Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-34568 March 28, 1988
RODERICK DAOANG, and ROMMEL DAOANG, assisted by their father, ROMEO
DAOANG, petitioners,
vs.
THE MUNICIPAL JUDGE, SAN NICOLAS, ILOCOS NORTE, ANTERO AGONOY and AMANDA
RAMOS-AGONOY, respondents.

PADILLA, J .:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision, dated 30 June 1971, rendered by the
respondent judge *in Spec. Proc. No. 37 of Municipal Court of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte, entitled: "In re Adoption of the Minors
Quirino Bonilla and Wilson Marcos; Antero Agonoy and Amanda R. Agonoy, petitioners", the dispositive part of which reads, as follows:
Wherefore, Court renders judgment declaring that henceforth Quirino Bonilla and
Wilson Marcos be, to all legitimate intents and purposes, the children by adoption of
the joint petitioners Antero Agonoy and Amanda R. Agonoy and that the former be
freed from legal obedience and maintenance by their respective parents, Miguel
Bonilla and Laureana Agonoy for Quirino Bonilla and Modesto Marcos and
Benjamina Gonzales for Wilson Marcos and their family names 'Bonilla' and 'Marcos'
be changed with "Agonoy", which is the family name of the petitioners.
Successional rights of the children and that of their adopting parents shall be
governed by the pertinent provisions of the New Civil Code.
Let copy of this decision be furnished and entered into the records of the Local Civil
Registry of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte, for its legal effects at the expense of the
petitioners.
1

The undisputed facts of the case are as follows:
On 23 March 1971, the respondent spouses Antero and Amanda Agonoy filed a petition with the
Municipal Court of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte, seeking the adoption of the minors Quirino Bonilla and
Wilson Marcos. The case, entitled: "In re Adoption of the Minors Quirino Bonilla and Wilson Marcos,
Antero Agonoy and Amanda Ramos-Agonoy, petitioners", was docketed therein as Spec. Proc. No.
37.
2

The petition was set for hearing on 24 April 1971 and notices thereof were caused to be served upon
the office of the Solicitor General and ordered published in the ILOCOS TIMES, a weekly newspaper
of general circulation in the province of Ilocos Norte, with editorial offices in Laoag City.
3

On 22 April 1971, the minors Roderick and Rommel Daoang, assisted by their father and
guardian ad litem, the petitioners herein, filed an opposition to the aforementioned petition for
adoption, claiming that the spouses Antero and Amanda Agonoy had a legitimate daughter named
Estrella Agonoy, oppositors' mother, who died on 1 March 1971, and therefore, said spouses were
disqualified to adopt under Art. 335 of the Civil Code.
4

After the required publication of notice had been accomplished, evidence was presented. Thereafter,
the Municipal Court of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte rendred its decision, granting the petition for
adoption.
5

Hence, the present recourse by the petitioners (oppositors in the lower court).
The sole issue for consideration is one of law and it is whether or not the respondent spouses Antero
Agonoy and Amanda Ramos-Agonoy are disqualified to adopt under paragraph (1), Art. 335 of the
Civil Code.
The pertinent provision of law reads, as follows:
Art. 335. The following cannot adopt:
(1) Those who have legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural children, or
children by legal fiction;
xxx xxx xxx
In overruling the opposition of the herein petitioners, the respondents judge held that "to add
grandchildren in this article where no grandchil is included would violate to (sic) the legal maxim that
what is expressly included would naturally exclude what is not included".
But, it is contended by the petitioners, citing the case of In re Adoption of Millendez,
6
that the
adoption of Quirino Bonilla and Wilson Marcos would not only introduce a foreign element into the family
unit, but would result in the reduction of their legititimes. It would also produce an indirect, permanent and
irrevocable disinheritance which is contrary to the policy of the law that a subsequent reconciliation
between the offender and the offended person deprives the latter of the right to disinherit and renders
ineffectual any disinheritance that may have been made.
We find, however, that the words used in paragraph (1) of Art. 335 of the Civil Code, in enumerating
the persons who cannot adopt, are clear and unambiguous. The children mentioned therein have a
clearly defined meaning in law and, as pointed out by the respondent judge, do not include
grandchildren.
Well known is the rule of statutory construction to the effect that a statute clear and unambiguous on
its face need not be interpreted; stated otherwise, the rule is that only statutes with an ambiguous or
doubtful meaning may be the subject of statutory construction.
