LABOR ChanRobles

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LABOR LAW: G. LABOR RELATIONS LAW
Prof. Joselito Guianan Chan
LAST-MINUTE
NOTES ON THE 2011 BAR EXAMINATION IN LABOR LAW BASED ON THE
SUPREME COURT-PRESCRIBED SYLLABUS


G. LABOR RELATIONS LAW

[These 8-part Notes discuss all topics/sub-topics in the Supreme Court-prescribed Syllabus for Labor Law]
==================================================================
TOPI CS UNDER THE SYLLABUS

1. Right to Self-organization
a. Who may unionize for purposes of collective bargaining
(1) Who cannot form, join or assist labor organizations
(2) Executive Order No. 180
b. Bargaining unit
(1) Test to determine the constituency of an appropriate bargaining unit
(2) Voluntary Recognition
(a) Requirements
(3) Certification election
(a) In an unorganized establishment
(b) In an organized establishment
(c) Rules prohibiting the filing of petition for certification election
(d) Requirements for validity of certification election
(e) Protests and other questions arising from conduct of certification election
(4) Run-off election
(a) Requirements
(5) Re-run election
(6) Consent election
(7) Affiliation and disaffiliation of the local union from the mother union
(a) Substitutionary doctrine
(8) Union dues and special assessments
(a) Requirements for validity
(9) Agency fees
(a) Requisites for assessment
2. Right to Collective Bargaining
a. Duty to bargain collectively
(1) Kiok Loy ruling
b. Mandatory provisions of CBA
(1) Grievance Procedure
(2) Voluntary Arbitration
(3) No Strike-No Lockout Clause
(4) Labor Management Council
c. ULP in Collective Bargaining
(1) Bargaining in bad faith
(2) Refusal to bargain
(3) Individual bargaining
(4) Blue sky bargaining
(5) Surface bargaining
d. Unfair Labor Practice
(1) ULP of Employers
(2) ULP of Labor Organizations
3. Right to Peaceful Concerted Activities
a. Forms of Concerted Activities
b. Who may declare a strike or lockout?
c. Requisites for a valid strike
d. Requisites for a valid lockout
e. Requisites for lawful picketing
f. Assumption of jurisdiction by the Secretary of Labor
or Certification of the Labor dispute to the NLRC for
compulsory arbitration
g. Nature of Assumption Order or Certification Order
h. Effect of defiance of Assumption or Certification Orders
ChanRobles Internet Bar Review : ChanRobles Professional Review, Inc.
www.chanroblesbar.com : www.chanroblesbar.com.ph
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i. Illegal Strike
(1) Liability of officers of the unions
(2) Liability of ordinary workers
(3) Waiver of illegality of strike
j. Injunctions
(1) Requisites for Labor Injunctions
(2) Innocent Bystander Rule

---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

==============================
TOPIC UNDER THE SYLLABUS:
a. Who may unionize for purposes
of collective bargaining
(1) Who cannot form, join or
assist labor organizations
(2) Executive Order No. 180
==============================
Relevant Provisions: Book V, Labor Code

Executive Order No. 180, Series of 1987 [June 01, 1987]
1.CONSTITUTIONALBASIS.
Underthe1987Constitution,itismandatedthattheStateaffirmslaborasaprimarysocialeconomicforce.It
shallprotecttherightsofworkersandpromotetheirwelfare.
1
Consequently,theStateisrequiredtoguaranteethe
rights of all workers to selforganization, collective bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities,
including the right to strike in accordance with law.
2
Further, the Constitution declares that the right of the people,
includingthoseemployed inthepublicandprivatesectors,toformunions,associations,orsocietiesforpurposesnot
contrarytolaw,shallnotbeabridged.
3
1.CONSTITUTIONALBASIS.
Underthe1987Constitution,itismandatedthattheStateaffirmslaborasaprimarysocialeconomicforce.It
shallprotecttherightsofworkersandpromotetheirwelfare.
4
Consequently,theStateisrequiredtoguaranteethe
rights of all workers to selforganization, collective bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities,
including the right to strike in accordance with law.
5
Further, the Constitution declares that the right of the people,
includingthoseemployed inthepublicandprivatesectors,toformunions,associations,orsocietiesforpurposesnot
contrarytolaw,shallnotbeabridged.
6
1.WHOMAYUNIONIZEFORPURPOSESOFCOLLECTIVEBARGAINING.
a.Personswhomayjoin,formorassistalabororganizationforcollectivebargainingpurposes.
Thefollowingareeligibletojoin,formorassistalabororganization:
1. Allpersonsemployedincommercial,industrialandagriculturalenterprises;
2. Employees of governmentowned or controlled corporations without original charters established under
theCorporationCode;
3. Employeesofreligious,charitable,medicaloreducationalinstitutions,whetheroperatingforprofitornot;
7
b.Employeeswhoareallowedtoorganizealabororganizationonlyformutualaidandprotectionbutnot
forcollectivebargainingpurposes.
Ambulant, intermittent and other workers, the selfemployed, rural workers and those without any definite
employers may form labor organizations for their mutual aid and protection and other legitimate purposes except
collectivebargaining.
8
Thereasonforthisruleisthatthesepersonshavenoemployerstocollectivelybargainwith.
c.Ruleontherightofsupervisorstojoinaunion.
Thereisnoprohibitioninthelaworintheimplementingrulesregardingtherightofsupervisoryemployeesto
organizealabororganizationorworkersassociationoftheirown.Theyare,however,notallowedtobecomemembers
ofalaborunioncomposedofrankandfileemployees.ThisisclearunderArticle245oftheLaborCode.
9
Incasethereis

1
Section 18, Article II [Declarationof Principles andState Policies], 1987 Constitution.
2
Section 3 [Labor], Article XIII [Social Justice and Human Rights], 1987 Constitution.
3
Section 8, Article III [Bill of Rights], 1987 Constitution.
4
Section18, ArticleII [Declarationof PrinciplesandStatePolicies], 1987Constitution.
5
Section3[Labor], ArticleXIII [Social JusticeandHumanRights], 1987Constitution.
6
Section8, ArticleIII [Bill of Rights], 1987Constitution.
7
Article243, Labor Code; Section2, RuleII, BookV, RulestoImplement theLabor Code, asamendedbyDepartment Order No. 40-03, Seriesof 2003, [Feb. 17, 2003] andfurther amendedbyDepartment Order No. 40-C-05, Seriesof 2005[March7, 2005]; SeealsoArticle243,
LaborCode.
8
Article243, LaborCode; FEU-Dr. NicanorReyesMedical Foundation, Inc. v. Trajano, G.R. No. 76273, July31, 1987.
9
Ibid..
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mixedmembershipofsupervisorsandrankandfileemployeesinoneunion,thenewruleenunciatedinArticle245A
10
oftheLaborCode,unlikeintheoldrules,isthatitcannotbeinvokedasagroundforthecancellationoftheregistration
of the union. The employees so improperly included are automatically deemed removed from the list of members of
saidunion.Inotherwords,theirremovalfromthesaidlistisbyoperationoflaw.
d.Ruleontherightofmanagerialemployeestojoinaunion.
Asfarasmanagerialemployeesareconcerned,theyareabsolutelyprohibitedfromforming,joiningorassisting
anylaborunionsforpurposesofcollectivebargaining.ThisisalsoclearunderArticle245oftheLaborCode.
11
e.Ruleontherightofalienemployeestojoinaunion.
AlienemployeeswithvalidworkingpermitsissuedbytheDepartmentofLaborandEmploymentmayexercise
their right to selforganization and join or assist labor unions forpurposesofcollectivebargainingbut only ifthey are
nationals of a country which grants the same or similar rights to Filipino workers, as certified by the Department of
ForeignAffairs,orwhichhasratifiedeitherILOConventionNo.87
12
orILOConventionNo.98.
13
f.Ruleontherightofworkingchildrentoselforganization.
Workingchildrenhavethesamefreedomasadultstojointhecollectivebargainingunionoftheirownchoosing
inaccordancewithexistinglaw.UnderPresidentialDecreeNo.603,itisclearlyprovidedthatneithermanagementnor
anycollectivebargainingunionshallthreatenorcoerceworkingchildrentojoin,continueorwithdrawasmembersof
suchunion.
14
g.Ruleontherightofhomeworkerstoselforganization.
Homeworkers have the right to form, join or assist organizations of their own choosing in accordance with
law.
15
Theregistrationofhomeworkersorganizationsorassociationsfollowingtherequirementsprescribedbylaw,will
vestlegalpersonalitythereto.
16
h.Ruleontherightofemployeesofcontractorstoselforganization.
Acontractualemployeeofalegitimateindependentcontractorisentitledtoalltherightsandprivilegesduea
regular employee as provided in the Labor Code including the right to selforganization, collective bargaining and
peacefulconcertedaction.
17
i.Ruleontherightofmembersoremployeesofcooperativestoselforganization.
Members of a cooperative have no right to form or join labor organizations for purposes of collective
bargaining for being themselves coowners of the cooperative. This prohibition covers employees of the cooperative
whoareatthesametimemembersthereof.
18
However,insofarasthecooperativesemployeeswhoarenotmembersorcoownersthereofareconcerned,
theyareentitledtoexercisetheirrighttoselforganizationandcollectivebargainingasguaranteedintheConstitution
andexistinglaws.Itisthefactofownershipofthecooperativeandnotinvolvementinthemanagementthereofwhich
disqualifies a member from joining any labor organization within the cooperative. Thus, irrespective of the degree of
theirparticipationintheactualmanagementofthecooperative,allmembersthereofcannotform,assistorjoinalabor
organizationforthepurposeofcollectivebargaining.
19
Butemployeemembersofacooperativemaywithdrawasmembersofthecooperativeforpurposesofjoining
alaborunion.
20
3.WHOCANNOTFORM,JOINORASSISTLABORORGANIZATIONS.

a.Personsnotallowedtoform,joinorassistlabororganizations.
1. Managerialemployees;and
2. Confidentialemployees.
b.Typesofmanagerialemployeesforpurposesofexercisingrighttoselforganization.
Thereare3typesofmanagerialemployees:
1.TopManagement
2.MiddleManagement
3.FirstLineManagement(alsocalledsupervisorylevel)
21
TopManagement.Thisiscomposedofacomparativelysmallgroupofexecutives.Itisresponsibleforthe
overallmanagementoftheorganization.Itestablishesoperatingpoliciesandguidestheorganizationsinteractionswith

10
AnewprovisioninsertedintotheLaborCodebySection9of RepublicAct No. 9481(effectiveonJune14, 2007).
11
Ibid..
12
Under Article2of ILOConventionNo. 87[Freedomof AssociationandProtectionof theRight toOrganize] of whichthePhilippinesisasignatory, workersandemployers, without distinctionwhatsoever, shall havetheright toestablishandsubject onlytotherulesof theorganization
concerned, joborganizationsof theirownchoosingwithout previousauthorization.
13
Article2of ILOConventionNo. 98whichdwellsontheRight toOrganizeandCollectiveBargaining.
14
Article111, Chapter3, TitleVI, P.D. No. 603, otherwiseknownasTheChildandYouthWelfareCode,asamendedbyPresidential DecreeNo. 1179whichtookeffect onAug. 15, 1977.
15
Section3, Department OrderNo. 5,Feb. 04, 1992.
16
Section4, Ibid..
17
Department OrderNo. 18-02, Seriesof 2002, [Feb. 21, 2002].
18
CooperativeRural Bankof DavaoCity, Inc. v. Ferrer-Calleja, G.R. No. 77951, Sept. 26, 1988; SanJoseElectricServiceCooperative, Inc. v. Ministryof Labor, G.R. No. 77231, May31, 1989.
19
Benguet ElectricCooperative, Inc. v. Ferrer-Calleja, G.R. No. 79025, Dec. 29, 1989.
20
Central NegrosElectricCorporationv. Secretaryof Labor, G.R. No. 94045, Sept. 13, 1991.
21
PaperIndustriesCorporationof thePhilippinesv. Laguesma, [G.R. No. 101738, April 12, 2000]; UnitedPepsi-ColaSupervisoryUnion[UPSU] v. Laguesma, [G.R. No. 122226, March25, 1998, 288SCRA15, 21-23].
Reciprocity Rule
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its environment. Typical titles of top managers are chief executive officer, president, or senior vicepresident.
Actual titles vary from one organization to another and are not always a reliable guide to membership in the highest
managementclassification.
Middle Management. This refers to more than one level in an organization. Middle managers direct the
activities of other managers and sometimes also those of operating employees. The middle managers principal
responsibilities are to direct the activities that implement their organizations policies and to balance the demands of
theirsuperiorswiththecapacitiesoftheirsubordinates.Aplantmanagerinanelectronicfirmisanexampleofamiddle
manager.
FirstLineManagement.Thisisthelowestlevelinanorganizationatwhichindividualsareresponsibleforthe
workofothers.Firstlinemanagersdirectoperatingemployeesonly;theydonotsuperviseothermanagers.Examples
offirstlinemanagersaretheforemanorproductionsupervisorinamanufacturingplant,thetechnicalsupervisorina
researchdepartment,andtheclericalsupervisorinalargeoffice.Firstlevelmanagersareoftencalledsupervisors.
Basedontheaboveclassification,managerialemployeesmayfallintotwo(2)distinctcategories:namely:
1.Themanagerspersecomposedoftopandmiddlemanagers;and
2.Thesupervisorscomposedoffirstlinemanagers.
Only the second above is allowed to form, join or assist a labor organization for purposes of collective
bargaining.
c.Confidentialemployeerule.
Withinthecontextoflaborrelations,confidentialemployeesarethosewhomeetthefollowingcriteria:
(1) Theyassistoractinaconfidentialcapacity;
(2) Topersonsorofficerswhoformulate,determine,andeffectuatemanagementpoliciesspecificallyinthe
fieldoflaborrelations.
The two (2) criteria are cumulative and both must be met if an employee is to be considered a confidential
employee.
22
Aconfidentialemployeemaybearankandfileorsupervisoryemployeebutbecauseinthenormalcourseof
hisduties,hebecomesawareofmanagementpoliciesrelatingtolaborrelations,heisnotallowedtoassist,formorjoin
arankandfileunionorsupervisoryunion,asthecasemaybe.Hisexclusionfromthebargainingunitisjustifiedunder
the confidential employee rule. To allow him to join a union would give rise to a potential conflict of interest.
Managementshouldnotberequiredtohandlelaborrelationsmattersthroughemployeeswhoarerepresentedbythe
union with which the company is required to deal and who, in the normal performance of their duties, may obtain
advance information on the companys position with regard to collective bargaining negotiations, the disposition of
grievances,orotherlaborrelationsmatters.
23
However,itmustbestressedthatthemereaccessofanemployeetoconfidentiallaborrelationsinformation
whichismerelyincidentaltohisdutiesand,therefore,knowledgethereofisnotnecessaryintheperformanceofsaid
duties,doesnotmakesuchemployeeaconfidentialemployee.Ifaccesstoconfidentiallaborrelationsinformationisto
beafactorinthedeterminationofanemployees confidentialstatus,suchinformationmustrelatetotheemployers
laborrelationspolicies.Therefore,accesstoinformationwhichisregardedbytheemployertobeconfidentialfromthe
businessstandpoint,suchasfinancialinformationortechnicaltradesecrets,willnotrenderanemployeeaconfidential
employee. An employee may not be excluded from an appropriate bargaining unit merely because he has access to
confidentialinformationconcerningtheemployersinternalbusinessoperationswhichisnotrelatedtothefieldoflabor
relations.
24
Thus,evenabankcashierwhoalsoservesasthesecretaryoftheboardofdirectorsmaynotbeclassifiedasa
confidentialemployeedisqualifiedtojoinaunion.True,theboardofdirectorsisresponsibleforcorporatepolicies,the
exerciseofcorporatepowersandthegeneralmanagementofthebusinessandaffairsofthecorporation.Assecretaryof
thebanksgoverningbody,theemployeeservesthebanksmanagement,butcouldnotbedeemedtohaveaccessto
confidential information specifically relating to the banks labor relations policies, absent a clear showing on this
matter.
25
Thedoctrineofnecessaryimplicationisthelegalbasisfortheineligibilityofaconfidentialemployeetojoina
union. The disqualification of managerial and confidential employees from joining a bargaining unit of rankandfile
employeesorsupervisoryemployeesisalreadywellentrenchedinjurisprudence.WhileArticle245oftheLaborCode
limitstheineligibilitytojoin,assistorformalabororganizationtomanagerialemployees,jurisprudencehasextended
thisprohibitiontoconfidentialemployeesorthosewho,byreasonoftheirpositionsornatureofwork,arerequiredto
assist or act in a fiduciary manner to managerial employees and, therefore, are likewise privy to sensitive and highly
confidentialrecords.
26
Article 245 of the Labor Code does not directly prohibit confidential employees from engaging in union
activities.Theirdisqualificationproceedsmerelyfromtheapplicationofthedoctrineofnecessaryimplicationbecause

22
TunaynaPagkakaisangManggagawasaAsiaBreweryv. AsiaBrewery, Inc., G.R. No. 162025, Aug. 3, 2010; SugbuanonRural Bank, Inc. v. Laguesma, G.R. No. 116194, Feb. 2, 2000.
23
SanMiguel Corp. SupervisorsandExempt EmployeesUnionv. Laguesma, G.R. No. 110399, Aug. 15, 1997, 277SCRA370, 374-375.
24
SeeSanMiguel CorporationSupervisorsandExempt EmployeesUnionv. Laguesma, supra; National Associationof TradeUnions-RepublicPlantersBankSupervisorsChapterv. Torres, G.R. No. 93468, Dec. 29, 1994, 239SCRA546, 560.
25
SugbuanonRural Bank, Inc. v. Laguesma, G.R. No. 116194, Feb. 2, 2000.
26
StandardCharteredBankEmployeesUnion[SCBEU-NUBE] v. StandardCharteredBank, G.R. No. 161933, April 22, 2008; MetrolabIndustries, Inc. v. Roldan-Confesor, G.R. No. 108855, Feb. 28, 1996, 254SCRA182; 324Phil. 416.
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what Article 245 singles out as ineligible to join, assist or form any labor organization are managerial employees. By
necessary implication, confidential employees are similarly disqualified. This doctrine states that what is implied in a
statuteisasmuchapartthereofasthatwhichisexpressed.
27
Simplystated,inthecollectivebargainingprocess,managerialemployeesaresupposedtobeonthesideofthe
employertoactasitsrepresentativesandtoseetoitthatitsinterestsarewellprotected.Theemployerisnotassured
ofsuchprotectionifmanagerialemployeesthemselvesareunionmembers.Collectivebargaininginsuchasituationcan
becomeonesided.Itisthesamereasonwhythepositionsofconfidentialemployeesareincludedinthedisqualification
foundinArticle245asifsuchdisqualificationwaswrittenintheprovision.Ifconfidentialemployeescouldunionizein
order to bargain for advantages for themselves, then they could be governed by their own motives rather than the
interest of the employer. Moreover, unionization of confidential employees for the purpose of collective bargaining
would mean the extension of the law to persons or individuals who are supposed to act in the interest of the
employers.Itisnotfarfetchedthatinthecourseofthecollectivebargainingnegotiations,theymightjeopardizethat
interestwhichtheyaredutyboundtoprotect.
d.Caseswhereconfidentialemployeeswerenotallowedtojoinunions.
Basedonjurisprudence,thefollowingareconsideredconfidentialemployeesundertheconfidentialemployee
rule:
1. Accountingpersonnelandradioandtelegraphoperators;
28
2. Division secretaries, all Staff of General Management, Personnel and Industrial Relations Department,
SecretariesofAudit,EDPandFinancialSystems;
29
3. Legal secretaries who are tasked with, among others, the typing of legal documents, memoranda and
correspondence,thekeepingofrecordsandfiles,thegivingofandreceivingnotices,andsuchotherduties
asrequiredbythelegalpersonnelofthecorporation,fallunderthecategoryofconfidentialemployeesand,
hence,excludedfromthebargainingunitcomposedofrankandfileemployees.
30
4. Executive secretaries of the General Manager and the executive secretaries of the Quality Assurance
Manager, Product Development Manager, Finance Director, Management System Manager, Human
Resources Manager, Marketing Director, Engineering Manager, Materials Manager and Production
Managerwerealsoconsideredconfidentialemployeessincetheyhaveaccesstovitallaborinformation.
31
e.Caseswhereconfidentialemployeeswereallowedtojoinunions.
Confidential employees are not completely prohibited from joining unions. This is the correct view since
confidentialemployeesareallowedtojoinunionsinsomecases.
Forinstance,inSouthernPhilippinesFederationofLaborv.FerrerCalleja,[G.R.No.80882,April24,1989,172
SCRA 676], the inclusion of the confidential rankandfile employees inthe bargainingunitof rankandfileemployees
was upheld by the Supreme Court. Much earlier, the High Court proclaimed in Filoil Refinery Corporation v. Filoil
SupervisoryandConfidentialEmployeesAssociation,[G.R.No.L26736,August18,1972],thatconfidentialrankand
fileemployeesmayjointheunionofsupervisors,especiallyinasituationwheretheconfidentialemployeesareveryfew
in number and are, by practice and tradition, identified with the supervisors in their role as representatives of
managementvisvistherankandfileemployees.Suchidentityofinteresthasallowedtheirinclusioninthebargaining
unit of supervisors for purposes of collective bargaining. They remain employees in relation to the company as their
employer. This identity of interest logically calls for their inclusion in the same bargaining unit and at the same time
fulfills the laws objective of insuring to them the full benefit of their right to selforganization and to collective
bargainingwhichcouldhardlybeaccomplishediftherespondentassociationsmembershipweretobebrokenupinto
fiveseparateineffectivetinyunits.
Jurisprudence,therefore,hasestablishedthatthereisnolegalprohibitionagainstconfidentialemployeeswho
arenotperformingmanagerialfunctionstoformandjoinaunion.
32
f.Someprinciplesontherighttoselforganization.
1. Anyemployee,whetheremployedforadefiniteperiodornot,shall,beginningonthefirstdayofhisservice,
beeligibleformembershipinanylabororganization.
33
2. RighttojoinaunioncannotbemadesubjectofaCBAstipulation.
34
3. The separation of unions doctrine

35
has already been rendered nugatory by the latest amendment of
Article245oftheLaborCodeintroducedbyR.A.No.9481
36
byaddingthephrase:Therankandfileunion
and the supervisors union operating within the same establishment may join the same federation or
national union. This doctrine prohibits the situation where the supervisory union and the rankandfile
union operating within the same establishment are both affiliated with one and the same federation
becauseofthepossibleconflictofinterestwhichmayariseintheareas,interalia,ofdiscipline,collective
bargainingandstrike.

27
Chuav. Civil ServiceCommission, [G.R. No. 88979, February7, 1992, 206SCRA65].
28
GoldenFarms, Inc. v. Ferrer-Calleja, [G.R. No. 78755, July19, 1989, 175SCRA471].
29
PhilipsIndustrial Development, Inc. v. NLRC, [G.R. No. 88957, June25, 1992, 210SCRA339].
30
Pier8Arrastre&StevedoringServices, Inc. v. Roldan-Confesor, [G.R. No. 110854, February13, 1995, 241SCRA294].
31
MetrolabIndustries, Inc. v. Roldan-Confesor, [G.R. No. 108855, February28, 1996, 254SCRA182; 324Phil. 416].
32
SanMiguel CorporationSupervisorsandExempt EmployeesUnionv. Laguesma, G.R. No. 110399, Aug. 15, 1997, 277SCRA370; National Associationof TradeUnions-RepublicPlantersBankSupervisorsChapterv. Torres, G.R. No. 93468, Dec. 29, 1994, 239SCRA546, 560.
33
Article277[c], LaborCode; No. 10, BasicAmendmentsunderR. A. 6715, preparedbyMembersof theSenate-HouseConferenceCommitteeof Congress.
34
SouthernPhilippinesFederationof Labor(SPFL) v. Calleja, G.R. No. 80882, April 24, 1989, 172SCRA676.
35
EnunciatedinAtlasLithographicServices, Inc. v. Laguesma, [G.R. No. 96566, January6, 1992]; Coastal SubicBayTerminal, Inc. v. Department of LaborandEmployment-Officeof theSecretary, [G.R. No. 157117, November20, 2006] andinotherrelatedcases.
36
Section8of RepublicAct No. 9481[effectiveJune14, 2007].
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4.EXECUTIVEORDERNO.180,SERIESOF1987[JUNE01,1987]ENUNCIATINGTHERIGHTTOSELFORGANIZATIONOF
GOVERNMENTEMPLOYEES.
a.2kindsofemployeesinthegovernmentsectorforpurposesofexerciseofrighttoselforganization.
1. Employees of government corporations established under the Corporation Code and, therefore, without
original charters. They are covered by the Labor Code. They have the right to join, assist or form labor
organizationsoftheirownchoosingandtobargaincollectivelywiththeirrespectiveemployersinthesame
mannerasemployeesintheprivatesectordo.
37
2. Employees in the government, including any political subdivision or instrumentality thereof and
governmentowned and/or controlled corporations with original charters. This explains why the Civil
Service Law, rules and regulations, and not the Labor Code, govern theiremployment. Their right to self
organizeisgovernedbyExecutiveOrderNo.180,Seriesof1987[June01,1987]issuedbyPres.CorazonC.
Aquino.
38
b.Whomayjoingovernmentemployeesorganizationsforpurposesofcollectivebargaining?
All rankandfile employees of all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of government,
includinggovernmentownedand/orcontrolledcorporationswithoriginalcharters,canform,joinorassistemployees
organizationsoftheirownchoosingforthefurtheranceandprotectionoftheirinterests.
39
c.Whoarenoteligibletojoingovernmentemployeesorganizationsforpurposesofcollectivebargaining?
Thefollowingarenoteligibletoformemployeesorganizations:
1. Highlevelemployeeswhosefunctionsarenormallyconsideredaspolicymakingormanagerialorwhose
duties are of a highly confidential nature are not eligible to join the organization of rankandfile
governmentemployees;
40
2. MembersoftheArmedForcesofthePhilippines;
3. Policeofficers;
4. Policemen;
5. Firemen;and
6. Jailguards.
41
d.Righttocollectivelybargainwiththeemployer.
Only workers in private corporations and governmentowned and/or controlled corporations, incorporated
under the general corporation law (Corporation Code), have the right to bargain collectively. Those in government
corporationswithoriginalcharterswhicharesubjecttoCivilServiceLaws,havenorighttobargaincollectively,except
wherethetermsandconditionsofemploymentarenotfixedbylaw.Theirrightsanddutiesarenotcomparablewith
thoseintheprivatesector.
42
e.Termsandconditionssubjecttonegotiation.
Thetermsandconditionsofemploymentorimprovementsthereof,exceptthosethatarefixedbylaw,maybe
the subject of negotiations between duly recognized employees organizations and appropriate government
authorities.
43
Thefollowingconcerns,amongothers,maybethesubjectofnegotiationbetweentheemployerandthe
accreditedemployeesorganization:
a.Scheduleofvacationandotherleaves;
b.Workassignmentofpregnantwomen;
c. Personnelgrowthanddevelopment;
d.Communicationsystemlateralandvertical;
e.Provisionforprotectionandsafety;
f.Provisionforfacilitiesforhandicappedpersonnel;
g.Provisionforfirstaidmedicalservicesandsupplies;
h.Physicalfitnessprogram;
i.Provisionforfamilyplanningservicesformarriedwomen;
j.Annualmedical/physicalexamination;
k.Recreational,social,athleticandculturalactivitiesandfacilities.
44
f.Mattersnotsubjecttonegotiation.
Mattersnotsubjecttonegotiationmaybeclassifiedasfollows:
a.Thosethatrequireappropriationoffunds;and
b.Thosethatinvolvetheexerciseofmanagementprerogatives.
Thosethatrequireappropriationoffunds,suchasthefollowing,arenotnegotiable:

