DAP

Political Law Constitutional Law Separation of Powers Fund Realignment Constitutionality of the Disbursement Acceleration
Program
Power of the Purse Executive Impoundment
When President Benigno Aquino III took office, his administration noticed the sluggish growth of the economy. The World Bank advised
that the economy needed a stimulus plan. Budget Secretary Florencio Butch Abad then came up with a program called the
Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP).
The DAP was seen as a remedy to speed up the funding of government projects. DAP enables the Executive to realign funds from slow
moving projects to priority projects instead of waiting for next years appropriation. So what happens under the DAP was that if a
certain government project is being undertaken slowly by a certain executive agency, the funds allotted therefor will be withdrawn by
the Executive. Once withdrawn, these funds are declared as savings by the Executive and said funds will then be reallotted to other
priority projects. The DAP program did work to stimulate the economy as economic growth was in fact reported and portion of such
growth was attributed to the DAP (as noted by the Supreme Court).
Other sources of the DAP include the unprogrammed funds from the General Appropriations Act (GAA). Unprogrammed funds are
standby appropriations made by Congress in the GAA.
Meanwhile, in September 2013, Senator Jinggoy Estrada made an expos claiming that he, and other Senators, received Php50M from
the President as an incentive for voting in favor of the impeachment of then Chief Justice Renato Corona. Secretary Abad claimed that
the money was taken from the DAP but was disbursed upon the request of the Senators.
This apparently opened a can of worms as it turns out that the DAP does not only realign funds within the Executive. It turns out that
some non-Executive projects were also funded; to name a few: Php1.5B for the CPLA (Cordillera Peoples Liberation Army), Php1.8B for
the MNLF (Moro National Liberation Front), P700M for the Quezon Province, P50-P100M for certain Senators each, P10B for Relocation
Projects, etc.
This prompted Maria Carolina Araullo, Chairperson of the Bagong Alyansang Makabayan, and several other concerned citizens to file
various petitions with the Supreme Court questioning the validity of the DAP. Among their contentions was:
DAP is unconstitutional because it violates the constitutional rule which provides that no money shall be paid out of the Treasury
except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.
Secretary Abad argued that the DAP is based on certain laws particularly the GAA (savings and augmentation provisions thereof), Sec.
25(5), Art. VI of the Constitution (power of the President to augment), Secs. 38 and 49 of Executive Order 292 (power of the President
to suspend expenditures and authority to use savings, respectively).
Issues:
I. Whether or not the DAP violates the principle no money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation
made by law (Sec. 29(1), Art. VI, Constitution).
II. Whether or not the DAP realignments can be considered as impoundments by the executive.
III. Whether or not the DAP realignments/transfers are constitutional.
IV. Whether or not the sourcing of unprogrammed funds to the DAP is constitutional.
V. Whether or not the Doctrine of Operative Fact is applicable.
HELD:
I. No, the DAP did not violate Section 29(1), Art. VI of the Constitution. DAP was merely a program by the Executive and is not a fund
nor is it an appropriation. It is a program for prioritizing government spending. As such, it did not violate the Constitutional provision
cited in Section 29(1), Art. VI of the Constitution. In DAP no additional funds were withdrawn from the Treasury otherwise, an
appropriation made by law would have been required. Funds, which were already appropriated for by the GAA, were merely being
realigned via the DAP.
II. No, there is no executive impoundment in the DAP. Impoundment of funds refers to the Presidents power to refuse to spend
appropriations or to retain or deduct appropriations for whatever reason. Impoundment is actually prohibited by the GAA unless there
will be an unmanageable national government budget deficit (which did not happen). Nevertheless, theres no impoundment in the
case at bar because whats involved in the DAP was the transfer of funds.
III. No, the transfers made through the DAP were unconstitutional. It is true that the President (and even the heads of the other
branches of the government) are allowed by the Constitution to make realignment of funds, however, such transfer or realignment
should only be made within their respective offices. Thus, no cross-border transfers/augmentations may be allowed. But under the
DAP, this was violated because funds appropriated by the GAA for the Executive were being transferred to the Legislative and other
non-Executive agencies.
Further, transfers within their respective offices also contemplate realignment of funds to an existing project in the GAA. Under the
DAP, even though some projects were within the Executive, these projects are non-existent insofar as the GAA is concerned because
no funds were appropriated to them in the GAA. Although some of these projects may be legitimate, they are still non-existent under
the GAA because they were not provided for by the GAA. As such, transfer to such projects is unconstitutional and is without legal
basis.