7

Besides, it appears that the legislator, in enacting the Civil Code of the Philippines, obviously
intended that only those persons who have certain classes of children, are disqualified to adopt. The
Civil Code of Spain, which was once in force in the Philippines, and which served as the pattern for
the Civil Code of the Philippines, in its Article 174, disqualified persons who have legitimate or
legitimated descendants from adopting. Under this article, the spouses Antero and Amanda Agonoy
would have been disqualified to adopt as they have legitimate grandchildren, the petitioners herein.
But, when the Civil Code of the Philippines was adopted, the word "descendants" was changed to
"children", in paragraph (1) of Article 335.
Adoption used to be for the benefit of the adoptor. It was intended to afford to persons who have no
child of their own the consolation of having one, by creating through legal fiction, the relation of
paternity and filiation where none exists by blood relationship.
8
The present tendency, however, is
geared more towards the promotion of the welfare of the child and the enhancement of his opportunities
for a useful and happy life, and every intendment is sustained to promote that objective.
9
Under the law
now in force, having legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural children, or children by legal fiction, is
no longer a ground for disqualification to adopt.
10

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The judgment of the Municipal Court of San Nicolas, Ilocos
Norte in Spec. Proc. No. 37 is AFFIRMED. Without pronouncement as to costs in this instance.
SO ORDERED.
Yap, Melencio-Herrera, Paras and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.


Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-3629 March 19, 1951
ELISEO SILVA, petitioner,
vs.
BELEN CABRERA, respondent.
Rivera, Castao, Medina and Lozada and Roman Cruz for petitioner.
Evaristo R. Sandoval for respondent.
MONTEMAYOR, J .:
In the Public Service Commission Belen Cabrera filed an application for a certificate of public
convenience to install, maintain, and operate in the City of Lipa, an ice plant with a 15-ton daily
productive capacity and to sell the produce of said plant in several municipalities of Batangas
province as well as in the City of Lipa. Eliseo Silva andOpulencia & Lat, holdres of certificates of
public convenience to operate each a 15-ton ice plant, opposed the application on the ground that
their service was adequate for the needs of the public, and that public convenience did not require
the operation of the ice plant applied for by Cabrera. Instead of the Commission conducting the
corresponding hearing in order to receive the evidence to be presented by applicant and oppositors,
Commissioner Feliciano Ocampo by order dated July 14, 1949, commissioned Atty. Antonio H.
Aspillera, Chief of the Legal Division "to take the testimony of witnesses" in this case pursuant to the
provisions of section 32 of Commonwealth Act No. 146 known as the Public Act Attorney Aspillera
conducted hearings, and received extensive evidence, oral and documentary, the transcript of the
stenographic notes taken consisting of 227 pages. Thereafter, the Commission in banc rendered a
decision, the dispositive part of which reads as follows:
In view of the foregoing, and finding from the evidence that public interests and convenience
will be promoted in a proper and suitable manner by authorizing the applicant to operate a
10-ton ice plant in Lipa City, and that applicant is a Filipino citizen and is financially qualified
to install and operate a 10-ton ice plant, the oppositions of Eliseo Silva and Opulencia & Lat
are hereby overruled, and a certificate of public convenience to operate a 10-ton ice plant in
the City of Lipa is hereby granted to the applicant herein, Belen Cabrera, the said certificate
to be subject to the following.
Eliseo Silva, one of the oppositors filed the present petition for review assigning two errors, to wit:
ERROR I. That section 3 prohibits a hearing before any person other than a
Commissioner in contested cases; consequently, the delegation made by the Commission to
Attorney Aspillera is illegal and contrary to law.
ERROR II. That the decision is not supported by evidence to warrant the Grant of the
certificate to applicant-respondent Belen Cabrera.
We shall address ourselves to the first assigned error because the determination of the same
disposes of this appeal. The legal point raised in this assignment of error was also raised before the
Commission. At the beginning of the hearing before Attorney Aspillera, counsel for oppositors, Silva,
now petitioner, asked that the hearing be had before one of the Commissioners because it was a
contested case. When his petition was overruled, he made it of record that his continuing "with the
hearing of this case shall not be understood as a waiver of our objection" (t. s. n., p. 3). It is therefore
clear that petitioner is not raising this issue here for the first time.