37
Article244, LaborCode.
38
SeeSection13, ExecutiveOrderNo. 180, June01, 1987; Sections1, 2, 3and4, RuleIII andSection1, RuleVIII, RulesandRegulationstoGoverntheExerciseof theRight of Government EmployeestoSelf-Organization.
39
Sections1and2, ExecutiveOrderNo. 180, June01, 1987; Sections1and2, RuleII, RulesandRegulationstoGoverntheExerciseof theRight of Government EmployeestoSelf-Organization.
40
Section3, ExecutiveOrderNo. 180, June01, 1987; Section2, RuleII, Ibid..
41
Section4, ExecutiveOrderNo. 180; Section1, RuleII, Ibid.; SeealsoChapter6, BookV, AdministrativeCodeof 1987[ExecutiveOrder No. 292].
42
HomeDevelopment Mutual Fundv. CommissiononAudit, G.R. No. 142297, June15, 2004citingAssociationof DedicatedEmployeesof thePhilippineTourismAuthority[ADEPT] v. CommissiononAudit, G.R. No. 119597, Sept. 11, 1998, 295SCRA366.
43
Section13, ExecutiveOrderNo. 180, June01, 1987; Section1, RuleVIII, Ibid..
44
Section2, RuleVIII, RulesandRegulationstoGoverntheExerciseof theRight of Government EmployeestoSelf-Organization.
HAPPFJ
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a.Increaseinsalaryemolumentsandotherallowancesnotpresentlyprovidedbylaw;
b.Facilitiesrequiringcapitaloutlays;
c. Carplan;
d.Providentfund;
e.Specialhospitalization,medicalanddentalservices;
f.Rice/sugar/othersubsidies;
g.Travelexpenses;
h.Increaseinretirementbenefits.
45
Thosethatinvolvetheexerciseofmanagementprerogatives,suchasthefollowing,arelikewisenotsubjectto
negotiation:
a. Appointment;
b. Promotion;
c. Assignment/detail;
d. Reclassification/upgradingofpositions;
e. Revisionofthecompensationstructure;
f. Penaltiesimposedasaresultofdisciplinaryactions;
g. Selectionofpersonneltoattendseminars,trainingsorstudygrants;
h. Distributionofworkload;
i. Externalcommunicationlinkages.
46
The parties may submit proposals to the proper authorities to improve the terms and conditions of their
employment.
47
g.Someprinciplesongovernmentemployeesrighttoselforganization.
1. Thelabororganizationinthegovernmentsectoristechnicallycalledanemployeesorganization.
48
2. RegistrationofemployeesorganizationsismadewithbothCivilServiceCommission(CSC)andtheBureau
of Labor Relations (BLR) of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE). Once registered, it is
technically called a registered employees organization.
49
In the private sector, this is theoretically
known as a legitimate labor organization. Cancellation of registration of an employees organization is
likewisemadebyboththeCSCandtheBLR.
3. Thesoleandexclusivebargainingunioniscalledanaccreditedemployeesorganization.
50
Intheprivate
sector,thisisinprincipleknownasarecognizedorcertifiedcollectivebargainingagent.
4. The unit where the government employees organization seeks to operate and represent is called
organizationalunit.Itistheemployersunitconsistingofrankandfileemployeesunlesscircumstances
otherwiserequire.
51
Intheprivatesector,thisistechnicallyknownasbargainingunit.
5. Rights and privileges of a registered employees organization. Upon the issuance of the certificate of
registration,theemployeesorganizationshallhavethefollowingrightsandprivileges:
a. Tobecertified,subjecttotheconditionsprescribedintheRulesandRegulationstoGoverntheExercise
oftheRightofGovernmentEmployeestoSelfOrganization,asthesolerepresentativeoftherankand
fileemployeeswiththerighttonegotiateforthem.
b. Toundertakeallotheractivitiesnotcontrarytolaworpublicpolicyforthefurtheranceandprotectionof
theinterestsofitsmembers.
52
6. Selectionofthesoleandexclusiverepresentative.Thedulyregisteredemployeesorganizationhavingthe
supportofthemajorityoftheemployeesintheappropriateorganizationalunitshouldbedesignatedasthe
sole and exclusive representative of the employees.
53
It is designated as such through modes similar to
privatesectorsselectionofsoleandexclusivebargainingagentthroughanyofthefollowing3modes:
a. Voluntaryrecognitionuponashowingthatnootheremployeesorganizationisregisteredorisseeking
registrationintheorganizationalunit,basedontherecordsoftheBLR,andthatthesaidorganization
hasthemajoritysupportoftherankandfileemployeesintheorganizationalunit.
54
b. Certificationelection.
55
c. Runoffelectionincaseswherethereareatleastthree(3)contendingorganizationsandnonereceived
a majority of the valid votes cast. Only the two (2) registered employees organizations receiving the
largestandsecondlargestnumberofvotesinthefirstvotingshallbevotedon.
56
7. Therighttostrikeisabsolutelyprohibitedinthegovernmentsector.
57

45
Section3, RuleVIII, Ibid..
46
47
48
Section1[h], RuleI, Ibid..
49
Section1[i], RuleI, Ibid..
50
Section1[j], RuleI, Ibid..
51
Section9, ExecutiveOrderNo. 180.
52
Sections4and5, RuleIV, Ibid..
53
Section10, ExecutiveOrderNo. 180.
54
Section11, Ibid..
55
Section12, Ibid...
56
Section17, RuleVI, Ibid..
57
CSCMemorandumCircular No. 6, s. 1987, [April 21, 1987] promulgatedbytheCivil ServiceCommissioncategoricallyprohibitsall government officialsandemployeesfromstagingstrikes, demonstrations, massleaves, walk-outsandother formsof massactionwhichwill result inthe
temporarystoppageor disruptionof publicservices. Allowingthemtostrikeorconduct thesaidprohibitedactsistoundermineor prejudicethegovernment system. ExecutiveOrderNo. 180, [June1, 1987], whichprovidestheguidelinesontheexerciseof theright of government workers
toorganize, implicitlyendorsedsaidCSCMemorandumCircularNo. 6, s. 1987, datedApril 21, 1987[supra] bystatingthat theCivil ServiceLawandrulesgoverningconcertedactivitiesandstrikesinthegovernment serviceshall beobserved. (Jacintov. Hon. CA, G.R. No. 124540. Nov.
14, 1997).
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8
===================================
b. Bargaining unit
(1) Test to determine the constituency
of an appropriate bargaining unit
===================================
1.BARGAININGUNIT.
a.Bargainingunit,meaning.
A bargaining unit refers to a group of employees sharing mutual interests within a given employer unit,
comprised of all or less than all of the entire body of employees in the employer unit or any specific occupational or
geographicalgroupingwithinsuchemployerunit.
58
Itmayalsorefertothegrouporclusterofjobsorpositionswithin
theemployersestablishmentthatsupportsthelabororganizationwhichisapplyingforregistration.
Itisalegalcollectivityforcollectivebargainingpurposeswhosemembershavesubstantiallymutualbargaining
interestsinthetermsandconditionsofemploymentaswillensuretoallemployeestheircollectivebargainingrights.To
beappropriate,abargainingunitmustinvolveagroupingofemployeeswhohavesubstantial,mutualinterestsinwages,
hoursofwork,workingconditionsandothersubjectsofcollectivebargaining.
59
Thereisnohardandfastruleindetermininganappropriatebargainingunit.Thetestwhetherthedesignation
of a bargaining unit is appropriate is whether it will best assure to all employees the exercise of their collective
bargaining rights. There should be a community of interest which should be reflected in groups having substantial
similarityofworkanddutiesorsimilarityofcompensationandworkingconditions,amongothercriteria.
60
b.Testsindetermininganappropriatebargainingunit.
Based on jurisprudence,
61
there are certain principles which may be used in determining the appropriate
collectivebargainingunit,towit:
(1) Substantialmutualinterestdoctrine;
(2) Globedoctrine;
(3) Collectivebargaininghistorydoctrine;and
(4) Employmentstatusdoctrine.
2.SUBSTANTIALMUTUALINTERESTPRINCIPLE.
Under this principle, the employees sought to be represented by the collective bargaining agent must have
substantial mutual interest in terms of employment and working conditions as evinced by the type of work they
perform.Itischaracterizedbysimilarityofemploymentstatus,samedutiesandresponsibilitiesandsubstantiallysimilar
compensationandworkingconditions.
62
SanMiguelCorporationv.Laguesma,[G.R.No.100485,September21,1994].
TheSupremeCourtappliedthisprincipleinapetitionoftheunionwhichseekstorepresentthesalespersonnel
in the various Magnolia sales offices in Northern Luzon. Petitioner took the position that each sales office should
constitute one bargaining unit. In disagreeing with this proposition of petitioner, the High Court said: What greatly
militatesagainstthisposition(ofthecompany)isthemeagernumberofsalespersonnelineachoftheMagnoliasales
officeinNorthernLuzon.EventhebargainingunitsoughttoberepresentedbyrespondentunionintheentireNorthern
Luzonsalesareaconsistsonlyofapproximatelyfiftyfive(55)employees.Surely,itwouldnotbeforthebestinterestof
theseemployeesiftheywouldfurtherbefractionalized.Theadagethereisstrengthinnumberistheveryrationale
underlyingtheformationofalaborunion.
SanMiguelCorporationSupervisorsandExemptEmployeesUnionv.Laguesma,[G.R.No.110399,August15,
1997,277SCRA370,380381].
The fact that the three (3) plants comprising the bargaining unit are located in three (3) different places,
namely, in Cabuyao, Laguna, in Otis, Pandacan, Metro Manila, and in San Fernando, Pampanga, was declared
immaterial.Geographicallocationcanbecompletelydisregardedifthecommunalormutualinterestoftheemployees
arenotsacrificed.
UniversityofthePhilippinesv.FerrerCalleja,[G.R.No.96189,July14,1992,211SCRA451].
All nonacademic rankandfile employees of the University of the Philippines in Diliman, Quezon City, Padre
Faura,Manila,LosBanos,LagunaandtheVisayaswereallowedtoparticipateinacertificationelectionasonebargaining
unit. The distance among the three (3) plants is not productive of insurmountable difficulties in the administration of

58
Section1, RuleI, BookV, RulestoImplement theLaborCode, asamendedbyDepartment OrderNo. 40-03, Seriesof 2003, [Feb. 17, 2003].
59
DunlopSlazenger[Phils.], Inc. v. Secretaryof LaborandEmployment, G.R. No. 131248, Dec. 11, 1998, 300SCRA120, 125-126.
60
DemocraticLaborAssociationv. CebuStevedoringCo., Inc., G.R. No. 10321, Feb. 28, 1958.
61
International School Allianceof Educators[ISAE] v. Quisumbing, [G.R. No. 128845, June1, 2000].
62
SanMiguel CorporationEmployeesUnion-PTGWOv. Confesor, G.R. No. 111262, Sept. 19, 1996, 262SCRA81, 98.
SGCE
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union affairs. Neither are there regional differences that are likely to impede the operations of a single bargaining
representative.
St. James School of Quezon City v. Samahang Manggagawa sa St. James School of Quezon City, [G.R. No.
151326,November23,2005].
Respondentunionsoughttorepresenttherankandfileemployees(consistingofthemotorpool,construction
andtransportationemployees)ofpetitionerschoolsTandangSoracampus.Petitionerschoolopposeditbycontending
thatthebargainingunitshouldnotonlybecomposedofsaidemployeesbutmustincludeadministrative,teachingand
office personnel in its five (5) campuses.The Supreme Court disagreed with said contention. The motor pool,
construction and transportation employees of the Tandang Sora campus had 149 qualified voters at the time of the
certificationelection,hence,itwasruledthatthe149qualifiedvotersshouldbeusedtodeterminetheexistenceofa
quorum during the election. Since a majority or 84 out of the 149 qualified voters cast their votes, a quorum existed
during the certification election. The computation of the quorum should be based on the rankandfile motor pool,
constructionandtransportationemployeesoftheTandangSoracampusandnotonalltheemployeesinpetitionersfive
(5)campuses.Moreover,theadministrative,teachingandofficepersonnelarenotmembersoftheunion.Theydonot
belongtothebargainingunitthattheunionseekstorepresent.
3.GLOBEDOCTRINE.
Thisprincipleisbasedonthewilloftheemployees.ItiscalledGlobedoctrinebecausethisprinciplewasfirst
enunciatedintheUnitedStatescaseofGlobeMachineandStampingCo.,[3NLRB294(1937)]whereitwasruled,in
defining the appropriate bargaining unit, that in a case where the companys production workers can be considered
eitherasasinglebargainingunitappropriateforpurposesofcollectivebargainingorasthree(3)separateanddistinct
bargainingunits,thedeterminingfactoristhedesireoftheworkersthemselves.Consequently,acertificationelection
shouldbeheldseparatelytochoosewhichrepresentativeunionwillbechosenbytheworkers.
63
InternationalSchoolAllianceofEducators[ISAE]v.Quisumbing,[G.R.No.128845,June1,2000].
The Supreme Court ruled that foreignhired teachers do not belong to the bargaining unit of the localhires
becausetheformerhavenotindicatedtheirintentiontobegroupedwiththelatterforpurposesofcollectivebargaining.
Moreover,thecollectivebargaininghistoryoftheschoolalsoshowsthatthesegroupswerealwaystreatedseparately.
4.COLLECTIVEBARGAININGHISTORYDOCTRINE.
This principle puts premium to the prior collective bargaining history and affinity of the employees in
determining the appropriate bargaining unit. However, the existence of a prior collective bargaining history has been
heldasneitherdecisivenorconclusiveinthedeterminationofwhatconstitutesanappropriatebargainingunit.
64
National Association of Free Trade Unions v. Mainit Lumber Development Company Workers Union, [G.R.
No.79526,December21,1990].
It was ruled here that there is mutuality of interest among the workers in the sawmill division and logging
divisionastojustifytheirformationofasinglebargainingunit.Thisholdstruedespitethehistoryofsaidtwodivisions
beingtreatedasseparateunitsandnotwithstandingtheirgeographicaldistancefromeachother.
SanMiguelCorporationv.Laguesma,[G.R.No.100485,September21,1994].
Despitethecollectivebargaininghistoryofhavingaseparatebargainingunitforeachsalesoffice,theSupreme
Court applied the principle of mutuality or commonality of interests in holding that the appropriate bargaining unit is
comprisedofallthesalesforceinthewholeofNorthernLuzon.
5.EMPLOYMENTSTATUSDOCTRINE.
The determination of the appropriate bargaining unit based on the employment status of the employees is
consideredanacceptablemode.
65
Forinstance,casualemployeesandthoseemployedonadaytodaybasis,according
totheSupremeCourtinPhilippineLandAirSeaLaborUnionv.CIR,[G.R.No.L14656,November29,1960],donothave
themutualityorcommunityofinterestwithregularandpermanentemployees.Hence,theirinclusioninthebargaining
unitcomposedofthelatterisnotjustified.Confidentialemployees,bytheverynatureoftheirfunctions,assistandactin
aconfidentialcapacityto,orhaveaccesstoconfidentialmattersof,personswhoexercisemanagerialfunctionsinthe
fieldof labor relations.As such, the rationale behindthe ineligibility of managerial employeestoform, assistorjoina
labor union equally applies to them. Hence, they cannot be allowed to be included in the rankandfile employees
bargainingunit.
66
Therationaleforthisinhibitionisthatifthesemanagerialemployeeswouldbelongtoorbeaffiliated
withaunion,thelattermightnotbeassuredoftheirloyaltytotheunioninviewofevidentconflictofinterest.Theunion
canalsobecomecompanydominatedwiththepresenceofmanagerialemployeesinitsmembership.
67

63
SeealsoMechanical Department LaborUnionsaPhilippineNational Railwaysv. CIR, G. R. No. L-28223, Aug. 30, 1968.
64
SanMiguel Corporationv. Laguesma, infra; National Associationof FreeTradeUnionsv. Mainit LumberDevelopment CompanyWorkersUnion, infra.
65
RothenbergonLaborRelations, pp. 482-510.
66
PhilipsIndustrial Development, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 88957, June25, 1992; GoldenFarms, Inc. v. Ferrer-Calleja, G.R. No. 78755, July19, 1989, 175SCRA471.
67
BulletinPublishingCo., v. Sanchez, G.R. No. 74425, Oct. 7, 1986, 144SCRA628.
desire or intention of the workers to be grouped
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BelycaCorporationv.FerrerCalleja,[G.R.No.77395,November29,1988].
Thisinvolvesacorporationengagedinpiggeryandpoultryraising,plantingofagriculturalcropsandoperation
ofsupermartsandcinemas,theSupremeCourtruledthatitisbeyondquestionthattheemployeesofthelivestockagro
divisionofthecorporationperformworkentirelydifferentfromthosebeingperformedbyemployeesinthesupermarts
and cinemas. The differences among them lie in their working conditions, hours of work, rates of pay, including the
categoriesoftheirpositionsandemploymentstatus.Asstatedbypetitionerinitspositionpaper,duetothenatureof
the business in which its livestockagro division is engaged, very few of its employees therein are permanent, the
overwhelmingmajorityofwhomareseasonalandcasualandnotregularemployees.Definitely,theyhaveverylittlein
common with the employees of the supermarts and cinemas. To lump all its employees in its integrated business
concernscannotresultinanefficaciousbargainingunitcomprisedofconstituentsenjoyingacommunityormutualityof
interest. Undeniably, the rankandfile employees of the livestockagro division fully constitute a bargaining unit that
satisfies both requirements of classification according to employment status and of substantial similarity of work and
dutieswhichwillultimatelyassureitsmemberstheexerciseoftheircollectivebargainingrights.
68
==========================================
b. Bargaining agent
(1) Voluntary Recognition
(a) Requirements
(2) Certification election
(a) In an unorganized establishment
(b) In an organized establishment
(c) Rules prohibiting the filing of petition
for certification election
(d) Requirements for validity of certification
election
(e) Protests and other questions arising
from conduct of certification election
(3) Run-off election
(a) Requirements
(4) Re-run election
(5) Consent election
==========================================
1.MODESOFDETERMININGTHESOLEANDEXCLUSIVEBARGAININGAGENT.
Thesoleandexclusivebargainingagentoftheemployeesinabargainingunitmaybedeterminedthroughany
ofthefollowingmodes:
1. Voluntaryrecognition;
2. Certificationelection;
3. Consentelection;
4. Runoffelection;
69
5. Rerunelection.
70
2.VOLUNTARYRECOGNITION.
a.Voluntaryrecognition,defined.
Voluntaryrecognitionreferstotheprocessbywhichalegitimatelaborunionisvoluntarilyrecognizedbythe
employerastheexclusivebargainingrepresentativeoragentinabargainingunitandreportedassuchwiththeRegional
OfficeinaccordancewithRuleVII,Section2,BookVoftheRulestoImplementtheLaborCode.
71
b.Voluntaryrecognition,whenproper.
Voluntaryrecognitionisproperonlyincaseswherethereisonlyonelegitimatelabororganizationexistingand
operatinginabargainingunit.Itcannotbedoneincasetherearetwoormoreunionsincontention.
c.Noticeofvoluntaryrecognition,whenandwherefiled.
Withinthirty(30)daysfromsuchvoluntaryrecognition,theemployerandtheunionshouldsubmitanoticeof
voluntaryrecognitiontotheDOLERegionalOfficewhichissuedtherecognizedlaborunionscertificateofregistrationor,
inthecaseoflocalchapter,wherethechartercertificateandtheotherdocumentsrequiredunderArticle234Awere
submittedandfiled.
72

68
SeealsoDemocraticLaborAssociationv. CebuStevedoringCo., Inc., G.R. No. 10321, Feb. 28, 1958, 103Phil. 1103.
69
Section2, RuleVI, BookV, RulestoImplement theLaborCode, asamendedbyDepartment OrderNo. 40-03,Seriesof 2003, [Feb. 17, 2003].
70
Not foundintheLabor Codenor initsImplementingRulesbut mentionedintheSyllabusfor Labor Law.
71
Section1[bbb], RuleI, BookV, Ibid..
72
Section1, RuleVII, BookV, Ibid..
VCCRR
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d.Requirementsforvoluntaryrecognition.
Thenoticeofvoluntaryrecognitionshouldbeaccompaniedbytheoriginalcopyandtwo(2)duplicatecopiesof
thefollowingdocuments:
(a) Ajointstatementunderoathattestingtothefactofvoluntaryrecognition;
(b) Certificateofpostingofthejointstatementofvoluntaryrecognitionforfifteen(15)consecutivedaysinat
leasttwo(2)conspicuousplacesintheestablishmentorbargainingunitwheretheunionseekstooperate;
(c) Theapproximatenumberofemployeesinthebargainingunit,accompaniedbythenamesofthosewho
support the voluntary recognition comprising at least a majority of the members of the bargaining unit;
and
(d) Astatementthatthelaborunionistheonlylegitimatelabororganizationoperatingwithinthebargaining
unit.
Itisfurtherrequiredthatallaccompanyingdocumentsofthenoticeofvoluntaryrecognitionshouldbecertified
underoathbytheemployerrepresentativeandpresidentoftherecognizedlaborunion.
73
e. Voluntaryrecognitionofaunionmadeduringpendencyofapetitionforcertificationelectionfiledby
anotherunion,notvalid.
Thevoluntaryrecognitionbytheemployerofaunionwhileapetitionforcertificationelectionfiledbyarival
unionispendingdoesnothaveanyvalideffect.Thus,itwasheldinMeShurnCorporationv.MeShurnWorkersUnion
FSM,[G.R.No.156292,January11,2005],thattheresultsofthecertificationelectionwherethepetitionerunionlost
cannotbesaidtoconstitutearepudiationbytheaffectedemployeesofsaidunionsrighttorepresentthem,inviewof
the discriminatory acts committed by the employer against the said union prior to the holding of the certification
electionactsthatincludedtheemployersimmediategrantofexclusiverecognitiontoanotherunionasabargaining
agentdespitethependingpetitionforcertificationelection.
3.CERTIFICATIONELECTION,INGENERAL(ARTICLES256AND257,LABORCODE).
a.Certificationelection,meaning.
Certification election refers to the process of determining through secret ballot the sole and exclusive
bargaining agent of the employees in an appropriate bargaining unit for purposes of collective bargaining or
negotiations. A certification election is conducted only upon the order of the MedArbiter of the Bureau of Labor
Relations(BLR)oftheDepartmentofLaborandEmployment(DOLE).
74
Itisthemostdemocraticmethodofdetermining
thechoiceoftheemployeesoftheirbargainingrepresentative.
75
Itisnotalitigationproceedinginthesenseinwhich
this term is commonly understood. It is a mere investigation of a nonadversary factfinding character in which the
Department of Labor and Employment plays the part of a disinterested investigator seeking merely to ascertain the
desires of the employees as to the matter of representation. It is not, therefore, bound by the technical rules of
evidence.
76
Incaseofdoubt,thepetitionshouldberesolvedinfavoroftheholdingofacertificationelection.
77
b.Whomayfileapetitionforcertificationelection.
Apetitionforcertificationelectionmaybefiledby:
1. alegitimatelabororganizationwhichmaybe:
(a)anindependentunion;or
(b)a national union or federation which has already issued a charter certificate to its local chapter
participatinginthecertificationelection;or
(c)alocalchapterwhichhasbeenissuedachartercertificatebythenationalunionorfederation.
78
2. an employer, when requested by a labor organization to bargain collectively and its majority status is in
doubt.
79
c.Majorityvote,meaning.
Absolutemajorityofallthemembersofthebargainingunitisnot requiredinorderforauniontobevalidly
certified as the exclusive bargaining agent. Majority of the ballots cast would be sufficient, even if only a small
proportionoftheeligiblevotersparticipatedinthecertificationelection.
80
d.Someprinciplesoncertificationelection,ingeneral.
1. The petitioning union shouldbelegitimate.
81
The acquisition ofrightsbyanyunionor labor organization,
particularlytherighttofileapetitionforcertificationelection,firstandforemost,dependsonwhetheror
notthelabororganizationhasattainedthestatusofalegitimatelabororganization.
82

2. Thedelayintheissuanceofthecertificateofregistrationtoaunionparticipatinginacertificationelection
case may effectively prevent the conduct thereof. However, where it is shown that such delay was not

73
Section2, RuleVII, BookV, Ibid..
74
Section1[h], RuleI, BookV, RulestoImplement theLaborCode, asamendedbyDepartment OrderNo. 40-03, Seriesof 2003, [Feb. 17, 2003].
75
PhilippineAirlinesEmployees Associationv. Ferrer-Calleja, G.R. No. 76673, June22, 1988.
76
AssociatedLaborUnionsv. Ferrer-Calleja, G.R. No. 82260, July19, 1989; ModernFishingGear LaborUnionv. Noriel, G.R. No. 53907, May6, 1988.
77
National Federationof Laborv. TheSecretaryof Labor, G.R. No. 104556, March9, 1998.
78
Articles256and257, LaborCode, asamendedbyR. A. No. 9481[effectiveonJune14, 2007]..
79
Article258, LaborCode; Section1, RuleVIII, BookV, RulestoImplement theLaborCode, asamendedbyDepartment OrderNo. 40-03, Seriesof 2003, [Feb. 17, 2003].
80
PAFLUv. Bureauof LaborRelations, G.R. No. L-43760, Aug. 21, 1976, 72SCRA396.
81
ProgressiveDevelopment Corp. PizzaHut v. Laguesma, [G.R. No. 115077, April 18, 1997, 271SCRA593].
82
TagaytayHighlandsInternational Golf ClubInc. v. Tagaytay HighlandsEmployees Union-PGTWO, G.R. No. 142000, Jan. 22, 2003.
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because of its fault but due mainly to its rivalry with other unions, it shall not stay the conduct of the
certificationelection.Mandamuswilllietocompeltheissuanceofsuchcertificateofregistration.
83
3. Thependencyofapetitiontocancelthecertificateofregistrationofaunionparticipatinginacertification
electiondoesnotstaytheconductthereof.
84
Therationalebehindthisisthatatthetimetheunionfiledits
petition,itstillhadthelegalpersonalitytoperformsuchactabsentanyorderdirectingthecancellation.
85
Moreover,itisnowprovidedunderArticle238AoftheLaborCodethatapetitionforcancellationofunion
registration does not suspend the proceedings for certification election nor does it prevent the filing of a
petition forcertification election. Incase ofcancellation, nothing in the law could restrict the right of the
uniontoseekjustandequitableremediesintheappropriatecourts.
86
4. As a general rule, the pendency of an unfair labor practice case filed against a labor organization
participatinginthecertificationelectiondoesnotstaytheholdingthereof.
87
Butthependencyofaformal
chargeofcompanydominationagainstoneoftheunionswhichisparticipatinginthecertificationelection
is a prejudicial question that bars the holding thereof until its final resolution.
88
Company domination
means that the employer has either initiated, dominated, assisted or otherwise interfered with the
formation or administration of the union, including the giving of financial or other support to it or its
organizersorsupporters.
89
5. Direct certification as a method of selecting the exclusive bargaining agent of the employees is not
allowed.
90
This is because the conduct of a certification election is still necessary in order to arrive in a
mannerdefinitiveandcertainconcerningthechoiceofthelabororganizationtorepresenttheworkersina
collectivebargainingunit.
91
6. Nocertificationelectioninentitiesimmunefromsuitisallowed.
92
3.1.CERTIFICATIONELECTIONINANUNORGANIZEDESTABLISHMENT(ARTICLE257,LABORCODE).
a.Unorganizedestablishment,meaning.
Asdistinguishedfromorganizedestablishment,anunorganizedestablishmentisafirmorcompanywhere
there is no recognized or certified collective bargaining union or agent.
93
A firm or company, however, may still be
consideredanunorganizedestablishmentevenifthereareunionsinexistencethereinforaslongasnotoneofthemis
dulyrecognizedorcertifiedasthesoleandexclusivebargainingrepresentativeoftheemployeesinthebargainingunitit
seekstooperateandrepresent.Further,afirmorcompanyremainsunorganizedevenifthereisadulyrecognizedor
certified bargaining agent for rankandfile employees, for purposes of the petition for certification election filed by
supervisors.Thereasonisthatthebargainingunitcomposedofsupervisorsisseparateanddistinctfromtheunionized
bargainingunitofrankandfileemployees.Hence,beingunorganized,the25%requiredminimumsupportofemployees
withinthebargainingunitofthesupervisorsneednotbecompliedwith.
94
b.Automaticconductofacertificationelectionuponfilingofthepetitionforcertificationelection.
Incaseofapetitionfiledbyalegitimateorganizationinvolvinganunorganizedestablishment,theMedArbiter
isrequiredtoimmediatelyordertheconductofacertificationelectionuponfilingofapetitionforcertificationelection
by a legitimate labor organization.
95
The twentyfive percent (25%) minimum support of the employees in the
bargaining unit which is required in organized establishments is not necessary in the case of unorganized
establishments.Theobviouspurposeistomakeiteasyforemployeestoselforganizeapolicywhichisenunciatedin
theConstitutionandlaborlaws.
3.2.CERTIFICATIONELECTIONINANORGANIZEDESTABLISHMENT(ARTICLE256,LABORCODE).
a.Requisitesfortheconductofacertificationelectioninanorganizedestablishments.
UnderArticle256,theMedArbiterisrequiredtoautomaticallyordertheconductofacertificationelectionby
secretballotinanorganizedestablishmentassoonasthefollowingrequisitesarefullymet:
1.ThatapetitionquestioningthemajoritystatusoftheincumbentbargainingagentisfiledbeforetheDOLE
withinthe60dayfreedomperiod;
2.Thatsuchpetitionisverified;and
3.That the petition is supported by the written consent of at least twentyfive percent (25%) of all the
employeesinthebargainingunit.
96
b.Writtenconsentofatleast25%ofalltheemployeesinthebargainingunit.
The 25% requirement may not be strictly enforced. Compliance therewith need not be established with
absolutecertainty.Evenifthestatutoryrequirementof25%ofthelaborforceaskingforcertificationelectionhasnot