On the issue of what are savings
These DAP transfers are not savings contrary to what was being declared by the Executive. Under the definition of savings in the
GAA, savings only occur, among other instances, when there is an excess in the funding of a certain project once it is completed, finally
discontinued, or finally abandoned. The GAA does not refer to savings as funds withdrawn from a slow moving project. Thus, since
the statutory definition of savings was not complied with under the DAP, there is no basis at all for the transfers. Further, savings
should only be declared at the end of the fiscal year. But under the DAP, funds are already being withdrawn from certain projects in
the middle of the year and then being declared as savings by the Executive particularly by the DBM.
IV. No. Unprogrammed funds from the GAA cannot be used as money source for the DAP because under the law, such funds may only
be used if there is a certification from the National Treasurer to the effect that the revenue collections have exceeded the revenue
targets. In this case, no such certification was secured before unprogrammed funds were used.
V. Yes. The Doctrine of Operative Fact, which recognizes the legal effects of an act prior to it being declared as unconstitutional by the
Supreme Court, is applicable. The DAP has definitely helped stimulate the economy. It has funded numerous projects. If the Executive
is ordered to reverse all actions under the DAP, then it may cause more harm than good. The DAP effects can no longer be undone.
The beneficiaries of the DAP cannot be asked to return what they received especially so that they relied on the validity of the DAP.
However, the Doctrine of Operative Fact may not be applicable to the authors, implementers, and proponents of the DAP if it is so
found in the appropriate tribunals (civil, criminal, or administrative) that they have not acted in good faith.


IN RE: PLAGIARISM MARIANO DEL CASTILLO
Intellectual Property Law Copyright Plagiarism
On April 28, 2010, the Supreme Court issued a decision which dismissed a petition issued by the Malaya Lolas Organization in the case
of Vinuya vs Romulo. Atty. Herminio Harry Roque Jr., counsel for Vinuya et al, questioned the said decision. He raised, among others,
that the ponente in said case, Justice Mariano del Castillo, plagiarized three books when the honorable Justice twisted the true intents
of the following books to support the assailed decision:
a. A Fiduciary Theory of Jus Cogens by Evan J. Criddle and Evan Fox-Descent, Yale Journal of International Law (2009);
b. Breaking the Silence: Rape as an International Crime by Mark Ellis, Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law (2006); and
c. Enforcing Erga Omnes Obligations by Christian J. Tams, Cambridge University Press (2005).
As such, Justice del Castillo is guilty of plagiarism, misconduct, and at least inexcusable negligence.
Interestingly, the three foreign authors mentioned above, stated that their works were used inappropriately by Justice Del Castillo and
that the assailed decision is different from what their works advocated.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is plagiarism in the case at bar.
HELD: No. Even if there is (as emphasized by the Supreme Court in its ruling on the Motion for Reconsiderationfiled by Vinuya et al in
2011), the rule on plagiarism cannot be applied to judicial bodies.
No Plagiarism
According to Blacks Law Dictionary: Plagiarism is the deliberate and knowing presentation of another persons original ideas or
creative expressions as ones own.
This cannot be the case here because as proved by evidence, in the original drafts of the assailed decision, there was attribution to the
three authors but due to errors made by Justice del Castillos researcher, the attributions were inadvertently deleted. There is therefore
no intent by Justice del Castillo to take these foreign works as his own.
But in plagiarism, intent is immaterial.
On this note, the Supreme Court stated that in its past decisions, (i.e. U.P Board of Regents vs CA, 313 SCRA 404), the Supreme Court
never indicated that intent is not material in plagiarism. To adopt a strict rule in applying plagiarism in all cases leaves no room for
errors. This would be very disadvantageous in cases, like this, where there are reasonable and logical explanations.
On the foreign authors claim that their works were used inappropriately
According to the Supreme Court, the passages lifted from their works were merely used as background facts in establishing the state
on international law at various stages of its development. The Supreme Court went on to state that the foreign authors works can
support conflicting theories. The Supreme Court also stated that since the attributions to said authors were accidentally deleted, it is
impossible to conclude that Justice del Castillo twisted the advocacies that the works espouse.
No Misconduct
Justice del Castillo is not guilty of misconduct. The error here is in good faith. There was no malice, fraud or corruption.
