Constitutional Law I

II.
THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS

Art. IX, A, Sec. 1
Section 1. The Constitutional Commissions, which shall be independent, are the Civil Service
Commission, the Commission on Elections, and the Commission on Audit.

(Independent) Constitutional Commissions
Civil Service Commission
Commission on Elections
Commission on Audit

A. Civil Service Commission
1. Composition & Qualifications of Commissioners

Art. IX, B, Sec. 1
Section 1. (1) The civil service shall be administered by the Civil Service Commission composed of a
Chairman and two Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time
of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, with proven capacity for public administration,
and must not have been candidates for any elective position in the elections immediately preceding their
appointment.
(2) The Chairman and the Commissioners shall be appointed by the President with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years without reappointment. Of those first appointed,
the Chairman shall hold office for seven years, a Commissioner for five years, and another Commissioner
for three years, without reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired term
of the predecessor. In no case shall any Member be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting
capacity.

shall administer the civil service
Composition
Chairman
two Commissioners
Qualifications
natural-born
35 years of age
with proven capacity for public administration
not have been candidates for any elective position in the elections immediately preceding
their appointment

Art. VII, Sec. 13
Section 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants
shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their
tenure. They shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly, practice any other profession, participate
in any business, or be financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege
granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-
owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the
conduct of their office.
The spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth civil degree of the President shall
not, during his tenure, be appointed as Members of the Constitutional Commissions, or the Office of the
Ombudsman, or as Secretaries, Undersecretaries, chairmen or heads of bureaus or offices, including
government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries.

Gaminde vs. Commission on Audit, 347 SCRA 655 (YESHA)
Thelma Gaminde vs Commission on Audit
December 13, 2000

FACTS
- The Case: Special civil action of certiorari seeking to annul and set aside two decisions of the
Commission on Audit (COA)
- On June 11, 1993, Petitioner Thelma P. Gaminde was appointed as ad interim Commissioner of the Civil
Service Commission (CSC) by then Pres. Ramos for a term expiring Feb. 2, 1999. She assumed office after
taking her oath and her appointment was confirmed by Congress.
- Before the end of her term, or on Feb. 24, 1998, petitioner sought clarification from the Office of the
Pres. as to the expiry date of her term of office. In reply, the Chief Presidential Legal Counsel (now
Associate Justice) Corona, in a letter, opined that petitioners term would expire on Feb. 2, 2000 not on
Feb. 2, 1999. She thus remained in office after Feb. 02, 1999, relying on the said advisory opinion.
- On Feb. 04, 1999, CSC Chairman Alma De Leon, requested opinion from the COA on whether petitioner
and her co-terminous staff should continue to be paid their salaries notwithstanding the fact that
their appointment had already expired. COA General Counsel issued an opinion that the petitioners
appointment had indeed expired.
- CSC Resident Auditor issued a notice disallowing in audit the salaries and emoluments pertaining
to petitioner and her staff, a decision which petitioner appealed to the COA en banc. The appeal was
dismissed, COA affirmed the disallowance, and held that the issue of petitioners term of office may be
addressed by mere reference to her appointment paper which had Feb. 02, 1999 as expiration date. COA
also stated that the Commission is bereft of power to recognize an extension of her term, not even with the
implied acquiescence of the Office of the President. Petitioner moved for reconsideration, she was again
denied; hence this petition.

ISSUE
WON petitioner Atty. Gamindes term of office, as CSCommissioner, expired on Feb. 2, 1999 or on Feb. 2,
2000

HELD
It expired on Feb. 2, 1999. For Commissioners (5 year term) the count is:
Feb.02, 1987---Feb.02, 1992---Feb.02, 1999---Feb.02, 2006

Ratio The appropriate starting point of the terms of office of the first appointees to the Constitutional
Commissions under the 1987 Constitution must be on Feb. 02, 1987, the date of the adoption of the 1987
Constitution in order to maintain the regular interval of vacancy every 2 years consistent in the previous
appointment intervals.

Reasoning
- The term of office of the Chairman and members of the Civil Service Commission is prescribed in the
1987 Constitution under Art IX-B Sec. 1(2). The 1973 Constitution introduced the first system of a regular
rotation or cycle in the membership of the CSC (Art. XII Sec. 1(1), 1973 Consti). It was a copy of the
Constitutional prescription in the amended 1935 Constitution of a rotational system for the appointment
of the Chairman and members of the Commission on Elections (Art. X Sec. 1, 1935 Consti, as amended).
- In Republic v Imperial, it was said that the operation of the rotational plan requires two conditions: (1)
that the terms of the first (3) Commissioners should start on a common date, and, (2) that any vacancy
due to death, resignation or disability before the expiration of the term should only be filled only for the
unexpired balance of the term.
- Consequently, the terms of the first Chairman and Commissioners of the Constitutional Commissions
under the 1987 Constitution must start on a common date, irrespective of the variations in the dates of
appointments and qualifications of the appointees, in order that the expirations of the first terms of 7,
5 and 3 years should lead to the regular recurrence of the 2-year interval between the expiration of the
terms.
- In the law of public officers, term of office is distinguished from tenure of the incumbent. The term
means the time during which the officer may claim to hold office as of right, and fixes the interval after
which the several incumbents shall succeed one another. The tenure represents the term during which the
incumbent actually holds the office. The term of office is not affected by the hold-over. The tenure may be
shorter than the term for reasons within or beyond the power of the incumbent.
- Although Art. XVIII Sec. 15 provides that incumbent members of the Constitutional Commissions shall
continue in office for one year after the ratification of this Constitution, unless they are sooner removed
for cause or become incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office or appointed to a new term,
what it contemplates is tenure not term. The term unless imports an exception to the general rule.
Clearly, the transitory provisions mean that the incumbent members of the Consti Commissions shall
continue for 1 year after ratification of the Consti under their existing appointments at the discretion
of the appointing power who may cut short their tenure by reasons the reasons stated therein. However,
they do not affect the term of office fixed in Art. IX, providing for a 7-5-3 yr rotational interval for the 1st
appointees.
Decision Term of office expired on Feb. 2, 1999. However, petitioner served as de facto officer in good
faith until Feb. 2, 2000 and thus entitled to receive her salary and other emoluments for actual service
rendered. COA decision disallowing salaries/emoluments is reversed.
Voting 10 Concur, Bellosillo No part., Related to one of the parties, Puno, concur (In the result), De
Leon, Jr., Concurring and Dissenting opinion
Mendoza, Joins De Leons dissent

SEPARATE OPINION

DE LEON [concur and dissent]

Dissents:
-the term of petitioner expired on Feb. 2, 2000 not on Feb. 2, 1999 as explained in ponencia.
-the term of the first set of CSCommissioners appointed under the 1987 Constitution commenced on the
Feb. 2, 1988 not on the date of its ratification on Feb. 2, 1987.
Concurs:
-that the salaries and emoluments which petitioner as CSCommissioner received after Feb. 2, 1999 should
not be disallowed by COA.

2. Appointment & Term of Office

Art. IX, B, Sec. 1
Section 1. (1) The civil service shall be administered by the Civil Service Commission composed of a
Chairman and two Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time
of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, with proven capacity for public administration,
and must not have been candidates for any elective position in the elections immediately preceding their
appointment.
(2) The Chairman and the Commissioners shall be appointed by the President with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years without reappointment. Of those first appointed,
the Chairman shall hold office for seven years, a Commissioner for five years, and another Commissioner
for three years, without reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired term
of the predecessor. In no case shall any Member be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting
capacity.

Appointment
by the President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments
No temporary or acting capacity
Term
Chairman: 7 years without reappointment
One Commissioner: 5 years without reappointment
Another Commissioner: 3 years without reappointment

3. Appointment of Personnel of Constitutional Commissions

Art. IX, A, Sec. 4
Section 4. The Constitutional Commissions shall appoint their officials and employees in accordance
with law.

De Guzman vs. Commission on Elections, 336 SCRA 188 (THERESE)
FACTS:

-RA 8189 (The Voters Registration Act of 1996) was enacted by President Fidel V. Ramos on June
10, 1996.
-The petitioners in this case assail the validity of Section 44 of the said Act, which provides:

"SEC. 44. Reassignment of Election Officers. - No Election Officer shall hold office in a particular city
or municipality for more than four (4) years. Any election officer who, either at the time of
the approval of this Act or subsequent thereto, has served for at least four (4) years in a
particular city or municipality shall automatically be reassigned by the Commission to a
new station outside the original congressional district."

-By virtue of the aforequoted provision of law, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) promulgated
two resolutions for its implementation, as well as several directives reassigning the petitioners (who are
either City or Municipal Election officers) to different stations.

Issue: Whether or not Section 44 of RA 8189 is unconstitutional

Held: NO. Petition dismissed.

Ratio: According to the petitioners, Section 44:
a. violates the equal protection clause
-Petitioners maintain that there is no substantial distinction between them (City and Municipal Election
Officers) and other COMELEC officials. However, the equal protection clause of the Constitution
permits a valid classification. In this case, the singling out of election officers is done in order to ensure
the impartiality of election officials by preventing them from developing familiarity with the people of
their place assignment.

b. infringes on their security of tenure and unduly deprive them of due process of law
-The guarantee of security of tenure under the Constitution is not a guarantee of perpetual employment.
It only means that an employee cannot be dismissed (or transferred) from the service for causes other
than those provided by law and after due process is accorded the employee. What it seeks to prevent
is capricious exercise of the power to dismiss. But, where it is the law-making authority itself which
furnishes the ground for the transfer of a class of employees, no such capriciousness can be raised for so
long as the remedy proposed to cure a perceived evil is germane to the purposes of the law.

c. undermines the authority of the COMELEC to appoint its own officials and employees
(IMPORTANT)

-As stressed upon by the Solicitor General, Section 44 establishes a guideline for the
COMELEC to follow.

-Said section provides the criterion or basis for the reassignment or transfer of an election
officer and does not deprive the COMELEC of its power to appoint, and maintain its
authority over its officials and employees. As a matter of fact, the questioned COMELEC
resolutions and directives illustrate that it is still the COMELEC which has the power to
reassign and transfer its officials and employees. But as a government agency tasked with
the implementation and enforcement of election laws, the COMELEC is duty bound to
comply with the laws passed by Congress.

-The independence of the COMELEC is not at issue here. There is no impairment or
emasculation of its power to appoint its own officials and employees. In fact, Section
44 even strengthens the COMELECs power of appointment, as the power to reassign or
transfer is within its exclusive jurisdiction and domain.

4. Salary

Art. XVIII, Sec. 17
Section 17. Until the Congress provides otherwise, the President shall receive an annual salary of three
hundred thousand pesos; the Vice-President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, and the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, two hundred forty thousand pesos each;
the Senators, the Members of the House of Representatives, the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court,
and the Chairmen of the Constitutional Commissions, two hundred four thousand pesos each; and the
Members of the Constitutional Commissions, one hundred eighty thousand pesos each.

Art. IX, A, Sec. 3
Section. 3. The salary of the Chairman and the Commissioners shall be fixed by law and shall not be
decreased during their tenure.

5. Disqualification

Art. IX, A, Sec. 2
Section 2. No member of a Constitutional Commission shall, during his tenure, hold any other office
or employment. Neither shall he engage in the practice of any profession or in the active management or
control of any business which, in any way, may be affected by the functions of his office, nor shall he be
financially interested, directly or indirectly, in any contract with, or in any franchise or privilege granted
by the Government, any of its subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities, including government-owned
or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.

6. Impeachment

Art. XI, Sec. 2
Section 2. The President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme Court, the Members of the
Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from office on impeachment for, and
conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high
crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All other public officers and employees may be removed from office as
provided by law, but not by impeachment.

7. Functions of the CSC

Art. IX, B, Sec. 3
Section 3. The Civil Service Commission, as the central personnel agency of the Government, shall
establish a career service and adopt measures to promote morale, efficiency, integrity, responsiveness,
progressiveness, and courtesy in the civil service. It shall strengthen the merit and rewards system,
integrate all human resources development programs for all levels and ranks, and institutionalize a
management climate conducive to public accountability. It shall submit to the President and the Congress
an annual report on its personnel programs.

Art. IX, A, Sec. 7- 8
Section 7. Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its Members, any case or matter
brought before it within sixty days from the date of its submission for decision or resolution. A case
or matter is deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, or
memorandum required by the rules of the Commission or by the Commission itself. Unless otherwise
provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought
to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy
thereof.
Section 8. Each Commission shall perform such other functions as may be provided by law.

Lazo vs. CSC, GR No. 108824, September 14, 1994 (ZION)
DENNIS LAZO vs Civil Service Commission
En Banc; September 14, 1994
Mendoza

Lazo vs CSC
Facts:
1. November 11, 1988: CSC received a letter from a certain Efren L. Pagurayan, reporting that
petitioner Dennis C. Lazo had boasted to him that he had bought his career service (subprofessional)
eligibility from the Civil Service Commission for P7,000.00, P4,500.00 of which had been paid to the
examiner and computer programmers in the Manila Office, and P2,500.00 to the Regional Office at
Tuguegarao.
2. December 18, 19898: CSC ordered investigation.
3. July 30, 1990: Regional Office assigned to investigate recommended dismissal of the case for
having found that Dennis Lazo was a fictitious character, also no witness to corroborate allegation.
4. Not satisfied, the CSC ordered further investigation of the matter. Rechecked of the exam sheets
revealed that Lazos score was 34.48% and not 76.46% as indicated in his certificate of eligibility.
5. July 24, 1991: Regional Office dismissed the administrative case for lack of evidence. July 2, 1992
it revoked his eligibility for being null and void but still dismissed the case
6. Lazo asked for reconsideration alleging that he was denied due process and lack of evidence. CSC
denied reconsideration. Appealed to the SC alleging the same grounds for reconsideration in CSC.
Issue: WON CSC erred when it revoked petitioners eligibility.
Held and Ratio: Dismissed.
1. Under the Constitution, the Civil Service Commission is the central personnel agency of the
government charged with the duty of determining questions of qualifications of merit and fitness of those
appointed to the civil service. Its power to issue a certificate of eligibility carries with it the power to
revoke a certificate for being null and void.
2. As a general proposition, in the context of this case, which simply involves the rechecking of
examination papers and nothing more than a reevaluation of documents already in the records of the CSC
according to a standard answer key previously set by it, notice and hearing was not required. The question
before the CSC did not require any evidentiary hearing. Instead, what applied was the rule of res ipsa
loquitur. 2 Petitioner could have examined the rechecking of his examination papers and, if he found
anything wrong, he could have asked for reconsideration. But, while he filed one in this case, he did not
show that his score was really 76.46%

8. Scope of the Civil Service

Art. IX, B, Sec. 2
Section 2. (1) The civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of
the Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters.
(2) Appointments in the civil service shall be made only according to merit and fitness to be determined,
as far as practicable, and, except to positions which are policy-determining, primarily confidential, or
highly technical, by competitive examination.
(3) No officer or employee of the civil service shall be removed or suspended except for cause provided by
law.
(4) No officer or employee in the civil service shall engage, directly or indirectly, in any electioneering or
partisan political campaign.
(5) The right to self-organization shall not be denied to government employees.
(6) Temporary employees of the Government shall be given such protection as may be provided by law.

Art. XII, Sec. 16
Section 16. The Congress shall not, except by general law, provide for the formation, organization, or
regulation of private corporations. Government-owned or controlled corporations may be created or
established by special charters in the interest of the common good and subject to the test of economic
viability.

National Service Corp. vs. NLRC, 168 SCRA 122 (1988) (FROI)
FACTS:
Respondent Eugenia Credo was an employee (first as security guard, now as chief of property
and records) of petitioner NASECO
Credo was placed under forced leave for failure to follow memorandum of managers
memorandum on companys Statement of Billings Adjustment
While on forced leave, Credo filed a case against NASECO with Labor Arbiter
While on forced leave, NASECOs Committee of Personal Affairs had a meeting wherein
they found out that Credo had offenses (all her offenses involved being rude and sarcastic
in front of customers and superior officers) before and recommended Credos termination
with no benefits
After forced leave, Credo had a meeting with the boss informing her that there were certain
charges against her, asked her to explain her side - she wasnt able to explain so she got fired
Credo filed supplemental complaint for illegal dismissal with Labor Arbiter
Labor Arbiter: dismissed Credos complaint; ordered NASECO to pay Credo separation pay
NLRC: directing NASECO to reinstate Credo to her former position, or substantially equivalent
position, with six (6) months' backwages and without loss of seniority rights and other privileges
appertaining thereto, and; dismissing Credo's claim for attorney's fees, moral and exemplary
damages.
NASECO: NLRC has no juridisction over NASECO - NASECO is a subsidiary of the National
Investment and Development Corporation (NIDC), a subsidiary wholly owned by the Philippine
National Bank (PNB), which in turn is a government owned corporation
ISSUE: Whether or not the Civil Service Law applies to tertiary corporations
HELD/RATIO: YES - NLRC has jurisdiction over such corporations: the Constitution [Art. IX-
B, Sec. 2(l)] defines the Civil Service as only those government-owned or controlled corporations with
original charters i.e. created by law, by an act of Congress, or by special law AND NOT formed under the
General Corporation Code.
taken from records of the Constitutional Commission
NASECO is a government owned and controlled corporation WITHOUT original charter -
NLRC and Labor Code applies, not Civil Service Law

Tupas vs. NHA, 173 SCRA 33 (KAT)

F: Respondent NHA is a corporation organized in 1959 under the Uniform Charter of Government
Corporations. Its shares of stock have been 100% owned by the Government from its incorporation.
Petitioner TUPAS is a legitimate labor organization with a chapter in NHA. TUPAS filed a petition for
certification election with DOLE. It was denied.

HELD: The civil service now covers only govt owned or controlled corporations w/ original
or legislative charters, that is those created by an act of Congress of by special law, and not
those incorporated under and pursuant to a general legislation.
xxx
There is, therefore, no impediment to the holding of a certification election among the workers of NHC for
it is clear that they are covered by the Labor Code, the NHA being a govt owned and/ or controlled corp.
w/o an original charter.

*Alliance of Govt Workers vs. Minister of Labor and Employment, 124 SCRA 1 (1983)
(KARL)

F: Petitioner is a federation of unions in govt-owned corps. and in govt schools. It petitioned the SC for a ruling
that PD 851, requiring "all employers... to pay their employees receiving a basic salary of not more than P1,000 a
month... a 13th month pay," applies to govt employees

HELD: NO. It is an old rule of statutory construction that restrictive statutes and acts w/c impose burdens on the
public treasury or w/c diminish rights and interests, no matter how broad their terms do not embrace the Sovereign,
unless the Sovereign is specifically mentioned. The Republic of the Phil. as a sovereign cannot be covered by a
general term like "employer" unless the language used in the law is clear and specific to that effect.

ISSUE 2: May government employees act through a labor federation which uses the collective bargaining power to
secure increased compensation for its members?

HELD: NO. The terms and conditions of employment in the Government including any political subdivision or
instrumentality thereof are governed by law. And this is effected through statutes or administrative circulars, rules
and regulations and not through Collective Bargaining agreements.
Under the present constitution, (1973), GOCC's are now part of the civil service, thus, not allowed to use concerted
activities to get other benefits or higher salaries different from that provided by law and regulation

*National Housing Corp. vs. Juco, 134 SCRA 172 (1985) (YESHA)

National Housing Corp. v. Juco, 134 SCRA 172 (1985)
F: Juco was an employee of the NHA. He filed a complaint for illegal dismissal w/ MOLE but his case was
dismissed by the labor arbiter on the ground that the NHA is a govt owned corp. and jurisdiction over its
employees is vested in the CSC. On appeal, the NLRC reversed the decision and remanded the case to the
labor arbiter for further proceedings. NHA in turn appealed to the SC.

ISSUE: Are employees of the National Housing Corporation, a GOCC without original charter, covered by
the Labor Code or by laws and regulations governing the civil service?

HELD: Sec. 11, Art XIIB of the Constitution specifically provides: "The Civil Service embraces every
branch, agency, subdivision and instrumentality of the Government, including every government owned
and controlled corporation.
The inclusion of GOCC within the embrace of the civil service shows a deliberate effort at the framers
to plug an earlier loophole which allowed GOCC to avoid the full consequences of the civil service system.
All offices and firms of the government are covered.
This consti provision has been implemented by statute PD 807 is unequivocal that personnel of GOCC
belong to the civil service and subject to civil service requirements.
"Every" means each one of a group, without exception. This case refers to a GOCC. It does not cover
cases involving private firms taken over by the government in foreclosure or similar proceedings.
xxx
For purposes of coverage in the Civil Service, employees of govt owned or controlled corps. whether
created by special law or formed as subsidiaries are covered by the Civil Service Law, not the Labor Code,
and the fact that pvt. corps. owned or controlled by the govt may be created by special charter does not
mean that such corps. not created by special law are not covered by the Civil Service.
xxx
The infirmity of the resp's position lies in its permitting the circumvention or emasculation of Sec. 1,
Art. XIIB [now Art IX, B, Sec. 2 (1)] of the Consti. It would be possible for a regular ministry of govt to
create a host of subsidiary corps. under the Corp. Code funded by a willing legislature. A govt owned corp.
could create several subsidiary corps. These subsidiary corps. would enjoy the best of two worlds. Their
officials and employees would be privileged individuals, free from the strict accountability required by the
Civil Service Dec. and the regulations of the COA. Their incomes would not be subject to the competitive
restraint in the open market nor to the terms and conditions of civil service employment. Conceivably, all
govt owned or controlled corps. could be created, no longer by special charters, but through incorp. under
the general law. The Constitutional amendment including such corps. in the embrace of the civil service
would cease to have application. Certainly, such a situation cannot be allowed.

University of the Philippines vs. Regino, 221 SCRA 598 (THERESE)

G.R. No. 88167 May 3, 1993
UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES and UP SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS, petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. TEODORO P. REGINO, Presiding Judge, RTC, Br. 84 NATIONAL CAPITAL
REGION, Q.C., ANGEL PAMPLINA, and The CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, respondents.
The Solicitor General for petitioner.
Araullo, Zambrano, Gruba, Chua Law Firm for private respondent.
Facts: Respondent Angel Pamplina, a mimeograph operator at the University of the Philippines
School of Economics, was dismissed on June 22, 1982 after he was found guilty of dishonesty and grave
misconduct for causing the leakage of the final examination questions in Economics 106 under Prof.
Solita Monsod.
The UP Board of Regents denied his appeal, so he sought relief from the Merit Systems Board created
under PD 1409. Under Section 5(l) thereof, the MSB has the power to "hear and decide administrative
cases involving officers and employees of the civil service."
UP filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction where it held that administrative matters involving the
discipline of UP employees fall under the jurisdiction of the UP Board of Regents (UP vs CA).
The motion was denied. MSB exonerated Pamplina and ordered his reinstatement.
UP then appealed to the Civil Service Commission, which on November 4, 1987, issued Resolution No. 87-
428, sustaining the MSB. 4 The motion for reconsideration was denied on April 13, 1988.
On June 10, 1988, the petitioners filed a second motion for reconsideration. This was also denied on
August 31, 1988, on the basis of Section 39(b) of PD 807, providing in part that "only one petition for
reconsideration shall be entertained" by the Civil Service Commission.
Pamplina filed a "Manifestation and Motion for Execution of Judgment" of the Commission, copy of
which was received by the Office of the Solicitor General on October 4, 1988. 5 This was opposed by the
petitioners, but in an order dated November 7, 1988, the Commission granted the motion. Nevertheless,
Pamplina was still not reinstated. UP claimed that the resolutions of the Commission had not yet become
final and executory.
Pamplina's reaction was to file a petition for a writ of mandamus on November 11, 1988. Judge Teodoro
P. Regino of the RTC of Quezon City granted the petition on April 27, 1989. The respondents (herein
petitioners) were ordered to immediately reinstate Pamplina.
On June 19, 1989, the present petition for certiorari was filed with this Court to seek the annulment of the
decision of the trial court.
Issue:
a. Whether or not the UP Board of Regents has the sole authority to discipline its employees
b. Whether or not UPs petition for certiorari was filed on time
Held: No. Petition dismissed.
Ratio:
a. UP contends that under its charter, Act 1870, it enjoys not only academic freedom but also institutional
autonomy. Section 6(e) of the said Act grants the UP Board of Regents the power "to appoint, on
recommendation of the president of the university, professors, instructors, lecturers, and other employees
of the university, to fix their compensation and to remove them for cause after an investigation and
hearing shall have been had." Pamplina was dismissed by virtue of this provision.
However, the Civil Service Law (PD 807) expressly vests in the Commission appellate jurisdiction in
administrative disciplinary cases involving members of the Civil Service. Section 9(j) mandates that the
Commission shall have the power to "hear and decide administrative disciplinary cases instituted directly
with it in accordance with Section 37 or brought to it on appeal." And Section 37(a), provides that, "The
Commission shall decide upon appeal all administrative disciplinary cases involving the imposititon of
a penalty of suspension for more than thirty (30) days, or fine in an amount exceeding thirty days' salary,
demotion in rank or salary or transfer, removal or dismissal from office." (Emphasis supplied)
Under the 1972 Constitution, all government-owned or controlled corporations, regardless of the
manner of their creation, were considered part of the Civil Service. 7 Under the 1987 Constitution only
government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters fall within the scope of the Civil
Service pursuant to Article IX-B, Section 2(l).
As a mere government-owned or controlled corporation, UP was clearly a part of the Civil Service
under the 1973 Constitution and now continues to be so because it was created by a special law and
has an original charter. As a component of the Civil Service, UP is therefore governed by PD 807 and
administrative cases involving the discipline of its employees come under the appellate jurisdiction of the
Civil Service Commission.
b. Petitioners received a copy of the resolution denying their motion for reconsideration on April 22, 1968.
In Article IX-A, Section 7, of the 1987 Constitution,it is provided that:
. . . Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision, order or ruling of each
Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days
from receipt of a copy thereof.
The petitioners therefore had thirty days from April 22, 1988, or until May 22, 1988, within which to
elevate their case to this Court. They did not do so and instead filed a second motion for reconsideration,
which was not allowed under Article IX, Section 39(b) of PD 807. On top of this, the second motion for
reconsideration was filed only on June 10, 1988, or 19 days beyond the 30-day reglementary period.

