1

Introduction

The Salvage Convention which was held in London in 1989, was adopted on the 28
th

of April 1989, and came into force seven years later, on the 14
th
of July 1996 (IMO,
2013). The term salvage refers to any action taken by a salver when intervening in
any casualty situation to salve the ship and the property, and most particularly to save
human lives while last, but not least, to prevent any environmental damage by
pollution (MARINE-SALVAGE, 2013).

Until 1989, the existing legislation regarding salvage was the Assistance and Salvage
Convention 1910, held in Brussels, Belgium (CIL, 2009). A salver would only be
rewarded for their operations if the salvage was successful. If they did not manage to
save either the property or the cargo, then they would receive no reward, a model
known as no cure-no pay (IMO, 2013). A payment under this salvage contract can
only be made if the salvers party makes a successful claim (USLEGAL, 2013).

The most widely used no cure-no pay contract is the Lloyds Form of Salvage
Agreement, universally known as a Lloyds Open Form, or LOF. Originating from the
late 1800s, this form has been used more than any other in salvage cases (LLOYDS,
2013). Since its standardization in 1908, it has undergone eleven revisions, with the
most recent being in January 2011. Other contracts used are the Beijing Form, the
Japanese Form, and the Turkish Form, yet the LOF remains the most preferred
contract worldwide (MARINE-SALVAGE, 2013). Under the LOF, the salvers receive a
proportion of the value of the salvage in return for the salvage services
(SHIPSBUSINESS, 2010).

In the Salvage Convention 1989, two new incentives were given to the salvers.
Special Compensation is payable to the salvers when they have minimised, or
prevented damage to the environment, but the value of the salvaged property is
insufficient financial reward for the costs incurred while taking part in the salvage
operation. The second choice the salvers have is to choose the Special
Compensation P&I Club Clause (SCOPIC), under which the remuneration is based on
pre-agreed tariffs (COMITEMARITIME, 2013).

The International Salvage Union (ISU), considers that the present system, under the
Salvage Convention 1989, along with the commercial arrangements of Lloyds Open
Form and the SCOPIC, provide insufficient recognition for the salvors efforts to
2

minimise or avoid damage to the environment. Therefore, the ISU has come up with a
proposal regarding the Salvage Convention 1989. The Union is of the opinion that the
Salvage Convention 1989 needs to be brought up to date. The ISU requires both an
award for salvage services to the maritime property, and an award for the degree of
success achieved by the salvors in minimising or even avoiding any damage to the
environment during their salvage operations (MARINE-SALVAGE, 2013).

This dissertations aim is to critically evaluate the International Salvage Unions
proposals for the amendment of the Salvage Convention 1989. This aim is going to be
achieved by discussing and analysing the two main objectives of this dissertation. The
first objective is to explain the ISUs proposals to amend the Salvage Convention
1989. With the appropriate methodology and data, this dissertation is going to define
the reasons why the Union is requesting this amendment and what the arguments are
which will be used to achieve the amendment. The second objective is to identify by
whom, any objections raised against the ISUs proposals are made and to examine
them. The Comit Maritime International (CMI), for example, has been against the
Unions proposal for extra funding.

After identifying, explaining and examining the arguments and counter-arguments
regarding the Unions proposal, this dissertation will have the evidence and will be
able to provide an answer as to why the Salvage Convention 1989 should be
amended.















3

Literature Review

The International Convention on Salvage 1989 starts with a chapter on general
provisions that, after giving definitions, covers different aspects to which this
convention is applicable and provides a handful of areas where it is applicable. The
second chapter deals with performance of participating parties and this also gives
details of cooperation among the parties. The third chapter gives details of rights of
salvors that clarify what are the conditions for reward, the criteria for fixing a reward
and other such matters. The fourth chapter explains what claims and actions may be
involved in the course of action and how to deal with such cases. This is the longest
chapter of the whole convention as it explains a broad range of actions.

As far as the language writing is concerned, it is well knittedformatted, easy to
understand, clear and simple. Proper headings, concise wording and clear numbering
make the data sorting, searching and citing straightforward and time saving. It very
logically starts with definitions and ends with the maximum point of action. Thus it can
be asserted that the argument is developed logically and each decision is defended
with sound reasoning. The next step in the literature review is the comparison of
different works of the same type of literature.

It is interesting to know that American Admiralty law gives a more material
reward to the salvor of material compared to the salvor of human beings. So, if a man
saves a vessel full of cattle he would be rewarded highly but if he saves all the human
beings present in the vessel and cannot save the vessel, he is not entitled to a single
penny. The life-saving activity here is left purely to morality and it is supposed that
every man would do everything possible to save another man. This was until the 1910
when the great maritime nations of the world agreed to put the legal compulsion up
against this obvious moral obligation. (Lawrence, 1954)

The traditional laws regarding salvage of ships and property in danger of being
lost at sea have served ship-owners and salvors well into the twentieth century
(Binney, 1990). The Brussels Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules to
Assistance and Salvage at Sea 1910 is the name of a treaty that has a logical basis of
the International Convention of Salvage 1989. It was concluded on 23 September
1910 in Brussels, hence why it is called Brussels Convention. It provided a basic
frame for salvage legislation.
Comment [D1]: Areas or examples? I havent
seen it but examples reads better.
Comment [D2]: I am assuming it is in English, so
language is not quite right. You could say language
used. However writing is the written
representation of the spoken word, so it covers both
English and the words used.
4

However this convention was limited in uniformity regarding the salvage
operations. For example, its rules were limited and did not explain much about
compensation and liability of salvors. Moreover, it lacked details regarding
environmental protection and measures to minimize the damage to the environment.
Its basis can be traced to the general awareness regarding environmental protection
prevailing at that time. The revolution in the industrial world was still at its peak and
new innovations and inventions were being made in every field of human life. Human
thought had not developed to the extent that it might see the danger that the
environment was exposed to by from these ships or vessels. No doubt some
individual thoughts were prevailingprevailed at that time, but proper legislation was not
present anywhere till until some a number of incidents made it clear for to the world
that it was far more dangerous than a man can think ofin danger.

The first amendment to the 1910 convention was made in 1967. This
amendment did not change anything except the addition of warships and other military
vessels being included in the salvage list. This Convention on salvage was one step
further forward towards more environment friendly laws and regulations. The Amoco
Cadiz disaster became the major reason to update the old convention in the form of
the 1989 Convention on salvage. The Amoco Cadiz was a supertanker on its way to
Europe carrying crude oil from the Middle East, but was wrecked off the Brittany
coast in April 1978. The result was disastrous as 223000 tons of crude oil spilled out
polluting an area of almost 360 km. The marine population of bivalves, limpets, sea
birds, periwinkles and limpets was severely affected and to a degree have never been
the same..
Creatures with a short lifespan have been replaced by the longer living
species. The effect is both long term and short term, no one is surely how long will it
take return to normal (G, G, & D, 1982). One of many changes that enhanced the
scope of the 1989 Convention on salvage from previous conventions include
environmental protection from as leakage of oil or other such material from ships.
Having witnessed at first hand the drastic effect on the environment, special
compensation was now to be awarded to encourage salvors to make attempts to
preserve and protect the environment from oil and fuel spills. The special
compensation was also offered to the salvor if he protects the ship or vessel from the
real danger or threat of loss or actual loss to the environment. On the basis of the
above discussion it can be asserted that with the passage of time, convention on
salvage has become more environment friendly and provides a synthesis between
environmental and human activity.
Comment [D3]: This really needs a date or a
timeline. The industrial revolution was in the 19
th

Century, whereas the first concerns regarding global
warming werent really voiced until the 1970s
Comment [D4]: This is just the same as the
previous sentence
5

If the three conventions of 1910, 1967, and 1989 are compared, it can be
observed that behind these three special factors encouraged concerned men to
amend each convention according to the requirements of the time. At the time of the
Brussels convention, it was a time of new technological changes and new discoveries,
it was necessary to take steps in order to secure the safety and sustainability of ships
and vessels. Thus a reward was offered to the salvor. Moreover, new technology was
also available to everyone what so ever intent that may have. So, this convention also
got safety from such kind of dangers. Actually at that time, it was a reward to the
salvor in response to the danger that he undertook to save the ship or vessel from
danger.

The amendment made to the 1967 Convention was also due to some social
factors. After the Second World War there was a huge increase in the sea power, in
the shape of vessels and warships millions were spent building gigantic armed ships
and carriers, so governments also took steps to offer salvage for protection. Many
incidents proved that these ships and vessels were huge dangers to the environment
and there were some discrepancies in previous conventions. So in order to remove
the danger and make everything more save safe 1989 convention came into being.

Of the three Conventions discussed, the 1989 Convention was more
convincing compared to the previous ones as many provisions made it more
appropriate and beneficial for both man and the environment. There is a huge
discrepancy between the law of savage and UNESCO convention on the protection of
underwater heritage. This UN institution aims at protecting the heritage buried at the
bottom of the sea in the form of ancient and historical shipwrecks.

The issue arises from an article of the Convention which states that reward for
salvage operations would depend upon the nature and degree of the danger
(Organization, 2010). on the other hand, these shipwreck heritages cannot bear the
loss caused by any danger thus liquid gas and oil spills in the sea harm not only harm
living creatures but also death remaining of the sunken. The dispute is on the point
that law of salvage does not offer any kind of reward in the case of preventive
measures to protect the environment. However recent changes have been made in
the law. Now the salvor that first discovers the wreck not only gets the ownership of
the wreck but also the ownership of all the artifacts that are recovered from the vessel.
(Brooke, 2008).
Comment [D5]: What sort of reward and for
salving what? This needs expanding
Comment [D6]: I am really sorry, but this is
nonsensical and impossible to understand.
Comment [D7]: I accept that this is basically a
summary, but this is a bit weak without an example
or two.
Comment [D8]: I have deleted this as it makes no
sense whatsoever and is not clear English.
6

The traditional definition of salvage says that it is a benefit that is conferred on
salvor for saving or for helping in the process of saving in a recognized condition of
danger from which one cannot extract oneself unaided. Forrest recognizes that there
are four criteria that are necessary to be satisfied before the salvage law can be
applied. The property and carrier should be on navigable waters, the rescue efforts to
save property should be voluntarily rendered, success might be total or partial and
conduct is inthe interest of saving the owner's property. (Craig, 2002) Thus the
element of danger is essential in the salvage service. Under this condition many
questions arise when it is compared with the convention of UCH.

