International Relations, week 2

The False Promise of International Institutions

by JJ Mearsheimer (International Security, 1994)

Since end of Cold War: Western policymakers have sought to create security based on institutions.
They explicitly reject balance-of-power politics as an organising concept.
This approach rests on the belief that institutions = key means of promoting world peace.
No single institution is to dominate. A framework of complementary, mutually reinforcing institutions.
Europe has the most well-developed, extensive institutions. Academics consider them a stabilising force.

Realists & Institutionalists disagree over whether institutions markedly affect stability.
Realists: they only matter on the margins. They are dependent on self-interested calculations of great powers.
Institutionalists: they alter state preferences & behaviour. They are independent variables.

What are institutions?
Institutions = a set of rules that stipulate the ways in which states should cooperate & compete w/ each other.
They are negotiated by states, entail mutual acceptance of higher norms and are embodied in organisations.
They call for the decentralised cooperation of individual sovereign states, without any effective mechanism of command.
(Lipson)

Realism
Realism paints a rather grim picture of world politics. Daily life = a struggle for world power. IR isnt a constant state
of war, but the possibility of war always looms.
States do frequently cooperate though. But this isnt the genuine peace that defies realism.
Five assumptions: anarchy, military capability, uncertainty about intentions of others, basic motive is survival, states
think strategically. Three main patterns of behaviour result:
1. States fear each other. They anticipate danger. Survivalist must be suspicious. There is no authority a state
can turn to and nothing but self-interest 3
rd
parties to punish an aggressor. Political exchange = more
dangerous than economic exchange as it can lead to war.
2. Each state aims to guarantee its own survival. Because of potential threats, states cant depend on others.
They see themselves as vulnerable & alone. Self Help (Waltz)
Alliances can be formed but theyre only temporary marriages of convenience.
3. States aim to maximise their relative power position over other states. Being the most formidable power =
the best way to guarantee survival.
All states are offensive & defensive. They constantly try to take advantage and avoid being taken advantage of.
Cooperation in a Realist World
Cooperation does occur, but is difficult to sustain. Two factors inhibit cooperation: relative-gains considerations and concern
about cheating.
States can think of relative or absolute gains, but realism dictates that they will think in relative terms.
Cooperation = difficult to achieve when states think relatively.
Concerns about cheating also hinders cooperation. States are reluctant to enter into cooperative agreements in case the other
side will cheat and gain relative advantage. Special peril of defection.
Balance-of-power logic often causes states to form alliances for defence or to gang up on a third state.
Institutions in a Realist World
Realists recognise that states sometimes operate through institutions, but see them as reflecting self-interest.
Institutions = arenas for acting out power relationships (Evans & Wilson, 1992)
Balance of power = the independent variable explaining war. Institutions = intervening variable.
NATO: basically a manifestation of the bipolar distribution of power in Europe. A tool of American power.
Varieties of Institutionalist Theories
International Relations, week 2


Liberal Institutionalism doesnt address the question of how to prevent war. Focuses on explaining why economic &
environmental cooperation among states = more likely than realists recognise.
Increased cooperation in those realms = likely to reduce war but they dont say how.
Cheating = main threat. Aim = to create rules that constrain states, not challenge fundamental realist claim.
Collective Security directly confronts war. Accepts importance of force, but argues the danger can be reduced by challenging
realist thinking about state behaviour & substituting 3 anti-realist norms: 1) states should reject using force to change status
quo, 2) responsible states mustnt serve narrow self-interest, 3) states must trust each other to renounce aggression and mean
that renunciation.
Critical Theory most ambitious. Ultimate aim: to transform fundamental nature of international politics and create a world
where theres the possibility of genuine peace. Directly challenges realist thinking. Assumes that ideas and discourse are driving
forces behind state behaviour. Ideas shape the material world.