83
U. E. AutomotiveEmployeesandWorkersUnionv. Noriel, G.R. No. L-44350, Nov. 25, 1978; SamahanngManggagawasaUnionIndustries, Inc. v. Noriel, G.R. No. L-50874, Oct. 23, 1981.
84
National Unionof BankEmployeesv. Ministerof Labor, G.R. No. L-53406, Dec. 14, 1981, 110SCRA274.
85
Pepsi-ColaProductsPhilippines, Inc. v. Hon. Secretaryof Labor, G.R. No. 96663andPepsi-ColaProductsPhilippines, Inc. v. Officeof theSecretary, Department of LaborandEmployment, G.R. No. 103300, Aug. 10, 1999.
86
AsinsertedbySection4, RepublicAct No. 9481, June14, 2007.
87
Barrerav. CIR, G,R, No. L-32853, Sept. 25, 1981, 107SCRA596.
88
UnitedCMCWorkersUnionv. Bureauof LaborRelations, G.R. No. L-51337, March22, 1984; AcojeMinesEmployeesv. AcojeLaborUnion, G.R. No. L-11273, Nov. 21, 1958; 104Phil. 814; StandardCigarettev. CIR, G.R. No. L-9908, April 22, 1957, 101Phil. 126.
89
SeeArticle248[d], LaborCode.
90
SamahangManggagawasaPermex[SMP-PIILU-TUCP] v. Secretaryof Labor, G.R. No. 107792, March2, 1998, 286SCRA692; Central NegrosElectricCooperativev. Secretaryof LaborandEmployment, G.R. No. 94045, Sept. 13, 1991, 201SCRA591.
91
WesternAgusanWorkersUnionv. Trajano, G.R. No. 75724, May6, 1991; Colgate-PalmolivePhilippines, Inc. v. Ople, G.R. No. 73681, June30, 1988.
92
International CatholicMigrationCommissionv. Calleja, G.R. No. 85750, Sept. 28, 1990; KapisananngManggagawaat TACsaIRRI-OrganizedLaborAssociationinLineIndustriesandAgriculturev. Secretaryof Labor, G.R. No. 89331, Sept. 28, 1990.
93
94
CaliforniaManufacturingCorporationv. Laguesma, G.R. No. 97020, June8, 1992.
95
Article257, LaborCode, asamendedbySection24, RepublicAct No. 6715, March21, 1989; Section1, RuleVIII, BookV, RulestoImplement theLaborCode, asamendedbyDepartment OrderNo. 40-03, Seriesof 2003, [Feb. 17, 2003]; FurusawaRubberPhilippines, Inc. v. Secretary
of LaborandEmployment, G.R. No. 121241, Dec. 10, 1997, 282SCRA635.
96
TradeUnionsof thePhilippinesandAlliedServicesWorldFederationof TradeUnions[TUPAS-WFTU] v. Laguesma, G.R. No. 102350, June30, 1994.
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been strictly complied with, the MedArbiter is still empowered to order its conduct for the purpose of ascertaining
whichofthecontendinglabororganizationsshouldbechosenastheexclusivebargainingagent.
97
4.RULESPROHIBITINGTHEFILINGOFAPETITIONFORCERTIFICATIONELECTION.
a.Whenfilingofapetitionforcertificationelectionallowed.
The general rule is that in the absence of a CBA duly registered in accordance with Article 231 of the Labor
Code,apetitionforcertificationelectionmaybefiledatanytime.
98
b.Rulesprohibitingthefilingofapetitionforcertificationelection(BarRules).
Nocertificationelectionmaybeheldunderthefollowingrules:
1. Certificationyearbarrule;
2. Negotiationsbarrule;
3. Bargainingdeadlockbarrule;or
4. Contractbarrule.
4.1.CERTIFICATIONYEARBARRULE.
Underthisrule,apetitionforcertificationelectionmaynotbefiledwithinone(1)year:
1. fromthedatethefactofvoluntaryrecognitionhasbeenentered;or
2. fromthedateavalidcertification,consentorrunoffelectionhasbeenconductedwithinthebargaining
unit.
99
Where an appeal has been filed from the order of the MedArbiter certifying the results of the election, the
running of the one (1) year period shall be suspended until the decision on the appeal has become final and
executory.
100
4.2.NEGOTIATIONSBARRULE.
Under this rule, no petition for certification election should be entertained while the sole and exclusive
bargainingagentandtheemployerareintheprocessofnegotiatingtheCBA.Whilethepartiesarenegotiatingtheterms
andconditionsoftheCBA,nochallengingunionshouldbeallowedtodisturbtheprocessaswouldundulyforestallthe
earlyconclusionoftheagreement.
4.3.BARGAININGDEADLOCKBARRULE.
Underthisrule,apetitionforcertificationelectionmaynotbeentertained:
1. Whenthedulycertifiedbargainingagenthascommencedandsustainednegotiationsingoodfaithwith
theemployerinaccordancewithArticle250oftheLaborCodewithinaperiodofone(1)yearfromthe
dateofavalidcertification,consentorrunoffelectionorfromthedateofvoluntaryrecognition;or
2. When a bargaining deadlock to which an incumbent or certified bargaining agent is a party has been
submittedtoconciliationorarbitrationorhasbecomethesubjectofavalidnoticeofstrikeorlockout.
101
KaisahanngManggagawangPilipino[KAMPILKATIPUNAN]v.Trajano,[G.R.No.75810,September9,1991,
201SCRA453].
Thebargainingdeadlockbarrulewasnotappliedbecauseformorethanfour(4)yearsafteritwascertifiedas
the exclusive bargaining agent of all the rankandfile employees, it did not take any action to legally compel the
employertocomplywithitsdutytobargaincollectively,hence,noCBAwasexecuted.Neitherdiditfileanyunfairlabor
practicesuitagainsttheemployernordiditinitiateastrikeagainstthelatter.Underthecircumstances,acertification
electionmaybevalidlyorderedandheld.
CapitolMedicalCenterAllianceofConcernedEmployeesUnifiedFilipinoServiceWorkersv.Laguesma,[G.R.
No.118915,February4,1997,267SCRA503].
The bargaining deadlockbar rule was applied in this case. Distinguishing this case from that of Kaisahan
[supra], the High Court cited the fact that the bargaining agent here has taken legal actions to legally coerce the
employertocomplywithitsstatutorydutytobargaincollectively.Ithaschargedtheemployerwithunfairlaborpractice
andconductedastriketoprotesttheemployersrefusaltobargain.Itisonlyjustandequitablethatthecircumstancesin
this caseshouldbeconsidered assimilar in naturetoa bargainingdeadlock whennocertification electioncould be
held. This is also to make sure that no floodgates will be opened for the circumvention of the law by unscrupulous
employerstopreventanycertifiedbargainingagentfromnegotiatingaCBA.
4.4.CONTRACTBARRULE.

97
CaliforniaManufacturingCorporationv. Laguesma, G.R. No. 97020, June8, 1992; AtlasFreeWorkersUnion-PSSLULocal v. Noriel, G.R. No. L-51905, May26, 1981, 104SCRA565; KapisananngmgaManggagawasaLaSuerte-FOITAFv. Noriel, G.R. No. L-45475, June20, 1977,
77SCRA414.
98
Section3, RuleVIII, BookV, RulestoImplement theLaborCode.
99
Section3[a], RuleVIII, BookV, Ibid..
100
Section3[a], RuleVIII, BookV, Ibid..
101
Section3[b] and[c], RuleVIII, BookV, Ibid.; National Congressof UnionsintheSugarIndustryof thePhilippines-TUCPv. Trajano, G.R. No. 67485, April 10, 1992.
CNBC
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a.Concept.
Underthisrule,apetitionforcertificationelectionmaynotbefiledwhenaCBAbetweentheemployeranda
dulyrecognizedorcertifiedbargainingagenthasbeenregisteredwiththeBureauofLaborRelations(BLR)inaccordance
withArticle231oftheLaborCode.WheretheCBAisdulyregistered,apetitionforcertificationelectionmaybefiled
only within the 60day freedom period prior to its expiry.
102
The purpose of this rule is to ensure stability in the
relationshipoftheworkersandthemanagementbypreventingfrequentmodificationsofanyCBAearlierenteredinto
bythemingoodfaithandforthestipulatedoriginalperiod.
103
b.Justificationsfortherule.
Thereasonsforthisruleareasfollows:
1. Certificationelectionmayonlybeentertainedwithinthe60dayfreedomperiod.Anypetitionfiledbefore
orafterthesixtydayfreedomperiodshouldbedismissedoutright.
104
2. WhenthereexistsaCBA,itisthedutyofbothpartiestokeepthestatusquoandtocontinueinfullforce
andeffectthetermsandconditionsoftheexistingagreementduringthe60dayperiodand/oruntilanew
agreementisreachedbytheparties.
105
3. At the expiration of the 60day freedom period, the employer should continue to recognize the majority
status of the incumbent bargaining agent where no petition for certification election challenging such
majoritystatusisfiledbyanyotherunion.
106
c.Whencontractbarruledoesnotapply.
Thecontractbarruledoesnotapplyinthefollowingcases:
1. Where there is an automatic renewal provision in the CBA but prior to the date when such automatic
renewal became effective, the employer seasonably filed a manifestation with the Bureau of Labor
Relationsofitsintentiontoterminatethesaidagreementifandwhenitisestablishedthatthebargaining
agentdoesnotrepresentanymorethemajorityoftheworkersinthebargainingunit.
107
2. Where the CBA, despite its due registration, is found in appropriate proceedings that: (a) it contains
provisions lower than the standards fixed by law; or (b) the documents supporting its registration are
falsified,fraudulentortaintedwithmisrepresentation.
108
3. Where the CBA does not foster industrial stability, such as contracts where the identity of the
representativeisindoubtsincetheemployerextendeddirectrecognitiontotheunionandconcludedaCBA
therewithlessthanone(1)yearfromthetimeacertificationelectionwasconductedwherethenounion
votewon.ThissituationobtainsinacasewherethecompanyenteredintoaCBAwiththeunionwhenits
statusasexclusivebargainingagentoftheemployeeshasnotbeenestablishedyet.
109
4.WheretheCBAwasregisteredbeforeorduringthelastsixty(60)daysofasubsistingagreementorduring
thependencyofarepresentationcase.
110
Itiswellsettledthatthesixtydayfreedomperiodbasedonthe
originalCBAshouldnotbeaffectedbyanyamendment,extensionorrenewaloftheCBAforpurposesof
certificationelection.
111
5.REQUIREMENTFORVALIDITYOFCERTIFICATIONELECTION.
a.Requisitesforthevalidityofthepetitionforcertificationelection.
Thefollowingrequisitesshouldconcur:
1. Theunionshouldbelegitimatewhichmeansthatitisdulyregisteredandlistedintheregistryoflegitimate
laborunionsoftheBLRorthatitslegalpersonalityhasnotbeenrevokedorcancelledwithfinality.
2. Incaseoforganizedestablishments,thepetitionforcertificationelectionwasfiledduring(andnotbefore
orafter)the60dayfreedomperiodofadulyregisteredCBA.
3. Incaseoforganizedestablishments,thepetitioncompliedwiththe25%writtensupportofthemembersof
thebargainingunit.
4. Thepetitionwasfilednotinviolationofanyofthe4barrules(seeabovediscussionthereof).
b.Requisitesforthevalidityofthecertificationelectionproceedings.
Thefollowingrequisitesshouldconcur:
1. Number of votes required for the validity of the certification election itself. In order to have a valid
certificationelection,atleastamajorityofalleligiblevotersintheappropriatebargainingunitmusthave
casttheirvotes.
112
2. Numberofvotestobecertifiedasthecollectivebargainingagent.Tobecertifiedasthesoleandexclusive
bargainingagent,theunionshouldobtainamajorityofthevalidvotescast.
113

102
Section3[d], RuleVIII, BookV, RulestoImplement theLabor Code, asamendedbyDepartment Order No. 40-03, Seriesof 2003, [Feb. 17, 2003]; RepublicPlantersBankGeneral ServicesEmployeesUnion-National Associationof TradeUnionsv. Laguesma, G.R. No. 119675, Nov.
21, 1996, 264SCRA637, 642.
103
SamahangManggagawasaPermex[SMP-PIILU-TUCP] v. Secretaryof Labor, G.R. No. 107792, March2, 1998, 286SCRA692.
104
Section3[d], RuleVIII, BookV, RulestoImplement theLaborCode, asamendedbyDepartment OrderNo. 40-03, Seriesof 2003, [Feb. 17, 2003]; TUPASv. Inciong, G.R. No. L-46499, Aug. 19, 1982, 114SCRA847.
105
106
107
PLDTEmployees Unionv. PhilippineLongDistanceTelephoneCompany, G.R. No. L-8138, Aug. 20, 1955.
108
Seeoldprovisionof Section4, RuleXVI, BookV, RulestoImplement theLaborCode, asamendedbyArticle1, Department OrderNo. 09, Seriesof 1997[21June1997].
109
SamahangManggagawasaPermex[SMP-PIILU-TUCP] v. Secretaryof Labor, G.R. No. 107792, March2, 1998, 286SCRA692; SeealsoFirestoneTireandRubberCompanyEmployeesUnionv. Estrella, G.R. Nos. L-45513-14, Jan. 6, 1978, 81SCRA49.
110
Section24, RuleVIII, BookV, RulestoImplement theLaborCode; SamahanngManggagawasaPacificPlasticv. Laguesma, G.R. No. 111245, Jan. 31, 1997, 267SCRA303, 310.
111
ALUv. Calleja, G.R. No. 85095, Nov. 6, 1989, 179SCRA127.
112
Article256, LaborCode; SamahanngManggagawasaPacificPlasticv. Laguesma, G.R. No. 111245, Jan. 31, 1997, 267SCRA303, 309.
113
Section16, RuleIX, BookV, RulestoImplement theLabor Code.
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c.Failureofelection.
Thereisfailureofelectionwhenthenumberofvotescastinacertificationorconsentelectionislessthanthe
majorityofthenumberofeligiblevotersandtherearenochallengedvotesthatcouldmateriallychangetheresultsof
theelection.
114
d.Effectoffailureofelection;holdingofanotherelectionwithinsix(6)months.
A failure of election shall not bar the filing of a motion for the immediate holding of another certification or
consentelectionwithinsix(6)monthsfromthedateofdeclarationofthefailureofelection.
115
e.Actiononthemotiontoholdanothercertificationelectionorconsentelection.
Within twentyfour (24) hours from receipt of the motion to hold another certification election or consent
election, the Election Officer shall immediately schedule the conduct of such election within fifteen (15) days from
receipt of the motion and cause the posting of the notice of certification election at least ten (10) days prior to the
scheduled date of election in two (2) most conspicuous places in the establishment. The same guidelines and list of
votersshallbeusedintheelection.
116
f.Proclamationandcertificationoftheresultofthecertificationelection.
Withintwentyfour(24)hoursfromthefinalcanvassofvotes,therebeingavalidelection,theElectionOfficer
shalltransmittherecordsofthecasetotheMedArbiterwhoshall,withinthesameperiodfromreceiptoftheminutes
andresultsofelection,issueanorderproclaimingtheresultsoftheelectionandcertifyingtheunionwhichobtainedthe
majorityofthevalidvotescastasthesoleandexclusivebargainingagentinthesubjectbargainingunit,underanyofthe
followingconditions:
(a) Noprotestwasfiledor,evenifonewasfiled,thesamewasnotperfectedwithinthefive(5)dayperiodfor
perfectionoftheprotest;
(b) Nochallengeoreligibilityissuewasraisedor,evenifonewasraised,theresolutionofthesamewillnot
materiallychangetheresultsoftheelections.
Thewinningunionshallhavetherights,privilegesandobligationsofadulycertifiedcollectivebargainingagent
fromthetimethecertificationisissued.
117
g.Nounionvote.
TheNoUnionvoteisalwaysoneofthechoicesinacertificationelection.Wheremajorityofthevalidvotes
castresultsinNoUnionobtainingthemajority,theMedArbitershalldeclaresuchfactintheorder.
118
6.PROTESTSANDOTHERQUESTIONSARISINGFROMCONDUCTOFCERTIFICATIONELECTION.

Inordertofullyappreciateandcomprehendthetopicofprotestsandotherquestionsthatmayberaisedin
connectionwiththecertificationelection,acomprehensivediscussionoftheelectionproceedingsispresentedbelow.
a.Electionproceedings;definition.
Election proceedings refer to the period during a certification election, consent or runoff election and
election of union officers, starting from the opening to the closing of the polls, including the counting, tabulation and
consolidation of votes, but excluding the period for the final determination of the challenged votes and the canvass
thereof.
119
b.MedArbiterhearsandresolvespetitionsforcertificationelection.
ThepetitionforcertificationelectionshouldbeheardandresolvedbytheMedArbiter.
120
c.ElectionOfficer.
TheMedArbiterdoesnotconductthecertificationelection.ItisconductedbyanElectionOfficer.Heisan
officer of the Bureau of Labor Relations or the Labor Relations Division in the Regional Office authorized to conduct
certificationelections,electionofunionofficersandotherformsofelectionsandreferenda.
121
d.Preelectionconference.
Within twentyfour (24) hours from receipt of the assignment for the conduct of a certification election, the
ElectionOfficershouldcausetheissuanceofanoticeofpreelectionconferenceuponthecontendingunionsandthe
employerwhichshouldbescheduledwithinten(10)daysfromreceiptoftheassignment.
Thepreelectionconferenceshould set themechanicsfortheelectionand should determine, among others,
thefollowing:

114
Section17, RuleIX, BookV, Ibid..
115
116
117
118
Id.
119
Section1[p], RuleI, Book V, RulestoImplement theLabor Code.
120
Section2, RuleVIII, BookV, Ibid..
121
Section1[o], RuleI, andSections2-5, RuleXII, BookV, Ibid..
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(a) Thedate,timeandplaceoftheelectionwhichshallnotbelaterthanfortyfive(45)daysfromthedateof
the first preelection conference, and shall be on a regular working day and within the employers
premises,unlesscircumstancesrequireotherwise;
(b) Thelistofeligibleandchallengedvoters;
(c) The number and location of polling places or booths and the number of ballots to be prepared with
appropriatetranslations,ifnecessary;
(d) The names of the watchers or representatives and their alternates for each of the parties during the
election;
(e) Mechanicsandguidelinesoftheelection.
122
e.Propertimetoquestionthelistofqualifiedvoters.
Thepropertimetoquestionthelistofqualifiedvotersisduringthepreelectionconference.Itcannolonger
becontestedduringtheactualconductofthecertificationelection.
123
f.Employersobligationtosubmitthelistofemployees.
Theemployerisdutyboundtosubmitthelistofemployeesinthebargainingunit.Incaseofunjustifiedrefusal
by the employer to submit the payroll in its custody despite efforts to make it produce it, the next best source of
information is the SSS list which, after all, is a public record whose regularity is presumed.
124
By express provision of
Article258AoftheLaborCode,theparticipationoftheemployerwhichistreatedasamerebystanderandnotaparty
tothecertificationelectionwithaconcomitantrighttoopposeit,islimitedtobeingnotifiedorinformedofthefilingof
thepetitionforcertificationelectionandtosubmitthelistofemployeesduringthepreelectionconference.
125
g.Qualificationsofvoters;inclusionexclusionofvoters.
Eligiblevoterreferstoavoterbelongingtotheappropriatebargainingunitthatisthesubjectofapetitionfor
certification,consentorrunoffelection.
126
Allemployeeswhoaremembersoftheappropriatebargainingunitsought
to be represented by the petitioner at the time of the issuance of the order granting the conduct of a certification,
consentorrunoffelectionshallbeeligibletovote.
h.Righttovotestartsfromfirstdayofemployment.
Any employee, whether employed for a definite period or not, shall, beginning on his first day of service,
alreadybeconsideredanemployeeforpurposesofmembershipinanylaborunion,hence,eligibletoparticipateina
127
Consequently,allemployeeswhetherprobationaryorpermanentorregularmaybeallowed
to participate in the certification election. The law does not make any distinction. It merely mentions the term
employees.
128
Itisbasic,however,thatonlypersonswhohavedirectemploymentrelationshipwiththeemployermayvotein
thecertificationelection,regardlessoftheirperiodofemployment.
129
Forexample,apiecerateworkerdoingworkfor
his own account with minimum interference from his indirect employer is not eligible to vote in the certification
election.
130
i.Ruleincaseofcontestedvoters.
Incaseofdisagreementoverthevoterslistorovertheeligibilityofvoters,allcontestedvotersshallbeallowed
tovotebuttheirvotesshallbesegregatedandsealedinindividualenvelopes.
131
j.Ruleontherightofdismissedemployeestovote.
Anemployeewhohasbeendismissedfromworkbuthascontestedthelegalityofhisdismissalinaforumof
appropriate jurisdiction at the time of the issuance of the order for the conduct of a certification election shall be
consideredaqualifiedvoter,unlesshisdismissalwasdeclaredvalidinafinaljudgmentatthetimeoftheconductofthe
132
k.Postingofthenoticeofelection.
TheElectionOfficerisrequiredtocausethepostingofthenoticeofelectionatleastten(10)daysbeforethe
actualdateoftheelectionintwo(2)mostconspicuousplacesinthecompanypremises.Thenoticeshouldcontain:
(a) Thedateandtimeoftheelection;
(b) Thenamesofallcontendingunions;
(c) Thedescriptionofthebargainingunitandthelistofeligibleandchallengedvoters.
Thepostingofthenoticeofelection,theinformationrequiredtobeincludedthereinandthedurationofits
postingcannotbewaivedbythecontendingunionsortheemployer.
133

122
123
AcojeWorkersv. NAMAWU, G.R. No. L-18848, April 23, 1963, 7SCRA730.
124
SamahanngManggagawasaPacificPlasticv. Laguesma, G.R. No. 111245, Jan. 31, 1997, 267SCRA303, 310.
125
AsinsertedbySection12, RepublicAct No. 9481whichlapsedintolawonMay25, 2007andbecameeffectiveonJune14, 2007.
126
Section1[q], RuleI, BookV, Ibid..
127
Article277[c], LaborCode.
128
AirtimeSpecialists, Inc. v. Director of LaborRelations, G.R. No. 80612-16, Dec. 29, 1989.
129
EastlandManufacturingCorporationv. Noriel, G.R. No. L-45528, Feb. 10, 1982, 111SCRA674.
130
MaligayaShipWatchmenAgencyv. AssociateWatchmenandSecurityUnion, G.R. No. L-12214-14, May28, 1958.
131
Sections5, 10and11, RuleIX, BookV, Ibid..
132
YokohamaTirePhilippines, Inc. v. YokohamaEmployeesUnion, [G.R. No. 159553, December10, 2007].
133
Section6, RuleIX, BookV, RulestoImplement theLaborCode, asamendedbyDepartment OrderNo. 40-03, Seriesof 2003, [Feb. 17, 2003].
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l.Secrecyandsanctityoftheballot.
To ensure secrecy of the ballot, the Election Officer, together with the authorized representatives of the
contending unions and the employer shall, before the start of the actual voting, inspect the polling place, the ballot
boxesandthepollingbooths.
134
m.Preparationofballots.
TheElectionOfficerisrequiredtopreparetheballotsinEnglishandFilipinoorthelocaldialect,corresponding
tothenumberofvotersandareasonablenumberofextraballots.AllballotsshouldbesignedatthebackbytheElection
Officerandtheauthorizedrepresentativeofeachofthecontendingunionsandtheemployer.Failureorrefusaltosign
theballotsshallbeconsideredawaiverthereofandtheElectionOfficershallenterthefactofsuchrefusalorfailurein
therecordsofthecaseaswellasthereasonfortherefusalorfailuretosign.
135
n.Markingofvotes.
Thevotermustputacross(x)oracheck()markinthesquareoppositethenameoftheunionofhischoiceor
NoUnionifhedoesnotwanttoberepresentedbyanyunion.
Ifaballotistorn,defacedorleftunfilledinsuchamannerastocreatedoubtorconfusionortoidentifythe
voter,itshallbeconsideredspoiled.Ifthevoterinadvertentlyspoilsaballot,heshouldreturnittotheElectionOfficer
whoshalldestroyitandgivehimanotherballot.
136
o.Challengingofvotes,grounds.
Anauthorizedrepresentativeofanyofthecontendingunionsandtheemployermaychallengeavotebeforeit
isdepositedintheballotboxonlyonanyofthefollowinggrounds:
(a) Thatthereisnoemployeremployeerelationshipbetweenthevoterandtheemployer;or
(b) Thatthevoterisnotamemberoftheappropriatebargainingunitwhichpetitionerseekstorepresent.
137
p.Procedureinchallengingofvotes.
Whenavoteisproperlychallenged,theElectionOfficershouldplacetheballotinanenvelopewhichshallbe
sealedinthepresenceofthevoterandtherepresentativesofthecontendingunionsandemployer.TheElectionOfficer
shouldindicateontheenvelopethevotersname,theunionoremployerchallengingthevoter,andthegroundforthe
challenge.ThesealedenvelopeshallthenbesignedbytheElectionOfficerandtherepresentativesofthecontending
unions and employer. The Election Officer should note all challenges in the minutes of the election and shall be
responsible for consolidating all envelopes containing the challenged votes. The envelopes shall be opened and the
questionofeligibilityshallbepassedupononlyifthenumberofsegregatedvoterswillmateriallyaltertheresultsofthe
election.
138
q.Onthespotquestions.
TheElectionOfficershouldruleonanyquestionrelatingtoandraisedduringtheconductoftheelection.Inno
case,however,shalltheElectionOfficerruleonanyofthegroundsforchallenge.
139
r.Spoiledballotsarenotreckonedtodeterminemajority.
The earlier ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of Allied Workers Association of the Philippines v. CIR,
[G.R.Nos.L22580andL22950,June6,1967,20SCRA364],thatspoiledballotsshouldbecountedtodeterminethe
majoritydoesnotpossessanyrelevanceanymoreaccordingtoPAFLUv.BureauofLaborRelations,[G.R.No.L43760,
August21,1976].
s.Protest;whenperfected.
Anypartyininterestmayfileaprotestbasedontheconductormechanicsoftheelection.Suchprotestshall
berecordedintheminutesoftheelectionproceedings.Protestsnotsoraisedaredeemedwaived.Theprotestingparty
mustformalizeitsprotestwiththeMedArbiter,withspecificgrounds,argumentsandevidencewithinfive(5)daysafter
thecloseoftheelectionproceedings.Ifnotrecordedintheminutesandformalizedwithinthesaidprescribedperiod,
theprotestshallbedeemeddropped.
140
However,inthecaseofNationalFederationofLaborv.TheSecretaryofLabor,[G.R.No.104556,March9,
1998,287SCRA599,607],itwasheldthatwhereasubstantialnumberofworkersweredisenfranchisedsincetheywere
notnotifiedofthedateofthecertificationelection,coupledwiththefactthatthereportoftheMedArbiterconfirmed
to be true the allegations of fraud and irregularities, the 5day period should be treated as a mere technicality which
shouldnotbeallowedtoprevailovertheworkerswelfare.AstheSupremeCourtstressedinLVNPictures,Inc.v.Phil.
MusiciansGuild,[G.R.Nos.L12582andL12598,January28,1961,1SCRA132],itisessentialthattheemployeesmust
beaccordedanopportunitytofreelyandintelligentlydeterminewhichlabororganizationshouldactintheirbehalf.
Itmustbenotedthataprotestcannotbefiledbyalaborunionwhichisnotaparticipantinthecertification
election.
141

134
135
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139
140
141
GOP-CCPWorkersUnionv. CIR, G.R. No. L-33015, Sept. 10, 1979, 93SCRA116.
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Forthesamereasonoflackofpersonality,aunionwhichhasdisaffiliatedfromitsmotherfederationandwhich
hasnoindependentregistrationcannotbeallowedtolodgeaprotest.
142
t.Openingandclosingofprecincts.
The election precincts should open and close on the date and time agreed upon during the preelection
conference. The opening and canvass of votes should proceed immediately after the precincts have closed. Failure of
any party or the employer or his/her/their representative to appear during the election proceedings should be
consideredasawaivertobepresentandtoquestiontheconductthereof.
143
u.Canvassingofvotes.
ThevotesshouldbecountedandtabulatedbytheElectionOfficerinthepresenceoftherepresentativesofthe
contendingunions.Uponcompletionofthecanvass,theElectionOfficerisrequiredtogiveeachrepresentativeacopyof
theminutesoftheelectionproceedingsandresultsoftheelection.Theballotsandthetallysheetsshallbesealedinan
envelope and signed by the Election Officer and the representatives of the contending unions and transmitted to the
MedArbiter,togetherwiththeminutesandresultsoftheelectionwithintwentyfour(24)hoursfromthecompletionof
thecanvass.Wheretheelectionisconductedinmorethanoneregion,consolidationofresultsshouldbemadewithin
fifteen(15)daysfromtheconductthereof.
144
7.RUNOFFELECTION.
a.Runoffelection,meaning.
A runoff election refers to an election between the labor unions receiving the two (2) highest number of
votesinacertificationelectionorconsentelectionwiththree(3)ormorechoices,wheresuchacertificationelectionor
consentelectionresultsinnoneofthethree(3)ormorechoicesreceivingthemajorityofthevalidvotescast,provided
thatthetotalnumberofvotesforallcontendingunionsisatleastfiftypercent(50%)ofthenumberofvotescast.
145
Iftherearenoobjectionsorchallengeswhich,ifsustained,canmateriallyaltertheresults,theElectionOfficer
shouldmotuproprioconductarunoffelectionwithinten(10)daysfromthecloseoftheelectionproceedingsbetween
thelaborunionsreceivingthetwohighestnumberofvotes.Forobviousreason,thechoiceofNoUnionshouldnotbe
includedintherunoffelection.
NoticeoftheconductofarunoffelectionshouldbepostedbytheElectionOfficeratleastfive(5)daysbefore
theactualdatethereof.
146
b.Qualificationofvotersintherunoffelection.
Thesamevoterslistusedinthecertificationelectionorconsentelectionshouldbeusedintherunoffelection.
Theballotsintherunoffelectionshouldprovideaschoicestheunionsreceivingthehighestandsecondhighestnumber
ofthevotescast.Thelaborunionreceivingthegreaternumberofvalidvotescastshouldbecertifiedasthewinner.
147
8.RERUNELECTION.
ThismodeofchoosingthesoleandexclusivebargainingunitisnotexpresslyprovidedintheLaborCodenorin
itsimplementingrules.Thecircumstanceswhichwouldjustifytheholdingofarerunelectionarenotsetoutinthelaw.
However, a rerun election may be justified if certain irregularities have been committed during the conduct of the
certificationelection,suchas,interalia,disfranchisement,lackofsecrecyinthevotingandbribery,inwhichcase,the
election should be invalidated.
148
Such invalidation would necessitate the conduct of a rerun election among the
contendingunionstodeterminethetruewillanddesireoftheemployeeelectorate.
9.CONSENTELECTION.
a.Consentelection,meaning.
A consent election refers to the process of determining through secret ballot the sole and exclusive
representativeoftheemployeesinanappropriatebargainingunitforpurposesofcollectivebargainingornegotiation.It
is voluntarily agreed upon by the parties, with or without the intervention of the Department of Labor and
Employment.
149
b.Consentelectionandcertificationelection,distinguished.
Aconsentelectionisonemutuallyagreeduponbytheparties,withorwithouttheinterventionbytheDOLE,its
purposebeingmerelytodeterminetheissueofmajorityrepresentationofalltheworkersinanappropriatecollective
bargainingunit;whileacertificationelectionisonewhichisorderedbytheDOLEandisaimedatdeterminingthesole
and exclusive bargaining agent of all the employees in an appropriate bargaining unit for the purpose of collective
bargaining.Fromtheverynatureofconsentelection,itisaseparateanddistinctprocessandhasnothingtodowiththe
importandeffectofacertificationelection.
150