The question is how the law of salvage is applicable to the recovery of UCH
under any circumstance? There are two opinions in answer to this question. Those
who want to the application of salvage law preserved for UCH recovery give broader
definition. They include both physical threats to artifacts and economic actual loss.
Opposed to this, others give a narrower approach. In both cases there is not a single
detailed interpretation from the court in either way. The court has left it to the legal
system of the adjacent country, for example in England, such an abandoned ship
becomes the property of the Crown, while in USA it becomes the property of the
person who finds it and claims it as his possession. And these days recovery of
artifacts located on the floor of the sea is increasingly feasible due to technological
advances in underwater survey and recovery techniques (U.S. Concerns Regarding
UNESCO Convention on Underwater Heritage, 2002)

No doubt this convention was designed to facilitate and remove those
drawbacks that were present in the convention for the unification of Certain Rules
Relating to Assistance and Salvage at Sea 1910. However with the changes in
technology, new methodologies and the incredible sizes of vessels have made the
process of salvation very difficult and very expensive. Moreover, there is also a need
for larger vessel that might salve the one in danger. (Gaskell, 1989)

Technology has moved on apace and use of internet and other hi-tech
equipment has made some articles of the 1989 Convention on salvage ineffective in
today's world. A dire need is felt these days for modification, revision and upgrading of
this convention. A major issue in this regard is that the world will have to live many
years without any certainty and this period will surely mark as a period of
unpredictability as opposed to this period of prediction and relaxation as was the case
7

in 1989 where until the last hour there was read danger that agreement would not be
reached in time. (Michael, 1990)

As time moves on, everything develops and it becomes necessary to update
the current paradigms according to the challenges met. This also applies to the
Conventions on salvation. There have been many articles that promote this. There
may be some elements of disagreement among interested parties. It is not quite a war
of attrition but at its roots lies the desire for everyone to get a bigger share of the pie.

Moreover there are two types of salvors. There are those who are provide
professional salvage services to shipping, and they are earning good money in the
form of salvage rewards both on the material front and environmental front. The
second group comprises of those treasure hunters that are looking for treasures in the
seabed of the oceans. According to UN report there are almost three million
shipwrecks on the seabed. Nobody knows how much treasure these wrecked vessels
and ships hold. These treasure hunters do not pay attention to the preservation of
underwater cultural heritage. These transgressions, along with many other challenges
threaten the efficacy of the 1989 Convention on salvage.

Remuneration is offered after assessing the level of success of the event, the effort
and involvement of the salvors. This includes the danger the salved vessel was in, the
threat to crew, passengers and cargo, expenses incurred and losses suffered, time
expended, risks of liability and the value of the property salved. All these will be taken
in to consideration by the court for the determination of the remuneration to the
salvors. In cases of fraud, rendering the salvage or assistance necessary, or have
been guilty of fraud, the salvors may be deprived by the court to remuneration, or may
be awarded reduced remuneration.

The Lloyd's Open Forum establishes the remuneration given to the salvors for
their services. It was instituted in 1980 as a form of independent arbitration to settle
any disputes over awards given to or requested by salvors.. Thus Lloyds became a
standard and was regarded as impartial whenever there is any kind of dispute
between opposing parties regarding the remuneration for services provided. It has
received high praise regarding its final modification relating to oil pollution at sea and
in open waters. Lloyds has offered a safety net provision in this regard, which means
the salvors, while providing their services, are required to use their best endeavours to
prevent oil spills from all types of vessels and not just laden or partially laden oil
Comment [D9]: This seems total nonsense and
needs rewriting
Comment [D10]: Leave this out or reword it to
make some sense in proper English.
8

tankers. A It should be noted however that this provision does not bind the salvors to
take any specific kind of measure to protect the environment from the danger from oil
or fuel that has already escaped or is escaping Here salvors can save materials
onboard the ship or vessel. However, the salvors efforts, regardless the success, or
any environmental damage caused, are still compensated. (Donald & O'May, 1983).

Oil, including fuel oil is the only cargo to which the safety net applies, and as
a result, it does not relate to any other hazardous and noxious cargoes, many of
which are carried in large quantities, such as liquefied gas and chemicals. Under this
scheme, the ship-owner should reimburse the salvors for their expenses, plus a
supplement up to an additional 15 %, which would depend upon the value of the
salvaged goods. This newly introduced scheme reflected an ever-increasing
worldwide awareness of the effects of oil pollution on the environment.
























9

Methodology

After specifying the aim and the objectives of the dissertation, the author is going to
analyse and justify the methods of approach, data collection and research which will
be used throughout this paper.

The two methods of approach are deductive and inductive. The first works from more
general to more specific reasoning, also known as a top-down approach. At the top
of this scheme, there is a theory which the author uses as a starting point. The next
step is to narrow down this theory and extract one or more hypotheses, which then
need to be tested. The outcomes of these hypotheses are the observations. Multiple
verifications, successful or not, are either going to lead the author to a confirmation of
their original theory, or to an unsuccessful result.

The second method, also known as bottom up, is called inductive, and its
methodology is in reverse to the deductive method. Starting from specific
observations, the author, through a procedure, arrives at generalisations and theories.
After having achieved these specific observations, the author tries to detect patterns
and regularities through which a number of tentative hypotheses can be formulated.
The exploration of such hypotheses will provide enough evidence in order for a
theory, or number of theories, to be developed (SOCIALRESEARCHMETHODS,
2006).

Judging by the brief analysis of both the deductive and inductive methods of
approach, the best suited method of approach for this dissertation is going to be the
inductive method. Arguments for and against the amendment of the Salvage
Convention 1989, are examined and analysed in order for some patterns and
regularities to be detected. The next step for the author is to formulate some tentative
hypotheses, coming from the critical evaluation of the ISUs proposals, and lastly, this
method will end by developing some general conclusions as to why the Salvage
Convention 1989 needs to be amended.

This dissertation is largely based upon secondary research and has been
supplemented with an interview. Therefore, its outcomes and all information provided
can be regarded as secure, up-to-date, and unlikely to contain any kind of prejudice
by the author.

10

The secondary research which was carried out was mostly based on carefully
researched and checked online documents including articles, websites content and
online fora, as the information provided there is updated, documented and easily
controlled, so that the qualitative character of the information remains high. Moreover
there was extensive reading and information collection from books and paper journals
as well.

The primary research contains an interview with the current president of the
International Salvage Union, Mr. Andreas Tsavliris. His position, and the information
provided by him regarding the main subject of this dissertation were of great
importance. Having to tackle one of the most critical elements of the ISU over the past
decades, the opinion of someone who is not only involved in the organisation, but is
also the president of it, was considered most appropriate and important. The interview
scheme was preferred instead of a questionnaire as direct communication is better
than a questionnaire the unrestricted restricted results are more accurate. Due to the
heavy work program of Mr. Tsavliris, the interview was conducted through a number
of emails, while Mr. Tsavliris was away from work. The interviews style was semi-
structured. The author asked some pre-arranged questions, but the answers given
raised some new questions, which were then asked subsequently.


















11

Results

THE SALVAGE CONVENTION 1989
Almost eighty years after the Convention on the law of salvage held in Brussels in
1910, which introduced the no cure - no pay scheme, the need for a change in the
no cure-no pay scheme was more than imperative. The 1910 Convention was
regarded as being outdated and the environmental concerns and awareness have
significantly increased since then. On April 28, 1989, the Salvage Convention was
concluded in London, but it was not until after July, 1996, that the conventions
provisions, which are analysed below, came into force after being ratified by 15
States, as mentioned in Article 29 (JUS, 2013). The 1989 Convention sought to
remedy the no cure - no pay deficiency by making provisions for an enhanced
salvage award taking into consideration both the skill and effort of the salvors
operating in preventing or minimising damage to the environment (IMO, 2013).

After describing the general provisions in Article 1 as to what is considered to be a
salvage operation (Art.1 a salvage operation means any act or activity undertaken to
assist a vessel or any other property in danger in navigable waters or in any other
waters whatsoever (JUS, 2013)) and also determining what vessel means, the
Convention makes its first reference to the environment in article 1 (d). Damage to
the environment means substantial physical damage to human health or to marine life
or resources in coastal or inland waters or areas adjacent thereto, caused by
pollution, contamination, fire, explosion, or similar major incidents (JUS, 2013). At this
point there is the first ever reference in a salvage convention to environmental
damage. Further references are made in articles 6(3), 8 (1)(b), 8(2)(b), 11, 13(b),
14(2), 14(5) and 16.

In article 8(1)(b), it is specified that included within the duties of the salvor is to
exercise due care to prevent or minimise damage to the environment, when carrying
out a salvage operation, where in subparagraph (2)(b) of the same article, the same
duties are held by the master and the owner of the ship. Article 11 refers to the co-
operation that needs to be achieved between salvors and public authorities whenever
a vessel is in distress for the purpose of saving human life, as well as protecting the
environment in general. Moving on to the reward fixation, article 13(b) clarifies that the
reward should be such - to encourage salvage operations, taking into account, among
other things, the skill and efforts of the salvors in preventing or minimising damage to
the environment (CMI, 2010).
12


Casualties such as the Amoco Cadiz (1978), Atlantic Empress (1979) and the
Christos Bitas (1978), that involved huge oil spills, resulted in governments refusing a
place of refuge for salvage work to be completed. As a result, salvors were forced to
end up towing the vessels into the open sea and scuttling them. The no cure-no pay
scheme prevented them from covering their running costs and, moreover, it
discouraged them from assisting ships in dire situations (MARINE-SALVAGE, 2013).

Those results led to the most controversial and most discussed article of the
Convention, article 14. In paragraph two the term special compensation appears for
the first time in a salvage convention script. When salvors operate with the intention of
prevention or minimising environmental damage, special compensation becomes
payable to them by the stricken vessels owner, which may produce an additional
payment of up to 30 per cent of the costs involved. However, the tribunal, if it deems it
fair, may increase special compensation further, but in no case should it be more than
100 per cent of the expenses incurred by the salvor. Paragraph 5 determines that no
special compensation, or part of it, will be awarded, if the salvor has been negligent
and as a result has failed to minimise or prevent pollution to the environment (JUS,
2013).

In article 16, the salvors, if they are involved in saving human lives, are entitled to a
fair share of the payment awarded to salvors for salving property, the vessel,
minimising or preventing damage to the environment.

These new facts changed the salvage industry and its provisions, because under
these changes, salvors would at least recover part of their expenses whenever there
was a threat of damage to the environment.

The 1989 Salvage Convention, in its final clauses of chapter five, clarified that it
should come into force only after the date 15 States have given their consent to be
bound by it, as happened on July 14 1996. Finally, in article 32, any revision or
amendment may be convened by the Organisation through a conference by request
of at least eight states parties, or one fourth of all the states parties, whichever is the
higher figure.

THE NAGASAKI SPIRIT CASE
13

On the 19
th
of September, 1992, the tanker NAGASAKI SPIRIT, part laden with
40,154 tons of crude oil, collided with the container ship OCEAN BLESSING in the
northern part of the Malacca Straits. It was a classic T-Bone collision and, as a result,
a massive fire ensued and approximately 12,000 tons of crude oil spilled into the
Malaysian waters (GILIGAN, 1998).