Liberal Institutionalism
Doesnt directly address the Q of whether institutions cause peace. Focuses on explaining cooperation where state interests
arent fundamentally opposed.
Goal-directed behaviour that entails mutual policy adjustments so that all sides end up better off than they would otherwise
be. (Milner)
States still think of winning and losing, but liberal institutionalism doesnt deal with these situations.
The theory largely ignores security issues and concentrates on economic (& environmental) issues.
The likelihood of cooperation is much less w/ respect to security, so these theorists pay less attention to it.
Liberal Institutionalists: cooperation/ institutions contribute to international stability.
Economic cooperation leads easily onto peace.
Causal Logic
Liberal institutionalists claim to accept realisms core, whilst arguing cooperation = easier than realists think.
Keohane: states must act as rational egoists.
The principle obstacle to cooperation = threat of cheating. Key to solve the Prisoners dilemma is for each side to convince the
other that they have a collective interest in making short-term sacrifices (gains from cheating). Institutions must deter cheaters
and protect victims with 3 messages: you will be caught, you will be punished and you will jeopardise future cooperation.
Liberal institutionalists dont aim to change fundamental norms of state behaviour. They concentrate on showing how rules can
work to counter the cheating problem, even while states are self-serving.
Rules can be employed to make 4 major changes:
1. Institutionalised iteration. Gives a chance for payback and rewards those who adhere to agreements.
2. Issue-linkage. Creates greater interdependence between states.
3. Increases in the amount of information available, discouraging cheating.
4. Reduce transaction costs as the institution takes care of negotiations & monitoring.
Liberal institutionalism = of limited utility with security as theres a risk of betrayal resulting in destruction.
Flaws in the Causal Logic
Yes, cheating = major obstacle. It ignores the other major obstacle to cooperation: relative-gains.
You might say that relative gains logic only exists in the security environment, but what about comparative advantage and
strategic trade theory? Also: military advantage rests on economic advantage.
Theres empirical evidence that relative-gains mattered among OECD countries during Cold War.
Can Liberal Institutionalism be repaired?
Two questions must be addressed to repair the theory:
1. Can institutions facilitate cooperation when states seriously care about relative gains?
No evidence that liberal institutionalists believe this.
2. When do states not worry about relative gains?
Liberal institutionalists havent answered this sufficiently.
Problems with the Empirical Record
We need evidence of cooperation that wouldnt have occurred without institutions.
Keohane: IEA, 1974-81. But even he concedes it largely failed. Its minor success during the Iran-Iraq war worked because it was
between advanced Western democracies with market economies.
International Relations, week 2


Martin: Role of EC in helping Britain get allies to put sanctions on Argentina. But it could have done it without.
Liberal institutionalism does not provide a sound basis for understanding IR & promoting stability.

Collective Security
Deals directly with how to cause peace.
Recognises centrality of military power but states that the key to enhancing stability = management of military power.
Inis Claude: The problem of power is here to stay...it is...a problem to be managed.
But: CS theory = anti-realist. Denies balance-of-power logic and traditional alliances.
Despite failures, Wilson created a brand of international morality vastly superior to the b.o.p. system.
But even Claude states that Collective Security is not a possibility to be taken seriously.
Causal Logic
Assumption that states behave according to dictates of realism. Aim: move beyond self-help and fear. Institutions are the key.
1. States must renounce the use of military force to alter the status quo. No wars of aggression.
There may be a small handful of states outside this norm. Without any, thered be no need for collective security.
Claude: CS assumes the lonely aggressor.
2. Responsible states mustnt think in terms of narrow self interest, They must see their national interest as bound up
with the national interest of other states. States in a self-help world calculate each move based on the b.o.p. There
must be a codified, binding commitment on all members part to respond to aggression whenever it occurs.
3. States must trust each other. This underpins the other 2 norms.
States must be confident that if an aggressor targets them, none of the other states will get cold feet and not help.
Flaws in the Causal Logic
Two major flaws:
1. CS = incomplete theory, as it doesnt explain how states overcome their fears and learn to trust each other.
Realism=anarchy + military power + uncertainty. CS overlooks the first two but on intentions, the first 2 norms call for
defence not offence, so states should only have benign intentions w/ military force.
But: the theory recognises that one/ more states might reject the norms. Thus theres no absolute certainty.
2. A collective security has a very demanding set of requirements:
i. States must be able to distinguish between aggressor and victim. Not always possible (WW1).
ii. Assumption that all aggression is wrong. But what about Vietnams 1979 overthrow of Pol Pot?
iii. Some states = especially friendly for historical/ ideological reasons. Collective action against one might provoke
the fury of or at least not rouse the others.
iv. Historical enmity between states can complicate CS.
v. Difficulty in distributing the burden of action.
vi. Difficult to get a rapid response. Desert Storm took 6 months to organise.
vii. Every local conflict is transformed into an international one.
viii. States obligation to respond impinges on sovereignty & states rights to decide whether or not to fight.
ix. Contradiction in attitudes towards force. Belief that war is horrible, but states are mandated to go to war to
defend.
Should it fail, potential victims are likely to be in deep trouble if theyve placed their faith in it.
Problems with the Empirical Record
History shows little support for collective security. This is acknowledged by the theorys proponents.
Iraq was an unusual case and no effort is underway to reform the UN to perform true collective security missions.
Fallback Positions
2 less ambitious forms: peacekeeping & concerts.
Peacekeeping is a less ambitious alternative strategy for promoting stability, but can only be accomplished with the consent of
the disputants and cant use force. It has no role to play in disputes between Great Powers. Only works on the margin.
Concerts: attenuated form of collective security. (Kupchan & Kupchan). But: these are 2 incompatible logics. The assumptions
of the 2 systems are different. A govt act according to Machiavellian balance of power logic &Wilsonian assumptions (Wright).

