Stonehill v.

Diokno
Search and Seizure General Warrants Abandonment of the Moncado Doctrine
Stonehill et al and the corporation they form were alleged to have committed acts in
violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and
Revised Penal Code. By the strength of this allegation a search warrant was issued
against their persons and their corporation. The warrant provides authority to search
the persons above-named and/or the premises of their offices, warehouses and/or
residences, and to seize and take possession of the following personal property to wit:
Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers,
journals, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers
showing all business transactions including disbursements receipts, balance sheets and
profit and loss statements and Bobbins (cigarette wrappers).
The documents, papers, and things seized under the alleged authority of the warrants in
question may be split into (2) major groups, namely:
(a) those found and seized in the offices of the aforementioned corporations and
(b) those found seized in the residences of petitioners herein.
Stonehill averred that the warrant is illegal for:
(1) they do not describe with particularity the documents, books and things to be seized;
(2) cash money, not mentioned in the warrants, were actually seized;
(3) the warrants were issued to fish evidence against the aforementioned petitioners in
deportation cases filed against them;
(4) the searches and seizures were made in an illegal manner; and
(5) the documents, papers and cash money seized were not delivered to the courts that
issued the warrants, to be disposed of in accordance with law.
The prosecution counters, invoking the Moncado doctrine, that the defects of said
warrants, if any, were cured by petitioners consent; and (3) that, in any event, the
effects seized are admissible in evidence against them. In short, the criminal cannot be
set free just because the government blunders.
ISSUE: Whether or not the search warrant issued is valid.
HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Stonehill et al. The SC emphasized however that
Stonehill et al cannot assail the validity of the search warrant issued against their
corporation for Stonehill are not the proper party hence has no cause of action. It should
be raised by the officers or board members of the corporation. The constitution protects
the peoples right against unreasonable search and seizure. It provides; (1) that no
warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge in the
manner set forth in said provision; and (2) that the warrant shall particularly describe the
things to be seized. In the case at bar, none of these are met. The warrant was issued
from mere allegation that Stonehill et al committed a violation of Central Bank Laws,
Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code. In other
words, no specific offense had been alleged in said applications. The averments thereof
with respect to the offense committed were abstract. As a consequence, it was
impossible for the judges who issued the warrants to have found the existence of
probable cause, for the same presupposes the introduction of competent proof that the
party against whom it is sought has performed particular acts, or committed specific
omissions, violating a given provision of our criminal laws. As a matter of fact, the
applications involved in this case do not allege any specific acts performed by herein
petitioners. It would be a legal heresy, of the highest order, to convict anybody of a
violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and
Revised Penal Code, as alleged in the aforementioned applications without
reference to any determinate provision of said laws or codes.
The grave violation of the Constitution made in the application for the contested search
warrants was compounded by the description therein made of the effects to be
searched for and seized, to wit:
Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, journals, correspondence, receipts,
ledgers, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers
showing all business transactions including disbursement receipts, balance sheets and
related profit and loss statements.
Thus, the warrants authorized the search for and seizure of records pertaining to all
business transactions of Stonehill et al, regardless of whether the transactions were
legal or illegal. The warrants sanctioned the seizure of all records of Stonehill et al and
the aforementioned corporations, whatever their nature, thus openly contravening the
explicit command of the Bill of Rights that the things to be seized be particularly
described as well as tending to defeat its major objective: the elimination of general
warrants. The Moncado doctrine is likewise abandoned and the right of the accused
against a defective search warrant is emphasized.

Columbia Pictures v. CA
Intellectual Property Law on Copyright Requirements Before a Search Warrant May
Be Issued in Copyright Cases Piracy
In 1986, the Video Regulatory Board (VRB) applied for a warrant against Jose Jinco
(Jingco), owner of Showtime Enterprises for allegedly pirating movies produced and
owned by Columbia Pictures and other motion picture companies. Jingco filed a motion
to quash the search warrant but the same was denied in 1987. Subsequently, Jinco filed
an Urgent Motion to Lift the Search Warrant and Return the Articles Seized. In 1989, the
RTC judge granted the motion. The judge ruled that based on the ruling in the 1988
case of 20
th
Century Fox Film Corporation vs CA, before a search warrant could be
issued in copyright cases, the master copy of the films alleged to be pirated must be
attached in the application for warrant.
ISSUE: Whether or not the 20
th
Century Fox ruling may be applied retroactively in this
case.
HELD: No. In 1986, obviously the 1988 case of 20
th
Century Fox was not yet
promulgated. The lower court could not possibly have expected more evidence from the
VRB and Columbia Pictures in their application for a search warrant other than what the
law and jurisprudence, then existing and judicially accepted, required with respect to the
finding of probable cause.
The Supreme Court also revisited and clarified the ruling in the 20
th
Century Fox Case.
It is evidently incorrect to suggest, as the ruling in 20th Century Fox may appear to do,
that in copyright infringement cases, the presentation of master tapes of the copyright
films is always necessary to meet the requirement of probable cause for the issuance of
a search warrant. It is true that such master tapes are object evidence, with the merit
that in this class of evidence the ascertainment of the controverted fact is made through
demonstration involving the direct use of the senses of the presiding magistrate. Such
auxiliary procedure, however, does not rule out the use of testimonial or documentary
evidence, depositions, admissions or other classes of evidence tending to prove
the factum probandum,especially where the production in court of object evidence
would result in delay, inconvenience or expenses out of proportion to is evidentiary
value.
In fine, the supposed pronouncement in said case regarding the necessity for the
presentation of the master tapes of the copy-righted films for the validity of search
warrants should at most be understood to merely serve as a guidepost in determining
the existence of probable cause in copy-right infringement cases where there is doubt
as to the true nexus between the master tape and the pirated copies. An objective and
careful reading of the decision in said case could lead to no other conclusion than that
said directive was hardly intended to be a sweeping and inflexible requirement in all or
similar copyright infringement cases.