142
Reyesv. Ople, G.R. No. L-48192, March30, 1979, 89SCRA279.
143
144
145
Article256, LaborCode; Section1[ss], RuleI, BookV, Ibid..
146
Section1, RuleX, BookV, Ibid..
147
SeeSection20, RuleIXandSection2, RuleX, BookV, Ibid..
148
Confederationof CitizensLaborUnionsv. Noriel, 116SCRA694[1982]; National Federationof Laborv. TheSecretaryof Labor, G.R. No. 104556, March9, 1998, 287SCRA599, 607.
149
Section1[h], RuleI, BookV, RulestoImplement theLaborCode, asamendedbyDepartment OrderNo. 40-03, Seriesof 2003, [Feb. 17, 2003].
150
SeeSection1[h], RuleI, BookV, RulestoImplement theLabor Code, asamendedbyDepartment Order No. 40-03, Seriesof 2003, [Feb. 17, 2003]; Algirev. DeMesa, [G.R. No. 97622, October 19, 1994, 237SCRA647], theSupremeCourt hadoccasiontoreiterateitsearlier holding
inWarrenManufacturingWorkersUnion[WMWU] v. Bureauof LaborRelations, [G.R. No. L-76185, March30, 1988, 159SCRA387] .
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Bylaw,asaresultoftheconsentelection,therighttobetheexclusiverepresentativeofalltheemployeesinan
appropriate collective bargaining unit is vested in the labor union designated or selected for such purpose by the
majorityoftheemployeesintheunitconcerned.
151
c.Consentelectionagreeduponbythepartiestoacertificationelectioncase.
During the preliminary conference that the MedArbiter is required to conduct in a certification election
proceeding, he is required to determine if the contending labor unions are willing to submit themselves to a consent
election. In case the contending unions agree to a consent election, the MedArbiter is not allowed to issue a formal
ordercallingfortheconductofacertificationelection.Instead,heshouldenterthefactoftheagreementintheminutes
ofthehearingwhichshouldthenbesignedbythepartiesandattestedtobytheMedArbiter.
152
d.Holdingofaconsentelectionduringthependencyofapetitionforcertificationelection.
Where a petition for certification election has been filed and upon the intercession of the MedArbiter, the
parties mutually agree to hold a consent election, the results thereof shall constitute a bar to the holding of a
certificationelectionforone(1)yearfromtheholdingofsuchconsentelection.Whereanappealhasbeenfiledfromthe
resultsoftheconsentelection,therunningoftheoneyearperiodissuspendeduntilthedecisiononappealhasbecome
finalandexecutory.
153
e.Holdingofaconsentelectionwherethereisnopetitionforcertificationelectionfiled.
Wherenopetitionforcertificationelectionisfiledbutthepartiesthemselvesagreetoholdaconsentelection
withtheintercessionoftheDOLERegionalOffice,theresultsthereofshallconstituteabartothefilingofapetitionfor
154
===================================
b. Bargaining agent
(7) Affiliation and disaffiliation of the
local union from the mother union
(a) Substitutionary doctrine
===================================
1.AFFILIATIONOFANINDEPENDENTUNIONWITHAFEDERATIONORANATIONALUNION.
a.Affiliate,meaning.
Anaffiliaterefersto:
(a) Anindependentunionaffiliatedwithafederationoranationalunion;or
(b) Alocalchapter(formerlyknownascharteredlocal)whichhasbeensubsequentlygrantedindependent
registrationbutdidnotdisaffiliatefromthefederationornationalunionwhichcreatedit.
155
Technically,alocalchaptercannotbeproperlycalledanaffiliateofafederationoranationalunionifithas
notacquiredanyindependentregistrationofitsown.
b.Purposeofaffiliationwithafederationoranationalunion.
Affiliation with a federation or a national union is principally for the purpose of strengthening the collective
bargainingleverageoftheaffiliate.
c.Someprinciplesonaffiliation.
1. The relationship between the affiliate union (independent union) and the mother union (federation or
national union) is that of principalagent relationship. The affiliate union is the principal and the mother
union, the agent.
156
This principle also applies in the case of a local chapter created by a federation or a
nationalunion.
157
2. The affiliate union, being an independently registered union, does not owe its existence to the federation
withwhichitisaffiliated.Itisaseparateanddistinctvoluntaryassociationowingitscreationtothewillofits
members.Itdoesnotgivethemotherfederationthelicensetoactindependentlyoftheaffiliateunion.It
onlygivesrisetoacontractofagency,wheretheformeractsinrepresentationofthelatter. Hence,local
unionsareconsideredprincipalswhilethefederationisdeemedtobemerelytheiragent.
158
3.By reason of the affiliation, the affiliate union becomes subject of the rules of the federation or national
union.
159
4. The appendage of the federations acronym to the affiliate unions name in the registration with the
Department of Labor and Employment does not change the principalagent relationship between them.
Suchinclusionoftheacronymismerelytoindicatethatthelocalunionisaffiliatedwiththefederationor

151
UnitedRestaurorsEmployeesandLaborUnion-PAFLUv. Torres, G.R. No. L-24993, Dec. 18, 1968, 26SCRA435.
152
SeeSections9and10, RuleVIII, BookV, Ibid..
153
Section23, RuleVIII, BookV, Ibid..
154
Ibid..
155
Section1[a], RuleI, BookV, Ibid..
156
ProgressiveDevelopment Corporationv. Secretary, Department of Labor andEmployment, [G.R. No. 96425, February4, 1992, 205SCRA802]; PambansangKapatiranngmgaAnakPawissaFormeyPlasticNational WorkersBrotherhoodv. Laguesma, G.R. No. 111836, Feb. 1,
1996, 253SCRA96, 103.
157
FilipinoPipeandFoundryCorporationv. NLRC, G. R. No. 115180, Nov. 16, 1999.
158
Insular Hotel EmployeesUnion-NFLv. Waterfront Insular Hotel Davao, [G.R. Nos. 174040-41, September 22, 2010], citingCoastal SubicBayTerminal, Inc. v. Department of Labor andEmployment-Officeof theSecretary, [G.R. No. 157117, Nov. 20, 2006]; Allianceof Nationalist and
GenuineLaborOrg. v. SamahanngmgaManggagawangNagkakaisasaManilaBaySpinningMills, G.R. No.118562, July5, 1996, 258SCRA371, 377.
159
LibertyCottonMillsWorkersUnion, v. LibertyCottonMills, Inc., supra; SeealsoMalayangSamahanngmgaManggagawasaM. Greenfieldv. Ramos, G.R. No. 113907, Feb. 28, 2000, 326SCRA428; Villarv. Inciong, G.R. Nos. L-50283-84, April 20, 1983, 121SCRA444.
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nationalunionatthetimeoftheregistration.Itdoesnotmeanthattheaffiliateunioncannotindependently
stand on its own. Neither can it be interpreted to mean that it cannot pursue its own interests
independently of the federation or national union. An affiliate union owes its creation and continued
existencetothewillofitsmembersandnottothefederationornationaluniontowhichitisaffiliated.
160
2.DISAFFILIATION.
a.Righttodisaffiliate.
Therightoftheaffiliateuniontodisaffiliatefromitsmotherfederationornationalunionisaconstitutionally
guaranteedrightwhichmaybeinvokedbytheformeratanytime.Itisaxiomaticthatanaffiliateunionisaseparateand
voluntary association free to serve the interest of all its members consistent with the freedom of association
guaranteedintheConstitution.
161
b.Disaffiliationofindependentlyregisteredunionandlocalchapter,distinguished.
The disaffiliation of an independentlyregistered union does not affect its legitimate status as a labor
organization.However,thesamethingmaynotbesaidofalocalchapterwhichhasnoindependentregistrationsinceits
creation was effected pursuant to thecharter certificate issuedto itby the federationor nationalunion. Once a local
chapter disaffiliates from the federation or national union which created it, it ceases to be entitled to the rights and
privilegesgrantedtoalegitimatelabororganization.Hence,itcannot,byitself,fileapetitionforcertificationelection.
162
c.Someprinciplesondisaffiliation.
1. Disaffiliationdoesnotdivestanaffiliateunionofitslegalpersonality.
163
2. Disaffiliationofanaffiliateunionisnotanactofdisloyalty.
164
3. Disaffiliationforpurposesofforminganewuniondoesnotterminatethestatusofthemembersthereofas
employeesofthecompany.Bysaidactofdisaffiliation,theemployeeswhoaremembersofthelocalunion
didnotformanewunionbutmerelyexercisedtheirrighttoregistertheirlocalunion.Thelocalunionisfree
todisaffiliatefromitsmotherunion.
165
4. Disaffiliationshouldbeapprovedbythemajorityoftheunionmembers.
166
5. Disaffiliationterminatestherighttocheckofffederationdues.Theobligationtocheckofffederationdues
isterminatedwiththevaliddisaffiliationofthelocalunionfromthefederationwithwhichitwaspreviously
affiliated.
167
6. Disaffiliation does not affect CBA. It does not operate to amend it or change the administration of the
contract.
168
7. Asageneralrule,alaborunionmaydisaffiliatefromtheparentuniontoformanindependentuniononly
during the sixtyday freedom period prior to the expiration of the existing CBA. It is not, however, legally
impossibletoeffect the disaffiliation priortothe freedomperiod,provided that the same is approved by
the majority of the members of the bargaining unit. Under this situation, the CBA continues to bind the
membersofthenewordisaffiliatedandindependentunionuptotheexpirationthereof.
169
8. DisaffiliatingfromthefederationandenteringintoaCBAwiththeemployerdoesnotconstituteanunfair
laborpractice.
170
9. Disaffiliation,notaviolationoftheunionsecurityclause.
171
10.Electionprotestinvolvingboththemotherfederationandlocalunion,notabartodisaffiliation.
172
11.Theissueofaffiliationordisaffiliationisaninterunionconflictthejurisdictionofwhichproperlylieswith
theBureauofLaborRelationsandnotwiththeLaborArbiter.
173
3.SUBSTITUTIONARYDOCTRINE.
DuringthelifetimeoftheCBA,themajoritystatusofthesoleandexclusivebargainingagentwhichnegotiated
itmaybequestionedaswhenthereexistextraordinarycircumstanceswhichaffectitsstandingintermsofmembership,
structureandotherswhichmayhavebeenoccasionedbyunionschismorsplitwhichcompletelychangesthesituation
oftheemployerandthebargainingagent.Apetitionforcertificationelectionmaythusbefiledtodeterminewhichof
theunionshasthemajoritystatus.Theunioncertifiedasthenewsoleandexclusivebargainingagentwillthussubstitute
thepreviousoneasapartytotheexistingCBA.Thisisallowedunderthesocalledsubstitutionarydoctrine.
The invocation of thisdoctrine, however, does not mean that the employees are allowed to revokethe CBA
validlyexecutedwiththeiremployerbyreasonofthechangeinthebargainingagentduringtheeffectivitythereof.
The new bargaining agent should respect the CBAs validity and binding effect. It may, however, negotiate for the
shorteningofthelifetimeoftheCBA.
174
Thisdoctrinecannotbeinvokedtosupportthecontentionthatthenewlycertifiedcollectivebargainingagent
automaticallyassumesallthepersonalundertakingsmadebythedeposedunionlikethenostrikestipulationinthe

160
Tropical Hut FoodEmployeesUnion-CGWv. Tropical Hut FoodMarket, G.R. No. 43495-99, Jan. 20, 1990; SeealsoSt. LukesMedical Center, Inc. v. Torres, G.R. No. 99395, June29, 1993.
161
PhilippineLaborAllianceCouncil v. BLR, G.R. No. L-41288, Jan. 31, 1977, 75SCRA162; Volkschel LaborUnionv. Bureauof Labor Relations, G.R. No. L-45824, June19, 1985, 137SCRA42.
162
SeeArticle234-A, Labor Code; Villarv. Inciong, G.R. Nos. L-50283-84, April 20, 1983, 121SCRA444.
163
PhilippineSkylanders, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 127374, Jan. 31, 2002; PeoplesIndustrial andCommercial EmployeesandWorkers Organization[FFW] v. PeoplesIndustrial andCommercial Corporation, G.R. No. L-37687, March15, 1982, 112SCRA440
164
PeoplesIndustrial andCommercial EmployeesandWorkersOrganization[FFW] v. PeoplesIndustrial andCommercial Corporation, G.R. No. L-37687, March15, 1982, 112SCRA440
165
Elisco-Elirol LaborUnion[NAFLU] v. Noriel, G. R. L-41955, Dec. 29, 1977.
166
Villarv. Inciong, supra; LibertyCottonMillsWorkersUnionv. LibertyCottonMills, Inc., G.R. No. L-33987, Sept. 4, 1975, 66SCRA512.
167
Volkschel LaborUnionv. Bureauof LaborRelations, G.R. No. L-45824, June19, 1985137SCRA42.
168
Volkschel LaborUnionv. Bureauof LaborRelations, supra.
169
AssociatedWorkersUnionPTGWOv. NLRC, G.R. Nos. 87266-69, July30, 1990.
170
PhilippineSkylanders, Inc. v. NLRC, [G.R. No. 127374, January31, 2002].
171
Tropical Hut Employees Union- CGW, v. Tropical Hut FoodMarket, Inc., [G.R. No. L-43495-99, January20, 1990].
172
PhilippineSkylanders, Inc. v. NLRC, [G.R. No. 127374, January31, 2002].
173
Id.
174
Elisco-Elirol LaborUnion[NAFLU] v. Noriel, G.R. No. 41955, Dec. 29, 1977.
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CBA.Whentheformerbargainingagentbounditselfanditsofficersnottostrike,itcouldnothavevalidlyboundalsoall
theotherrivalunionsexistinginthebargainingunitinquestion.Itwastheagentoftheemployees,notoftheother
unions which possess distinct personalities. To consider the union contractually bound to the nostrike stipulation
would,therefore,violatethelegalmaximresinteraliosactaaliosnecprodestnecnocet.Ofcourse,theunion,asthe
newly certified bargaining agent, may always voluntarily assume all the personal undertakings made by the displaced
agent.
175

====================================
(8) Union dues and special assessments
(a) Requirements for validity
====================================
Relevant Provisions: Articles 241 [o] and 277 [a], Labor Code
1.UNIONDUESANDSPECIALASSESSMENTS.
a.Rightofuniontocollectduesandassessments.
Allunionsareauthorizedtocollectreasonableamountsofthefollowing:
1. membershipfees;
2. uniondues;
3. assessments;
4. fines;
5. contributions for labor education and research, mutual death and hospitalization benefits, welfare fund,
strikefundandcreditandcooperativeundertakings;
176
6.Agencyfees.
177
b.Checkoff,defined.
The term checkoff means a method of deducting from the employees pay at prescribed periods, any
amountdueforfees,finesorassessments.
178
Itisaprocessordevicewherebytheemployer,onagreementwiththe
unionrecognizedastheproperbargainingrepresentative,oronpriorauthorizationfromitsemployees,deductsunion
duesoragencyfeesfromthelatterswagesandremitsthemdirectlytotheunion.
179
c.Requisitesforvalidityofunionspecialassessments.
The following requisites must concur in order for special assessments for the unions incidental expenses,
attorneysfeesandrepresentationexpensestobevalidandupheld,namely:
(1) Authorizationbyawrittenresolutionofthemajorityofallthemembersatageneralmembershipmeeting
dulycalledforthepurpose;
(2) Secretarysrecordoftheminutesofsaidmeeting;and
(3) Individualwrittenauthorizationsforcheckoffdulysignedbytheemployeesconcerned.
180
d.Assessmentforattorneysfees,negotiationfeesandsimilarcharges.
Asfarasattorneysfees,negotiationfeesorsimilarchargesareconcerned,theruleisthatnosuchattorneys
fees, negotiation fees or similar charges of any kind arising from the negotiation or conclusion of the CBA shall be
imposedonanyindividualmemberofthecontractingunion.Suchfeesmaybechargedonlyagainsttheunionfundsin
an amounttobe agreeduponbytheparties. Anycontract, agreementor arrangementofany sortto the contrary is
deemednullandvoid.
181
Clearly,whatisprohibitedisthepaymentofattorneysfeeswhenitiseffectedthroughforced
contributionsfromtheworkersfromtheirownfundsasdistinguishedfromtheunionfunds.
182
e.Individualwrittenauthorization,whenrequired.
Thelawstrictlyprohibitsthecheckofffromanyamountdueanemployeewhoisamemberoftheunion,of
any special assessment, attorneys fees, negotiation fees or any other extraordinary fees other than for mandatory
activities under the Labor Code, without the individual written authorization duly signed by the employee. Such
authorization must specifically state the amount, purpose and beneficiary of the deduction.
183
The purpose of the
individual written authorization is to protect the employees from unwarranted practices that diminish their
compensationwithouttheirknowledgeorconsent.
184
f.Individualwrittenauthorization,whennotrequired.
Inthefollowingcases,individualwrittenauthorizationisnotrequired:

175
Benguet Consolidated, Inc. v. BCI Employees&WorkersUnion[PAFLU], G.R. No. L-24711, April 30, 1968, 23SCRA465.
176
Articles241[o] and277[a], LaborCode; Section1, RuleXIII, BookV, RulestoImplement theLaborCode, asamendedbyDepartment OrderNo. 40-03, Seriesof 2003, [Feb. 17, 2003].
177
Article248[e], Labor Code.
178
A. L. AmmenTrans. v. Bicol Transport EmployeesMutual Association, G.R. No. L-4941, July25, 1952, 91Phil. 649.
179
Gabriel v. TheHon. Secretaryof Labor andEmployment, G.R. No. 115949, March16, 2000; ABS-CBNSupervisorsEmployeesUnionMembersv. ABS-CBNBroadcastingCorp., G.R. No. 106518, March11, 1999; HolyCrossof DavaoCollege, Inc. v. Joaquin, G.R. No. 110007, Oct.
18, 1996, 263SCRA358.
180
Article241[o], Labor Code; Gabriel v. TheHon. Secretaryof LaborandEmployment, supra, ABS-CBNSupervisorsEmployeesUnionMembersv. ABS-CBNBroadcastingCorp., supra.
181
SeeArticle241inrelationtoparagraph[b] of Article222of theLaborCode.
182
Gabriel v. TheHon. Secretaryof LaborandEmployment, supra; Vengcov. Trajano, G.R. No. 74453, May5, 1989; StellarIndustrial Services, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 117418, Jan. 24, 1996, 252SCRA323; Palacol v. Ferrer-Calleja, G.R. No. 85333, February26, 1990, 182SCRA710.
183
Article241[o], LaborCode.
184
Galvadoresv. Trajano, G.R. No. 70067, Sept. 15, 1986, 144SCRA138.
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1. Assessmentfromnonmembersofthebargainingagentofagencyfeeswhichshouldbeequivalenttothe
duesandotherfeespaidbymembersoftherecognizedbargainingagent,ifsuchnonmembersacceptthe
benefitsundertheCBA.
185
2. Deductions for fees for mandatory activities such as labor relations seminars and labor education
activities.
186
3. Checkoffforunionservicefeesauthorizedbylaw.
187
4. DeductionsforwithholdingtaxmandatedundertheNationalInternalRevenueCode.
5. Deductionsforwithholdingofwagesbecauseofemployeesdebttotheemployerwhichisalreadydue.
188
6. Deductionsmadepursuanttoajudgmentagainsttheworkerundercircumstanceswherethewagesmaybe
thesubjectofattachmentorexecutionbutonlyfordebtsincurredforfood,clothing,shelterandmedical
attendance.
189
7. Deductionsfromwagesorderedbythecourt.
8. Deductions authorized by law such as for premiums for PhilHealth, social security, PagIBIG, employees
compensationandthelike.
g.Someprinciplesonunionduesandassessments.
1. Checkoff for a special assessment is not valid after the withdrawal of the individual written
authorizations.
190
2. Unlikeinauthorizationforunionduesandassessments,disauthorizationdoesnotrequirethatitbewritten
individually. The fact that the disauthorizations were collective in form consisting of randomly procured
signatures and under loose sheets of paper, is of no moment for the simple reason that the documents
containing the disauthorizations have the signatures of the union members. Such retractions were valid.
Thereisnothinginthelawwhichrequiresthatthedisauthorizationsmustbeinindividualform.
191
3. Therightoftheincumbentbargainingrepresentativetocheckoffandtocollectduesisnotaffectedbythe
pendencyofarepresentationcaseoranintrauniondispute.
192
4. Approvaloftheunionduesandassessmentsbythemajorityofallthemembersoftheunionisrequired.
193
Article241[n]oftheLaborCodeandSection13[a],RuleVIII,BookIIIoftheRulestoImplementtheLaborCodedisallow
adeductionforspecialassessmentwhichwaspassedbyamereboardresolutionofthedirectors,andnotbythe
majorityofallthemembersoftheunion.Also,awrittenauthorizationdulysignedindividuallybytheemployees
concernedisaconditionsinequanontherefor.Employeesareprotectedbylawfromunwarrantedpracticesthathave
fortheirobjectthediminutionofthehardearnedcompensationduethem.
=============================
(9) Agency fees
(a) Requisites for assessment
=============================
Relevant Provision: 2
nd
Sentence, Paragraph [e], Article 248, Labor Code
1.CHECKOFFOFAGENCYFEESFROMNONMEMBERSOFTHEBARGAININGAGENT.
a.Agencyfees.
Theduesandotherfeesthatmaybeassessedfromnonbargainingagentmemberswithinthebargainingunit
who accept and avail of the benefits flowing from the CBA are called agency fees. Payment of agency fees to the
certifiedcollectivebargainingagentwhichsuccessfullynegotiatedtheCBAisbutareasonablerequirementrecognized
bylaw.Inthisaspect,thelegalbasisoftheunion'srighttoagencyfeesisneithercontractualnorstatutory,butquasi
contractual, deriving from the established principle that nonunion employees may not unjustly enrich themselves by
benefitingfromemploymentconditionsnegotiatedbythebargainingagent.
194
b.Employerhasthedutytocheckoffagencyfees.
Theemployerisrequiredtocheckofffromnonbargainingunionmemberswithinacollectivebargainingunit
thesamereasonablefeesequivalenttotheduesandotherfeesnormallypaidbythebargainingunionmemberswithout
theneedforindividualcheckoffauthorizations.
195
c.Noindividualwrittenauthorizationbynonbargainingunionmembersrequired.
To effect the checkoff of agency fees, no individual written authorization from the nonbargaining agent
memberswhoacceptthebenefitsresultingfromtheCBAisnecessary.
196

185
Article248[e], LaborCode.
186
Article241[o], LaborCode.
187
RCPI v. Secretaryof Labor, G.R. No. 77959, Jan. 9, 1989.
188
Article1706, Civil Code.
189
Article1708, Civil Code.
190
Palacol v. Ferrer-Calleja, [G.R. No. 85333, February26, 1990, 182SCRA710-711].
191
Palacol v. Ferrer-Calleja, [supra].
192
Seeoldprovisionof Section1, RuleXVIII, BookV, RulestoImplement theLaborCode, asamendedbyArticle1, Department Order No. 09, Seriesof 1997[21June1997].
193
StellarIndustrial Services, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 117418, Jan. 24, 1996, 252SCRA323; Palacol v. Calleja, etc., supra.
194
HolyCrossof DavaoCollege, Inc. v. Joaquin, G.R. No. 110007, Oct. 18, 1996, 263SCRA358; 331Phil. 680, 692.
195
Article248[e], LaborCode; Section4, RuleXXV, BookV, RulestoImplement theLaborCode, asamendedbyDepartment OrderNo. 40-03, Seriesof 2003, [Feb. 17, 2003].
196
Del PilarAcademyv. Del PilarAcademyEmployeesUnion, supra; HolyCrossof DavaoCollege, Inc. v. Joaquin, supra.
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d.Nonmembersofthecertifiedbargainingagentneednotbecomemembersthereof.
It must be emphasized that the employees who are not members of the certified bargaining agent which
successfully concluded the CBA are not required to become members of the latter. Their acceptance of the benefits
flowingfromtheCBAandtheiractofpayingtheagencyfeesdonotmakethemmembersthereof.
===========================
a. Duty to bargain collectively
(1) Kiok Loy ruling
===========================
Relevant Provisions: Articles 250 to 253, Article 248, Labor Code
1.COLLECTIVEBARGAININGAGREEMENT,DEFINED.
ACollectiveBargainingAgreementorCBAreferstothenegotiatedcontractbetweenadulyrecognizedor
certifiedexclusivebargainingagentofworkersandtheemployerconcerningwages,hoursofworkandallotherterms
and conditions of employment in the appropriate bargaining unit, including mandatory provisions for grievances and
arbitrationmachineries.
197
Duringitslifetime,theCBAisconsideredthelawbetweenthepartiesthecollectivebargainingagentandits
members,ontheonehand,andtheemployer,ontheother.
198
2.ESSENTIALREQUISITESOFCOLLECTIVEBARGAINING.
Priortoanycollectivebargainingnegotiationsbetweentheemployerandthebargainingunion,thefollowing
requisitesmustfirstbesatisfied:
1. Employeremployeerelationshipmustexistbetweentheemployerandthemembersofthebargainingunit
beingrepresentedbythebargainingagent.
199
2. The bargaining agent must have the majority support of the members of the bargaining unit established
throughthemodessanctionedbylaw.
200
3.Alawfuldemandtobargainismadeinaccordancewithlaw.
201
3.DUTYTOBARGAINCOLLECTIVELY.
a.Dutytobargaincollectively,meaning.
Thedutytobargaincollectivelymeanstheperformanceofamutualobligationtomeetandconvenepromptly
andexpeditiouslyingoodfaithforthepurposeofnegotiatinganagreementwithrespecttowages,hoursofworkandall
othertermsandconditionsofemploymentincludingproposalsforadjustinganygrievancesorquestionsarisingunder
suchagreementandexecutingacontractincorporatingsuchagreementsifrequestedbyeitherpartybutsuchdutydoes
notcompelanypartytoagreetoaproposalortomakeanyconcession.
202
b.Two(2)situationscontemplated.
Thedutytobargaincollectivelyinvolvestwo(2)situations,namely:
1. DutytobargaincollectivelyintheabsenceofaCBA.
203
2. DutytobargaincollectivelywhenthereisanexistingCBA.
3.1.DUTYTOBARGAINCOLLECTIVELYINTHEABSENCEOFACBA(ARTICLE251,LABORCODE).
Essentially, the duty to bargain in this situation requires that the employer and the bargaining union should
meet,conveneandconferforcollectivebargainingpurposes.TheadvantageofnegotiatingaCBAforthefirsttimeliesin
thefactthatbothpartiesarenotrestrictedorencumberedbyanypreviousagreementsonanyoftheissuesthatmaybe
raised in the course thereof. They are free to take positions on anything without having to worry about possible past
agreements affecting the current ones for discussion. A CBA is an attempt to erect a whole system of industrial self
government.Itconstitutesageneralizedcodetogovernamyriadofcaseswhichthedraftsmencannotwhollyanticipate
andis,therefore,morethanacontract.Itcoversthewholeemploymentrelationshipandcallsintobeinganewcommon
lawthecommonlawofaparticularindustryorofaparticularshop.
204
3.2.DUTYTOBARGAINCOLLECTIVELYWHENTHEREEXISTSACBA(ARTICLE253,LABORCODE).
a.Concept.
Whenthereisacollectivebargainingagreement,thedutytobargaincollectivelyshallmeanthatneitherparty
shall terminate nor modify such agreement during its lifetime. However, either party can serve a written notice to
terminateormodifytheagreementatleastsixty(60)dayspriortoitsexpirationdate.Itshallbethedutyofbothparties