While petitioner Silva contends that the delegation made by the Commission to Attorney Aspillera to
take the testimony of witnesses was illegal and contrary to the provisions of section 3 of the Public
Service Act as amended by Republic Act No. 178, respondent equally claims that said delegation is
perfectly proper and legal. It will be remembered that the delegation to receive testimony was made
under the provisions of section 32 of the Public Service Act (Com. Act No. 146). Said section reads
as follows:
SEC. 32. The Commission may, in any investigation or hearing, by its order in writing, cause
the depositions of witnesses residing within or without the Philippines to be taken in the
manner prescribed by the Code of Civil Procedure. The Commission may also, by proper
order, commission any of the attorneys of the Commission or chiefs of division to receive
evidence, and it may likewise commission any clerk the court of first instance of justice of the
Peace of the Philippines to take the testimony of the witnesses any case pending before the
Commission where such witnesses reside in places distant from Manila and it would be
inconvenient and expensive for them to appear personally before the Commission. It shall be
the duty of the clerk of the Court of First Instance or justice of the peace so commissioned to
designate promptly a date or dates for the taking of such evidence, giving timely notice to the
parties, and on such date to proceed to take the evidence, reducing it to writing. After the
evidence has been taken, the justice of the peace shall forthwith certify to the correctness of
the testimony of the witnesses and forward it to the Commission. It shall be the duty of the
respective parties to furnish stenographers for taking and transcribing the testimony taken. In
case there was no stenographers available, the testimony shall be taken in long-hand by
such person as the justice of the peace may designate. For the convenience of the parties
the Commission may also commission any other person to take the evidence in the same
manner.
For purpose of reference we are also reproducing the pertinent portion of section 3 of the same Act
as amended by Republic Act No. 178, relied upon by the petitioner:
All the powers herein vested upon the Commission shall be considered vested upon any of
the Commissioner, acting either individually or jointly as hereinafter provided. The
Commissioners shall equitably divide among themselves all pending cases and those that
may hereafter be submitted to the Commission, in such manner and from as they determine,
and shall proceed to hear and determine the cases assigned to each; Provided, however,
That (1) all contested cases, (2) all cases involving the fixing of rates, and (3) all petitions for
reconsideration of orders or decisions shall be heard by the Commission in banc, and the
affirmative vote of at least two Commissioner shall be necessary for the promulgation of a
decision or a non-interlocutory order: And, provided, further, That in cases (1) and (2) the
Commission may delegate the reception of the evidence to one of the Commissioners, who
shall report to the Commission in banc, the evidence so received by him to enable it to
render its decision. (Underlining is ours)
After examining the law, particularly the language used in section 3 and 32, above-quoted, we agree
with the petitioner that the delegation made to Attorney Aspillera especially considering the manner
in which he received the evidence, was contrary to the provisions of the public Service Act.
The law (sec. 3) is clear that in a contested case like the present, only the Commission in banc is
authorized to conduct the hearing, although said Commission may delegate the reception of the
evidence to one of the Commissioners who shall report to the Commission in banc, the evidence so
received by him.
Under Commonwealth Act No. 146 before it was amended by Republic Act No. 178, the Public
Service Commission only of a Public Service Commissioner and a deputy Commissioner. The
Deputy Commissioner acted only on matters delegated to him by the Public Service Commissioner,
and in case of the latter's absence, illness or incapacity, he acted in his stead. The Public Service
Commissioner alone heard and disposed of all cases, contested and non-contested. There could
therefore be no hearing or decision in banc. The Legislature in promulgating Commonwealth Act 146
evidently believed that one Commissioner, either the Public Service Commissioner or his deputy if
properly commissioned, was sufficient to hear and decide even contested cases and cases involving
the fixing of rates. Under said Commonwealth Act 146 before amendment, particularly section 32
thereof, the Commission besides authorizing the taking of depositions and the testimonies of the
witnesses by clerk of courts of first instance and justice of the peace in the provinces, also
authorized the reception of evidence by the Commission's attorneys and chiefs of divisions. Then
came Republic Act 178 amending sections 2 and 3 of Commonwealth Act 146 making the
Commission to consist of one Public Service Commissioners and two Associate Public Service
Commissioner under the second section, and under section 3, as already seen from the
reproduction of said section, requiring that all contested cases involving the fixing of rates, he heard
and decided by the three Commissioners in banc although the reception of evidence may be
delegated to one of the Commissioners alone. The inference is obvious. In contested cases like
present, the Legislature did not wish to entrust the holding of a hearing and the reception of
evidence to anyone but the three Commissioners acting in banc or one of them when properly
authorized.