CSC vs. Sojor, 554 SCRA 160 (2008) (ZION)

PNOC-EDC vs. Leogardo, 175 SCRA 26 (FROI)
Philippine National Oil Company - Energy Development Corp v. Vicente Leogardo, Deputy
Minister of Labor
Facts:
Petitoner PNOC-EDC is a subsidiary of PNOC organized under the General Corporation Code
Petitioner filed with Ministry of Labor and Employment for clearance application for dismissal of
Vicente Ellelina, a contractual employee
Petitioner wants Ellelina fired because the latter allegedly committed a crime (alarm or public
scandal): during company XMAS party, because of the refusal of the raffle committee to give
him the prize corresponding to his lost winning ticket, he tried to grab the armalite rifle of the
Philippine Constabulary Officer outside the building despite the warning shots fired by the latter.
Clearance was initially granted but was reversed by Respondent Vicente Leogardo
Issues:
1. Whether or not Petitioner is covered by the Civil Service Law
2. Whether or not Ellelinas dismissal was justified
Held/Ratio:
1. NO. Court affirms ruling in NASECO v. NLRC - only those government owned and controlled
corporations with original charters are covered by Civil Service
a. the test in determining whether a government-owned or controlled
corporation is subject to the Civil Service Law is the manner of its creation
such that government corporations created by special charter are subject to
its provisions while those incorporated under the general Corporation Law
are not within its coverage.
2. NO. The dismissal ordered by petitioner was a bit too harsh considering the nature of the act
which he had committed and that it was his first offense.

Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System vs. Hernandez, 143 SCRA 602 (KAT)

Facts
Several contractual employees of the MWSS filed a complaint before the NLRC for willful failure to
pay their wage differentials, allowances, and other monetary benefits.
The defense of MWSS was that it was a GOCC, and therefore the NLRC had no jurisdiction over the
case.
Nevertheless, the Labor-Arbiter rendered a decision against MWSS citing that only regular
employees are NOT within the NLRC jurisdiction. Since the petitioners were contractual employees, they
are still within NLRC jurisdiction. The L-A also stated that the Civil Service Decree applies to employees
in government corporation in all matters, except monetary claims, which is a case governed by the Labor
Code. Since this is a money case, the NLRC still had jurisdiction.
MWSS filed an certiorari to the SC

ISSUE: Are employees of the MWSS covered by the Labor Code or the Civil Service laws?

SC:
The character of the MWSS as a government-owned or controlled corporation is not contested; it is,
in any case, a proposition that cannot be gainsaid. Republic Act No. 6234 created it as a "government
corporation to be known as the Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System."
MWSS is a GOCC created under RA 6234. Employment in the MWSS is governed NOT BY THE LABOR
CODE, but by civil service law rules and regulations. Thus, controversies arising from or connected with
that employement are NOT RECOGNIZABLE BY THE NLRC.

The contention of the L-A that only regular employees are not covered by NLRC, and that non-regular or
contractual employees are still covered by NLRC, is sophistical. There is no legal or logical justification
for such a distinction. Indeed it is ruled out by the fact that positions in the civil service are classified into
career and non-career. (not by regular or contractual).

The other contention of the L-A that monetary claims are still governed by the NLRC/ Labor Code, is even
more patently illogical, and deserves no confutation. (confutation!?!)

RECAP:
1. The MWSS is a GOCC and employment is governed by the CSL, not the Labor Code
2. Both regular and contractual employees are covered. There is no distinction.
3. NLRC has no jurisdiction over money claims of contractual employees of GOCCs. They are still
governed by the CSL, not the Labor Code.

Quimpo v. Tanodbayan, 146 SCRA 137 (KARL)

Quimpo v. Tanodbayan, 146 SCRA 137 -- Tanodbayan Has Jurisdiction over all Government Owned Firms
Regardless of How Organized.

F: F. Quimpo filed a complaint w/ the Tanodbayan (TB) charging G. Dimaano and D. Remo, manager and
analyst of Petrophil, w/ viol. of RA 3019 for their refusal to pay Quimpo's fees as surveyor. The TB dismissed the
complaint, however, on the ground that his jurisdiction extended only to govt owned corps. organized under a
special law. Petrophil is a corp. organized under the Gen. Corp. Code; it was acquired by the govt to carry out its
oil and gasoline programs. Quimpo filed a petition for certiorari, questioning the decision of the TB. The new TB
confessed judgment.

ISSUE: WON PETROPHIL is a government owned or controlled corporation whose employees fall within the
jurisdictional purview of the Tanodbayan for purposes of the Anti-graft and Corrupt Practices Act?

HELD: YES. Uphold the Tanodbayan jurisdiction. While it may be that PETROPHIL was not originally "created"
as a GOCC, PETROPHIL became a subsidiary of PNOC and thus shed-off its private status. It is now funded and
owned by the government as in fact, it was acquired to perform functions related to governmental programs and
policies on oil. It was acquired not temporarily but as a permanent adjunct to perform essential government related
functions

a. Terms & Conditions of Employment in the Civil Service

i. Oath of Allegiance to the Constitution

Art. IX, B, Sec. 4
Section 4. All public officers and employees shall take an oath or affirmation to uphold and defend this
Constitution.

Art. XI, Sec. 18
Section 18. Public officers and employees owe the State and this Constitution allegiance at all times and
any public officer or employee who seeks to change his citizenship or acquire the status of an immigrant of
another country during his tenure shall be dealt with by law.

b. Merit System

ii. Appointment of Defeated Candidates

Art. IX, B, Sec. 6
Section 6. No candidate who has lost in any election shall, within one year after such election, be
appointed to any office in the Government or any Government-owned or controlled corporations or in any
of their subsidiaries.

People vs. Sandiganbayan, 559 SCRA 449 (2008) (YESHA)
People of the Philippines vs The Sandiganbayan & Alejandro Villapando
July 23, 2008

Facts:
During the May 11, 1998 elections, Villapando ran for Municipal Mayor of San Vicente, Palawan. Orlando
M. Tiape (now deceased), a relative of Villapando's wife, ran for Municipal Mayor of Kitcharao, Agusan
del Norte. Villapando won while Tiape lost. Thereafter, on July 1, 1998, Villapando designated Tiape as
Municipal Administrator of the Municipality of San Vicente, Palawan. A Contract of Consultancy dated
February 8, 1999 was executed between the Municipality of San Vicente, Palawan and Tiape whereby
the former employed the services of Tiape as Municipal Administrative and Development Planning
Consultant in the Office of the Municipal Mayor for a period of six months from January 1, 1999 to June
30, 1999.

Solomon B. Maagad and Renato M. Fernandez filed a complaint, and an information charging the two
with violation of Article 244 of the Revised Penal Code [unlawful appointment] was filed before the
Sandiganbayan, where Villapando was acquitted.

The Sandiganbayan explained that temporary prohibition is not synonymous with absence or lack of legal
qualification. In ascertaining the legal qualifications of a particular appointee to a public office, "there
must be a law providing for the qualifications of a person to be nominated or appointed" therein. A person
who possessed the required legal qualifications (example - educational attainment, civil service eligibility
or experience) for a position may be temporarily disqualified for appointment to a public position by
reason of the one year prohibition imposed on losing candidates. Upon the other hand, one may not
be temporarily disqualified for appointment, but could not be appointed as he lacked any or all of the
required legal qualifications imposed by law. In this case, the prosecution did not allege, much less prove
that the Mayors appointee lacked any of the qualifications imposed by law on the position of Municipal
Administrator. The Sandiganbyan held that it was a valid appointment.

Hence, this petition by the Office of the Ombudsman, through the Office of the Special Prosecutor,
representing the People of the Philippines

Issue: WoN Villapando is guilty of unlawful appointment

Held: It seems so [court did not categorically say so], but case is remanded to the Sandiganbayan for
further proceedings

Ratio:

The Sandiganbayan in disregarding basic rules of statutory construction, acted with grave abuse of
discretion. Hence, its decision granting Villapando's Demurrer to Evidence and acquitting the latter [due
to its interpretation of legal disqualification] is declared null and void.

Legal disqualification cannot be read as excluding temporary disqualification in order to exempt
therefrom the legal prohibitions under Section 6, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution and Section 94(b)
of the Local Government Code of 1991. Both expressly prohibits losing candidates within one year after
such election to be appointed to any office in the government or any government-owned or controlled
corporations or in any of their subsidiaries.

iii. Ban on Holding Multiple Positions

Art. IX, B, Sec. 7
Section 7. No elective official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity to any
public office or position during his tenure.
Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall
hold any other office or employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality
thereof, including Government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.

Art. VII, Sec. 13
Section 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants
shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their
tenure. They shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly, practice any other profession, participate
in any business, or be financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege
granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-
owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the
conduct of their office.cralaw
The spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth civil degree of the President shall
not, during his tenure, be appointed as Members of the Constitutional Commissions, or the Office of the
Ombudsman, or as Secretaries, Undersecretaries, chairmen or heads of bureaus or offices, including
government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries.c

Art. VI, Sec. 13
Section 13. No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may hold any other office or
employment in the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries, during his term without forfeiting his
seat. Neither shall he be appointed to any office which may have been created or the emoluments thereof
increased during the term for which he was elected.c

Art. VIII, Secs. 8 (1) (3) and 12
Section 8. (1) A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the Supreme Court
composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a representative of
the Congress as ex officio Members, a representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired
Member of the Supreme Court, and a representative of the private sector.
(3) The Clerk of the Supreme Court shall be the Secretary ex officio of the Council and shall keep a record
of its proceedings.
Section 12. The Members of the Supreme Court and of other courts established by law shall not be
designated to any agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative functions.

Debulgado vs. Civil Service Commission, 237 SCRA 184 (THERESE)

G.R. No. 111471 September 26, 1994
CITY MAYOR ROGELIO R. DEBULGADO and VICTORIA T. DEBULGADO, petitioners,
vs.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, respondent.
FELICIANO, J.:
Facts: Petitioner Rogelio R. Debulgado is the incumbent Mayor of the City of San Carlos, Negros
Occidental.

October 1, 1992: Petitioner mayor appointed his wife, Victoria Debulgado, as head of the Office of
General Services of the City Government of San Carlos.

Petitioner Victoria was one of three (3) employees of the City Government who were considered for the
position of General Services Officer. Before her promotion in 1992, she had been in the service of the
City Government for about thirty-two (32) years. She joined the City Government on 3 January 1961 as
Assistant License Clerk.

October 1, 1992: petitioner Victoria assumed the new post, and commenced discharging the functions, of
General Services Officer of San Carlos City and receiving the regular salary attached to that position.

December 16, 1992: Public respondent Civil Service Commission = received a letter from Congressman
Tranquilino B. Carmona of the First District of Negros Occidental, calling attention to the promotional
appointment issued by petitioner Mayor in favor of his wife.

The Commission directed its Regional Office No. 6-Iloilo City to submit a report on the appointment of
petitioner Victoria.

Thereafter the Commission recalled the approval issued by Director Purita Escobia of the CSC Field Office
of Bacolod and disapproved the promotion of Victoria.

Petitioners moved for reconsideration, contending that the statutory prohibition against nepotism was
not applicable to the appointment of Victoria as General Services Officer. Petitioners also asserted that
the Commission had deprived petitioner Victoria of her right to due process by unilaterally revoking her
appointment.

Petitioner Mayor denies that he had been motivated by personal reasons when he appointed his wife
to the new post. He states that his wife was the most qualified among the candidates for appointment
to that position, she having worked for the City Government for thirty-two (32) years and being highly
recommended by the OIC-Treasurer of San Carlos City.

The basic contention of petitioners is that the prohibition against nepotic appointments is applicable only
to original appointments and not to promotional appointments.

Issue/s:
a. Whether or not the prohibition against nepotic appointment applies to promotional appointments
b. Whether or not the Commission gravely abused its discretion in revoking Victorias appointment/
Whether or not she had a vested right to it

Held: Petition DISMISSED. The prohibition applies to promotional appointments.
Ratio:
a. The prohibitory norm against nepotism in the public service is set out in Section 59, Book V of the
Revised Administrative Code of 1987 (also known as E.O. No. 292). Section 59 reads as follows:

Sec. 59. Nepotism (1) All appointments in the national, provincial, city and municipal
governments or in any branch or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled
corporations, made in favor of a relative of the appointing or recommending authority,
or of the chief of the bureau or office, or of the persons exercising immediate supervision over him, are
hereby prohibited.

As used in this Section the word "relative" and members of the family referred to are those related within
the third degree either of consanguinity or of affinity.

(2) The following are exempted from the operation of the rules on nepotism: (a) persons employed
in a confidential capacity, (b) teachers, (c) physicians, and (d) members of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines: Provided, however, That in each particular instance full report of such appointment shall be
made to the Commission.

The restriction mentioned in subsection (1) shall not be applicable to the case of a member
of any family who, after his or her appointment to any position in an office or bureau,
contracts marriage with someone in the same office or bureau, in which event the employment
or retention therein of both husband and wife may be allowed.

Section 6 of Rule XVIII, of the "Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292 and
other Pertinent Civil Service Laws," implemented the same.

A textual examination of Section 59 at once reveals that the prohibition was cast in comprehensive
and unqualified terms. Firstly, it explicitly covers "all appointments", without seeking to make any
distinction between differing kinds or types of appointments.

Secondly, Section 59 covers all appointments to the national, provincial, city and municipal government,
as well as any branch or instrumentality thereof and all government owned or controlled corporations.
Thirdly, there is a list of exceptions set out in Section 59 itself, but it is a short list:

(a) persons employed in a confidential capacity;
(b) teachers;
(c) physicians; and
(d) members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.

The list has not been added to or subtracted from for the past thirty (30) years. The list does not contain
words like "and other similar positions." Thus, the list appears to be a closed one, at least closed
until lengthened or shortened by Congress.

The original appointment of a civil service employee and all subsequent personnel actions undertaken
by or in respect of that employee such as promotion, transfer, reinstatement, reemployment, etc., must
comply with the Implementing Rules including, of course, the prohibition against nepotism in Rule XVIII.

Section 59, Book V, E.O. No. 292 means exactly what it says in plain and ordinary language: it refers
to "all appointments" whether original or promotional in nature. The public policy embodied in Section
59 is clearly fundamental in importance, and the Court has neither authority nor inclination to dilute that
important public policy by introducing a qualification here or a distinction there.

b. NO. Victoria was afforded an opportunity to be heard when she filed a motion for reconsideration with
the Commission and there challenged the disapproval by the Commission.

Moreover, because the promotional appointment in favor of petitioner Victoria was a violation of Section
59, it was null and void as being contra legem. A void appointment cannot give rise to security of tenure
on the part of the holder of such appointment.

The Commission is empowered to take appropriate action on all appointments and other personnel
actions, e.g., promotions. 15 Such power includes the authority to recall an appointment initially
approved in disregard of applicable provisions of Civil Service law and regulations.

The recall or withdrawal by the Commission of the approval which had been issued by one of its Field
Officers, Director Escobia, was accordingly lawful and appropriate, the promotional appointment of
petitioner Victoria being void "from the beginning."

The respondent Commission had authority, indeed the duty, to recall on its own initiative the erroneous
initial approval of the promotional appointment extended to petitioner Victoria.

*CLU v Executive Secretary, 194 SCRA 317 (1991) (ZION)

*Flores v. Drilon, 223 SCRA 568 (1993) (FROI)
ROBERTO A. FLORES, DANIEL Y. FIGUEROA, ROGELIO T. PALO, DOMINGO A. JADLOC, CARLITO
T. CRUZ and MANUEL P. REYES, v. HON. FRANKLIN M. DRILON, Executive Secretary, and RICHARD
J. GORDON (weve read this case before way way back under the appointment powers of the executive)

FACTS: On Richard Gordon - then Mayor of Olongapo - being the first chairman of Subic Bay
Metropolitan Authority by express provision of law, to wit:

Sec. 13 (d) of R.A. 7277

(d) Chairman administrator The President shall appoint a professional manager as administrator of
the Subic Authority with a compensation to be determined by the Board subject to the approval of the
Secretary of Budget, who shall be the ex oficio chairman of the Board and who shall serve as the chief
executive officer of the Subic Authority: Provided, however, That for the first year of its operations from
the effectivity of this Act, the mayor of the City of Olongapo shall be appointed as the chairman and chief
executive officer of the Subic Authority

ISSUE: Whether or not appointment of local elective officials to other government posts unconstitutional
HELD: YES - appointment is unconstitutional.

Sec. 7 of Art. IX-B of the Constitution provides:
No elective official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity to any
public office or position during his tenure.
hold any other office or employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality
thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.

affirmation that public office is a full-time job; basic idea is that the ban allows the local
executive to focus on his constituents

Lorenzana vs. Fajardo, 462 SCRA 1 (KAT)

FACTS: In a verified complaint dated May 27, 2002, complainant alleged that respondent, while
employed as Legal Officer V at the Urban Settlement Office in Manila, until his retirement on May 15,
2002, was a member of the Peoples Law Enforcement Board (PLEB) of Quezon City, receiving a monthly
honorarium of P4,000.00. He was also a member of the Lupong Tagapamayapa of Barangay Novaliches
Proper, also receiving a monthly allowance/ honorarium. Complainant also alleged that respondent was
engaged in the private practice of law, receiving acceptance fees ranging from P20,000.00 to P50,000.00.
He lives in a house and lot owned by complainants family without paying any rental and refuses to leave
the place despite the latters demands.

HELD:

The prohibition against government officials and employees, whether elected or appointed, from
concurrently holding any other office or position in the government is contained in Section 7, Article IX-B
of the Constitution which provides:
hold any other office or 2employment in the Government, or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality
thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.

Respondent failed to establish that his primary functions as Legal Officer of the Manila Urban Settlements
Office allow his appointment as PLEB member, an exception to dual appointment prohibited by the
Constitution and the statutes. Indeed, respondent, in accepting such appointment, has transgressed
the Constitution, the Administrative Code of 1987, and the Local Government Code of
1991. Being contra leges, respondent also violated the Code of Professional Responsibility and the
Attorneys Oath.

On respondents appointment as a member of the Lupong Tagapamayapa of Barangay Novaliches
Proper, while serving as Legal Officer V of the Manila Urban Settlements Office, we agree with the
IBP Investigating Commissioner that the same is in order, being allowed by law. (Sec 406 og the Local
Government Code of 1991)

In the case at bar, respondents appearance as counsel is not merely isolated. Evidence presented by
complainant shows that he had an extensive practice of law. While employed as a Legal Officer in the
Urban Resettlement Office of Manila, he maintained a law office. The pleadings he signed as counsel for
his clients filed with the courts indicate his office address as Room 201 7 JA Building, 244 Gen. Luis St.,
Novaliches, Quezon City.

WHEREFORE, for accepting employment as a member of the PLEB of Quezon City while concurrently
employed as Legal Officer V of the Manila Urban Settlement Office, in violation of the Constitution and
the statutes, which in turn contravene his Attorneys Oath and Code of Professional Responsibility; and
by engaging in the illegal practice of law, Atty. Cesar G. Fajardo is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice
of law for a period of six (6) months effective from notice and is REPRIMANDED and WARNED that any
repetition of similar acts would be dealt with more severely.

c. Standardization of Pay & Ban on Double Compensation

Art. IX-B, Sec. 13 - Wala nito. Imbento si Sir :))

Art. IX, B, Sec. 5
Section 5. The Congress shall provide for the standardization of compensation of government officials and
employees, including those in government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters, taking
into account the nature of the responsibilities pertaining to, and the qualifications required for, their
positions.

Art. IX, B, Sec. 8
Section 8. No elective or appointive public officer or employee shall receive additional, double, or indirect
compensation, unless specifically authorized by law, nor accept without the consent of the Congress, any
present, emolument, office, or title of any kind from any foreign government.cralaw
Pensions or gratuities shall not be considered as additional, double, or indirect compensation.

Santos vs. Court of Appeals, 345 SCRA 553 (KARL)

d. Ban on Partisan Political Activities

Art. IX, B, Sec. 2
Section 2. (1) The civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the
Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters.cralaw
highly technical, by competitive examination.cralaw
law.cralaw
partisan political campaign.cralaw

Trinidad vs. Valle, 105 SCRA 606 (YESHA)
Vicente Trinidad vs Judge Gabriel Valle
July 20, 1981

Facts:
Vicente D. Trinidad, former mayor of Iguig, Cagayan, charged Judge Gabriel O. Valle, Jr. of the Court of
First Instance of Ilocos Norte with having delivered a speech at a conference of barangay captains in the
house of Mayor Proceso Maramag at Iguig, advising them to support the leadership of Maramag (whos
running against Trinidad) and Minister of Defense Juan Ponce Enrile.
Judge Valle happened to be in Iguig at that time because he was rendering rural service, he admitted that
he delivered a speech in Ilocano but he denied that he favored Maramag. According to his version, he told
the barangay captains that because former Mayor Trinidad was allegedly his cousin and Maramag had
been his colleague in the fiscal's office, he had no comment to make.

Issue: WoN act of the judge constitutes electioneering / partisan political activity

Held:
Yes! Record contains strong indications that he was engaged in partisan political activity!

Ratio:
Court finds that it was improper or indecorous for Judge Valle to have taken part in the political meeting,
he should have realized that his mere presence there would be construed as an endorsement of Maramag
as against complainant Trinidad and that such behavior would render him vulnerable to the charge of
electioneering.

Judge was fined - seven days worth of salary.

Vistan vs Nicolas, 201 SCRA 524 (THERESE)

A.M. No. MTJ-87-79 September 13, 1991
LEONILA A. VISTAN, complainant, vs. JUDGE RUBEN T. NICOLAS, Municipal Trial Court,
Pandi, Bulacan, respondent.
A.C. No. 3040 September 13, 1991
LEONILA ANGELES VDA. DE VISTAN, complainant, vs. ATTY. RUBEN T. NICOLAS,
respondent.
PER CURIAM:
Facts: These consolidated cases were brought by the same complainant, Leonila A. Vistan, against
Respondent Judge Ruben T. Nicolas, Municipal Trial Court (MTC), Pandi, Bulacan.

Complainant Leonila Vistan charged respondent judge with gross ignorance of the law, grave abuse
of authority (for rendering a decision in a criminal case acquitting the accused despite the fact that
respondent had not yet ruled on the accuseds written offer of evidence), and immorality (for maintaining
an illicit relationship with a woman not his wife with whom he has a child).

The case (AM No. MTJ-87-79 ) was initially dismissed for having been moot and academic upon
respondents resignation from service when he became a congressional candidate in the 1987 elections.