The salvage company involved in the case agreed to intervene under the LOF 90
contract and managed to tow the vessel away from the Malaysian waters after
concerns from the authorities about environmental damage. Ten days later the ship
was anchored off Indonesia. The two sides (the salvage company and the ship and
cargo owners/insurers) did not manage to come to a deal and therefore they appealed
to the High Court in 1997 (DIGILIB, 2009). The House of Lords held that under the
1989 Salvage Conventions article 14.3, a fair rate for equipment, and personnel
reasonably used in a salvage operation, meant a fair rate of expenditure and did not
include any element of profit (CMI, 2010).

Lord Mustill in his judgment said: ...the promoters of the Convention did not choose,
as they might have done, to create an entirely new and distinct category of
environmental salvage, which would finance the owners of vessels and gear to keep
them in readiness simply for the purposes of preventing damage to the environment.
Paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of article 14 all make it clear that the right to special
compensation depends on the performance of "salvage operations" which ... are
defined by article 1(a) as operations to assist a vessel in distress. Thus although
article 14 is undoubtedly concerned to encourage professional salvors to keep vessels
readily available, this is still for the purposes of a salvage, for which the primary
incentive remains a traditional salvage award (IPSOFACTOJ, nd).

The problems arising from Article 14 of the 1989 Salvage Convention led to
dissatisfaction and uncertainty. Among other problems, it was found that under Article
14.2, claims for uplift over actual costs incurred necessitated proof not only that
environmental damage would have resulted but for the salvors intervention, but also
the extent of the damage had the operation been unsuccessful. Naval architects, drift
experts and a variety of other experts were needed. Additionally the accounting
exercise referred to in the Nagasaki Spirit case by the House of Lords was found to
be both expensive and time-consuming (CMI, 2010).

SCOPIC
14

As a result of all these deficiencies mentioned above, a new clause was implemented
in order to replace, but keep the same effect as Article 14 of the 1989 Salvage
Convention (CMI, 2010). The SCOPIC (Special Compensation P&I Club) clause
endorsed the concept that contractors could receive Special Compensation (expenses
plus a fair rate for any tugs and equipment used) only in circumstances where the
salved fund was not sufficient to allow them to recover adequate award provided by
Article 13, but its innovation was that it introduced a tariff to calculate the contractors
Special Compensation along with an uplift fixed at 25 per cent (Lloyds, 2013). Article
13 awards will be discounted by 25 per cent of the amount by which any such award
exceeds the SCOPIC remuneration.

The SCOPIC clause was warmly embraced by the maritime community, but through
its use in a number of cases, some matters emerged that needed clarification to
confirm the original intent behind SCOPIC, and a number of gaps appeared which
needed to be filled in the wording of the clause, like Tariff Rates. The drafting sub-
committee of SCOPIC, to this end, produced the amended SCOPIC 2000, which
came into effect in September 2000 (IMCBROKERS, 2013).

The SCOPIC clause is an optional clause to LOF and is only included as part of that
contract if specifically agreed in writing.

Shipowners liability for special compensation is insured in the P&I market and,
subsequently, such developments may not be thought by property underwriters to
have any immediate relevance. Thus, there are aspects of SCOPIC which will
concern all property underwriters if the ship owners and the contractors involved
agree to add a SCOPIC clause to their LOF contract (Lloyds, 2013).

The ISU has expressed its oppositions to the current use of the SCOPIC clause,
stressing that it is nothing more than a safety net and is not a method for
remuneration. The union has also characterised it to be more an LOF contract
solution than an international one and has claimed that problems, such as who would
be the negotiator for the rates, how they would be determined, and whether people
would seek to apply it as a matter of law rather than contract. As a result it gives no
incentive to the salvors to intervene and the problems of Article 14 remain.

On the other hand, the International Chamber of Shipping (ICS) suggests that the
SCOPIC clause is more than just a safety net (as this term appears in the LOF 80 for
15

any changes made, to provide compensation for the salvors because of the no cure-
no pay principle) and it does positively encourage salvors to intervene where
otherwise they might not do so, and therefore it is an improvement over Article 14.
Moreover, the ICS points out that as LOF contracts are used around the world and
they have a global recognition, the same is likely to happen with the SCOPIC clause.
The Chamber believes that salvors are generously awarded under SCOPIC, whilst the
ISU representatives believe that was the original intention, but inflation and currency
changes over the past years have diminished the generosity, and as a result, salvors
are discouraged from intervening under these circumstances (CMI, 2010).

BUREAU VERITAS REPORT
The Bureau Veritas investigation in the early 1990s is a strong ally of the ISU in terms
of proof that the industry, along with its resources, are in decline. The indicators of
such results are a reduction in casualty rates, falling levels of remuneration, and
competition created by the availability of offshore support vessels and other ancillary
craft, leading to the withdrawal of professional salvors from the market, the reduction
of dedicated salvage craft and lastly, the closure of additional salvage stations
(COMITEMARITIME, 2010).

What arose through this report and what is considered to be the cause of all those
problems, is that the international salvage industry is in the hands of comparatively
few companies. The union points out that these companies have shareholders
seeking profit. As a result, if the industry is generously rewarded, then they would
keep on sticking with it and they will accept the risk, but if the industry is not
sufficiently rewarded, then they are most likely to move their assets to a less risk-
orientated business. Taking into consideration the very few international players, such
an act could be a problem for both the shipping industry and the environment.

The ICS, on the other hand, does not accept these claims to be real and points out
that new entrants have joined the salvage industry. Additionally, reduction in the
number of salvage companies can be a reflection of mergers and the greater range of
operations being performed.

LOF 2011 LSSA
After lengthy and constructive debate at the Lloyds Salvage Groups meetings in
2010 and 2011, a number of amendments to the existing LOF have been agreed. The
16

new LOF is known as LOF 2011.Two new clauses have been added to the existing
LOF.

The first clause refers to the wider accessibility of the Arbitrators Award and the
Appeal Award. Therefore such access will be via subscription from the Lloyds
website. The second change has to do with the notification of LOFs to Lloyds. The
Contractor shall, within two weeks, notify the Lloyds Council of their engagement and
forward the original agreement to the Council as soon as possible (LONDONPANDI,
2013).

The Lloyds Standard Salvage and Arbitration (LSSA) Clauses went through some
amendments as well. Under the new clause 13 for container vessels, it is provided
that any correspondence or notices in respected of salved property may be sent to the
party or parties who have provided salvage insurance cover in respect of that
property. Clause 14 provides that, subject to the express approval of the Arbitrator,
where an agreement is reached between the contractors and the owners of salvaged
cargo comprising at least 75% by value of salved cargo represented in accordance
with clause 7 of the Rules, the same agreement shall be binding on the owners of all
salvaged cargo who were not represented at the time of the said approval.

Finally, the new clause 15 provides that, subject to the express approval of the
Arbitrator, any salvaged cargo with a value below an agreed figure may be omitted
from the salvage fund and excused from liability for salvage where the cost of
including such cargo in the process is likely to be disproportionate to its liability for
salvage (LLOYDS, 2013).












17

Discussion

Seeing what has taken place in the salvage industry since its organization and
regulation in the late 19
th
century, and what changes have occurred, it is easy to
realise that there are two different opinions and strategies coming from two different
sectors of the industry. On the one side is the ISU, which looks forward to the
amendment of the 1989 Salvage Convention in order to be able to increase revenue
for salvors in the Union and also be able to remain competitive and up-to-date in
terms of technology and equipment. On the opposite side, there are the shipowners
and the insurers, who are fighting to keep their costs as low as possible in order to
maximise profit.

As a result, both sides have put forward arguments in order to support their proposal
and to try to convince the opposing side to adopt and accept their proposals. At this
point in the dissertation, the author will now refer to the two objectives mentioned in
the introduction and analyse them. First, regarding the ISUs proposals, there will be
an extensive explanation of the Unions proposals in favour of the amendment of the
1989 Salvage Convention. Secondly, the author is going to bring to light the
objections raised by the parties who are against this amendment (CMI ICS). In the
last part of this section, there will be an analysis, in terms of critical evaluation, of the
Unions proposals, which will lead to the final conclusion of this dissertation - why the
1989 SC should be amended.

Apart from the award given for salving maritime property, the ISU suggests a second
award that should be given to those who are participating in a salvage operation. This
award will be given based on the degree of success achieved by a salvor in
minimising or avoiding any damage to the environment during the salvage operation.

This proposal is formulated by the ISU because the Union believes that the current
award system for salvors based on the 1989 Salvage Convention, the commercial
arrangements under Lloyds Open Form 2011, and where applicable, the SCOPIC
2011, do not properly recognise the salvors efforts in carrying out their obligations
under the 1989 Salvage Convention in minimising or avoiding environmental damage
(MARINE-SALVAGE, 2013).

As Archie Bishop, the Legal Adviser to the International Salvage Union (HFW. 2013)
writes in one of his papers, the ISU raised the issue for the update of the 1989
18

Salvage Convention with the Lloyds Form Salvage Group which is responsible for
keeping the LOF contract up-to-date and in tune with the needs of the maritime
industry. A subcommittee was set up by the Salvage Group whose members were
representatives from the London Property Underwriters, the International Group of
P&I Clubs, the International Chamber of Shipping, and the International Salvage
Union. The issue for change of the present conditions regarding the salvage award
under the 1989 Salvage Convention was discussed at a number of meetings between
2007 and 2008, but unfortunately the unanimity required in order to implement any
changes could not be achieved. The idea that change was necessary was supported
by the ISU and the London Property Underwriters, whilst the shipowners and the ICS
were implacably against any change, remaining wholly content with the current
system (LAW.TULANE, 2013).

After their first failure, the Union then approached the Comit Maritime International,
which had previously drafted both the 1910 and the 1989 Salvage Conventions, and
asked them for a review of the 1989 Convention to be added to their work schedule.
After accepting this request, the CMIs Council set up an International Working Group
(IWG) to examine the issue. The IWG then issued a questionnaire to gather pertinent
information from some 56 national maritime law associations. This resulted in the
possible review of the 1989 Convention being discussed at two venues - an
exploratory meeting held in London in May 2010, and a CMI Colloquium held in
Buenos Aires in October 2010 at which all sides of the industry presented their
positions and all issues were debated. Later on, a second questionnaire was sent to
the 56 maritime law associations and its report was prepared for the Beijing
Conference which was held in October 2012 (COMITEMARITIME, 2013).

At the CMI Colloquium in Buenos Aires, the ISU president, Todd Busch, when giving
explanations as to why the salvage industry felt it was not being properly rewarded for
preventing environmental damage, said: "Let me say straight away we recognise
salvors are in many cases rewarded for protecting the environment by virtue of the
Salvage Conventions Article 13.1 (b). However, all too often the tribunal is unable to
give full effect to this provision because of the low value of the salved property. Cases
that give rise to a material threat to the environment are often of low value compared
to the cost and effort involved and it is in these cases that we feel inadequately
rewarded. In such cases Article 14 (subsequently replaced by SCOPIC - which has its
own problems) ameliorated the problem by providing compensation so salvors were
not 'out of pocket', but it has always been a 'safety net' rather than a method of
19

remuneration. SCOPIC (which only applies to Lloyds Open Form cases) is the same,
a safety net. Statistically, SCOPIC is applicable in 25% of all LOF cases so, in 25% of
cases, salvors are receiving just the bare minimum. In other cases the effect will
diminish as values rise, until the value is high enough to fairly reward the salvor for
what he has actually done. The break-even point is uncertain but it could be as much
as 50% of all cases. It is the injustice of being inadequately paid for the benefit
conferred that we seek to correct" (SOYER and TETTENBORN, 2012).