It is urged on the part of the respondent that the order of delegation in favor of Atty. Aspillera "was a
mere authority `to take the testimony of witnesses in the above-entitled case', which in fact is in the
form of a deposition and not a reception of evidence, much less a hearing" (p. 9, brief for
respondent), and so does not violate section 3. An examination of the record does not support this
contention. What Atty. Aspillera did was to represent the Commission, act as a sort of
Commissioner, conduct hearings, receive evidence, oral and documentary, and pass upon petitions
and objections as they came up in the course of said hearing. He even addressed questions to the
witnesses. He passed upon the competency and admissibility of exhibits and admitted them. In the
transcript of the stenographic notes, Atty. Aspillera is repeatedly referred to as the "Commission"
and the proceedings had before him on different dates as "hearings". (t. s. n. pp. 1, 3, 52, 62, 86,
90.) After the submission of the evidence Atty. Aspillera declared the "Case submitted". (t. s. n. p.
227.) It is obvious that the evidence received by Atty. Aspillera were not mere depositions or
testimonies, and that his actuation that of a mere official like a justice of the peace receiving a
deposition under the provisions of Rule 18 of the Rules of Court. The role played by Atty. Aspillera
was rather that of a Commissioner under Rule 34 wherein he acted as a representative of the
Commission that made the delegation to him, passed upon petitions and objections during the trial,
either overruling or sustaining the same and ordered witnesses to answer if the objection to the
question was overruled, and then making his findings and report to the body that commissioned him.
Respondent cites the case of Abel G. Flores, applicant vs. A. L. Ammen Transportation Co., Inc.,
oppositor, case No. 27141 of the Public Service Commission wherein the same point of the legality
of a delegation to take testimony was involved. The oppositor in that case believing that the
Commission exceeded its jurisdiction in making the delegation, brought the case to this Supreme
Court under G.R. No. L-1637 but its petition for certiorari was dismissed for lack of merit. From this,
respondent infers that even in contested cases the reception of evidence may be delegated to a
person other than one of the Commissioners. We have examined that case and we find that the
authority given there was not to receive evidence but to take a deposition and that the person
delegated was a justice of the peace. We quote a portion of the order of Associate Commissioner
Gabriel P. Prieto in that case:
Es verdad que el articulo 3 de la Ley claramente dispone que en los asuntos contenciosos y
en que envuelven la fijacion de tarifas la Comision solo puede delegar la recepcion de lads
pruebas a cualquiera de sus Comisionados. Pero tambien es cierto, que la deposicion no
una delegacion de la recepcion de las pruebas, porque al funcionario que la toma, la ley no
le concede las facultades del tribunal que ha ordenado dicha deposicion. En efecto, la Regla
18 de los Reglamentos que regula esta actuacion, no autoriza al funcionario que toma la
deposicion para resolver las cuestiones que surgen o se suscitan durante su actuacion; no
le faculta para hacer sus conclusiones de hecho o de derecho; ni le permite, siquiera, rendir
informe o report de todo lo actuado. Su unica ogligacion es certificar la declaracion tal como
ha sido prestada por el deponente. El que toma la deposicion no es como el arbitro o
comisionado de que habla la Regla 34 de los Reglamentos, que actua por delegacion y obra
en representacion del tribunal que le ha nombrado.
It will readily be noticed from the portion of the order above-quoted that Commissioner Prieto admits
that under section 3 as amended, in contested cases and cases involving the fixing of rates, the
Commission may delegate the reception of evidence only to one of the Commissioners and to no
one else.
The respondent also calls our attention to the case of Cebu Transit Co. Inc., vs. Jereza, (58 Phil.,
760), wherein this court held that the Commission was authorized to designate Commissioners for
the purpose of receiving evidence, and that the law did not contain any prohibition. That case is
inapplicable for at that time in the year 1933 when the case was decided, Republic Act 178 had not
yet been promulgated, said Act having passed only in 1947.
In conclusion, we hold that under the provisions of section 3 of the Public Service Act as amended
by Republic Act 178, the reception of evidence in a contested case may be delegated only to one of
the Commissioners and to no one else, it being understood that such reception of evidence consists
in conducting hearings, receiving evidence, oral and documentary, passing upon the relevancy and
competency of the same, ruling upon petitions and objections that come up in course of the
hearings, and receiving and rejecting evidence in accordance with said rulings. However, under
section 32, of the same Act, even in contested cases or cases involving the fixing of rates, any
attorney of chief of division of the Commission, a clerk of court of Courts of First Instance, or a
Justice of the Peace, may be authorized to take depositions or receive the testimonies of witnesses,
provided that the same is done under provisions of Rule 18 of the Rules of Court.
