-
democratic, semi-authoritarian, or Freedom Houses partly free) that tell us little about the
regimes other than what they are not, which tends to obscure important differences among mixed
cases.
1
Second, much of the literature on mixed regimes suffers from a democratizing bias.
2

Mixed regimes are frequently treated as partial forms of democracy (Collier and Levitsky 1997), or
as regimes that are in transition to democracy. Yet such characterizations may be misleading.
Although some mixed regimes did in fact democratize during the post-Cold War period (Mexico,
Serbia), others remained stable (Malaysia, Ukraine), moved in multiple directions (Albania,
Zambia), or became increasingly authoritarian (Azerbaijan, Belarus). Various hybrid regimes have
now remained in place for more than a decade, which is longer than the life span of many Latin
American military regimes in the 1960s and 1970s. Rather than treating mixed regimes as partial or
transitional democracies, then, it may be more useful to think about the specific types of regimes
they actually are.

This paper examines one type of hybrid regime, which we call competitive
authoritarianism.
3
Such regimes are authoritarian in that they do not meet standard procedural
minimum criteria for democracy. Elections are often unfair and civil liberties are frequently violated.
However, they are competitive in that democratic institutions are more than faades. Rather, they
permit opposition groups to contest seriously forand sometimes even winpower. The
combination of autocratic rule and democratic rules creates an inherent source of tension.
Consequently, competitive authoritarian regimes are characterized by periodic crises in which
opposition challenges force incumbents to choose between cracking down and losing power. These

1
For example, El Salvador, Latvia, and Ukraine each received a combined political and civil liberties score of sixor
Partly Freefrom Freedom House in 199293. Yet whereas Latvia denied full citizenship rights for people of
Russian descent, El Salvador was characterized by widespread human rights violations and a lack of civilian control
over the military. Ukraine possessed broad citizenship rights and civilian control over the military, but civil liberties
were frequently violated and incumbents routinely manipulated democratic procedures.
2
Similar critiques can be found in Herbst (2001), Carothers (2002), and the articles in the April 2002 issue of
the Journal of Democracy.
3
This concept is discussed in greater detail in Levitsky and Way (2002).


3
crises have resulted in a variety of outcomes, ranging from authoritarian entrenchment (Malaysia,
Zimbabwe) to incumbent turnover without regime change (Ukraine, Zambia) to democratization
(Peru, Serbia).

We seek to explain these diverging regime trajectories. We focus on three variables. The
first is incumbents organizational capacity to thwart opposition challenges, which we argue is
enhanced by elite cohesion and strong coercive and electoral organizations. The second variable is
the organizational capacity of the opposition. Well-organized and united opposition movements are
more likely to topple autocratic incumbents than those that are poorly organized and/or divided.
The third variable is countries linkage to, and dependence on, Western governments and
institutions. Close ties to the West generally raised the costs of authoritarian entrenchment during
the 1990s. Thus, incumbent survival is most likely in countries with a cohesive elite and strong
states and governing parties, weak and divided oppositions, and weak ties to the West. Incumbent
turnover is most likely in countries with weak states and governing parties, united opposition
movements, and close ties to the West.

We apply this framework to 12 cases of competitive authoritarianism, all of which faced
some kind of regime crisis between 1990 and 2001. The cases are taken from five regions: Africa
(Kenya, Zambia, Zimbabwe), Central Europe (Albania, Serbia), the former Soviet Union (Armenia,
Russia, Ukraine), Latin America (Mexico, Nicaragua, Peru), and East Asia (Malaysia). We find
that in cases of high Western linkage, such as countries in Central Europe and Latin America, even
autocratic incumbents with substantial coercive capacity were likely to yield to, rather than repress,
serious democratic challenges. In cases of low Western linkage, outcomes hinged on the
organizational capacity of governments and their opponents. Where governments possessed
substantial coercive capacity and strong ruling parties (Malaysia, Zimbabwe), or where they faced
weak and deeply divided oppositions (Kenya, Russia), incumbents survived crises. Where elites
were fragmented and ruling party and state organizations were weak, and/or where opposition
movements were united, incumbents fell (Ukraine, Zambia). Yet where competition was primarily a
product of incumbent weakness, the removal of autocratic incumbents often did not result in
democratization, but rather in a new period of competitive authoritarian rule.

These results have important implications for comparative research on regimes and regime
change. First, they suggest that several factors that are said to contribute to democratic stability,
such as elite cohesion, strong parties, and effective states, also contribute to the stability of
authoritarian regimes. Elite fragmentation and state and party weakness limit incumbents capacity to
build and maintain authoritarian rule, which may result in competitive politics and even incumbent
turnover. Yet these factors are unlikely to contribute to stable democracy. In other words, the very
conditions that enhance pluralism and competition in some authoritarian regimes may simultaneously
inhibit democratization (Way 2002a, Way 2002b). These results caution against viewing
competitive authoritarianism as a halfway house on the road to democracy.



4
Our findings also run counter to several contemporary approaches to regime change,
particularly those that focus on elite attitudes and behavior and on institutional design.
4
We find that
leadership choices are often better explained by domestic and international constraints than by the
presence or absence of democratic values,
5
and that in the absence of other structural factors
supporting pluralism, the long-term effects of democratic statecraft are often quite meager. We also
find that because formal political institutions in many competitive authoritarian regimes are weak and
easily manipulated by incumbents, institutional design is often better understood as endogenous to
regime outcomes than as an independent cause of those outcomes. Our analysis of regime change is
thus closer to approaches that emphasize structural factors such as the role of state power, the
balance of social forces, and international constraints (Skocpol 1979; Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and
Stephens 1992; Collier 1999).

The Concept of Competitive Authoritarianism

Competitive authoritarian regimes are regimes in which democratic institutions exist and are
widely viewed as the primary means of gaining and maintaining power, but in which incumbents
violate democratic rules to such a degree that the regime cannot be labeled a democracy. Examples
include Croatia under Franco Tudjman, Haiti under Jean Bertrand Aristide, Malaysia under
Mahathir Mohammad, Peru under Alberto Fujimori, Russia under Boris Yeltsin and Vladimir Putin,
Serbia under Slobodan Milosevic, and Ukraine under Leonid Kravchuk and Leonid Kuchma, as
well as Albania, Armenia, Cameroon, Georgia, Ghana, Kenya, Mexico, Senegal, Tanzania, Zambia,
and Zimbabwe during much of the 1990s.
6


Competitive authoritarian regimes are non-democratic in that they do not meet standard
procedural minimum definitions of democracy.
7
Democratic regimes meet four minimum criteria:
(1) executives and legislatures are chosen through elections that are open, free, and fair; (2) virtually
all adults possess the right to vote; (3) civil and political liberties are broadly protected; and (4)
elected authorities are not subject to the tutelary control of military or clerical leaders.
8
Although
democracies may at times violate these criteria, such violations are not sufficiently severe or
systematic to impede challenges to incumbents. By contrast, competitive authoritarian regimes are

4
For example, Robert Moser, summarizing a recent collection of essays on Russian politics, suggests that the
problems of Russian democracy arose primarily from poor elite decisions and institutional design (Moser
2001: 10). On elite attitudes and decisions, see Di Palma (1990), Fis h (1998), and McFaul (2002). On institutional
design, see Stepan and Skach (1993), Linz and Valenzuela (1994), Lijphart and Waisman (1996), and Fish (2001).
5
Thus, in certain contexts autocratic leaders have behaved democratically (Nicaragua in 1990, Zambia in
1991, Mexico in 2000), whereas in other contexts seemingly democratic opposition leaders have behaved
in a highly undemocratic manner (Berisha in Albania, Ter-Petrosian in Armenia, Chiluba in Zambia).
6
Competitive authoritarianism does not encompass all hybrid regimes. Other regimes that mix authoritarian and
democratic features include constitutional oligarchies (electoral regimes in which suffrage is denied to certain
groups, as in Latvia during the 1990s), semi-competitive regimes (electoral regimes in which a major political force is
barred from competition, as in Argentina between 1957 and 1966), and tutelary regimes (electoral regimes in which
non-elected actors such as military or religious authorities wield substantial veto power, as in Guatemala in the
1980s and Iran in the late 1990s).
7
On procedural minimum definitions, see ODonnell and Schmitter (1986: 8) and Collier and Levitsky (1997).
8
This definition is consistent with mid-range definitions of democracy. See Diamond (1999: 13-15).


5
characterized by frequent and often severe violations of democratic procedure, such that the playing
field between government and opposition is markedly uneven.
9
Incumbents routinely abuse state
resources, restrict the media, and manipulate electoral results, and journalists and opposition
politicians are frequently subject to surveillance, harassment, and, occasionally, arrest, exile, or
violent repression.

Yet competitive authoritarian regimes are not fully closed. In full-blown authoritarian
regimes, formal democratic institutions such as elections, parliaments, and courts either do not exist
or exist merely as faades or legitimating mechanisms. They do not yield meaningful contestation for
power or generate uncertainty with regard to the allocation of political authority.
10
In competitive
authoritarian regimes, by contrast, the existence of meaningful democratic institutions creates arenas
through which opposition groups may contest seriously forand occasionally win--power.
Elections are often bitterly fought contests. Although fraud, unequal media access, and harassment
of the opposition stack the cards in favor of incumbents, elections often generate considerable
uncertainty, and in some cases (Nicaragua in 1990, Zambia in 1991, Serbia in 2000), incumbents
lose them. Similarly, although institutions such as the courts, legislatures, and the media are often
weak and/or subordinated to the executive, opposition forces may, on occasion, use them to pose
serious challenges to the government. Although incumbents may repress these challenges, direct
assaults on democratic institutions tend to be costly in terms of both domestic and international
legitimacy. Consequently, efforts to limit competition and suppress dissent often take more subtle
forms, such as bribery, blackmail, and the manipulation of debts, tax authorities, compliant
judiciaries, and other state agencies to legally harass or persecute opponents.

Although competitive authoritarian regimes are not new,
11
they became especially prevalent
in the post-Cold War period. The Western liberal hegemony that emerged in the wake of the
collapse of the Soviet Union undermined the legitimacy of alternative regime models, eliminated
many alternative sources of financial and military support, and created strong incentives for
peripheral states to adopt formal democratic institutions. As Andrew Janos (2000) has argued,
liberal hegemony places a web of constraints on peripheral elites seeking to maintain good
standing in the international community. In a non-hegemonic context, Western powers are also more
likely to tolerate (and in many cases, support) authoritarian regimes that present themselves as
buffers against Western rivals. This was clearly seen during the Cold War. The rise of the Soviet
Union after World War II contributed to the emergence of both quasi-Leninist dictatorships and
U.S.-backed anti-communist dictatorships in much of the Third World.


9
Competitive authoritarianism must therefore be distinguished from unstable, ineffective, or otherwise
flawed regimes that nevertheless meet the minimum criteria for democracy, such as what Guillermo
ODonnell (1994) has called delegative democracies.
10
According to this definition, regimes in Egypt, Singapore, and the Central Asian republics were fully
authoritarian during the 1990s.
11
Historical examples include Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania in the 1920s, Argentina under the first Pern
government (1946-55), Zambia in the 1960s, and the Dominican Republic in the 1970s.


6
The collapse of the Soviet Union ushered in a period of Western liberal hegemony of
unprecedented scope. These changes increased the cost of building and sustaining authoritarian
regimes in several ways. For one, the evaporation of alternative sources of military and economic
support created an incentive for peripheral elites to remain on good terms with Western
governments and institutions. Other forms of international influence included demonstration effects,
direct state-to-state pressure (in the form of sanctions, behind the scenes diplomacy, and in some
cases, military intervention), explicit conditionality (as in the case of European Union membership),
and the activities of emerging transnational non-governmental organizations (NGOs). The effects of
international pressure vary considerably across states and regions. Many autocratic governments
benefit from pockets of international permissiveness created by economic or security interests that
trump democracy promotion on Western foreign policy agendas. Nevertheless, for most
governments in lower and middle-income countries, the costs associated with the maintenance of
full-scale authoritarian institutionsand the benefits associated with adopting democratic ones--rose
considerably in the 1990s. As a result, even highly autocratic leaders were at times forced to
tolerate the uncertainties created by meaningful democratic institutions.

Crisis and Change in Competitive Authoritarian Regimes

Competitive authoritarian regimes may be relatively enduring.
12
As long as autocratic
incumbents do not cancel or openly steal elections or commit egregious human rights violations, they
may be able to hold onto power for many years. Using techniques such as bribery, co-optation,
and various forms of legal persecution, governments may limit opposition challenges without
provoking massive protest or international repudiation.
13
Yet the coexistence of autocratic
incumbents and democratic rules creates an inherent source of instability. The persistence of
meaningful elections, formally empowered courts and legislatures, and an independent media
provides mechanisms through which opposition forces may periodically challenge the government.
Such challenges present autocratic incumbents with a difficult dilemma. On the one hand, overt
repressioncanceling elections, jailing opponents, ignoring Supreme Court rulings, or closing the
legislatureis costly, because the challenges are formally legal and often enjoy broad domestic and
international legitimacy. On the other hand, if opposition challenges are allowed to run their course,
incumbents risk losing power.
14
Such situations frequently result in an incumbent crisis in the
government is forced to choose between egregiously violating democratic rules, at the cost of
international isolation and domestic conflict, and allowing the challenge to proceed, at the cost of
possible defeat.

Such crises resulted in a variety of regime outcomes. In some cases (Kenya, Russia,
Malaysia), incumbents weathered the storm. In other cases (Peru, Serbia), failed crackdown
attempts eventually led to the removal of autocratic incumbents. In still other cases (Nicaragua,
Zambia in 1991, Ukraine in 1994), incumbents lost elections and ceded power peacefully. Yet the

12
Perhaps the clearest case of a stable competitive authoritarian regime is Malaysia. See Case (1996).
13
For an insightful account of such strategies in Ukraine, see Darden (2001).
14
These dilemmas are insightfully presented by Schedler (2002a).


7
removal of autocratic incumbents does not always lead to democracy. As Table 1 shows, only half
of our cases of incumbent turnover (Mexico, Nicaragua, Peru, Serbia) resulted in democratization.
In four cases (Albania, Armenia, Ukraine, Zambia), turnover was accompanied by the persistence
of competitive authoritarian rule. Hence, although the removal of autocratic incumbents creates an
opportunity for democratization, it should not be equated with democratization.