LUCIEN TRAN VAN NGHIA VS. RODRIGUEZ
January 31, 2000

Facts: A was deported from the Philippines and was barred from entering the
Philippines. But he re-entered the country using an alias. He was subsequently caught by
immigration agents and charged with violation of 45(d) of the Philippine Immigration
Act. He then filed a petition for habeas corpus.

Issue: Whether the petition for habeas corpus should be granted.

Held: No.
The writ of habeas corpus will not issue where the person alleged to be restrained of his
liberty is charged with an offense in the Philippines. Here, A is charged with violation of
45(d) of the Philippine Immigration Act. He is now detained because of said charge and
therefore his petition for release on a writ of habeas corpus is without merit.

Burgos, Sr. vs. Chief of Staff
G.R. L-64261. December 26, 1984

Doctrine: A machinery which is movable by nature becomes immobilized when placed
by the owner of the tenement, property or plant, but not so when placed by a tenant,
usufructuary, or any other person having only temporary right, unless such person acted
as the agent of the owner.
Facts: Armed with a search warrant issued by the Court of First Instance of Rizal, law
enforcement officers searched the offices of the We forum and Metropolitan Mail
newspapers. During the course of the search, the law enforcement officers seized office
and printing machines, equipment, paraphernalia and several other materials used in
the distribution of newspapers. Petitioner avers, among others, that the seizure of the
properties mentioned above amounts to seizure of real properties, which cannot be
validly conducted under the strength of a search warrant. It must be noted that real
properties are not susceptible of confiscation under a search warrant. Hence this appeal
which assails the validity of the search and the seizure of the properties of the
petitioner.
Issue: Whether there is merit in the petitioners assertion that real property were
invalidly seized under the disputed warrants.
Held: No. The petitioners assertion does not hold water. Under Article 415(5) of the
civil code, machinery, receptacles, instruments or implements intended by the owner of
the tenement for an industry or works which may be carried on in a building or on a
piece of land and which tend directly to meet the needs of the said industry or works
are considered immovable property. In another case decided by the Court, in which the
abovementioned legal provision was invoked, it was ruled that machinery which is
movable by nature becomes immobilized when placed by the owner of the tenement,
property or plant, but not so when placed by a tenant, usufructuary, or any other person
having only temporary right, unless such person acted as the agent of the owner. In the
case at bar, petitioners do not claim to be the owners of the land and/or building on
which the machineries were placed. This being the case, the machineries in question,
while in fact bolted to the ground remains movable property susceptible to seizure under
a search warrant.

Uy v. BIR
Search and Seizure Requisites of a Valid Search Warrant
In Sept 1993, Rodrigo Abos, a former employee of UPC reported to the BIR that Uy
Chin Ho aka Frank Uy, manager of UPC, was selling thousands of cartons of canned
cartons without issuing a report. This is a violation of Sec 253 & 263 of the Internal
Revenue Code. In Oct 1993, the BIR requested before RTC Cebu to issue a search
warrant. Judge Gozo-Dadole issued a warrant on the same day. A second warrant was
issued which contains the same substance but has only one page, the same was dated
Oct 1
st
2003. These warrants were issued for the alleged violation by Uy of Sec 253. A
third warrant was issued on the same day for the alleged violation of Uy of Sec 238 in
relation to sec 263. On the strength of these warrants, agents of the BIR, accompanied
by members of the PNP, on 2 Oct 1993, searched the premises of the UPC. They
seized, among other things, the records and documents of UPC. A return of said search
was duly made by Labaria with the RTC of Cebu. UPC filed a motion to quash the
warrants which was denied by the RTC. They appealed before the CA via certiorari. The
CA dismissed the appeal for a certiorari is not the proper remedy.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was a valid search warrant issued.
HELD: The SC ruled in favor of UPC and Uy in a way for it ordered the return of the
seized items but sustained the validity of the warrant. The SC ruled that the search
warrant issued has not met some basic requisites of validity. A search warrant must
conform strictly to the requirements of the foregoing constitutional and statutory
provisions. These requirements, in outline form, are:
(1) the warrant must be issued upon probable cause;
(2) the probable cause must be determined by the judge himself and not by the
applicant or any other person;
(3) in the determination of probable cause, the judge must examine, under oath or
affirmation, the complainant and such witnesses as the latter may produce; and
(4) the warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be searched and persons
or things to be seized.
The SC noted that there has been inconsistencies in the description of the place to be
searched as indicated in the said warrants. Also the thing to be seized was not clearly
defined by the judge. He used generic itineraries. The warrants were also inconsistent
as to who should be searched. One warrant was directed only against Uy and the other
was against Uy and UPC. The SC however noted that the inconsistencies wered cured
by the issuance of the latter warrant as it has revoked the two others.
Section 2, Article III of the Constitution guarantees the right of the people against
unreasonable searches and seizures:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose
shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath
or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.