Respondent was re-appointed to the service on 9 February 1989 as MTC Judge, this time, of Pandi,
Bulacan. Accordingly, AM No. MTJ-87-79 was reinstated.

The other case, AC No. 3040, for disbarment of respondent, was filed on 15 May 1987. The charges
set forth are basically the same as those in AM No. MTJ-87-79, namely: (1) knowingly rendering an
unjust judgment during his tenure as MTC Judge of Guiguinto, Bulacan, in Criminal Case No. 3073; (2)
immorality, for cohabiting with a paramour; and (3) violation of election laws. Except for the last
charge, the offenses attributed to Respondent are based on the same set of facts.

Issue: Whether or not respondent is guilty for violating election laws

Held: YES. (The prayer for disbarment is DENIED but respondent Municipal Trial Court Judge, Ruben
T. Nicolas, is SEVERELY CENSURED for his gross misconduct in holding himself out as a candidate for
an elective office while still a member of the Bench; also DISMISSED from service.)

Ratio:
Complainant narrated that as early as 10 February 1987, prior to 24 March 1987, or the date set by the
Commission on Election (COMELEC) to be the start of the campaign period, and while still an MTJ
Judge of Guiguinto, Bulacan, respondent started circulating handbills/letters addressed to electoral
constituents in the second district of Bulacan indicating his intention to run for a congressional seat.

Respondent admitted having circulated such a letter. He denies, however, that he was electioneering,
stating that he was merely voicing out his intention to run for Congressman as a matter of consultation.

The Court ruled that respondent had acted improperly when he sent out letters/handbills, manifesting his
intention to run as a congressional candidate, addressed to electoral constituents of the second district
of Bulacan as early as 10 February 1987, while still the incumbent MTC Judge of Guiguinto, Bulacan, and
prior to the commencement of the campaign period on 24 March 1987.

Section 45 of Pres. Decree No. 807 (Civil Service Law) clearly states:

Section 45. No officer or employee in the Civil Service including members of the Armed Forces, shall
engage directly or indirectly in any partisan political activity or take part in any election
except to vote nor shall be use his official authority or influence to coerce the political activity of any
other person or body. Nothing herein provided shall be understood to prevent any officer or employee
from expressing his views on current political problems or issues, or from mentioning the names of
candidates for public office whom he supports: ...

In addition, Rule 5.10, Canon 5, of the Code of Judicial Conduct provides:

Rule 5.10. A judge is entitled to entertain personal views on political questions. But to avoid suspicion
of political partisanship, a judge shall not make political speeches, contribute to party
funds publicly endorse candidates for political office or participate in other partisan
political activities.

For having held himself out as a congressional candidate while still a member of the Bench, Respondent
took advantage of his position to boost his candidacy, demeaned the stature of his office, and must be
pronounced guilty of gross misconduct.

Art. XVI, Sec. 5
Section 5. (1) All members of the armed forces shall take an oath or affirmation to uphold and defend
this Constitution.
(2) The State shall strengthen the patriotic spirit and nationalist consciousness of the military, and respect
for people's rights in the performance of their duty.
(3) Professionalism in the armed forces and adequate remuneration and benefits of its members shall be a
prime concern of the State. The armed forces shall be insulated from partisan politics.
No member of the military shall engage, directly or indirectly, in any partisan political activity, except to
vote.
(4) No member of the armed forces in the active service shall, at any time, be appointed or designated
in any capacity to a civilian position in the Government, including government-owned or controlled
corporations or any of their subsidiaries.
(5) Laws on retirement of military officers shall not allow extension of their service.
(6) The officers and men of the regular force of the armed forces shall be recruited proportionately from
all provinces and cities as far as practicable.
(7) The tour of duty of the Chief of Staff of the armed forces shall not exceed three years. However, in
times of war or other national emergency declared by the Congress, the President may extend such tour of
duty.

Cailles v. Bonifacio, 65 Phil 328 (1938) (ZION)

*Section 2, Art. XI of the 1935 Const
Section 2. The Auditor General shall examine, audit, and settle all accounts pertaining to the revenues
and receipts from whatever source, including trust funds derived from bond issues; and audit, in
accordance with law and administrative regulations, all expenditures of funds or property pertaining
or held in trust by the Government or the provinces or municipalities thereof. He shall keep the general
accounts of the Government and preserve the vouchers pertaining thereto. It shall be the duty of the
Auditor General to bring the attention of the proper administrative officer expenditures of funds or
property which, in his opinion, are irregular, unnecessary, excessive, or extravagant. He shall also perform
such other functions as may be prescribed by law.

Santos v. Yatco, 59 OG 548 (1959) (FROI)
Alejo Santos v. Yatco (sorry, cant find original case - just got it from the polifile)
FACTS:
This is petition for prohibition seeking to enjoin the enforcement of the order of Judge Yatco disallowing
thenSecretary of Defense Alejo Santos from campaigning personally for Governor Tomas Martin in the
province of Bulacan.
The petition was granted for the ff. reasons:
HELD/RATIO:
1. The position of department secretaries is not embraced and included within the terms officers
and employees in the Civil Service;
2. When Santos, a Nacionalista campaigned for Gov. Martin, a candidate of the Nacionalista Party,
he was acting as a member of the Cabinet in discussing the issues before the electorate and
defending the actuations of the Administration to which he belongs;
3. The question of impropriety as distinct from illegality of such campaign because of its deleterious
influence upon the members of the armed forces, who are administratively subordinated to the
Secretary of National Defense and who are often called upon by the COMELEC to aid in the
conduct of orderly and impartial elections, is not justiciable by the court.

e. Removal or Suspension only for Cause

Art. IX, B, 2 -not sure what this is
(3) No officer or employee of the civil service shall be removed or suspended except for
cause provided by law.

De los Santos v Mallare, 87 Phil 289 (KAT)
F: Eduardo de los Santos, petitioner, was appointed City Engineer of Baguio on 7/16/46 by the Pres. He
then began the exercise of the duties and functions of the position. On 6/1/50, Gil Mallare was extended
an ad interim appointment by the Pres. to the same position, after w/c, on 6/3, the Undersec. of the DPW
& Communications directed Santos to report to the Bureau of Public Works for another assignment.
Santos refused to vacate the office, and when the City Mayor and the
other officials named as Mallare's codefendants ignored him and paid Mallare the salary corresponding to
the position, he commenced these proceedings.

HELD: The provision of Sec. 2545 of the Rev. Admin. Code that the Pres. may remove at pleasure any of
the said appointive officers is incompatible w/ the constitutional inhibition that "No officer or employee
in the Civil Service shall be removed or suspended except for cause as provided by law." We therefore
declare Sec. 2545 of the RAC as repealed by the Consti. and ceased to be operative from the time that
instrument came into effect.

Corpus v. Cuaderno, 13 SCRA 591 (1965) (KARL)

FACTS:
Marino Corpus, Special Assistant to the Governor of the Central Bank, was
administratively charged with dishonesty, incompetence, neglect of duty and violation of
the internal regulations of the office. He was suspended by the Monetary Board despite
the recommendation of the investigating committee that he be reinstated and there was
no basis for actions against Corpus. The Board considered him resigned as of the date of
his suspension. Corpus moved for reconsideration but was denied. He filed the petition
to CFI of Manila which favored him and declared the Resolution of the Board as null and
void. He was awarded P5,000 as attorneys fees. Both Petitioner and respondent appealed
the judgment. Petitioner was appealing the amount awarded to him contending that it was
lower than what he has spent for attorneys fees. While the respondent claimed that an
officer holding highly technical position may be removed at any time for lack of confidence
by the appointing power who was Governor Cuaderno.
ISSUE: Is the lack of confidence by the appointing power be a ground for removing an
employee or a public officer?
HELD: The Constitution distinguishes the primarily confidential from the highly
technical employees, and to the latter the loss of confidence as a ground for removal is
not applicable. No public officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be removed or
suspended except for a cause provided by law. Pertaining to the petitioners claim for
damages, the agreement between a client and his lawyer as to attorneys fees cannot bind
the other party who was a stranger to the fee contract. While the Civil Codeallows a party
to recover reasonable counsel fees by way of damages, such fees must lie primarily in the
discretion of the trial court. Decision appealed affirmed by the Supreme Court.

Ingles v. Mutuc, 26 SCRA 171 (1968)(YESHA)
Ingles v. Mutuc, 26 SCRA 171 (1968)
F: Plaintiffs herein are civil service eligibles, holding positions under the Office of the President. About
the second week of January, 1962, plaintiffs received a communication from Executive Sec. Mutuc
advising them that their services in the government were terminated. They appealed to the President but
said appeal was denied. They filed an action against the Exec. Sec. alleging that they had been removed
from office without just cause and without due process. Defendant, on the other hand, averred that the
positions which plaintiffs were then occupying were primarily confidential in nature and therefore, their
appointments were subject to removal at the pleasure of the appointing power.

ISSUE: W/N plaintiffs are occupying positions which are primarily confidential and therefore are subject
to
removal at the pleasure of the appointing authority.

HELD: NO. The fact that the plaintiffs held office for the "president's Private Office" under subdivision
entitled
"private secretaries" and that they handled "confidential Matters" even if they only performed clerical
work do
not make them officers and employees occupying highly confidential offices. There is nothing in the items
of the
plaintiffs (who were clerks and secretaries) to indicate that their respective positions are "primarily
confidential" in nature. The fact that they handled at times "confidential matters" does not suffice to
characterize their positions as primarily confidential. No officer or employee in the Civil Service shall
be removed or suspended except for cause as provided for by law and since plaintiffs positions were
protected by this provision, their removal without cause was therefore illegal. Adapted.
xxx
Officer holding position primarily confidential in nature; Statement in De los Santos v. Mallare
declared as mere obiter. The assumption that an officer holding a position w/c is primarily confidential in
nature is "subject to removal at the pleasure of the appointing power," is inaccurate. This assumption is
evidently based upon a statement in De los Santos v. Mallare to the effect that "three specified classes
of positions policy determining, primarily confidential and highly technical are excluded from the merit
system and dismissal at pleasure of officers and employees appointed therein is allowed by the Consti.
xxx.

This was, however, a mere obiter, bec., the office involved in said case that of City Engineer of Baguio did
not belong to any of the excepted classes, and, hence, it was not necessary to determine whether
its incumbents were removable or not at the pleasure of the appointing power. What is more, said
obiter, if detached from the context of the decision of w/c it forms part, would be inconsistent w/ the
constitutional command to the effect that "no officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be removed
or suspended except for cause as provided by law" and it is conceded that one holding in the Govt a
primarily confidential position is "in the Civil Service." Meaning of "term merely expires"; Distinguished
from "removal" and "dismissal."When
an incumbent of a primarily confidential position holds office at the pleasure of the appointing power, and
that
pleasure turns into displeasure, the incumbent is not "removed" or "dismissed" from office his
term merely "expires," in much the same way as an officer, whose right thereto ceases upon expiration
of the fixed term for w/c he had been appointed or elected, is not and can not be deemed "removed"
or "dismissed" therefrom, upon the expiration of said term. The main difference bet. the former primarily
confidential officer and the latter is that the latter's term is fixed or definite, whereas that of the former is
not prefixed, but indefinite, at the time of his appointment or election, and becomes fixed and determined
when the appointing power expresses its decision to put an end to the services of the incumbent. When
this event takes place, the latter is not "removed" or "dismissed" from office his term merely "expired."

Cristobal v. Melchor, 78 SCRA 175 (THERESE)

G.R. No. L-43203 July 29, 1977
JOSE C. CRISTOBAL, plaintiff-appellant, vs. ALEJANDRO MELCHOR and FEDERICO
ARCALA, defendants-appellees.
MUOZ PALMA, J:
Facts: Jose C. Cristobal, a third-grade civil service eligible, was formerly employed as a private
secretary in the Presidents Private Office, Malacanang, Manila.

January 1962: The then Executive Secretary Amelito Mutuc, by means of a letter dated January 1,
1962, informed plaintiff that his services as private secretary were terminated effective today. A similar
letter was addressed by Secretary Mutuc to some other employees in the Office of the President.

The dismissed employees appealed to the President by means of letters dated January 3, 1962 and
January 26, 1962 for a reconsideration of their separation from the service. In a letter dated February
27, 1962, their request for reconsideration was denied by Secretary Mutuc, acting by authority of the
President.

March 24, 1962, five of the employees who were separated (not including the herein plaintiff) filed a civil
action before the Court of First Instance of Manila against Secretary Mutuc and the cash disbursing officer
of the Office of the President praying for reinstatement and the payment of their salaries effective as of
January 1, 1962, entitled "Raul R. Ingles. et al vs. Amelito R. Mutuc et als."

The Supreme Court which reversed the dismissal of their complaint and declared their removal from
office as illegal and contrary to law, and ordered their reinstatement and the payment of their salaries
from January 1, 1962 up to the date of their actual reinstatement.

While the civil action filed by Raul R. Ingles, et als. was still pending in the Court of First Instance of
Manila. the dismissed employees who filed said action were recalled to their positions in the Office of the
President, without prejudice to the continuation of their civil action, With respect to the other employees
who were not reinstated, efforts were exerted by Secretary Mutuc to look for placements outside of
Malacaang so that they may be re-employed. The herein plaintiff was one of those who had not been
fortunate enough to be reappointed to any positions as befits his qualifications.

After the SC decision in Mutuc, Cristobal wrote several letters addressed to the Office of the President
requesting reinstatement. The Office of the President, however, denied all these requests.

Cristobal thus filed an action in the Court of First Instance-Manila praying for his reinstatement. The
trial court dismissed the complaint based on Section 16 of Rule 66 of the Rules of Court which expressly
provides that an action against a public office or employee may not be filed for the plaintiff's ouster from
office unless the same is commenced within one year after the cause of the ouster, or the right of the
plaintiff to hold such office or position arose. Since Cristobal failed to bring the action until after the lapse
of 9 years, the triacl court held that his case was now barred by laches.

Issue: Whether or not Cristobal was barred by laches for failure to file the complaint within a year from
dismissal

Held: NO. Cristobal is reinstated in the Office of the President or some other office as may befit his
qualifications.

Ratio:
Laches: is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by
exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier.

The essence of laches is not merely lapse of time. It is essential that there be also acquiescence in the
alleged wrong or lack of diligence in seeking a remedy. In this case, Cristobal sought reconsideration of his
separation from the service. Although he did not join in the Ingles vs Mutuc court action, he continued to
press his request for reinstatement during the pendency of the case. In fact Secretary Mutuc assured him
that he would work for his reinstatement.

The continued promise not only of Mutuc but of the subsequent Secretaries led Cristobal to wait for his
reinstatement, such reinstatement however, never having been acted upon. It would thus be the height of
inequity if after Cristobal relied and reposed his faith and trust on the word and promises of the former
Executive Secretaries, the court would rule that he had lost his right to seek relief because of the lapse of
time.
Cristobal, just like the Plaintiffs in the Ingles v Mutuc case, was not holding an office characterized
as "highly confidential", he was performing purely clerical work although he handled "confidential
matters" occasionally. He is therefore protected in his tenure and may not be therefore removed without
just cause. He is entitled to backwages for five years although he had been dismissed for nine years,
applying by analogy the award of backwages in cases of unfair labor practice.

Grio vs. Civil Service Commission, 194 SCRA 458 (ZION)

Samson vs. Court of Appeals, 145 SCRA 654 (FROI)
MARCIAL F. SAMSON, City Mayor of Caloocan City, THE CITY TREASURER, THE CITY
AUDITOR, both of Caloocan City, and HERMOGENES LIWAG v.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, CFI-RIZAL and FELICIANO C. TALENS

FACTS:
Feliciano Talens (civil service eligible) was appointed on 1970 by Mayor Asistio as Asst. Secretary
to the Mayor - appointment was permanent pursuant to Sec 24(b) of RA 2260 or Civil Service Act
1972: Mayor Samson fired Feliciano Talens citing lack and loss of confidence and replaced him
with Hermogenes Liwag pursuant to Sec 5(f) of RA 2260
Section 5 of Republic Act No. 2260, as amended by Republic Act No. 6040 provides that
"That non-competitive service shall be composed of positions expressly declared by law
to be in the non-competitive service and those which are policy-determining, primarily
confidential or highly technical in nature" and continues with an enumeration of specific
officers and employees embraced within the scope of non-competitive service. Among
those included in the enumeration are heads of departments created in charters of cities
and secretaries of provincial governors, city mayors and municipal mayors.
ISSUE: Whether or not the position of Assistant Secretary to the Mayor is a competitive service
HELD: YES - assistant sec. is part of competitive; Talens removal was illegal. AN assistant
secretary IS NOT similar to a secretary.
General rule: position in all branches, subdivisions and instrumentalities of the governmentalities
of the government, including those in government owned or controlled corporations, belong to
the competitive service. The only exceptions are those expressly declared by law to be in the non-
competitive service and those which are policy-determining, primarily confidential or highly
technical in nature.
Statutory construction: expressio unius est exclusio alterius
an "assistant secretary," although described as secretary, technically differs in function
from the "Secretaries." An "assistant" merely helps, aids or serves in a subordinate capacity
to the person who is actually clothed with all the duties and responsibilities of "secretary."
Needless to say, the functions strictly attributable to a "secretary" and which wo uld repose
on such person the trust and confidence of the employer, is not automatically vested or
transferred to an "assistant secretary," because the latter simply assists or aids the former in the
accomplishment of his duties.

Borres vs. Court of Appeals, 153 SCRA 120 (KAT)
Facts: Upon recommendation of the vicemayor, the mayor appointed respondents as security guards of
the vice mayor. The mayor and vice mayor lost in the election. As the new mayor, petitioner terminated
the services of respondents for lack of confidence. Respondents sued for reinstatement on the ground that
their removal was illegal.
Held: The positions of respondents [security guards of the vice mayor] are primarily confidential, as they
involve giving protection to the vice mayor. The relationship between the vice mayor and his security
depend on the highest of trust and confidence. Hence, the tenure of respondents ended upon
loss of confidence in them.

Astruquillo vs. Manglapus, 190 SCRA 280 (KARL)

FACTS:

Astraquillo appointed as Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary and Chief
of Mission to UAE was accused of improper interference. The Sec. of Foreign Affairs
recommended termination which was approved by the President.2.

Alunan Galang( to Kuwait) received a telex message informing him to vacate the post
because his appt. has beenterminated.3.

Alejandro Melchor (Moscow), the Pres. Terminated his service( described as a political(
non career Ambassador)upon recommendation of the Sec of Foreign Affairs and was
approved by the Pres.

Issue: W/N the political/non-career appointments of the diplomats can be terminated at
the pleasure of the Pres.Without just cause or in need of investigation.

HELD: YES.

Their appointments to the Foreign Service were made on bases other than those of
the usual test of merit and fitness ( determined by competitive exams or highly based
qualifications). Their tenure therefore is coterminous with that of the appointing authority
or subject to his pleasure.

Under the Foreign Service act of 1952:Career Officers: are Foreign Service Officers
appointed by the President upon the recommendation of the secretary and MUST be
eligible BY passing competitive examinations to determine fitness and aptitude for work,
demonstrates loyalty to the RP and the Constitution. It is from This set of Certified Officers
where the President can exclusively make such appointments. Non Career officers: did not
qualify and not certified (to the req. mentioned above) their entry is based onother bases
other that merit and fitness by exam.
-

Being non-career officers, their termination is not dependent on proof of some legally
recognized cause but rests on the will of the Pres., in the exercise of her discretion. The
termination was a political decision she can make, the recommendation of the secretary
(as her alter ego in Foreign affairs) cannot be contested as not being a personal decision.
Besides, her approval means she was the one in effect who ordered the termination

Tamano vs. Manglapus, 214 SCRA 567 (YESHA)
Yusoph Tamano vs Raul Manglapus & Franklin Drilon
October 13, 1992

Facts:
Petitioner, Yusoph C. Tamano, was appointed Foreign Service Officer II and Consul by then President
Aquino. Before Tamano's appointment was submitted to the Commission on Appointments for
confirmation, President Aquino, in a communication addressed to Secretary of Foreign Affairs Salvador
H. Laurel, revoked Tamano's appointment "effective ab initio owing to the absence of appropriate items"

Tamano filed this suit for mandamus, praying that the Court issue an order directing respondents Foreign
Affairs Secretary and the Executive Secretary to reinstate him to his position and pay all his back salaries
plus other benefits accruing to him from March 1, 1987 to date.

Issue: WoN petitioner has a clear legal right to be reinstated as Foreign Service Officer II

Held: No! He is a political appointee or non-career officer, served at the pleasure of the President.

Ratio: The record shows that the petitioner was appointed FSO II and Consul without having taken
therefore, without having passed the foreign service examination. Neither was his appointment
confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. These are indispensable requirements for a Foreign
Service Officer to be embraced in the Career Service Corps. He, therefore, belonged to the non-career
service composed of those who have been appointed, not on the basis of the usual test of merit and fitness,
but subject to the appointing power's pleasure, limited to the duration of a particular period or project for
which, the employment was made.

As a political appointee or non-career officer, he served at the pleasure of the President of the Philippines.
He has no clear right to the office to which he weeks to be reinstated nor does the appointing authority
have a clear duty to appoint or reinstate him thereto.

Civil Service Commission vs. Salas, 274 SCRA 414 (THERESE)

G.R. No. 123708, June 19, 1997

Facts:

On October 7, 1989, respondent Salas was appointed by the PAGCOR Chairman as Internal Security Staff
(ISS) member and assigned to the casino at the Manila Pavilion Hotel. However, his employment was
terminated by the Board of Directors of PAGCOR on December 3, 1991, allegedly for loss of confidence,
after a covert investigation conducted by the Intelligence Division of PAGCOR. The summary of
intelligence information claimed that respondent was allegedly engaged in proxy betting as detailed in
the affidavits purportedly executed by two customers of PAGCOR who claimed that they were used as
gunners on different occasions by respondent. The two polygraph tests taken by the latter also yielded
corroborative and unfavorable results.

On December 23, 1991, he submitted a letter of appeal to the Chairman and the Board of Directors of
PAGCOR, requesting reinvestigation of the case since he was not given an opportunity to be heard, but
the same was denied. On February 17, 1992, he appealed to the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB)
which denied the appeal on the ground that, as a confidential employee, respondent was not dismissed
from the service but his term of office merely expired. On appeal, the CSC issued Resolution No. 92-1283
which affirmed the decision of the MSPB.

On September 14, 1995, the Court of Appeals rendered its questioned decision with the finding that herein
respondent Salas is not a confidential employee, hence he may not be dismissed on the ground of loss of
confidence. In so ruling, the appellate court applied the "proximity rule" enunciated in the case of Grio,
et al. vs. Civil Service Commission, et al.

Issue:

Whether or not Section 16 of the PD No. 1869 has been superseded and repealed by Section 2(1), Article
IX-B of the 1987 Constitution

Held:

The Court of Appeals opined that the provisions of Section 16 of Presidential Decree No. 1869 may no
longer be applied in the case at bar because the same is deemed to have been repealed in its entirety
by Section 2(1), Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution. This is not completely correct. On this point,
we approve the more logical interpretation advanced by the CSC to the effect that "Section 16 of PD
1869 insofar as it exempts PAGCOR positions from the provisions of Civil Service Law and Rules has
been amended, modified or deemed repealed by the 1987 Constitution and Executive Order No. 292
(Administrative Code of 1987)".

However, the same cannot be said with respect to the last portion of Section 16 which provides that "all
employees of the casino and related services shall be classified as 'confidential appointees.'" While such
executive declaration emanated merely from the provisions of Section 2, Rule XX of the implementing
rules of the Civil Service Act of 1959, the power to declare a position as policy-determining, primarily
confidential or highly technical as defined therein has subsequently been codified and incorporated
in Section 12(9), Book V of Executive Order No. 292 or the Administrative Code of 1987. This later
enactment only serves to bolster the validity of the categorization made under Section 16 of Presidential
Decree No. 1869. Be that as it may, such classification is not absolute and all-encompassing.

Thus, the aforecited case was decided on the uncontested assumption that the private respondent therein
was a confidential employee, for the simple reason that the propriety of Section 16 of Presidential Decree
No. 1869 was never controverted nor raised as an issue therein.

That decree was mentioned merely in connection with its provision that PAGCOR employees hold
confidential positions. Evidently, therefore, it cannot be considered as controlling in the case at bar.
Even the fact that a statute has been accepted as valid in cases where its validity was not challenged
does not preclude the court from later passing upon its constitutionality in an appropriate cause where
that question is squarely and properly raised. Such circumstances merely reinforce the presumption of
constitutionality of the law.