--Table 1 about here

We seek to explain the variation in regime outcomes shown in Table 1. Why are some
autocratic governments able to weather the storms created by episodes of democratic contestation,
often by cracking down and further consolidating authoritarian rule, while others lose power, either
because they fail to crack down or because they attempt to crack down but fail? More broadly,
what explains why some competitive authoritarian regimes democratize in the face of crisis while
others remain stable or experience authoritarian retrenchment?

We begin with the assumption that incumbents in competitive authoritarian regimes seek to
remain in office, and that extra-legal tactics (such as electoral fraud and various forms of repression)
are among the options they consider as they pursue that goal. Given this assumption, three
variables are of particular importance in explaining regime outcomes: (1) incumbent capacity; (2)
opposition unity and strength; and (3) the international context.

Incumbent Capacity
In large part, the fate of competitive authoritarian regimes in crisis hinges on the capacity of
incumbents to thwart opposition challenges. Maintaining an authoritarian regime requires substantial
political, organizational, and financial resources. Governments that possess such resources are
much more likely to survive opposition challenges than those that lack them. Three dimensions of
incumbent capacity are particularly important to regime survival: (1) elite cohesion; (2) coercive
capacity; and (3) electoral capacity.

Elite Cohesion
Elite cohesion refers to the degree of discipline and loyalty that executives can command
from other regime elites, such as cabinet ministers, military leaders and other security officials, and
parliamentary and party leaders. Just as elite cohesion is critical to democratic stability (Linz 1978;
Higley and Gunther 1992), it is also critical to the survival of authoritarian regimes (Easter 1997;
Roeder 2001). This is particularly true in periods of crisis, when incumbents must consider
strategiessuch as violent repression or electoral fraudthat can potentially bring high costs.
Incumbents who cannot rely on key regime allies or subordinates during periods of crisis are less
likely to risk such strategies, and if they adopt them, they are more likely to fail.

Regimes vary considerably on the dimension of elite cohesion. In some cases, due to weak
states, unstable political institutions, or deep ideological or ethnic divisions, incumbents repeatedly


8
confront insubordination from within the government or the security forces.
15
In other cases, due to
strong social or ideological ties or highly institutionalized parties or militaries, cases of defection or
insubordination are rare.

Coercive Capacity
Incumbent survival also depends on the governments capacity to repress or control
opposition forces. Coercive capacity is important on at least two levels. On one level, an effective
coercive apparatus may employ low level repression (surveillance, harassment, detention, and
occasional beatings or killings) to intimidate citizens and discourage them from participating in
opposition activities. On another level, an effective coercive apparatus must be able to reliably
suppress (or pre-empt though massive shows of force) opposition protests. Where incumbents lack
the capacity to crack down on such protests, they are more likely to fall.

Coercive capacity requires both an infrastructure of repression and effective control over
that infrastructure. In many regimes, this includes well-equipped and disciplined military and police
forces and an internal security apparatus equipped with secret police and extensive surveillance
operations (including the use of phone tapping, media monitoring, and informant networks). It may
also include state-sponsored paramilitary organizations and party-affiliated informant and thug
networks. Other state agencies, such as the tax administration, may also be used as mechanisms for
intimidating and controlling the media, the private sector, and much of the opposition. For such an
apparatus to be effective, of course, incumbents must fully control it. Where presidents cannot rely
on military, secret service, or other agencies of coercion to follow their orders, incumbent capacity
will be reduced.

Electoral Capacity
A third dimension of incumbent capacity is electoral organization. Unlike their counterparts
in full-scale authoritarian regimes, incumbents in competitive authoritarian regimes must win
elections. This must be done through a combination of voter mobilization and fraud, both of which
require an organizational infrastructure, often in the form of a party. Electoral machines are
particularly important whenas is often the case in competitive authoritarian regimes--incumbents
lack widespread popular support. In such cases, unpopular incumbents must rely on local party
structures, patronage networks, various government agencies, andin post-Soviet countries
directors of enterprises to bring voters to the polls.

Beyond winning votes, electoral machines are also critical for stealing votes. Marginal
electoral manipulation or fraudoften on the scale of 5-10 percent of the votecan be decisive for
the fate of unpopular incumbents. Like get-out-the-vote efforts, activities such as stuffing or
destroying ballot boxes, tampering with voter registration rolls, intimidating voters, or manipulating
electoral results require the coordination and control of thousands of local officials and activists.
Without a minimum of organization, such coordination is extremely difficult.

15
Such was the case in many former Soviet republics, where the leading threats to incumbents have often
come from former members of the government, particularly prime ministers.


9

In general, then, incumbent capacity is enhanced by strong states and governing parties.
State strengthwhich entails both the domination of state officials over subordinates and the
capacity of state agencies to successfully implement the objectives of state officialstends to foster
elite cohesion and enhance the coercive and electoral capacity of incumbents. In the absence of a
minimum of state strength, governing elites tend to fragment, executives have a more difficult time
utilizing state agencies and regional administrations to intimidate opponents or manipulate electoral
process, and governments will be less able to rely on repression to put down social and political
protest (Way 2002). Strong parties foster elite cohesion (through institutionalized patronage
networks or shared ideology), facilitate electoral mobilization (and manipulation), and may carry out
activitiessuch as surveillance and intimidationthat enhance incumbents coercive capacity.
Revolutionary parties are often particularly effective in these areas. Revolutionary struggles tend to
produce disciplined parties whose leaders and cadres exhibit high levels of ideological commitment
and internal solidarity.

Opposition Capacity
A second variable that shapes the fate of incumbents in competitive authoritarian regimes is
the strength of the political opposition. Strong opposition movements are more likely to defeat
autocratic incumbents at the polls. They also raise the cost of repression, which increases the
likelihood that incumbents will choose not to crack down. We measure opposition capacity along
two dimensions: (1) cohesion; and (2) mobilizational capacity.

Opposition Cohesion
Opposition cohesion is often critical to the success of anti-authoritarian movements (Bratton
and van de Walle 1997: 198-200; Corrales 2001). Divided oppositions may contribute to the
survival of autocratic incumbents in at least two ways. First, in the electoral arena, opposition
division often enables unpopular incumbents to win with a mere plurality of the vote. Although
incumbents in competitive authoritarian regimes often lack majority support, their core support base,
combined with incumbency advantages and vote rigging, usually helps to ensure at least 30-40
percent of the vote. If opposition parties fail to coalesce behind a single candidate, such pluralities
may be sufficient to win.
16
Polarized oppositions also enable autocratic incumbents to employ
divide and rule strategies. In cases of severe internal division, one opposition party may work with
the incumbent to prevent the victory of a rival party.
17


We measure opposition cohesion in terms of three levels. In cases of high cohesion,
virtually major opposition groups are organized into single party or coalition. In cases of medium
cohesion, opposition parties are fragmented but are not deeply divided along ideological, ethnic or
other lines. The absence of deep cleavages makes it more likely that they will be able to unite into
broad anti-authoritarian coalitions during elections or moments of regime crisis. In cases of low

16
A clear example is Kenya in 1992 and 1997.
17
Such debilitating splits emerged within the Mexican opposition in 1988 and between communist and non-
communist opposition parties in Russia and Ukraine in the 1990s.


10
cohesion, opposition parties are deeply divided along ideological, ethnic, or regional lines. In such
cases, opposition parties often oppose each other as much, if not more, than they do the party in
power, which seriously inhibits the formation of broad anti-authoritarian coalitions.

Mobilizational Strength
A second component of opposition capacity is the ability of opposition movements to
mobilize citizens against the government. The capacity to mount large and sustained protest
movements raises the cost of repression for incumbents. The repression of large demonstrations
requires a more extensive use of force, which may bring severe costs in terms of both domestic and
international legitimacy. Hence, the better organized and mobilized an opposition movement is, the
more likely incumbents will be to cede power. In measuring mobilizational strength, we focus on (1)
the strength of opposition party organizations; (2) the strength and independence of civil society,
particularly labor, student, and human rights organizations; and (3) the degree to which civil society
organizations are aligned with the political opposition.

The International Dimension: The Role of Western Influence
The third variable shaping the fate of competitive authoritarian regimes is the international
environment. International influences are difficult to measure and compare. For one, they take a
variety of forms. Although some of these forms are easily observable (military intervention, explicit
conditionality), others (demonstration effects, the diffusion of ideas) have subtler effects that are
difficult to measure. Moreover, the effects of the international environment vary across time, region,
and individual states. Yet the effect of the international environment on regimes appears to be
considerable.
18
Our hypothesis is that in the post-Cold War period, ties to the Westparticularly
the United States and the European Unionraise the cost of authoritarian entrenchment and
strengthen incentives for elites to play by democratic rules. We disaggregate Western influence into
two dimensions: linkage and leverage.

Linkage to the West
Linkage to the West takes a variety of forms. These include geographic proximity,
economic integration, military alliances, flows of international assistance, international media
penetration, ties to international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and other transnational
networks, and networks of elites employed by multilateral institutions and/or educated in Western
universities. During the post-Cold War period, these linkages raised the costs of authoritarian
entrenchment in several ways. First, Western governments were more likely to promote or defend
democracy in neighboring countries, particularly in Central Europe and Latin America.
19
This was
the case for several reasons, including cultural proximity, fear of large-scale immigration or regional
conflict, and a greater penetration of Western media and international NGOs, which exposed
authoritarian abuses and generated pressure for Western responses. Second, the possibility of entry
into Western alliances and institutions (particularly the EU and NATO) created a strong incentive

18
See Starr (1991); OLoughlin et al (1998); Kopstein and Reilly (2000); and Brinks and Coppedge (2001).
19
Thus, whereas Western governments were often inconsistent in their democracy promotion efforts in Africa
and Asia during the 1990s, they intervened with greater force and consistency to block moves toward
authoritarianism in Central Europe and Latin America.


11
for elites in neighboring countries to play by democratic rules (Gentleman and Zubek 1992;
Kopstein and Reilly 2000: 25).
20
Third, close proximity to the West increases the flow of
information and ideas across borders, which may influence elite and mass expectations about what
is (and is not) acceptable or possible. Where such information flows are high, it is often more
difficult for leaders to achieve an elite or mass-level consensus around authoritarian measures.
Finally, the presence within the government of Western-educated technocrats may provide an
additional source of resistance to overtly authoritarian acts. This resistance may be a product of
socialization into democratic norms, but it may also be strategic: many technocrats seek to pursue
careers in Western and multilateral institutions and thus seek to avoid tarnishing their reputations
among Western colleagues.

Western Leverage
Linkage is most influential when it is combined with economic and/or military dependence
on the West. Several factors may reduce the leverage of Western states and institutions and
therefore permit greater margin for authoritarian entrenchment. These include: (1) a strong
economy with a large domestic market or a highly valued commodity such as oil; (2) military
security or other issues (such as drugs or immigration) that trump democracy promotion as a foreign
policy goal for Western states; and (3) the presence or absence of a regional hegemon that is able
and willing to provide alternative sources of support. At times during the 1990s, China, Russia, and
to a lesser extentNigeria and South Africa provided critical resources to non-democratic
regimes in smaller neighboring states, which helped to mitigate the impact of the Western influence.
21


Applying the Framework

This section applies the framework developed above to 12 cases of competitive
authoritarianism: Albania, Armenia, Kenya, Malaysia, Mexico, Nicaragua under the Sandinista
government, Peru, Russia, Serbia, Ukraine, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. In all of these cases,
competitive authoritarian regimes experienced at least one incumbent crisis between 1990 and
2002. We define an incumbent crisis as a period of opposition contestation that forces the
government to choose between egregiously violating democratic rules and running a serious risk of
losing power. The cases fall into three distinct outcomes: (1) incumbent survival and regime
persistence (Kenya, Malaysia, Russia, Zimbabwe); (2) incumbent turnover without democratization
(Albania, Armenia, Ukraine, Zambia); and incumbent turnover with democratization (Mexico,
Nicaragua, Peru, Serbia).

Incumbent Survival and Regime Stability
In Kenya, Malaysia, Russia, and Zimbabwe, autocratic incumbents survived opposition
challenges throughout the 1990-2002 period, and as a result, regimes either remained stable or
underwent authoritarian entrenchment. All four cases were marked by relatively low Western

20
This effect was clearest in the case of the EU, which has an explicit democracy clause, but initial talks
toward a Free Trade Agreement for the Americas have also included discussion of a democracy clause.
21
France occasionally played a similar role in francophone Africa.


12
influence and either (1) high incumbent capacity or (2) weak and/or divided oppositions. Table 2
summarizes the cases. In Malaysia, a strong state and governing party, together with low Western
influence and a weak and divided opposition, enabled the Mahathir government to survive the
challenge posed by Anwar Ibrahim and the Reformasi movement in 1998-99. In Zimbabwe, a
powerful repressive apparatus, low Western influence, and the support of South Africa enabled the
Mugabe government to suppress an electoral challenge mounted by a strong and united opposition.
In Kenya, greater Western influence and only moderate incumbent capacity nearly resulted in the
defeat of the Moi government, but a deeply divided opposition enabled Moi to survive two electoral
challenges. Finally, in Russia, which was characterized by low incumbent capacity, low Western
influence, and a weak and divided opposition, Boris Yeltsin managed to fend off a challenge by the
Duma and win re-election in 1996.

--Table 2 about here--
Kenya
After a period of relatively mild one party rule under Jomo Kenyatta (1963-78), Kenya
became increasingly authoritarian during the 1980s under President Daniel Arap Moi. Opposition
parties were banned and civil liberties severely restricted (Kamua 1991; Throup and Hornsby
1998). In 1991, however, domestic and international pressure forced President Moi to restore
multiparty competition, which transformed Kenya into a transformed into competitive authoritarian
regime and created an immediate incumbent crisis.

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES: The Moi government possessed moderate incumbent
capacity. Elite cohesion was moderate. Although Moi confronted substantial elite fragmentation
resulting in both cabinet instability and an attempted coup--during his initial years in office (Throup
and Hornsby 1998: 31-33, 45), he consolidated control over the governing Kenya African National
Union (KANU) during the 1980s. Nevertheless, Moi never achieved the elite cohesion of the
Kenyatta period (Throup and Hornsby 1998). The governments coercive capacity was relatively
high. The Kenyan state has historically been one of the strongest in Africa (Jackman and Rosberg
1982: 9, 12; Widner 1992: 14). Central to this coercive capacity was the Provincial Administration
established under colonial rule (Throup and Hornsby 1998: 10-11). During the 1980s, Moi
doubled the size of army, expanded the police forces, and increased the states surveillance capacity
(Widner 1992: 125, 144). Finally, the governments electoral capacity was moderate. A
predominantly patronage-based party, KANU had been very weak under Kenyatta (Widner 1992:
31-32, 39-40). During the 1980s, however, Moi infused it with state resources, revitalized local
organizations, and created a youth wing and other ancillary organizations (Widner 1992; Throup
and Hornsby 1998: 36-38, 354-355). As a result, party membership skyrocketed (Berg-Schlosser
and Siegler 1990: 139), and KANU became an increasingly effective mechanism of control
(Widner 1992). During the 1990s, KANU was by far the largest party in Kenya, and the only
one with an established presence in every part of the country (Throup and Hornsby 1998: 339,
179).