Later in his speech, regarding Special Compensation, he added: "We recognize the
introduction of the SCOPIC Clause substantially improved the mechanism of
assessing special compensation, as compared to the 1989 Salvage Conventions
Article 14, in LOF cases. But I emphasize, SCOPIC, like Article 14 is a method of
compensation when an award to cover cost cannot be made. It is not a method of
remuneration which is what we seek. Salvors would not be in the salvage business if
their remuneration was restricted to an Article 14 or SCOPIC award" (SOYER and
TETTENBORN, 2012).

After identifying problems in article 14, referring to SCOPIC as a safety net and finally
saying that current levels of remuneration are insufficient for salvors, the ISU
president went on to give three reasons as to why the present system had to change.

"Firstly, much has changed since the Salvage Convention was first drafted in 1981.
Environmental issues now dominate every salvage case and what may have been a
satisfactory encouragement then is no longer so today. Further, there is more risk to
the salvor from tougher regimes which can criminalize the actions of well-meaning
salvors.

Secondly, while salvors always work to protect the environment whilst carrying out
salvage operations, they are not fully rewarded for the benefit they confer. They are
rewarded for saving the ship and cargo, but not the environment.

Thirdly, salvors and marine property insurers believe it is not fair that the traditional
salvage reward that currently, but inadequately, reflects the salvors efforts in
protecting the environment is wholly paid by the ship and cargo owners and their
insurers without any contribution from the liability insurers, who cover the shipowners
exposure to claims for pollution and environmental damage" (SOYER and
TETTENBORN, 2012).
20


The Unions president, Todd Busch used the date problem in order to support his
position. Thirty years since the Conventions drafting in 1981 is quite some time,
especially when taking into consideration that the environmental issues tend to
dominate all salvage operations. Therefore, the environmental perspective has to be
taken into more serious consideration. In his second argument, Mr. Busch, placed
emphasis on the awards given. He claimed that the awards were ship- and cargo-
orientated and clearly not environmentally-orientated. Again, the environmental factor
had not been taken into consideration. Lastly, the liability insurers should be included
in the salvage reward, along with the current players (shipowners, cargo owners and
insurers).

The Unions next step was to clearly identify and put forward the existing problems,
along with the proposed amendments that needed to be made. The ISU focused on
three articles, which should be amended and which proposed the following changes.

ARTICLE 1(d)
In the whole convention, the provisions which have an environmental concern apply
when there is damage to the environment, or a threat of it, as defined in article 14.1.
The term damage to the environment is defined as follows: d) "Damage to the
environment means substantial physical damage to human health or to marine life or
resources in coastal or inland waters or areas adjacent thereto, caused by pollution,
contamination, fire, explosion or similar major incidents (COMITEMARITIME 2013).

The ISUs thesis is that there is no limitation to the environment of coastal waters and
therefore there should be no restriction. What should be removed is the words in
coastal or inland waters or areas adjacent thereto. According to the present wording,
no geographical limit is needed. The word substantial also needs to be taken into
consideration, as something that may be substantial to one area may not be in
another. For example, an oil spill of one tonne in the River Plate would undoubtedly
be substantial. The same size oil spill in the middle of the Atlantic Ocean is not likely
to be considered substantial. The Unions feeling is that any informed tribunal would
be capable of making up its mind in the light of all the circumstances and, in the
interest of simplicity, sees no purpose in imposing any geographical limit. That said, it
could accept a limit of the Economic Zone which is used in later conventions such as
the 1992 Protocol, the HNS Convention and the Bunker Convention, which all refer to
the economic zone (COMITEMARITIME, 2013).
21


ARTICLE 13.
Very little change is required to the current Article 13, according to the ISU proposal.
The main change has to do with the removal of 13.1 (b). This article will be
incorporated later on into the new article 14. Below, there is the current article 13, with
the proposed amendments highlighted in bold print.

13.1. The reward shall be fixed with a view to encouraging salvage operations, taking
into account the following criteria, without regard to the order in which they are
presented below:
(a) the salved value of the vessel and other property
(b) the skill and efforts of the salvors in preventing or minimising damage to the
environment, is changing to the new article (b)
(b) the measure of success obtained by the salvor
(c) the nature and degree of the danger;
(d) the skill and efforts of the salvors in salving the vessel, other property and life;
(e) the time used and expenses and losses incurred by the salvors;
(f) the risk of liability and other risks run by the salvors or their equipment;
(g) the promptness of the services rendered;
(h) the availability and use of vessels or other equipment intended for salvage
operations;
(i) the state of readiness and efficiency of the salvor's equipment and the value
thereof.
(j) Any award under the revised Article 14.
13.2. Payment of a reward fixed according to paragraph 1 shall be made by all of the
vessel and other property interests in proportion to their respective salved values.
However, a State Party may in its national law provide that the payment of a reward
has to be made by one of these interests, subject to the right of recourse of this
interest against other interests for their respective shares. Nothing in this article shall
prevent any right of defence.
13.3. The rewards, exclusive of interest and recoverable legal costs that may be
payable theron, shall not exceed the salved value of the vessel and other property.
13.4. For the avoidance of doubt, no account shall be taken under this article of
the skill and effort of the salvor in preventing or minimising damage to the
environment (LAW.TULANE, 2013).
The ISU in this new proposed article wants to clarify that the reward will be given to
the salvors, relating to the measure of success in their operation. The newly
22

introduced (j) paragraph, adds any other awards under the new Article 14. Salvors are
looking for economical motivations to intervene in salvage operations and, as a result,
greater profit. Therefore, the introduction of paragraph 13.4, clarifies emphatically that
the current Article 13.1. (b), is something that should be excluded from the
conversation. Under article 13, no account of the salvors effort in preventing or
minimising environmental damage shall be taken into consideration.

REVISED ARTICLE 14
Article 14, as has been previously clarified on this paper through the LOF, the
Nagasaki Spirit case, and SCOPIC, tends to be the most controversial article of the
whole 1989 Salvage Convention. Following numerous discussions the industry
reached the conclusion that Article 14s outcome was uncertain, expensive to
implement and cumbersome to operate. It was replaced by SCOPIC in LOF cases in
1999, but is still the law in 60 countries. The Unions proposal is to remove it
completely, and to replace it with the following:

1. If the salvor has carried out salvage operations in respect of a vessel which
by itself or its bunkers or its cargo threatened damage to the environment he
shall in addition to the reward to which he may be entitled under article 13, be
entitled to an environmental award. The environmental award shall be fixed with
a view to encouraging the prevention and minimisation of damage to the
environment whilst carrying out salvage operations, taking into account the
following criteria without regard to the order in which they are presented below.
(a) any reward made under the revised Article 13
(b) the criteria set out in the revised Article 13.1 (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) and (i)
(c) the extent to which the salvor has prevented or minimised damage to the
environment and the resultant benefit conferred (COMITEMARITME, 2010).

Under this proposal made by the ISU, a tribunal could make an environmental award
every time there was a threat to the environment. With the new criteria set in the
proposed Article 14, the salvor does not have to actually prevent damage to the
environment. The new environmental award is no longer limited to expenses as in the
present Article 14.1, nor does it depend on proof that the damage to the environment
has been prevented, as required by the current Article 14.2. The amount of the award
is left entirely to the tribunals discretion, after taking into consideration such factors
when reaching its assessment.

23

As Archie Bishop points out: The suggested criteria emulate Article 13 save for (c)
which gives the tribunal the power to take into account the degree of success in
preventing damage and the benefit thereby conferred. So, if there was a threat of
pollution in waters that would impose a liability on the owner, the award would be
more than if it had been in waters which did not impose such a liability, for the benefit
conferred would be that much greater (SOYER and TETTENBORN, 20012).

The Union accepted that there should be some form of cap on any environmental
award and therefore proposed that:

14.2 An environmental award shall not exceed the amount of the shipowners
limitation fund under the CLC 1992, the HNS Convention 1996, the Bunker
Convnetion 2001, or the 1996 LLMC Protocol or their respective successors,
whichever may be appropriate to the circumstances of their case
(LAW.TULANE, 2013).

Due to the fact that the Conventions mentioned above have no relevance to an
environmental award, except in establishing the amount of the appropriate cap, some
were unhappy with this development. Therefore an alternative proposal has been
made.

14.2. An environmental award shall not exceed
(a) In relation to a ship not exceeding 5000 tons gross x special drawing
rights
(b) In relation to a ship exceeding 5000 tons y special drawing rights per
gross ton subject to a maximum of z special drawing rights.
14.3. For the avoidance of doubt, an environmental award shall be paid in
addition to any liability the ship owner may have for damage caused to other
parties.

This provision is very beneficial for the salvors, as they do not want to be put in a
position of competing with third party claimants, something which will lead to
inevitable delays. In most such cases, it is not likely to be relevant to the owner for if a
limitation fund is applicable. In addition, the salvor is not likely to have been
successful in preventing damage and therefore be entitled to an environmental-based
award.

24

14.4 Any environmental award shall be paid by the shipowners.
As with the present Article 14, the Unions proposal makes the shipowner liable for
any environmental award rather than the cargo owner, as they are the ones who are
liable for any pollution under modern conventions and laws. The proposed
amendment to Article 14 concludes with two Articles that are in use under the current
convention.

14.5 If the salvor has been negligent and has thereby failed to prevent or minimise
damage to the environment, he may be deprived of the whole or part of any
environmental award under this article.
14.6. Nothing in this article shall affect any right of recourse on the part of the owner
of the vessel (LAW.TULANE, 2013).

The proposed amendments to Article 14 result in a tribunal being the only responsible
body able to assess an environmental award. According to Archie Bishop, experience
over more than 100 years has shown that a properly informed tribunal has the
capability to weigh up all factors set out in Article 13 and provide a just and fair
decision regarding the environmental award, which is high likely to satisfy the industry.
Lloyds Open Form deals with approximately 100 cases each year, many of substantial
proportions. For almost a hundred years, courts worldwide have been dealing with
such cases, therefore this system is proven to be tried and tested. Mr. Bishop
concludes that under these circumstances there is no reason why a tribunal cannot
do the same when assessing an environmental award (SOYER and TETTENBORN).
The difference now is that instead of examining the loss of cargo or the possible
damage, the tribunal will now have to examine and establish the danger of damage to
the environment. P&I Clubs have expressed their doubts by saying that such a system
includes high percentages of uncertainty and is very complicated
(COMITEMARITIME, 2013). According to Archie Bishop though, the proposed system
is no more complicated or uncertain than the current system which the P&I Clubs are
happy with. The present assessment of a salvage award under Article 13 is very
similar to what is proposed by the ISU for assessment of environmental salvage and
has to be done in almost all cases, even when SCOPIC is involved.