Court of Appeals - G.R. SP No. 38319 set aside Resolution No. 92-1283 of the Civil Service Commission
(CSC) and ordered the reinstatement of herein private respondent Rafael M. Salas with full back wages for
having been illegally dismissed by the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR), but
without prejudice to the filing of administrative charges against him if warranted.

f. Right of Self-Organization

Art. III, Sec. 8
Section 8. The right of the people, including those employed in the public and private sectors, to form
unions, associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged.

Art. IX, B, Sec. 2
Section 2. (1) The civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of
the Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters.cralaw
highly technical, by competitive examination.cralaw
law.cralaw
partisan political campaign.cralaw

Book V, Title I, Subtitle A, Chapter 6, Administrative Code of 1987
Chapter 6
RIGHT TO SELF-ORGANIZATION
Sec. 38. Coverage. - (1) All government employees, including those in government-owned or controlled
corporations with original charters, can form, join or assist employees' organizations of their own
choosing for the furtherance and protection of their interests. They can also form, in conjunction with
appropriate government authorities, labor-management committees, work councils and other forms of
workers' participation schemes to achieve the same objectives.

*Alliance of Govt Workers v. Minister of Labor, 124 SCRA 1 (1983) (ZION)

*National Service Corp. v. NLRC, 168 SCRA 122 (1988) (FROI)
FACTS:
Respondent Eugenia Credo was an employee (first as security guard, now as chief of property
and records) of petitioner NASECO
Credo was placed under forced leave for failure to follow memorandum of managers
memorandum on companys Statement of Billings Adjustment
While on forced leave, Credo filed a case against NASECO with Labor Arbiter
While on forced leave, NASECOs Committee of Personal Affairs had a meeting wherein
they found out that Credo had offenses (all her offenses involved being rude and sarcastic
in front of customers and superior officers) before and recommended Credos termination
with no benefits
After forced leave, Credo had a meeting with the boss informing her that there were certain
charges against her, asked her to explain her side - she wasnt able to explain so she got fired
Credo filed supplemental complaint for illegal dismissal with Labor Arbiter
Labor Arbiter: dismissed Credos complaint; ordered NASECO to pay Credo separation pay
NLRC: directing NASECO to reinstate Credo to her former position, or substantially equivalent
position, with six (6) months' backwages and without loss of seniority rights and other privileges
appertaining thereto, and; dismissing Credo's claim for attorney's fees, moral and exemplary
damages.
NASECO: NLRC has no juridisction over NASECO - NASECO is a subsidiary of the National
Investment and Development Corporation (NIDC), a subsidiary wholly owned by the Philippine
National Bank (PNB), which in turn is a government owned corporation
ISSUE: Whether or not the Civil Service Law applies to tertiary corporations
HELD/RATIO: YES - NLRC has jurisdiction over such corporations: the Constitution [Art. IX-
B, Sec. 2(l)] defines the Civil Service as only those government-owned or controlled corporations with
original charters i.e. created by law, by an act of Congress, or by special law AND NOT formed under the
General Corporation Code.
taken from records of the Constitutional Commission
NASECO is a government owned and controlled corporation WITHOUT original charter -
NLRC and Labor Code applies, not Civil Service Code
FOR THIS HEADING: in the records of the Constitutional Commissions, the Commissioners
were discussing that those subsidiary corporations that have collective bargaining agreements are
not part of the Civil Service.

*TUPAS v. NHA, 173 SCRA 33 (1989) (KAT)
FACTS: Respondent NHC is a corporation organized in 1959 under the Uniform Charter of Government
Corporations. Its
shares of stock have been 100% owned by the Government from its incorporation. Petitioner TUPAS is a
legitimate labor
organization with a chapter in NHC. TUPAS filed a petition for certification election with DOLE. It was
denied.

ISSUE: W/N employees of NHC have undoubtedly the right to form unions.
HELD: The right to unionize is now explicitly recognized and granted to both employees in both
governmental
and the private sectors. There is no impediment to the holding of a certificate of election among the
workers of
NHC for it is clear that they are covered by the Labor Code, for NHC is a GOCC without an original
charter.
Statutory implementation of the Consti (par 5 sec 2 art IXB)
is found in Art 244 of the Labor Code.

g. Right to Strike

SSS Employees Association v. CA, 175 SCRA 686 (KARL)
EO 180

*Manila Public School Teachers Assocn v. Laguio, 200 SCRA 323 (1991) (YESHA)
Manila Public School Teachers Association v. Laguio, 200 SCRA 323 (1991)
F: On September 17,1990, Monday, at least 800 public school teachers proceeded to the national office
of the DECS and aired their grievances. The mass action continued into the week despite the DECS
Secretary's RETURN TO WORK order. The Secretary filed administrative charges against the protesting
teachers. The Secretary rendered the questioned decisions in the administrative proceeding. He dismissed
some teachers and placed others in under suspension. Two separate petitions were filed to assail the
validity of the return to work order and his decisions in the administrative proceeding.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE MASS ACTIONS ARE CONSIDERED AS STRIKES?
HELD: Yes. The mass actions constituted a concerted and unauthorized stoppage of, or absence from
work, which it was the teachers' duty to perform, undertaken for essentially economic reasons.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT PUBLIC SCHOOL TEACHERS CAN STRIKE?
HELD: No. Employees of the public service do not have the right to strike although they have the right to
self organization and negotiate with appropriate government agencies for the improvement of working
conditions.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT DUE PROCESS WAS OBSERVED DURING THE ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEEDINGS?
HELD: This court is a court of last resort. It resolves questions of law where there is no dispute of the
facts or that the facts have been already determined by the lower tribunals. It is not a trier of facts. It can
not resolve the issue which requires the establishment of some facts. The remedy is for the petitioners
to participate in the administrative proceedings. If they lost, they may appeal to the Civil Service
Commission. If pending said administrative proceedings, immediate recourse to judicial authority was
believed necessary, recourse is with the RTC where there would be opportunity to prove relevant facts

9. Review of Decisions

Art. IX, A, Sec. 7
Section 7. Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its Members, any case or matter
brought before it within sixty days from the date of its submission for decision or resolution. A case
or matter is deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, or
memorandum required by the rules of the Commission or by the Commission itself. Unless otherwise
provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought
to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy
thereof.crala

Dario v. Mison, 176 SCRA 84 (1989) (THERESE) -> I only put in the procedural aspect, in
relation to Art IX A, Sec. 7. (medj magulo. haha)

Facts:

March 25, 1986: President Aquino promulgated Proclamation No. 3 DECLARING A NATIONAL
POLICY TO IMPLEMENT THE REFORMS MANDATED BY THE PEOPLE, PROTECTING THEIR
BASIC RIGHTS, ADOPTING A PROVISIONAL CONSTITUTION, AND PROVIDING FOR AN ORDERLY
TRANSITION TO A GOVERNMENT UNDER NEW CONSTITUTION

Among other things, Proclamation No. 3 provided:
SECTION 1. ...
The President shall give priority to measures to achieve the mandate of the people to:

(a) Completely reorganize the government, eradicate unjust and oppressive structures, and all iniquitous
vestiges of the previous regime;

Actually, the reorganization process started as early as February 25, 1986, when the President, in her first
act in office, called upon "all appointive public officials to submit their courtesy resignation(s) beginning
with the members of the Supreme Court." Later on, she abolished the Batasang Pambansa and the
positions of Prime Minister and Cabinet under the 1973 Constitution.

Since then, the President has issued a number of executive orders and directives reorganizing various
other government offices, a number of which, with respect to elected local officials, has been challenged
in this Court, and two of which, with respect to appointed functionaries, have likewise been questioned
herein.
On May 28, 1986, the President enacted Executive Order No. 17, "PRESCRIBING RULES AND
REGULATIONS FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SECTION 2, ARTICLE III OF THE FREEDOM
CONSTITUTION." Executive Order No. 17 recognized the "unnecessary anxiety and demoralization
among the deserving officials and employees" the ongoing government reorganization had generated, and
prescribed grounds for the separation/replacement of personnel.

On January 30, 1987, the President promulgated Executive Order No. 127, "REORGANIZING THE
MINISTRY OF FINANCE." Among other offices, Executive Order No. 127 provided for the reorganization
of the Bureau of Customs and prescribed a new staffing pattern therefor.

On January 6, 1988, incumbent Commissioner of Customs Salvador Mison issued a Memorandum, in
the nature of "Guidelines on the Implementation of Reorganization Executive Orders," prescribing the
procedure in personnel placement.

On the same date, Commissioner Mison constituted a Reorganization Appeals Board charged with
adjudicating appeals from removals under the above Memorandum. On January 26, 1988, Commissioner
Mison addressed several notices to various Customs officials.

As far as the records will likewise reveal, a total of 394 officials and employees of the Bureau of Customs
were given individual notices of separation.

A number supposedly sought reinstatement with the Reorganization Appeals Board while others went to
the Civil Service Commission.
The first thirty-one mentioned above came directly to this Court.

On June 30, 1988, the Civil Service Commission promulgated its ruling ordering the reinstatement of the
279 employees.

On January 6, 1989, Commissioner Mison challenged the Civil Service Commission's Resolution in this
Court.

On June 10, 1988, Republic Act No. 6656, "AN ACT TO PROTECT THE SECURITY OF TENURE OF
CIVIL SERVICE OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF GOVERNMENT
REORGANIZATION," 22 was signed into law. Under Section 7, thereof:

Sec. 9. All officers and employees who are found by the Civil Service Commission to have been separated
in violation of the provisions of this Act, shall be ordered reinstated or reappointed as the case may be
without loss of seniority and shall be entitled to full pay for the period of separation.

Issue: Whether or not the Supreme Court may validly review the decision of the Civil Service
Commission

Held: YES.

Ratio:
The Court rejects contentions that the Bureau's petition raises no jurisdictional questions, and is therefore
bereft of any basis as a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. The questions raised
in Commissioner Mison's petition (in G.R. 85310) are, indeed, proper for certiorari, if by "jurisdictional
questions" we mean questions having to do with "an indifferent disregard of the law, arbitrariness and
caprice, or omission to weigh pertinent considerations, a decision arrived at without rational deliberation,
34 as distinguished from questions that require "digging into the merits and unearthing errors of
judgment 35 which is the office, on the other hand, of review under Rule 45 of the said Rules.

What cannot be denied is the fact that the act of the Civil Service Commission of reinstating hundreds
of Customs employees Commissioner Mison had separated, has implications not only on the entire
reorganization process decreed no less than by the Provisional Constitution, but on the Philippine
bureaucracy in general; these implications are of such a magnitude that it cannot be said that assuming
that the Civil Service Commission erred the Commission committed a plain "error of judgment" that
Aratuc says cannot be corrected by the extraordinary remedy of certiorari or any special civil action. We
reaffirm the teaching of Aratuc as regards recourse to this Court with respect to rulings of the Civil
Service Commission which is that judgments of the Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court
through certiorari alone, under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

In Aratuc we declared:

It is once evident from these constitutional and statutory modifications that there is a definite tendency
to enhance and invigorate the role of the Commission on Elections as the independent constitutional
body charged with the safeguarding of free, peaceful and honest elections. The framers of the new
Constitution must be presumed to have definite knowledge of what it means to make the
decisions, orders and rulings of the Commission "subject to review by the Supreme Court'.
And since instead of maintaining that provision intact, it ordained that the Commission's actuations be
instead 'brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari", We cannot insist that there was no intent to change
the nature of the remedy, considering that the limited scope of certiorari, compared to a review, is well
known in remedial law.

We observe no fundamental difference between the Commission on Elections and the Civil Service
Commission (or the Commission on Audit for that matter) in terms of the constitutional intent to leave
the constitutional bodies alone in the enforcement of laws relative to elections, with respect to the former,
and the civil service, with respect to the latter (or the audit of government accounts, with respect to the
Commission on Audit). As the poll body is the "sole judge" of all election cases, so is the Civil Service
Commission the single arbiter of all controversies pertaining to the civil service.

Under the new Constitution, as under the 1973 Charter, "any decision, order, or ruling of each
Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari," which, as Aratuc tells us, "technically
connotes something less than saying that the same 'shall be subject to review by the Supreme Court,
which in turn suggests an appeal by petition for review under Rule 45.

Therefore, our jurisdiction over cases emanating from the Civil Service Commission is limited to
complaints of lack or excess of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, complaints that justify certiorari under Rule 65.

While Republic Act No. 6656 states that judgments of the Commission are "final and executory"and
hence, unappealable, under Rule 65, certiorari precisely lies in the absence of an appeal.

Accordingly, we accept Commissioner Misons petition (G.R. No. 85310) which clearly charges the Civil
Service Commission with grave abuse of discretion, a proper subject of certiorari, although it may not
have so stated in explicit terms.

Manalansang v. CSC, 203 SCRA 797 (1991) (ZION)

Mancita v. Barcinas, 216 SCRA 772 (1992) (FROI)
FILOMENA R. MANCITA v.
HON. CEFERINO P. BARCINAS, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Camarines
Sur, Branch 31, 5th Judicial Region, Pili, Camarines Sur, PRESCILLA B. NACARIO, HON. DELFIN
DIVINAGRACIA, as Municipal Mayor of Pili, Camarines Sur, and HON. PATRICIA A. ST0. TOMAS, in
her capacity as Chairman, Civil Service Commission

Facts:
1 Aug 1980: Petitioner Filomena Mancita was appointed as Municipal Development
Coordinator of Pili, CamSur on permanent status.
14 March 1983: BP 337 Local Govt Code took effect. BP 337 enumerates all offices common in
all municipalities, one of which is the Municipal Planning and Development Coordinator (MPDC)
28 March 1983: Sangguniang Bayan of Pili passed Resolution 38, creating the Office of the MPDC
1 Jan 1985: Reorganization Plan of Pili was approved by the joint Commission on Local
Government Personnel Administration (JELGPA)
17 June 1985: Filomena Mancita was informed by Anastacio Prila, Mayor of Pili, stating that with
the Reorganization Plan of Pili, the Office of the MDC was abolished and as such, her services are
terminated effective 30 June 1985
30 June 1985: Mayor Prila appointed Prescilla Nacario as MPDC
Mancita appealed to the Merit System Protection Board (MSPB), with the same ruling in her
favor; she was to be reinstated.
CSC affirmed MSPB ruling
15 Oct 1990: Mayor Divinagracia, successor of Mayor Prila, informed Nacario that her services
were to be terminated to give way to Mancita as ruled by the MSPB and the CSC
Nacario filed petition for declaratory relief and prohibition with the RTC
RTC: ruled in favor of Nacario
ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over the case
HELD/RATIO: NO - RTC has no jurisdiction; only SC has jurisdiction to review CSC
decisions
Since the decision, order or ruling of the Civil Service Commission is subject to review only by this
Court oncertiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, the Regional Trial Court of Pili, Branch
31, Camarines Sur, has no jurisdiction over Civil Case No. P-1781, an action which seeks a review
of a decision of the Civil Service Commission.

10. Fiscal Autonomy

Art. IX, A, Sec. 5
Section 5. The Commission shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Their approved annual appropriations shall be
automatically and regularly released.

Civil Service Commission vs. Department of Budget and Management, 464 SCRA 115
(KAT)
FACTS:
-The Civil Service Commission (petitioner) via the present petition for mandamus seeks to compel the
Department of Budget and Management (respondent) to release the balance of its budget for fiscal year
2002. At the same time, it seeks a determination by this Court of the extent of the constitutional concept
of fiscal autonomy.
-By petitioners claim, the amount of P215,270,000.00 was appropriated for its Central Office by the
General Appropriations Act (GAA) of 2002, while the total allocations for the same Office, if all sources of
funds are considered, amount to P285,660,790.44.[1] It complains, however, that the total fund releases
by respondent to its Central Office during the fiscal year 2002 was only P279,853,398.14, thereby leaving
an unreleased balance of P5,807,392.30.
-To petitioner, this balance was intentionally withheld by respondent on the basis of its no report, no
release policy whereby allocations for agencies are withheld pending their submission of the documents
mentioned in Sections 3.8 to 3.10 and Section 7.0 of National Budget Circular No. 478 on Guidelines on
the Release of the FY 2002 Funds,

HELD:
Respondents act of withholding the subject funds from petitioner due to revenue shortfall is hereby
declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
RATIO:
-That the no report, no release policy may not be validly enforced against offices vested with fiscal
autonomy is not disputed. Indeed, such policy cannot be enforced against offices possessing fiscal
autonomy without violating Article IX (A), Section 5 of the Constitution

- By parity of construction, automatic release of approved annual appropriations to petitioner, a
constitutional commission which is vested with fiscal autonomy, should thus be construed to mean that
no condition to fund releases to it may be imposed. This conclusion is consistent with the above-cited
June 3, 1993 Resolution of this Court which effectively prohibited the enforcement of a no report, no
release policy against the Judiciary which has also been granted fiscal autonomy by the Constitution
-Respecting respondents justification for the withholding of funds from petitioner as due to a shortfall in
revenues, the same does not lie. In the first place, the alleged shortfall is totally unsubstantiated. In the
second place, even assuming that there was indeed such a shortfall, that does not justify non-compliance
with the mandate of above-quoted Article IX (A), Section 5 of the Constitution.

-Furthermore, the Constitution grants the enjoyment of fiscal autonomy only to
the Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions of which petitioner is one, and the
Ombudsman. To hold that petitioner may be subjected to withholding or reduction of
funds in the event of a revenue shortfall would, to that extent, place petitioner and the
other entities vested with fiscal autonomy on equal footing with all others which are not
granted the same autonomy, thereby reducing to naught the distinction established by the
Constitution.
- The agencies which the Constitution has vested with fiscal autonomy should thus be
given priority in the release of their approved appropriations over all other agencies not
similarly vested when there is a revenue shortfall.
-Clearly, while the retention or reduction of appropriations for an office is generally allowed when there is
an unmanageable budget deficit, the Year 2002 GAA, in conformity with the Constitution, excepted from
such rule the appropriations for entities vested with fiscal autonomy. Thus, even assuming that there was
a revenue shortfall as respondent claimed, it could not withhold full release of petitioners funds without
violating not only the Constitution but also Section 64 of the General Provisions of the Year 2002 GAA.
-The plain implication of the omission of the provision proscribing such reduction of appropriations
below that for the previous year is that Congress is not prohibited from reducing the
appropriations of Constitutional Commissions below the amount appropriated for them
for the previous year.

Civil Service Commission vs. Department of Budget and Management, 482 SCRA 233
(KARL)

11. Approval of Appointments by the CSC

Barrozo v. CSC, 198 SCRA 487 (YESHA)
Barrozo v. CSC, 198 SCRA 487
F: On 11/10/88, David Borja retired as City Engineer of Baguio. At that time, petitioner Teodoro Barrozo
was a
Senior Civil Engineer of DPWH assigned to the office of the City Engineer of Baguio and resp. V. Julian
was the Asst. City Engineer of Baguio. On 12/27/88, Mayor Labo extended to Barrozo a permanent
appointment as City Engineer of Baguio. On 2/16/89, after his protest was rejected by Mayor Labo, pvt.
resp. Julian appealed to the MSPB of the CSC, claiming that as a qualified next in rank officer, he had
a preemptive right over Barrozo. The CSC Cordillera Admin. Region, to w/c the appeal was referred,
declared Barrozo's appointment void for being violative of Civil Service promotion rules. MFR was denied.
CSC, on appeal, affirmed the decision.

HELD: The CSC has no power of appointment except over its own personnel. Neither does it have the
authority to review the appointments made by other officers except only to ascertain if the appointee
possesses the required qualifications. The determination of who among aspirants with the minimum
statutory qualifications should be preferred belongs to the appointing authority and not the CSC. It cannot
disallow an appointment bec. it believes another person is better qualified and mush less can it direct the
appointment of its own choice.
xxx
The law does not absolutely require that the person who is next in rank shall be promoted to fill a vacancy.
In fact, the vacancy may be filled not only by promotion but "by transfer of present employees in the
govt service, by reinstatement, by reemployment of persons separated through reduction in force, or by
appointment of persons w/ the civil service eligibility appropriate to the position. What the Civil Service
Act
provides is that if a vacancy is filled by promotion, the person holding that position next in rank
thereto "shall be considered for promotion."
xxx
One who is next in rank is entitled to preferential consideration for promotion to the higher vacancy but
it does not necessarily follow that he and no one else can be appointed. The rule neither grants a vested
right to the holder nor imposes a ministerial duty on the appointing authority to promote such person to
the next higher position.

Luego vs. Civil Service Commission, 143 SCRA 327 (THERESE)

Felimon Luego vs Civil Service Commission and Felicula Tuozo (August 5, 1986)

Facts: Petitioner was appointed Admin Officer II, Office of the City Mayor, Cebu City, by Mayor Solon.
The appointment was described as permanent but the CSC approved it as temporary, subject to the
final action taken in the protest filed by the private respondent and another employee.

Subsequently, the CSC found the private respondent better qualified than the petitioner for the contested
position and, accordingly directed that the latter be appointed to said position in place of the petitioner
whose appointment is revoked. Hence, the private respondent was so appointed to the position by Mayor
Duterte, the new mayor.

The petitioner, invoking his earlier permanent appointment, questions the order and the validity of the
respondents appointment.

Issue: Whether or not the CSC is authorized to disapprove a permanent appointment on the ground
that another person is better qualified than the appointee and, on the basis of this finding, order his
replacement.

Held: No. Petitioner is declared entitled to the office in dispute by virtue of his permanent appointment.

Ratio: The appointment of the petitioner was not temporary but permanent and was therefore protected
by Constitution. The appointing authority indicated that it was permanent, as he had the right to do so,
and it was not for the respondent CSC to reverse him and call it temporary.

Section 9(h), Art V of the Civil Service Decree provides that the Commission shall have inter alia
the power to approve all appointments, whether original or promotional, to positions in the civil
service .and disapprove those where the appointees do not possess appropriate eligibility or required
qualifications.

The CSC is not empowered to determine the kind or nature of the appointment extended by the
appointing officer, its authority being limited to approving or reviewing the appointment in the light of
the requirements of the CSC Law. When the appointee is qualified and all the other legal requirements
are satisfied, the Commission has no choice but to attest to the appointment in accordance with the CSC
Laws.

CSC is without authority to revoke an appointment because of its belief that another person was better
qualified, which is an encroachment on the discretion vested solely in the city mayor.

Temporary Appointments

Romualdez vs. Civil Service Commission, 197 SCRA 168 (ZION)

Province of Camarines Sur vs. Court of Appeals, 246, SCRA 281 (YESHA)
Province of Camarines Sur vs Court of Appeals & Tito B. Dato
July 14, 1995

Facts:
In 1960, respondent Dato was appointed as Private Agent by the then Gov. of Camarines Sur, Apolonio
Maleniza. 1972, Dato was promoted and appointed Assistant Provincial Warden by then Gov. Felix
Alfelor, Sr. Dato had no civil service eligibility for the position he was appointed to, thus, he could not
be legally extended a permanent appointment. He was extended a temporary appointment, which was
renewed annually.
1974, Gov. Alfelor approved the change in Dato's employment status from temporary to permanent upon
the latter's representation that he passed the civil service examination for supervising security guards.
This was not favorably acted upon by the Civil Service Commission (CSC) reasoning that Dato did not
possess the necessary civil service eligibility for the office he was appointed to. His appointment remained
temporary and no other appointment was extended to him. 1976,Dato was indefinitely suspended by Gov.
Alfelor after criminal charges were filed against him and a prison guard for allegedly conniving and/or
consenting to evasion of sentence of some detention prisoners who escaped from confinement.

Two years after the request for change of status was made, Mr. Lope B. Rama, head of the Camarines
Sur Unit of the Civil Service Commission, wrote the Gov. a letter informing him that the status of
private respondent Dato has been changed from temporary to permanent, the latter having passed the
examination for Supervising Security Guard. The change of status was to be made retroactive to June 11,
1974, the date of release of said examination.
Sangguniang Panlalawigan, suppressed the appropriation for the position of Assistant Provincial Warden
and deleted private respondent's name from the petitioner's plantilla.
Dato was subsequently acquitted of the charges against him. Consequently, he requested the Gov. for
reinstatement and backwages.
His request was not heeded. Dato filed an action before the RTC.

RTC Decision: Ordered the payment of backwages of Dato equivalent to five years. Province of Camarines
Sur appealed the decision to the CA.
CA: Affirmed RTCs decision. Hence the present petition.