Opposition capacity was medium-low. On the one hand, Kenyan civil society, based on
church organizations, lawyers groups, and the Kikuyu-dominated business community, had


13
developed a moderate mobilizational capacity by the 1990s (Widner 1992: 190, 202; Throup and
Hornsby 1998: 302-303). On the other hand, the political opposition was deeply divided along
ethnic lines, particularly between the Kikuyu and the Luo, which made the formation of a broad
opposition front difficult (Oyugi 1997; Throup and Hornsby 1998: 141, 589-90).

Western influence in Kenya--scored as medium--is relatively high by African standards
(Berg Schlosser and Siegler 1990: 153) but lower than in Latin America and Central Europe. On
dimensions such as geographic proximity, media and cultural penetration, and technocratic linkage,
Kenya scores fairly low. However, Kenya maintained close ties to the West during the Cold War,
and Great Britain retained immense strategic interests in the country through the 1990s.
22

Moreover, because nearly a third of government expenditure was derived from foreign assistance
during the 1990s, international donor countries enjoyed substantial leverage over the Moi
government (Throup and Hornsby 1998: 74, 266-270).

DEPENDENT VARIABLE: In the context of a prolonged economic downturn and
increased civic protest, the Moi government confronted a deep political crisis in the early 1990s. In
July 1991, opposition leaders, including Luo leader Oginga Odinga and Kikuyu leader Kenneth
Matiba, created the multi-ethnic Forum for the Restoration of Democracy (FORD). The
government successfully repressed incipient pro-democracy protests (Throup and Hornsby 1998:
66), but this repression drew the ire of Western governments. In November 1991, the Paris Group
of international donors suspended $350 million in aid and explicitly linking its restoration to political
reform (Barkan 1993: 91; Barkan and Ngethe 1999: 185). This pressure was decisive: within two
weeks, opposition parties were legalized, paving the way for multiparty elections in 1992 (Throup
and Hornsby 1998: 87-88).

The aid cutoff ushered in KANUs darkest hour (Throup and Hornsby 1998: 105). With
the government reeling from the Western freeze on aid, and with a united FORD presenting a
real threat (Barken 1993: 92), KANU elites began to defect to the opposition (Throup and
Hornsby 1998: 105, 93-96). However, two factors enabled Moi to survive the crisis. First, the
security forces remained intact and under Mois control (Throup and Hornsby 1998: 105), which
allowed the government to launch a low-level campaign of violence against the opposition (Throup
and Hornsby 1998: 371), including attacks on the media, the burning of opposition headquarters,
and state-sponsored ethnic clashes that left thousands dead (Barkan 1993: 93; Throup and
Hornsby 1998: 380-81; Adar 2000: 116-120). Second, FORD divided along ethnic lines, with
Luo elites creating Ford-Kenya and Kikuyu leaders joining FORD-asili (Oyugi 1997). Although the
1992 election was far from fair--KANU engaged in intimation and ballot stuffing in rural areas
(Throup and Hornsby 1998: 289, 454-462)it was the FORD split that effectively ensured
President Mois re-election (Throup and Hornsby 1998: 118). Moi won just 36 percent of the
vote, but with the opposition vote divided, KANU managed to retain the presidency and win a
parliamentary majority. Western governments accepted the results and external assistance was

22
Africa Today, June 2002, p. 13.


14
restored (Throup and Hornsby 1998: 520-523, 564). The opposition remained divided in the 1997
elections, which allowed Moi to win another re-election--this time with 40 percent of the vote.

Although Moi held onto power through the end of the decade, civil society pushed the
regime in an increasingly open direction. In 1997, a broad array of civic and political organizations
created the National Convention Executive Council (NCEC), which launched a campaign for
constitutional reform (Steeves 1999: 72; Adar 2000: 124). In mid-1997, large-scale civic protest
and a new round of international pressure forced the government to make a series of concessions
that leveled the playing field somewhat for that years election (Steeves 1999: 73-75; Barkan and
Ngethe 1999). As it became clear that Moi would not seek re-election in 2002, KANU
fragmented. With KANU divided, opposition forces gained influence in the parliament and
transformed the body into a real center of power.
23
Hence, a divided opposition enabled Moi to
retain power through 2002, elite fragmentation and an increasingly robust civil society created the
potential for incumbent turnover in the relatively near future.

Malaysia
Although Malaysia maintained an electoral regime since independence, politics was
dominated by the United Malays National Organization (UMNO), its allies in the National Front
(BN), and, beginning in the late 1980s, Prime Minister Mahathir Mohammad. The government
maintained substantial limits on civil liberties and exerted substantial control over the judiciary and
most of the media (Crouch 1996: 77-77; Slater 2001). Hence, even though elections were
contested vigorously and opposition parties often captured at least 40 percent of the vote, the
electoral system was heavily loaded in favor of the government (Crouch 1996: 75).

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES: The Mahathir government enjoyed substantial incumbent
capacity. The governing elite remained remarkably cohesive for most of the post-independence
period (Crouch 1996: 54). Although UMNO briefly divided in 1987, Mahathir subsequently
purged and reconsolidated control over the party control (Milne and Mauzy 1999: 41-43; Slater
2001). Malaysia also scores high in terms of coercive capacity. It has a strong state apparatus with
a powerful bureaucracy (Jesudason 1995) and a highly effective and repressive police force
(Slater 2001: 14). With respect to electoral capacity, UMNO maintained a powerful party
organization, with more than two million members, 16,500 local branches, and an extensive
grassroots organization that enabled it to assign an activist to monitor every ten households (Case
2001: 52; Gomez 1995: 22-23). Financed by vast patronage resources, UNMO thus served as an
effective electoral machine that virtually guaranteed large majorities for the government (Crouch
1996: 55).

By contrast, opposition capacity in Malaysia was low. Due to ethnic division, a weak labor
movement, and years of corporatist control over major social organizations, civil society was weak
(Jesudeson 1995; Salleh 1999). Moreover, the leading opposition parties were divided along
ethno-religious lines. Whereas the Democratic Action Party (DAP) was based among the Chinese

23
Africa Today, February 2001, pp. 35-36.


15
and Indian minorities, the Islamic Party of Malaysia (PAS) emphasized Malay communal issues
and sought the creation of an Islamic state (Crouch 1996: 66-67).

Finally, Malaysia is a case of low Western influence. Due to its relatively developed and
diversified economy, Malaysia enjoyed substantial autonomy from Western governments and
institutions. Malaysias major trading partners were Japan and Korea, not the U.S. or Europe, and
it was able to turn to these countries (and increasingly, to China) as alternative sources of assistance
(Felkner 2000: 55-59). Finally, relative to Latin America and Central Europe, the influence of the
Western-based media, international NGOs, and Western-educated technocrats was low (Milne and
Mauzy 1999: 146-47; Salleh 1999: 195).

DEPENDENT VARIABLE: The Mahathir government confronted its most severe test in
the wake of the countrys 1997 financial crisis (Funston 1999: 176). The challenge came from
Finance Minister and Deputy Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim, a popular politician who many viewed
as responsible for overcoming the 1997 crisis. When Anwar moved to challenge Mahathir
politically, Mahathir sacked him, and when Anwar began to mobilize protests against the
government in September 1998, he was arrestedand later convictedon charges of sexual
misconduct. Anwars detention sparked the emergence of the opposition Reformasi movement,
which was backed by a range of parties and NGOs (Funston 1999: 173-76). Anwars wife, Wan
Azizah, created the National Justice Party, which, together with the DAP and PAS, launched the
broad-based Alternative Front to challenge UMNO in the 1999 elections. On the international
front, U.S.-Malaysian relations reached an all-time low (Chin 1998: 189), and the IMF and U.S.
government officials publicly backed the Reformasi movement (Funston 1999: 183; Singh 2000:
534). These developments left the government as vulnerable as it had ever been (Case 2001:
51).

Mahathir survived the challenge. On the external front, Western institutions ultimately
exerted little leverage over the Mahathir government. Malaysia spurned the IMF and, with financial
assistance from Japan, its economy recovered in 1999 (Felkner 2000: 55, 57; Case 2001: 43).
Domestically, Mahathir was able to deploy an armada of packed regime institutionsthe media,
the police, the judiciary, and the national election commissionto prevent Anwar from challenging
his leadership (Slater 2001: 23). State security forces were remarkably effective in suppressing
the popular dissent that arose after Anwars sacking (Slater 2001: 14, 24). At the same time,
opposition forces remained weakly organized (Boo Teik 2000: 4; Slater 2001: 23). Consequently,
although UMNOs electoral performance in 1999 was its worst in 40 years, the governing BN
retained more than three-quarters of the seats in parliament. The government cracked down on
opposition groups after the election (Muzaffar 1999), and soon afterward, ideological conflict
between the DAP and the PAS led to the break up of the opposition coalition. Hence, substantial
incumbent capacity, together with a weak and divided opposition allowed the Mahathir government
to survive the 1998-99 crisis with relative ease.

Russia


16
Though more open than under Putin, Russia under Boris Yeltsin was nevertheless a
competitive authoritarian regime. Elections were marred by at least some fraud (Sobyanin 1994;
Mendelson 2001; Fish 2001b), and in 1993, Yeltsin used the military to shut down Parliament. In
this context, Yeltsin successfully weathered two major threats to his tenure: the 1993 challenge by
Parliament and the 1996 presidential election.

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES: Under Yeltsin, incumbent capacity was quite low. For much of
the 1990s, the Russian state was relatively weak. The central government faced numerous
challenges from the countrys 89 regions (cf. Treisman 1999), and control over military was
uncertain. The failure of the August 1991 attempted coup had been largely due to the armys refusal
to follow orders from Soviet leaders (Remington 1997: 74), and in the immediate post-Soviet
period, government officials were unsure of their capacity to command military forces (Foye 1993a:
4, 6). Yeltsons electoral capacity was also weak. Like many post-Soviet politicians, Yeltsin
refused to invest political capital in building a pro-government party, but instead used divide and rule
tactics to fend off opposition challenges. Several attempts at creating a ruling partyincluding
Democratic Russia (1990), Russias Choice (1993), and Our Home is Russia (1995)failed,
in part due to Yeltsins unwillingness to support them (McFaul 1997: 16). As a result, Yeltsin was
unable to build a stable majority in the legislature.

Yet the opposition to Yeltsin was also extremely weak. For one, it was deeply divided. As
in Ukraine, the best-organized opposition forces were extremist, particularly the unreformed
Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF). Viewed by many observers as the only
functioning party in Russia in the 1990s (cf. Sakwa 1997), the CPRF attracted a much more stable
and loyal support base than other parties (Colton 1999). Yet the communists radical message of
re-nationalization and revival of the USSR and association with neo-Nazi groups meant that they
had great difficulty attracting majority support, and other leading opposition parties, such as the
liberal Iabloka, refused to cooperate with them.

Finally, Western influence in Russia was comparatively low. Unlike Central Europeans, few
Russians traveled to the West or enjoyed access to Western-based media and NGOs. The share
of foreign direct investment in GDP hovered around 1 percent during the 1990s, and foreign aid as
a share of gross national income never exceeded 1 percent (World Development Indicators).
Finally, Russias nuclear and military capacities substantially reduced Western leverage.

DEPENDENT VARIABLE: The most serious threat to Yeltsins power came in 1993 when he
was challenged by the head of Parliament, Ruslan Khasbulatov, and Vice President Aleksandr
Rutskoi. In October of that year, Yeltsin attempted to dissolve the Supreme Soviet. However,
Khasbulatov, and Rutskoi, backed by the Constitutional Court, refused to back down and, in
alliance with Communist and nationalist forces, began mobilizing armed resistance against the
president. Yeltsin survived the challenge because he manageddespite his precarious control over


17
coercive structures--to convince the military to take the legislature by force.
24
He also benefited
from the refusal of liberal opposition groups to back the Parliamentary rebellion.

The 1996 presidential election presented Yeltsin with a second crisis. At the outset of the
electoral campaign, Yeltsins public approval rating was in the single digits. Although the election
was marked by at least some fraud, Yeltsins survival was largely a product of opposition
polarization. Because the leading opposition candidate was Communist leader Gennadii Zyuganov,
Yeltsin was able to play into fears of a Stalinist revival among liberals and other anti-communist
critics. The unwillingness of opposition forces to unite behind Zyuganov allowed the unpopular
incumbent to win re-election with 54 percent of the vote.

Since taking office in 2000, Vladimir Putin has addressed many of the weaknesses in
Yeltsins rule. He has weakened the oligarchs and regional elites, secured control over much of
the media, and cracked down on various forms of dissent. He has also invested in a ruling party,
Unit, which has been effective at subordinating the Duma to the presidents dictates. At the same
time, a strengthening economy and increased energy production has further eroded Western
influence. The combination of state strength, heightened international autonomy, and Putins party
building efforts all suggest that Russia is unlikely to democratize in the near future.

Zimbabwe
Zimbabwe has been a competitive authoritarian regime since the end of white rule in 1980.
Despite regular elections and a degree of judicial independence, post-1980 politics was dominated
by the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) and President Robert
Mugabe. The government strictly controlled the media and at times engaged in large-scale human
violations.
25
Although efforts to create a one-party state failed in 1990, violence and intimidation led
opposition parties to boycott elections in 1995 and 1996.
26


INDEPENDENT VARIABLES: Zimbabwe scores high on the dimension of incumbent
capacity. Elite cohesion was moderate to high. Forged in the struggle against white rule, the new
governing elite remained fairly united and cohesive during the 1980s, particularly after the
Zimbabwe African Peoples Union (ZAPU) was purged from the security forces (Darbon 1992: 2-
3; MacBruce 1992: 212-213). Although fissures emerged in the 1990s (Sithole 1999: 76-77), a
series of purges allowed Mugabe to consolidate a vise-like grip on ZANU by the end of the
decade (Rotberg 2002: 236). The Mugabe governments coercive capacity was very high.
Zimbabwe had one of the strongest states in Sub-Saharan Africa (Stoneman and Cliffe 1989: 40-
41; Herbst 1990), with a particularly effective coercive apparatus (Weitzer 1984a, 1984b). The
Rhodesian government had created a remarkably efficient and brutal state--including a repressive

24
According to Yeltsins own account, he had an extremely difficult time finding the forces willing to undertake this
task: the army, numbering two and a half million people, could not produce even a thousand soldiers, not even one
regiment could be found to come to Moscow to defend the city (Yeltsin 1996: 276).
25
The most significant of these was the massive repression in Matabeland between 1982 and 1984, during
which several thousand people were killed (Weitzer 1984a: 545; Cokorinos 1984: 50; Rotberg 2002: 228).
26
Hence, politics was marked by elections without competition throughout much of the 1990s (Quantin 1992: 25).