We realize that our present ruling will greatly handicap the Public Service Commission and slow
down its tempo in the disposal of contested cases and cases involving the fixing of rates, especially
where the witnesses reside in the provinces; but where the law is clear, neither this court nor the
commission may on grounds of convenience, expediency or prompt dispatch of cases, disregard the
law or circumvent the same. The remedy lies with the Legislature if it could be convinced of the
necessity of amending the law, and persuaded to approve a suitable amendment.
Finding that the delegation of the reception of evidence in this case as well as the exercise of the
authority so given, are in violation of section 3 of the Public Service Act as amended, we set aside
the order of delegation of July 14, 1949, and declare all the proceedings had thereunder to be null
and void. Setting aside the decision appealed from, let this case be returned to the Public Service
Commission so that evidence may be submitted by the parties in a hearings before the
Commission in banc of before any of the Commissioners if properly authorized, unless of course,
said parties agree at said hearing or hearings to re-submit the evidence already presented and taken
down, with such modifications and under such conditions as they may agree upon, including such
other evidence which they may wish to present. There is no pronouncement as to costs. So ordered.
Paras, Feria, Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Tuason, Reyes, Jugo and Bautista Angelo, JJ., concur.



Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-22301 August 30, 1967
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MARIO MAPA Y MAPULONG, defendant-appellant.
Francisco P. Cabigao for defendant-appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General F. R. Rosete and Solicitor
O. C. Hernandez for plaintiff-appellee.
FERNANDO, J .:
The sole question in this appeal from a judgment of conviction by the lower court is whether or not
the appointment to and holding of the position of a secret agent to the provincial governor would
constitute a sufficient defense to a prosecution for the crime of illegal possession of firearm and
ammunition. We hold that it does not.
The accused in this case was indicted for the above offense in an information dated August 14, 1962
reading as follows: "The undersized accuses MARIO MAPA Y MAPULONG of a violation of Section
878 in connection with Section 2692 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by
Commonwealth Act No. 56 and as further amended by Republic Act No. 4, committed as follows:
That on or about the 13th day of August, 1962, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused
did then and there wilfully and unlawfully have in his possession and under his custody and control
one home-made revolver (Paltik), Cal. 22, without serial number, with six (6) rounds of ammunition,
without first having secured the necessary license or permit therefor from the corresponding
authorities. Contrary to law."
When the case was called for hearing on September 3, 1963, the lower court at the outset asked the
counsel for the accused: "May counsel stipulate that the accused was found in possession of the
gun involved in this case, that he has neither a permit or license to possess the same and that we
can submit the same on a question of law whether or not an agent of the governor can hold a firearm
without a permit issued by the Philippine Constabulary." After counsel sought from the fiscal an
assurance that he would not question the authenticity of his exhibits, the understanding being that
only a question of law would be submitted for decision, he explicitly specified such question to be
"whether or not a secret agent is not required to get a license for his firearm."
Upon the lower court stating that the fiscal should examine the document so that he could pass on
their authenticity, the fiscal asked the following question: "Does the accused admit that this pistol cal.
22 revolver with six rounds of ammunition mentioned in the information was found in his possession
on August 13, 1962, in the City of Manila without first having secured the necessary license or permit
thereof from the corresponding authority?" The accused, now the appellant, answered categorically:
"Yes, Your Honor." Upon which, the lower court made a statement: "The accused admits, Yes, and
his counsel Atty. Cabigao also affirms that the accused admits."
Forthwith, the fiscal announced that he was "willing to submit the same for decision." Counsel for the
accused on his part presented four (4) exhibits consisting of his appointment "as secret agent of the
Hon. Feliciano Leviste," then Governor of Batangas, dated June 2, 1962;
1
another document
likewise issued by Gov. Leviste also addressed to the accused directing him to proceed to Manila,
Pasay and Quezon City on a confidential mission;
2
the oath of office of the accused as such secret
agent,
3
a certificate dated March 11, 1963, to the effect that the accused "is a secret agent" of Gov.
Leviste.