No Inexcusable Negligence
The error of Justice del Castillos researcher is not reflective of his gross negligence. The researcher is a highly competent one. The
researcher earned scholarly degrees here and abroad from reputable educational institutions. The researcher finished third in her class
and 4
th
in the bar examinations. Her error was merely due to the fact that the software she used, Microsoft Word, lacked features to
apprise her that certain important portions of her drafts are being deleted inadvertently. Such error on her part cannot be said to be
constitutive of gross negligence nor can it be said that Justice del Castillo was grossly negligent when he assigned the case to her.
Further, assigning cases to researchers has been a long standing practice to assist justices in drafting decisions. It must be emphasized
though that prior to assignment, the justice has already spelled out his position to the researcher and in every sense, the justice is in
control in the writing of the draft.
Read full text
Justice Maria Lourdes Sereno dissenting
There is such a thing as judicial plagiarism. And though judicial plagiarism does not necessarily carry with them the imposition of
sanctions nor does it mean that a case should undergo retrial based on it, the existence of which should be acknowledged.


495 SCRA 170 Political Law Constitutional Law Legislative Branch Question Hour Constitutionality of E.O. 464
In 2005, scandals involving anomalous transactions about the North Rail Project as well as the Garci tapes surfaced. This prompted the
Senate to conduct a public hearing to investigate the said anomalies particularly the alleged overpricing in the NRP. The investigating
Senate committee issued invitations to certain department heads and military officials to speak before the committee as resource
persons. Ermita submitted that he and some of the department heads cannot attend the said hearing due to pressing matters that
need immediate attention. AFP Chief of Staff Senga likewise sent a similar letter. Drilon, the senate president, excepted the said
requests for they were sent belatedly and arrangements were already made and scheduled. Subsequently, GMA issued EO 464 which
took effect immediately.
EO 464 basically prohibited Department heads, Senior officials of executive departments who in the judgment of the department heads
are covered by the executive privilege; Generals and flag officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and such other officers who in
the judgment of the Chief of Staff are covered by the executive privilege; Philippine National Police (PNP) officers with rank of chief
superintendent or higher and such other officers who in the judgment of the Chief of the PNP are covered by the executive privilege;
Senior national security officials who in the judgment of the National Security Adviser are covered by the executive privilege; and Such
other officers as may be determined by the President, from appearing in such hearings conducted by Congress without first securing
the presidents approval.
The department heads and the military officers who were invited by the Senate committee then invoked EO 464 to except themselves.
Despite EO 464, the scheduled hearing proceeded with only 2 military personnel attending. For defying President Arroyos order barring
military personnel from testifying before legislative inquiries without her approval, Brig. Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan were relieved
from their military posts and were made to face court martial proceedings. EO 464s constitutionality was assailed for it is alleged that it
infringes on the rights and duties of Congress to conduct investigation in aid of legislation and conduct oversight functions in the
implementation of laws.
ISSUE: Whether or not EO 464 is constitutional.
HELD: The SC ruled that EO 464 is constitutional in part. To determine the validity of the provisions of EO 464, the SC sought to
distinguish Section 21 from Section 22 of Art 6 of the 1987 Constitution. The Congress power of inquiry is expressly recognized in
Section 21 of Article VI of the Constitution. Although there is no provision in the Constitution expressly investing either House of
Congress with power to make investigations and exact testimony to the end that it may exercise its legislative functions advisedly and
effectively, such power is so far incidental to the legislative function as to be implied. In other words, the power of inquiry with
process to enforce it is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or
effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or change; and where the
legislative body does not itself possess the requisite information which is not infrequently true recourse must be had to others who
do possess it.
Section 22 on the other hand provides for the Question Hour. The Question Hour is closely related with the legislative power, and it is
precisely as a complement to or a supplement of the Legislative Inquiry. The appearance of the members of Cabinet would be very,
very essential not only in the application of check and balance but also, in effect, in aid of legislation. Section 22 refers only to Question
Hour, whereas, Section 21 would refer specifically to inquiries in aid of legislation, under which anybody for that matter, may be
summoned and if he refuses, he can be held in contempt of the House. A distinction was thus made between inquiries in aid of
legislation and the question hour. While attendance was meant to be discretionary in the question hour, it was compulsory in inquiries
in aid of legislation. Sections 21 and 22, therefore, while closely related and complementary to each other, should not be considered as
pertaining to the same power of Congress. One specifically relates to the power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation, the aim of
which is to elicit information that may be used for legislation, while the other pertains to the power to conduct a question hour, the
objective of which is to obtain information in pursuit of Congress oversight function. Ultimately, the power of Congress to compel the
appearance of executive officials under Section 21 and the lack of it under Section 22 find their basis in the principle of separation of
powers.