18
police force, an elaborate surveillance system run by the Central Intelligence Organization (CIO),
and an army capable of relocating 500,000 Africans into protected villages--as part of its
counterinsurgency war in the 1960s and 1970s (Herbst 2000: 17; Weitzer 1984a, 1984b). Not
only did this apparatus remain intact after 1980, but security spending increased dramatically and
new repressive bodies, such as the notorious Fifth Brigade, were added (Weitzer 1984a: 534;
MacBruce 1992: 214-215). ZANU also possessed relatively high electoral capacity. Due to the
need to wage a protracted guerrilla war, ZANU developed a stronger presence in the rural areas
than most African parties had at independence (Herbst 1990: 34). The party also sponsored a
range of ancillary and paramilitary organizations--such as Womens and Youth Leagues and the
Zimbabwe National Liberation War Veterans Associationthat were used to both mobilize
supporters and intimidate opposition activists (Cokorinos 1984: 52; Darbon 1992: 11; Sithole and
Makumbe 1997).

Opposition capacity was relatively high in the late 1990s. Although opposition parties and
civil society had been weak during the 1980s (Stoneman and Cliffe 1989: 107-108; Sithole 1998:
28; Alexander 2000: 386),
27
student, human rights, and church groups grew stronger and more
independent during the 1990s (Sithole 1999: 82-83; Dorman 2002). In particular, the Zimbabwe
Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU), whose membership soared to a reported 700,000 in 1998
(Alexander 2000: 386-89), emerged as a force to be reckoned with (Sithole 1999: 85).
Together with the Zimbabwe Council of Churches, the ZCTU launched the broad-based National
Constitutional Assembly (NCA) in 1998. The next year, NCA and ZCTU leaders founded the
Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), which united the opposition into a single, well-
organized party (Alexander 2000: 389-391).

Western influence in Zimbabwe was relatively low. Because Rhodesia was largely cut off
from the West after its 1965 Unilateral Declaration of Independence, it became relatively self-
sufficient. Western media and NGO penetration are relatively low, as was the number of top
ZANU and government officials who maintained close ties to Western institutions. Western
influence was also limited by a regional hegemon: South Africa. South Africa was Zimbabwes
leading trading partner, and Zimbabwe depended heavily on South Africa for fuel, electricity, and
transport (Cokorinos 1984: 52; Hamill 2001: 12).

DEPENDENT VARIABLE: After running virtually unopposed in the 1995 (parliamentary)
and 1996 (presidential) elections, ZANU faced a severe electoral challenge beginning in the late
1990s. A major turning point came in February 2000, when a government-sponsored constitutional
reform package was defeated in a referendum (Sithole 2001). This set the stage for parliamentary
and presidential elections (in 2000 and 2002, respectively) in which ZANU would confront a unified
opposition.


27
The leading opposition party in the 1990 election, the Zimbabwe Unity Movement, had no intelligible
structures, no headquarters anywhere (Sithole 1998: 117).


19
Mugabe survived these challenges through massive and sustained repression. The 2000
parliamentary election took place in an atmosphere of state-sponsored violence, in which journalists
and MDC activists were repeatedly attacked and government-backed war veterans carried out
campaigns of intimidation in rural areas (Rotberg 2000: 48; Sithole 2001: 166). Despite doctored
voter rolls and some rigging (Compagnon 2000: 451; Rotberg 2000: 49), the MDC nearly won the
election, capturing 57 of 120 seats. Although the MDC hoped to topple Mugabe via Serbia-style
post-election protests, the government responded with a show of brutal force that was
unquestionably successful, and further protests were cancelled.
28


State-sponsored violence increased in the run-up to the March 2002 presidential election,
which pitted Mugabe against popular MDC candidate Morgan Tsvangarai. In rural areas,
government-backed war veterans invaded white-owned land and attacked MDC supporters.
29

Although the Supreme Court ruled that the land invasions were unconstitutional, the government
ignored these rulings, and in early 2001, Chief Justice Anthony Gubbay resigned violent threats
(Meredith 2002: 205-6). In early 2002, parliament approved legislation that made it illegal for
citizens to criticize the president or for journalists to operate without government accreditation, and
the military command declared that it would not accept an MDC victory.
30
Just weeks before the
election, Tsvangirai was arrested on charges of plotting Mugabes assassination. On election day, a
reduction in the number of voting booths in (MDC-dominated) Harare left 350,000 registered
voters unable to cast ballots. These measures, combined with severe rural intimidation, paved the
way for an easy Mugabe victory.
31


Neither opposition protest nor external pressure succeeded in forcing Mugabe from power
in the immediate aftermath of the election. The MDC organized mass protests, including a three-day
general strike, but the protests again fizzled in the face of massive repression.
32
Although the EU and
U.S. imposed sanctions and Britain orchestrated Zimbabwes suspension from the Commonwealth,
it quickly became apparent that Britain...enjoyed little or no leverage over the Harare government
(Hamill 2001: 12). Mugabe benefited from the tacit support of the South African government, which
lobbied against international sanctions, refused to use its control over Zimbabwes power and fuel
supplies as leverage against Mugabe, andin stark contrast to Western governments--accepted the
2002 election as legitimate.
33
This support, together with the governments coercive capacity,
enabled Mugabe to survive the crisis.

Turnover without Democratization
In Albania (1997), Armenia (1996-1998), Ukraine (1994), and Zambia (1991), incumbent
crises resulted in turnover but not full democratization. These outcomes were largely a product of
low incumbent capacity (except in Armenia), combined with relatively low levels of Western

28
Africa Report, December 2000, p. 22-24; February 2001, p. 29.
29
Africa Today, October 2000, p. 13, June 2001, p. 26-27; September 2001, p. 20.
30
Africa Today, February, 2002, p. 22-23.
31
Africa Today April-May 2002, p. 24.
32
The Economist, 23 March 2002; Africa Today, April-May 2002, p. 20.
33
Africa Today April-May 2002, p. 20-22.


20
influence (except in Albania). The cases are summarized in Table 3. In Albania, a virtual state
collapse encouraged the intervention of European powers, which oversaw an election that brought
the opposition to power. In Ukraine in 1994, the governments inability to control its own regional
administrations contributed directly to the presidents electoral demise. In both Albania and
Ukraine, uncertain control over the military limited the options of incumbents and essentially forced
them to abide by democratic institutions. In Zambia, a bankrupt state and relatively weak,
patronage-based party could not fend off a united and mobilized opposition. In Armenia, which
possessed a relatively strong state, the government fell amidst severe elite fragmentation. In
Armenia, Ukraine, and Zambia, incumbent turnover in a context of low Western influence led not to
democratization but rather to a continuation of competitive authoritarian rule. In Albania, which
experienced greater Western influence during the 1990s, incumbent turnover resulted in a marginally
democratic regime that was contingent on sustained external intervention.

--Table 3 about here--

Albania
Following its defeat of the communist Albanian Party of Labor (APL) in 1992, the
Democratic Party, led by Sali Berisha, governed Albania via a combination of authoritarian and
democratic means.
34
After a severe crisis and external intervention brought a change of government
in 1997, Albania became more pluralistic but nevertheless remained on the borderline between
competitive authoritarianism and democracy.

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES: Incumbent capacity in Albania was very low in the
1990s, due, in large part, to state weakness. As a result of a lack of any foreign assistance during
the last 13 years of the communist regime (Johnson 2001: 181), the army suffered from minimal
training, shortages of food, fuel and ammunition, inoperable equipment, and an ineffective command
system (Vickers and Pettifer 2000: 46, 211-12). Coercive organs were further undermined under
Berisha, who slashed military spending, purged as much as two-thirds of the military officer corps,
and dismissed 70 percent of the secret police (Biberaj 2000: 324, 152-3; Vickers and Pettifer
2000: 217). The government also lacked effective control over the military (Vickers and Pettifer
2000: 62; Biberaj 1998: 93). After Berisha appointed a loyalist with no military experience as
defense minister in 1992, some senior officers openly refused to obey him.

Opposition strength was moderate. Though lacking the mobilizational muscle of the
Serbian opposition, the Socialist Party--which was built upon the bases of the old APL--possessed
a national structure and attracted substantial support in rural areas. Moreover, the Socialists
dominant position within the opposition meant that opposition forces were relatively unified (Biberaj
1998: 282). Finally, Albania was closely linked to, and highly dependent on, the West. At one

34
Although a vibrant independent press developed under Berisha, the president prevented the emergence of
independent television and radio and made frequent use of libel laws to silence criticism (Biberaj 2000: 161,
221). In 1993, Socialist Party leader Fatos Nano was arrested on embezzlement charges in what was viewed
by international human rights organizations as a move to silence opposition (Amnesty International News
Service 45/97).


21
level, Albanias unique level of isolation from the world under Hoxha means that Albania lacks the
web of contacts with Western countries found in other more open communist regimes in Central
Europe. Nevertheless, the countrys proximity to Western Europe meant that Western governments
quickly felt the impact of Albanias political crises. Estimates suggest that roughly 600,000 legal and
illegal migrants fled from Albania into surrounding countries between 1990 and 1999.

DEPENDENT VARIABLE: Berishas fall from power in 1997 can be directly traced to the
states failure to control social unrest, which triggered intervention by neighboring countries fearful of
the effects of a sustained crisis. In 1996, the Democrats won parliamentary elections that were
widely viewed as rigged (ODIHR Albania 1996). Both the OSCE and the United States
government demanded that new elections be held in disputed areas. Although the government
initially weathered the crisis, riots broke out in early 1997 after the failure of numerous pyramid
schemes in which hundreds of thousands of Albanians had invested their savings. Uprisings broke
out in the south and armed bandits began roaming the countryside robbing banks, destroying public
buildings and looting arms depots that had been abandoned by security forces (Schmidt 1998;
Biberaj 2000: 323). A state of emergency failed to quell the unrest, and in the ensuing disorder,
Socialist leader Fatos Nano, who had been imprisoned since 1993, was able to walk out of prison.
According to Johnson (2001: 179), weak military capacity was a major reason why the government
subsequently rejected the use of force.

International actors played a central role in resolving the crisis. In March 1997, the OSCE
brokered a compromise that established a government of national reconciliation and new elections.
After the EU and NATO declined to send troops, Italy received a UN mandate to send a
Multinational Protection Force of 6,000 to Albania. The force oversaw elections two months later in
which the Socialists won two-thirds of the parliamentary seats. Increased international engagement,
particularly in the wake of the 1999 crisis is Kosovo,
35
resulted in greater political freedom after
1997.
36
However, the removal of Berisha did not lead to full-scale democratization. International
human rights organizations continued to document substantial violations of civil liberties under the
Socialists (Human Rights Watch 2001).

Ukraine
Ukraine remained competitive authoritarian throughout the 1990s. President Leonid Kravchuk
repeatedly interfered with media coverage of the government during the early 1990s (Roeder 1994:
79) and attempted fraud during the 1994 presidential elections (Democratic Elections in Ukraine
1994). In 1994, Kravchuk lost to his former Prime Minister, Leonid Kuchma, who governed in an
increasingly autocratic manner over the rest of the decade.


35
Both the collapse of the pyramid schemes and the Kosovo crisis motivated increased European Union
involvement in Albania through aid provision and civil society programs aimed at re-establishing control
over public utilities and policing (Johnson 2001: 175). Foreign aid per capita increased from being the 29
th

highest in the world in 1994 ($52 per capita) to being the fourth highest in 1999 ($152).
36
For example, the press has become increasingly free with the emergence of independent radio and
television (U.S. Department of State 2000).


22
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES: Incumbent capacity was low in the early 1990s. The post-
communist governing elite was highly fragmented. No ruling party emerged. Rather, the party of
power functioned via loose and unstable coalitions (Kuzio 1997: 21-22; Wasylyk 1994). State
capacity was initially undermined by a deep cleavage between the Ukrainian speaking western part
of the country and the predominantly Russian speaking east. During Kravchuks presidency, the
central government confronted secessionist demands and rebellions in several regions of the country.
Kravchuk also faced problems creating a loyal national army. In the early 1990s, there was
tremendous uncertainty concerning the loyalty of the armed forces and other security organs (Kuzio
2000: 182), particularly given that military officers were overwhelmingly Russian (Foye 1993b: 62,
63). Coup rumors abounded in 1993 (Kuzio 1993).

Opposition forces were also weak during the 1990s. Civil society was weakly organized,
and opposition parties were little more than loose collections of like-minded elites. Although key
opposition forces (including the communists) united behind Kuchma in 1994, as the Communist
Party grew in strength, the opposition divided between anti-communist nationalists supporting
Ukrainian independence and the communists, who sought closer ties to Russia.

Western influence in Ukraine was relatively low. International media and NGO influence
was low, and few elites were trained in the West. Ukraines dependence on the West was also
low. Western aid represented a small share (about 1 percent) of gross national income and capital
formation during the 1990s (World Development Indicators 2001). In addition, economic
dependence on Russia,
37
as well as close elite ties to Russia, meant that Russia served as an
important alternative hegemon for Ukraine.

DEPENDENT VARIABLE: State weakness and elite fragmentation contributed directly to
Kravchuks removal in 1994. Kravchuk lost the 1994 presidential race in part because of his weak
grip on his own administration in key locales in the east, where many state officials supported--and
manipulated--the voting process in favor of Kuchma.
38
Another important factor undermining
Kravchuks ability to retain power was his weak influence with security forces. Almost certainly
inspired by Yeltsins dissolution of the Russian legislature, Kravchuk contemplated disbanding
parliament (FBIS-SOV 1 October 93: 25; Kravchuk 2002: 227) in 1993 in the midst of a deep
conflict with parliament. According to his own account, however, Kravchuk was dissuaded from
taking any action when the Ukrainian intelligence service rejected the idea (Kravchuk 2002: 228).