London Arbitrators are said to have already taken into account the potential liability
from which cargo and ship are saved. Such potential liability does not have to be
proven to the last dollar. It is sufficient to know of the risk and to weigh in the balance
the degree of that risk. It will be the same for an environmental award. A threat will be
25

sufficient for an award to be made but clearly the degree of that threat and the likely
consequences will have a bearing on the amount that is awarded. That is for the
tribunal to decide. (SOYER and TETTENBORN, 2012).

The ISUs president said in Buenos Aires "salvors do not expect to be paid unless
there is a benefit conferred and they fully expect an environmental award to be
commensurate with that benefit. They do not expect anything unless it has been
earned and are happy for an appropriate tribunal to make the judgment of what is fair
and reasonable" (LAW.TULANE, 2013).

The Unions proposals for amendments to Articles 13 and 14 are the only proposals
put forward to date, but alternative solutions are likely to be presented in the future.
The ISU is resilient to an extent, due to the fact that they are looking forward to
changing the existing standards in the salvage industry and achieving their goals, but
in no sense are they willing to abandon their basic principles and proposals.

OBJECTIONS RAISED
As mentioned above, there were two sides to the amendment issue. Those for the
amendment, the ISU and the London Property Underwriters, and those against it, the
P&I Clubs and the ICS who both represent the shipowners interests. The chairman of
the International Working Groups, Stuart Hetherington, in December 2011, at the U.S.
Maritime Law Association meeting in Hawaii, summarised in an excellent way the
CMIs current position on the subject.

In his paper, Hetherington explained that of the twenty-four responses to the
questionnaires which were previously mentioned on this paper and which had been
completed by the National Maritime Law Associations (NMLAs) regarding the
environment issue, the vast majority wanted an amendment to the definition of
damage to the environment, nevertheless not the exact and whole proposal was
made by the ISU. There seems to be support for extending the geographical scope of
damage to the environment to at least the exclusive economic zone. The NMLAs
seem fairly relaxed as to whether the word substantial should be changed. The ISU
has recently suggested substantial be replaced by the word significant, which might
be more appealing to the NMLAs.

26

While there is a more even split, the majority feel some change is needed to articles
13 and 14 to reflect the environmental issue (though not necessarily in the way
suggested by the ISU) (BISHOP, 2006).

Charles Hume, the Chairman of the Salvage Sub-Committee of the International
Group of P&I Clubs, in his paper on the Hawaii meeting. strongly opposes the
amendments proposed by the ISU.

It is easy to paint the P&I Clubs as the bad guys because they don't like
'environmental salvage'. Surely, people say, it must be 'a good thing' - a bit like
'corporate social responsibility'; how could anyone possibly gainsay the importance of
preventing or minimising damage to the environment or the taking of practical steps to
do so? Well the answer is that we don't (MLAUS, 2013). The Chairman went on to
say that the P&I Clubs have previously expressed that there should be an incentive to
salvors, specifically to avoid environmental damage, when the prospects of a low or
total lack of award would otherwise discourage them from doing so.

Firstly, The discussions which led to the introduction of LOF 80, and the original
exception to 'no cure no pay' by means of the safety net for laden tankers, secondly
the discussions which led to the Salvage Convention 1989 and the extension of the
exception to no cure no pay' to encompass the 'special compensation' provisions of
Article 14 of the Convention - providing a greater incentive to salvors to prevent or
minimise damage to the environment, or so it was thought at the time and lastly the
discussions with the ISU and property underwriters between 1997 and 1999 which
were triggered by the case of the 'Nagasaki Spirit' and led to the introduction of
SCOPIC on 15` August1999. Apart from the many other benefits for salvors, property
underwriters and Clubs which SCOPIC provides, it should be remembered that one of
the drivers as the Clubs were concerned was enabling them to take an increasingly
participative role in casualty management to ensure that their exposure to
environmental damage claims was minimised. SCOPIC has delivered on that
objective as well (COMITEMARITIME, 2010).

Therefore, the Clubs claim that they are not opposed to the salvors being fairly
remunerated for their efforts in preventing or minimising damage to the environment,
and in addition the Clubs emphasise that the salvors are already fairly remunerated.
Mr. Humes adds: What then is this concept of an 'environmental salvage' award
which the ISU, and others who believe it to be a 'good thing', get so excited about?
27

Well, we wish we knew - its outlines are so vague and imprecise, its suggested
mechanisms so potentially uncertain and unwieldy that we have yet to comprehend it
(MLAUS, 2013).

Later in his paper, Charles Hume underlines that even if the Clubs were of the idea
that SCOPIC could provide everything that environmental salvage needed, they
participated in the Environmental Salvage Working Group of the Lloyds Salvage
Group to hear the ISUs explanation of it. After the meeting, the Clubs sent an email to
the ISU and the property underwriters to which they received no actual response.

To summarise the extensive notes that we took, we understood that the ISU and
property underwriters would get together to formulate a proposal to the ICS and Clubs
which would, by way of worked examples, be sufficiently clear, substantial and
tangible for us to understand, and
which would demonstrably improve casualty response and confer benefit on those
currently paying for casualty response, and:
which would identify what, if any, elements of the current casualty response regime,
specifically the notable practical benefits and certainties of SCOPIC, would be either
retained or adjusted, and
which would address the ISU's concern that they are not adequately remunerated for
what they do to `salve' the environment, and
which would address the property underwriters' concern that there is unfairness in
the allocation between property and P&I of the current cost of environment protection.
For our part, we undertook to consider seriously any proposal which fulfilled these
criteria with an open and constructive mind. You accepted that if the proposal did not
at least satisfy the second bullet point above, the ISU saw no purpose in pursuing ES
as an idea in any event." (COMITEMARITIME, 2013).

CURRENT CLUBS POSITION
The P&I Clubs see SCOPIC as being the solution, which has successfully dealt with
the unworkable conditions of Article 14 over the past 12 years. Moreover, they claim
that it is not the sates concern as to who pays. From their provision, the 1989
Salvage Convention operates in an effective and satisfactory way with a mechanism
to prevent damage to the environment. According to the Clubs, it seems highly
unlikely that someone will be able to demonstrate a clear and well-documented
compelling need to amend the Convention. As far as Article 13.1 (b) is concerned, it
requires that the reward shall be fixed with a view to encouraging salvage operations
28

and that arbitrators should take into account the skill and efforts of the salvors in
preventing or minimising damage to the environment. The Clubs insist that the
mechanism already exists and salvors should continue to use it, and therefore they do
not see why a change in the wording is needed (MLAUS, 2013). Hume accuses the
Union of not being true environmental altruists and what they really want is an
additional revenue stream.

Just before his conclusion, the Chairman says that many commentators have pointed
to the inherent practical difficulties of an environmental salvage award. As a result, if
Article 14 is said to be commercially impractical, then the environmental salvage is
likely to be even harder to establish: There is an inherent and intellectually fatal flaw
in trying to align environmental salvage with property salvage: if it is to be done, it
must logically be proportional to quantifiable savings in liability for environmental
damage. This is impossible to demonstrate (MLAUS, 2013).

At his conclusion, Mr. Hume finds it difficult to believe how the ISU has beguiled the
CMI into spending so much time on the remote possibility of revising the Salvage
Convention. It is also disappointing to him that the ISU stopped the dialogue with the
Clubs regarding the environmental salvage issue. The P&I Clubs, in the papers last
paragraph, emphasize their commitment to the salvage industry by agreeing to
increase SCOPIC rates (COMITEMARITIME, 2013).

It is quite obvious that the P&I Clubs are strongly against any amendment proposed
by the ISU and as it is clearly understood by the nature of Mr. Humes paper, that they
are willing to remain opposed to the Union for their own gain.


ICSs POSITION
The International Chamber of Shipping, which represents 80% of the worlds
merchant fleet (GCAPTAIN, 2013) in its paper on the Unions proposal, focuses on
the financial difficulties claimed by the ISU. Shipowners and their insurers are seeking
to maintain a vibrant and viable salvage industry (words used by the ISU) for their
own benefit as well. The Unions strongest argument when trying to persuade the
other players involved in salvage is that the industry is having financial problems and
in order for the problems to be overcome, more funding is needed. The ICS, as well
as the P&I Clubs, requested more detailed information, but the ISU could not verify
their claim.
29


The salvors second reason for introducing the concept is that, over the past decades,
environmental awareness when there is an incident has risen, and quite often
environmental protection takes priority over simple salvage operations for saving
property. The Unions claim is that under this scheme, the operations performed for
protecting and saving the environment are of enormous benefit to the liability insurers,
as the pollution liability is then reduced. However, the salvors are not entitled to an
environmental award which would reflect the benefit to the P&I Clubs interests.
Consequently, the salvors claim that they are not properly rewarded under the present
LOF and the 1989 Salvage Convention.

The ICS though is not yet persuaded that there is a need for a separate environmental
salvage award. The ICS remains deeply skeptical about the proposal for a separate
environmental salvage award, especially as salvage services are already generously
rewarded under the present system. said the ICS Insurance Committee Chairman,
Matheos Los (GCAPTAIN, 2013). The Chamber claims that the concept discussed is
quite similar to the liability salvage concept which was discussed during the
negotiation of the 1989 Salvage Convention and which was finally rejected in favour of
Articles 13 and 14 and also SCOPIC. The ICS, after briefly referring to SCOPIC,
mentions that the tariff rates increased significantly in July 2007 and, as a result,
SCOPIC provides salvors with the certainty of a reasonable and profitable reward for
preventing or minimising damage to the environment in cases which might otherwise
not be financially attractive i.e. where prospects for success (and therefore the
earning of a traditional Article 13 award) are slight (COMITEMARITIME, 2013).

After giving a short background to Articles 13 and 14, the ICS paper emphasises the
fact that negotiated compromises were made between the various interests in a
salvage operation. It is apparent from this that to unravel one part would entail
unraveling all aspects. All principles taken into consideration when negotiating the
Salvage Convention reflect the present concepts in public law Conventions where all
parties share responsibility for the environment and, at the same time, they seek to
ensure that salvors are given an incentive to assist ships which may be considered as
a threat to the environment.

The Chamber notes that in the ISUs paper to the LSG Working Group, the
environmental salvage award proposal is likely to alter the basis of salvage operations
as the prime concern would no longer be to salve property. As Lord Mustill explained
30

in the Nagasaki Spirit case in 1997, the Convention should, by no means, create a
new distinct category of environmental salvage which would finance salvors to keep
their vessels in readiness for saving the environment. The primary purpose for salvors
would be providing assistance to ships in distress, for which the primary incentive is a
traditional salvage reward. Prevention of damage to the environment is an incidental
benefit of some operations which deserves financial recognition by way of special
compensations and not by a freestanding reward.