While the executive branch is a co-equal branch of the legislature, it cannot frustrate the power of Congress to legislate by refusing to
comply with its demands for information. When Congress exercises its power of inquiry, the only way for department heads to exempt
themselves therefrom is by a valid claim of privilege. They are not exempt by the mere fact that they are department heads. Only one
executive official may be exempted from this power the President on whom executive power is vested, hence, beyond the reach of
Congress except through the power of impeachment. It is based on her being the highest official of the executive branch, and the
due respect accorded to a co-equal branch of government which is sanctioned by a long-standing custom. The requirement then to
secure presidential consent under Section 1, limited as it is only to appearances in the question hour, is valid on its face. For under
Section 22, Article VI of the Constitution, the appearance of department heads in the question hour is discretionary on their part.
Section 1 cannot, however, be applied to appearances of department heads in inquiries in aid of legislation. Congress is not bound in
such instances to respect the refusal of the department head to appear in such inquiry, unless a valid claim of privilege is subsequently
made, either by the President herself or by the Executive Secretary.
When Congress merely seeks to be informed on how department heads are implementing the statutes which it has issued, its right to
such information is not as imperative as that of the President to whom, as Chief Executive, such department heads must give a report
of their performance as a matter of duty. In such instances, Section 22, in keeping with the separation of powers, states that Congress
may only request their appearance. Nonetheless, when the inquiry in which Congress requires their appearance is in aid of legislation
under Section 21, the appearance is mandatory for the same reasons stated in Arnault.

Senate vs. Ermita , GR 169777, April 20, 2006
Senate vs. Ermita , GR 169777, April 20, 2006

FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition proffer that the President has abused power by issuing E.O. 464 Ensuring Observance of
the Principles of Separation of Powers, Adherence to the Rule on Executive Privilege and Respect for the Rights of Public Officials
Appearing in Legislative Inquiries in Aid of Legislation Under the Constitution, and for Other Purposes. Petitioners pray for its
declaration as null and void for being unconstitutional.
In the exercise of its legislative power, the Senate of the Philippines, through its various Senate Committees, conducts inquiries or
investigations in aid of legislation which call for, inter alia, the attendance of officials and employees of the executive department,
bureaus, and offices including those employed in Government Owned and Controlled Corporations, the Armed Forces of the Philippines
(AFP), and the Philippine National Police (PNP).
The Committee of the Senate issued invitations to various officials of the Executive Department for them to appear as resource
speakers in a public hearing on the railway project, others on the issues of massive election fraud in the Philippine elections, wire
tapping, and the role of military in the so-called Gloriagate Scandal.
Said officials were not able to attend due to lack of consent from the President as provided by E.O. 464, Section 3 which requires all
the public officials enumerated in Section 2(b) to secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either house of
Congress.

ISSUE:
Is Section 3 of E.O. 464, which requires all the public officials, enumerated in Section 2(b) to secure the consent of the President prior
to appearing before either house of Congress, valid and constitutional?

RULING:
No. The enumeration in Section 2 (b) of E.O. 464 is broad and is covered by the executive privilege. The doctrine of executive privilege
is premised on the fact that certain information must, as a matter of necessity, be kept confidential in pursuit of the public interest. The
privilege being, by definition, an exemption from the obligation to disclose information, in this case to Congress, the necessity must be
of such high degree as to outweigh the public interest in enforcing that obligation in a particular case.
Congress undoubtedly has a right to information from the executive branch whenever it is sought in aid of legislation. If the executive
branch withholds such information on the ground that it is privileged, it must so assert it and state the reason therefor and why it must
be respected.
The infirm provisions of E.O. 464, however, allow the executive branch to evade congressional requests for information without need of
clearly asserting a right to do so and/or proffering its reasons therefor. By the mere expedient of invoking said provisions, the power of
Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is frustrated.


549 SCRA 77 Political Law Constitutional Law The Legislative Department Inquiry in aid of legislation Executive Privilege
Legislative (Sec 21) & Oversight (Sec 22) Powers

In April April 2007, DOTC entered into a contract with Zhong Xing Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE) for the supply of equipment
and services for the National Broadband Network (NBN) Project in the amount of $329,481,290.00 (approximately P16 Billion Pesos).