4
Counsel for the accused then stated that with the presentation of the above exhibits he was
"willing to submit the case on the question of whether or not a secret agent duly appointed and
qualified as such of the provincial governor is exempt from the requirement of having a license of
firearm." The exhibits were admitted and the parties were given time to file their respective
memoranda.1wph 1. t
Thereafter on November 27, 1963, the lower court rendered a decision convicting the accused "of
the crime of illegal possession of firearms and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from one
year and one day to two years and to pay the costs. The firearm and ammunition confiscated from
him are forfeited in favor of the Government."
The only question being one of law, the appeal was taken to this Court. The decision must be
affirmed.
The law is explicit that except as thereafter specifically allowed, "it shall be unlawful for any person to
. . . possess any firearm, detached parts of firearms or ammunition therefor, or any instrument or
implement used or intended to be used in the manufacture of firearms, parts of firearms, or
ammunition."
5
The next section provides that "firearms and ammunition regularly and lawfully issued
to officers, soldiers, sailors, or marines [of the Armed Forces of the Philippines], the Philippine
Constabulary, guards in the employment of the Bureau of Prisons, municipal police, provincial
governors, lieutenant governors, provincial treasurers, municipal treasurers, municipal mayors, and
guards of provincial prisoners and jails," are not covered "when such firearms are in possession of
such officials and public servants for use in the performance of their official duties."
6

The law cannot be any clearer. No provision is made for a secret agent. As such he is not exempt.
Our task is equally clear. The first and fundamental duty of courts is to apply the law. "Construction
and interpretation come only after it has been demonstrated that application is impossible or
inadequate without them."
7
The conviction of the accused must stand. It cannot be set aside.
Accused however would rely on People v. Macarandang,
8
where a secret agent was acquitted on
appeal on the assumption that the appointment "of the accused as a secret agent to assist in the
maintenance of peace and order campaigns and detection of crimes, sufficiently put him within the
category of a "peace officer" equivalent even to a member of the municipal police expressly covered
by section 879." Such reliance is misplaced. It is not within the power of this Court to set aside the
clear and explicit mandate of a statutory provision. To the extent therefore that this decision conflicts
with what was held in People v. Macarandang, it no longer speaks with authority.
Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is affirmed.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro and
Angeles, JJ., concur.



Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-26712-16 December 27, 1969
UNITED CHRISTIAN MISSIONARY SOCIETY, UNITED CHURCH BOARD FOR WORLD
MINISTERS, BOARD OF FOREIGN MISSION OF THE REFORMED CHURCH IN AMERICA,
BOARD OF MISSION OF THE EVANGELICAL UNITED PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH,
COMMISSION OF ECUMENICAL MISSION ON RELATIONS OF THE UNITED PRESBYTERIAN
CHURCH, petitioners,
vs.
SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSION and SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM, respondents.
Sedfrey A. Ordoez for petitioners.
Office of the Solicitor General Antonio P. Barredo, Assistant Solicitor General Felicisimo R. Rosete
and Solicitor Buenaventura J. Guerrero for respondents.
TEEHANKEE, J .:
In this appeal from an order of the Social Security Commission, we uphold the Commission's Order
dismissing the petition before it, on the ground that in the absence of an express provision in the
Social Security Act
1
vesting in the Commission the power to condone penalties, it has no legal
authority to condone, waive or relinquish the penalty for late premium remittances mandatorily
imposed under the Social Security Act.
The five petitioners originally filed on November 20, 1964 separate petitions with respondent
Commission, contesting the social security coverage of American missionaries who perform religious
missionary work in the Philippines under specific employment contracts with petitioners. After
several hearings, however, petitioners commendably desisted from further contesting said coverage,
manifesting that they had adopted a policy of cooperation with the Philippine authorities in its
program of social amelioration, with which they are in complete accord. They instead filed their
consolidated amended petition dated May 7, 1966, praying for condonation of assessed penalties
against them for delayed social security premium remittances in the aggregate amount of
P69,446.42 for the period from September, 1958 to September, 1963.
In support of their request for condonation, petitioners alleged that they had labored under the
impression that as international organizations, they were not subject to coverage under the
Philippine Social Security System, but upon advice by certain Social Security System officials, they
paid to the System in October, 1963, the total amount of P81,341.80, representing their back
premiums for the period from September, 1958 to September, 1963. They further claimed that the
penalties assessed against them appear to be inequitable, citing several resolutions of respondent
Commission which in the past allegedly permitted condonation of such penalties.
On May 25, 1966, respondent System filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that "the Social
Security Commission has no power or authority to condone penalties for late premium remittance, to
which petitioners filed their opposition of June 15, 1966, and in turn, respondent filed its reply thereto
of June 22, 1966.