Issue: W/N Dato was a permanent employee of petitioner Province of Camarines Sur at the time he was
suspended on March 16, 1976.

Held: No. Dato, being merely a temporary employee, is not entitled to his claim for backwages for the
entire period of his suspension.

Ratio: At the time Dato was appointed Assistant Provincial Warden on January 1, 1974, he had not
yet qualified in an appropriate examination for the position. Such lack of a civil service eligibility made
his appointment temporary and without a fixed and definite term and is dependent entirely upon the
pleasure of the appointing power.

The fact that private respondent obtained civil service eligibility later on is of no moment as his having
passed the supervising security guard examination, did not ipso facto convert his temporary appointment
into a permanent one. What is required is a new appointment since a permanent appointment is not a
continuation of the temporary appointment these are two distinct acts of the appointing authority

The letter communicated by Mr. Lope Rama to the Gov. of Camarines Sur is a clear arrogation of
power properly belonging to the appointing authority. CSC has the power to approve or disapprove
an appointment set before it. It does not have the power to make the appointment itself or to direct
the appointing authority to change the employment status of an employee. CSC should have ended
its participation in the appointment of private respondent on January 1, 1974 when it confirmed
the temporary status of the latter who lacked the proper civil service eligibility. When it issued the
foregoing communication on March 19, 1976, it stepped on the toes of the appointing authority, thereby
encroaching on the discretion vested solely upon the latter.

Decano vs. Edu, 99 SCRA 410 (FROI)
FEDERICO DECANO v.
ROMEO F. EDU, as Acting Commissioner of Land Transportation and CIPRIANO POSADAS, as Acting
Registrar, Land Transportation Commission, Dagupan City Agency
FACTS:
12 Sept 1962: Undersec. of Public Works and Communications assigned Federico Decano
as janitor in temporary capacity in the Motor Vehicles Agency in Dagupan - approved by CSC
Decano worked for almost four years until 29 April 1966 when Cipriano Posadas (acting
Registrar) received telegram from Romeo Edu (acting LTC Commissioner) to the effect of
terminating the services of Decano
Decano filed petition for mandamus and injunction in CFI: Posadas and Edu acted in excess of
jurisdiction, having no power to terminate the services of Decano
CFI: ruled in favor of Decano
Issue: Whether or not Edu and Posadas had authority to terminate the services of Decano
Held/Ratio: NO - aforementioned officials had no authority to remove Decano from
service.
Decano could be removed from service, since his appointment was temporary - acceptance of a
temporary appointment divests an appointee of the right to security of tenure against removal
without case
Decano could only be removed at the pleasure of the appointing official i.e. the Undersec of
Public Works

Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Maynila vs. Civil Service Commission, 241 SCRA 506 (KAT)

FACTS:
-This petition stemmed from a complaint for illegal dismissal and unfair labor practice filed with public
respondent Civil Service Commission ("CSC") by private respondents, through Pamantasan Ng Lungsod
Ng Maynila Faculty Organization ("PLMFO"), against petitioner Pamantasan Ng Lungsod Ng Maynila
("PLM") and its officers.
-The sixteen (16) individual private respondents were full-time instructors of PLM under "temporary
contracts" of employment renewable on a yearly basis. They, among other instructors, joined the PLMFO.
-Uniform notices of termination, all dated 24 April 1990, were individually sent to private respondents
informing them of "the expiration of their temporary appointments at the close of office hours on 31 May
1990" and the non-renewal of their appointments for the school year (SY) 1990-1991.
-On 29 May 1990, private respondents, through PLMFO, filed with the CSC a verified complaint for illegal
dismissal and unfair labor practice against petitioner and its officers.
-In a Resolution, 2 dated 16 December 1991, the PSLMC found petitioner guilty of "Unfair Labor Practice"
and held that private respondents "should be reinstated."
-The CSC, accordingly, directed the reinstatement, with back salaries, of private respondents
HELD:
Unfortunately for petitioner, however, the two supposed independent issues, i.e., the unfair labor
practice charge and the complaint for illegal dismissal both filed by private respondents, are, in fact, here
unavoidably interlinked. The non-renewal of an employment contract with a term, it is true, is ordinarily a
valid mode of removal at the end of each
period. 11 This rule, however, must yield to the superior constitutional right of employees, permanent or
temporary, to self-organization. While, a temporary employment may be ended with or without
cause, it certainly may not, however, be terminated for an illegal cause.

Padilla vs. Civil Service Commission, 403 SCRA 116 (KARL)

Lack of Eligibility after Reorganization

National Land Titles and Deeds Regn Adm vs. CSC, 221 SCRA 145 (YESHA)
National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration vs Civil Service Commission & Violeta Garcia
April 7, 1993

Facts:
Petitioner Garcia, a Bachelor of Laws graduate and a first grade civil service eligible was appointed Deputy
Register of Deeds VII under permanent status. Said position was later reclassified to Deputy Register of
Deeds III pursuant to PD 1529, to which position, petitioner was also appointed under permanent status
up to September 1984. By virtue of Executive Order No. 649 (which took effect on February 9, 1981)
which authorized the restructuring of the Land Registration Commission (LRC) to National Land Titles
and Deeds Registration Administration (NALDTRA) and regionalizing the Offices of the Registers therein,
petitioner Garcia was issued an appointment as Deputy Register of Deeds II on October 1, 1984, under
temporary status, for not being a member of the Philippine Bar.
In a Memorandum dated October 30, 1986, the then Minister, now Secretary, of Justice notified
petitioner Garcia of the termination of her services as Deputy Register of Deeds II on the ground that
she was "receiving bribe money". This was appealed before the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB).
MSPB dropped the appeal on the ground that since the termination of her services was due to the
expiration of her temporary appointment, her separation is in order.
CSC issued a resolution, directed that petitioner be reinstated in her position. Held that under the vested
right theory the new requirement of BAR membership to qualify for permanent appointment does not
apply to her but only to the filling up of vacant lawyer positions after the effectivity of the EO.

ISSUE: WoN the membership in the bar, which is the qualification requirement prescribed for
appointment to the position should be required of and/or applied only to new applicants and not to those
who were already in the service of the LRC at the time of the issuance and implementation of the EO

Held: Yes, EO expressly provided for abolition of existing positions in the now defunct LRC and required
new appointments to be issued to all employees of the NALTDRA.

Ratio:
The law mandates that from the moment an implementing order is issued, all positions in the Land
Registration Commission are deemed non-existent. This, however, does not mean removal. Abolition of a
position does not involve or mean removal for the reason that removal implies that the post subsists and
that one is merely separated therefrom. After abolition, there is in law no occupant. Thus, there can be no
tenure to speak of. It is in this sense that from the standpoint of strict law, the question of any impairment
of security of tenure does not arise.
There is no such thing as a vested interest or an estate in an office, or even an absolute right to hold it.
Except constitutional offices which provide for special immunity as regards salary and tenure, no one can
be said to have any vested right in an office or its salary.

De Tavera vs. Civil Service Corporation, 200 SCRA 759 (THERESE)

G.R. No. 92595 May 28, 1992
HON. MITA PARDO DE TAVERA, in her capacity as Chairman, Board of Commissioners,
Population Commission of the Philippines, petitioner,
vs.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION and FELIX SEVIDAL, respondents.
Leven S. Puno for private respondent.
NARVASA, C.J.:

Facts:
Section 21 of EO 123 promulgated on January 30, 1987, authorized the reorganization of the
governing body and secretariat of the POPCOM as an agency attached to the DSWD.

Pursuant thereto, a new staffing pattern was drawn up and an Organization, Staffing and Classification
Action Summary (OSCAS) based thereon was prepared.

The position of Population Programs Coordinator was upgraded to Regional Director for which, among
others, an educational attainment of Bachelor's Degree in Health, Social/Behavioral
Sciences or other relevant courses was prescribed.

After a review of the qualifications and performance of the incumbent POPCOM staff, petitioner as
Chairman of the POPCOM Board of Commissioners notified private respondent Felix Sevidal, then
Population Programs Coordinator, in a Memorandum dated December 28, 1987, that he "was not being
considered for reappointment under the approved Organization, Staffing and Classification Action
Summary (OSCAS) by the Board of Commissioners." Appointed in his stead was Placido N. Triste who
holds a Bachelor's degree.

October 20, 1989: The CSC ruled favorably on private respondent's motion for reconsideration. Finding
that he had never been found guilty of any offense, the CSC concluded that Sevidal's separation from the
service was without legal basis. Thus, the directive, subject of this petition.

Issue: Whether or not Sevidal may be appointed as Regional Director

Held: NO. Petition granted.

Ratio: The respondent Civil Service Commission did act with grave abuse of discretion in directing the
appointment of private respondent to the position of Regional Director notwithstanding the fact that he
clearly lacked the requisite educational qualification and that record of his public service raises serious
questions about his moral fitness to remain in office.

Consistent with the elevation of the position of Population Programs Coordinator to Regional Director
in the new plantilla and staffing pattern of the POPCOM, the educational qualification standard for the
upgraded position was changed so as to require the holder or appointee to have a Bachelor's Degree in
Health, Social or Behavioral Sciences or other courses relevant to the position. Private respondent
being only a third year college student, it is plain to see that he does not meet the minimum
academic qualification for the position of Regional Director.

For the respondent Civil Service Commission then to direct that private respondent be appointed to a
position for which he does not possess the required educational qualifications is grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction, being at cross-purposes with its (CSC's) bounden duty to ensure that
only the qualified are admitted to the public service, hence to "disapprove those (appointments) whose
appointees do not possess the appropriate eligibility or required qualifications."

Moreover, private respondent had also been accused of various charges (such as forging the signature of
the POPCOM chair, using office funds for his own benefit etc.). The fact that he had not been convicted of
any of these charges does not absolutely exempt him from being morally unfit or notoriously undesirable,
especially through other perceived actions over a period of time but for which they were not formally
called upon to answer. Parenthetically, Executive Order No. 17 effective May 28, 1986 cites as a valid
cause for separation or replacement of a public officer or employee "the existence of a probable cause
for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act as determined by the Ministry Head concerned
or "any analogous ground showing that the incumbent is unfit to remain in the service or his separation/
replacement is in the interest of the service."

Imposition of Additional Qualifications by the CSC

Juliano vs. Subido, 62 SCRA 480 (ZION)

Declaration of Vacancy

Mayor vs. Macaraig, 194 SCRA 672 (FROI)
Jovencio Mayor v. Hon. Catalino Macaraig
FACTS:
on constitutionality of RA 6715, insofar as it declares vacant "all positions of the Commissioners,
Executive Labor Arbiters and Labor Arbiters of the National Labor Relations Commission," and
operates to remove the incumbents upon the appointment and qualification of their successors.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 6715 is unconstitutional
HELD/RATIO: RA 6715 is unconstitutional.
Right to security of tenure guaranteed by the Constitution
Valid cause for removal is abolition of office - abolition is within the prerogative of the legislative.
However, abolition of office is not the same as declaring the same offices as vacant -
not within the power of the legislative; such an act would violate security of tenure. It can not be
justified by the professed "need to professionalize the higher levels of officialdom invested with
adjudicatory powers and functions, and to upgrade their qualifications, ranks, and salaries or
emoluments."
no express abolition of office in RA 6715, no implied abolition - no inconsistency so repugnant
between the old rules with regard to functions of NLRC and RA 6715.
RA 6715 did not change the essential function of the NLRC as a supervisory and
adjudicatory body.
position titles are only that - new names (Executive Clerk, Deputy Executive Clerk) for old
offices (Executive Director, Deputy Executive Director) and as such, there is no abolition
of office.

Demotion/More Qualified Persons

Central Bank vs. Civil Service Commission, 171 SCRA 744 (KAT)
DOCTRINE: Even if officers and employees in the career service of the Civil Service enjoy the right to
preference in promotion, it is not mandatory that the vacancy be filled by promotion. The appointing
authority should be allowed the choice of men of his confidence, provided they are qualified and eligible.
FACTS:
The questioned resolutions directed the immediate revocation of the appointment of Dr.
Angela P. Jordan to the position of Assistant Bank Physician of the Central Bank of the
Philippines and the issuance of an appointment in favor of herein private respondent,
Dr. Basilio E. Borja to the said position.
On October 3, 1984, the Promotions Board of the Central Bank, with a representative of the
Civil Service Commission in attendance, deliberated on the filling up of the vacant position of
Assistant Bank Physician of the Central Bank of the Philippines (Salary Grade 22). It found Dr.
Jordan, who then had the rank of Coordinating Assistant (Salary Grade 20) as the only next-
in-rank employee. After considering further the qualifications of Dr. Jordan, said Board certified
her for promotion to the position of Assistant Bank Physician and submitted the proposal to the
Office of the Governor of the Central Bank.
On the other hand, it appears that as early as July, 1984, respondent Borja filed
an application for the position of Medical Director in the Central Bank. His papers
were acted upon by the Promotions Board and he was considered for the position of
Physician (Salary Grade 16). The bank approved the Board's proposal in a Resolution
dated October 5, 1984. 3 On October 9, 1984, respondent Borja reported for duty. On
October 15, 1984, he was issued his appointment as Physician.
On January 2, 1985, the promotion of Dr. Jordan to Assistant Bank Physician was
approved by the Senior Deputy Governor of the Central Bank under Personnel Action
No. 001, Series of 1985. 4 On January 10, 1985, Dr. Jordan was designated to act as
Assistant Bank Physician. On January 30, 1985, she was issued an appointment as
Assistant Bank Physician to take effect January 2, 1985. On February 15, 1985, private
respondent contested Dr. Jordan's appointment claiming that he was the next-in-rank
employee and that he was more qualified than she.
ISSUE:
May the Civil Service Commission disapprove an appointment and require the
appointment of another person whom it believes is more qualified for the position?
HELD:
NO.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the questioned Resolutions of the Civil Service Commission
dated May 26, 1987 and October 16, 1987, respectively, are hereby declared null and void and
the Commission is directed to attest the appointment of Dr. Angela Jordan as Assistant Bank
Physician. No costs.
RATIO:
It is well-settled principle that the appointing authority is given ample discretion in
the selection and appointment of qualified persons to vacant positions. This is a
management prerogative which is generally unhampered by judicial intervention.
Within the parameters of this principle, the right to select and appoint employees is
the prerogative of the employer which may be exercised without being held liable
therefor provided that the exercise thereof is in good faith for the advancement of the
employer's interest and not for the purpose of defeating or circumventing the rights of
the employees under special laws or under valid agreements and provided further that
such prerogatives are not exercised in a malicious, harsh, oppressive, vindictive or
wanton manner, or out of malice or spite.
There is no question that the Central Bank of the Philippines is vested with the power of
appointment under Section 14 of Republic Act No. 265, as amended, otherwise known as
the Central Bank Act. At issue in this petition is the extent of the power of the Civil Service
Commission to approve or disapprove a particular appointment.
Under the Civil Service Act of 1959, the Commissioner of Civil Service has the
final authority on appointments. But the situation has changed under the new law,
Presidential Decree No. 807, otherwise known as the Civil Service Decree, wherein the
Commission is not authorized to curtail the discretion of the appointing official on the
nature or kind of appointment to be extended. The authority of the Commission is
limited to approving or reviewing the appointment in the light of the requirements
of the law governing the Civil Service.
In the case at bar, the qualifications of Dr. Jordan were never disputed. The fact that she was
qualified was attested to by the Promotions Board. A representative of the Commission was
present in the deliberation of the said board.
Private respondent anchors his protest on the ground that he is more qualified than the
appointee. It is well-settled that when the appointee is qualified, as in this case, and
all the other legal requirements are satisfied, the Commission has no alternative but to
attest to the appointment in accordance with the Civil Service Laws. The Commission
has no authority to revoke an appointment on the ground that another person
is more qualified for a particular position. It also has no authority to direct the
appointment of a substitute of its choice. To do so would be an encroachment on
the discretion vested upon the appointing authority. An appointment is essentially within
the discretionary power of whomsoever it is vested, subject to the only condition that the
appointee should possess the qualifications required by law.
The Commission has the authority to check whether or not the appointee possesses the
appropriate civil service eligibility or the required qualifications. If he does, his appointment
must be approved; if not it should be disapproved. No other criterion may be employed by the
Commission when it acts on an appointment.
Thus, when as in this case, it is not disputed that the appointee, Dr. Jordan, is qualified
for the contested position, the Commission exceeded its power in revoking her
appointment on the ground that private respondent is more qualified. The Commission
cannot substitute its will for that of the appointing authority.
The appointing authority found that Dr. Jordan satisfied all the requirements set by the Central
Bank on promotion the wisdom of which cannot be questioned
00

Alim vs. Civil Service Commission, 204 SCRA 510 (KARL)

Aquino vs. Civil Service Commission, 208 SCRA 240 (YESHA)
Victor Aquino vs Civil Service Commission & Leonarda de la Paz
April 22, 1992

Facts: Petitioner Aquino was designated as Officer-in-charge of the Division Supply Office by the DECS
Regional Director in view of the retirement of the Supply Officer I.
Two years thereafter, the Division Superintendent of City Schools issued a promotional appointment to
respondent Leonarda de la Paz as Supply Officer I in the DECS division. The Civil Service Regional Office
IV approved her appointment as permanent.
Petitioner filed a protest with DECS Secretary questioning the qualification and competence of
respondent for the position of Supply Officer I.
Finding the petitioner better qualified than the respondent, the DECS Secretary in a decision sustained
the protest and revoked the appointment of private respondent, and petitioner was issued a permanent
appointment as Supply Officer by the DECS Regional Director. Said appointment was approved by the
Civil Service Regional Office IV.
In an appeal to the CSC, public respondent CSC found the appeal meritorious, thus revoking the
appointment of petitioner and restoring private respondent to her position under her previously approved
appointment.
In the case at bar, petitioner assailing the revocation of his appointment, invokes the rulings in previous
jurisprudence that the CSC has no authority to revoke an appointment on the ground that another
person is more qualified for a particular position for that would have constituted an encroachment on the
discretion vested solely in the appointing authority.

Issue: WoN Civil Service Commission committed grave abuse of discretion in revoking the appointment
of petitioner Aquino as Supply Officer I as it found respondent Leonarda de la Paz better qualified

Held: No. The conclusion of CSC in the questioned decision that private respondent is more qualified
than petitioner merely supports the validity of the restoration of private respondent to her previously
approved appointment considering that she meets the prescribed qualification standards required of the
position of Supply Officer I and the appropriate civil service eligibility.
CSC revoked the appointment of the successful protestant, petitioner herein, principally because the
right to security of tenure of the prior appointee, private respondent herein, to the contested position
had already attached. It must be noted that public respondent CSC did not direct the appointment of a
substitute of its choice. It merely restored the appointment of private respondent who was first appointed
to the contested position.

It is well settled that once an appointment is issued and the moment the appointee assumes position,
he acquires a legal, not merely equitable right, which is protected not only by statute, but also by the
Constitution, and cannot be taken away from him either by revocation of the appointment, or by removal,
except for cause and with previous notice and hearing.

DECS Secretary directed to restore respondent Leonarda de la Paz to her previously approved
appointment as Supply Officer I.

Gayatao vs. Civil Service Commission, 210 SCRA 183 (THERESE)

AGUSTINA G. GAYATAO, petitioner, vs.CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION and BAYANI I.
FERNANDEZ, respondents.

Facts:
Private respondent Bayani I. Fernandez was holding the position of Customs Operations Chief I (COC) in
the Bureau of Customs since March 5, 1984 in a permanent capacity.

He was assigned to the aircraft Operations Division. On October 15, 1987, per Customs Personnel Order
(CPO) No. C-152-87 issued by Commissioner Salvador M. Mison, he was reassigned as Acting Chief of the
Export Division at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA) Customhouse.

On February 15, 1988, Commission Mison, purportedly acting pursuant to Executive Order No. 127
implementing the reorganization of the Department of Finance, Bureau of Customs, appointed petitioner
Agustina G. Gayatao, then a Supervising Customs Trade Examiner, to the position of Customs Operations
Chief at the NAIA Customhouse, effective March 1, 1988 .

Thereafter, in CPO No. B-27-88 dated March 3, 1988, petitioner was designated as COC of the Export
Division at NAIA, while private respondent was designated as Customs Operations Assistant Chief
(COAC) of the Aircraft Operations Division, both designations being effective March 1, 1988.

Aggrieved by the actions of said commissioner, private respondent filed a letter of protest on May 18,1988
before the Merit System Protection Board of respondent Civil Service Commission (CSC) questioning the
appointment of petitioner as COC and his demotion to the position of COAC.

CSC: Revoked the appointment of petitioner Gayatao as Customs Operations Chief and directed the
Bureau of Customs to appoint respondent Fernandez in her stead.

Issue: Whether the CSC committed grave abuse of discretion in revoking the appointment of petitioner
and ordering the appointment of private respondent in her place

Held: NO. CSC decision is affirmed. Petition dismissed.

Ratio:
Petitioner: CSC has no authority to revoke her appointment on the ground that another person is
more qualified, for that would constitute an encroachment on the discretion vested solely in the
appointing authority. In support of said contention, petitioner cites the case of Central Bank of the
Philippines, et al. vs. Civil Service Commission, et al., where the Court ruled that under the Civil Service
Decree (Presidential Decree No. 807), the authority of the CSC is limited to approving or renewing an
appointment in the light of the requisites of the law governing the civil service. The CSC has no authority
to revoke an appointment on the ground that another person is more qualified for a particular position.
It will be in excess of its power if it substitutes its will for that of the appointing authority. The CSC not
being the "appointing power" in contemplation of law, cannot direct the appointment of a substitute of its
choice.

The abovementioned doctrines are inapplicable in this case.

A reading of the questioned resolution of respondent commission readily shows that the revocation of
the appointment of petitioner was based primarily on its finding that the said appointment was null and
void by reason of the fact that it resulted in the demotion of private respondent without lawful cause in
violation of the latter's security of tenure.

Records will show that prior to the reorganization, appellant was already holding the position of Customs
Operations Chief I since March 1984. His reappointment to the position of Customs Operation Assistant
Chief is therefore a clear demotion of rank and position. The Commission finds no sufficient justifiable
reason for this demotion. The appointing authority cannot entirely disregard the rule on equity of
the incumbent and justify demotion in the guise of reorganization, if such demotion will amount to a
penalty without justifiable ground or will result in deprivation of due process on the part of the employee
concerned.

It is within the power of public respondent to order the reinstatement of government employees who have
been unlawfully dismissed. The CSC, as the central personnel agency, has the obligation to implement
and safeguard the constitutional provisions on security of tenure and due process. In the present case, the
issuance by the CSC of the questioned resolutions, for the reasons clearly explained, is indubitably in the
performance of its constitutional task of protecting and strengthening the civil service.

Unclassified Service

Balquidra vs. Court of First Instance of Capiz, 80 SCRA 123 (ZION)
Orcullo vs. Civil Service Commission, 358 SCRA 115 (FROI)
Norberto Orcullo Jr. v. CSC
FACTS:
Petitioner was hired as Project Manager for the Coordinating Council of the Philippines-BOT
Center on March 1996 - with his employment being contractual and coterminous with the project
- which was to end on January 2000
Sept 1996 - 6 months into work, petitioner was fired (inability to work together with other staff,
always absent in outside meetings)
Petitioner appealed to CSC, petition dismissed: his contract stipulates the condition that Unless
terminated earlier
Appealed to CA, petition dismissed
ISSUE: Whether or not employees in the public service, regardless of their status of employment, are
protected by the tenurial security right embodied in the Constitution.
HELD/RATIO: NO - unclassified service provided for by Civil Service Law
contractual, coterminous service is defined falls under unclassified service by the Civil Service
Law:
Sec. 9. Non-Career Service. - The Non-Career Service shall be characterized by (1) entrance on bases
other that those of the usual tests of merit and fitness utilized for the career service; and (2) tenure which
is limited to a period specified by law, or which is coterminous with that of the appointing authority
or subject to his pleasure, or which is limited to the duration of a particular project for which purpose
employment was made.
xxx
(4) Contractual personnel or those whose employment in the government is in accordance with
a employment in the government is in accordance with a special contract to undertake a specific
work or job, requiring special or technical skills not available in the employing agency, to be
accomplished within a specific period, which in no case shall exceed one year, and performs or
accomplishes the specific work or job, under his own responsibility with a minimum of direction
and supervision from the hiring agency.
kinds of co-terminous service (as provided Sec 14 Omnibus Rules Book V Implementing EO
292):
(1) Co-terminous with the project - when the appointment is co-existent with the duration of a particular
project for which purpose employment was made or subject to the availability of funds for the same;
(2) Co-terminous with the appointing authority - when appointment is co-existent with the
tenure of the appointing authority or at his pleasure;
(3) Co-terminous with the incumbent - when the appointment is co-existent with the appointee, in that
after the resignation, separation or termination of the services of the incumbent the position shall be
deemed automatically abolished; and
(4) Co-terminous with a specific period - appointment is for a specific period and upon expiration and
upon thereof, the position is deemed abolished.