Ukraine did not democratize after Kravchuks removal. Indeed, Kuchmas ability to
consolidate state control over the regions and the security forces, together with an effective system
of internal surveillance and blackmail (Darden 2001), enhanced elite cohesion and allowed the
president to govern in an increasingly authoritarian manner. In 1999, tight control over state
agencies enabled Kuchma to manipulate elections through widespread, systematic and

37
In 1999, Russia accounted for 48 percent of Ukraines imports, most of which was natural gas and other
energy resources (CIA fact-book). Ukraines energy debt to Russia is estimated to be between US$ 1.4 and
2 billion.
38
See Kuzio (1996: 132-133); FBIS-SOV 3 August 1994: 38; and Democratic Elections in Ukraine (1994).


23
coordinated action by [s]tate officials and public institutions at various levels (ODIHR 1999: 18;
Darden 2001).
39
Kuchma also benefited from a deeply divided opposition, as nationalist forces
opted to back the government when the Communists emerged as the leading contender for the
presidency in 1999. Finally, Kuchma benefited from the support of Russian president Putin,
particularly in the wake of a 2000 scandal in which a leaked audiotape appeared to link the
president to the murder of an independent journalist (Levitsky and Way 2001).

Zambia
Zambia experienced two incumbent turnovers between 1991 and 2001 but did not
democratize. In 1991, after two decades of single party rule under the United National
Independence Party (UNIP), longtime autocrat Kenneth Kaunda held multiparty elections and was
defeated by union leader Frederick Chiluba. Yet the regime remained competitive authoritarian, as
politics continued to be marked by fraud and regular abuses of civil liberties throughout the 1990s
(Mphaisha 2000).

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES: Incumbent capacity under Kaunda was medium-low.
The Zambian state is considered among the weakest in southern Africa (Lodge 1998: 25-26; Shafer
1994). Kaunda ruled largely through patronage and never developed the kind of repressive
apparatus seen in neighboring Zimbabwe (Bratton 1994: 123; Baylies and Szeftel 1992: 88). The
severe economic crisis of the late 1980s eroded the states capacity even further. Kaundas control
over the security apparatuses also appears to have been relatively weak: the government suffered
three coup attempts between 1980 and 1990. The governments electoral capacity was moderate.
Although UNIP possessed a national structure and maintained a large urban presence (Lodge 1998:
32), it was a loosely structured, patronage-based organization with a fairly weak presence in rural
areas.
40


Opposition strength was relatively high in the late 1980 and early 1990s. The labor
movement, based largely in the copper sector, was particularly strong. The Zambia Congress of
Trade Unions (ZCTU), which had 380,000 members in 1980 (Bratton 1994: 113-114), was one of
the most potent labor organizations in the region. The church also emerged as an important civic
actor (Bartlett 2000: 435-6). The opposition was further strengthened by its internal cohesion. In
1990, unions, students, and former government leaders founded the Movement for Multi-Party
Democracy, which, under the guidance of ZCTU leader Frederick Chiluba, emerged as a united
opposition front.

Finally, Zambias ties to the West were relatively weak. The countrys dependence on the
West was quite high. In the mid-1980s, it was the most indebted country in the world relative to

39
Tax officers were used to blackmail local officials into getting out the vote (Darden 2001) and local and
regional officials did everything from distributing campaign materials to threatening to cut off gas or
electricity supplies if villagers did not support Kuchma (ODIHR Ukraine 1999: 16-17).
40
According to Kees van Donge, UNIP was a maximum coalition of regional and other groups whose
interests often had to be satisfied at the cost of party strength (1995: 209, 196; also Baylies and Szeftel 1992:
78).


24
GDP and received more per capita external assistance than any other African state (van de Walle
1997: 29; Lodge 1998: 32). However, in terms of geographic proximity, elite linkages, and media
and other influences, Zambia ranked low. The United States had few identifiable interests in
Zambia, and Zambia was low on the unusually crowded U.S. foreign policy agenda the early
1990s (Carothers 1999: 69, 73).

DEPENDENT VARIABLE: A combination of incumbent weakness and opposition
capacity led to the collapse of one-party rule in 1991. During the second half of the 1980s, Zambia
suffered a severe economic shock due to declining copper prices. Due to its heavy reliance on
patronage, the crisis hit the government particularly hard (Bratton 1994: 124). Fiscal crisis and
IMF-dictated food price increases led to riots in 1986 and 1990 (Lodge 1998: 32; Bratton 1992:
85-86). The 1990 riots were followed by a coup attempt and mass demonstrations throughout the
country. In this context, Kaunda agreed hold multiparty elections (Bratton 1992, 1994).
According to Bartlett, political liberalization was the only alternative open for a regime that lacked
the will for, or the means of, repression (Bartlett 2000: 444). The MMD, which benefited from the
organizational strength of the ZCTU and a wave of defections from UNIP (Baylies and Szeftel
1992: 81-83; Bratton 1994), overwhelmingly defeated UNIP in the 1991 election, and Kaunda
peacefully handed the presidency over to Chiluba.

Although the Zambian regime remained competitive after 1991, it did not democratize.
The Chiluba government repeatedly violated civil and political liberties, assaulted the independent
media, and maneuvered to bar both Kaunda and his running mate from participating in the 1996
presidential election (Bratton and Posner 1999; Mphaisha 2000). Chiluba was re-elected in 1996 in
an election that was so riddled with abuse that UNIP opted to boycott it (Bratton and Posner
1999). Chiluba retained power largely because the opposition was weak and fragmented, which
allowed the government to essentially dominate by default(Burnell 2001: 256-258). Yet the
fragmentation of the MMD coalition prevented Chiluba from consolidating power. In 2001,
Chiluba attempted to change the constitution in order to serve a third term. However, he faced
substantial intra-party opposition and was forced to back down (Bongololo 2001). In December
2001, in elections that were widely criticized, Vice President Levy Mwanawasa narrowly defeated
a highly fragmented opposition (with just 29 percent of the vote), which allowed the MMD to retain
power for another term.

Armenia
Armenia has been a competitive authoritarian regime since the collapse of the Soviet Union. In
1996, Levon Ter-Petrosian, an anti-communist opposition leader who had been elected president in
1991, stole an election from his former Prime Minister Vazgen Manukian. Less than two years
later, however, Ter-Petrosian was forced to resign amidst severe elite fragmentation. Ter-
Petrosians removal did not result in democratization, but rather in an increasingly authoritarian
regime.

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES: In contrast to the other cases discussed in this section,
the Armenian government possessed substantial incumbent capacity. State capacity was relatively


25
high. Ter-Petrosian initially faced tremendous state building challenges as armed groups--using
weapons stolen from nearby Soviet army basesthat emerged to fight in the disputed Karabagh
region of Azerbaijan created problems of public order. Yet the government quickly disarmed and
subordinated these groups (Masih and Krikorian 1999: 20-22; Mitiaev 1998: 77-78). Armenia
won the war in Nagorno-Karabagh (capturing 20 percent of Azerbaijani territory) in 1992-1994
and emerged from it with a strong and disciplined military apparatus. In addition, the governing
party, the Armenian National Movement (ANM), which had emerged out of the broad-based late
1980s movement to assert Armenian control over Karabagh, was relatively strong. The ANM won
a majority of seats in the 1990 legislative elections. At the same time, however, elite cohesion was
relatively low. The ANM was a heterogeneous coalition that included intelligentsia from the
communist era, younger activists, and figures from the Communist establishment (Aves 1996: 4).
Throughout the early 1990s, ANM leaders broke off to form their own parties (Libaridian 1999:
10, 23-24; Masih and Krikorian 1999: 45-46).

Opposition capacity was medium-low. Civil society was fairly weak. Moreover,
opposition forces were fragmented into at least five groupings led by different ex-government
officials, as well as the Dashniak, a predominantly diaspora-based party. Unlike Russia and
Ukraine, however, no strong communist party polarized the opposition. For the most part,
differences among the parties revolved around personalities and tactics.

Like many other post-Soviet countries, Armenia was weakly linked to the West during the
1990s. The level of Western-based media, NGO, and technocratic linkage was low.
41

Facing a blockade from Azerbaijan and Turkey, Armenia was reliant on Western aid, which
accounted for 58 percent of gross capital formation in 1999 (World Development Indicators).
However, Russia, which remained very active militarily in the region, was the most important
neighboring power.

DEPENDENT VARIABLE: State strength and relatively weak Western influence
facilitated authoritarian regime-building in Armenia. Despite his oppositionist credentials, Ter-
Petrosian responded in a harsh manner to opposition that emerged in the early 1990s. In December
1994, Ter-Petrosian banned the Dashniaks, which was considered the most powerful party outside
of the ANM. During the 1995 parliamentary elections, the ANM tightly controlled local electoral
commissions, which denied registration to many opposition candidates (Dudwick 1997: 94-95;
Fuller 1996: 45-46). In this context, the ANM won 62 percent of the seats in parliament.

A more potent opposition threat emerged in 1996, when, just weeks before presidential
elections, four parties united behind the candidacy of ex-Prime Minister Vazgen Manukian.
Although official results stated that Ter-Petrosian won the election 52 percent to 41 percent, the
results were widely considered inaccurate and were condemned by the U.S. government and the

41
Although Armenia has a very active and organized diaspora community, the ANM had relatively weak and
often hostile relations with diaspora groups, which had actively opposed the movement for independence in
the late 1980s (Masih and Krikorian 1999: 12-13).


26
European Parliament. Manukian responded by leading a 150,000-strong demonstration that
attacked Parliament (Danielian 1996-1997: 128). Yet--unlike Zambia, Albania, and Ukraine--the
military remained unambiguously loyal to Ter-Petrosian during the crisis (Fuller 1996: 43), and
security forces quickly put down the protests. Despite this apparent victory, the surprisingly strong
opposition challenge convinced many ANM elites that the party was losing ground (Astourian 2001:
48, Danielyan 1998). Within months, a deep split emerged (Mitiaev 1998: 129), and in February
1998, long-simmering disagreements over Karabagh policies led to widespread defections from the
party. As legislators abandoned the ANM, the government lost control over Parliament and Ter-
Petrosian was forced to resign (Mitiaev 1998: 131).

Ter-Petrosians resignation and replacement by former Prime Minister Robert Kocharian
pushed Armenia in an authoritarian, rather than a democratic, direction. In 1998, Kocharian won
elections that were characterized by substantial abuse, and in March 2002, Kocharian closed down
Television A+, the most independent station in the country.

Incumbent Removal and Democratization
In Mexico, Nicaragua, Peru, and Serbia, autocratic incumbents were removed from power
either through elections or in the context of post-election crises. In each of these cases, incumbent
turnover was accompanied by a democratic transition. All four cases were characterized by
relatively high levels of incumbent capacity, which in some cases enabled governments to survive
repeated opposition challenges. However, high levels of Western linkage imposed severe
constraints on incumbents, which ultimately facilitated their removal. In all four cases, regime change
resulted in democratization. The cases are summarized in Table 4. In Mexico, a strong state and
party and a divided opposition allowed the PRI to remain in power during the 1990s, but in a
context of close integration with the United States, the government was unwilling to repress a
growing opposition was thus forced to cede power in 2000. In Nicaragua, an effective coercive and
electoral apparatus and a weak opposition allowed the Sandinista government to dominate politics
throughout the 1980s, but a U.S.-sponsored war and embargo eventually compelled the
government to hold free elections and, once defeated, cede power. In Peru, although Alberto
Fujimoris popularity and a weak opposition left the govnernment virtually unchallenged in the mid-
1990s, governing party weakness and a unified opposition challenge compelled the government to
engage in a series of political shenanigans thatin a context of strong international pressure--
contributed to the regimes implosion in 2000. Finally, in Serbia, a regime characterized by a
relatively strong state and party was badly weakened by a U.S.-led war, after which a well-
organized and unified opposition movement forced Milosevic from power.
--Table 4 about here--

Mexico
Prior to the 1980s, Mexico was a full-scale authoritarian regime. The Institutionalized
Revolutionary Party (PRI) thoroughly dominated politics, and elections were ritualistic pageants in
which the PRI usually won more than 80 percent of the vote (Lindau 1996: 319). Beginning in the
1980s, however, the regime became increasingly competitive. Although elections were marred by
fraud, violence, and widespread abuse of state resources (Levy and Bruhn 2001: 87-88), the


27
opposition National Action Party (PAN) and Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD) slowly
emerged as serious contenders for power.

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES: Mexico is a case of high incumbent capacity. Through
the late 1980s, the regime was characterized by a remarkable cohesive ruling elite (Ronfeldt 1989:
435). The PRI served as an effective vehicle for resolving elite conflict, suffering only one major
fracture prior to 1987 (Ronfeldt 1989; Cornelius et al. 1989: 18). Moreover, the PRIs tight
control over the military ensured that the possibility of a coup was virtually nil (Wager 1995: 6,
72). The PRI governments coercive capacity was also high. The Mexican Revolution produced a
strong state bureaucracy (Centeno 1994: 45-73) and a disciplined military that played an active
and effectiverole in suppressing protest (Ronfeldt 1984a: 17; 1984b; Wager 1984). The army
put down peasant uprisings in several states during the 1960s, routed incipient guerrilla groups in the
late 1960s, and crushed large-scale student protests in 1968 (Ronfeldt 1984b: 64-65). The size
and budgetof the armed doubled during the 1980s (Wager 1984: 160-169, 175; Grayson
1990a: 269-270). Finally, the PRIs electoral capacity was high. Created as a mass party with
close links to labor and peasant organizations, the PRI became one of the worlds most
accomplished vote-getting machines during the 1940s and 1950s (Cornelius 1996: 57-58). Its
strength lay not only in its ability to deliver votes but also in its remarkable capacity to organize
fraud,
42
which demonstrated clearly the partys capacity for control (Bruhn 1997: 40). Although
the PRI machine weakened during the 1980, it remained the only party with a truly national
network of campaign organizers as late as 1994 (Cornelius 1996: 59).
43


Opposition capacity--scored as medium--was mixed. Whereas most civic and social
organizations had been co-opted or repressed by the state before the 1980s, Mexico witnessed a
remarkable flowering of civil society during the 1980s and 1990s (Schulz and Williams 1995: 3),
as church and student groups, social movements, NGOs, and independent unions, business
associations, and media outlets proliferated (Levy and Bruhn 2001: 69-71; Lawson 2002). During
the 1990s, the opposition PAN and PRD developed relatively strong national organizations.
However, opposition capacity was reduced by deep ideological differences between the
conservative PAN and the leftist PRD, which made it difficult to construct a broad anti-PRI
coalition.