Concluding, the Chamber believed that the basis proposed by the ISU for assessment
of environmental salvage awards threatened damage to the environment is very
broad. Given the presence of bunkers on all ships, this basis could then be used in all
salvage operations. Quantifying an environmental award would be difficult and, as a
result, any method of assessment based on the extent to which a salvor has
minimised or prevented damage to the environment would inevitably be hypothetical
(COMITEMARITIME, 2013).

The ICS clearly stands against any amendment of the existing Salvage Convention,
just like the P&I Clubs have already done. Their paper includes proof that any
amendment is not to their benefit and interest, and the language used is much softer
than the one used in the Clubs paper by Charles Hume. By invoking Lord Mustills
sayings on the Nagasaki Spirit case, the Chamber makes is position even stronger
and well documented. In order to maintain a bond with the salvage industry and not
have them totally against them, the Chamber adds: ICS notes that the International
Union of Marine Insurance (IUMI) also believes that the proposals require further
detailed consideration, not least to ensure shipowners agreement, and that the
discussion should therefore be put back until 2016 (GCAPTAIN, 2013).

THE OUTCOME OF THE BEIJING CONFERENCE 2012
Back in December 2008, the ISU wrote to the CMI and, after reminding them that the
1989 Conventions was almost 20 years old, and 30 years had already passed since
its drafting begun, they suggested that a revision of certain aspects was necessary.
The CMI set up an International Working Group and sent two questionnaires to the
NMLAs in 2009 and 2010. There have also been two IWG meetings and a Colloquium
at Buenos Aires in 2010.

The first questionnaire regarding Article 13 is as follows:
31

1.2 Do you consider that the words contained in Article 1(d) of the Salvage
Convention ("in coastal or inland waters or areas adjacent thereto") should be
deleted?
1.3 Alternatively do you think words such as those used in the other Conventions (e.g.
"where ever such may occur" / "exclusive economic zone" / "territorial sea") should
replace those words in Article 1(d) of the Salvage Convention?
1.4 Have there been any reported cases in your jurisdiction in which the word
"substantial" (which is contained in Article 1(d) of the Salvage Convention), as used in
that definition, have been interpreted?
1.4.1 If so, could you provide a copy of the decision?
1.4.2 If there have been no such cases in your jurisdiction do you think it likely that
the word "substantial" could create difficulties of interpretation?
1.4.3 If so, do you consider that there is any other word or group of words that could
better identify what is intended by the definition? (COMITEMARITIME, 2013).
Sixteen out of twenty-four NMLAs who responded to the questionnaire were in favour
of the change of words in coastal or inland waters or areas adjacent thereto with
words which refer to the exclusive economic zone. Two did not express an opinion,
and of the six who did not want to amend the present wording, four recognised that
the wording could be improved.

Regarding the alteration of the word substantial referring to damage to the
environment, two NMLAs did not express an opinion whether the word should be
deleted, seven were in favour of the deletion, and the remaining fifteen considered
that the tribunals were very capable of interpreting the word satisfactorily. The
Chinese MLA favoured the deletion on the basis that its use is contrary to the trend of
strengthening environment protection as it fails to reward the ordinary, non-substantial
physical damage, and because of the lack of clarity as to what was meant by use of
the word substantial. The Slovenian, Italian and Swedish MLAS suggested that both
the words major and substantial should be deleted. The South African MLA which
favoured the deletion was uncertain whether the word should be replaced and queried
if it was whether such words as not trifling nor insignificant should qualify as damage
to the environment (COMITEMARITIME, 2013).

Questions asked for Article 13 are:
4.2 Has your jurisdiction made any provision, as provided for in Article 13 paragraph 2
for the payment of a reward by one of the interests referred to in the opening sentence
of this paragraph?
32

4.3 Do you think it would be appropriate to specify in this Article that in container ship
cases the vessel owner only is responsible for the payment of claims (and therefore
would be responsible for the provision of security) subject to a right of recourse
against the other interests for their respective shares?
Article 13 paragraph 2 provides that:
"Payment of a reward fixed according to paragraph 1 shall be made by all of the
vessel and other property interests in proportion to their respective salved values.
However, a State Party may in its national law provide that the payment of a reward
has to be made by one of these interests, subject to a right of recourse of this interest
against the other interests for their respective shares. Nothing in this article shall
prevent any right of defence" (COMITEMARITIME, 2013).

Three NMLAs reported that in their countries their legislation places liability with the
shipowners. Four NMLAs claimed that it would benefit the Convention to identify the
shipowner as the one who is responsible for paying claims and the provision of
security in container cases. The rest of the NMLAs did not consider it necessary to
make special provisions for container ships.

As far as Article 14 is concerned, the questionnaire sent included the following:
5.2 Do you consider that consideration should be given to amending article 14 in order
to create an entitlement to an environmental award? (It is recognised that there are
"political" issues involved as to who would pay for such an award but the IWG would
be interested to know whether your MLA would be in favour of an investigation of this
issue. It is also recognised that if you answer this question in the affirmative,
consequential changes may need to be made to the definition of "damage to the
environment" in article 1(d), to article 13, article 15 and article 20).

Ten NMLAs were for the consideration of the environmental salvage issue and seven
were against it. Two of the remaining expressed no opinion, and four recognized that
some change may be necessary. Only one was open to persuasion. The German
MLA hoped that the competing parties would first negotiate a resolution. The
Norwegian MLA pointed out that the increased focus on the environmental side of
casualties suggested that Article 14 needed to be drafted to encourage professional
salvors to maintain dedicated vessels and equipment and be ready to prevent
environmental damage. Some NMLAs pointed out that SCOPIC is the indication that
Article 14 had not worked. The arguments in favour of the amendment are based on
the changing face of salvage, and on the fact that salvors are not properly rewarded
33

when there is low salved value. Those against the amendment focused mainly on the
unpredictability of an environmental award and the need to share the liability for any
such award with the property owners and their insurers.

Regarding the second questionnaire that was given to the NMLAs, information was
sought with a view to ascertaining how much empirical data was available to support
the salvors proposals. Data was sought as to the number of claims made by salvors
that had resulted in a modest reward by reason of the low salved value. Up to today,
eleven NMLAs have responded and none of them is able to provide an example of an
instance where a salvor declined to be involved because of the low value of the
property to be salved. Similarly, no examples have been reported in which authorities
prevented the completion of a salvage operation and consequently deprived the
salvor of a possible award. Same responses also suggest that Article 14 awards do
not permit a profit element to be incorporated and there are no examples of any uplift
being applied to an Article 14 award.

The conclusion of the Beijing Conference is that some matters should be put forward
to the IMO as amendments worthy of consideration to the Salvage Convention.

Forwarding a draft Protocol to the Salvage Convention to the IMO (bearing in mind
IMO Resolutions A500(XII) and A777(18)).

Forwarding a report to the IMO identifying the issues which have been debated and
the conclusions reached.

Alternatively the Conference may like the CMI to suggest that in light of the debate at
the Conference, consideration needs to be given to amending the LOF to take
account of these discussions.

The Conference may, on the other hand, consider that no further action should be
taken by the CMI on the issue of salvage at the present time (COMITEMARITIME,
2013).
The final sentence summarises the outcome of the Beijing Conference. The ISU
proposals regarding the environmental award were not accepted by the CMI and
therefore no further action has been taken.

ISUs RESPONSE
34

The Union, after the unforeseen outcome of the Beijing Conference, responded
through the following statement:

The International Salvage Union (ISU) is disappointed that the CMI Conference in
Beijing did not support its proposals for modest change to the 1989 Salvage
Convention. ISU is nevertheless grateful to those countries which did support change.
The proposals were intended to introduce a salvage award that recognises salvors
efforts to protect the environment during salvage operations.

Members of the ISU provide a vital service to the shipping industry, often working in
challenging and dangerous conditions. ISU will continue to work with shipowners, the
insurance community, maritime lawyers and other relevant parties and pursue all
avenues in order to ensure that salvors are properly rewarded and that the framework
within which salvage operations are conducted encourages innovation, investment
and global readiness to intervene in casualty situations (COMITEMARITIME, 2013).

CRITICAL EVALUATION OF BOTH POSITIONS
After having seen and examined both sides positions regarding the amendment of the
1989 Salvage Convention, concerning Articles 1, 13 and 14, the author is now going
to critically evaluate the arguments set by both sides for and against the amendment,
use the data provided by the interview with the current ISU president Mr. Andreas
Tsavliris and, finally, give an answer as to whether the ISU is right in asking for an
amendment of the 1989 Salvage Convention.

The P&I Clubs, the ICS and the CMI are those who stand against the proposed
amendments by the ISU. Their basic argument is that any problematic provisions of
Article 14 have already been settled with the introduction of SCOPIC. Under this
scheme, salvors are generously rewarded and the environmental factor is also
considered (MARSECREVIEW, 2013). It is more than obvious that the P&I Clubs, by
accepting the SCOPIC solution, realized that Article 14 had some issues regarding its
proper function. By introducing SCOPIC they feel that salvors are now generously
rewarded (MARSECREVIEW, 2013) and all incentives are given to them to intervene
in salvage operations when there is a threat to the environment (COMITEMARITIME,
2013).

The ISU, on the other hand, keeps on referring to SCOPIC as a safety net, rather
than a remuneration method. Problems arising concern the person who will be the
35

negotiator, and also the tariff rate (CMI, 2010). Such provisions tend to make SCOPIC
more of a law than an actual contract, and therefore it gives no extra incentive to
salvors to intervene in operations were environmental damage is happening and
success is not guaranteed. The Clubs and the ICS insist on its use by using the
argument that LOF is a worldwide recognised and much-used contract (Lloyds, 2013).
The Union answers by saying that currency rates have changed over the past years
and therefore the reward is diminished. Subsequently, salvors are discouraged in
intervening in an operation when SCOPIC is agreed and is going to be their
remuneration method.

According to Archie Bishop, there is another tricky provision regarding SCOPIC. If
SCOPIC is incorporated then it replaces Article 14 which will no longer apply. This is a
crucial point for the salvor, for if SCOPIC is included but not invoked (or is later
terminated), the salvor will not be covered by either Article 14 or SCOPIC (MARINE-
SALVAGE, 2013).

Nevertheless, SCOPIC seems to be working well in terms of use (between 1999-2010
there have been 1008 LOF cases, in which SCOPIC was incorporated into the
contract 30% of the time, and invoked in 24%. At the same time, there were only
seven SCOPIC-related arbitrations (MARINE-SALVAGE, 2013). But, as mentioned
above, it is considered to be a safety net provision for salvors who feel that they are
not properly rewarded. This fact can be easily concluded by the following numbers.
The total gross income of the world salvage industry was $250 million in 2008 earned
from 250 operations. $300 million was gained from wreck removals. The salvage
industry estimated that rewards are adequate in about 50% of salvage cases and too
low in the other 50%. Rewards are highlighted as too low in 25% of cases where
SCOPIC has been used and the bare minimum paid (BISHOP, 2006).