Acceptance of Separation Pay

Dytiapco vs. Civil Service Commission, 211 SCRA 88 (KAT)

EDGARDO DYTIAPCO VS. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, OFFICE OF THE PRESS
SECRETARY AND DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF BROADCAST SERVICES [July 03, 1992]

FACTS:
This petition for review seeks to annul and set aside the resolutions of respondent Civil Service
Commission dated June 28, 1989 and November 27, 1989 dismissing the appeal of petitioner Edgardo
Dytiapco to be reinstated in the government service on the ground that he had already received his
separation and terminal leave benefits.
July 28, 1977: petitioner, a Professional Career Service Eligible, was permanently appointed Junior
Newscaster in the Bureau of Broadcast Services (BBS). Thereafter, he was promoted Senior Newscaster on
February 16, 1979 and sent to Anaheim, California on September 1987 as representative of the Bureau of
Broadcast in the National Association of Broadcaster Convention
Executive Order No. 297 reorganizing the Office of the Press Secretary including the Bureau of
Broadcast took effect on July 25, 1987.
December 28, 1987: petitioner received a letter from the Press Secretary "That due to limited
number of positions in the approved new staffing pattern," his "services shall be considered only until
January 31, 1988]
Petitioner immediately appealed his dismissal to the Press Secretary and protested the adverse
rating given him by the Evaluation Committee formed to effect the reorganization of the Bureau of
Broadcast Services
finding himself in dire financial straits, petitioner filed a claim for separation and terminal
leave benefits and on May 5, 1988 received from the Bureau of Broadcast the sums of P26,779.72 and
P19,028.86 as separation and terminal leave pay
May 12, 1988: petitioner wrote respondent Civil Service Commission appealing for his reinstatement
on the ground that his termination was without a valid cause as he is a Civil Service eligible holding a
permanent appointment
ISSUE:
WON Dytiapco should be reinstated despite already receiving his separation and terminal leave benefits?
HELD:
YES
Respondent Civil Service Commission gravely abused its discretion in finding that petitioner's receipt of
separation and terminal leave benefits renders his appeal closed and terminated
The Resolutions of the CSC of June 28, 1989 and November 27, 1989 are hereby annulled and set aside.
Respondents Press Secretary and Director of the Bureau of Broadcasts are hereby ordered to reinstate
petitioner Edgardo Dytiapco to the position he was holding immediately before his dismissal without
loss of seniority with full pay for the period of his separation. Petitioner is likewise ordered to return to
respondent Bureau of Broadcast the separation pay and terminal leave benefits he received in the amount
of P26,779.72 and P19,028.86 respectively.

RATIO:
Petitioner never abandoned his appeal for reinstatement when he accepted separation pay and
terminal leave benefits.
His acceptance of separation and terminal leave benefits was dictated more by economic necessity
rather than a desire to leave government employment.
The procedures for the removal of employees pursuant to government reorganization such as
that mandated by Executive Order No. 297 was laid down by Republic Act No. 6656, entitled "An Act
To Protect the Security of Tenure of Civil Service Officers and Employees in the Implementation of
Government Reorganization", which was given retroactive effect as of June 30, 1987.
Petitioner's dismissal was not for a valid cause, thereby violating his right to security
of tenure. The reason given for his termination, that there is a "limited number of positions in the
approved new staffing pattern" necessitating his separation on January 31, 1988, is simply not true.
There is no evidence that his position as senior newscaster has been abolished, rendered redundant or
merged and/or divided or consolidated with other positions. According to petitioner, respondent Bureau
of Broadcast had accepted applicants to the position he vacated. He was conveniently eased out of the
service which he served with distinction for thirteen (13) years to accommodate the proteges of the "new
power brokers".
Respondent Commission's reliance on its earlier decision in the leofilo Pa-alan case promulgated
on April 21, 1989, that acceptance of benefits renders an appeal "closed and terminated", is misplaced.
It deprives petitioner of his right to due process and added another ground for his removal not
contemplated by R.A. No. 6656, that is, the mere payment of his separation and terminal leave benefits.
Settled is the rule that separation or replacement of officers and employees pursuant
to government reorganization should be only for "justifiable reasons" or for any of the
grounds enumerated in Section 3 of Executive Order No. 17.
The separation of Career Civil Service employees pursuant to such reorganization must be done in
good faith.
In recourse, petitioner is a holder of a Professional Career Civil Service eligibility. He
had been permanently appointed to the government service since 1977, had been president
and even sent abroad to represent the Bureau of Broadcast in the National Association of
Broadcaster Convention in 1987. He was not removed for any of the grounds mentioned in
Section 3 of E.O. No. 17 nor pursuant to a valid cause under Section 2 of R.A. No. 6656.

Validity of Appointment Dependent on Legality of Dismissal

Costin vs. Quimbo, 120 SCRA 159 (KARL)

Facts:

Petitioner Estanislao Lajer was a member of the municipal police force of Abuyog, Leyte since Jan 1, 1949.
He was extended a promotional appointment as sergeant of police on Oct 15, 1958. On Nov 25, 1959, the
outgoing municipal mayor of Abuyog accorded him another promotional appointment as chief of police. This last
appointment was not attested and approved as required by law.

On Jan 14, 1960, the new municipal mayor dismissed Lajer and 8 other policemen and extended to respondent
Higinio Verra a permanent appointment as Chief of Police. Verras appointment was eventually approved as
permanent in accordance with Sec. 24 (b) of Republic Act 2260 by the Commissioner of Civil Service.

On Jan 19, 1960, Lajer, et al filed an action for mandamus (Civil Case No. 2713) against the mayor, treasurer and
the municipal council of Abuyog, contesting their separation from the service.

While this petition for mandamus was pending, there was a change in the admin as a result of the 1963 local
elections. The newly elected mayor dismissed Verra and appointed petitioner Marcial Costin as chief of police.

On Dec 29, 1964, Verra filed Civil Case No. 3606 for quo warranto with mandamus against Costin, the mayor, and
the treasurer, questioning the legality of his separation alleging that he could not be dismissed because he was a
civil service eligible and was in possession of a permanent appointment attested by the CSC.

The mandamus suit (Civil Case No. 2713) filed by Lajer, et al prospered and was appealed to the CA. On Jan 22,
1966, CA held that Lajer and 2 others were illegally removed from office and are entitled to reinstatement with
payment of the back wages. Thus, petitioner (then mayor) Tisado reinstated Lajer as chief of police on April 1,
1966.

On Dec 2, 1969, respondent judge rendered his decision in Civil Case No. 3606, declaring Verra to be entitled to
immediate reinstatement with back salary.

Petitioners then brought this decision to the SC in a petition for review, seeking its annulment or reversal.

Issues:

WON the appointment of Verra to the position of Chief of Police of Abuyog was valid and consequently his removal
therefrom illegal.
Whether the CA in its decision in the Civil Case No. 2713 ordered the reinstatement of Lajer to the position of
Sergeant of Police or Chief of Police.
WON Verra is bound by the decision of the lower court in Case No. 2713 for mandamus, not being a party to it.
Held/ Ratio:

1.No. The validity of Verras appointment hinges on the legality of Lajers removal. It is elementary in the law
of public officer that no person, no matter how qualified and eligible for a certain position, may be appointed to
an office which is not vacant. There can be no appointment to a non-vacant position. The incumbent must first be
legally removed or his appointment validly terminated.

The lower court overlooked the fact that Verra could not have been permanently appointed to the position because
no less than the CA had declared that his predecessor, Lajer, was illegally terminated from office and must be
reinstated.

Verra argues that Lajers appointment was temporary and terminable at the pleasure of the appointing power as it
could not be considered final or complete, not having been attested by the prov. treasurer in accordance with Sec.
20 of RA 2260 and not having been certified by the Commissioner of Civil Service as provided for in Section 2(a) of
Rule VI of the Civil Service Rules implementing Section 16(g) of RA 2260.

However, said requirements could not be complied with because Lajer who have been appointed on Nov. 25, 1959
was replaced on Jan 14, 1960 by the new mayor who appointed Verra. Citing Dichoso vs. Valdepenas, SC stated
that the incoming mayor should have awaited the action of the prov. treasurer and the Commissioner, before
appointing his own protg. Thus, Verra cannot rely on the absence of an attestation and certification because by
the fact of Verras appointment, these requirements could no longer be fulfilled. Mayor Traya took the appointment
away from the Office of the Prov. Treasurer and subsequently from the Commissioner before they could be acted
upon.

2.Lajer was reinstated to the position of chief of police. Mr. Lajer did not go to court to contest the position of
police sergeant. Lajer filed a petition for mandamus to be reinstated as chief of police. When the decision of the
CFI of Leyte ordering Lajers reinstatement was appealed to the CA, the CA specifically described petitioner Lajer as
chief of police.

3.Yes. The issue before the CFI and the CA in the Mandamus suit was WON the Mayor, Municipal council,
Treasurer, and the Municipality of Abuyog illegally terminated the chief of police, sergeant, and six other members
of the police and WON mandamus may issue to compel their reinstatement. Mandamus having issued, any person
whether Verra or any other appointee to the contested position must give up the office in favor of the officer
adjudged by the courts to be entitled to it.

Disposition: Petition is hereby granted.

Transfers

Department of Education, Culture and Sports vs. Court of Appeals, 183 SCRA 555 (YESHA)
DECS, represented by Edna Azurin, Anastacio Ramento, and Hon. Onofre Corpus vs Court of Appeals vs
Gloria Navarro

Facts:
Gloria V. Navarro was appointed Secondary School Principal II, without reference to any particular
school. In 1982, petitioner Edna B. Azurin in her capacity as Schools Division Superintendent of Quezon
City, effected a reshuffling of all high school principals in Quezon City in the exigencies of the service, as
all of the principals had been overstaying in one station for more than five (5) years. As a result of said
reshuffling, respondent Navarro was reassigned from Carlos Albert High School to the Manuel Roxas
High School (both in QC) without demotion in rank nor diminution in salary.

Respondent Navarro wrote a letter to the petitioner, requesting for a reconsideration of her transfer
or reassignment and citing her achievements as an administrator of Carlos Albert High School as her
reason therefor. Petitioner Azurin denied the said request explaining that respondent Navarro's new
assignment was made in the exigencies of the service and precisely in recognition of her capabilities as
school administrator, and that since respondent Navarro had already spent ten (10) years as principal in
Carlos Albert High School, she was accordingly advised to consider her new assignment as a challenge to
accomplish new and bigger projects for Manuel Roxas High School.

Despite the denial of her request for reconsideration, respondent Navarro gave notice to petitioner Azurin
that she would not comply with her new assignment allegedly because the Magna Carta for Public School
Teachers states that no principal/teacher could be transferred without her consent and that the reasons
for her transfer are not plausible.

Issue: WoN the reassignment of Gloria Navarro is valid

Held: Yes, reasons given by Azurin in recommending Navarro's reassignment were far from whimsical,
capricious or arbitrary.

Ratio:
Sec 6 of Republic Act No. 4670 known as the Magna Carta of Public School Teachers: Except for cause
and as herein otherwise provided, no teacher shall be transferred without his consent from one station
to another. Where the exigencies of the service require the transfer of a teacher from one station to
another, such transfer may be effected by the school superintendent who shall previously notify the
teacher concerned of the transfer and the reason or reasons therefor.

Moreover, respondent Navarro has not exhausted administrative remedies as she did not elevate the
matter of her transfer to the Civil Service Commission in accordance with Section 24 (c) PD No. 807,
otherwise known as the Civil Service Decree which provides:

"(C) Transfer. A transfer is a movement from one position to another which is equivalent in rank, level,
or salary without break in service involving the issuance of an appointment.

It shall not be considered disciplinary when made in the interest of public service, in which case, the
employees concerned shall be informed of the reasons therefor. If the employee believes that there is no
justification for the transfer he may appeal his case to the (Civil Service) Commission."

By not appealing her case to the Civil Service Commission before filing Special Civil Action No. Q-37025,
respondent Navarro is indubitably without cause of action.

*De Guzman vs. Commission on Elections, 336 SCRA 188 (THERESE) -refer to my digest
above (same case lang :D)

Cario vs. Daoas, 380 SCRA 355 (ZION)
Pastor vs. City of Pasig, 382 SCRA 232 (FROI)
Rualo vs. Petargue, 449 SCRA 121 (KAT)
00Facts:
On 26 October 1993, President Fidel V. Ramos (President Ramos) issued Executive
Order No. 132, entitled Approving the Streamlining of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue. On 28 July 1997, President Ramos issued Executive Order No. 430 (EO
430) entitled Further Streamlining the Bureau of Internal Revenue in line with its
Computerized Integrated Tax System.
On 17 September 1997, then BIR Commissioner Liwayway Vinzons-Chato
(Commissioner Vinzons-Chato) issued Revenue Memorandum Order No. 57-97
(RMO 57-97) prescribing the Policies and Guidelines on Streamlining the Bureau
of Internal Revenue under Executive Order No. 430 which included redeployment of
personnel
On 24 November 1997, Commissioner Vinzons-Chato issued RTAO 28-97 reassigning
certain revenue personnel citing the exigencies of the revenue service as well as EO
430 and RMO 57-97 as basis.
Pitargue raised the issue of whether funds appropriated for a specific purpose may be
transferred as a result of the reorganization of the BIR as provided in EO 430 and its
implementing policies and guidelines under RMO 57-97
Pitargue, testifying in his capacity as a taxpayer, declared that he has a right to seek
protection against the misappropriation of public funds resulting from the reorganization
in the BIR which he claims is violative of the provisions of the Constitution and the
General Appropriations Act of 1997. Perez, a Chief Revenue Officer of the BIR,
testified that the issuance of several RTAOs threatens her right to security of tenure
ISSUE:
Whether Pitargue, Perez and Vasquez are entitled to the writ of preliminary injunction
granted by the trial court
HELD:
NO
RATIO
For respondents to be entitled to an injunctive writ, they must show that there exists
a right to be protected and that the acts against which the injunction is directed are
violative of the right. We note that respondents employed the shotgun approach in
their petition before the trial court to show their entitlement to the writ of preliminary
injunction. Pitargue sued as a taxpayer fearing possible misappropriation of public
funds. Vasquez, who received an RTAO reassigning him, raised violation of his
constitutional rights to security of tenure and to due process. Perez sued as a BIR
employee fearing a violation of her constitutional rights to security of tenure and to
due process by a probable inclusion in the RTAOs. Let us examine whether their
allegations are sufficient for the issuance of an injunctive writ.
As to Pitargue, it is premature for him to raise violation of the appropriation laws as an
issue
Section 3 of EO 430 prevents any transfer of appropriation or any augmentation of the
funds available for Personal Services. It is speculative on the part of respondents
to assert that funds intended for another purpose have been transferred to meet the
funding requirements of an impending reorganization under EO 430 and the present
reassignments under RMO 57-97 and RTAO 28-97 and 1-98 to 35-98.
It was premature for respondents to raise violation of appropriation laws as an issue as
final placement shall take place only upon approval of the Revised Staffing Pattern of
the BIR by the Department of Finance and Department of Budget and Management.
Being BIR employees, Perez and Vasquez focused their objections on security of
tenure. In the case of Perez, respondents object to the specter of a transfer. In the
case of Vasquez, respondents object to the place of transfer. Under the law, any
employee who questions the validity of his transfer should appeal to the Civil
Service Commission. The trial court should have dismissed the case as to Perez
and Vasquez, who both failed to exhaust administrative remedies.
To subordinate essential government services, along with the great resources and
efforts they entail, to the individual preferences and opinions of civil service employees,
would negate the principle that a public office is a public trust and that it is not the
private preserve of any person
Section 2(3), Article IX-B of the Constitution provides that [n]o officer or employee of
the civil service shall be removed or suspended except for cause provided by law.
Respondents did not cite any BIR employee who suffered a diminution of rank and
salary as a result of the issued RTAOs. Neither did they cite any BIR employee
who was removed from office as a result of the transfers. Failing these, we assert
the presumption of regularity of the issuance of the RTAOs - that Commissioner
Vinzons-Chato issued the RTAOs as part of a bona-fide reassignment of selected BIR
employees to streamline the Bureaus services.
Courts should avoid issuing a writ of preliminary injunction which would in effect dispose
of the main case without trial.[36] In issuing the writ of preliminary injunction, the
trial court did not maintain the status quo but restored the situation before the status
quo, that is, the situation before the issuance of the RTAOs. In effect, the trial court
accepted respondents premise about an unlawful reorganization and prejudged the
constitutionality of the questioned issuances (EO 430, RMO 57-97 and RTAO 28-97
and 1-98 to 35-98).

B. Commission of Elections

1. Composition & Qualifications of Commissioners
Art. IX, C, Sec. 1
Art. VII, Sec. 13
*Macalintal vs. Commission on Elections, 405 SCRA 614 (KARL)

Cayetano v. Monsod, 201 SCRA 210 (YESHA)
CaRespondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the position of
chairman of the COMELEC. Petitioner opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does not
possess required qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. The
1987 constitution provides in Section 1, Article IX-C: There shall be a Commission on Elections composed
of a Chairman and six Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the
time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a college degree, and must not have
been candidates for any elective position in the immediately preceding elections. However, a majority
thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten years.

ISSUE: W/N MONSOD HAS BEEN ENGAGED IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW FOR 1O YEARS?

HELD: YES. The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court. It embraces the
preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the management of
such
actions and proceedings on behalf of clients, and other works where the work done involves the
determination of the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions (PLA vs. Agrava.)
The records of the 1986 constitutional commission show that the interpretation of the term practice of law
was liberal as to consider lawyers employed in the Commission of Audit as engaged in the practice of law
provided that they use their legal knowledge or talent in their respective work.
The court also cited an article in the January 11, 1989 issue of the Business Star, that lawyers nowadays
have their own specialized fields such as tax lawyers, prosecutors, etc., that because of the demands of
their specialization, lawyers engage in other works or functions to meet them. These days, for example,
most
corporation lawyers are involved in management policy formulation. Therefore, Monsod, who passed the
bar in 1960, worked with the World Bank Group from 19631970, then worked for an investment bank till
1986, became member of the CONCOM in 1986, and also became a member of the Davide Commission
in 1990, can be considered to have been engaged in the practice of law as lawyer-economist, lawyer-
manager, lawyer-entrepreneur, etc.

ISSUE: W/N THE COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
IN CONFIRMING MONSOD'S APPOINTMENT?

HELD: NO. The power of the COA to give consent to the nomination of the Comelec Chairman by the
president is mandated by the constitution. The power of appointment is essentially within the discretion
of whom it is so vested subject to the only condition that the appointee should possess the qualification
required by law. From the evidence, there is no occasion for the SC to exercise its corrective power since
there is no such grave abuse of discretion on the part of the CA.

2. Appointment & Term of Office and Rule against Reappointment
Art. IX, C, Sec. 1
Nacionalista Party v. Angelo Bautista, 85 PHIL 103 (1949) (THERESE)

Facts: President Quirino designated the Solicitor General as Acting member of the Comelec in
November, 1949. The Nacionalista Party filed this action for prohibition on the following grounds:
(1) the Solicitor General did not resign from his office;
(2) there is no vacancy in the Comelec because the retirement of the Comelec member causing the vacancy
was accepted by the President in bad faith (the granting of Commissioner Francisco Enages retirement
application was said to have been done in bad faith based on the allegation that the Commissioner voted
to suspend the elections in Negros Occidental and Lanao and the Liberal Party fears he might vote to
annul the said elections); and
(3) assuming there indeed was a vacancy, the functions of a Solicitor General are incompatible with that of
a Comelec member.

Issue: Whether or not the designation was valid

Held: NO, it was not. By the nature of the Comelec's functions, the Comelec must be independent.

Ratio: Members of the COMELEC are not allowed to perform other functions, powers and duties to
preserve its impartiality. The Solicitor General's duties also require undivided time and attention for
efficiency.

Issue: Whether or not prohibition would lie

Held: NO. The case is by nature a quo warranto proceeding because it questions the legality of the
respondent's designation or his right to office. The proceeding is instituted by the other party claiming the
position occupied and/or the Solicitor General.
Prohibition however, has a different purpose, which is to prevent the usurpation of jurisdiction by a
subordinate court.
Although there is no other party who claims a right over the position occupied and nor will the Solicitor
General file a case against himself, the court must grant the remedy of a quo warranto proceeding because
the Solicitor General's continued occupancy as member of the Comelec is illegal.

Brillantes v. Yorac, 192 SCRA 358 (DEC 18, 1990) (ZION)
Art. IX-A, Sec. 1
NP v. Vera, 85 Phil 149 (FROI)
NP v. Vera, 85 Phil 149 (from polifile)

F: This is an action brought by the Nacionalista Party against De Vera on the ground that his appointment
as Chairman of the COMELEC is a violation of the Constitution particularly Art. X, Sec. 1 of the 1935
Constitution which provides that the members of the COMELEC shall hold office for nine years without
reappointment.

Held: The prohibition against reappointment comes as a continuation of the requirement that the
Commission shall hold office for a term of nine years. Reappointment is not prohibited provided his term
will not exceed nine years in all.

In July 1945, three Commissioners were appointed. De Vera was appointed for three years. If he were to
succeed himself, he cannot be reappointed to do so because that would preclude the appointment of a new
member after 3 years and would furthermore increase his term to 12 years since upon the expiration of his
term, his successor must be appointed for nine years.

But in this case, de Vera's appointment was by virtue of the death of the Chairman in 1947 and he was
promoted to occupy the chairmanship of the Commission for the unexpired term only. Thus, this is not
offensive to the Constitution because it does not increase de Vera's term of office to more than nine years
nor does it preclude the appointment of a new member upon the expiration of the first term of three
years.

Republic v. Imperial, 96 Phil 770 (KAT)
F: This is a quo warranto proceeding to test the legality of the continuance in office of Imperial as
Chairman and Perez as member of COMELEC. When Chairman de Vera died in August 1951, before
the expiration of the maximum term of nine years of the Chairman of the Commission, Imperial was
appointed Chairman to succeed de Vera. His appointment provided for a term expiring July 12, 1960.
The SG contended that the term for which he will legally serve as Chairman legally expired on July 12,
1954, the expiration of the 9 year term for which the first Chairman was appointed. Comelec member
Perez on the other hand, was appointed for a term of 9 years expiring on 24 November 1958. The SG
contended that his term legally expired on July 12, 1951, the expiration of the term of 6 years for which
Commissioner Enage, his predecessor was appointed.
Held: The terms cannot begin from the first appointments made in July 12, 1945 but from the date of
the organization of the COMELEC under CA 657 on June 21, 1941. Thus, the term of office of the first
Chairman, Lopez Vito began on June 21, 1941 and ended June 20, 1950. That of member Enage began on
June 21, 1941 to June 20, 1944 (but this was not filled). Since the first 3 year term had already expired in
1944, the appointment
of De Vera on June 12, 1945 must be for the full term of nine years (June 1944 to June 1953). The first
vacancy occurred by the expiration of the term of Enage. His successor, Perez, was named for a full 9
year term which shall have started on June 1947 to June 1956. The second vacancy happened upon the
death of Lopez Vito on May 1947. To succeed him, de Vera appointed and lasted only up to June 1950,
the unexpired period of Lopez Vito's term. Thus, on June 1950, a vacancy occurred which De Vera could
no longer fill because his appointment was expressly prohibited by the Constitution. Thus, the next
Chairman was respondent Imperial whose term of 9 years must be deemed to have began on June 21,
1990 to expire on June 20, 1959.