197
Section1[f], RuleII, NCMBRevisedProcedural GuidelinesintheConduct of VoluntaryArbitrationProceedings[Oct. 15, 2004]; Section1[j], RuleI, BookV, RulestoImplement theLaborCode, asamendedbyDepartment OrderNo. 40-03, Seriesof 2003, [Feb. 17, 2003]; Section1[2],
RuleIII, NCMBManual of ProceduresforConciliationandPreventiveMediationCases; SeePhilippineAirlines, Inc. v. PhilippineAirlinesEmployeesAssociation[PALEA], G.R. No. 142399, March12, 2008.
198
SamahangManggagawasaTopFormManufacturing-UnitedWorkersof thePhilippines[SMTFM-UWP] v. NLRC, G.R. No. 113856, Sept. 7, 1998; MarcopperMiningCorporationv. NLRC, G.R. No. 103525, March29, 1996, 255SCRA322.
199
AlliedFreeWorkersUnionv. CompaniaMaritima, G.R. No. L-22951, Jan. 31, 1967;
200
SeeArticles255to258, LaborCode.
201
Article250, LaborCode; KiokLoyv. NLRC, G.R. No. L-54334, Jan. 22, 1986.
202
Article252, Labor Code.
203
204
48AmJur1797, p. 248.
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tokeepthestatusquoandtocontinueinfullforceandeffectthetermsandconditionsoftheexistingagreementduring
the60dayperiodand/oruntilanewagreementisreachedbytheparties.
205
b.Freedomperiod.
Thelastsixty(60)daysofthe5yearlifetimeofaCBAimmediatelypriortoitsexpirationiscalledthefreedom
period.Itisdenominatedassuchbecauseitistheonlytimewhenthelawallowsthepartiestofreelyserveanoticeto
terminate,alterormodifytheexistingCBA.Itisalsothetimewhenthemajoritystatusofthebargainingagentmaybe
challengedbyanotherunionbyfilingtheappropriatepetitionforcertificationelection.
206
c.Automaticrenewalclause.
Ifunchallenged,themajoritystatusoftheexistingbargainingagentshouldberespected.
A petition for certification election challenging the majority status of the existing bargaining agent should be
filedwithinandnotbeforeorafterthe60dayfreedomperiod.Upontheexpirationofthesaidperiodandnopetition
forcertificationelectionisfiledbyachallengingunion,theemployerisdutyboundtocontinuetorecognizethemajority
status of the incumbent bargaining agent.
207
Negotiation for a new CBA may even validly commence between the
incumbent bargaining agent and the employer during the 60day freedom period if no challenge to the bargaining
agentsmajoritystatusisposedbyanotherunion.
d.Statusquoshouldbemaintained.
Pending the renewal of the CBA, the parties are bound to keep the status quo and to treat the terms and
conditions embodied therein still in full force and effect during the 60day freedom period until a new agreement is
negotiatedandultimatelyconcludedbytheparties.Thisprincipleisotherwiseknownastheautomaticrenewalclause
whichismandatedbylawanddeemedincorporatedinallCBAs.
208
4.KIOKLOYRULING.
a.KiokLoydoctrine.
ThisdoctrineisbasedontherulingInKiokLoyv.NLRC,
[No.L54334,January22,1986,141SCRA179,188],
where the petitioner, Sweden Ice Cream Plant, refused to submit any counterproposal to the CBA proposed by its
employeescertifiedbargainingagent.TheHighCourtruledthattheemployerhadtherebylostitsrighttobargainthe
termsandconditionsoftheCBA.Thus,theCBAproposedbytheunionwasimposedlock,stockandbarrelontheerring
company.
The Kiok Loy case epitomizes the classic case of negotiating a CBA in bad faith consisting of the employers
refusaltobargainwiththecollectivebargainingagentbyignoringallnoticesfornegotiationsandrequestsforcounter
proposals.SuchrefusaltosendacounterproposaltotheunionandtobargainanewontheeconomictermsoftheCBA
constitutesanunfairlaborpracticeunderArticle248[g]oftheLaborCode(violationofthedutybargaincollectively).
209
b.OthercasessubsequenttoKiokLoy.
TherulingthattheCBAproposedbythebargainingunionmaybeadoptedasthenewCBAifemployerrefused
tonegotiatehasbeenreiteratedinthefollowingcases:
1.DivineWordUniversityofTaclobanv.SecretaryofLaborandEmployment,
[G.R.No.91915,September11,
1992, 213 SCRA 759], where the university refused to perform its duty to bargain collectively; hence, the
High Tribunal upheld the unilateral imposition on the university of the CBA proposed by the Divine Word
UniversityEmployeesUnion.
2. General Milling Corporation v. CA, [G.R. No. 146728, February 11, 2004], where the Supreme Court
imposed on the employer the draft CBA proposed by the union for two (2) years commencing from the
expiration of the 3year term of the original CBA. This was because of the employers refusal to counter
proposetotheunionsproposalswhichwasdeclaredasanunfairlaborpracticeunderArticle248[g]ofthe
LaborCode.
==============================
b. Mandatory provisions of CBA
(1) Grievance Procedure
(2) Voluntary Arbitration
(3) No Strike-No Lockout Clause
(4) Labor-Management Council
==============================
Relevant Provision: Article 260 [Grievance Machinery]; Articles 261 to 262 [Voluntary Arbitration]; and
Article 255 [Labor-Management Council], Labor Code

205
206
PicopResources, Inc. v. Taeca, [G.R. No. 160828, August 9, 2010]; MRRYardCrewv. PNR, G.R. No. L-33621, July26, 1976, 72SCRA88; General TextilesAlliedWorkersAssociation- GTAWAv. Director of Bureauof Labor Relations, G.R. No. L-45719, July31, 1978, 84SCRA
430.
207
208
Article253, Labor Code; NewPacificTimber &SupplyCo., Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 124224, March17, 2000; Pier 8Arrastre&StevedoringServices, Inc. v. Roldan-Confesor, G.R. No. 110854, Feb. 13, 1995, 241SCRA294; Unionof FiliproEmployeesv. NLRC, G.R. No. 91025, Dec.
19, 1990.
209
General MillingCorporationv. CA, [G.R. No. 146728, February11, 2004].
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1.MANDATORYPROVISIONSOFTHECBA.
TheSyllabusmentions4provisionsthataremandatorilyrequiredtobestatedintheCBA,towit:
1.GrievanceProcedure
210
2.VoluntaryArbitration
211
3.NoStrikeNoLockoutClause
4.LaborManagementCouncil
212
IftheseprovisionsarenotreflectedintheCBA,itsregistrationwillbedeniedbytheBLR.
2.GRIEVANCEPROCEDURE.
a.Grievanceorgrievableissue,defined.
Agrievanceorgrievableissueisanyquestionraisedbyeithertheemployerortheunionregardinganyof
thefollowingissuesorcontroversies:
1. TheinterpretationorapplicationoftheCBA;
2. Theinterpretationorenforcementofcompanypersonnelpolicies;or
3. AnyclaimbyeitherpartythattheotherpartyisviolatinganyprovisionsoftheCBAorcompanypersonnel
policies.
213
Itmustbestressed,however,thatinordertobegrievable,theviolationsoftheCBAshouldbeordinaryandnot
grossincharacter;otherwise,theyshallbeconsideredasunfairlaborpractice.GrossviolationoftheCBAisdefinedas
flagrant and/or malicious refusal by a party thereto to comply with the economic provisions thereof.
214
If what is
violated,therefore,isanoneconomicorapoliticalprovisionoftheCBA,thesameshallnotbeconsideredasunfairlabor
practiceandmaythusbeprocessedasagrievableissueinaccordancewithandfollowingthegrievancemachinerylaid
downintheCBA.
b.Grievancemachinery,defined.
Grievancemachineryreferstothemechanismfortheadjustmentandresolutionofgrievancesarisingfrom
the interpretation or implementation of a CBA and those arising from the interpretation or enforcement of company
personnelpolicies.
215
c.Grievanceprocedure,defined.
Grievance procedure refers to the internal rules of procedure established by the parties in their CBA with
voluntaryarbitrationastheterminalstep,whichareintendedtoresolveallissuesarisingfromtheimplementationand
interpretation of their collective agreement.
216
It is that part of the CBA which provides for a peaceful way of settling
differencesandmisunderstandingbetweentheparties.
217
Thetermsgrievanceprocedureandgrievancemachinerymaybeusedinterchangeably.
3.VOLUNTARYARBITRATION.
a.Voluntaryarbitration,defined.
Voluntaryarbitrationreferstothemodeofsettlinglabormanagementdisputesinwhichthepartiesselecta
competent,trainedandimpartialthirdpersonwhoistaskedtodecideonthemeritsofthecaseandwhosedecisionis
finalandexecutory.
218
b.VoluntaryArbitrator.
A Voluntary Arbitrator refers to any person who has been accredited by the National Conciliation and
MediationBoard(NCMBorBoard)assuch,oranypersonnamedordesignatedintheCBAbythepartiesastheir
VoluntaryArbitrator,oronechosenbythepartieswithorwithouttheassistanceoftheNCMB,pursuanttoaselection
procedureagreeduponintheCBAoroneappointedbytheNCMBincaseeitherofthepartiestotheCBArefusesto
submittovoluntaryarbitration.ThistermincludesapanelofVoluntaryArbitrators.
219
A Voluntary Arbitrator is not an employee, functionary or part of the government or of the Department of
LaborandEmployment,butheisauthorizedtorenderarbitrationservicesprovidedunderlaborlaws.
220
4.NOSTRIKENOLOCKOUTCLAUSE.
AnostrikenolockoutclauseintheCBAisanexpressionofthefirmcommitmentofthepartiestheretothat,
onthepartoftheunion,itwillnotmountastrikeduringtheeffectivityoftheCBA,andonthepartoftheemployer,that
itwillnotstagealockoutduringthelifetimethereof.Ithasheretoforebeenheldthatanostrike,nolockoutprovision
intheCBAisavalidstipulationalthoughtheclausemaybeinvokedbyanemployeronlywhenthestrikeiseconomicin
natureoronewhichisconductedtoforcewageorotherconcessionsfromtheemployerthatarenotmandatedtobe
grantedbythelawitself.Itdoesnotbarstrikesgroundedonunfairlaborpractices.
221

210
SeeArticle260, Labor Code.
211
SeeArticles261to262, Labor Code.
212
213
Section1[u], RuleI, BookV, RulestoImplement theLaborCode, asamendedbyDepartment OrderNo. 40-03, Seriesof 2003, Feb. 17, 2003; Section1[g], RuleII, NCMBRevisedProcedural GuidelinesintheConduct of VoluntaryArbitrationProceedings[Oct. 15, 2004]; No. 4, NCMB
Primer onGrievanceSettlement andVoluntaryArbitration.
214
215
216
RuleIII [7], NCMBManual of ProceduresforConciliationandPreventiveMediation.
217
No. 12, NCMBPrimer onGrievanceSettlement andVoluntaryArbitration; SeealsoSection1[h], RuleII, NCMBRevisedProcedural GuidelinesintheConduct of VoluntaryArbitrationProceedings[Oct. 15, 2004].
218
Section1[d], RuleII, NCMBRevisedProcedural GuidelinesintheConduct of VoluntaryArbitrationProceedings[Oct. 15, 2004].
219
Section1[e], RuleII, NCMBRevisedProcedural GuidelinesintheConduct of VoluntaryArbitrationProceedings[Oct. 15, 2004]; SeealsoArticle212[n], LaborCode; Section1, RuleI, BookV, RulestoImplement theLaborCode, asamendedbyDepartment OrderNo. 40-03, Seriesof
2003, [Feb. 17, 2003]; Section1[27], RuleIII, NCMBManual of ProceduresforConciliationandPreventiveMediationCases.
220
Ludo&LuymCorporationv. Saornido, G.R. No. 140960, Jan. 20, 2003.
221
MalayangSamahanngmgaManggagawasaM. Greenfield(MSMG-UWP) v. Ramos, G.R. No. 113907, Feb. 28, 2000, 326SCRA428, citingMasterIronLaborUnionv. NLRC, G.R. No. 92009, Feb. 17, 1993, 219SCRA47; SeealsoPanayElectricCompany, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No.
102672, Oct. 4, 1995, 248SCRA688; PeoplesIndustrial andCommercial EmployeesandWorkersOrganization[FFW] v. PeoplesIndustrial andCommercial Corporation, G.R. No. L-37687, March15, 1982, 112SCRA440.
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Thesamerulealsoappliesincaseofalockout.Thesaidclausemayonlybeinvokedbytheunionincasethe
groundforthelockoutiseconomicinnaturebutitmaynotbesocitedifthegroundisunfairlaborpracticecommitted
bytheunion.
TheSupremeCourtconsistentlyruledinalonglineofcasesthatastrikeisillegalifstagedinviolationofthe
saidclauseintheCBAespeciallywhenconclusivearbitrationclauseisprovidedtherein.
222
Thus,inthe2010caseofC.
Alcantara&Sons,Inc.v.CA,[G.R.No.155109,September29,2010],itwasdeclaredthatastrikemayberegardedas
invalidalthoughthelaborunionhascompliedwiththestrictrequirementsforstagingoneasprovidedinArticle263of
theLaborCodewhenthesameisheldcontrarytoanexistingagreement,suchasanostrike,nolockoutprovisionthat
enjoinsboththeunionandthecompanyfromresortingtotheuseofeconomicweaponsavailabletothemunderthe
lawandtoinsteadtakerecoursetovoluntaryarbitrationinsettlingtheirdisputes.
5.LABORMANAGEMENTCOUNCIL.
a.Creationoflabormanagementcouncils.
LabormanagementcouncilsaremandatedtobecreatedineveryestablishmentpursuanttotheConstitutional
granttoemployeesoftherighttoparticipateinpolicyanddecisionmakingprocessesinallmattersaffectingtheirrights,
duties,benefitsandwelfare.
223
Under the Rules to Implement the Labor Code, the Department of Labor and Employment is mandated to
promote the formation of labormanagement councils in organized and unorganized establishments to enable the
workers to participate in policy and decisionmaking processes in the establishment, insofar as said processes will
directlyaffecttheirrights,benefitsandwelfare,exceptthosewhicharecoveredbycollectivebargainingagreementsor
aretraditionalareasofbargaining.
224
In establishments where no legitimate labor organization exists, labormanagement committees may be

formedvoluntarilybyworkersandemployersforthepurposeofpromotingindustrialpeace.TheDepartmentofLabor
and Employment should endeavor to enlighten and educate the workers and employers on their rights and
responsibilitiesthroughlaboreducationwithemphasisonthepolicythrustsoftheLaborCode.
225
b.Selectionofrepresentativestolabormanagementcommitteesorcouncils.
Inorganizedestablishments,theworkersrepresentativestothecouncilshouldbenominatedbytheexclusive
bargainingrepresentative.Inestablishmentswherenolegitimatelabororganizationexists,theworkersrepresentative
shouldbeelecteddirectlybytheemployeesatlarge.
226
============================
c. ULP in Collective Bargaining
(1) Bargaining in bad faith
(2) Refusal to bargain
(3) Individual bargaining
(4) Blue sky bargaining
(5) Surface bargaining
============================
1.BARGAININGINBADFAITH.
a.Basicprinciples.
Itisessentialthattheemployerandtheemployeesshouldbothactingoodfaith.Itisinthisprincipleofgood
faiththatdependsentirelythesuccessandeffectivenessofmaintainingindustrialstabilityandpeace.Thesigningofthe
CBA is not the end of the collective bargaining and negotiations process. It continues to the stage where the parties
theretoaremandatedtoadministerandimplementtheagreedtermsandconditionsoftheemploymentrelationship.
The CBA process covers, therefore, all aspects of the employment relationship between the employer and the
employees, commencing with the negotiation of its stipulations and finally, its administration, application and
implementation.
Collective bargaining is not merely going through the motions of negotiating. A party must not have a
predeterminedresolvenottobudgefromaninitialposition.Itisnotsurfacebargainingaccompaniedbyapurposeto
defeat it. It is not shadow boxing to a draw. But it is not necessarily incompatible with stubbornness. Good faith
bargainingrequiresthatclaimsmadebyeitherbargainershouldbehonestclaims.Itwouldnotbefarfetchedtoreach
theconclusionthatbargaininglacksgoodfaithwhenanemployermechanicallyrepeatsclaimofinabilitytopaywithout
makingtheslightestefforttosubstantiatetheclaim.
227
Whereanemployerdidnotevenbothertosubmitananswertothebargainingproposalsoftheunion,thereis
aclearevasionofthedutytobargaincollectively.
228

222
ToyotaMotor Phils. Corp. WorkersAssociation[TMPCWA] v. NLRC, G.R. Nos. 158786&158789, October 19, 2007; FilconManufacturingCorporationv. Lakas ManggagawasaFilcon-Lakas ManggagawaLabor Center [LMF-LMLC], G.R. No. 150166, July
26, 2004.
223
SeeSection3, ArticleXIII, 1987Constitution; Article255, Labor Code.
224
Section1, RuleXXI, BookV, RulestoImplement theLaborCode, asamendedbyDepartment OrderNo. 40-03, Seriesof 2003, [Feb. 17, 2003].
225
Article277[h], LaborCode, asamendedbySection33, RepublicAct No. 6715, March21, 1989.
226
Section2, RuleXXI, BookV, Ibid..
227
NLRBv. Truitt ManufacturingCo., 351U. S. 149; 48AmJur2d1200.
228
TheBradmanCo., Inc. v. CIR, G.R. No. L-23134, July21, 1977.
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A CBA is not simply a document by which the union and the employees have imposed upon management
expressrestrictionsofitsotherwiseabsoluterighttomanagetheenterprise.Whileregulatingorrestrainingtheexercise
of management functions, the CBA does not oust management from the performance of these functions. The choice
availabletothepartiestoaCBAisnotbetweenenteringorrefusingtoenterintoarelationshipbutbetweenhavingthat
relationshipgovernedbyanagreeduponruleoflaworleavingeachandeverymattersubjecttoatemporaryresolution
dependentsolelyupontherelativestrength,atanygivenmoment,ofthecontendingforces.
229
b.MakingapromiseduringtheCBAnegotiations,notanindicationofbadfaith.
PromisesmadebymanagementduringtheCBAnegotiationsmaynotbeconsideredanindicationofbadfaith
oraschemeoffeigningtoundertakethenegotiationproceedingsthroughemptypromises.Theunionhas,underthe
law, the right and opportunity to insist on the foreseeable fulfillment of the companys promise by demanding its
incorporation in the CBA. As held in Samahang Manggagawa sa Top Form ManufacturingUnited Workers of the
Philippines[SMTFMUWP]v.NLRC,[G.R.No.113856,September7,1998],becausetheproposalwasneverembodied
intheCBA,thepromisehasremainedjust that,apromise,theimplementationofwhichcannotbevalidlydemanded
underthelaw.
c.Adamantstanceresultinginanimpasse,notanindiciumofbadfaith.
Theadamant insistenceon abargaining position tothepointwhere thenegotiations reach an impassedoes
not establish bad faith. Neither can bad faith be inferred from a partys insistence on the inclusion of a particular
substantiveprovisionunlessitconcernstrivialmattersorisobviouslyintolerable.
230
d.Partieshavenoobligationtoprecipitatelyagreetotheproposalsofeachother.
While the law makes it an obligation for the employer and the employees to bargain collectively with each
other, such compulsion does not include the commitment to precipitately accept or agree to the proposals of the
other.Allitcontemplatesisthatbothpartiesshouldapproachthenegotiationwithanopenmindandmakereasonable
efforttoreachacommongroundofagreement.
231
e.AllegationsofbadfaithwipedoutwiththesigningoftheCBA.
WiththeexecutionoftheCBA,badfaithbargainingcannolongerbeimputeduponanyofthepartiesthereto.
AllprovisionsintheCBAaresupposedtohavebeenjointlyandvoluntarilyincorporatedthereinbytheparties.TheCBA
isproofenoughthatthecompanyexertedreasonableeffortatgoodfaithbargaining.
232
2.REFUSALTOBARGAIN.
a.Effectoffailureorrefusalofmanagementtogivecounterproposalstotheunionsdemands.
Thefailureoftheemployertosubmititscounterproposalstothedemandsofthebargaininguniondoesnot,
byitself,constituterefusaltobargain.
233
However,itisdifferentiftheemployerrefusestosubmitananswerorreplyto
thewrittenbargainingproposalsofthecertifiedbargainingunion.Inthiscase,unfairlaborpracticeiscommitted.While
the law does not compel the parties to reach an agreement, it does contemplate that both parties will approach the
negotiationwithanopenmindandmakeareasonableefforttoreachacommongroundofagreement.
234
In the case of General Milling Corporation v. CA, [G.R. No. 146728, February 11, 2004], the Supreme Court
foundthepetitionerguiltyofunfairlaborpracticeunderArticle248[g]forrefusingtosendacounterproposaltothe
unionandtobargainanewontheeconomictermsoftheCBA.
Similarly, in the earlier case of Colegio de San Juan de Letran v. Association of Employees and Faculty of
Letran,[G.R.No.141471,September18,2000],thepetitionerschoolwasdeclaredguiltyofunfairlaborpracticewhenit
failedtomakeatimelyreplytotheproposalsofthecertifiedbargainingunionmorethanamonthafterthesamewere
submittedtoit.Inexplainingitsfailuretoreply,theschoolmerelyofferedthefeebleexcusethatitsBoardofTrustees
hadnotyetconvenedtodiscussthematter.Clearly,itsactuationshowedalackofsinceredesiretonegotiatetheCBA
therebyrenderingitguiltyofanunfairlaborpractice.
b.RefusalofapartytosigntheCBA.
A party to a fullyconcluded CBA may be compelled to sign it, especially if said refusal to sign is the only
remaininghitchtoitsbeingimplemented.Suchrefusalisconsideredanunfairlaborpractice.
235
3.INDIVIDUALBARGAINING.
Employersactofnegotiatingwithindividualmembersoftheunionisanunfairlaborpractice.Tonegotiateor
attempttonegotiatewithindividualworkersratherthanwiththecertifiedbargainingagentisobviouslyULP.
236
4.BLUESKYBARGAINING.
Bluesky bargaining means making exaggerated or unreasonable proposals.

237
This kind of unfair labor
practiceactmayonlybecommittedbythebargainingunion.
Inthe2004caseof StandardCharteredBankEmployeesUnion[NUBE]v.Confesor,[G.R.No.114974,June
16, 2004], the minutes of the meeting show that the union based its economic proposals on data of rankandfile

229
48AmJur1797, p. 248.
230
SamahangManggagawasaTopFormManufacturing-UnitedWorkersof thePhilippines[SMTFM-UWP] v. NLRC, supra; DivineWordUniversityof Taclobanv. Secretaryof LaborandEmployment, G.R. No. 91915, Sept. 11, 1992, 213SCRA759, 912-913.
231
Unionof FiliproEmployees-Drug, FoodandAlliedIndustriesUnions-KilusangMayoUno[UFE-DFA-KMU] v. NestlePhilippines, Inc., G.R. Nos. 158930-31, March3, 2008.
232
SamahangManggagawasaTopFormManufacturing-UnitedWorkersof thePhilippines[supra].
233
PhilippineMarineRadioOfficersAssociationv. Court of Industrial Relations, G.R. Nos. L-10095andL-10115, Oct. 31, 1957, 102Phil. 373.
234
KiokLoyv. NLRC, G.R. No. 54334, Jan. 22, 1986; BradmanCo., Inc. v. CIR, G.R. Nos. L-24134-35, July21, 1977, 78SCRA10.
235
RoadwayExpressv. General Teamster, 320F2d, 859.
236
InsularLifeAssuranceCo., Ltd., EmployeesAssociation-NATUv. InsularLifeAssuranceCo., Ltd., G.R. No. L-25291, Jan. 30, 1971, 37SCRA244.
237
Arthur A. SloaneandFredWitney, LaborRelations, 7
th
Edition1991, p. 195.
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employeesandtheprevailingeconomicbenefitsreceivedbybankemployeesfromotherforeignbanksdoingbusinessin
thePhilippinesandotherbranchesofthebankintheAsianregion.Hence,itcannotbesaidthattheunionwasguiltyof
anunfairlaborpracticeforblueskybargaining.
5.SURFACEBARGAINING.
Surfacebargainingisdefinedasgoingthroughthemotionsofnegotiatingwithoutanylegalintenttoreach
anagreement.Thiskindofunfairlaborpracticemayonlybecommittedbytheemployer.
AccordingtoStandardCharteredBankEmployeesUnion[NUBE]v.Confesor,[supra],itinvolvesthequestion
ofwhetheranemployersconductdemonstratesanunwillingnesstobargainingoodfaithorismerelyhardbargaining.
Therecanbenosurfacebargaining,absentanyevidencethatmanagementhaddoneacts,bothatandawayfromthe
bargaining table, which tend to show that it did not want to reach an agreement with the union or to settle the
differences between it and the union. Here, admittedly, the parties were not able to agree and reached a deadlock.
However,itmustbeemphasizedthatthedutytobargaindoesnotcompeleitherpartytoagreetoaproposalorrequire
the making of a concession.
Hence, the parties failure to agree does not amount to an unfair labor practice under
Article248[g].
238
=============================
(1) ULP of Employers
=============================
Relevant Provision: Article 248, Labor Code
1.UNFAIRLABORPRACTICE(ULP),INGENERAL.
a.Whenanactisconsideredunfairlaborpractice.
At the outset, it must be clarified that not all unfair acts constitute unfair labor practices. While an act or
decisionofanemployeroraunionmaybeunfair,certainlynoteveryunfairactordecisionthereofmayconstitutean
unfairlaborpractice(ULP)asdefinedandenumeratedunderArticles248and249oftheLaborCode.
239
TheactcomplainedofasULPmusthaveaproximateandcausalconnectionwiththefollowing:
1.Exerciseoftherighttoselforganization;
2.Exerciseoftherighttocollectivebargaining;or
3.ObservanceofaCBA.
Sans this connection, the unfair acts do not fall within the technical signification of the term unfair labor
practice.
240
b.Article248[f],theonlyULPnotrelatedtotheexerciseoftherighttoselforganizationandcollective
bargaining.
TheonlyULPwhichistheexceptionasitmayormaynotrelatetotheexerciseoftherighttoselforganization
andcollectivebargainingistheactdescribedunderArticle248[f],i.e.,todismiss,dischargeorotherwiseprejudiceor
discriminateagainstanemployeeforhavinggivenorbeingabouttogivetestimonyundertheLaborCode.
241
c.LaborCodeprovisionsonULP.
UndertheLaborCode,thereareonlyfive(5)provisionsrelatedtounfairlaborpractices,towit:
1. Article 247 which describes the concept of unfair labor practices and prescribes the procedure for their
prosecution;
2. Article248whichenumeratestheunfairlaborpracticesthatmaybecommittedbyemployers;
3. Article249whichenumeratestheunfairlaborpracticesthatmaybecommittedbylabororganizations;
4. Article 261 which considers violations of the CBA as no longer unfair labor practices unless the same are
grossincharacterwhichmeansflagrantand/ormaliciousrefusaltocomplywiththeeconomicprovisions
thereof.
5. Article263[c]whichreferstounionbustinginvolvingthedismissalfromemploymentofunionofficersduly
elected in accordance with the union constitution and bylaws, where the existence of the union is
threatenedthereby.
d.Partieswho/whichmaycommitULP.
Anunfairlaborpracticemaybecommittedbyanemployerorbyalabororganization.Article248describesthe
unfair labor practices that may be committed by an employer; while Article 249 enumerates those which may be
committedbyalabororganization.

238
SeealsoNational Unionof Restaurant Workers[PTUC] v. CIR, G.R. No. L-20044, April 30, 1964, 10SCRA843.
239
GalaxieSteel WorkersUnion[GSWU-NAFLU-KMU] v. NLRC, G.R. No. 165757, Oct. 17, 2006.
240
AlliedBankingCorporationv. CA, G.R. No. 144412, Nov. 18, 2003; SeealsoTunaynaPagkakaisangManggagawasaAsiaBreweryv. AsiaBrewery, Inc., G.R. No. 162025, Aug. 3, 2010.
241
PhilcomEmployeesUnionv. PhilippineGlobal Communications, G.R. No. 144315, July17, 2006.
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On the part of the employer, only the officers and agents of corporations, associations or partnerships who
haveactuallyparticipatedinorauthorizedorratifiedunfairlaborpracticesarecriminallyliable.
242
On the part of the union, only the officers, members of governing boards, representatives or agents or
members of labor associations or organizations who have actually participated in or authorized or ratified the unfair
laborpracticesarecriminallyliable.
243
e.ElementsofULP.
Beforeanemployerorlabororganization,asthecasemaybe,maybesaidtohavecommittedanunfairlabor
practice,thefollowingelementsmustconcur:
1.Thereshouldexistanemployeremployeerelationshipbetweentheoffendedpartyandtheoffender;and
2.The act complained of must be expressly mentioned and defined in the Labor Code as an unfair labor
practice.
Absentoneoftheelementsaforementionedwillnotmaketheactanunfairlaborpractice.
Thefirstrequisiteisnecessarybecauseanunfairlaborpracticemayonlybecommittedinconnectionwiththe
right to selforganization and collective bargaining by employees. Necessarily, there must be an employment
relationshipinorderfortheorganizationalrighttobevalidlyandlawfullyinvoked.
The second requisite should be present since the Labor Code itself requires that the unfair labor practice be
expresslydefinedbythisCode.Ifanactisnotcoveredbyanyofthegroundsexpresslymentionedinthelaw,itcannot
bedeemedanunfairlaborpracticeact.
f.AspectsofULP.
UnderArticle247,anunfairlaborpracticehastwo(2)aspects,namely:
1.Civilaspect;and
2.Criminalaspect.
Thecivilaspectofanunfairlaborpracticeincludesclaimsforactual,moralandexemplarydamages,attorneys
feesandotheraffirmativereliefs.
244
Generally,thesecivilclaimsshouldbeassertedinthelaborcasebeforetheLabor
Arbiterswhohaveoriginalandexclusivejurisdictionoverunfairlaborpractices.
245
2.UNFAIRLABORPRACTICESOFEMPLOYERS(ARTICLE248,LABORCODE).
Article248.UnfairLaborPracticesofEmployers.Itshallbeunlawfulforanemployerto
commitanyofthefollowingunfairlaborpractices:
(a) To interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their right to self
organization;
(b) Torequireasaconditionofemploymentthatapersonoranemployeeshallnotjoina
labororganizationorshallwithdrawfromonetowhichhebelongs;
(c) Tocontractoutservicesorfunctionsbeingperformedbyunionmemberswhensuch
willinterferewith,restrainorcoerceemployeesintheexerciseoftheirrightstoself
organization;
(d) To initiate, dominate, assist or otherwise interfere with the formation or
administration of any labor organization, including the giving of financial or other
supporttoitoritsorganizersorsupporters;
(e) Todiscriminateinregardtowages,hoursofworkandothertermsandconditionsof
employment in order to encourage or discourage membership in any labor
organization. Nothing in this Code or in any other law shall stop the parties from
requiring membership in a recognized collective bargaining agent as a condition for
employment,exceptthoseemployeeswhoarealreadymembersofanotherunionat
the time of the signing of the collective bargaining agreement. Employees of an
appropriate bargaining unit who are not members of the recognized collective
bargainingagentmaybeassessedareasonablefeeequivalenttotheduesandother
feespaidbymembersoftherecognizedcollectivebargainingagent,ifsuchnonunion
members accept the benefits under the collective bargaining agreement: Provided,
that the individual authorization required under Article 242, paragraph (o) of this
Code shall not apply to the nonmembers of the recognized collective bargaining
agent;
(f) Todismiss,dischargeorotherwiseprejudiceordiscriminateagainstanemployeefor
havinggivenorbeingabouttogivetestimonyunderthisCode;
(g) ToviolatethedutytobargaincollectivelyasprescribedbythisCode;
(h) Topaynegotiationorattorneysfeestotheunionoritsofficersoragentsaspartof
thesettlementofanyissueincollectivebargainingoranyotherdispute;or
(i) Toviolateacollectivebargainingagreement.