Wording of Article 1 does not seem to be a problem or an area of conflict between the
ISU and those opposed to the amendments. As it was concluded from the
questionnaires sent, the NMLAs were in favour of the proposed change of wording in
Article 1. The same applies to the CMI, the P&I Clubs, and the ICS. What have been
the so called causes of the problem are the proposed Articles 13 and 14.

The three allies against the proposed amendments focus mainly on their strongest
argument that salvors are already generously paid under SCOPIC and LOF. Charles
Hume finds it difficult to understand why the salvors are requesting a separate
36

environmental award when they are paid under LOF or SCOPIC, even if prospects of
a low or no award exist. It is unlikely for them that the Union can really prove that the
current system is not working well. The common belief between the Clubs is that the
ISU are not environmentally altruistic, but they are seeking more revenue. Moreover,
the ICS adds another dimension to their counter arguments. The Chamber claims that
with the introduction of a separate environmental award, the prime incentive of
salvage is missing and is likely to become extinct. Salvors would then have as their
priority obtaining the award and not salving property. The ICS uses Lord Mustills
decision on the Nagasaki Spirit case, where he concluded by saying that the primary
concern in salvage should be helping ships in distress. Anything more than that
(salving the environment) is already recognised under Special Compensation and
should not be altered by a freestanding award.

Something that is also used as an argument by the Chamber is that the wording used
by the ISU, threatened damage to the environment, regarding the environmental
award, is very broad. What should be considered a threat to the environment? All
ships carry bunker fuels. Under this scope, all salvage operations can claim an
environmental award. Nevertheless, the ICS remains conciliatory and leaves room for
discussion after 2016. Finally, the CMI is using the outcome of the Beijing Conference
as its decision. No further action should be taken, regarding the ISUs proposal for
amendment.

Basically, all key players who do not wish Articles 13 and 14 be amended do not want
to pay more money, especially in the present financial climate. An environmental
award is likely to be added to their expenses. They all feel that SCOPIC is the solution
that already exists for what the salvors are asking for, and as a result there is no
reason for an extra award. Moreover, the prime incentive of saving cargo and ships in
distress will be lost and salvors would only intervene in cases where environmental
threats exist in order to receive greater financial reward.

Salvors, on the other hand, make it clear that their revenue is small, and they can no
longer remain competitive in terms of equipment needed and effectiveness. SCOPIC
is not enough for them, as it is considered to be a safety net rather than a
remuneration method; nevertheless it has worked extremely well. A tribunal, too often,
is unable to give full effect to this provision because of the low value of the salved
property from which the award is made (MARINE-SALVAGE, 2013).

37

According to Mr. Andreas Tsavliris, the current president of the ISU, the Union would
like to see a number of changes to SCOPIC; however these amendments are
opposed by shipowners and insurers. SCOPIC has worked well since its introduction
in 1999, but it is not perfect (TSAVLIRIS, 2013). Another issue raised by those
against the amendments is that LOF is working well and there is no decline in cases.
The ISU have recently stated though that the number of LOF cases is declining. Mr.
Tsavliris adds that: The data from Lloyds speaks for itself.


Year by year trend of vessels involved in LOF services. Source: Lloyds, 2013

Analysis of LOFs, including the stripping out of numerous small yacht salvages
undertaken on LOF, shows that the use of LOF is still in decline. Modern
communication is the most influential factor on the decline of LOF. Prior to satellite
and mobile communication the Master had autonomy in deciding whether to accept
LOF; this decision is now made by the shipowner and/or his underwriters. A
secondary reason is that LOF is perceived by many as expensive, both in terms of
award and legal costs. However, it is a fact that 75% of LOF cases are settled and do
not go to arbitration, thereby keeping legal costs low(TSAVLIRIS, 2013).

As stated by the ICS above, revenue from LOF and SCOPIC has increased
substantially for the ISU. Mr. Tsavliris denies this specific statement. Lloyds own
data on LOF awards from 2000 shows that LOF revenue has significantly decreased
(TSAVLIRIS, 2013).
38


Amounts awarded. Source: Lloyds, 2013

Seeing that revenue has decreased and that there has been a significant decrease in
LOF cases, the author realises that there should have been a new way for salvors to
retain, if not increase their revenue. Both sides have, on numerous occasions, stated
that a thriving and up-to-date salvage industry is what they are looking for. However,
numbers show that LOF cases and revenue do not seem to follow this perspective.

The Union has also settled on three basic principles which demand change. Unlike in
the past, the environment is now relevant in every salvage case and there is
enormous regulatory control by the involved coastal state in salvage operations. Quite
often, port authorities are being given the power to determine precisely what work is
done. Back then, the main concern was oil cargoes. Nowadays, other pollutants can
be regarded as more damaging. Almost every ship is carrying pollutants (bunkers,
cargoes) and therefore, there is hardly an incident in which environmental
considerations are not relevant. Public environmental concerns dictate the way in
which salvage operations should be carried out and have to be the first consideration
of every salvor.

Governments, on their side, are legislating by imposing potential criminal liabilities on
a salvor, and not only to increase potential civil rights. Salvors have accepted their
liability for negligence during a salvage operation, but before 2001 they had the so
called responder immunity. The Bunker Convention 2001 removed this immunity,
opening up the salvors to third party claims. Despite a good defence that exists, it is
likely that the salvors will be drawn into expensive, time-consuming litigation subject to
39

the vagaries of a variety of jurisdictions. Nevertheless, the IMO recommended to
Member States that they should make provisions for responder immunity. It remains
to be seen how many States will accept this recommendation made by the IMO. The
potential criminal and civil liabilities of a salvor are very different to those in the 1980s
when the Salvage Convention was being developed. Moreover, they are a definite
disincentive to the salvor to get involved in other peoples problems (MARINE-
SALVAGE, 2013). By taking such a risk, the salvors are hopefully searching for a
proper and more appropriate reward.

To continue, in many shipping casualties where a coastal state is involved, it is
frequently required that the bunker fuel be removed by the salvor before they are
allowed to operate. This requirement arises even in cases when salvors feel it is an
unnecessary precaution. These concerns are well illustrated by the Prestige case.
Refusal to give the Prestige a port of refuge may have been understandable to the
coastal authorities back then, but it is commonly accepted that if a port of refuge had
been provided, the ship and much of her cargo could have been salved. and
consequently the environmental disaster would have been reduced. It is accepted that
the award for the salvors would have been around $10 to $12 million, the award would
have been paid out of the salved property fund without intervention of SCOPIC, the
remaining cargo oil on board would have been contained and, finally, the cost of
cleaning up the spill would have been considerably less at between $40 to $50 million.

As the salvors could not operate and because the ship was not given a place of
refuge, she finally sank. The environmental damage caused is estimated to be around
$1 billion. Had the ship and cargo been salved, claims of $1 billion would have been
avoided. An enhanced award would have been given to the salvors, yet conferred
very small amount in relation to the money saved. The Prestige lost approximately
70,000 tonness of oil, the Erika almost the same amount, and the Exxon Valdez
lost some 37,000 tonnes. Claims of about $5 billion were made for these incidents. In
contrast, during 2009, ISU members salved 1,022,730 tonness of pollutants and to go
back even earlier, in the last 15 years they have salved almost 16 million tonnes of
pollutants, many of which could have ended up in the sea and around coastlines. If a
SCOPIC clause is used, due to the ship and cargos nominal value, its tariff basis
does not have a reward mechanism for the salvors work to prevent damage to the
environment. A change in the law to provide the possibility of a reward for protecting
the environment would provide additional encouragement for the salvor (MARINE-
SALVAGE, 2013).
40


Lastly, salvors efforts in environmental protection are currently taken into
consideration, to a certain degree, as those efforts are one of the criteria taken into
account when assessing an award under Article 13. But, the reward under Article 13
is paid wholly by the ship and cargo insurers, and their respective underwriters pro-
rata to value, and there isnt any contribution from the shipowners liability
underwriters who would normally bear the cost of pollution claims and who therefore
directly benefit from the work carried out by a salvor. It is easy for someone to
understand that this is far from just. As highlighted by Mr. Andreas Tsavliris in his
interview with the author: the advantages of clearly identifying environmental services
within a salvage contract are as follows:

It will identify to property underwriters the amount of an Article 13 award that
they currently pay and which should be attributable to liability underwriters
It will demonstrate the growing importance and value of environmental
services within an Article 13 award
It will clearly identify the returns to the salvage business on its investment in
environmental services (equipment and personnel) and ensure that future
investment is appropriately targeted (TSAVLIRIS, 2013).


















41

Conclusions and recommendations

After presenting, analysing, and finally evaluating the working practices adopted by
the ISU and the CMI-ICS-P&I Clubs, the author has made it clear why the 1989
Salvage Convention should be amended. Arguments put forward by the Salvage
Union based on data examples and critical evaluation seem to be much stronger than
those presented by the opposing side. Salvors seem not to be properly rewarded
under the present scheme, despite environmental concerns increasing over the past
years. SCOPIC works well, but it is a tariff rate. Money spent on claims could have
been saved, like in the Prestige case, if salvors were also given an environmental
award.

The ISU believes that its case for change mentioned above is persuasive and fair
given the way concern for the environment has rightly increased. The salvage industry
faces numerous challenges in a shipping environment that has changed significantly.
Commercial pressures increase and society requires good environmental outcomes.
However the current regime does not fairly reward salvors for their operations. There
is also increased involvement and demands from shore-based authorities and
incidents are played out where a salvor risks criminal prosecution if pollution happens
during a salvage operation. By adding large cruise ships, container ships, and bulker
carriers, it is easy to understand what the salvage industry has to think of. According
to the author, salvors are not seeking any environmental award unless a benefit has
been conferred and it should be in proportion to that benefit. Salvors are problem
solvers and are not likely to hide from a challenge. The Union requests that the
assessment of this award be made by the appropriate tribunal, guided by principles
that have worked well for years.

The next step is the ratification of the proposed arguments indicated by the ISU, which
are likely to lead to a safer, fairer and better-structured modern shipping industry.








42

Bibliography
Binney, B. F. (1990). Protecting the Environment with Salvage Law: Risks, Rewards,
and the 1989 Salvage Convention. Washington Law Review, 639.
Brooke, W. (2008). Keepers, weepers, or no finders at all: the effect of international
trends on the exercise of Us Jurisdiction and Substantive law in the salvage of
historic wrecks. Tulane Maritime Law Journal, 305.
Craig, F. (2002). A New International Regime for the Protection of Underwater
Cultural Heritage. The International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 511-
554.
Donald, R., & O'May. (1983). May, Lloyd's Form and The Montreal Convention.
Tulane Maritime Journal, 1412-1436.
G, M. D., G, C., & D, J. C. (1982). The Long-Term Effects of the Amoco Cadiz Oil
Spill [and Discussion]. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of
London., 323-333.
Gaskell, N. J. (1989). The International Convention on Salvage 1989. International
Journal of Estuarine and Coastal Law, 268.
James, D., & Dewell, J. (1912). The Laws of Salvage. The Yale Law Journal, 493-499.
Lawrence, J. (1954). The Life Salvor Problem in Admiralty. The Yale Law Journal,
779-791.
Michael, K. (1990). The International Convention on Salvage 1989: How It Came to
Be. The International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 530-556.
Organization, I. M. (2010, September 21). IMO, International Convention On Salvage,
1989. Retrieved from SiSu: http://www.jus.uio.no/sisu
U.S. Concerns Regarding UNESCO Convention on Underwater Heritage. (2002). The
American Journal of International Law, 468-470.