Respondent Commission set the Motion to Dismiss for hearing and oral argument on July 20, 1966.
At the hearing, petitioners' counsel made no appearance but submitted their Memorandum in lieu of
oral argument. Upon petition of the System's Counsel, the Commission gave the parties a further
period of fifteen days to submit their Memorandum consolidating their arguments, after which the
motion would be deemed submitted for decision. Petitioners stood on their original memorandum,
and respondent System filed its memorandum on August 4, 1966.
On September 22, 1966, respondent Commission issued its Order dismissing the petition, as
follows:
Considering all of the foregoing, this Commission finds, and so holds, that in the absence of
an express provision in the Social Security Act vesting in the Commission the power to
condone penalties, it cannot legally do so. The policy enunciated in Commission Resolution
No. 536, series of 1964, cited by the parties, in their respective pleadings, has been
reiterated in Commission Resolution No. 878, dated August 18, 1966, wherein the
Commission adopting the recommendation of the Committee on Legal Matters and
Legislation of the Social Security Commission ruled that it "has no power to condone, waive
or relinquish the penalties for late premium remittances which may be imposed under the
Social Security Act."
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby dismissed and petitioners are directed to pay the
respondent System, within thirty (30) days from receipt of this Order, the amount of
P69,446.42 representing the penalties payable by them, broken down as follows:
United Christian Missionary Society P5,253.53
Board of Mission of the Evangelical United Brothers
Church
7,891.74
United Church Board for World Ministers 12,353.75
Commission on Ecumenical Mission & Relations 33,019.36
Board of Foreign Mission of the Reformed Church in
America
10,928.04
TOTAL P 69,446.42
Upon failure of the petitioners to comply with this Order within the period specified herein, a
warrant shall be issued to the Sheriff of the Province of Rizal to levy and sell so much of the
property of the petitioners as may be necessary to satisfy the aforestated liability of the
petitioners to the System.
This Court is thus confronted on appeal with this question of first impression as to whether or not
respondent Commission erred in ruling that it has no authority under the Social Security Act to
condone the penalty prescribed by law for late premium remittances.
We find no error in the Commission's action.
1. The plain text and intent of the pertinent provisions of the Social Security Act clearly rule out
petitioners' posture that the respondent Commission should assume, as against the mandatory
imposition of the 3% penalty per month for late payment of premium remittances, the discretionary
authority of condoning, waiving or relinquishing such penalty.
The pertinent portion of Section 22 (a) of the Social Security Act peremptorily provides that:
SEC 22. Remittance of premiums. (a) The contributions imposed in the preceding
sections shall be remitted to the System within the first seven days of each calendar month
following the month for which they are applicable or within such time as the Commission may
prescribe. "Every employer required to deduct and to remit such contribution shall be liable
for their payment and if any contribution is not paid to the system, as herein prescribed, he
shall pay besides the contribution a penalty thereon of three per centum per month from the
date the contribution falls due until paid . . .
2

No discretion or alternative is granted respondent Commission in the enforcement of the law's
mandate that the employer who fails to comply with his legal obligation to remit the premiums to the
System within the prescribed period shall pay a penalty of three 3% per month. The prescribed
penalty is evidently of a punitive character, provided by the legislature to assure that employers do
not take lightly the State's exercise of the police power in the implementation of the Republic's
declared policy "to develop, establish gradually and perfect a social security system which shall be
suitable to the needs of the people throughout the Philippines and (to) provide protection to
employers against the hazards of disability, sickness, old age and death."
3
In this concept, good faith
or bad faith is rendered irrelevant, since the law makes no distinction between an employer who
professes good reasons for delaying the remittance of premiums and another who deliberately
disregards the legal duty imposed upon him to make such remittance. From the moment the
remittance of premiums due is delayed, the penalty immediately attaches to the delayed premium
payments by force of law.
2. Petitioners contend that in the exercise of the respondent Commission's power of direction and
control over the system, as provided in Section 3 of the Act, it does have the authority to condone
the penalty for late payment under Section 4 (1), whereby it is empowered to "perform such other
acts as it may deem appropriate for the proper enforcement of this Act." The law does not bear out
this contention. Section 4 of the Social Security Act precisely enumerates the powers of the
Commission. Nowhere from said powers of the Commission may it be shown that the Commission is
granted expressly or by implication the authority to condone penalties imposed by the Act.