242
243
244
SeeArticle247, LaborCode.
245
UnderArticle217, LaborCode.
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Theprovisionsoftheprecedingparagraphnotwithstanding,onlytheofficersandagentsof
corporations,associationsorpartnershipswhohaveactuallyparticipatedin,authorizedorratified
unfairlaborpracticesshallbeheldcriminallyliable.
246
2.1.INTERFERENCEWITH,RESTRAINTORCOERCIONOFEMPLOYEESINTHEEXERCISEOFTHEIRRIGHTTOSELF
ORGANIZATION.
a.Testofinterference,restraintorcoercion.
Paragraph [a] of Article 248 considers it an unfair labor practice of employers to interfere with, restrain or
coerceemployeesintheexerciseoftheirrighttoselforganization.Thetermsinterfere,restrainorcoercearevery
broad that any act of management that may reasonably tend to have an influence or effect on the exercise by the
employeesoftheirrighttoselforganizemayfallwithintheirmeaningandcoverage.AccordingtotheSupremeCourtin
InsularLifeAssuranceCo.,Ltd.,EmployeesAssociationNATUv.InsularLifeAssuranceCo.,Ltd.,[G.R.No.L25291,
January 30, 1971, 37 SCRA 244], the test of whether an employer has interfered with or restrained or coerced
employeeswithinthemeaningofthelawiswhethertheemployerhasengagedinconductwhichmayreasonablytend
to interfere with the free exercise of the employees rights. It is not necessary that there be direct evidence that any
employee was in fact intimidated or coerced by the statements or threats of the employer if there is a reasonable
inferencethattheantiunionconductoftheemployerdoeshaveanadverseeffectontheexerciseoftherighttoself
organizationandcollectivebargaining.
However the act is called or denominated whether as interference, restraint or coercion, or as a
discriminatorydischarge,orasarefusaltobargain,orevenasacombinationofanyoralloftheseisofnoconsequence.
Whatisimportantisthattheactconstitutesanunfairlaborpractice.
247
Thesignificantpointtoconsider,forachargeofunfairlaborpracticetoprosper,isthatitmustbeshownthat
the employers act was motivated by ill will, bad faith, or fraud, or was oppressive to labor, or done in a manner
contrary to morals, good customs, or public policy, and, of course, that social humiliation, wounded feelings or grave
anxietyresulted.
248
b.Totalityofconductdoctrine.
In ascertaining whether the act of the employer constitutes interference with, restraint or coercion of the
employeesexerciseoftheirrighttoselforganizationandcollectivebargaining,thetotalityofconductdoctrinemaybe
applied. This means that expressions of opinion by an employer, though innocent in themselves, may be held to
constitute an unfair labor practice because of the circumstances under which they were uttered, the history of the
particularemployerslaborrelationsorantiunionbiasorbecauseoftheirconnectionwithanestablishedcollateralplan
ofcoercionorinterference.Anexpressionwhichmaybepermissiblyutteredbyoneemployer,might,inthemouthofa
morehostileemployer,bedeemedimproperandconsequentlyactionableasanunfairlaborpractice.
249
Thepastconductoftheemployerandlikeconsiderations,coupledwithanintimateconnectionbetweenthe
employersactionandtheunionaffiliationoractivitiesoftheparticularemployeeoremployeestakenasawhole,may
raiseasuspicionastothemotivationfortheemployersconduct.Thefailureoftheemployertoascribeavalidreason
thereformayjustifyaninferencethathisunexplainedconductinrespectoftheparticularemployeeoremployeeswas
inspiredbythelattersunionmembershipandactivities.
250
c.Someprinciplesoninterference,restraintorcoercionasULP.
1.InterferenceintheemployeesrighttoselforganizationisULP.Forexample:
a. In General Milling Corporation v. CA, [G.R. No. 146728, February 11, 2004], the Supreme Court
consideredtheactoftheemployerinpresentingthelettersbetweenFebruarytoJune1993bythirteen
(13) union members signifying their resignation from the union clearly indicative of the employers
pressure on its employees and, therefore, ULP. The records show that the employer presented these
letters to prove that the union no longer enjoyed the support of the workers. The fact that the
resignations of the union members occurred during the pendency of the case beforethe LaborArbiter
showstheemployersdesperateattempttocastdoubtonthelegitimatestatusoftheunion.Theilltimed
lettersofresignationfromtheunionmembersindicatethattheemployerhadinterferedwiththerightof
itsemployeestoselforganization.Becauseofsuchact,theemployerwasdeclaredguiltyofunfairlabor
practice.
b. InHaciendaFatimav.NationalFederationofSugarcaneWorkersFoodandGeneralTrade,[G.R.No.
149440,January28,2003],theSupremeCourtupheldthefactualfindingsoftheNLRCandtheCourtof
Appealsthatfromtheemployersrefusaltobargaintoitsactsofeconomicinducementsresultinginthe
promotionofthosewhowithdrewfromtheunion,theuseofarmedguardstopreventtheorganizersto
comein,andthedismissalofunionofficialsandmembers,onecannotbutconcludethattheemployer
didnotwantaunioninitshaciendaaclearinterferenceintherightoftheworkerstoselforganization.
Hence,theemployerwasheldguiltyofunfairlaborpractice.

246
AsamendedbyBatasPambansaBilang130, August 21, 1981.
247
RepublicSavingsBankv. CIR, G.R. No. L-20303, Sept. 27, 1967, 21SCRA226.
248
TunaynaPagkakaisangManggagawasaAsiaBreweryv. AsiaBrewery, Inc., [G.R. No. 162025, August 3, 2010.
249
InsularLifeAssuranceCo., Ltd., EmployeesAssociation-NATU, v. InsularLifeAssuranceCo., Ltd., supra; SamahanngManggagawasaBandolino-LMLCv. NLRC, G.R. No. 126195, July17, 1997, 275SCRA633.
250
Royal Undergarment Corporationof thePhilippinesv. CIR, G.R. No. L-39040, June6, 1990.
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2. Interferenceinthechoiceoftheunionsbargainingpanel.Ifanemployerinterferesintheselectionofthe
unionsnegotiators or coerces theunionto excludefrom its panelofnegotiators, a representative of the
union,andifitcanbeinferredthattheemployeradoptedthesaidacttoyieldadverseeffectsonthefree
exerciseoftherighttoselforganizationorontherighttocollectivebargainingoftheemployees,anunfair
laborpracticeunderArticle248[a],inconnectionwithandinrelationtoArticle243oftheLaborCode,is
committed.
251
3.Formationofaunionisneveravalidgroundtodismiss.InMarkRocheInternationalv.NLRC,[G.R.No.
123825, August 31, 1999], in ruling that the private respondents were not constructively dismissed but
illegally dismissed, it was established that it was the filing of the petition for certification election and
organizationofaunionwithinthecompanywhichledpetitionerstodismissprivate respondentsandnot
petitioners'allegationsofabsenceorabandonmentbyprivaterespondents.Evidently,itwasafterreceiving
the notice of hearing of the petition for certification election on 27 October 1992 that petitioners
immediatelytoldprivaterespondentsthattheywerenolongeremployed.Theformationofalaborunion
hasneverbeenagroundforvalidtermination,andwherethereisanabsenceofclear,validandlegalcause,
thelawconsiderstheterminationillegal.
4. Itisanunfairlaborpracticetodismissaunionofficeroranemployeeforhisunionactivities.Inthe2000
caseofColegiodeSanJuandeLetranv.AssociationofEmployeesandFacultyofLetran,[G.R.No.141471,
September18,2000],theoutrightterminationforallegedinsubordinationoftheunionpresidentwhilethe
CBAnegotiationwasongoingwasdeclaredasanactofunionbustingasitinterferedwiththeemployees
righttoselforganization.Thefactualbackdropoftheterminationoftheunionpresidentleadstonoother
conclusionbutthatshewasdismissedinordertostriptheunionofaleaderwhowouldfightfortherightof
hercoworkersatthebargainingtable.
In Cathay Pacific Steel Corp. v. Hon. CA, [G.R. No. 164561, August 30, 2006], the act of the employer in
dismissingasupervisoryemployee(PersonnelSuperintendent)onaccountofhisunionactivitiesrelatedto
theformationofthesupervisoryunionwasheldasanunfairlaborpractice.
h. When closure constitutes ULP. In holding that petitioner is liable for unfair labor practice and illegal
dismissal,theSupremeCourt,inSt.JohnColleges,Inc.v.St.JohnAcademyFacultyandEmployeesUnion,
[G.R.No.167892,October27,2006],pronouncedthatthetimingof,andthereasonsfor,theclosureofthe
highschooldepartmentanditsreopeningafteronlyoneyearfromthetimeitwascloseddown,showthat
theclosurewasdoneinbadfaithforthepurposeofcircumventingtheunionsrighttocollectivebargaining
anditsmembersrighttosecurityoftenure.PetitionerSJCIunderminedtheLaborCodessystemofdispute
resolution by closing down its high school department while the 1997 CBA negotiations deadlock issues
werependingresolutionbeforetheSecretaryofLaborandEmployment.Theclosurewasdoneinbadfaith
forthepurposeofdefeatingtheunionsrighttocollectivebargaining.Besides,asfoundbytheNLRC,the
alleged illegality and excessiveness oftheunionsdemandswerenot sufficientlyprovedbySJCI.Even on
the assumption that the unions demands were illegal or excessive, SJCIs remedy was to await the
resolutionbytheDOLESecretaryandtofileaULPcaseagainsttheunion.However,SJCIdidnothavethe
powertotakemattersintoitsownhandsbyclosingdownitshighschooldepartmentinordertogetridof
theunion.
Inthe2008caseofPurefoodsCorp.v.NagkakaisangSamahangManggagawangPurefoodsRankandFile,
[G.R.No.150896,August28,2008],theclosureofpetitionersSto.Tomasfarmwasdeclaredtohavebeen
madeinbadfaith.Badgesofbadfaithareevidentfromthefollowingactsofthepetitioner:itunjustifiably
refusedtorecognizetheSto.TomasFreeWorkersUnions(STFWUs)andtheotherunionsaffiliationwith
PurefoodsUnifiedLaborOrganization(PULO);itconcludedanewCBAwithanotherunioninanotherfarm
during the agreed indefinite suspension of the collective bargaining negotiations; it surreptitiously
transferredandcontinueditsbusinessinalesshostileenvironment;anditsuddenlyterminatedtheSTFWU
membersbutretainedandbroughtthenonmemberstoitsMalvarfarm.Petitionerpresentednoevidence
to support itscontention thatit was incurring losses or thatthe subject farms leaseagreementwas pre
terminated.Ineluctably,theclosureoftheSto.Tomasfarmcircumventedthelabororganizationsrightto
collectivebargainingandviolatedthemembersrighttosecurityoftenure.Thesuddenterminationofthe
STFWUmembersistaintedwithULPbecauseitwasdonetointerferewith,restrainorcoerceitsemployees
intheexerciseoftheirrighttoselforganization.Thus,thepetitionercompanyisliableforthepaymentof
moralandexemplarydamagesofP500,000.00totheillegallydismissedSTFWUmembers.
2.2.YELLOWDOGCONTRACT.
Paragraph[b]ofArticle248describeswhatiscommonlyknownasyellowdogcontract.Itisonewhichexacts
from workers as a condition of employment that they shall not join or belong to a labor organization, or attempt to
organize one during their period of employment or that they shall withdraw therefrom in case they are already
membersofalabororganization.
Atypicalyellowdogcontractembodiesthefollowingstipulations:
1. Arepresentationbytheemployeethatheisnotamemberofalabororganization;
2. Apromisebytheemployeethathewillnotjoinaunion;and

251
StandardCharteredBankEmployeesUnion[NUBE] v. Confesor, [G.R. No. 114974, June16, 2004].
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3. Apromisebytheemployeethatuponjoiningalabororganization,hewillquithisemployment.
TheactoftheemployerinimposingsuchaconditionconstitutesunfairlaborpracticeunderArticle248[b]of
theLaborCode.Suchstipulationinthecontractisnullandvoid.
2.3.CONTRACTINGOUTOFSERVICESANDFUNCTIONS.
Paragraph[c]ofArticle248describeswhentheactoftheemployerofcontractingoutofservicesorfunctions
beingperformedbyunionmembersisconsideredanunfairlaborpractice.
Asageneralrule,theactofanemployerinhavingworkorcertainservicesorfunctionsbeingperformedby
unionmemberscontractedoutisnotperseanunfairlaborpractice.Thisissobecausecontractingoutofajob,workor
service is clearly an exercise by the employer of its business judgment and its inherent management rights and
prerogatives.
252
It is only when the contracting out of a job, work or service being performed by union members will
interferewith,restrainorcoerceemployeesintheexerciseoftheirrighttoselforganizationthatitshallbeunlawfuland
shallconstituteanunfairlaborpractice.
253
2.4.COMPANYUNION.
Paragraph [d] of Article 248 considers it an unfair labor practice to initiate, dominate, assist or otherwise
interferewiththeformationoradministrationofanylabororganization,includingthegivingoffinancialorothersupport
toitoritsorganizersorsupporters.Suchunioniscalledcompanyunionasitsformation,functionoradministrationhas
beenassistedbyanyactdefinedasunfairlaborpracticeundertheLaborCode.
254
InPhilippineAmericanCigarandCigaretteFactoryWorkersIndependentUnionv.PhilippineAmericanCigar
and Cigarette Manufacturing Co., [G.R. No. L18364, February 28, 1963, 7 SCRA 375], it was pronounced that one
indicationthattheunioniscompanydominatedconsistsintheactoftheemployerinsecuringauthorizationcardsfrom
employees and by immediately granting the union exclusive recognition as a bargaining agent and entering into a
contracttherewithalthoughitwasnotthedulyauthorizedrepresentativeoftheemployees.Anotheriswhentheunion
approachedthemanagementratherthantheemployeesingettingtheplantorganizedandmanagementextendedthe
requestedassistancetotheunion.Theactsofthecompanyinsolicitingmembershipandallowingunionactivitiestobe
held during working time and coercing employees to join the union under threat of dismissal or demotion are clear
indiciaofcompanydomination.
InOceanicAirProductsv.CIR,[G.R.No.18704,January31,1963,7SCRA208],severalemployeeswereforced
by company officers to join a union. No member of the union had been dismissed despite the implementation of a
retrenchmentpolicywhichresultedinthedismissalofotheremployeeswhoareofficersandmembersofanotherunion.
Afterthedismissals,thecompanyhiredseverallaborers.Alltheseindicatethattheunioniscompanydominated.
2.5.PARAGRAPH[E]OFARTICLE248COVERSTHREESEPARATECONCEPTS.
Thethree(3)sentencescomprisingparagraph[e]ofArticle248treatofthree(3)separatelaborlawconcepts,
towit:
1.Discrimination. This is found in the first sentence thereof which considers as an unfair labor practice to
discriminateinregardtowages,hoursofworkandothertermsandconditionsofemploymentinorderto
encourageordiscouragemembershipinanylabororganization.
2.Unionsecurityclause. Thisistreatedinthesecond sentencethereof whichstatesthat(n)othinginthis
Code or in any other law shall stop the parties from requiring membership in a recognized collective
bargaining agent as a condition for employment, except those employees who are already members of
anotherunionatthetimeofthesigningofthecollectivebargainingagreement.
3.Agency fee. This is described in the third sentence thereof in that (e)mployees of an appropriate
bargaining unit who are not members of the recognized collective bargaining agent may be assessed a
reasonable fee equivalent to the dues and other fees paid by members of the recognized collective
bargainingagent,ifsuchnonunionmembersacceptthebenefitsunderthecollectivebargainingagreement
provided that the individual authorization required under Article 242, paragraph (o) of this Code shall not
applytothenonmembersoftherecognizedcollectivebargainingagent.
2.5.1.DISCRIMINATION.
a.Concept.
Discriminationhasbeendefinedasthefailuretotreatallpersonsequallywhennoreasonabledistinctioncan
befoundbetweenthosefavoredandthosenotfavored.
255
Whatisprohibitedasunfairlaborpracticeunderthelawistodiscriminateinregardtowages,hoursofwork,
and other terms and conditions of employment in order to encourage or discourage membership in any labor
organization.
256

252
ManilaElectricCompanyv. Quisumbing, G.R. No. 127598, Jan. 27, 1999, 302SCRA173, 214]; SeealsoDeOcampov. NLRC, 213SCRA652[1992].
253
Article248[c], LaborCode; Section6[f], Department OrderNo. 18-02, Seriesof 2002, [Feb. 21, 2002].
254
Article212[i], LaborCode; Section1[k], RuleI, BookV, RulestoImplement theLaborCode.
255
Portuguezv. GSISFamilyBank[ComsavingsBank], G.R. No. 169570, March2, 2007citingPhilippineAmericanLifeGen. InsuranceCo. v. Gramaje, G.R. No. 156963, Nov. 11, 2004, 442SCRA274, 284-285.
256
Article248[e], LaborCode.
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b.Thepurposeoftheallegeddiscriminatoryact,material.
In Manila Pencil Co., Inc. v. CIR, [G.R. No. L16903, August 31, 1965, 14 SCRA 955], it was ruled that even
assumingthatbusinessconditionsjustifythedismissalofemployees,itisanunfairlaborpracticeofemployertodismiss
permanentlyonlyunionmembersandnotnonunionists.
InManilaRailroadCo.v.KapisananngmgaManggagawasaManilaRailroadCo.,[G.R.No.L19728,July30,
1964],thenonregularizationoflongtimeemployeesbecauseoftheiraffiliationwiththeunionwhilenewemployees
wereimmediatelyregularizedwasdeclaredanactofdiscrimination.
InAHS/PhilippinesEmployeesUnionv.NLRC,[G.R.No.73721,March30,1987],theemployertransferredthe
unionpresidentfromthemainofficeinManilatoCebuatthetimewhentheunionwasstillbeingorganized.Itwasheld
thattheunevenapplicationofitsmarketingplanresultinginthesaidtransferoftheunionpresidentispatentlyanactof
discriminationconstitutiveofunfairlaborpractice.
In Bondoc v. CIR, [G.R. No. 33955, January 26, 1989], the employee charged his employer as having
discriminatedagainsthiminthegrantofpromotionbecausehewasnotamemberofanylaborunion.TheSupreme
Courtheldthattheemployeescontentionthathewasdiscriminatedagainsttoforcehimtojoinalabororganizationis
untenablebecausehefailedtomentionanyspecificunion.Moreover,itisnotbelievablefortheemployertoharassand
oppressanemployeetoforcehimtojoinaunion,foritcannotbecomprehendedhowhisjoiningaunionwouldbenefit
hisemployer.
2.5.2.UNIONSECURITYCLAUSE.
a.Natureofstipulation.
ThestipulationinaCBAbasedonthesecondsentenceofparagraph[e]ofArticle248commonlyknownasthe
union security clause allows the parties thereto to enter into an agreement requiring membership in the exclusive
collective bargaining agent which successfully negotiated said CBA as a condition for continued employment with the
exceptionofemployeeswhoarealreadymembersofanotherunionatthetimeofthesigningoftheCBA.
Union security is a generic term which is applied to and comprehends closed shop, union shop,
maintenance of membership or any other form of agreement which imposes upon employees the obligation to
acquireorretainunionmembershipasaconditionaffectingtheircontinuedemployment.Inotherwords,thepurpose
ofaunionsecurityarrangementistoguaranteethecontinuedexistenceoftheunionthroughenforcedmembershipfor
thebenefitoftheworkers.
257
Theemployerunderthisclauserecognizesthatthemembershipofemployeesintheunionwhichnegotiated
theCBAshouldbemaintainedandcontinuedasaconditionforemploymentorretentionofemployment.Theobvious
purposeistosafeguardandensuretheunionscontinuedexistenceandtostrengthenandprotectitfromthefickleness
or perfidy of its own members. Without this clause, the existence of the union is always subject to uncertainty as its
membersmayresignanytimeresultinginthedecimationofitsranks.
258
b.Therightnottojoinaunionisnotabsolutesinceitmayberestricted.
Time and again, it has been ruled that the individual employees right not to join a union may be validly
restricted by a union security clause in a CBA Theoretically, there is nothing in law or jurisprudence to prevent an
employerandaunionfromstipulatingthatexistingemployees(whoalreadyattainedregularandpermanentstatusbut
whoarenotmembersofanyunion)aretobeincludedinthecoverageofaunionsecurityclause.EvenArticle248(e)of
the Labor Code only expressly exempts old employees who already have a union from inclusion in a union security
clause.
259
c.Variousformsofunionsecurityarrangements.
Generally,aunionsecurityclausemaytaketheformof:
1.Closedshopagreement;
2.Maintenanceofmembershipagreement;
3.Unionshopagreement;
4.Modifiedunionshopagreement;
5.Exclusivebargainingagreement;
6.Bargainingformembersonlyagreement;
7.Agencyshopagreement;or
8.Preferentialhiringagreement.
The above classification admits of certain modified types which the parties may agree upon in the CBA
dependingonthepeculiarrequirementsofthesituationorthepartiesthereto.
d.ClosedShopAgreement.
A closedshop may be defined as an enterprise in which, by agreement between the employer and its
employeesortheirrepresentatives,nopersonmaybeemployedinanyorcertainagreeddepartmentsoftheenterprise
unlessheorsheis,becomes,and,forthedurationoftheagreement,remainsamemberingoodstandingofaunion
entirelycomprisedoforofwhichtheemployeesininterestareapart.
260
Basically,aclosedshopagreementstipulates
theundertakingbytheemployernottohireoremployanypersonwhoisnotamemberofthebargainingunion.Once

257
Bankof thePhilippineislandsv. BPI EmployeesUnion-DavaoChapter-Federationof UnionsinBPI Unibank, G.R. No. 164301, Aug. 10, 2010; PicopResources, Inc. v. Taeca, G.R. No. 160828, Aug. 9, 2010.
258
CaltexRefineryEmployeesAssociation[CREA] v. Brillantes, G.R. No. 123782, Sept. 16, 1997, 279SCRA218, 236.
259
Bankof thePhilippineislandsv. BPI EmployeesUnion-DavaoChapter-Federationof UnionsinBPI Unibank, G.R. No. 164301, Aug. 10, 2010.
260
Del MontePhilippines, Inc. v. Saldivar, G.R. No. 158620, Oct. 11, 2006.
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employed, it is required that the said person should remain a member of the bargaining union in good standing as a
conditionforcontinuedemployment,atleastduringthewholedurationoftheCBA.Thisrequirementforemployeesor
workerstobecomemembersofaunionasaconditionforemploymentredoundstothebenefitandadvantageofsaid
employees because by holding out to loyal members a promise of employment in the closed shop, the union wields
groupsolidarity.
261
e.Maintenanceofmembershipagreement.
Thereismaintenanceofmembershipshopwhenemployees,whoareunionmembersasoftheeffectivedate
oftheagreement,orwhothereafterbecomemembers,mustmaintainunionmembershipasaconditionforcontinued
employmentuntiltheyarepromotedortransferredoutofthebargainingunit,ortheagreementisterminated.
262
f.Unionshopagreement.
Thereisunionshopwhenallnewregularemployeesarerequiredtojointheunionwithinacertainperiodasa
conditionfortheircontinuedemployment.
263
g.Modifiedunionshopagreement.
Employeesunderthisarrangementwhoarenotunionmembersatthetimeofthesigningorexecutionofthe
CBAarenotrequiredtojointhebargainingunion.However,anyandallworkershiredoremployedafterthesigningor
executionoftheCBAarerequiredtojointhebargainingunion.
h.Exclusivebargainingagentagreement.
TheunionwhichnegotiatedandconcludedtheCBAwithmanagementisconsideredandrecognizedasthesole
andexclusivebargainingagentofallthecoveredemployeesinthebargainingunit,whethertheybemembersornotof
thesaidagent.
i.Bargainingformembersonlyagreement.
Underthisarrangement,theunionwhichnegotiatedandconcludedtheCBAwithmanagementisrecognized
asthebargainingagentonlyforitsownmembers.(RothenbergonLaborRelations,page410).
j.Agencyshopagreement.
Underthisscheme,thereisnorequirementfornonmembersofthebargainingagenttobecomeitsmembers.
However,itisrequiredthatsuchnonunionmembersshouldpaytothebargainingagentanagencyfeeasacondition
fortheircontinuedemployment.ThethirdsentenceofArticle248[e]oftheLaborCodevalidatesthisarrangement.
k.Preferentialhiringagreement.
Itistheprincipalfeatureofthisarrangementthattheemployergivespreferenceinhiringtothemembersof
the bargaining agent under equal circumstances and qualifications. Once hired or employed, they are required to
maintaintheirmembershipingoodstandinginthebargainingagentforthedurationoftheCBAasaconditionfortheir
continuedemployment.
l.Employeesexemptedfromcoverageofunionsecurityclause.
All employees in the bargaining unit covered by a Union Security Clause in their CBA with management are
subject to its terms.However, under law and jurisprudence, the following kinds of employees are exempted from its
coverage,namely:
1. Employees who, at the time the union security agreement takes effect, are bonafide members of a
religiousorganizationwhichprohibitsitsmembersfromjoininglaborunionsonreligiousgrounds.
264
2. Employeesalreadyintheserviceandalreadymembersofaunionotherthanthemajorityatthetimethe
unionsecurityagreementtookeffect.
265
3. Confidentialemployeeswhoareexcludedfromtherankandfilebargainingunit.
266
4. Employeesexcludedfromtheunionsecurityclausebyexpresstermsoftheagreement.
267
2.5.3.CHECKOFFOFAGENCYFEESFROMNONMEMBERSOFTHEBARGAININGAGENT.
a.Agencyfees.
Theduesandotherfeesthatmaybeassessedfromnonbargainingunionmemberswithinthebargainingunit
who accept and avail of the benefits flowing from the CBA are called agency fees. Payment of agency fees to the
certifiedcollectivebargainingagentwhichsuccessfullynegotiatedtheCBAisbutareasonablerequirementrecognized
bylaw.Inthisaspect,thelegalbasisoftheunion'srighttoagencyfeesisneithercontractualnorstatutory,butquasi
contractual, deriving from the established principle that nonunion employees may not unjustly enrich themselves by
benefitingfromemploymentconditionsnegotiatedbythebargainingagent.
268

261
National Labor Unionv. AguinaldosEchague, G.R. No. L-7358, May31, 1955; SeealsoBankof thePhilippineislandsv. BPI EmployeesUnion-DavaoChapter-Federationof UnionsinBPI Unibank, G.R. No. 164301, Aug. 10, 2010.
262
Bankof thePhilippineislandsv. BPI EmployeesUnion-DavaoChapter-Federationof UnionsinBPI Unibank, G.R. No. 164301, Aug. 10, 2010; PicopResources, Inc. v. Taeca, G.R. No. 160828, Aug. 9, 2010.
263
AlabangCountryClub, Inc. v. NLRC, supra; Bankof thePhilippineislandsv. BPI EmployeesUnion-DavaoChapter-Federationof UnionsinBPI Unibank, G.R. No. 164301, Aug. 10, 2010.
264
Victorianov. ElizaldeRopeWorkers Union, G.R. No. L-25246, Sept. 12, 1974, 59SCRA54, 68.
265
Article248[e], LaborCode; FreemanShirt ManufacturingCo. v. CIR, G.R. No. L-16561, Jan. 28,1961, 1SCRA353, 356; Sta. CeciliaSawmillsv. CIRG.R. No. L-19273-4, Feb. 29, 1964, 10SCRA433, 437.
266
MetrolabIndustries, Inc. v. Confesor, G.R. No. 108855, Feb. 28, 1996, 254SCRA182, 197.
267
Bankof thePhilippineislandsv. BPI EmployeesUnion-DavaoChapter-Federationof UnionsinBPI Unibank, G.R. No. 164301, Aug. 10, 2010.
268
HolyCrossof DavaoCollege, Inc. v. Joaquin, G.R. No. 110007, Oct. 18, 1996, 263SCRA358; 331Phil. 680, 692.
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[NOTE:SeefurtherdiscussiononagencyfeeunderthetopicofRighttoSelfOrganizationabove]
2.6.FILINGOFCHARGESORGIVINGOFTESTIMONY.
Underparagraph[f]ofArticle248oftheLaborCode,itisanunfairlaborpracticeforanemployertodismiss,
dischargeorotherwiseprejudiceordiscriminateagainstanemployeeforhavinggivenorbeingabouttogivetestimony
undertheLaborCode.
269
Itmustbeunderscoredthatthisistheonlyunfairlaborpracticethatneednotberelatedto
theexercisebytheemployeesoftheirrighttoselforganizationandcollectivebargaining.
270
InPhilippineAmericanCigarandCigaretteFactoryWorkersIndependentUnionv.PhilippineAmericanCigar
and Cigarette Manufacturing Co., [G.R. No. L18364, February 28, 1963]. the employer dismissed the brother of an
employeewhofiledacaseagainstit.TheSupremeCourtruledthatsuchactoftheemployerconstitutesunfairlabor
practice.AlthoughSection4[a]5ofRepublicActNo.875(nowArticle248[f]oftheLaborCode)wouldseemtorefer
only to the dismissal of the one who filed charges against the company as constituting an unfair labor practice, the
legislativeintentistoassureabsolutefreedomoftheemployeestoestablishlabororganizationsandunionsaswellasto
profferchargesforviolationoflaborlaws.Ifthedismissalofanemployeeduetothefilingbyhimofsaidchargeswould
beandisanunduerestraintuponsaidfreedom,thedismissalofhisbrotherowingtothenonwithdrawalofthecharges
oftheformerwouldbeandconstituteasmuch,infactagreaterandmoreeffective,restraintuponthesamefreedom.
Whatisprohibitedtobedonedirectlyshallnotbeallowedtobeaccomplishedindirectly.
In ItogonSuyoc Mines, Inc. v. Baldo, [G.R. No. L17739, December 24, 1964], it was declared that an unfair
labor practice was committed by the employer when it dismissed the worker who had testified in the hearing of a
certificationelectioncasedespiteitspriorrequestfortheemployeenottotestifyinthesaidproceedingaccompanied
withapromiseofbeingreinstatedifhefollowedsaidrequest.
271
2.7.VIOLATIONOFTHECBAORREFUSALTOCOMPLYTHEREWITH.
a.Three(3)actsofCBArelatedULPs.
Article248enunciatesthree(3)CBArelatedunfairlaborpractices,towit:
1. ToviolatethedutytobargaincollectivelyasprescribedintheLaborCode.
272
2. Topaynegotiationorattorneysfeestotheunionoritsofficersoragentsaspartofthesettlementofany
issueincollectivebargainingoranyotherdispute.
273
3. Toviolateacollectivebargainingagreement.
274
b.Dutytobargaindevolvesonbothparties.
Thedutytobargaincollectivelydevolvesuponboththeemployerandthelabororganization.
275
Asdescribed
inthelaw,thedutytobargaincollectivelymeanstheperformanceofamutualobligationtomeetandconvenepromptly
andexpeditiouslyingoodfaithforthepurposeofnegotiatinganagreementwithrespecttowages,hoursofworkandall
othertermsandconditionsofemployment,includingproposalsforadjustinganygrievancesorquestionsarisingunder
such agreement and executing a contract incorporating such agreements if requested by either party; but such duty
doesnotcompelanypartytomakeanyconcession.
276
[NOTE:Seefurtherdiscussionondutytobargaincollectively
underthetopicofRighttoSelfOrganizationabove]
2.8.PAYMENTOFNEGOTIATIONFEESORATTORNEYSFEES.
Article 248 [h] of the Labor Code considers as an unfair labor practice the act of the employer in paying
negotiationfeesorattorneysfeestotheunionoritsofficersoragentsaspartofthesettlementofanyissueincollective
bargainingoranyotherdispute.Article222[b]oftheLaborCoderequiresthatsuchattorneysfees,negotiationfeesor
similarchargesshouldbepaidfromtheunionfunds.
277
2.9.VIOLATIONOFTHECBA.
Article248[i]oftheLaborCodeshouldbereadinrelationtoArticle261thereof.UnderArticle261,violations
ofaCBA,exceptthosewhicharegrossincharacter,shallnolongerbetreatedasanunfairlaborpracticeandshallbe
resolved as grievances under the CBA. Gross violations of CBA shall mean flagrant and/or malicious refusal to comply
withtheeconomicprovisionsofsuchagreement.
278
Examples:
Theactoftheemployerinrefusingtoimplementthenegotiated wageincreasestipulatedintheCBA,which
increase is intended tobedistinct and separate from any otherbenefits or privileges that maybe forthcomingto the
employees,isanunfairlaborpractice.
279
Refusalforaconsiderablenumberofyearstogivesalaryadjustmentsaccordingtotheimprovedsalaryscales
intheCBAisanunfairlaborpractice.
280