CS addresses how to push states away from war and recognises the role of the military but doesnt address how trust is possible
and historical support is scant.
International Relations, week 2



Critical Theory
Directly addresses how to bring about peace, making bold claims about changing states behaviour. Aim: a peace system.
IDEAS are taken very seriously. They are the driving force of history.
CT recognises that Realism has been dominant for 700 years, but intends to change that situation by undermining it.
But CT has very little to say about the future of IR, i.e. where do we go once weve undermined Realism?
Causal Logic
Institutions are at the core. Aim = alter the constitutive & regulative norms of the intl. system so states stop thinking and acting
according to realism. States will renounce the use of military force and therell be a shared peace.
More ambitious than Collective Security. Aim: to create a world in which all states consider war an unacceptable practice.
The key is to alter state identity radically. States are to have a powerful sense of responsibility to the international community.
Realist: this is desirable in principle, but not realisable in practise because states are forced to act as egoists.
Critical theory challenges the realist claim that structural factors are the determinants of state behaviour. Ideas. Discourse.
Institutions often can change environments (Fischer). Social reality is constituted by intersubjective consciousness...human
beings are free to change their world by a collective act of will.
Cox: The state has no physical existence. Wendt: Anarchy is what states make of it.
Where realists see a fixed & knowable world, critical theorists see the possibility of endless interpretations of the world.
Most critical theorists see a top-down dissemination of these new ideas, originating with the elite.
Flaws in the Causal Logic
Explanation of how change occurs is incomplete or contradictory.
State behaviour changes when discourse changes, but what determines why some discourses become dominant?
It is difficult to judge the fate of realism through the lens of critical theory.
Changes in the material world drive changes in discourse. Ashley: developments in late capitalist society
Realists believe in an objective reality. Critical theory sees a subjective reality.
When critical theorists attempt to explain why realism = losing its hegemonic power, they point to objective factors.
Problems with the Empirical Record
Realism has prevailed since 1300. Critical Theorists accept this. But they see the end of the Cold War as a watershed.
For the more cautious, 1989 created opportunities for change, but the change hasnt yet been realised.
Three points on CTs interpretation of history:
1. Sheer continuity of realist behaviour. Must be deep-seated.
2. Scant support for critical theories in feudal era. Fischer: feudal actors in essence behaved like modern states.
3. The end of the Cold War is like the end of many other Great Power wars. Rather tame relations.
Further scepticism: for CT, the end of the Cold War marked a shift in thinking. Gorbachev ended the Cold War based on a change
in ideas. But: we must look at the structural, interest factors underlying the collapse of the soviet union. Economic crisis.
Why should we accept that a theory with 1200 years staying power will disappear? CT says little about how change happens.

CONCLUSION
Many policymakers see promise in institutions for promoting peace. But the three institutionalist theories are flawed.
They appear to have had little independent effect on state behaviour.
Important paradox: though the world doesnt operate w/ these theories, they are very influential.
Perhaps because of their relationship to realism and the core elements of US political ideology.
Realism has long been an influential theory in the US. But Americans tend to dislike realism as its opposed to how most
Americans prefer to think of themselves and the world.
Four reasons for US elites & public to be hostile toward realism: it is a pessimistic theory, it treats war as inevitable, it doesnt
distinguish between good and bad states and America has historically thumbed its nose at realism, through isolationism.

But these theories do not accurately describe the world, thus policies based on them are bound to fail.
Failure of League.
Failure to stop war in Bosnia.