The Project was to be financed by the Peoples Republic of China. The Senate passed various resolutions relative to the NBN deal. On
the other hand, Joe De Venecia issued a statement that several high executive officials and power brokers were using their influence to
push the approval of the NBN Project by the NEDA.
Neri, the head of NEDA, was then invited to testify before the Senate Blue Ribbon. He appeared in one hearing wherein he was
interrogated for 11 hrs and during which he admitted that Abalos of COMELEC tried to bribe him with P200M in exchange for his
approval of the NBN project. He further narrated that he informed President Arroyo about the bribery attempt and that she instructed
him not to accept the bribe. However, when probed further on what they discussed about the NBN Project, Neri refused to answer,
invoking executive privilege. In particular, he refused to answer the questions on (a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up the
NBN Project, (b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it, and (c) whether or not she directed him to approve. He later refused
to attend the other hearings and Ermita sent a letter to the SBRC averring that the communications between GMA and Neri is privileged
and that the jurisprudence laid down in Senate vs Ermitabe applied. The SBRC cited Neri for contempt.
ISSUE: Whether or not the three questions sought by the SBRC to be answered falls under executive privilege.
HELD: The oversight function of Congress may be facilitated by compulsory process only to the extent that it is performed in pursuit of
legislation.
The communications elicited by the three (3) questions are covered by the presidential communications privilege.
1st, the communications relate to a quintessential and non-delegable power of the President, i.e. the power to enter into an
executive agreement with other countries. This authority of the President to enter intoexecutive agreements without the concurrence of
the Legislature has traditionally been recognized in Philippine jurisprudence.
2nd, the communications are received by a close advisor of the President. Under the operational proximity test, petitioner can
be considered a close advisor, being a member of President Arroyos cabinet. And
3rd, there is no adequate showing of a compelling need that would justify the limitation of the privilege and of the unavailability of
the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.

489 SCRA 160 Political Law The Executive Branch Presidential Proclamation 1017 Take Care Clause Take Over Power Calling
Out Power
Bill of Rights - Freedom of Speech Overbreadth
In February 2006, due to the escape of some Magdalo members and the discovery of a plan (Oplan Hackle I) to assassinate the
president, then president Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (GMA) issued Presidential Proclamation 1017 (PP1017) and is to be implemented by
General Order No. 5 (GO 5). The said law was aimed to suppress lawlessness and the connivance of extremists to bring down the
government.
Pursuant to such PP, GMA cancelled all plans to celebrate EDSA I and at the same time revoked all permits issued for rallies and other
public organization/meeting. Notwithstanding the cancellation of their rally permit, Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU) head Randolf David
proceeded to rally which led to his arrest.
Later that day, the Daily Tribune, which Cacho-Olivares is the editor, was raided by the CIDG and they seized and confiscated anti-GMA
articles and write ups. Later still, another known anti-GMA news agency (Malaya) was raided and seized. On the same day, Beltran of
Anakpawis, was also arrested. His arrest was however grounded on a warrant of arrest issued way back in 1985 for his actions against
Marcos. His supporters cannot visit him in jail because of the current imposition of PP 1017 and GO 5.
In March, GMA issued PP 1021 which declared that the state of national emergency ceased to exist. David and some opposition
Congressmen averred that PP1017 is unconstitutional for it has no factual basis and it cannot be validly declared by the president for
such power is reposed in Congress. Also such declaration is actually a declaration of martial law. Olivares-Cacho also averred that the
emergency contemplated in the Constitution are those of natural calamities and that such is an overbreadth. Petitioners claim that PP
1017 is an overbreadth because it encroaches upon protected and unprotected rights. The Sol-Gen argued that the issue has become
moot and academic by reason of the lifting of PP 1017 by virtue of the declaration of PP 1021. The Sol-Gen averred that PP 1017 is
within the presidents calling out power, take care power and take over power.
ISSUE: Whether or not PP 1017 and GO 5 is constitutional.
HELD: PP 1017 and its implementing GO are partly constitutional and partly unconstitutional.