43

References

ADMIRALTYLAWGUIDE, 2010. Convention. [online] [viewed 22 June 2013] available
from: http://www.admiraltylawguide.com/conven/salvage1910.html
BISHOP A., 2006. TULANE MARITIME LAW JOURNAL [e-journal] vol.30 pp.83
available from:
http://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/tulmar37&div=7&collec
tion=journals&set_as_cursor=0&men_tab=srchresults&terms=beijing%20con
ference%202012&type=matchall
CIL.NUS, 2009. 1910 [online] [viewed 25 June 2013] available from:
http://cil.nus.edu.sg/1910/1910-international-convention-for-the-unification-of-
certain-rules-of-law-related-to-assistance-and-salvage-at-sea-and-protocol-
of-signature/
CMI,2010. Uploads [online] [viewed 24 June 2013] available
from:http://cmi.admissiondigital.com/Uploads/Salvage%20Convention/Discus
sion%20paper%20for%20Review%20of%20Salvage%20Convention%20198
9%20with%20annexures.pdf
CMI2012BEIJING, 2012. DCT [online] [viewed 24 June 2013] available from:
http://www.cmi2012beijing.org/dct/page/65642
COMITEMARITIME,2013. Salvage Convention 1989 [online] [viewed 21 June 2013]
available from: http://www.comitemaritime.org/Salvage-Convention-
1989/0,2746,14632,00.html
COMITEMARITIME, 2013. Uploads. [online] [ viewed 22 June 2013] available from:
http://www.comitemaritime.org/Uploads/Salvage%20Convention/Position%20
Paper%20by%20ISC.pdf
COMITEMARITIME, 2013. Uploads [online] [viewed 22 June 2013] available from:
http://www.comitemaritime.org/Uploads/Salvage%20Convention/Graham%20Daines
%20-%20Scopic%20Paper.pdf
COMITEMARITIME, 2013. Uploads [online] [viewed 23 June 2013] available from:
http://www.comitemaritime.org/Uploads/Salvage%20Convention/Developmen
t%20of%20Environmental%20Salvage%20-
%20Archie%20Bishop%209%20Feb%202012.pdf
COMITEMARITIME, 2013. Uploads [online] [viewed 24 June 2013] available from:
http://www.comitemaritime.org/Uploads/Salvage%20Convention/Position%20
Paper%20by%20ISC.pdf
COMITEMARITIME, 2013. Uploads [online] [viewed 24 June 2013] available from:
http://www.comitemaritime.org/Uploads/Salvage%20Convention/Charles%20
44

Hume%20paper%20-
%20CMI%20Review%20of%20the%20Salvage%20Convention.pdf
DEFINITIONS.USLEGAL,2013. No cure no pay [online] [viewed 25 June 2013]
available from: http://definitions.uslegal.com/n/no-cure-no-pay/
DIGILIB.LIB, 2009. Dspace [online] [viewed 27 June 2013] available from:
http://digilib.lib.unipi.gr/dspace/bitstream/unipi/4607/1/Kallimasiotis.pdf
GCAPTAIN, 2013. Historys 10 most famous oil spills [online] [viewed 25 June 2013]
available from: http://gcaptain.com/historys-10-most-famous-oil-spills/
GCAPTAIN, 2013. Deeply skeptical environment [online] [viewed 25 June 2013]
available from: http://gcaptain.com/deeply-skeptical-environmental/
GILLIGAN, 1998. International rules. TULLANE MARITIME LAW JOURNAL [e-
journal] vol.22 pp.620 Abstract only. Available from:
http://heinonline.org/HOL/LuceneSearch?terms=%22international+notes%22
+%22tulane+maritime+law%22&base=js&all=true&searchtype=advanced&co
llection=journals&submit=Go&sections=any&x=-805&y=-157
HFW, 2013. Archie Bishop [online] [viewed 26 June 2013] available from:
http://www.hfw.com/Archie-Bishop
JUS.UIO,2013. Imo [online] [viewed 20 June 2013] available from:
http://www.jus.uio.no/lm/imo.salvage.convention.1989/doc.html
IMCBROKERS, 2013. Blog [online] [viewed 25 June 2013] available from:
http://www.imcbrokers.com/blog/overview/detail/salvage-contracts-scopic-
clause
IMO, 2013. List of conventions [online] [viewed 20 June 2013] available from:
http://www.imo.org/About/Conventions/ListOfConventions/Pages/Internationa
l-Convention-on-Salvage.aspx
IPSOFACTOJ, nd. International [online] [viewed 23 June 2013] available from:
http://www.ipsofactoj.com/international/2000/Part6/int2000(6)-014.htm
LAW.TULANE, 2013. Uploaded files [online] [viewed 25 June 2013] available from:
http://www.law.tulane.edu/uploadedFiles/Institutes_and_Centers/Maritime_La
w_Center/The%20Development%20of%20Environmenatl%20Salvage%20an
d%20Review%20of%20the%20Salvage%20Convention%201989.pdf
LLOYDS, 2013. The market [online] [viewed 25 June 2013] available from:
http://www.lloyds.com/the-market/tools-and-resources/lloyds-agency-
department/salvage-arbitration-branch/lloyds-open-form-lof
LLOYDS, 2013. The market [online] [viewed 23 June 2013] available from:
http://www.lloyds.com/the-market/tools-and-resources/lloyds-agency-
department/salvage-arbitration-branch/lloyds-open-form-lof
45

LLOYDS, 2013. The market [online] [viewed 22 June 2013] available from:
http://www.lloyds.com/the-market/tools-and-resources/lloyds-agency-
department/salvage-arbitration-branch/scopic
LLOYDS, 2013. The market [online] [viewed 25 June 2013] available from:
http://www.lloyds.com/The-Market/Tools-and-Resources/Lloyds-Agency-
Department/Salvage-Arbitration-
Branch/~/media/Files/The%20Market/Tools%20and%20resources/Agency/S
alvage%20Arbitration%20Branch/Agency_LOF2011_%20Amendments.pdf
LLOYDS, 2013. Media [online] [viewed 24 June 2013] available from:
http://www.lloyds.com/~/media/Files/The%20Market/Tools%20and%20resour
ces/Agency/Salvage%20Arbitration%20Branch/Lloyds%20Open%20Form%2
0Report%202012.pdf
LONDONPANDI, 2013. Article [online] [viewed 25 June 2013] available from:
http://www.londonpandi.com/article/618/lof-2011/
MARINE-SALVAGE, 2013. Media information [online] [viewed 25 June 2013]
available from: http://www.marine-
salvage.com/media_information/Press/ISU%20response%20to%20CMI%20o
utcome%20Beijing%202012.pdf
MARINE-SALVAGE, 2013. [online] [viewed 21 June 2013] available from:
http://www.marine-salvage.com/
MARINE-SALVAGE, 2013. Environmental [online] [viewed 21 June 203] available
from: http://www.marine-salvage.com/environmental/legal-framework/
MARINE-SALVAGE, 2013. Media information [online] [viewed June 25 2013]
available from: http://www.marine-salvage.com/media-
information/articles/archive/the-mystery-of-scopic-unravelled/
MARINE-SALVAGE, 2013. Media information [online] [viewed 25 June 2013]
available from: http://www.marine-salvage.com/media-
information/conference-papers/the-challenges-facing-the-salvage-industry/
MARINE-SALVAGE, 2013. Environmental [online] [viewed 23 June 2013] available
from: http://www.marine-salvage.com/environmental/isu-environmental-
salvage-awards-article-maritime-risk/
MARITIMEJOURNAL, 2013. News [online] [viewed 23 June 2013] available from:
http://www.maritimejournal.com/news101/industry-news/isu-response-to-cmi
MARITIMEJOURNAL.MURDOCH, 2013. The market [online] [viewed 26 June 2013]
available from:
https://maritimejournal.murdoch.edu.au/archive/vol_4/1987vol4makins.pdf
46

MARSECREVIEW, 2013. 2012 [online] [viewed 25 June 2013] available from:
http://www.marsecreview.com/2012/10/cmi-must-listen-to-shipowners-says-
ics/
MLAUS, 2013. Archives [online] [viewed 25 June 2013] available from:
http://www.mlaus.org/archives/library/2194.pdf
MULTRASHIP, 2013. Dbdocs [online] [viewed 24 June 2013] available from:
http://www.multraship.com/dbdocs/attachment_15.pdf

OMAY, 1983. Lloyds form and the Montreal Convention. [pdf] viewed 24 June 2013]
available from:
http://heinonline.org/HOL/LuceneSearch?terms=%22lloyd%27s+form++and+
+the+montreal+convention%22+&base=js&all=true&searchtype=advanced&c
ollection=journals&submit=Go&sections=any&x=2&y=10
SHIPBUSINESS,2010. Salvage contract [online] [viewed 27 June 2013] available
from: http://shipsbusiness.com/salvage-contract.html
SOCIALRESEARCHMETHODS, 2006. [online] [viewed 22 June 2013] available from:
http://www.socialresearchmethods.net/kb/dedind.php
SOYER S. and TETTENBORN A., 2012. Pollution at Sea. Law and Liability [e-book]
UK: informal law. Available from:
http://books.google.gr/books?id=YBT6oGdr92UC&pg=PA176&lpg=PA176&d
q=%22We+recognize+the+introduction+of+the+SCOPIC+Clause+substantial
ly+improved+the+mechanism+of+assessing+%E2%80%98special+compens
ation%E2%80%99,+as+compared+to+the+1989+Salvage+Convention+Articl
e+14,+in+LOF+cases.+But+I+emphasize,+SCOPIC,+like+Article+14+is+a+m
ethod+of+compensation+when+an+award+to+cover+cost+cannot+be+made.
+It+is+not+a+method+of+remuneration+which+is+what+we+seek.+Salvors+
would+not+be+in+the+salvage+business+if+their+remuneration+was+restrict
ed+to+an+Article+14+or+SCOPIC+award.%22&source=bl&ots=HT2YiGGdv
x&sig=m69yLll-kMbZ03kKb-
KVcXJOeRo&hl=el&sa=X&ei=t4AcUsLzKMashQfxsYC4CA&ved=0CC8Q6A
EwAA#v=onepage&q&f=false