269
SeealsoSection13[d], RuleXII, BookIII, RulestoImplement theLaborCode.
270
PhilcomEmployeesUnionv. PhilippineGlobal Communications, G.R. No. 144315, July17, 2006; SeealsoBisigManggagawasaTrycov. NLRC, G.R. No. 151309, Oct. 15, 2008.
271
SeealsoNational FastenerCorporationv. CIR, G.R. No. L-15834, Jan. 20, 1961, 1SCRA17; H. G. Henares&Sonsv. National LaborUnion, G.R. No. L-17535, Dec. 28, 1961, 3SCRA765.
272
Article248[g], LaborCode.
273
Article248[h], LaborCode.
274
Article248[i], LaborCode.
275
SeeArticles248[g] and249[c], respectively, of theLaborCode.
276
Article252, LaborCode; ElizaldeRopeFactory, Inc. v. CIR, G.R. No. L-16419, May30, 1963, 8SCRA67.
277
PacificBankingCorporationv. Clave, G.R. No. 56965, March7, 1984. 128SCRA112; Galvadoresv. Trajano, G.R. No. 70067, Sept. 15, 1986, 144SCRA138; AmalgamatedLaborersAssociationv. CIR, G.R. No. L-23467, March27, 1968, 22SCRA1266.
278
SeeFlight AttendantsandStewardsAssociationof thePhilippines[FASAP] v. PhilippineAirlines, Inc., G.R. No. 178083, July22, 2008.
279
PhilippineApparel WorkersUnionv. NLRC, G.R. No. L-50320, July31, 1981; AlhambraIndustries, Inc. v. CIR, G.R. No. L-25984, Oct. 30, 1970, 35SCRA550.
280
Benguet Consolidatedv. BCI EmployeesandWorkersUnion, G.R. No. L-25471, March27, 1968, 22SCRA1293.
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The act of the employer to permit nonunion members to participate in the service charges, contrary to the
stipulationintheCBA,isanunfairlaborpractice.
281
=============================
(2) ULP of Labor Organizations
===========================
1.UNFAIRLABORPRACTICESOFLABORORGANIZATIONS.
Article249.UnfairLaborPracticesofLaborOrganizations.Itshallbeunfairlaborpractice
foralabororganization,itsofficers,agentsorrepresentatives:
(a) To restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their right to selforganization.
However, a labor organization shall have the right to prescribe its own rules with
respecttotheacquisitionorretentionofmembership;
(b)To cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an employee,
including discrimination against an employee with respect to whom membership in
suchorganizationhasbeendeniedortoterminateanemployeeonanygroundother
than the usual terms and conditions under which membership or continuation of
membershipismadeavailabletoothermembers;
(c) Toviolatetheduty,orrefusetobargaincollectivelywiththeemployer,provideditis
therepresentativeoftheemployees;
(d)Tocauseorattempttocauseanemployertopayordeliveroragreetopayordeliver
anymoneyorother thingsof value,inthenature of an exaction,for services which
are not performed or not to be performed, including the demand for fee for union
negotiations;
(e) To ask for or accept negotiation or attorneys fees from employers as part of the
settlementofanyissueincollectivebargainingoranyotherdispute;or
(f) Toviolateacollectivebargainingagreement.
Theprovisionsoftheprecedingparagraphnotwithstanding,onlytheofficers,membersof
governingboards,representativesoragentsormembersoflaborassociationsororganizationswho
have actually participated in, authorized or ratified unfair labor practices shall be held criminally
liable.
282
1.RESTRAINTANDCOERCIONOFEMPLOYEESINTHEEXERCISEOFTHEIRRIGHTTOSELFORGANIZATION.
UnderArticle249[a],itisunfairlaborpracticeforalabororganization,itsofficers,agentsorrepresentativesto
restrainorcoerceemployeesintheexerciseoftheirrighttoselforganization.Thisprovisionissubstantiallysimilarto
Article248[a]oftheLaborCodeinvolvingtheunfairlaborpracticesofemployersexceptthattheterminterfereisnot
included therein. The significance in the omission of said term is the grant of unrestricted license to the labor
organization,itsofficers,agentsorrepresentativestointerferewiththeexercisebytheemployeesoftheirrighttoself
organization. Such interference is not unlawful since without it, the labor organization cannot be expected to
organize and recruit members. It becomes unlawful within the context of paragraph [a] of Article 249 only when it
amountstorestraintorcoercionwhichisexpresslyprohibitedthereunder.
Underthesameprovision,alabororganizationisgrantedtherighttoprescribeitsownruleswithrespectto
theacquisitionorretentionofmembership.Theserulesarenormallyfoundintheconstitutionandbylawsofthelabor
organization. Pursuant to this right, the labor organization can prescribe the proper qualifications for membership
thereinaswellastherulesandregulationstobefollowedbyitsmembersinordertoretaintheirmembershipingood
standingtherein.
Therules,tobevalid,mustbereasonableandwithintheboundsofthelaw.Thus,thelabororganizationinM.
D. Transit v. de Guzman, [G.R. No. L18810, April 23, 1963, 7 SCRA 726], was declared to have committed an unfair
laborpracticewhenitexpelledamemberjustbecausehefiledchargesagainsttheunionofficers.
2.DISCRIMINATION.
Under Article 249 [b], it is considered an unfair labor practice for a labor organization, its officers, agents or
representativestocauseorattempttocauseanemployertodiscriminateagainstanemployee,includingdiscrimination
against an employee with respect to whom membership in such organization has been denied, or to terminate an

281
AlbaPatiodeMakati, v. AlbaPatiodeMakati EmployeesAssociation, G.R. No. L-37922, March16, 1984.
282
AsamendedbyBatasPambansaBilang130, August 21, 1981.
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employee on any ground other than the usual terms and conditions under which membership or continuation of
membershipismadeavailabletoothermembers.
ThisgroundisthecounterpartoftheunfairlaborpracticeofemployersunderArticle248[e]whichconsistsin
the act of discriminating against an employee in regard to wages, hours of work and other terms and conditions of
employment in order to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization. If the act of discrimination
committed bythe employerwas instigatedby theunion,both the employer andthe union may bedeclaredguilty of
unfairlaborpractice.
3.DUTYOFUNIONTOBARGAINCOLLECTIVELY.
Under Article249 [c], it is anunfair laborpracticeforadulycertified soleand exclusivebargaining union, its

officers, agents or representatives to refuse or violate the duty to bargain collectively with the employer. This is the
counterpartprovisionofArticle248[g]respectingtheviolationbytheemployerofitsdutytobargaincollectively.
Theobviouspurposeofthelawistoensurethattheunionwillnegotiatewithmanagementingoodfaithand
forthepurposeofconcludingamutuallybeneficialagreementregardingthetermsandconditionsoftheiremployment
relationship.
Forinstance,itisunfairlaborpracticeforalabororganizationtodemandthattheemployershouldnegotiatea
CBAwithitatatimewhenithasyettobecertifiedasthesoleandexclusivebargainingagentoftheemployeessincethe
certificationelectioncaseisstillpending.Thisactviolatestheemployersrighttocollectivelybargainonlywiththesole
andexclusiverepresentativeofthemajorityofitsworkers.
283
4.FEATHERBEDDING.
a.AntifeatherbeddingprovisionofArticle249[d].
UnderArticle249[d],itisanunfairlaborpracticeforalabororganization,itsofficers,agentsorrepresentatives
tocauseorattempttocauseanemployertopayordeliveroragreetopayordeliveranymoneyorotherthingsofvalue,
inthenatureofanexaction,forserviceswhicharenotperformedornottobeperformed,includingthedemandforfee
forunionnegotiations.
Thispracticeoftheunioniscommonlyknownasfeatherbeddingasitundulyandunnecessarilymaintainsor
increasesthenumberofemployeesusedortheamountoftimeconsumedtoworkonaspecificjob.Thisisdonebythe
employees to unduly secure their jobs in the face of technological advances or as required by minimum health and
safety standards, among other justifications. These featherbedding practices have been found to be wasteful and
withoutlegitimatejustifications.
b.Paymentsforstandbyservices.
Aunioncommitsanunfairlaborpracticeunderthisprovisionbycausingorattemptingtocauseanemployerto
payoragreetopayforstandbyservices.Paymentsforstandingby,orforthesubstantialequivalentofstandingby,
arenotpaymentsforservicesperformedwithinthemeaningofthelaw.Whenanemployerreceivedabonafideoffer
of competent performance of relevant services, it remains for the employer, through free and fair negotiation, to
determinewhethersuchoffershouldbeacceptedandwhatcompensationshouldbepaidfortheworkdone.
284
Aunionsdemandforacontractcallingforpaymentsforthepresenceofoneofitsmembersatajobsitewhen
nounionistsworkwasbeingdonetherein,andwhentheemployerindicatedthatithadnoneedforsuchlabor,coupled
with a strike to make the employer respond to such demand, is an exaction within the meaning of this law, and the
demandisconsiderednotabonafideofferofcompetentperformanceofrelevantservices.
285
c.Paymentsformadework.
Where work is actually done by an employee with the employers consent, the unions demand that the
employee be compensated for time spent in doing the work does not violate the law.
286
The law leaves to collective
bargainingthedeterminationofwhat,ifany,work,includingbonafidemadework,shallbeincludedascompensable
servicesandwhatrateofcompensationshallbepaidforit.
287
Amusiciansunionhasbeenheldnottohaveviolatedtheantifeatherbeddingprovisionbyrefusingtopermita
unionbandtoperformattheopeninggameofthebaseballseason,refusingtopermitaunionorganisttoplayatthe
homegames,andpicketingthebaseballstadium,inordertoforcetheownerofthebaseballteamtohireaunionband
toplayatallweekendhomegames;orbyrefusingtoconsenttoappearancesoftravellingbandsinatheaterunlessthe
theater manager also employs a local orchestra in connection with certain programs where the local orchestra is to
perform actual and not token services, even though the theater manager does not need or want to employ the local
orchestra.
288
d.Paymentsforworkalreadycompensated.
The antifeatherbedding provision has been held not to bar a union from demanding payment for work for
whichtheemployerhasalreadypaidanotherperson.Hence,aunionhasbeenheldnotguiltyofanunfairlaborpractice

283
LakasngManggagawangMakabayanv. MarceloEnterprises, G.R. No. L-38258, Nov. 19, 1982, 118SCRA425.
284
NLRBv. GambleEnterprises, Inc., 345US11797LEd864, 73SCt 560.
285
International Brotherhoodof Teamsters, etc., 212NLRB968, 1974CCHNLRB26867, 87BNALRRM1101.
286
NLRBv. GambleEnterprises, Inc., 345US117, 97l Ed864, 73SCt 560; AmericanNewspaperPublishersAssociationv. NLRB, 345US100, 97LEd852, 73SCt 552, 31ALR2d497.
287
AmericanNewspaperPublishersAssociationv. NLRB, 345US100, 97LEd852, 73SCt 552, 31ALR2d497.
288
MusiciansUnionv. SuperiorCourt of AlamedaCounty, 69Cal 2d695, 73Cal Rptr201, 447P2d313; NLRBv. GambleEnterprises, Inc., 345US117, 97LEd864, 73SCt 560.
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indemandingpaymenttoitofanamountequaltothewagespaidbytheemployertoanonunionemployeeforworkto
whichtheunionsmemberswereentitled.Iftheworkisactuallydonebyemployees,therecanbenoconflictwiththe
antifeatherbeddingprovision,regardlessofwhetherornotthepersonsreceivingpaymentaretheoneswhoperformed
thework.
289
5.DEMANDORACCEPTANCEOFNEGOTIATIONFEESORATTORNEYSFEES.
UnderArticle249[e],itisanunfairlaborpracticeforalabororganization,itsofficers,agentsorrepresentatives
toaskfororacceptnegotiationfeesorattorneysfeesfromemployersaspartofthesettlementofanyissueincollective
bargainingoranyotherdispute.
This is the counterpart provision of Article 248 [h] regarding the payment, on the part of the employer, of
negotiationfeesorattorneysfeestotheunionoritsofficersoragentsaspartofthesettlementofanyissueincollective
bargainingoranyotherdispute.Thereasonforthispolicyofthelawistopreventundueinfluencebytheemployeron
theindependenceoftheunioninitsdecisionoveranyissuesitmayhavewiththeformer.Moreover,itispossiblethat
thematteroffixingtheamountofnegotiationfeesorattorneysfeesalonewouldpresentaproblemmuchcomplicated
thanthemoresubstantiveissuesinvolvingthetermsandconditionsandwelfareoftheworkers.
6.VIOLATIONOFTHECBA.
Under Article 249 [f], it is considered an unfair labor practice for a labor organization, its officers, agents or
representativestoviolateaCBA.
ThisisthecounterpartprovisionofArticle248[i]regardingtheemployersactofviolatingaCBA.Butitmustbe
notedthatunderArticle261oftheLaborCode,violationoftheCBAisgenerallyconsideredmerelyagrievableissue.It
becomes an unfair labor practice only if the violation is gross in character which means that there is flagrant and/or
malicious refusal to comply with the economic (as distinguished from noneconomic) stipulations in the CBA. This
principleappliesnotonlytotheemployerbuttothelabororganizationaswell.
=================================
a. Forms of Concerted Activities
=================================
Relevant Provisions: Articles 263 and 264, Labor Code
1.FORMSOFCONCERTEDACTIVITIES.
Therearethree(3)formsofconcertedactivities,namely:
1. Strike;
2. Lockout;
3. Picketing.
2.STRIKE.
Strike means any temporary stoppage of work by the concerted action of the employees as a result of an
industrialorlabordispute.
290
Thetermstrikeencompassesnotonlyconcertedworkstoppagesbutalsothefollowing:
1. Slowdowns;
291
2.Massleaves;
3. Sitdowns;
4. Attemptstodamage,destroyorsabotageplantequipmentandfacilitiesandsimilaractivities;
292
5. Overtimeboycott;
293
6. Thesportingbytheworkersofcloselycroppedhairorcleanlyshavenheadsaftertheirunionfiledanotice
ofstrikeasaresultofaCBAdeadlockisaformofillegalstrike.
294
3.LOCKOUT.
Lockout means the temporary refusal of an employer to furnish work as a result of an industrial or labor
dispute.
295

289
Rabouinv. NLRB[CA2] 195F2d906.
290
Article212(o), Labor Code, asamendedbySection4, RepublicAct No. 6715; Section1[uu], RuleI, BookV, RulestoImplement theLabor Code, asamendedbyDepartment Order No. 40-03, Seriesof 2003, [Feb. 17, 2003]; No. 01, PrimeronStrike, PicketingandLockout; Section1
[24], RuleIII, NCMBManual of ProceduresforConciliationandPreventiveMediationCases; G&STransport Corp. v. Infante, G.R. No. 160303, Sept. 13, 2007.
291
BagongPagkakaisangManggagawangTriumphInternational v. Secretaryof theDepartment of LaborandEmployment, [G.R. Nos. 167401and167407, July5, 2010].
292
Section2, P. D. No. 823, asamendedbyP. D. No. 849; SamahangManggagawasaSulpicioLines, Inc.-NAFLUv. SulpicioLines, Inc. G.R. No. 140992, March25, 2004, 426SCRA319. BukluranngManggagawasaClothmanKnittingCorp.-Solidarityof UnionsinthePhils. For
Empowerment andReformsv. CA, G.R. No. 158158, Jan. 17, 2005, 448SCRA642.
293
Interphil LaboratoriesEmployeesUnion-FFWv. Interphil Laboratories, Inc., G.R. No. 142824, Dec. 19, 2001.
294
National Unionof WorkersintheHotel, Restaurant andAlliedIndustries[NUWHRAIN-APL-IUF] Dusit Hotel NikkoChapterv. TheHonorableCA, [G.R. Nos. 163942and166295, November11, 2008].
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Itconsistsofthefollowing:
1. Shutdowns;
2. Massretrenchmentanddismissalsinitiatedbytheemployer.
296
3. Theemployersactofexcludingemployeeswhoareunionmembers.
297
4.PICKETING.
Picketingistheactofworkersinpeacefullymarchingtoandfrobeforeanestablishmentinvolvedinalabor
disputegenerallyaccompaniedbythecarryinganddisplayofsigns,placardsandbannersintendedtoinformthepublic
aboutthedispute.
298
==================================
b. Who may declare a strike or lockout?
==================================
1.WHOMAYDECLAREASTRIKEORLOCKOUT?
a.Inestablishmentswithcertifiedbargainingagent.
Anycertifiedordulyrecognizedbargainingagentmaydeclareastrikeincaseofbargainingdeadlockorunfair
laborpractice.Theemployermaydeclarealockoutbasedonthesamegrounds.
299
b.Inestablishmentswithnocertifiedbargainingagent.
In the absence of a certified or duly recognized bargaining agent, any legitimate labor organization in the
establishmentmaydeclareastrikebutonlyonthegroundofunfairlaborpractice.
300
Thegroundofbargainingdeadlockcannotbeinvokedinsupportofastrikeinanunorganizedestablishment
where there is no certified or duly recognized bargaining representative for the simple reason that no CBA can be
negotiated absent such certified or duly recognized bargaining agent. In this situation, the existence of a bargaining
deadlockisanimpossibility.
301
c.Minorityunioncannotstageastrike.
Astrikeconductedbyaminorityunionispatentlyillegalbecausenolabordisputewhichwilljustifytheconduct
ofastrikemayexistbetweentheemployerandaminorityunion.Topermittheunionspicketingactivitieswouldbeto
flauntatthewillofthemajority.
302
==================================
c. Requisites for a valid strike
d. Requisites for a valid lockout
==================================
1.REQUISITESFORAVALIDSTRIKEORLOCKOUT.
Therequisitesforavalidstrikearelikewiseapplicabletoalockout.Thediscussionbelowontherequisitesare
applicabletobothstrikeandlockout.
a.Proceduralbutmandatoryrequisites.
InaccordancewithArticle263andpertinentprevailingjurisprudence,astrikeorlockout,inordertobevalid
andlegal,mustconformtothefollowingproceduralrequisites:
FirstrequisiteItmustbebasedonavalidandfactualground;
SecondrequisiteAnoticeofstrike/lockoutmustbefiledwiththeNCMBDOLE;
Third requisite A notice must be served to the NCMBDOLE at least twentyfour (24) hours prior to the
taking of the strike/lockout vote by secret balloting, informing said office of the decision to conduct a
strike/lockoutvote,andthedate,place,andtimethereof;

295
Article212(p), Labor Code, asamendedbySection4, RepublicAct No. 6715; Section1[gg], RuleI, BookV, RulestoImplement theLabor Code, asamendedbyDepartment Order No. 40-03, Seriesof 2003, [Feb. 17, 2003]; No. 01, Primer onStrike, PicketingandLockout; Section1
[14], RuleIII, NCMBManual of ProceduresforConciliationandPreventiveMediationCases; Rural Bankof AlaminosEmployeesUnion[RBAEU] v. NLRC, G.R. Nos. 100342-44, Oct. 29, 1999.
296
Section3, P. D. No. 823, asamendedbyP.D. No. 849.
297
ComplexElectronicsEmployeesAssociation[CEEA], etc., v. NLRC, G.R. No. 121315, July19, 1999; Sta. MesaShipways&EngineeringCo. v. CIR, 48O. G. 3353.
298
Section1[19], RuleIII, NCMB Manual of Procedures for Conciliation and Preventive Mediation Cases; No. 15, GuidelinesGoverningLaborRelations; No. 01, PrimeronStrike, PicketingandLockout; Ilawat BuklodngManggagawa[IBM] v. NLRC, G.R. No. 91980, June27, 1995.
299
Section6, RuleXXII, BookV, RulestoImplement theLaborCode, asamendedbyDepartment OrderNo. 40-03, Seriesof 2003, [Feb. 17, 2003]; No. 05, Primer onStrike, PicketingandLockout; Section3, RuleIV, NCMBManual of ProceduresforConciliationandPreventiveMediation
Cases.
300
Article263[c], LaborCode; Section6, RuleXXII, BookV, RulestoImplement theLaborCode, asamendedbyDepartment OrderNo. 40-03, Seriesof 2003, [Feb. 17, 2003]; No. 05, PrimeronStrike, PicketingandLockout; Section3, RuleIV, NCMBManual of ProceduresforConciliation
andPreventiveMediationCases
301
Section3, RuleIV, NCMBManual of ProceduresforConciliationandPreventiveMediationCases.
302
UnitedRestaurorsEmployees&LaborUnion-PAFLUv. Torres, [G.R. No. L-24993, December18, 1968, 26SCRA435].
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FourthrequisiteAstrike/lockoutvotemustbetakenwhereamajorityofthemembersoftheunion,incase
ofastrike,orthemembersoftheBoardofDirectorsofthecorporationorassociationorofthepartnersina
partnership,incaseofalockout,obtainedbysecretballotinameetingcalledforthepurpose,mustapprove
it;
FifthrequisiteAstrike/lockoutvotereportshouldbesubmittedtotheNCMBDOLEatleastseven(7)days
beforetheintendeddateofthestrike/lockout;
SixthrequisiteExceptincasesofunionbusting,thecoolingoffperiodof15days,inthecaseofunfairlabor
practices,or30days,inthecaseofcollectivebargainingdeadlock,shouldbefullyobserved;and
Seventh requisite The 7day waiting period or strike/lockout ban reckoned after the submission of a
strike/lockoutvotereporttotheNCMBDOLEshouldalsobefullyobservedinallcases.
Alltheforegoingrequisites,althoughproceduralinnature,aremandatoryandfailureofaunionoremployerto
complytherewithwouldrenderastrikeorlockoutillegal.
303
2.FIRSTREQUISITE:EXISTENCEOFVALIDANDFACTUALGROUND/S.
a.Validgrounds.
Thelawrecognizesonlytwo(2)groundsinsupportofavalidstrike/lockoutinaccordancewithArticle263[c]of
theLaborCode,viz.:
1.Collectivebargainingdeadlock(EconomicStrike);and/or
2.Unfairlaborpractice(PoliticalStrike).
304
Astrikeorlockoutnotbasedonanyofthesetwogroundsisillegal.
305
b.Someprinciplesonthefirstrequisite.
1. ViolationofCBA,exceptwhengross,isnotanunfairlaborpractice,hence,maynotbecitedasgroundfora
validstrikeorlockout.OrdinaryviolationofaCBAisnolongertreatedasanunfairlaborpracticebutasa
meregrievancewhichshouldbeprocessedthroughthegrievancemachineryandvoluntaryarbitration.It
becomesanunfairlaborpracticeonlywhenitisgrossinnaturewhichmeansthatthereisflagrantand/or
maliciousrefusaltocomplywiththeeconomicprovisionsthereofbyeithertheemployerortheunion.
306
2. Interunionorintrauniondispute,notavalidground.
307
3. Violationoflaborstandards,notavalidground.
308
4. Wagedistortion,notavalidground.
309
3.SECONDREQUISITE:FILINGOFANOTICEOFSTRIKEORNOTICEOFLOCKOUTWITHNCMBDOLE.
Article 264 [a] of the Labor Code provides that no labor organization or employer shall declare a strike or
lockoutwithoutfirsthavingfiledanoticeofstrikeornoticeoflockoutrequiredunderArticle263[c]oftheLaborCode.
Article263[d]oftheLaborCoderequiresthatthenoticeofstrikeornoticeoflockoutmustbeinaccordance
withtheimplementingrulesandregulationspromulgatedbytheSecretaryofLaborandEmployment.Thesaidrulesand
regulationsareextensivelycitedanddiscussedintheappropriatenotesandcommentsbelow.
a.Noticeofstrike.
AnoticeofstrikereferstothenotificationfiledbyadulyregisteredlaborunionwiththeNationalConciliation
andMediationBoard(NCMB)oftheDepartmentofLaborandEmployment(DOLE)informingthelatterofitsintentionto
goonstrikebecauseoftheallegedcommissionbytheemployerofunfairlaborpracticesorbecauseofadeadlockinthe
collectivebargainingnegotiations.
310
b.Noticeoflockout.
AnoticeoflockoutreferstothenotificationfiledbyanemployerwiththeNCMBDOLEinformingthelatterof
itsintentiontotemporarilyceaseitsoperationbecauseoftheallegedcommissionbyadulyregisteredlaborunionof
unfairlaborpracticesorbecauseofadeadlockinthecollectivebargainingnegotiations.
311
c.Wheretofilethenoticeofstrike/lockout.
A notice of strike or lockout or a request for preventive mediation is required to be filed with the regional
branchoftheNCMBhavingjurisdictionovertheworkplaceoftheunionmembers.Incaseofmultipleworkplaces,the
followingrulesmustbeobserved:
(a) Wheretwoormoreregionalbrancheshavejurisdictionoverthevariousworkplaces,thebranchthatfirst
receivesthenoticeshallacquirejurisdictionoverthedisputetotheexclusionoftheothers.

