Manila prince hotel vs GSIS

facts:
GSIS pursuant to the privatization program of the phil. Gov. decided to sell 51%
shares of the manila hotel corporation thru a public bidding. Subsequently two
corporations entered in the bidding manila prince hotel corp. (41.58) and renong berhad
a Malaysian firm (44.00), the Malaysian firm got the highest bid. Pending the declaration
of the Malaysian firm to be the winning bidder the Filipino corp sent a managers check
to GSIS matching the bid of the Malaysian firm but it was disregarded by the GSIS.
Issue: WON the manila prince hotel corporations bid should be preffered.
WON it is a state action.
Held:
The court explains Filipino first policy under the 1987 constitution the Filipino
First Policy provision of the Constitution bestows preference on qualified Filipinos the
mere tending of the highest bid is not an assurance that the highest bidder will be
declared the winning bidder. Resultantly, respondents are not bound to make the
award yet, nor are they under obligation to enter into one with the highest bidder. For in
choosing the awardee respondents are mandated to abide by the dictates of the 1987
Constitution the provisions of which are presumed to be known to all the bidders and
other interested parties. Therefore manila prince hotel should be given preference since
it matched the highest bid and it is a Filipino corporation.
In constitutional jurisprudence, the acts of persons distinct from the government are
considered state action covered by the Constitution (1) when the activity it engages in
is a public function; (2) when the government is so significantly involved with the
private actor as to make the government responsible for his action; and, (3) when the
government has approved or authorized the action. It is evident that the act of
respondent GSIS in selling 51% of its share in respondent MHC comes under the
second and third categories of state action. Without doubt therefore the transaction,
although entered into by respondent GSIS, is in fact a transaction of the State and
therefore subject to the constitutional command.
[46]

Article 12, Section 10, paragraph 2 of the 1987 Constitution provides that "in the grant
of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, the
State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos." It means just that qualified Filipinos
shall be preferred. When the Constitution speaks of "national patrimony", it refers not
only to the natural resources of the Philippines but also to the cultural heritage of the
Filipinos.

DAVID G. NITAFAN, WENCESLAO M. POLO, and MAXIMO A. SAVELLANO,
JR., petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE and THE FINANCIAL OFFICER,
SUPREME COURT OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Facts:
The petitioners are judges of branch 52, 53 and 19 of NCR they seek to prohibit
the respondents from making deductions of withholding taxes from their salaries. They
explained that deductions from their salaries by the use of withholding taxes is a
violation of the constitution article 8 section 10 which explains that their salary shall not
be decreased.
Issue: WON their salaries shall not be decreased.
Held:
No. The debates, interpellations and opinions expressed regarding the
constitutional provision in question until it was finally approved by the Commission
disclosed that the true intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution, in adopting it,
was to make the salaries of members of the Judiciary taxable, all citizens should bear
their aliquot part of the cost of maintaining the government and should share the burden
of general income taxation equitably.











MILAGROS E. AMORES, Petitioner,
vs.
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and EMMANUEL JOEL
J. VILLANUEVA,Respondents
Facts:
Petitioner Milagros questions the legality of the assumption of office of
Emmanuel Joel Villanueva as the representative of the party list organization CIBAC in
the house of representatives. Milagros explained that Villanueva was aged more than
30 years old (31) and he did not change his sectoral affiliation atleast 6 months.
Issue: WON Villanueva is ineligible.
Held:
No, A cardinal rule in statutory construction is that when the law is clear and free
from any doubt or ambiguity, there is no room for construction or interpretation. There is
only room for application. Section 15 of RA No. 7941 Change of Affiliation; Effect. Any
elected party-list representative who changes his political party or sectoral
affiliation during his term of office shall forfeit his seat: Provided, That if he changes
his political party orsectoral affiliation within six (6) months before an election, he shall
not be eligible for nomination as party-list representative under his new party or
organization.
Section 9. Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. No person shall be nominated as
party-list representative unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a
registered voter, a resident of the Philippines for a period of not less than one (1)year
immediately preceding the day of the election, able to read and write, a bona fide
member of the party or organization which he seeks to represent for at least ninety (90)
days preceding the day of the election, and is at least twenty-five (25) years of age on
the day of the election.
In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five (25) but not
more than thirty (30) years of age on the day of the election.
It is, therefore, beyond cavil that Sections 9 and 15 of RA No. 7941 apply to private
respondent.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Villanueva is declared ineligible.