Finally, U.S. influence in Mexico was exceptionally high. Although the U.S. and Mexico
maintained an arms length relationship during the Cold War (Domnguez and Fernndez de
Castro 2001: 3-10), the 1980s witnessed a dramatic increase in Mexicos linkages to (and
dependence on) the U.S. and international financial institutions (Kaufman Purcell 1997; Domnguez
and Fernndez de Castro 2001).
44
Rapid economic integration during the 1980s, which culminated
in the 1993 passage of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), quadrupled U.S.

42
Local PRI branches organized ballot stuffing, as well as flying brigades, or groups of voters that were
trucked from polling station to polling station to cast multiple ballots (Cornelius 1996: 60).
43
According to Cornelius, the PRI mobilized 1.2 million activists on election day in 1994 (1996: 59-60).
44
For example, the U.S. and IMF orchestrated four major financial bailouts of Mexicototaling nearly $70
million--between 1982 and 1995 (Aguayo 2000: 35).


28
investment in Mexico and transformed Mexico into the U.S.s second largest trading partner (Levy
and Bruhn 1999: 566). Political interactions between the U.S. and Mexico multiplied at all levels
(Domnguez and Fernndez de Castro 2001: 75),
45
which expanded U.S. public interest in Mexico
and Mexican affairs (Domnguez and Fernndez de Castro 2001: 92). Consequently, Mexican
governments were forced to accept the scrutiny of the U.S. Congress, public interest groups, and a
myriad of committees and commissions (Centeno 1994: 240). Increased linkage was also seen in
the rise of U.S.-educated technocrats to the top of the Mexican power structure (Camp 1985;
Centeno 1994). U.S.-educated technocrats predominated in the governments of Miguel De la
Madrid (1982-88), Carlos Salinas (1988-94), and Ernesto Zedillo (1994-2000) (Camp 1985;
Centeno 1994).
46
The emerging technocratic elite was fluent in English, was familiar with global
intellectual and ideological trends, and maintained close ties to the U.S. intellectual, political, and
economic elite (Centeno 1994: 125-126). Finally, Mexico was penetrated by U.S.-based media
and international civil society (Lawson 2002: 98; Dresser 1996b). International NGOs established
close ties to local human rights and pro-democracy groups, providing them with resources,
protection, and access to the U.S. media and Congress (Dresser 1996b).

DEPENDENT VARIABLE: The PRI regime entered into crisis in 1988, when left-of-
center PRI defector Cuauhtemoc Crdenas challenged Carlos Salinas for the presidency and, in the
face of possible defeat, the PRI carried out a massive fraud (Cornelius et al. 1989: 21; Bruhn 1997:
140-41).

Although Cardenas led a series of mass demonstrations that threatened the regime, the
PRI survived because: (1) it maintained full control over the military (Bruhn 1997: 49); (2) the U.S.
governmentin the waning days of the Cold War-- backed Salinas (Whitehead 1991: 246); and
(3) the opposition divided, as the PAN, fearing a Cardenas government, abandoned the protests
(Magaloni 2001: 4, 11).

Although PRI strength and PAN-PRD polarization enabled Ernesto Zedillo to win the
presidency in 1994, the growing strength of parties and civil society, combined with unprecedented
international scrutiny of Mexican politics (Kaufman Purcell 1997: 149-150), created a dilemma
from which PRI leaders could not escape. On the hand, as the opposition gained strength,
repression and fraud would be increasing necessary to retain power. On the other hand, the
international media and NGO presence was such that even minor acts of repression and fraud now
gained widespreadand costly--international attention (Kaufman Purcell 1997: 149-150). Though
hardly democratic, the PRIs technocratic leadership was greatly concerned with the international
image of Mexico and the damage done to that image by widespread reports of human rights
violations and democratic failings (Dresser 1996b: 337). These constraints compelled the PRI to
respond to emerging opposition challenges with concessions, rather than repression.

The 1990s were thus characterized by a series of PRI concessions that ultimately resulted in
the partys removal from power. First, in the early 1990s, when a string of local electoral scandals

45
U.S. and Mexican presidents met a stunning 23 times between 1989 and 2000.
46
According to one count, nearly two-thirds of President Miguel De la Madrids (1982-88) cabinet was
educated abroad (Camp 1985: 103).


29
provoked opposition protests that gained widespread international attention, the PRI began, for the
first time, to concede state-level elections (Dresser 1996b: 332; Eisenstadt 2001). Second,
although the government initially responded to the 1994 Zapatista National Liberation Army
(EZLN) uprising in Chiapas with massive force (Wager and Schulz 1995: 172), the repression
spurred international concern and led to an influx of human rights organizations from abroad
(Dresser 1996b: 334). Thus, even though the army quickly cornered the rebels (Wager and Schulz
1995), the government found itself hampered in using force (Kaufman Purcell 1997: 149) by
concern that repression would frighten away investors and create a backlash that could destroy
NAFTA (Schulz and Williams 1995: 12). Third, concerned about the international credibility of
the 1994 election, the PRI agreed to a series of unprecedented measures to limit fraud (Kaufman
Purcell 1997: 150), including the presence of foreign observers (Dresser 1996b: 336). Finally,
weakened by a deep financial crisis, the Zedillo government reluctantly and grudgingly negotiated
the 1996 electoral reforms that democratized Mexico (Lawson 2002: 20).
47
The 2000 election,
which was heavily monitored by international and domestic observers (Pastor 2000), was won by
PAN candidate Vicente Fox. The PRI left power peacefully, largely because the balance of forces
had so dramatically changed that the costs for the PRI to refuse to recognize its defeat were
enormous (Magaloni 2001: 16).

Serbia
Throughout the 1990s, Serbia maintained a competitive authoritarian regime in which
elections, though marred by fraud and intimidation, were nevertheless hotly contested. Despite a
severe economic crisis, the loss of three wars, international sanctions, and some of the largest and
most sustained demonstrations in the post-communist era, Slobodan Milosevic held onto power
longer than any other post-Communist leader outside of Central Asia.

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES: The Serbian government enjoyed substantial incumbent
capacity during the 1990s. Elite cohesion was preserved through nationalist ideology, an extensive
patronage network based on state owned enterprises (Cohen 2001: 131), and a strong party
organization. In the late 1980s, Milosevic successfully transformed the existing communist party into
the Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS), which retained key material and organizational resources from
the previous regime. The SPS possessed a developed structure of branches and membership
(estimated at 400,000 in 1990), substantial property, and a large media empire (Cohen 2001: 120,
Thomas 1999: 76).
48
During elections, Milosevic was able to draw on physical intimidation by
gangs of party activists (Gagnon 1994/95: 161) and use party organs and state agencies to pump
in 500,000-700,000 votes (roughly 10-15 percent of the overall vote) (Cohen 2001: 417). The
government also possessed an extensive security apparatus, particularly the police, which employed

47
According to Beatriz Magaloni, PRI was compelled to re-negotiate the rules of the game. The alternative
was to crash after each electoral round until the legitimacy of the electoral system was destroyed (2001: 11).
48
Among the assets obtained by the Party was the Socialist Alliance for the Working People of Serbia
(SAWP), a government sponsored umbrella group for social organizations, which helped to transport pro-
Milosevic Kosovo Serbs to rallies across the country (Thomas 1999: 45-47). The SAWP, which ultimately
merged with the SPS, maintained assets worth an estimated US$160 million (Andrejevich 1990).


30
at least 100,000 people by 1995 and was armed with cannons and other heavy artillery (Cohen
2001: 132).

Milosevic faced a well-organized but fractious opposition. The Serbian oppositions
capacity to mobilize street protests was probably greater than any of the other countries covered in
this paper. Liberal groups organized massive protests in cities across the country throughout the
1990s.
49
By the late 1990s, the opposition had also managed to organize youth groups capable of
actively resisting police intimidation (Bujasevic and Radovanovic 2001). For most of the decade,
the opposition was weakened by a high level of fragmentation. Nevertheless, the absence of deep
ethnic or ideological cleavages enhanced prospects for eventual opposition unity.

Finally, Serbia was characterized by high Western influence. Close Western linkages were
in part a product of the relative openness of the communist regime (Pribicevic 1995/1996: 124),
which created an elite that was highly familiar with Western norms. In addition, Serbias proximity to
Western Europe increased the likelihood that fear of a spreading Balkan war would led the U.S.
and European governments to intervene in the region.

DEPENDENT VARIABLE: The combination of effective nationalist appeals, high
incumbent capacity, and a fragmented opposition allowed Milosevic to weather several challenges
during the 1990s. In 1992-93, after the SPS failed to win a majority in parliament, Milosevic was
able to lure the far right Serbian Radical Party, a one-time ally of oppositionist Vuk Draskovic, into
a red-brown coalition. A more serious challenge emerged in the winter of 1996-1997 after the
SPS was soundly defeated in a series of local elections. When the government annulled the results,
the liberal opposition group Zajedno organized three months of daily demonstrations (reaching
500,000 people in Belgrade) throughout the country to call for Milosevics ouster. Facing strong
international pressure, as well as opposition from the Orthodox church, Milosevic reversed course
and accepted the opposition victories but did not relinquish control over the national government.
Despite the size and persistence of the demonstrations, there were few government defections and
Milosevics authority remained largely intact.

Two critical changes sealed Milosevics fate in the late 1990s. First, the regime and state
were badly weakened by the war with NATO. Although sanctions and war may have helped
Milosevic in the short run by strengthening Serbian nationalism (cf Thomas 1999: 131), they
ultimately weakened both public and intra-regime support for Milosevic.
50
By 2000, Milosevics
capacity to withstand popular protest had diminished. Many in the police feared large-scale
popular rebellion (Bujasevic and Radovanovic 2001: 28). There was also widespread
dissatisfaction in the military, as many officers blamed Milosevic for the armys failure in four
successive wars (Cohen 2001: 417, 414). These developments weakened the command structure
of the security forces (Cohen 2001: 420-21; Bujasevic and Radovanovic 2001). Second, and

49
These included rallies of 500,000 in 1991 and 100,000 in 1992, daily protests of between 50,000 and 500,000
over the space of three months in 1996-97; and a critical anti-Milosevic demonstration of 600,000 in late 2000.
50
The NATO bombings had inflicted an estimated 30-40 billion dollars in damage to the countrys economic
infrastructure (Bardos 2001: 419).


31
crucially, opposition forces united behind the presidential candidacy of Vojislav Kostunica, a
moderate nationalist politician. Kostunicas broad-based candidacy gave the opposition an
unprecedented capacity to win majority electoral support.

In this new context, Milosevic was unable to maintain himself in power. After Milosevic
fraudulently claimed that Kostunica had failed to win the first round of the 2000 presidential
election,
51
the opposition organized a successful general strike, and on October 5, over 600,000
demonstrators gathered in Belgrade and stormed Parliament, Radio-Television Serbia, several radio
stations, and the SPS headquarters (Cohen 2001: 410-415; Bujasevic and Radovanovic 2001: 47-
97). Security forces refused to repress the demonstrations. A day later, Milosevic resigned. The
new government received substantial support from the West. Although the Serbian/Yugoslav
governments have been plagued by political infighting, the government has refrained from extra-legal
measures and the country has remained democratic.

Nicaragua
Nicaragua evolved from a one party authoritarian regime in the aftermath of the 1979
revolution into a competitive authoritarian regime in the late 1980s. Although competitive elections
were held in 1984, they were carried out in a context of civil war and were boycotted by the major
opposition parties. Daniel Ortega of the ruling Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) won
the presidency with 67 percent of the vote. Beginning in 1987, however, a series of internationally-
brokered concessions created the conditions for a highly competitive election in 1990.

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES: Nicaragua was a case of high incumbent capacity. Elite
cohesion was extremely high. A former guerrilla movement, the FSLN was a centralized,
disciplined party. Open conflict within the partys National Directorate (DN) was rare (Miranda
and Ratliff 1993: 19), and the DN did not suffer a single defection through the entire 1979-90
period. The FSLN also possessed substantial coercive capacity. Confronted with a U.S.-backed
civil war, the FSLN built a powerful army (Farhi 1990: 112; Walker 1991: 86-87). Whereas
former dictator Anastasio Somozas National Guard contained only 7500 men (Farhi 1990: 33), the
Sandinista Popular Army grew to 96,000 troops in 1990 (Prevost 1995: 103). The FSLN also
established an extensive state security system (Leiken 1990: 28; Miranda and Ratliff 1993: 189-
90), which included an elaborate surveillance system, extensive informant networks, and a state
security force that was ten times larger than Somozas (Miranda and Ratliff 1993: 189-90). The
countrys 15,000 neighborhood-based Sandinista Defense Committees also played a role in
policing and surveillance (Serra 1991: 53-54; Oquist 1992: 24). Finally, the FSLN possessed
substantial electoral capacity. Although it maintained a limited and selective membership (roughly
30,000 in the mid-1980s) (Vanden and Prevost 1993: 114), the FSLN possessed a degree of
organization and discipline that was unmatched in Nicaraguan history. The partys mobilizational
capacity was enhanced by close ties to mass-based labor, peasant, youth, and womens

51
According to the opposition count, Kostunica won the first round with 52 percent of the vote. However,
the government claimed that Kostunica had only received 48.96 percent and that a run-off was required.


32
organizations whose combined membership was an estimated 300,000 (Vanden and Prevost 1993:
59-62; Williams 1994: 173).

Opposition capacity was, by contrast, relatively low. Because most major civic and social
organizations were linked to the FSLN-state, independent civil society was weak (Luckham 1998).
The political opposition was weak and fragmented into nearly two dozen small parties (Weaver and
Barnes 1991). As late as 1990, the opposition possessed a weak organization with little more
than a single office in each municipality (LASA 1990: 23). Yet despite its fragmentation, the
opposition was not deeply divided (Kuant and OKane 1990: 9), and in 1989, 14 partiesranging
from the communist left to the conservative rightformed the National Opposition Union (UNO),
which enhanced the oppositions electoral capacity.

Finally, Western influence in Nicaragua was very high. Prior to 1979, Nicaragua had been
one of the most heavily U.S.-dependent countries in the hemisphere (Farhi 1990: 31).
52
Although
the revolution loosened these ties, Nicaraguas close proximity to the U.S. left it vulnerable to a
backyard effect.
53
Indeed, not since Vietnam [had] a small country attracted so much U.S.
media attention or caused such acrimony in Congress (Leiken 1990: 26). U.S. attention to
Nicaragua was reinforced by the displaced Nicaraguan elite, which established a well-financed and
connected Miami-based exile community. Nicaraguas proximity to the U.S. also exposed it to
mass media penetration from neighboring countries (Frederick 1987; Reding 1991: 43). Finally,
Western leverage over Nicaragua was high. Although the FSLN reduced Nicaraguas dependence
on the U.S., largely via the support from the Soviet bloc,
54
this break provoked a costly U.S.-
sponsored civil war,
55
and when Soviet assistance dried up in the late 1980s, Western leverage
again increased dramatically.