*Matibag vs. Benipayo, 380 SCRA 49 (KARL)

3. Appointment of Personnel
Art. IX, A, Sec. 4

4. Salary
Art. IX, A, Sec. 3
Art. XVIII, Sec. 17

5. Disqualification

Art. IX, A, Sec. 2

6. Impeachment
Art. XI, Sec. 2

7. Powers & Functions of the COMELEC

a. Enforce Election Laws
Art. IX, C, Sec. 2. (1)

Sanchez v. COMELEC, 114 SCRA 454 (YESHA)
Virgilio Sanchez vs Commission on Elections
June 19, 1982

FACTS
- Jan. 30, 1980 local elections- Sanchez and Biliwang ran for Mayor of San Fernando, Pampanga
- Biliwang was proclaimed winner
- Sanchez filed with COMELEC a Petition to declare null and void the local elections due to alleged large
scale terrorism
- Ultimately, the COMELEC found that after the voting was over in the local elections, terrorism and
irregularities were committed- counters were threatened by armed goons and policemen into making
spurious election returns in favor of Biliwang.
- Thus, COMELEC issued a resolution ordering:
1. The annulment the Jan. 30, 1980 election and the setting aside of the proclamation of Biliwang
2. To certify to the President/Prime Minister and the Batasang Pambansa the failure of election, so
that remedial legislation may be enacted, and pending such enactment, the President/PM may appoint
municipal officials in San Fernando
- Sanchez sought reconsideration of the COMELEC Resolution certifying the failure of election, and
praying instead that COMELEC call a special election in San Fernando
- COMELEC denied reconsideration
- Both Biliwang and Sanchez filed petitions with the SC, which were consolidated into the following
issues:

ISSUES
1. WON the COMELEC has the power to annul an entire municipal election on the ground of post-election
terrorism
2. WON the COMELEC has the authority to call for a special election

HELD
1. Biliwang asserts that COMELEC lacks the power to annul elections of municipal officials because, under
Section 190 of the 1978 Election Code, the power to try election contests relative to elective municipal
officials is vested in the CFI
- SC: It may be true there is no specific provision vesting COMELEC with authority to annul an election.
Under the 1935 Constitution, the SC said that COMELEC did not have this power, and that instead
the power lay with the Senate Electoral Tribunal and the House Electoral Tribunal. Now, however, it
is the sole judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of all members of the
Batasang Pambansa and elective provincial and city officials. The COMELEC must be deemed possessed
of the authority, in line with its plenitude of powers and its function to protect the integrity of elections.
2. COMELEC opined that it had no powers to order the holding of a new or special election, because
the actual election itself took place, and in a proper, orderly fashion. According to COMELEC, the Batas
Pambansa Blg. 52 grants COMELEC authority to call for a new or special election only in a failure of
election, but in this case, there was a failure to gauge the true and genuine will of the electorate, as
opposed to a failure of election (tainted casting of ballots (failure of election) vs. tainted counting of
ballots (failure to gauge the will))
- SC: to state that this is not the failure of election contemplated by Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 because
elections did take place is too tenuous a distinction. In practical effect, no election has been held; there
has been in truth and in fact, a failure to elect. This interpretation only hampers the effectiveness of the
COMELEC and delays the opportunity to the voters to cast their votes.
Decision The SC upholds the power and prerogative of the COMELEC to annul an election and to call
for a special election.

Gallardo vs. Tabamo, 218 SCRA 253 (THERESE)

ANTONIO GALLARDO, ANTONIO AREVALO, CRESENCIO ECHAVEZ, EMMANUEL
ARANAS, PALERMO SIA, RONNIE RAMBUYAN,PRIMO NAVARRO and NOEL NAVARRO,
petitioners, vs. HON. SINFOROSO V. TABAMO, JR., in his capacity as Presiding Judge
of Branch 28 of the Regional Trial Court of Mambajao, Camiguin, and PEDRO P.
ROMUALDO, respondents

This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court. Petitioners
seek to prohibit, restrain and enjoin respondent Judge Tabamo from continuing with the proceedings in a
petition for injunction, prohibition and mandamus with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and
restraining order filed as a taxpayers suit. At the time of filing both the special civil action and the instant
petition, petitioner Antonio Gallardo was the incumbent Governor of the Province of Camiguin and was
seeking re-election in the May 11, 1992 synchronized elections. Petitioners Arevalo, Echavez, Aranas, and
Sia are the provincial treasurer, provincial auditor, provincial engineer, and provincial budget officer of
Camiguin. Their co-petitioners Rambuyon, Primo and Noel Navarro are all government project laborers.
On the other hand, the private respondent was the incumbent Congressman of the lone Congressional
district of Camiguin, a candidate for the same office in the said synchronized elections and the Regional
Chairman of the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) in Region X.

FACTS: April 10, 1992: private respondent filed his Petition (Special Civil Action No. 465) before the
court a quo against petitioners to prohibit and restrain them from pursuing or prosecuting certain
public works projects as it violates the 45-dayban on public works imposed by the Omnibus Election
Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 881) because although they were initiated few days before March 27, 1992,
the date the ban took effect, they were not covered by detailed engineering plans, specifications or a
program of work which are preconditions for the commencement of any public works project. The
questioned projects are classified into two (2) categories: (a) those that are Locally-Funded, consisting
of 29 different projects for the maintenance or concreting of various roads, the rehabilitation of the
Katibawasan Falls and the construction of the Capitol Building, and (b) those designated as Foreign-
Assisted, consisting of fifteen (15) projects which include the construction of Human Development
Center, various Day Care cum Production Centers and waterworks systems; the extension and renovation
of various buildings; the acquisition of hospital and laboratory equipment; and the rehabilitation of office
and equipment. On the same day, respondent Judge issued the question TRO. In the same order, he
directed the petitioners to file their Answer within 10 days from receipt of notice and set the hearing on
the application for the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction for April 24, 1992. Instead of filing
the Answer, the petitioners filed the special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, with a prayer for a
writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order. They contend that the case principally
involves an alleged violation of the Omnibus Election Code thus the jurisdiction is exclusively vested in
the Comelec, not the Regional Trial Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of Special Civil Action No.
465.

RULING:
The material operative facts alleged in the petition therein inexorably link the private respondent's
principal grievance to alleged violations of paragraphs (a), (b), (v) and (w), Section 261 of the Omnibus
Election Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 881).There is particular emphasis on the last two (2) paragraphs
which read:

Sec. 261. The following shall be guilty of an election offense:
(a) Vote-buying and vote-selling
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Conspiracy to bribe voters
xxx xxx xxx
(v) Prohibition against release, disbursement or expenditure of public funds. Any
public official or employee includingbarangay officials and those of government-owned or controlled
corporations and their subsidiaries, who, during forty-fivedays before a regular election and thirty days
before a special election, releases, disburses or expends any public fundsfor:

(1) Any and all kinds of public works, except the following:
xxx xxx xxx
(w) Prohibition against construction of public works, delivery of materials for public works
and issuance of treasury warrants and similar devices. During the period of forty-five days
preceding a regular election and thirty days before a special election, any person who (a) undertakes the
construction of any public works, except for projects or works exempted in the preceding paragraph; or
(b) issues, uses or avails of treasury warrants or any device undertaking future delivery of money, goods or
other things of value chargeable against public funds.

The court ruled that Comelec has jurisdiction to enforce and administer all laws relative to the conduct
of elections. The 1987 Constitution implicitly grants the Commission the power to promulgate such rules
and regulations as provided in Section 2 of Article IX-C. Moreover, the present Constitution also invests
the Comission with the power to investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute cases of violations of
election law, including acts or omissions constituting election frauds, offenses, and malpractices. It is not
true that, as contended by the petitioners, the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court under the election
laws is limited to criminal actions for violations of the Omnibus Election Code. The Constitution itself
grants to it exclusive original jurisdiction over contests involving elective municipal officials.

Neither can the Court agree with the petitioners' assertion that the Special Civil Action filed in the RTC
below involves the prosecution of election offenses; the said action seeks some reliefs incident to or in
connection with alleged election offenses; specifically, what is sought is the prevention of the further
commission of these offenses which, by their alleged nature, are continuing. There is as well no merit in
the petitioners' claim that the private respondent has no legal standing to initiate the filing of a complaint
for a violation of the Omnibus Election Code. There is nothing in the law to prevent any citizen from
exposing the commission of an election offense and from filing a complaint in connection therewith. On
the contrary, under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, initiation of complaints for election offenses may
be done motu propio by the Commission on Elections or upon written complaint by any citizen, candidate
or registered political party or organization under the party-list system or any of the accredited citizens
arms of the Commission.

However, such written complaints should be filed with the "Law Department of the Commission; or with
the offices of the Election Registrars, Provincial Election Supervisors or Regional Election Directors, or
the State Prosecutor, Provincial Fiscal or City Fiscal." As earlier intimated, the private respondent was not
seriously concerned with the criminal aspect of his alleged grievances. He merely sought a stoppage of the
public works projects because of their alleged adverse effect on his candidacy. Indeed, while he may have
had reason to fear and may have even done the right thing, he committed a serious procedural misstep
and invoked the wrong authority. The court, therefore, has no alternative but to grant this petition on
the basis their resolution of the principal issue. Nevertheless, it must be strongly emphasized that in so
holding that the trial court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of Special Civil Action No. 465.

b. Decide Administrative Question re Election except Right to Vote

Art. IX, C, Sec. 2 (3)

c. Petition for Inclusion or Exclusion of Voters

Art. IX, C, Sec. 2. (6)

d. Prosecute Election Law Violations

*BP Blg. 881, Sec. 265
EO 134, Sec. 11, February 27, 1987
De Jesus v. People, 120 SCRA 760 (ZION)
Corpus v. Tanodbayan, 149 SCRA 281 (FROI)
People v. Basilla, 179 SCRA 87 (KAT)

DOCTRINE: The COMELEC may validly delegate this power (Jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute
cases) to the Provincial Fiscal

FACTS:
As an aftermath of the May 1987 congressional elections in Masbate, complaints for violations
of Section 261 of the Omnibus Election Code (BP Blg. 881) were filed with the Office of the
Provincial Fiscal of Masbate against the private respondents for vote-buying and for carrying of
deadly weapon.
ISSUE
WON the Commission on Elections ("Comelec") has authority to deputize the chief state
prosecutors, provincial and city fiscals and their assistants, under Sections 2 (4) and (8 ), Article
IX-C of the 1987 Constitution, and WON the Comelec did deputize such prosecution officers
to conduct preliminary investigation of complaints for alleged violation of election laws and to
institute criminal informations therefor
HELD:
YES The Petition must be granted.
RATIO:
There is no dispute that the Comelec is vested with power and authority to conduct preliminary
investigation of all election offenses punishable under the Omnibus Election Code and to
prosecute such offenses in court.
We note that while Section 265 of the Code vests "exclusive power" to conduct preliminary
investigation of election offenses and to prosecute the same upon the Comelec, it at the same
time authorizes the Comelec to avail itself of the assistance of other prosecuting arms of
the Government. Section 2 of Article IX-C of the 1 987 Constitution clearly envisage that the
Comelec would not be compelled to carry out all its functions directly and by itself alone.
The concurrence of the President with the deputation by Comelec of the prosecuting arms of the
Government, was expressed in general terms and in advance in Executive Order No. 134.
The prompt investigation and prosecution and disposition of election offenses constitute
an indispensable part of the task of securing free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible
elections. The investigation and prosecution of election offenses are, in an important sense,
more important than the maintenance of physical order in election precinct. 'without the
assistance of provincial and city fiscals and their assistants and staff members, and of the state
prosecutors of the Department of Justice, the prompt and fair investigation and prosecution of
election offenses committed before or in the course of nationwide elections would simply not
be possible, unless, perhaps, the Comelec had a bureaucracy many times larger than what it
actually has. Moreover, the prosecution officers designated by the Comelec become deputies
or agents of the Comelec and pro tanto subject to the authority, control and supervision of the
Comelec in respect of the particular functions covered by such deputation. The acts of such
deputies within the lawful scope of their delegated authority are, in legal contemplation, the
acts of the Comelec itself. The only limitation the Constitution itself places upon the Comelec's
authority over its deputies relates to the enforcement of such authority through administrative
sanctions. Such sanctions-e.g., suspension or removal-may be recommended by the Comelec
to the President (Sec. 2 [8], Article IX-C, 1987 Constitution) rather than directly imposed by the
Comelec, evidently, to pre-empt and avoid potential difficulties with the executive department of
the Government where the prosecution and other officers deputized are ordinarily located.

People v. Inting, 187 SCRA 788 (1990) (KARL)
Article IX-C, Sec. 2

People v. Delgado, 189 SCRA 715 (1990) (YESHA)
People v. Delgado, 189 SCRA 715 (1990)
F: Upon recommendation of the provincial election supervisor, who conducted a preliminary
investigation of the alleged election offenses of Delgado, et. al, the Comelec filed an information against
the latter. The respondents moved for reconsideration and the suspension of the warrants of arrests on
the ground that no preliminary investigation was conducted. The trial court ordered for reinvestigation.
The Comelec opposed the order on the ground that only the SC may review the decisions, orders,
resolutions of the Comelec. The trial court denied the Comelec motion. Hence this certiorari.

ISSUE: W/N THE COMELEC ACTION MAY BE REVIEWED ONLY ON CERTIORARI BY THE SC?
HELD: NO. According to the constitution, the Comelec has the following functions: (1) enforcement of
election
laws; (2) decision of election contests; (3) decision of administrative questions; (4) deputizing law
enforcement
agencies; (5) registration of political parties; and (6) improvement of elections. What are reviewable on
certiorari by the SC are those orders, decisions, etc., rendered in actions or proceedings before the
Comelec in
the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers. Thus decisions of the Comelec on election
contests or
on administrative questions are subject to judicial review only by the SC. In this case, no Comelec
adjudicatory
power is exercised. As a public prosecutor, the Comelec has the exclusive authority to conduct preliminary
investigation and prosecute offenses punishable under the election code before the competent court. But
when
the Comelec files the information, the subsequent disposition of the case is subject to the court's approval.
The
Comelec can't conduct reinvestigation unless so ordered by that court nor refuse its order of
reinvestigation.

Commission on Elections vs. Silva, 286 SCRA 177 (THERESE)

G.R. No. 129417 February 10, 1998
COMELEC vs. SILVA
FACTS: The Private Respondents, who were charged of having tampered some certificates of canvass,
moved for the Dismissal of the Cases filed against them. The Chief State Prosecutor, who had been
designated by the Commission on Elections to prosecute the cases, filed a comment joining in private
respondents' request. Eventually, the cases were dismissed. The COMELEC sought to appeal the dismissal
of the cases to the Court of Appeals. When the Chief State Prosecutor was required to comment, he
stated that he cannot give his conformity to the Notice of Appeal filed by the Comelec as it would not be
consistent with his position that he would abide by whatever finding the court may come up with on the
existence of probable cause as against the Private Respondents. Thus, the judges denied due course to the
appeal. The sole basis for the denial was the fact that the prosecutor, whom the COMELEC had deputized
to prosecute the cases, had earlier taken a contrary stand against the COMELEC.

ISSUE: Who has the authority to decide whether or not to appeal from the orders of dismissal the
COMELEC or its designated prosecutor?

RULING: Whether the orders of dismissal should be appealed is for the COMELEC to decide, not for
Chief State Prosecutor whom it has merely deputized to represent in it court. The 1987 Constitution
mandates the COMELEC not only to investigate but also to prosecute cases of violation of election laws.
This means that the COMELEC is empowered to conduct preliminary investigations in cases involving
election offenses for the purpose of helping the Judge determine probable cause and for filing an
information in court. This power is exclusive with COMELEC.

Prosecutors designated by the COMELEC to prosecute the cases act as its deputies. They derive their
authority from it and not from their offices.

Consequently, it was beyond the power of Chief State Prosecutor to oppose the appeal of the COMELEC.
For that matter, it was beyond his power, as COMELEC-designated prosecutor, to leave to the trial courts
the determination of whether there was probable cause for the filing of the cases and, if it found none,
whether the cases should be dismissed

Commission on Elections vs. Tagle, 397 SCRA 618 (ZION)

e. Recommend Pardon, Amnesty, Parole or Suspension of Sentence
Art. IX, C, Sec. 5
People vs. Basilla, 179 SCRA 87 (FROI)

Tan vs. Commission on Elections, 237 SCRA 353 (KAT)

F: Prompted by the enactment of BP 885 w/c was enacted to create the new Province of Province of
Negros del Norte, petitioners herein, who are residents of the Prov. of Negros Occidental, in the various
cities and municipalities therein, filed w/ this Court a case for prohibition for the purposes of stopping
resps. COMELEC from conducting the plebiscite w/c was scheduled to be held for 1/3/86. Petitioners
contend that the law is
unconstitutional and it is not in complete accord w/ the LGC as in Art XI, Sec. 3 of our (1973) Consti. xxx
The plebiscite sought to be enjoined by them was held as scheduled but there are still serious issues raised
in the instant case affecting the legality, constitutionality and validity of such exercise w/c should properly
be passed upon and resolved by this Court. The plebiscite was confined only to the inhabitants of the
territory of Negros del Norte. Bec. of the exclusions of the voters from the rest of the province of Negros
Occ., petitioners found need to change the prayer of their petition to the end that the constitutional issues
w/c they have raised in the action will be ventilated and given final resolution.
HELD: We now state that the ruling in the cases of Lopez v. COMELEC and Paredes v. Hon. Exec. Sec., et
al. sanctioning the exclusion of the voters belonging to an existing political unit from w/c the new political
unit will be derived, from participating in the plebiscite conducted for the purpose of determining the
formation of another political unit, is hereby abandoned.

Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino vs. COMELEC, 423 SCRA 665 (KARL)

f. Deputize Law Enforcement Agents & Recommend Their Removal
Art. IX, C, Sec. 2. (4), (8)

g. Registration of Parties, Orgns & Coalitions & Accreditation of Citizens
Arms
Art. IX, C, Sec. 2. (5)

LDP vs. Comelec, 423 SCRA 665 (YESHA)
-same as Karls case [immediately preceding this one] Karl ikaw na yan ha! <3
-joke, eto na nga. But wont touch on other ish, yun under this one lang :D

Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino, represented by its Chairman, Edgardo J. Angara, vs The
COMELEC and Agapito Aquino
February 24, 2004

[irrelevant but you have to read this, ang funny] The Bible tells the story of how two women came
to King Solomon to decide who among them is the babys true mother. King Solomon, in his legendary
wisdom, awarded the baby to the woman who gave up her claim after he threatened to split the baby into
two.
It is fortunate that the two women did not ask the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to decide the
babys fate; otherwise, it would have cut the baby in half. For that is what the COMELEC exactly did in
this case.

Facts:
The General Counsel of the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP), a registered political party, informed
the COMELEC by way of Manifestation that only the Party Chairman, Senator Edgardo J. Angara, or
his authorized representative may endorse the certificate of candidacy of the partys official candidates.
The same Manifestation stated that Sen. Angara had placed the LDP Secretary General, Representative
Agapito A. Aquino, on "indefinite forced leave." In the meantime, Ambassador Enrique A. Zaldivar was
designated Acting Secretary General.
However, Rep. Aquino filed his Comment, contending that the Party Chairman does not have the
authority to impose disciplinary sanctions on the Secretary General. As the Manifestation filed by the LDP
General Counsel has no basis, Rep. Aquino asked the COMELEC to disregard the same.

ISSUE:
Is the ascertainment of the identity of political party and its officers within COMELEC jurisdiction?

RULING:
Yes. The court ruled that the COMELEC correctly stated that "the ascertainment of the identity of [a]
political party and its legitimate officers" is a matter that is well within its authority. The source of
this authority is no other than the fundamental law itself, which vests upon the COMELEC the power
and function to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election.
In the exercise of such power and in the discharge of such function, the Commission is endowed with
ample "wherewithal" and "considerable latitude in adopting means and methods that will ensure the
accomplishment of the great objectives for which it was created to promote free, orderly and honest
elections."
In the case at bar, the Party Chairman, purporting to represent the LDP, contends that under the Party
Constitution only he or his representative, to the exclusion of the Secretary General, has the authority to
endorse and sign party nominations. The Secretary General vigorously disputes this claim and maintains
his own authority. Clearly, the question of party identity or leadership has to be resolved if the COMELEC
is to ascertain whether the candidates are legitimate party standard bearers or not.

Atienza vs. Comelec, 612 SCRA 761 (2010) (THERESE)

Facts:
- On July 5, 2005 Drilon, as former president of the Liberal Party, announced his partys
withdrawal of support for the administration of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo.
- Atienza and a number of party members denounced Drilons move, claiming that he made
the announcement without consulting his party.
- On March 2, 2006 petitioner Atienza hosted a party conference to supposedly discuss
local autonomy and party matters but, when convened, the assembly proceeded to declare all
positions in the LPs ruling body vacant and elected new officers, with Atienza as LP president.
Drilon contested this with the COMELEC, and it issued a resolution partially granting Drilons
petition and annulled the election of new officers.
- Both sides challenged COMELEC ruling, and the Court held that the COMELEC had
jurisdiction over the intra-party leadership dispute; and that Drilons term as LP president was to
end only on November 30, 2007.
- Meanwhile the LPs electing body NECO held another election, and this time Roxas was
elected President. Atienza et al was expelled from the party for holding illegal elections.

Issue:
- WoN the COMELEC had jurisdiction over intra-party disputes
- WoN the election of the Roxas and the other new officers were valid

Held:
- Yes.
- Yes.

Ratio:
- First issue:
o The COMELECs jurisdiction over intra-party disputes is limited. It does not have blanket
authority to resolve any and all controversies involving political parties. Political parties are
generally free to conduct their activities without interference from the state. The COMELEC
may intervene in disputes internal to a party only when necessary to the discharge of its
constitutional functions.
o The COMELECs jurisdiction over intra-party leadership disputes has already been settled by
the Court. The Court ruled in Kalaw v. Commission on Elections that the COMELECs powers
and functions under Section 2, Article IXC of the Constitution, "include the ascertainment of
the identity of the political party and its legitimate officers responsible for its acts." The Court
also declared that the COMELECs power to register political parties necessarily involved the
determination of the persons who must act on its behalf. Thus, the COMELEC may resolve
an intra-party leadership dispute, in a proper case brought before it, as an incident of its
power to register political parties.
- Second issue:
o The political party is still a private organization, not a state instrument. The discipline of
members by a political party does not involve the right to life, liberty or property within the
meaning of the due process clause. An individual has no vested right, as against the state,
to be accepted or to prevent his removal by a political party. The only rights, if any, that party
members may have, in relation to other party members, correspond to those that may have
been freely agreed upon among themselves through their charter, which is a contract among
the party members. Thus the removal of Atienza et al from the party is a valid act of discipline.

Art. IX, C, Sec. 7
Art. IX, C, Sec. 8
Art. VI, Sec. 5
Art. XVIII, Sec. 7
h. Regulation of Public Utilities & Media of Information
Art. IX, C, Sec. 4
National Press Club v. COMELEC, GR No. 102653, March 05, 1992 (ZION)
*RA 6646
Chavez vs. Commission on Elections, 437 SCRA 415 (FROI)
Adiong v. COMELEC, 207 SCRA 712 (KAT)

F: Petitoner, Adiong, a 1992 senatorial candidate, assails Comelec Resolution No. 2347 insofar as it
prohibits the posting of decals and stickers on mobile places, public or private, and limits their location or
publication to authorized postiing areas.
ISSUE: Whether or not the resolution is constitutional.
RULING: NO. The prohibition unduly infringes on the citizen's fundamental right of free speech. There is
no public interest substantial enough to warrant the kind of restriction involved in this case. The posting
of decals amd stickers in mobile places does not endanger any substantial government or public interest.
Under the clear and present danger rule, not only must the danger be patently clear and pressingly
present
but the evil sought to be avoided, must be so substantive as to justify a clamp over one's mouth or a
writing instrument to be stilled. Significantly, the freedom of expression curtailed by the prohibition is not
so much that of the candidate or the political party. The regulation strikes at the freedom of an individual
to express his preference and, by displaying it on his car, to convince others to agree with him. A sticker
may be furnished by a candidate but once the car owner agrees to have it placed on his private vehichle,
the expression becomes a statement by the owner, primarily his own and not of anybody else. Morever,
The restriction is so broad that it encompasses even the citizen's private property, which in this case is a
privately owned vehicle. In consequence of this prohibition, another cardinal right guaranteed under the
Constitution is violated which is that no person shall be deprived of his property without due proocess of
law.