The issue cannot be considered as moot and academic by reason of the lifting of the questioned PP. It is still in fact operative because
there are parties still affected due to the alleged violation of the said PP. Hence, the SC can take cognition of the case at bar. The SC
ruled that PP 1017 is constitutional in part and at the same time some provisions of which are unconstitutional. The SC ruled in the
following way;
Resolution by the SC on the Factual Basis of its declaration
The petitioners were not able to prove that GMA has no factual basis in issuing PP 1017 and GO 5. A reading of the Solicitor Generals
Consolidated Comment and Memorandum shows a detailed narration of the events leading to the issuance of PP 1017, with supporting
reports forming part of the records. Mentioned are the escape of the Magdalo Group, their audacious threat of the Magdalo D-Day, the
defections in the military, particularly in the Philippine Marines, and the reproving statements from the communist leaders. There was
also the Minutes of the Intelligence Report and Security Group of the Philippine Army showing the growing alliance between the NPA
and the military. Petitioners presented nothing to refute such events. Thus, absent any contrary allegations, the Court is convinced
that the President was justified in issuing PP 1017 calling for military aid. Indeed, judging the seriousness of the incidents, GMA was
not expected to simply fold her arms and do nothing to prevent or suppress what she believed was lawless violence, invasion or
rebellion. However, the exercise of such power or duty must not stifle liberty.
Resolution by the SC on the Overbreadth Theory
First and foremost, the overbreadth doctrine is an analytical tool developed for testing on their faces statutes in free speech cases.
The 7 consolidated cases at bar are not primarily freedom of speech cases. Also, a plain reading of PP 1017 shows that it i s not
primarily directed to speech or even speech-related conduct. It is actually a call upon the AFP to prevent or suppress all forms of
lawless violence. Moreover, the overbreadth doctrine is not intended for testing the validity of a law that reflects legitimate state
interest in maintaining comprehensive control over harmful, constitutionally unprotected conduct. Undoubtedly, lawless violence,
insurrection and rebellion are considered harmful and constitutionally unprotected conduct. Thus, claims of facial overbreadth are
entertained in cases involving statutes which, by their terms, seek to regulate only spoken words and again, that overbreadth claims,
if entertained at all, have been curtailed when invoked against ordinary criminal laws that are sought to be applied to protected
conduct. Here, the incontrovertible fact remains that PP 1017 pertains to a spectrum of conduct, not free speech, which is manifestly
subject to state regulation.
Resolution by the SC on the Calling Out Power Doctrine
On the basis of Sec 17, Art 7 of the Constitution, GMA declared PP 1017. The SC considered the Presidents calling-out power as a
discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom, it stressed that this does not prevent an examination of whether such power was
exercised within permissible constitutional limits or whether it was exercised in a manner constituting grave abuse of discretion. The SC
ruled that GMA has validly declared PP 1017 for the Constitution grants the President, as Commander-in-Chief, a sequence of
graduated powers. From the most to the least benign, these are: the calling-out power, the power to suspend the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus, and the power to declare Martial Law. The only criterion for the exercise of the calling-out power is that whenever it
becomes necessary, the President may call the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. And such
criterion has been met.
Resolution by the SC on the Take Care Doctrine
Pursuant to the 2
nd
sentence of Sec 17, Art 7 of the Constitution (He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.) the president
declared PP 1017. David et al averred that PP 1017 however violated Sec 1, Art 6 of the Constitution for it arrogated legislative power
to the President. Such power is vested in Congress. They assail the clause to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees,
orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction. The SC noted that such provision is similar to the power
that granted former President Marcos legislative powers (as provided in PP 1081). The SC ruled that the assailed PP 1017 is
unconstitutional insofar as it grants GMA the authority to promulgate decrees. Legislative power is peculiarly within the province of
the Legislature. Sec 1, Article 6 categorically states that [t]he legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines
which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives. To be sure, neither Martial Law nor a state of rebellion nor a state of
emergency can justify GMA[s exercise of legislative power by issuing decrees. The president can only take care of the carrying out of
laws but cannot create or enact laws.
Resolution by the SC on the Take Over Power Doctrine
The president cannot validly order the taking over of private corporations or institutions such as the Daily Tribune without any authority
from Congress. On the other hand, the word emergency contemplated in the constitution is not limited to natural calamities but rather
it also includes rebellion. The SC made a distinction; the president can declare the state of national emergency but her exercise of
emergency powers does not come automatically after it for such exercise needs authority from Congress. The authority from Congress
must be based on the following:
(1) There must be a war or other emergency.
(2) The delegation must be for a limited period only.
(3) The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the Congress may prescribe.
(4) The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national policy declared by Congress.
Resolution by the SC on the Issue that PP 1017 is a Martial Law Declaration
The SC ruled that PP 1017 is not a Martial Law declaration and is not tantamount to it. It is a valid exercise of the calling out power of
the president by the president.