DEPENDENT VARIABLE: Although the Sandinistas faced no serious domestic
challenges during the 1980s, international constraints pushed the FSLN toward an increasingly
competitive regime. By 1988, the human and economic costs of the U.S.-backed civil war had
become virtually unbearable. After five years of recession and three years of hyperinflation (Conroy
1990: 48-49), it became clear that there were no viable options for economic recuperation so long
as the contra war continued and Nicaragua remained on the margins of international trade, finance
and assistance (Roberts 1990: 93). At the same time, a withdrawal of Soviet aid compelled
Nicaragua to submit to the realities of U.S. hegemony in the Western hemisphere (Vanden and
Prevost 1993: 106). In this context, the FSLN government sought to enhance its legitimacy in the
Westa strategy that required democratic reform (Roberts 1990).

52
The U.S. invaded Nicaragua four times in the nineteenth century and then occupied the country, off and
on, from 1912 until 1932 (Robinson 1992: 20).
53
As an economic advisor to the Sandinista government put it: This is a very small, vulnerable country, in
the backyard of the United States, with long land borders...not an island like Cuba....These geopolitical
realities are more important than the Sandinistas intentions... (quoted in LASA 1984: 34).
54
Nicaragua received more than $3 billion in foreign aid and credit from the Soviet bloc between 1979 and 1987
(Conroy 1990: 52).
55
The civil war resulted in 30,000 Nicaraguan deaths and as much as $4 billion in damages (Vanden and
Prevost 1993: 130; Conroy 1990: 55).


33

Western pressure thus achieved what a weak and fragmented opposition could not: political
liberalization in anticipation of the 1990 elections. In 1989, the FSLN agreed to a series of political
concession that included the repeal of repressive security laws, a more balanced Supreme Electoral
Council, greater media access, andcruciallyUN and OAS observation of the 1990 election
(LASA 1990: 11). Although reform concessions did not create a level playing field (the FSLN
retained a near-monopoly over state resources and the media), two factors benefited the
opposition. First, it united behind a single presidential candidate, Violeta Chamorro. Second,
international actors intervened heavily in the election. U.S. logistical and financial support, which
totaled an estimated $12.5 to $14 million (Reding 1991: 40;Williams 1994: 180), provided UNO
with an organizational capacity that it could not have achieved on its own. More importantly,
international observers played a critical role in mediating disputes between UNO and the
government (LASA 1990: 32-33; Pastor 1990: 19-20).
56
The election itself was observed by
more international observers than any previous election in an independent country (Pastor 1990:
18). When it became clear that Ortega had lost the election, Carter and representatives of the UN
and OAS rushed to the FSLN headquarters to ensure that he would accept the result (LASA 1990:
34; Pastor 1990: 21). The FSLN ceded power in April 1990, ushering in a surprisingly smooth
democratic transition.

Peru
Perus competitive authoritarian regime emerged in 1992 after President Alberto Fujimori
closed Congress and dissolved the constitution. Although international pressure forced Fujimori to
quickly restore electoral politics (McClintock 1996: 69-70; Cameron 1997: 65-66), the post-1992
regime was far from democratic. Civil liberties were routinely violated,
57
and much of the media and
the judiciary were embedded in a web of corruption and blackmail spun by Fujimoris shadowy
intelligence advisor, Vladimiro Montesinos (Cameron 2000, 2002; Youngers 2000).

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES: Incumbent capacity in Peru was relatively high, but
uneven. Though initially low,
58
elite cohesion increased substantially over the course of the 1990s.
The lynchpin of this cohesion was Montesinos, who stacked the military, the judiciary, and other
state institutions with allies and ensured discipline through a vast network of bribery, surveillance,
and blackmail (Obando 1999; Rospigliosi 2000; Cameron 2002). The government also possessed
substantial coercive capacity. Although Fujimori inherited a badly weakened state in 1990, he took
a series of measures to strengthen it in the early 1990s (Rospigliosi 2000: 113-114; 118-119). At
the same time, Montesinos crafting of the military command consolidated the governments control
over the security apparatus (Rospigliosi 2000). The core of the new coercive structure was the
National Intelligence Service (SIN), which Montesinos transformed into an immense apparatus

56
According to Robert Pastor, Carter would listen to UNOs charges...and then take them up directly with
the senior levels of the Sandinista government. In virtually every case, Ortega responded (1990: 19).
57
The most serious cases of human rights violations under Fujimori were the 1991 massacre of 15 people at
Barrios Altos and the July 1992 killing of nine students at La Cantuta University.
58
The government suffered several important defections and shakeups in the 1990-93 period, as well as a
coup attempt in November 1992.


34
(Rospigliosi 2000: 156-158). The SIN staff grew from a few dozen to 1500, and its budget
increased by more than 50 times relative to the 1980s (Rospigliosi 2000: 197-201). The SIN
became Perus political police (Youngers 2000: 2), operating a death squad, spying on members
of the government, the armed forces, the media, and the opposition, manipulating the courts, and
bribing and blackmailing much of the media into submission (Cameron 2000, 2002; Rospigliosi
2000).

At the same time, the governments electoral capacity was relatively low. Fujimori invested
little in party organization (Roberts 1995, 2002; Planas 2000: 347-351). During his decade in
office, he createdand discardedfour different parties,
59
none of which possessed even a
minimal organizational structure. Consequently, Fujimori never possessed an effective governing
party (Roberts 2002). Instead, he relied on direct appeals to win elections and on state agencies
particularly the SIN and the armed forcesto govern (Roberts 1995; 2002).

Opposition capacity in Peru was medium-low. In the wake of a profound economic crisis
and a brutal guerrilla insurgency, both the party system and civil society decomposed in the early
1990s,
60
leaving the anti-Fujimori opposition fragmented and disorganized (Cameron 1997; Roberts
1998; Tanaka 1998). Labor and other national civic organizations virtually disappeared (Roberts
1998), and the opposition fragmented into dozens of personalistic parties that lacked even a
minimum of organization or capacity for collective action (Levitsky and Cameron 2003). However,
with the collapse of the populist American Popular Revolutionary Alliance (APRA) and the Marxist
left, ideological cleavages within the opposition disappeared, which enhanced its capacity to form a
broad anti-Fujimori front.

Western influence in Peru was high, though not as high as in Mexico and Nicaragua. The
U.S. was Perus leading trading partner, and at several points during the 1990s, Peru was the
largest recipient of U.S. aid in Latin America (Roberts and Peceny 1997: 220; Youngers 2000: 69-
70). In addition, much of Perus technocratic elite was educated in the West and maintained ties to
Western institutions.
61
Although the international media and NGO presence was not as extensive
as in Mexico, journalists and human rights organizations maintained close ties to the transnational
human rights and democracy network. U.S. leverage over Peru, though generally high, was limited
by the fact that the U.S.-sponsored drug war trumped democracy promotion as a foreign policy
goal during the 1990s (McClintock 2000; Youngers 2000).

DEPENDENT VARIABLE: The Fujimori government regime faced few serious challenges
between 1992 and 1995. U.S. pressure on the government eased considerably after the restoration
of electoral politics (Cameron 1997: 60), and Fujimoris popularity, together with extreme

59
These were: Change 90 (1990), New Majority (1992), Lets Go Neighbors (1998), and Peru 2000 (2000).
60
Perus four largest parties, which accounted for more than 90 percent of the vote during the mid-1980s,
declined to less than 10 percent of the vote--combinedin 1995 (Tanaka 1998: 55).
61
Fujimoris first two Finance Ministers, Juan Carlos Hurtado Miller and Carlos Boloa, were educated at
Harvard and Oxford, respectively, and his principal economic advisor during the 1990-92 period, Hernando
de Soto, was a former GATT economist with close ties to U.S think tanks and government agencies.


35
opposition weakness, allowed him to easily win re-election in 1995 (with 62 percent of the vote).
However, as Fujimoris public support began to erode during his second term, the government
became increasingly coercive. Because Fujimori lacked a party or a viable successor, his re-election
to a third term in 2000despite its unconstitutionalitywas seen as critical to ensuring regime
continuity. To achieve this goal, the government undertook a series of autocratic measures,
including passage of dubiously constitutional legislation allowing a third term, the sacking of
members of the Constitutional Tribunal who moved to declare the bill unconstitutional, and the
derailing of a referendum initiative on Fujimoris re-election (Youngers 2000: 51-53; Conaghan
2001: 308). Moreover, because Fujimoris Peru 2000 lacked the organization to collect the nearly
500,000 signatures required to register a new party, the government resorted to a massive forgery
scheme whose exposure badly hurt its credibility. Finally, the electoral process was marred by the
governments near-monopoly over media access, harassment of opposition candidates, and
widespread misuse of state resources (including the use of military personnel in the campaign)
(Cameron 2000: 10-11; Conaghan 2001).

Although the continued weakness of the opposition might have ensured an easy victory in
2000, two factors worked to undermine Fujimoris re-election project. First, although civil society
was unable to block government abuses, local linkages to international NGOs ensured that they
gained substantial international exposure, which hurt Fujimoris image abroad. As a result, the 2000
electoral process came under close international scrutiny. International monitoring, which included
observer missions from the Organization of Americas States (OAS), the U.S.-based National
Democratic Institute, and the Carter Center, limited the governments ability to carry out fraud or
repression. Second, although opposition parties failed to unite around a single candidate in 2000,
they nrallied behind Alejandro Toledo after he emerged as the leading anti-Fujimori candidate.
Opposition unity and intense international scrutiny had a major impact on election night, when the
government appeared to be manipulating electoral results. Strong pressure from the U.S. and the
OAS, together with a mass protest backed by all major opposition parties, forced Fujimori to
accede to a second round against Toledo. When Fujimori refused to clean up the electoral process
for the second round, Toledo, backed by the entire spectrum of opposition parties, boycotted the
race. The U.S. and OAS observer missions denounced the uncontested race as unfair, and in July
2000, opposition forces united behind a massive three-day protest aimed at blocking Fujimoris
inauguration.

Fujimori initially survived the crisis. The armed forces remained cohesive and loyal, and the
opposition was unable to sustain a mass protest movement. Soon after the election, the
governmentwhich had won only 52 of 120 seats in Congressbought off 18 opposition deputies
to win back its legislative majority (Cameron 2002: 10). Nevertheless, the regime was badly
wounded by the 2000 election. Internationally, the government grew increasingly isolated.
62

Although the OAS did not impose sanctions, it sent a mission to Peru to push for democratizing
reforms. The mission became a fixture in Peruvian political life (Cooper and Legler 2001: 124)

62
All but two Latin American presidents skipped Fujimoris inauguration, and the U.S. congress voted to
withhold $42 million in anti-narcotics assistance to Peru.


36
and made it impossible for the Fujimori administration to ignore or quash what had turned into an
internationally monitored public discussion of the problems of democratization in Peru (Conaghan
2001: 19). In this context, elite cohesion eroded, as Western-oriented softliners such as Foreign
Minister Francisco Tudela pushed for a compromise with the OAS. In September, a videotape of
Montesinos bribing an opposition legislator was leaked, probably by military officials (Cameron
2002: 4). The leaked videotape prompted Fujimoris resignation and flight from Peru. In
November 2000, the Congress appointed opposition legislator Valentn Paniagua as interim
president. Paniagua oversaw a smooth democratic transition, culminating in Alejandro Toledos
election as president in June 2001.

Although the 2000-01 transition was largely a product of regime implosion, rather than
domestic or external pressure (Cameron 2002; Levitsky and Cameron 2003), the variables
employed in this study contributed to Fujimoris fall in at least three ways. First, the lack of strong
governing party forced Fujimori to rely on legal and political shenaniganssuch as the signature
scandal and the bribery of opposition deputiesthat ultimately weakened it (Roberts 2002: 19-21).
Second, international pressure during and after the 2000 election contributed to the regime divisions
that gave rise to the leaked videotape. Third, the absence of deep cleavages within the opposition
was critical. Had the opposition been deeply divided, Fujimori probably would have won the 2000
election without having to resort to fraud.

Comparing the Cases

As Figure 1 shows, the theoretical framework outlined in this paper does a fairly good job
of explaining the outcomes of our cases. First, Western influence is closely associated with both
incumbent turnover and democratization. Among high linkage cases, not a single autocratic
incumbent survived through 2002. Although some high capacity incumbents survived earlier crises
(Mexico in 1988, Serbia in 1996-97), and although some regime changes required large-scale
foreign intervention (Albania, Nicaragua, Serbia), in all cases, high Western linkage eventually made
the cost of authoritarian entrenchment prohibitively high. Moreover, incumbent turnover in high
linkage cases generally resulted in democratization rather than the emergence of a new autocratic
government. Due to the incentives created by geographic proximity and the fact that opposition
movements and leaders maintained close ties to Western elites and transnational democracy
networks, the Fox (Mexico), Toledo (Peru), Chamorro (Nicaragua), and Djindjic (Serbia)
governments all had strong incentives to adhere to democratic rules of the game.

--Figure 1 about here

Among cases of low Western linkage, by contrast, not a single regime democratized.
Although Armenia, Ukraine, and Zambia experienced incumbent turnover, the new governments
showed no more respect for democratic institutions than their predecessors. Without the incentives
created by geographical proximity and close ties to Western governments, institutions, and
democracy networks, the Chiluba (Zambia), Kuchma (Ukraine), and Kocharian (Armenia)


37
governments had weaker incentives to play by democratic rules. Consequently, patterns of
competitive authoritarian persisted.

Incumbent capacity also had a major impact on regime outcomes, although these effects
varied according to the international context. In a context of high Western linkage, cases of high
incumbent capacity eventually democratized (Mexico, Nicaragua, Peru, Serbia). Albania, which
was a case of high linkage and low incumbent capacity, remained competitive authoritarian after the
1997 turnover, although the regime was closer to democracy than it had been in the pre-turnover
period. Given that key components of incumbent capacity, such as strong states and parties, are
widely believed to contribute to democratic stability, these outcomes should not be surprising.