Art. IX, C, Sec. 9

i. Decide Election Contests

Art. IX, C, Sec. 2. (2)

Art. IX, C, Sec. 3

RA 7166, Sec. 22

Lagumbay v. COMELEC, GR No. L-25444 (January 31, 1966) (KARL)

8. Rule-Making

Art. IX, A, Sec. 6

Art. IX, C, Sec. 3

9. Other Functions

Art. IX, A, Sec. 8

10. Act as National Board of Canvassers for Senators

EO 144, Sec. 2, March 2, 1987
11. Review of COMELEC Decisions, Orders, and Resolutions
Art. IX, A, Sec. 7

Flores vs. Commission on Elections, 184 SCRA 484 (1990) (YESHA)
Facts:
Petitioner Roque Flores was declared by the board of canvassers as having the highest number of votes
for kagawad on the March 1989 elections, in Barangay Poblacion, Tayum, Abra, and thus proclaimed
punong barangay in accordance with Section 5 of R.A. 6679. However, his election was protested by
private respondent Rapisora, who placed second in the election with one vote less than the petitioner. The
Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Tayum sustained Rapisora and installed him as punong barangay in place
of the petitioner after deducting two votes as stray from the latters total. Flores appealed to the RTC,
which affirmed the challenged decision in toto. The judge agreed that the four votes cast for Flores only,
without any distinguishing first name or initial, should all have been considered invalid instead of being
divided equally between the petitioner and Anastacio Flores, another candidate for kagawad. The total
credited to the petitioner was correctly reduced by 2, demoting him to second place.

The petitioner went to the COMELEC, which dismissed his appeal on the ground that it had no power to
review the decision of the RTC, based on Section 9 of R.A. 6679, that decisions of the RTC in a protest
appealed to it from the municipal trial court in barangay elections on questions of fact shall be final and
non-appealable. In his petition for certiorari, the COMELEC is faulted for not taking cognizance of the
petitioners appeal.

Issues:
- WoN the COMELEC has jurisdiction

Held:
-Under Art IXC, Sec 2(2) of the Consti, the COMELEC shall have jurisdiction, hence, Sec. 9 of RA 6679
insofar as it provides that the decision of the municipal or metropolitan court in a barangay case should
be
appealed to the RTC must be declared unconstitutional. P had a right to presume the law as valid. Hence
his appeal to the RTC would be considered as an appeal to the COMELEC. Decisions of the COMELEC
on election contests involving municipal & barangay officer shall be final & unappealable with respect
to questions of fact & not of law. Art IX6 Sec 2(2) of the Consti was not intended to divert the SC of its
authority to resolve questions of law as inherent in the judicial power conferred upon it by the Consti

Sarmiento vs. Commission on Elections, 212 SCRA 307 (THERESE)

Facts: This special civil action for certiorari seek to set aside the Resolutions of Respondent Commission
on Elections (COMELEC) in the following Special Cases:
1) G.R. No. 105628 SPC No. 92-266
2) G.R. No. 105725 SPC No. 92-323
3) G.R. No. 105727 SPC No. 92-288
4) G.R. No. 105730 SPC No. 92-315
5) G.R. No. 105771 SPC No. 92-271
6) G.R. No. 105778 SPC No. 92-039
7) G.R. No. 105797 SPC No. 92-153, G.R. No. 105919 SPC No. 92-293
9) G.R. No. 105977 SPC No. 92-087

Issue: Whether the challenged Resolutions above specified (the SPC) as having been issued with grave
abuse of discretion in that, inter alia, the Commission, sitting en banc, took cognizance of and decided the
appeals without first referring them to any of it Divisions.

Held: The COMELEC en banc acted without jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, when it
resolved the appeals of petitioners in the above mentioned Special Cases without first referring them to
any of its Divisions. Section 3, subdivision C, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution expressly provides:

Sec. 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and shall promulgate its rules
of procedure in order to expedite disposition of election cases, including pre-proclamation controversies.
All such election cases shall be heard and decided in division, provided that motions for reconsideration
of decisions shall be decided by the Commission en banc.
Said Resolutions are therefore, null and void and must be set aside. Consequently, the appeals are deemed
pending before the Commission for proper referral to a Division.

A resolution directing the COMELEC to assign said Special Cases to the Divisions pursuant to Section
8, Rule 3 of its Rules on assignment of cases would, logically, be in order. However, Section 16 of R.A.
No. 7166 6 provides that all pre-proclamation cases pending before it shall be deemed terminated at the
beginning of the term of the office involved. The terms of the offices involved in the Special Cases subject
of these petitions commenced at noon of June 30 1992. These cases have thus been rendered moot and
such a resolution would only be an exercise in futility.

Therefore, the instant petitions are DISMISSED but without prejudice to the filing by petitioners of
regular elections protests. If the winning candidates for the positions involved in the Special Cases subject
of these petitions have already been proclaimed, the running of the period to file the protests shall be
deemed suspended by the pendency of such cases before the COMELEC and of these petitions before this
Court.

Notes:
1) G.R. No. 105628 SPC No. 92-266 granting the appeal from the ruling of the Municipal Board of
Canvassers of Virac, Catanduanes which ordered the exclusion from the canvass of one (1) election return;
2) G.R. No. 105725 SPC No. 92-323 reversing the ruling of the City Board of Canvassers of Iriga City
which ordered the exclusion from the canvass of six (6) election returns and in UND No. 92-243 ordering
the said Board of Canvassers to include in the canvass the election returns involved therein;
3) G.R. No. 105727 SPC No. 92-288 dismissing the appeal of petitioner from the ruling of the Provincial
Board of Canvassers of Catanduanes which ordered the inclusion in the canvass the certificate of canvass
for the municipality of Virac, excluding the returns from 48 precincts;
4) G.R. No. 105730 SPC No. 92-315 affirming the ruling of the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Jose
Panganiban, Camarines Norte which dismissed petitioners opposition to the composition of the said
Municipal Board of Canvassers;
5) G.R. No. 105771 SPC No. 92-271 affirming the ruling of the Municipal Board of Canvassers of
Cabusao, Camarines Sur which, among others, rejected petitioners objection to certain election returns;
6) G.R. No. 105778 SPC No. 92-039 dismissing said case for non-compliance with Section 20 of R.A.
No. 7166;
7) G.R. No. 105797 SPC No. 92-153 affirming the rulings of the Provincial Board of Canvassers of
Davao Oriental which rejected petitioners objections to the canvass of some certificates of canvass; G.R.
No. 105919 SPC No. 92-293 dismissing petitioners appeal from the ruling of the Municipal Board of
Canvassers of Upi Nuro, Maguindanao;
9) G.R. No. 105977 SPC No. 92-087 denying the amended pre-proclamation petition, which is an appeal
from the rulings of the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Ternate, Cavite, and denying a subsequent
motion to resolve the issues raised in said amended petition

*Milla vs. Balmores-Laxa, 406 SCRA 679 (ZION)
*Munoz vs. Commission on Elections, 495 SCRA 407 (FROI)
*Bautista vs. Commission on Elections, 414 SCRA 299 (KAT)
FACTS:
-10 June 2002: Bautista filed his certificate of candidacy for Punong Barangay in Lumbangan for the 15
July 2002 barangay elections. Election Officer Josefina P. Jareo (Election Officer Jareo) refused to
accept Bautistas certificate of candidacy because he was not a registered voter in Lumbangan.
-1 July 2002: the trial court ordered Election Officer Jareo to accept Bautistas certificate of candidacy
and to include his name in the certified list of candidates for Punong Barangay.
-the COMELEC Law Department recommended the cancellation of Bautistas certificate of candidacy
since he was not registered as a voter in Lumbangan. The COMELEC en banc failed to act on the
COMELEC Law Departments recommendation before the barangay elections on 15 July 2002.
-During the 15 July 2002 barangay elections, Bautista and private respondent Divina Alcoreza
(Alcoreza) were candidates for the position of Punong Barangay in Lumbangan. Bautista obtained
the highest number of votes (719) while Alcoreza came in second with 522 votes, or a margin of 197
votes. Thus, the Lumbangan Board of Canvassers (Board of Canvassers)[7]proclaimed Bautista as
the elected Punong Barangay[8] on 15 July 2002. On 8 August 2002, Bautista took his oath of office as
Punong Barangay before Congresswoman Eileen Ermita-Buhain of the First District of Batangas. On 16
August 2002, Bautista again took his oath of office during a mass oath-taking ceremony administered by
Nasugbu Municipal Mayor Raymund Apacible.
-In Resolution No. 5404, the COMELEC en banc resolved to cancel Bautistas certificate of candidacy
ISSUE:
Whether the COMELEC en banc committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of
jurisdiction when it issued Resolution Nos. 5404 and 5584;
HELD:
YES
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition. Petitioner Raymundo A. Bautista is ineligible for the position
of Punong Barangay of Barangay Lumbangan for not being a registered voter of Barangay Lumbangan.
The proclamation of the second placer Divina Alcoreza as winner in lieu of Bautista is void. Instead,
the highest ranking sangguniang barangay member of Barangay Lumbangan shall assume the office of
Punong Barangay of Lumba00ngan for the unexpired portion of the term
RATIO:
Under Rules of Procedure(Sec.3) , jurisdiction over a petition to cancel a certificate of candidacy lies
with the COMELEC sitting in Division, not en banc. Cases before a Division may only be entertained
by the COMELEC en banc when the required number of votes to reach a decision, resolution, order or
ruling is not obtained in the Division. Moreover, only motions to reconsider decisions, resolutions, orders
or rulings of the COMELEC in Division are resolved by the COMELEC en banc.
In the instant case, the COMELEC en banc did not refer the case to any of its Divisions upon receipt
of the petition. It therefore acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion when it
entertained the petition and issued the order of May 2, 1996.
In this case, Election Officer Jareo reported to the COMELEC Law Department Bautistas ineligibility for
being a non-registered voter. The COMELEC Law Department recommended to the COMELEC en banc
to deny due course or to cancel Bautistas certificate of candidacy. The COMELEC en banc approved the
recommendation in Resolution No. 5404 dated 23 July 2002.
The proceeding on the cancellation of a certificate of candidacy does not merely pertain to the
administrative functions of the COMELEC. Cancellation proceedings involve the COMELECs quasi-
judicial functions.
(t)he term administrative connotes, or pertains, to administration, especially management, as by
managing or conducting, directing or superintending, the execution, application, or conduct of persons
or things. It does not entail an opportunity to be heard, the production and weighing of evidence, and
a decision or resolution thereon.
While a quasi-judicial function is
A term which applies to the action, discretion, etc., of public administrative officers or bodies, who are
required to investigate facts, or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions
from them, as a basis for their official action and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature. (Emphasis
supplied)
The COMELECs exercise of its quasi-judicial powers is subject to Section 3 of Article IX-C which
expressly requires that all election cases, including pre-proclamation controversies, shall be decided
by the COMELEC in division, and the motion for reconsideration shall be decided by the COMELEC en
banc. It follows, as held by the Court in Canicosa, that the COMELEC is mandated to decide cases first
in division, and then upon motion for reconsideration en banc, only when the COMELEC exercises its
quasi-judicial powers.
Under Section 3, Rule 23 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure, a petition for the denial or
cancellation of a certificate of candidacy must be heard summarily after due notice. It is thus clear that
cancellation proceedings involve the exercise of the quasi-judicial functions of the COMELEC which
the COMELEC in division should first decide. More so in this case where the cancellation proceedings
originated not from a petition but from a report of the election officer regarding the lack of qualification of
the candidate in the barangay election. The COMELEC en banc cannot short cut the proceedings by acting
on the case without a prior action by a division because it denies due process to the candidate.
We hold that its order to set aside the proclamation of petitioner is invalid for having been rendered
without due process of law. Procedural due process demands prior notice and hearing. Then after the
hearing, it is also necessary that the tribunal show substantial evidence to support its ruling. In other
words, due process requires that a party be given an opportunity to adduce his evidence to support his
side of the case and that the evidence should be considered in the adjudication of the case.
Petitioner cannot be deprived of his office without due process of law. Although public office is not
property under Section 1 of the Bill of Rights of the Constitution, and one cannot acquire a vested right
to public office, it is, nevertheless, a protected right. Due process in proceedings before the COMELEC,
exercising its quasi-judicial functions, requires due notice and hearing, among others.
COMELEC is without power to partially or totally annul a proclamation or suspend the effects of a
proclamation without notice and hearing.

Baytan vs. Commission on Elections, 396 SCRA 703 (KARL)

*Jaramilla vs. Commission on Elections, 414 SCRA 337 (YESHA)
Alberto Jaramilla vs COMELEC, Antonio Suyat, Municipal Board of Canvassers of Sta.
Cruz, Ilocos Sur, The New Municipal Board of Canvassers (COMELEC) and Ireneo Cortez
[phew!]
October 23, 2003

Facts:
Antonio Suyat and Alberto J. Jaramilla both ran for the position of Member of the Sangguniang Bayan
in the Municipality of Sta. Cruz, Ilocos Sur in the 14 May 2001 elections. On 16 May 2001, the Municipal
Board of Canvassers of Sta. Cruz, proclaimed the winning candidates for the offices of Mayor, Vice-
Mayor and 8 members of the Sangguniang Bayan. The Certificate of Canvass of Votes and Proclamation
shows the following results and ranking with respect to the members of the Sangguniang Bayan, to wit:
(1) RAGUCOS, Ma. Luisa Laxamana (6,324); (2) ABAYA, Juan Jr., Andaquig (6,013); (3) GINES, Fidel
Cudiamat (5,789); (4) QUILOP, Renato Avila (5,227); (5) BILIGAN, Osias Depdepen (5,130); (6) RUIZ,
Agustin Turgano (4,972); (7) JARAMILLA, Alberto Jimeno (4,815); and (8) CORTEZ, Ireneo
Habon (4,807). In the tabulated results issued by the Election Officer and Chairperson of the Municipal
Board of Canvassers of Sta. Cruz, it is shown that Suyat obtained 4,779 votes and was ranked 9. Upon
review by Suyat, he discovered that Jaramilla was credited with only 23 votes per Election Return from
Precinct 34A1. However, when the figures were forwarded to the Statement of Votes by Precinct, Jaramilla
was credited with 73 votes for Precinct 34A1 or 50 votes more than what he actually obtained. If the entry
were to be corrected, the affected candidates would be ranked as follows: (7) CORTEZ, Ireneo Habon
(4,807); (8) SUYAT, Antonio (4,779); and (9) JARAMILLA, Alberto (4,765). On 13 June
2001, Suyat filed before the COMELEC en banc an Urgent Motion for Issuance of Order to Reconvene,
which the latter treated as a Petition for Correction of Manifest Error. Jaramilla countered in his Answer
that said petition should be dismissed for having been filed out of time and for lack of the required
certification of non-forum shopping. On 24 October 2002, COMELEC en banc issued a resolution,
annulling the proclamation of Jaramilla and creating a new Municipal Board of Canvassers. Jaramilla
filed the petition for certiorari with prayer for temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction
ascribing grave abuse of discretion.

Issues:
- WoN COMELEC en banc properly assumed original jurisdiction over the Petition for Correction of
Manifest Errors
-WoN COMELEC correctly took cognizance of respondent Suyats petition for correction despite its
having been filed beyond the 5-day reglementary period fixed in the COMELEC Rules of Procedure and its
lack of certification against forum-shopping

Held:
-Yes to both

Ratio:
- Article IX-C of the Constitution states in part that "The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or
in two divisions, and shall promulgate its rules of procedure in order to expedite disposition of election
cases, including pre-proclamation controversies. All such election cases shall be heard and decided in
division, provided that motions for reconsideration of decisions shall be decided by the Commission
en banc." This provision applies only in cases where the COMELEC exercises its adjudicatory or quasi-
judicial powers, and not when it merely exercises purely administrative functions. This Petition for
Correction of Manifest Errors alleges an erroneous copying of figures from the election return to the
Statement of Votes by Precinct. Such an error in the tabulation of the results, which merely requires a
clerical correction without the necessity of opening ballot boxes or examining ballots, demands only the
exercise of the administrative power of the COMELEC. Hence, the Commission en banc properly assumed
original jurisdiction over the aforesaid petition.

-The COMELEC has authority to suspend the reglementary periods provided by the rules, or the
requirement of certification of non-forum shopping for that matter, in the interest of justice and speedy
resolution of the cases before it.

*Mutilan vs. Commission on Elections, 520 SCRA 152(THERESE)

Facts: Mutilan and private respondent Ampatuan were candidates for Governor during the election of
regional officials held on 8August 2005 in the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). Private
respondent was proclaimed as the duly elected Governor of the ARMM.

Petitioner filed an Electoral Protest and/or Petition to Annul the Elections. He contested the results of
the elections in Maguindanao, Basilan, Tawi-Tawi, and Sulu on the ground that no actual election was
conducted in the precincts in these provinces. Petitioner alleged that the voters did not actually vote
and that the ballots were filled up by non-registered voters. Petitioner also contested the results in 7
municipalities in Lanao del Sur where massive substitute voting allegedly took place.

COMELEC Second Division dismissed the petition. The Division stated that during the initial hearing of
the case, petitioners counsel admitted that the petition was not an election protest but one for annulment
of elections and sought for elevation of the case to the Comelec En Banc. The COMELEC Second
Division ruled that jurisdiction over petitions for annulment of elections is vested in the COMELEC En
Banc. However, the elevation of the case to the COMELEC En Banc is not sanctioned by the rules or
by jurisprudence. Thus, the COMELEC Second Division dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction.
Comelec En Banc affirmed upon Motion for Reconsideration.

Issue: Whether the COMELEC Second Division acted in excess of its jurisdiction and with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in dismissing the petition to annul elections and in
not elevating the petition to the COMELEC En Banc.

Held: The COMELEC Second Division is not prohibited from elevating the petition to the COMELEC En
Banc. Under Section3, Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution, all election cases, including pre-proclamation
controversies, must be heard and decided by a division of the COMELEC.
The COMELEC Second Division ruled that automatic elevation of the case to the En Banc is not
sanctioned by the rules or by jurisprudence. Petitioner argues that the COMELEC Second Division
should have elevated the petition to the COMELEC En Banc instead of dismissing the petition for lack of
jurisdiction. We agree with petitioner.

While automatic elevation of a case erroneously filed with the Division to En Banc is not provided in the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure, such action is not prohibited.

Section 4, Rule 2 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides:

Means to Effect Jurisdiction. - All auxiliary writs, processes and other means necessary to carry into
effect its powers or jurisdiction may be employed by the Commission; and if the procedure to be followed
in the exercise of such power or jurisdiction is not specifically provided for by law or these rules, any
suitable process or proceeding may be adopted.

Hence, there is nothing in the COMELEC Rules of Procedure to prevent the COMELEC Second Division
from referring the petition to annul the elections to the COMELEC En Banc. Nevertheless, the petition
must still fail. In his Electoral Protest and/or Petition to Annul the Elections, petitioner alleged that
no actual election was conducted in the contested areas. Petitioner further alleged that the voters did
not actually vote and the ballots were filled up by non-registered voters. Petitioner also alleged massive
disenfranchisement and substitute voting. Petitioner argued that the irregularities warrant the annulment
and setting aside of the elections in the contested areas.

There are three instances where a failure of elections may be declared, thus:
(a) the election in any polling place has not been held on the date fixed on account of force majeure,
violence, terrorism, fraud or other analogous causes;
(b) the election in any polling place has been suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing of the
voting on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or other analogous causes; or
(c) after the voting and during the preparation and transmission of the election returns or in the custody
or canvass thereof, such election results in a failure to election account of force majeure, violence,
terrorism, fraud or other analogous causes.

In all three instances, there is a resulting failure to elect. In the first instance, the election has not been
held. In the second instance, the election has been suspended. In the third instance, the preparation and
the transmission of the election returns give rise to the consequent failure to elect; the third instance is
interpreted to mean that nobody emerged as a winner. None of the three instances is present in
this case. In this case, the elections took place. In fact, private respondent was proclaimed the winner.
Petitioner contests the results of the elections on the grounds of massive disenfranchisement, substitute
voting, and farcical and statistically improbable results. Petitioner alleges that no actual election was
conducted because the voters did not actually vote and the ballots were filled up by non-registered voters.

Galido v. COMELEC, 193 S 78 (1991) (ZION)
*Rivera v. COMELEC, 199 S 178 (1991) (FROI)
Bulilis vs. Nunez, GR No. 195953, August 9, 2011 (KAT)
CERIACO BULILIS vs.VICTORINO NUEZ, Hon. PRESIDING JUDGE, 6th MCTC, Ubay,
Bohol, Hon. Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 52, Talibon, Bohol [August 9, 2011]
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
FACTS:
October 25, 2010, petitioner Ceriaco Bulilis (Bulilis) was proclaimed winner of the elections
for punong barangay of Barangay Bulilis, Ubay, Bohol. He won over respondent Victorino Nuez
(Nuez) by a margin of four (4) votes.
On November 2, 2010, Nuez filed an Election Protest1 (for judicial recount and annulment
of proclamation) with the 6th Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Ubay, Bohol.
Bulilis filed a petition for certiorari6 under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Talibon, Bohol. However, in an Order7 dated December 22, 2010, the RTC
dismissed the petition on the ground that it is the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) that has
exclusive appellate jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari in election cases involving municipal
and barangay officials.
ISSUE:
WON under the rules relied upon by the RTC, the COMELECs appellate jurisdiction in election cases
is allegedly limited to decisions of election courts and not interlocutory orders.(WONthe COMELECs
appellate jurisdiction is only limited to "decided barangay election cases)
HELD:
NO. The Petition must fail.
WHEREFORE, the present Petition is DISMISSED.
RATIO:
There is no merit in petitioners argument that Rule 28, Section 1 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure
limits the COMELECs jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari in election cases to issues related to
elections, returns and qualifications of elective municipal and barangay officials. Said provision, taken
together with the succeeding section,14 undeniably shows that an aggrieved party may file a petition
for certiorari with the COMELEC whenever a judge hearing an election case has acted
without or in excess of his jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion and there is no
appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
Neither can petitioner take refuge in Rule 14, Section 12 of A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC which provides:
SEC. 12. Jurisdiction of the Commission on Elections in certiorari cases. - The Commission on Elections
has the authority to issue the extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus only in aid
of its appellate jurisdiction over decisions of the courts in election cases involving elective municipal and
barangay officials.
the Court had in a subsequent issuance, A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC15 (which amended, among others, Rule 65
of the Rules of Court), clearly provided that:
In election cases involving an act or an omission of a municipal or a regional trial court,
the petition shall be filed exclusively with the Commission on Elections, in aid of its
appellate jurisdiction.
Plainly, from the foregoing, this Court recognizes the COMELECs appellate jurisdiction over
petitions for certiorari against all acts or omissions of courts in election cases. Indeed, in the
recent case of Galang v. Geronimo,16 the Court had the opportunity to rule that a petition for certiorari
questioning an interlocutory order of a trial court in an electoral protest was within the appellate
jurisdiction of the COMELEC.
Interpreting the phrase "in aid of its appellate jurisdiction," the Court held in J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc.
v. Jaramillo, et al. that if a case may be appealed to a particular court or judicial tribunal or body, then
said court or judicial tribunal or body has jurisdiction to issue the extraordinary writ of certiorari, in aid
of its appellate jurisdiction. This was reiterated in De Jesus v. Court of Appeals, where the Court stated
that a court may issue a writ of certiorari in aid of its appellate jurisdiction if said court has jurisdiction to
review, by appeal or writ of error, the final orders or decisions of the lower court.
Note that Section 8, Rule 14 of the 2010 Rules of Procedure in Election Contests Before the Courts
Involving Elective Municipal Officials states that:
Sec. 8. Appeal. An aggrieved party may appeal the decision to the COMELEC within five (5) days after
promulgation, by filing a notice of appeal with the court that rendered the decision, with copy served on
the adverse counsel or on the adverse party who is not represented by counsel.
Since it is the COMELEC which has jurisdiction to take cognizance of an appeal from the decision of the
regional trial court in election contests involving elective municipal officials, then it is also the COMELEC
which has jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. Clearly, petitioner
erred in invoking this Court's power to issue said extraordinary writ.
Although Galang involved a petition for certiorari involving an interlocutory order of a regional trial court
in a municipal election contest, the rationale for the above ruling applies to an interlocutory order issued
by a municipal trial court in a barangay election case. Under Rule 14, Section 8 of A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC,
decisions of municipal trial courts in election contests involving barangay officials are appealed to the
COMELEC. Following the Galang doctrine, it is the COMELEC which has jurisdiction over petitions for
certiorari involving acts of the municipal trial courts in such election contests.
In all, the RTC committed no grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the petition for lack of jurisdiction.
This being the case, the Court finds it unnecessary to resolve the other issues raised by petitioner.

12. Fiscal Autonomy
Art. IX, A, Sec. 5

***Relevant Case: Penera vs. Comelec, GR No. 181613, November 25, 2009 (KARL)

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