FRANCISCO VS HRET.
FACT:
The case at bar is a petition questioning the constitutionality of the impeachment
proceedings being held by the House of Representatives against Chief Justice Davide.
The first impeachment proceeding brought against the Chief Justice, together with
other associate justices, is by Joseph Estrada, for the alleged culpable violation of the
Constitution, betrayal of public trust, and other high crimes. It proceeded due to good
form but was later on dismissed due to lack of substance.
Another impeachment proceeding was being brought against the Chief Justice, in a
period less than the one-year bar provided by the Constitution and the rules of the
House of Representatives. This was initiated by 2 representatives and was endorsed by
many other representatives.
This resulted to many petitions by many individuals as well as associations questioning
the constitutionality of such move by Congress. The petitions were consolidated having
raised similar issues. The petitions contend that the second impeachment proceeding
was in culpable violation of the Constitution wherein there is a one-year bar before one
can initiate impeachment proceedings against the same individual. The first proceeding
was less than a year away from the filing of the second proceeding.
Congress mainly contended that the Supreme Court had no power to inquire about the
impeachment proceedings as it is the former which has the power to facilitate or
administer impeachment proceedings, as provided by the Constitution. If the Supreme
Court interrupts and inquires about the proceedings, it will disturb the doctrine of
separation of powers as well as the doctrine of checks and balances. The impeachment
proceeding is in itself under the power of the Congress and is a political question.
ISSUE:
1. w/n the second impeachment proceeding against Davide is constitutional?
2. w/n the impeachment proceeding was a political question wherein the SC cannot
disturb it?
RULING:
1. It is prevalent that the second impeachment proceeding against the Chief Justice is
unconstitutional. Under Article XI of our present Constitution, it is provided that with
regard to the impeachment of public officials such as the Chief Justice, there is a one-
year bar provided. No impeachment proceeding shall be initiated against the same
official within a period of one year. The term initiate refers to the filing of the case
against the official. It starts when a complaint is filed with the Committee of Justice of
the House of Representatives. It is not initiated during the time when it is verified by
the other members of the House or when it is given to Senate for hearing.
2. It is said that the SC cannot question or inquire about the impeachment proceedings
since it will disturb the separation of power, check and balance between the branches
of government, and that the SC has vested interest in the issue.
The Constitution was equivocal in granting the judiciary, moreover the SC, the duty to
settle controversies that are legally demandable and enforceable. It has been vested
the duty to check if there is any grave abuse of discretion on the part of any branch or
office of government. In this petition wherein the constitutionality of the impeachment
proceeding is questioned, no one has the power to interpret the fundamental law of the
land and answer the issue of constitutionality other than the SC. Given such, even if the
legislative that commences and administers impeachment proceedings, it is not a bar
for the SC to inquire about their actions especially if constitutionality is involved.



















Civil liberties union vs. executive secretary
Facts:
The petitioner question Executive Order No. 284 issued by the president cabinet
members, undersecretary or asst. secretaries and other appointive officials of the
executive department to hold 2 positions in the government and government
corporations and to receive additional compensation. They find it unconstitutional
against the provision provided by Section 13, Article VII prohibiting the President,
Cabinet members and their deputies to hold any other office or employment. Section 7,
par. (2), Article IX-B further states that Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the
primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or
employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof,
including government-owned or controlled corporation or their subsidiaries." In the
opinion of the DOJ as affirmed by the Solicitor General, the said Executive Order is valid
and constitutional as Section 7 of Article IX-B stated unless otherwise allowed by law
which is construed to be an exemption from that stipulated on Article VII, section 13,
such as in the case of the Vice President who is constitutionally allowed to become a
cabinet member and the Secretary of Justice as ex-officio member of the Judicial and
Bar Council.

ISSUE:

Whether Section 7 of Article IX-B provides an exemption to Article VII, section 13 of the
constitution.

RULING:

The court held it is not an exemption since the legislative intent of both Constitutional
provisions is to prevent government officials from holding multiple positions in the
government for self enrichment which a betrayal of public trust. Section 7, Article I-XB
is meant to lay down the general rule applicable to all elective and appointive public
officials and employees, while Section 13, Article VII is meant to be the exception
applicable only to the President, the Vice- President, Members of the Cabinet, their
deputies and assistants. Thus the phrase unless otherwise provided by the
Constitution in Section 13, Article VII cannot be construed as a broad exception from
Section 7 of Article IX-B that is contrary to the legislative intent of both constitutional
provisions. Such phrase is only limited to and strictly applies only to particular instances
of allowing the VP to become a cabinet member and the Secretary of Justice as ex-
officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council. The court thereby declared E.O 284 as
null and void.


Chiongbian vs Comelec
Facts:
The petitioner chiongian seeks to prohibit respondent customs officials from
cancelling the registration certificates of the petitioners vessels and respondent
Philippine shipping administration from rescinding the sale of three vessels to petitioner.
Respondents claim that the petitioner is not a Filipino citizen and therefore not qualified
by law to operate and own vessels of phil. Industry. The Philippine Shipping
Administration also alleges that petitioner violated the contract of sale of
three vessels executed between them, on the ground of misrepresentation,
petitioner having alleged in said contract that his father was a naturalized
Filipino citizen.
Issue: WON he is a Filipino citizen.
Held:
Yes, Article IV of the Constitution provides:
SECTION 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:
(2) Those born in the Philippine Islands of foreign parents who, before the
adoption of this Constitution, had been elected to public office in the
Philippine Islands.
(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.
William chiongbians father was elected to be a councilor of municipal town
of plaridel, misamis falling under paragraph 2 of the above article and
William as the son of his father faliing under paragraph 3. Therefore
chiongbian is a Filipino citizen.