In a context of low Western linkage, by contrast, incumbent capacity is associated with
authoritarian outcomes. Thus, in Malaysia and Zimbabwe (and to a lesser extent, Kenya),
incumbent capacity allowed autocratic incumbents to ward off opposition challenges, which resulted
in the persistence and even entrenchment of authoritarian rule. In contrast to high linkage cases
such as Mexico and Nicaragua, the external costs associated with the full use of the regimes
coercive capacity were lower. Thus, whereas Salinas, Zedillo, and Ortega had strong incentives to
under-utilize their coercive capacity after 1989, Mugabe in Zimbabwe, Ter-Petrosian in Armenia,
and Mahathir in Malaysia did not.

In cases of low Western linkage and low incumbent capacity, autocratic governments often
lacked the organizational resources to repress or defeat opposition challenges, which increased their
vulnerability to opposition challenges. Here, the failure to repress opposition challenges was not a
product of external constraints as much as it was a product of internal weakness. Whereas the PRI
chose to under-utilize its coercive power, leaders like Kaunda, Kravchuk, and Yeltsin were not
certain that they possessed such power. In these cases, the strength and unity of opposition forces
was critical to explaining the fate of autocratic incumbents. Where opposition forces were able to
unite behind a single candidate, as in Zambia in 1991 (and more ambiguously, Ukraine in 1994),
weak incumbents lost power. Where opposition forces were internally polarized, as in Russia in
1996, even weak incumbents were likely to survive. Ukraine (1999) and Kenya, which are cases
of medium incumbent capacity, also fit this pattern, as united oppositions would likely have defeated
Kuchma and Moi.

Although opposition strength did not directly determine regime outcomes in other cases, it
nevertheless had important effects. For example, even though high Western linkage/high incumbent
capacity cases all eventually democratized, opposition capacity affected both the timing of the
transition and the quality of the new democratic regime. Thus, in Mexico, opposition division clearly
slowed down the transition after 1988, whereas in Nicaragua, a broad opposition coalition helped
to avoid such an outcome in 1990. Moreover, where strong and sustained democracy movements
played the leading role in bringing about transitions (Mexico, Serbia), new democracies tended to
be stronger.



38
Two cases do not easily fit the framework outlined in Figure 1: Armenia and Russia.
Although our framework correctly predicts that Armeniaa case of high incumbent capacity and
low Western linkagewould not democratize during the 1990s, it cannot easily account for the
incumbent turnover of 1998. In Russia, our variables predict the right outcome but the mechanism
is not entirely what we would expect. As our theory predicts, a polarized opposition helped Yeltsin
overcome both the 1993 Duma crisis and the 1996 electoral challenge, despite a low level of
incumbent capacity. Yet our theory does not predict that Yeltsin would successfully use coercive
force to overcome the 1993 crisis. (Of course, Yeltsin himself tells us that he was barely able to
gain the militarys compliance).

The outcomes discussed above can be usefully organized into four clusters, based on scores
on the dimensions of Western linkage and incumbent capacity. These clusters are presented in
Table 5. In the upper left quadrant we have cases of high Western linkage and high incumbent
capacity. These conditions favor democratic outcomes, due to incentives created by high linkage
and the existence, in most cases, of relatively strong states and parties. Mexico, Serbia, andto a
lesser extentNicaragua and Peru fall into this quadrant, as do Croatia and Slovakia. In the lower
left quadrant we have cases of high Western linkage and low incumbent capacity. In these cases,
incumbent turnover is very likely, but the domestic conditions for stable democracy are somewhat
weaker. Thus, democratic outcomes will be highly contingent on external intervention, and the
regimes that emerge are likely to be less stable (and perhaps less democratic). Albania falls into this
category, as does Haiti.

--Table 5 about here

In the upper right quadrant we have cases of low Western linkage and high incumbent
capacity. Here, the conditions for stable authoritarianism are greatest, as incumbents possess the
organizational capacity to crack down and face weaker external constraints against such
crackdowns. Malaysia and Zimbabwe fall into this category, as does contemporary Russia under
Putin. Finally, in the lower right quadrant we have cases of low Western linkage and low incumbent
capacity. These conditions are not favorable to either democracy or stable authoritarianism.
Autocratic incumbents are vulnerable to opposition challenges, but in the absence of either strong
incentives to democratize or a solid organizational foundation for democracy, incumbent turnover is
likely to usher in another autocratic government. Hence, these low-low conditions favor the
persistence of (often unstable) competitive authoritarian regimes.

Theoretical Implications

These findings suggest several implications for the literature on regime change. First,
structural variables such as international linkages and state and party strength seem to better
explain competitive authoritarian regime outcomes than do approaches that focus on elite behavior
and institutional design. Neither elite attitudes (Fish 1998; McFaul 2002) nor elite behavior (Di
Palma 1990) have much explanatory power in our cases. In Albania, Armenia, and Zambia, for
example, erstwhile democratic opposition leaders governed in an autocratic fashion after coming


39
to power. At the same time, authoritarian incumbents in Mexico, Nicaragua, Ukraine (1994), and
Zambia (1991) stepped down peacefully. Moreover, we find that in the absence of other structural
factors supporting competitive politics, the longer-term effects of democratic crafting are often quite
meager. Thus, Yeltsins relative tolerance of opposition and dissent during the early 1990s did
little to prevent Putin from assaulting the media only a few years later.

Formal institutional design, as in the case of presidentialist versus parliamentary systems,
also offers little explanatory purchase in our cases. Whereas all three of the presidentialist cases in
Latin America democratized, neither of the two parliamentary systems in the sample (Albania and
Malaysia) became fully democratic. More importantly, in countries with weak or fragile political
institutions, constitutional choices often do not lock in as is often assumed (cf. Roeder 2001).
Rather, they are frequently designed, and redesigned, by incumbents seeking to extend their power
(Easter 1997). Thus, autocratic incumbents transformed parliamentary systems into presidential
systems in Kenya and Zimbabwe, Presidents Yeltsin and Fujimori imposed hyper-presidential
constitutions after carrying out coups, and Alexander Lukashenka had little difficulty transforming
Belaruss parliamentary republic into the most autocratic presidential regime in Europe.
63


Second, our results support recent scholarship that argues that international context is
critical to explaining regime outcomes, and that, in the post-Cold War period, ties to the West
increase the prospects for democracy (Kopstein and Reilly 2000; Brinks and Coppedge 2001).
Yet also find that different types of Western influence have very different effects, which suggests that
the concept should be disaggregated. Specifically, we find that whereas Western linkagesin the
form of geographical proximity, media and NGO influence, and elite technocratic tieshave a
strong positive effect on democratization, the effects of Western leverage are weaker and less
consistent. As the Kenyan case demonstrates, Western leverage can, at critical moments, be
decisive in convincing autocratic incumbents to hold elections. However, the democratizing effect of
leverage is limited in at least two ways. First, while the holding (or not) of minimally competitive
elections is relatively easy to monitor and to enforce from the outside, it is much more difficult
monitor or enforce truly clean elections and the broad protection of civil libertiesconditions that
are necessary for a regime to be called democratic. Second, Western leverage tends to be
employed unevenly and erratically as particular countries gain and lose salience on foreign policy
agendas. Thus, international donors had a decisive impact in Kenya in late 1991 but then appeared
to lose interest in democratization for much of the rest of the decade (Throup and Hornsby 1998:
596). Hence, although leverage has been effective in particular cases at particular times, Western
linkages appear to have a broader and more consistent democratizing effect.

Third, we find that some variables that are widely believed to foster democratic stability may
also contribute to authoritarian regime stability. Elite cohesion (Higley and Gunther 1992), effective
states (ODonnell 1993; Linz and Stepan 1996), and strong parties (Mainwaring and Scully 1995)
have been all been linked persuasively to democratic stability. Yet each of these variables may also

63
Indeed, in 1990, Gorbachev created parliamentary systems in all of the soon-to-be post-Soviet republics, but almost all of
them created presidencies within a year.


40
contribute to the consolidation of authoritarian rule.
64
Strong states and parties enhance the
capacity of autocratic incumbents to maintain internal discipline, repress and co-opt opponents, put
down opposition protests, and winor stealelections.
65
And as cases such as Albania, Ukraine,
and Zambia make clear, weak states and ruling parties may leave incumbents without the tools with
which to maintain themselves in power. A major implication of this finding is that in some
competitive authoritarian regimes, the very factors that sustain competitive rule and make incumbent
turnover possible, such as fragmented elites and weak states and governing parties, may at the same
time be serious obstacles to democratization (Way 2002a). In such cases, in which competition and
turnover are largely a product of incumbent weakness, competitive authoritarianism should not be
understood as a halfway house to democracy. Another implication is that in such cases of
pluralism by default (Way 2002a), effective state and party-building, by enhancing the capacity of
incumbents to crack down on their opponents, may well lead to increased authoritarian rather than
democratization. This dynamic is clearly seen in several post-Soviet cases such as Russia under
Putin, Ukraine under Kuchma, and Belarus under Lukashenka (Way 2002b).

These findings lead us to a final, crucial point: incumbent turnover should not be conflated
with democratization. Many regimes in Africa and the former Soviet Union have experienced one
or more instances of incumbent turnover without democratizing. Indeed, turnover may be a
relatively routine outcome in non-democratic regimes. It is therefore a mistake to assume that the
replacement of an autocratic incumbent by a nominally democratic opposition constitutes a
democratic transition (or even movement in a democratic direction). Not only are such assumptions
empirically inaccurate and conceptually muddled, but they have theoretical costs as well. As this
paper has shown, the factors that lead to non-democratic incumbent turnover often differ
considerably from the factors that lead to democratization.

Conclusion

The category of mixed or hybrid political regimes remains under-developed. This paper has
taken an initial step toward conceptualizing and theorizing one type of hybrid regime: what we call
competitive authoritarianism. Drawing on a medium-n qualitative comparison, we explored the
question of why some competitive authoritarian regimes survive periods of crisis while others break
down. We further asked why some competitive authoritarian breakdowns lead to democracy while
others do not.

Several avenues for research emerge from the paper. First, there exists a clear need for
further research on the problems of building and sustaining contemporary authoritarian regimes. In
contrast to the vast literature on democratization and democratic consolidation that has emerged
over the last 15 years, little work has been done on issues of authoritarian institution-building. Our
analysis suggests that questions of state and party-building should be a primary focus of research in

64
Easter (1997) and Roeder (2001) make this point with regard to elite cohesion.
65
On parties and authoritarian capacity, see Widner (1992) and Slater (2001). On state capacity and
authoritarian, see Bellin (2002).



41
this area. It also suggests a need to further disaggregate the concept international influence, and to
better understand the varying effects of different types of international influence. Finally, the paper
highlights the utility of cross-regional comparison as a means of building and refining theories of
regime change. For example, despite initial interest in comparing transitions in East and South
(Przeworski 1991; Schmitter and Karl 1994), few scholars have undertaken systematic
comparisons of cases from post-communist Eurasia, Africa, Asia, and Latin America.
Notwithstanding important historical, cultural, and economic differences, competitive authoritarian
regimes have emerged in each of these regions. Rather than a barrier to comparison, regional
differences can provide important insights into why such regimes emerge, how they function, and
why they endure or collapse.


42
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62
Table 1: Outcome of Incumbent Crises in Selected Competitive Authoritarian Regimes


Incumbent Turnover? Democratization Non-Democratic Outcome

Yes

Nicaragua 1990
Mexico 2000
Peru 2000
Serbia 2000
Zambia 1991
Ukraine 1994
Armenia 1996-98
Albania 1997

No

Kenya 1992
Russia 1993
Malaysia 1998-99
Zimbabwe 2002



63

Table 2: Comparing Cases of Incumbent Survival


Incumbent Capacity

Opposition Capacity Western Influence
Kenya Medium

Elite cohesion: medium
Coercive capacity: high
Electoral capacity: medium
Medium-Low

Mobilizational: medium
Unity: low
Medium

Linkage: medium-low
Leverage: medium-high
Malaysia High

Elite cohesion: high
Coercive capacity: high
Electoral capacity: high
Low

Mobilizational: low
Unity: low
Low

Linkage: low
Leverage: low
Russia Low

Elite cohesion: low
Coercive capacity: low
Electoral capacity: low
Low

Mobilizational: low
Unity: low
Low

Linkage: low
Leverage: low
Zimbabwe High

Elite cohesion: med-high
Coercive capacity: high
Electoral capacity: med-high
High

Mobilizational:medium-high
Unity: high
Low

Linkage: low
Leverage: medium-low




64

Table 3: Comparing Cases of Incumbent Turnover without Democratization

Incumbent Capacity

Opposition Capacity Western Influence

Albania
(1997)
Low

Elite cohesion: Low
Coercive capacity: Low
Electoral capacity: Med
Medium

Mobilizational: Medium
Unity: Medium
High

Linkage: High
Leverage: High

Armenia
(1996-98)
Medium-High

Elite cohesion: Low
Coercive capacity: High
Electoral capacity: High
Medium-Low

Mobilizational: Low
Unity: Medium
Low

Linkage: Low
Leverage: Low

Ukraine
(1994)
Low

Elite cohesion: Low
Coercive capacity: Low
Electoral capacity: Low
Medium-Low

Mobilizational: Low
Unity: Medium
Low

Linkage: Low
Leverage: Low

Zambia
(1991)
Medium-Low

Elite cohesion: Low-Med
Coercive capacity: Low
Electoral capacity: Med
High

Mobilizational: High
Unity: High
Medium

Linkage: Low
Leverage: High






65

Table 4: Comparing Cases of Democratization


Incumbent Capacity

Opposition Capacity Western Influence
Mexico High

Elite cohesion: high
Coercive capacity: high
Electoral capacity: high
Medium

Mobilizational: high
Unity: low
High

Linkage: very high
Leverage: high
Nicaragua High

Elite cohesion: high
Coercive capacity: high
Electoral capacity: high
Medium-Low

Mobilizational: low
Unity: medium
High

Linkage: very high
Leverage: very high
Peru Medium-High

Elite cohesion: medium-high
Coercive capacity: high
Electoral capacity: low
Medium-Low

Mobilizational: low
Unity: medium
High

Linkage: high
Leverage: medium-high
Serbia High

Elite cohesion: high
Coercive capacity: med-high
Electoral capacity: high
Medium-High

Mobilizational: high
Unity: medium
High

Linkage: high
Leverage: medium-high



66
Table 5: Four Clusters of Regime Outcomes

High Western Linkage Low Western Linkage

High Incumbent
Capacity


Democratization


Mexico, Nicaragua, Peru, Serbia

Incumbent Survival/
Regime Stability

Malaysia, Zimbabwe

Low Incumbent
Capacity


Unstable, Contingent
Democratization

Albania

Turnover without
Democratization

Ukraine, Zambia





41