3. Moreover, the funds contributed to the System by compulsion of law have already been held by us
to be "funds belonging to the members which are merely held in trust by the Government."
4
Being a
mere trustee of the funds of the System which actually belong to the members, respondent
Commission cannot legally perform any acts affecting the same, including condonation of penalties,
that would diminish the property rights of the owners and beneficiaries of such funds without an
express or specific authority therefor.
4. Where the language of the law is clear and the intent of the legislature is equally plain, there is no
room for interpretation and construction of the statute. The Court is therefore bound to uphold
respondent Commission's refusal to arrogate unto itself the authority to condone penalties for late
payment of social security premiums, for otherwise we would be sanctioning the Commission's
reading into the law discretionary powers that are not actually provided therein, and hindering and
defeating the plain purpose and intent of the legislature.
5. Petitioners cite fourteen instances in the past wherein respondent Commission had granted
condonation of penalties on delayed premium payments. They charge the Commission with grave
abuse of discretion in not having uniformly applied to their cases its former policy of granting
condonation of penalties. They invoke more compelling considerations of equity in their cases, in
that they are non-profit religious organizations who minister to the spiritual needs of the Filipino
people, and that their delay in the payment of their premiums was not of a contumacious or
deliberate defiance of the law but was prompted by a well-founded belief that the Social Security Act
did not apply to their missionaries.
The past instances of alleged condonation granted by the Commission are not, however, before the
Court, and the unilateral conclusion asserted by petitioners that the Commission had granted such
condonations would be of no avail, without a review of the pertinent records of said cases.
Nevertheless, assuming such conclusion to be correct, the Commission, in its appealed Order of
September 22, 1966 makes of record that since its Resolution No. 536, series of 1964, which it
reiterated in another resolution dated August 18, 1966, it had definitely taken the legal stand,
pursuant to the recommendation of its Committee on Legal Matters and Legislation, that in the
absence of an express provision in the Social Security Act vesting in the Commission the power to
condone penalties, it "has no power to condone, waive or relinquish the penalties for late premium
remittances which may be imposed under the Social Security Act."
6. The Commission cannot be faulted for this correct legal position. Granting that it had erred in the
past in granting condonation of penalties without legal authority, the Court has held time and again
that "it is a well-known rule that erroneous application and enforcement of the law by public officers
do not block subsequent correct application of the statute and that the Government is never
estopped by mistake or error on the part of its agents."
5
Petitioners' lack of intent to deliberately
violate the law may be conceded, and was borne out by their later withdrawal in May, 1966 of their
original petitions in November, 1964 contesting their social security coverage. The point, however, is
that they followed the wrong procedure in questioning the applicability of the Social Security Act to
them, in that they failed for five years to pay the premiums prescribed by law and thus incurred the
3% penalty thereon per month mandatorily imposed by law for late payment. The proper procedure
would have been to pay the premiums and then contest their liability therefor, thereby preventing the
penalty from attaching. This would have been the prudent course, considering that the Act provides
in Section 22 (b) thereof that the premiums which the employer refuses or neglects to pay may be
collected by the System in the same manner as taxes under the National Internal Revenue Code,
and that at the time they instituted their petitions in 1964 contesting their coverage, the Court had
already ruled in effect against their contest three years earlier, when it held in Roman Catholic
Archbishop vs. Social Security Commission
6
that the legislature had clearly intended to include
charitable and religious institutions and other non-profit institutions, such as petitioners, within the
scope and coverage of the Social Security Act.
7. No grave abuse of discretion was committed, therefore, by the Commission in issuing its Order
dismissing the petition for condonation of penalties for late payment of premiums, as claimed by
petitioners in their second and last error assigned. Petitioners were duly heard by the Commission
and were given due opportunity to adduce all their arguments, as in fact they filed their
Memorandum in lieu of oral argument and waived the presentation of an additional memorandum.
The mere fact that there was a pending appeal in the Court of Appeals from an identical ruling of the
Commission in an earlier case as to its lack of authority to condone penalties does not mean, as
petitioners contend, that the Commission was thereby shorn of its authority and discretion to dismiss
their petition on the same legal ground.
7
The Commission's action has thus paved the way for a final
ruling of the Court on the matter.
ACCORDINGLY, the order appealed from is hereby affirmed, without pronouncement as to costs.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Zaldivar Sanchez, Castro and Fernando, JJ., concur.
Dizon and Barredo, JJ., took no part.