303
PhimcoIndustries, Inc. v. PhimcoIndustriesLabor Association[PILA], G.R. No. 170830, Aug. 11, 2010; Pierov. NLRC, G.R. No. 149610, Aug. 20, 2004.
304
SeealsoSection5, RuleXXII, BookV, RulestoImplement theLaborCode, asamendedbyDepartment OrderNo. 40-03, Seriesof 2003, [Feb. 17, 2003], andasfurtheramendedbyDepartment OrderNo. 40-A-03[March12, 2003]; Section1, RuleV, NCMBManual of Proceduresfor
ConciliationandPreventiveMediationCases; No. 011, PrimeronStrike, PicketingandLockout.
305
SanMiguel Corporationv. NLRC, G. R. No. 99266, March2, 1999.
306
Article261, Labor Code; SeealsoSection5, RuleXXII, BookV, RulestoImplement theLabor Code, asamendedbyDepartment Order No. 40-03, Seriesof 2003, [Feb. 17, 2003], andasfurther amendedbyDepartment Order No. 40-A-03[March12, 2003]; No. 012, PrimeronStrike,
PicketingandLockout; Section3, RuleV, NCMBManual of ProceduresforConciliationandPreventiveMediationCases; No. 7, GuidelinesGoverningLaborRelations.
307
Article263[b], LaborCode; Section5, RuleXXII, BookV, RulestoImplement theLaborCode, Ibid.; No. 012, Primer, Ibid.; Section3, RuleV, NCMBManual, Ibid.; No. 5, Guidelines, Ibid..
308
No. 012, PrimeronStrike, PicketingandLockout; Section3, RuleV, NCMBManual of ProceduresforConciliationandPreventiveMediationCases; No. 5, GuidelinesGoverningLaborRelations.
309
UnderRepublicAct No. 6727, otherwiseknownastheWageRationalizationAct.
310
Section1[18], RuleIII, NCMBManual of ProceduresforConciliationandPreventiveMediationCases.
311
Section1[17], RuleIII, Ibid..
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(b) Bywrittenagreementofbothparties,thevenueofthedisputemaybewaived.
312
4.THIRDREQUISITE:SERVICEOFA24HOURPRIORNOTICETOTHENCMBDOLETOINFORMITOFTHECONDUCTOF
ASTRIKE/LOCKOUTVOTEBYSECRETBALLOTING.
Inthe2005caseofCapitolMedicalCenter,Inc.v.NLRC,[G.R.No.147080,April26,2005],itwasimposedas
additional requisite that a 24hour notice must be served to the NCMBDOLE prior to the taking of the strike/lockout
votebysecretballoting,informingitoftheunionsdecisiontoconductastrikevoteortheemployersdecisiontostagea
lockoutvote,aswellasthedate,place,andtimethereof.
5.FOURTHREQUISITE:CONDUCTOFASTRIKE/LOCKOUTVOTE.
a.Majorityapprovaloftheconductofastrike.
Article264[a]oftheLaborCodeexpresslyimposestherequirementthatnolabororganizationshalldeclarea
strike without the necessary strike vote first having been obtained and reported to the Department of Labor and
Employment.
Article263[f]oftheLaborCoderequiresthatadecisiontodeclareastrikemustbeapprovedbyamajorityof
thetotalunionmembershipinthebargainingunitconcerned,obtainedbysecretballotinmeetingsorreferendacalled
forthatpurpose.Thisprocessiscalledstrikevoteballoting.
313

Thepurposeofastrikevoteistoensurethatthedecisiontostrikebroadlyrestswiththemajorityoftheunion
members in general and not with a mere minority. At the same time, it is meant to discourage wildcat strikes, union
bossismandevencorruption.
314
b.Majorityapprovaloflockout.
Article 264 [a] of the Labor Code expressly requires that no employer shall declare a lockout without the
necessarylockoutvotefirsthavingbeenobtainedandreportedtotheDepartmentofLaborandEmployment.
Article263[f]oftheLaborCoderequiresthatadecisiontodeclarealockoutmustbeapprovedbyamajorityof
theboardofdirectorsofthecorporationorassociationorofthepartnersinapartnership,obtainedbysecretballotina
meetingcalledforthatpurpose.
315
c.Durationofthevalidityofthemajorityapprovalofastrike/lockout.
Themajoritydecisiontostageastrikeorlockoutisvalidforthedurationofthedisputebasedonsubstantially
thesamegroundsconsideredwhenthestrikeorlockoutvotewastaken.
316
6.FIFTHREQUISITE:SUBMISSIONOFTHESTRIKE/LOCKOUTVOTEREPORTTOTHENCMBDOLE.
a.Purposeforrequiringastrike/lockoutvotereport.
Theevidentintentionofthelawinmandatorilyrequiringthesubmissionofthestrike/lockoutvotereportisto
reasonably regulate the right to strike or lockout which is essential to the attainment of legitimate policy objectives
embodiedinthelaw.Verily,meresubstantialcompliancewithamandatoryprovisionwillnotsuffice.Strictadherenceto
themandateofthelawisrequired.
317
b.Whentosubmitthestrike/lockoutvotereport.
Astrike/lockoutvoteshouldbereportedtotheRegionalBranchoftheNCMB,atleastseven(7)daysbefore
theactualstagingoftheintendedstrike/lockout,subjecttotheobservanceofthecoolingoffperiodsprovidedunderthe
law.
318
7.SIXTHREQUISITE:OBSERVANCEOFTHECOOLINGOFFPERIODS.
a.Generalrule.
The coolingoff periods provided under the law before the intended date of the actual mounting of the
strike/lockoutareasfollows:
1. Incaseofbargainingdeadlock,thecoolingoffperiodisthirty(30)days;
2. Incaseofunfairlaborpractice,thecoolingoffperiodisfifteen(15)days.
319
b.Exceptionincaseofunionbusting.
In case of an unfair labor practice involving the dismissal from employment of union officers duly elected in
accordance with the union constitution and bylaws which may constitute unionbusting, where the existence of the

312
Section4, RuleIV, NCMBManual of ProceduresforConciliationandPreventiveMediationCases; No. 06, PrimeronStrike, PicketingandLockout.
313
SeeSection1[ww], RuleI, BookV, RulestoImplement theLaborCode,asamendedbyDepartment OrderNo. 40-03, Seriesof 2003, [Feb. 17, 2003].
314
No. 07, PrimeronStrike, PicketingandLockout.
315
SeeSection10, RuleXXII, BookV, RulestoImplement theLaborCode, asamendedbyDepartment OrderNo. 40-03, Seriesof 2003, [Feb. 17, 2003]; Section1, RuleVII, No. 06[2], PrimeronStrike, PicketingandLockout; Section1[30], RuleIII andSection1, RuleVII, NCMBManual
of ProceduresforConciliationandPreventiveMediationCases; No. 2[b], GuidelinesGoverningLabor Relations.
316
Article263[f], LaborCode.
317
BukluranngManggagawasaClothmanKnittingCorporationSolidarityof UnionsinthePhilippinesforEmpowerment andReforms(BMC-SUPER)v. CA, G.R. No. 158158, Jan. 17,2005; StamfordMarketingCorporationv. JosephineJulian, G.R. No. 145496, Feb. 24, 2004.
318
Article263[f], Labor Code; Section5, RuleXXII, BookV, RulestoImplement theLabor Code, asamendedbyDepartment Order No. 40-03, Seriesof 2003, [Feb. 17, 2003], andasfurther amendedbyDepartment Order No. 40-A-03[March12, 2003]; No. 2[c], GuidelinesGoverning
LaborRelations; No. 06, PrimeronStrike, PicketingandLockout; Section2, RuleVII, NCMBManual of ProceduresforConciliationandPreventiveMediationCases.
319
Article263[c], Labor Code; Section7, RuleXXII, BookV, RulestoImplement theLabor Code, asamendedbyArticle1, Department Order No. 40-03, Seriesof 2003[February17, 2003]; No. 06, Primer onStrike, PicketingandLockout; Section5, RuleIV, NCMBManual of Procedures
forConciliationandPreventiveMediationCases; No. 3, GuidelinesGoverningLaborRelations.
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unionisthreatened,the15daycoolingoffperioddoesnotapplyandtheunionmaytakeactionimmediatelyafterthe
strikevoteisconductedandtheresultsthereofdulysubmittedtotheregionalbranchoftheNCMB.
320
In cases of unionbusting, except for the 15day coolingoff period, all the other requisites must be fully
compliedwith.
321
c.Coolingoffperiodwhennoticeofstrikeisfiledinanunorganizedestablishment.
Inunorganizedestablishmentswhereadulycertifiedorrecognizedbargainingagentisabsent,anoticeofstrike
maybefiledbyanylegitimatelabororganizationinbehalfofitsmembersbutonlyonthegroundofunfairlaborpractice
becausetheothergroundofcollectivebargainingdeadlockisnotavailabletoitsincetherecanbenoCBAnegotiationin
anestablishmentwherethereisnocertifiedbargainingagent.Thecoolingoffperiodinthiscaseisfifteen(15)daysfrom
theintendeddateofthestrike.Incase,however,theexistenceofthelabororganizationisthreatenedbecauseofunion
busting, the 15day coolingoff period need not be complied with and the union may take action immediately after
complyingwiththeothermandatoryproceduralrequisites.
322
d.Reckoningofthecoolingoffperiods.
Thestartofthecoolingoffperiodsshouldbereckonedfromthetimethenoticeofstrikeorlockoutisfiledwith
theNCMB,acopythereofhavingbeenservedontheotherpartyconcerned.
323
e.Purposeofthecoolingoffperiods.
Inrequiringacoolingoffperiod,theavowedintentofthelawistoprovideanopportunityformediationand
conciliationbytheNCMBDOLE.Itisdesignedtoaffordthepartiestheopportunitytoamicablyresolvethedisputewith
the assistance of the ConciliatorsMediators of the NCMBDOLE. It thus directs the NCMBDOLE to exert all efforts at
mediation and conciliation to effect a voluntary settlement during the coolingoff period. Should the dispute remain
unsettleduntilthelapseoftherequirednumberofdaysfromthemandatoryfilingofthenotice,thelaborunionmay
strikeortheemployermaycommencealockoutafterhavingcompliedwiththe7dayrequirementforthefilingofthe
strikeorlockoutvote,asthecasemaybe.
324
8.SEVENTHREQUISITE:OBSERVANCEOFTHE7DAYWAITINGPERIODORSTRIKE/LOCKOUTBAN.
a.Purposeofthe7daywaitingperiodorstrike/lockoutban.
Theseven(7)daywaitingperiodisintendedtogivetheDepartmentofLaborandEmploymentanopportunity
toverifywhethertheprojectedstrikereallycarriestheimprimaturofthemajorityoftheunionmembers.
325
b.Waitingperiodorstrike/lockoutbanandcoolingoffperiod,distinguished.
The 7day waiting period or strike/lockout ban is a distinct and separate requirement from the coolingoff
periodprescribedbylaw.Thelattercannotbesubstitutedfortheformer.
326
Thecoolingoffperiod,ontheonehand,iscountedfromthetimeofthefilingofthenoticeofstrikeorlockout
uptotheintendedoractualstagingthereof.Incaseofunfairlaborpractice,thecoolingoffperiodis15days;andincase
ofcollectivebargainingdeadlock,suchperiodis30days.The7daywaitingperiodorstrike/lockoutban,ontheother
hand,isreckonedfromthetimethestrike/lockoutvotereportissubmittedtotheNCMBDOLE.
Consequently, a strike or lockout is illegal for failure to comply with the prescribed mandatory coolingoff
period and the 7day waiting period or strike/lockout ban after the submission of the report on the strike/lockout
vote.
327
c.Effectonthe7daywaitingperiodofstrike/lockoutbanifthestrike/lockoutvoteistakenandreported
withinthecoolingoffperiod.
Itmustbestressedthattherequirementsofcoolingoffperiodand7daywaitingperiodorstrike/lockoutban
mustbothbecompliedwith,althoughthelaborunionmaytakeastrikevoteandtheemployermayconductalockout
vote and report the same to the NCMBDOLE within the statutory coolingoff period. In this case, the 7day waiting
period or strike/lockout ban should be counted from the day following the expiration of the coolingoff period. A
contrary view would certainly defeat and render nugatory the salutary purposes behind the distinct requirements of
coolingoffperiodandthewaitingperiodorstrike/lockoutban.
328
d.Someprinciplesoncoolingoffperiodand7daywaitingperiod.
1. Astrikestagedonthesamedaythenoticeofstrikeisfiled,heldillegal.
329
2. AstrikemountedonthesamedaythestrikevotereportissubmittedtotheNCMBDOLE,heldillegal.
330
3. Deficiencyofevenone(1)day,heldfatal.
331
4. Onedaystrikewithoutcomplyingwiththe7daystrikeban,heldillegal.
332

320
Article263[c], Labor Code; Section7, RuleXXII, BookV, RulestoImplement theLabor Code, asamendedbyArticle1, Department Order No. 40-03, Seriesof 2003[February17, 2003]; No. 06, Primer onStrike, PicketingandLockout; Section5, RuleIV, NCMBManual of Procedures
forConciliationandPreventiveMediationCases; No. 3, GuidelinesGoverningLaborRelations.
321
Sukothai CuisineandRestaurant v. CA, [G.R. No. 150437, July17, 2006].
322
Article263[c], LaborCode.
323
Seeoldprovisionof Section3, RuleXXII, BookV, RulestoImplement theLaborCode, asamendedbyArticle1, Department Order No. 09, Seriesof 1997[21June1997].
324
No. 010, PrimeronStrike, PicketingandLockout; National Federationof SugarWorkers(NFSW)v. Ovejera, G.R. No. L-59743, May31, 1982; SeealsoPhimcoIndustries, Inc. v. PhimcoIndustriesLaborAssociation[PILA], G.R. No. 170830, Aug. 11, 2010.
325
National Federationof Sugar Workers(NFSW) v. Ovejera, [G.R. No. L-59743, May31, 1982].
326
SamahangManggagawasaSulpicioLines, Inc. NAFLUv. SulpicioLines, Inc., G.R. No. 140992, March25, 2004.
327
Unionof FiliproEmployeesv. NestlePhilippines, Inc., G.R. No. 88710-13, Dec. 19, 1990; Liberal LaborUnionv. Phil. CanCo., G.R. No. L-4834, March28, 1952, 91Phil. 72; PhilippineAirlinesv. PhilippineAirlinesEmployeesAssociation, G.R. No. L-8197, Oct. 31, 1958.
328
No. 06, PrimeronStrike, PicketingandLockout issuedbytheNCMB; National Federationof SugarWorkers(NFSW)v. Ovejera, [G.R. No. L-59743, May31, 1982].
329
PilipinoTelephoneCorp. v. PilipinoTelephoneEmployeesAssociation[PILTEA], [G.R. No. 160058, June22, 2007].
330
National Unionof WorkersintheHotel, Restaurant andAlliedIndustries[NUWHRAIN-APL-IUF] Dusit Hotel NikkoChapterv. TheHonorableCA, [G.R. Nos. 163942and166295, November11, 2008].
331
CCBPI PostmixWorkersUnionv. NLRC, [G.R. No. 114521, November 27, 1998] andCoca-ColaBottlersPhils, Inc. v. NLRC, [G.R. No. 123491, November27, 1998, 299SCRA410].
332
SamahangManggagawasaSulpicioLines, Inc. NAFLUv. SulpicioLines, Inc., [G.R. No. 140992, March25, 2004].
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=================================
e. Requisites for lawful picketing
=================================
1.REQUISITESFORLAWFULPICKETING.
a.Therequisitesforavalidstrikeorlockoutarenotapplicabletopicketing.
The7requisitesforavalidstrikeorlockoutdiscussedabovedonotapplytopicketing.
b.Requisitesforlawfulpicketing.
Thefollowingaretherequisites:
1.Itshouldbepeacefullycarriedout;
2.Thereshouldbenoactofviolence,coercionorintimidationattendantthereto;
3.Theingressto(entrance)oregressfrom(exit)thecompanypremisesshouldnotbeobstructed;
4.Publicthoroughfaresshouldnotbeimpeded.
333
c.Righttopicketisprotectedbytheconstitutionandthelaw.
Unlike a strike which is guaranteed under the Constitutional provision on the right of workers to conduct
peacefulconcertedactivitiesunderSection3,ArticleXIIIthereof,therighttopicketisguaranteedunderthefreedomof
speechandofexpressionandtopeaceablyassembletoairgrievancesintheConstitutionunderSection4,ArticleIII(Bill
ofRights)thereof.
334
Therighttopicketislikewiseguaranteedaspartoftherightguaranteedunderthelawtoengageinconcerted
activitiesforpurposesofcollectivebargainingfortheirmutualbenefitandprotection.
335
d.Effectofabsenceofemploymentrelationshiponpicketing.
Picketing, if peacefully carried out, cannot be prohibited even in the absence of employeremployee
relationship.
336
e.Effectoftheuseoffoullanguageduringtheconductofthepicket.
Intheeventthepicketersemploydiscourteousandimpolitelanguageintheirpicket,suchmaynotresultin,or
giveriseto,libeloractionfordamages.
337
f.Whenpicketbecomesastrike.
Indistinguishingbetweenapicketandastrike,thetotalityofthecircumstancesobtaininginacaseshouldbe
takenintoaccount.
SantaRosaCocaColaPlantEmployeesUnionv.CocaColaBottlersPhils.,Inc.,[G.R.Nos.16430203,January
24,2007].
Petitioners contend that what they conducted was a mere picketing and not a strike. In disagreeing to this
contention,the High Court emphasized that it is not an issue in this case that there was alabordisputebetween the
parties as petitioners had notified the respondent of their intention to stage a strike, and not merely to
picket.Petitionersinsistencetostageastrikeisevidentinthefactthatanamendednoticeofstrikewasfiledevenas
respondentmovedtodismissthefirstnotice.Thebasicelementsofastrikearepresentinthiscase:106membersof
petitionerUnion,whoserespectiveapplicationsforleaveofabsenceonSeptember21,1999weredisapproved,opted
not to report for work on said date, and gathered in front of the company premises to hold a mass protest action.
Petitionersdeliberately absentedthemselvesand instead wore red ribbonsandcarriedplacards with sloganssuchas:
YES KAMI SA STRIKE, PROTESTA KAMI, SAHOD, KARAPATAN NG MANGGAGAWA IPAGLABAN, CBAWAG
BABOYIN, STOP UNION BUSTING. They marched to and fro in front of the companys premises during working
hours. Thus, petitioners engaged in a concerted activity which already affected the companys operations. The mass
concertedactivityobviouslyconstitutesastrike.Moreover,thebarefactthatpetitionersweregivenaMayorspermitis
notconclusiveevidencethattheiraction/activitydidnotamounttoastrike.TheMayorsdescriptionofwhatactivities
petitioners were allowed toconduct is inconsequential. To repeat, what is definitiveof whether the action stagedby
petitionersisastrikeandnotmerelyapicketisthetotalityofthecircumstancessurroundingthesituation.
g.Distinctionbetweenastrikeandpicketing.
Tostrikeistowithholdortostopworkbytheconcertedactionofemployeesasaresultofanindustrialorlabor
dispute. The work stoppage may be accompanied by picketing by the striking employees outside of the company
compound.While a strike focuses on stoppage of work, picketing focuses on publicizing the labor dispute and its

333
Section13, RuleXXII, BookV, RulestoImplement theLaborCode, asamendedbyDepartment OrderNo. 40-03, Seriesof 2003, [Feb. 17, 2003].
334
SeealsoDeLeonv. National LaborUnion, G.R. No. L-7586, Jan. 30, 1957, 100Phil. 789; TheInsularLifeAssuranceCo., Ltd. EmployeesAssociation-NATUv. TheInsularLifeAssuranceCo., Ltd., G.R. No. L-25291, Jan. 30, 1971, 37SCRA244.
335
MalayangManggagawasaEssov. EssoStandardEastern, Inc., G.R. No. L-24224, July30, 1965, 14SCRA801.
336
PhilippineAssociationof FreeLaborUnions[PAFLU] v. Court of First Instance, G.R. No. L-49580, Jan. 17, 1983, 120SCRA1.
337
PhilippineCommercial andIndustrial Bankv. PhilnabankEmployeesAssociation, G.R. No. L-29630, July2, 1981, 105SCRA315.
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incidentstoinformthepublicofwhatishappeninginthecompanystruckagainst.Apicketsimplymeanstomarchto
andfromtheemployerspremises,usuallyaccompaniedbythedisplayofplacardsandothersignsmakingknownthe
factsinvolvedinalabordispute.Itisastrikeactivityseparateanddifferentfromtheactualstoppageofwork.
PhimcoIndustries,Inc.v.PhimcoIndustriesLaborAssociation(PILA),[G.R.No.170830,August11,2010].
Whiletherightofemployeestopublicizetheirdisputefallswithintheprotectionoffreedomofexpressionand
therighttopeaceablyassembletoairgrievances,theserightsarebynomeansabsolute.Protectedpicketingdoesnot
extendtoblockingingresstoandegressfromthecompanypremises.Thatthepicketwasmoving,waspeacefulandwas
notattendedbyactualviolencemaynotfreeitfromtaintsofillegalityifthepicketeffectivelyblockedentrytoandexit
fromthecompanypremises.
==================================================
f. Assumption of jurisdiction by the Secretary
of Labor or Certification of the Labor dispute
to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration
g. Nature of Assumption Order or Certification Order
h. Effect of defiance of Assumption or Certification Orders
==================================================
Relevant Provisions: Articles 263 and 264, Labor Code
1.POWERTOASSUMEJURISDICTIONOVERALABORDISPUTEORTOCERTIFYITTOTHENLRCFORCOMPULSORY
ARBITRATION.
a.GroundsforassumptionorcertificationbytheDOLESecretary.
Article263[g]oftheLaborCodeprovidesthatwhenintheopinionoftheSecretaryofLaborandEmployment,
thelabordisputecausesorwilllikelytocauseastrikeorlockoutinanindustryindispensabletothenationalinterest,he
isempoweredtodoeitheroftwo(2)things:
1.Hemayassumejurisdictionoverthelabordisputeanddecideithimself;or
2.HemaycertifyittotheNLRCforcompulsoryarbitration,inwhichcase,itwillbetheNLRCwhichshallhear
anddecideit.
338
ThispowermaybeexercisedbytheDOLESecretaryevenbeforetheactualstagingofastrikeorlockoutsince
Article 263 [g] does not require the existence of a strike or lockout but only of a labor dispute involving national
interest.
339
b.Whatconstitutesanationalinterestcase?
TheLaborCodevestsintheSecretaryofLaborandEmploymentthediscretiontodeterminewhatindustries
areindispensabletothenationalinterest.Accordingly,uponthedeterminationbytheDOLESecretarythatsuchindustry
is indispensable to the national interest, he has authority to assume jurisdiction over the labor dispute in the said
industryorcertifyittotheNLRCforcompulsoryarbitration.
340
AmatchfactorylikethepetitionerinPhimcoIndustries,Inc.v.Brillantes,[G.R.No.120751,March17,1999,
304SCRA747],thoughofvalue,canscarcelybeconsideredasanindustryindispensabletothenationalinterestasit
cannotbeinthesamecategoryasgenerationordistributionofenergy,orthoseundertakenbybanks,hospitals,and
exportoriented industries. Thus, it was declared that the DOLE Secretary acted with grave abuse of discretion in
assuming jurisdiction over the labor dispute in this case without any showing that the petitioner was engaged in an
industryindispensabletothenationalinterest.
c.Differentruleonstrikesandlockoutsinhospitals,clinicsandmedicalinstitutions.
Inlinewiththenationalconcernforandthehighestrespectaccordedtotherightofpatientstolifeandhealth,
strikesandlockoutsinhospitals,clinicsandsimilarmedicalinstitutionsshall,toeveryextentpossible,beavoidedandall
seriousefforts,notonlybylaborandmanagementbutgovernmentaswell,beexhaustedtosubstantiallyminimize,if
notprevent,theiradverseeffectsonsuchlifeandhealth,throughtheexercisehoweverlegitimatebylaborofitsrightto
strikeandbymanagementtolockout.
341
Inlabordisputesadverselyaffectingthecontinuedoperationofsuchhospitals,clinicsormedicalinstitutions,it
shallbethedutyofthestrikingunionorlockingoutemployertoprovideandmaintainaneffectiveskeletalworkforceof
medical and other health personnel whose movement and services shall be unhampered and unrestricted as are
necessarytoinsuretheproperandadequateprotectionofthelifeandhealthofitspatients,mostespeciallyemergency
cases,forthedurationofthestrikeorlockout.
342

338
SeealsoArticle263[i], LaborCode.
339
Government InsuranceSystemEmployeesAssociation, v. CIR, G.R. No. L-18734, Dec. 30, 1961.
340
PhiltreadWorkersUnion[PTWU] v. Confesor, G.R. No. 117169, March12, 1997, 269SCRA293].
341
Article263[g], LaborCode; FarEasternUniversity-Dr. Nicanor ReyesMedical Foundation[FEU-NRMF] v. FEU-NRMFEmployeesAssociation-Allianceof FilipinoWorkers[FEU-NRMFEA-AFW], G.R. No. 168362, Oct. 12, 2006.
342
Id.; SeenewSection16, RuleXXII, BookV, RulestoImplement theLabor Code, asamendedbyDOLEDepartment OrderNo. 40-G-03, Seriesof 2010, issuedbyDOLESecretaryMarianitoRoqueonMarch29, 2010.
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Insuchcases,theDOLESecretarymayimmediatelyassume,withintwentyfour(24)hoursfromknowledgeof
theoccurrenceofsuchastrikeorlockout,jurisdictionoverthesameorcertifyittotheNLRCforcompulsoryarbitration.
For this purpose, the contending parties are strictly enjoined to comply with such orders, prohibitions and/or
injunctionsasareissuedbytheDOLESecretaryortheNLRC,asthecasemaybe,underpainofimmediatedisciplinary
action,includingdismissalorlossofemploymentstatusorpaymentbythelockingoutemployerofbackwages,damages
andotheraffirmativerelief,evencriminalprosecutionagainsteitherorbothofthem.
343
d.Certifiedlabordisputes.
Certified labor disputes are national interest cases certified by the DOLE Secretary to the NLRC for
compulsoryarbitrationunderArticle263[g]oftheLaborCode.
344
e.Incertifiedcases,NLRCcannotamendthetermsoftheDOLESecretaryscertificationorder.
TheNLRC,whensittinginacompulsoryarbitrationcasecertifiedtoitbytheDOLESecretary,isnottakingthe
roleofajudicialcourtbutasanadministrativebodychargedwiththedutytoimplementtheorderoftheSecretary.As
the implementing body, its authority does not include the power to amend the Secretarys order.
345
Having been
certified to the NLRC, it becomes the proper forum for the full and complete settlement or adjudication of all labor
disputesbetweentheparties,aswellasissuesthatarerelevanttoorincidentsofthecertifiedcase.
346
f.EffectsofcertificationoflabordisputestotheNLRC,similartothoseassumeddirectlybytheDOLE
Secretary.
Thefollowingaretheeffectsofbothassumptionorcertificationoflabordisputes:
1. Onintendedorimpendingstrikeorlockout.Uponassumptionorcertification,theintendedorimpending
strikeorlockoutisautomaticallyenjoined,notwithstandingthefilingofanymotionforreconsiderationof
thecertificationordernorthenonresolutionofanysuchmotionwhichmayhavebeendulysubmittedto
theOfficeoftheDOLESecretary.
347
2. Onactualstrikeorlockout.Ifaworkstoppagehasalreadytakenplaceatthetimeoftheassumptionor
certification,allstrikingorlockedoutemployeesshallimmediatelyreturntoworkandtheemployershall
immediately resume operations and readmit all workers under the same terms and conditions prevailing
beforethestrikeorlockout.
348
3. Oncasesalreadyfiledormaybefiled.Allcasesbetweenthesameparties,exceptwheretheassumption
orcertificationorderspecifiesotherwise,theissuessubmittedforarbitrationwhicharealreadyfiledormay
befiledandarerelevanttoorareproperincidentsofthecertifiedcase,shallbeconsideredsubsumedor
absorbedbytheassumedorcertifiedcase,andshallbedecidedbytheDOLESecretaryor,incertifiedcases,
bytheappropriateDivisionoftheNLRC.
349
4. Onotherpendingcases.Thepartiestoanassumedorcertifiedcase,underpainofcontempt,arerequired
toinformtheircounselsandtheDOLESecretaryorNLRCDivisionconcerned,ofallcasespendingwiththe
LaborArbitersandVoluntaryArbitratorsrelativeorincidenttotheassumedorcertifiedcasebeforeit.
350
g.Someprinciplesonassumption/certificationpoweroftheDOLESecretary.
1. Priornoticeandhearingarenotrequiredintheissuanceoftheassumptionorcertificationorder.
351
2. ApplicabilityofArticle221toproceedingsbeforetheDOLESecretaryinassumptioncases.Thus,technical
rulesofevidenceprevailingincourtsoflawandequityhavenoroominadministrativeand/orquasijudicial
proceedingssuchasinassumptionorcertificationproceedings.Consequently,theDOLESecretarymaywell
resorttopositionpapertypeofproceeding.
352
3. When the DOLE Secretary exercises the powers under Article 263 [g], he is granted great breadth of
discretion in order to find a solution to a labor dispute.
353
It necessarily includes and extends to all
questions and controversies that may have arisen from the labor dispute over which he assumed
jurisdiction,includingthosecasesfallingundertheoriginalandexclusivejurisdictionofLaborArbiters.
354
It
alsoincludesmattersincidentaltothelabordispute,i.e.,issuesthatarenecessarilyinvolvedinthedispute
itself,notjusttothoseascribedinthenoticeofstrikeorotherwisesubmittedtohimforresolution.
355
4. TheDOLESecretarymayseektheassistanceoflawenforcementagencieslikethePhilippineNationalPolice
toensurecompliancewiththeprovisionthereofaswellaswithsuchordersashemayissuetoenforcethe
same.

343
Ibid..
344
Section2, RuleVIII, 2005RevisedRulesof Procedureof theNLRC.
345
Universityof SantoTomasv. NLRC, G.R. No. 89920, Oct. 18, 1990; Unionof FiliproEmployeesv. NLRC, G.R. No. 91025, Dec. 19, 1990, 192SCRA414.
346
MarcopperMiningCorporationv. Brillantes, G.R. No. 119381, March11, 1996, 254SCRA595, 600.
347
SeealsoSection3[a], RuleVIII, 2005RevisedRulesof Procedureof theNLRC.
348
Id..
349
Section3[b], RuleVIII, 2005RevisedRulesof Procedureof theNLRC; PhilippineFederationof PetroleumWorkers[PFPW] v. CIR, 37SCRA711; International Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Secretaryof Labor andAssociatedLabor Union[ALU], G.R. No. 92981-83, Jan. 9, 1992; St.
ScholasticasCollegev. Torres, G.R. No. 100158, June29, 1992.
350
2
nd
Paragraph, Section3[b], RuleVIII, The2005RevisedRulesof Procedureof theNLRC; BagongBayanCorporationRealtyInvestorsandDevelopersv. Ople, G.R. No. 73334, Dec. 8, 1986.
351
Capitol Medical Center, Inc. v. Trajano, [G.R. No. 155690, June30, 2005].
352
TelefunkenSemiconductorsEmployeesUnion-FFWv. Court of Appeals, [G.R. Nos. 143013-14, December 18, 2000].
353
PhilcomEmployeesUnionv. PhilippineGlobal Communications, G.R. No. 144315, July17, 2006.
354
St. Scholasticas Collegev. Torres, G.R. No. 100158, June29, 1992, 210SCRA565,570.
355
Unionof FiliproEmployees-Drug, FoodandAlliedIndustriesUnions-KilusangMayoUno[UFE-DFA-KMU] v. NestlePhilippines, Inc., G.R. No. 158930-31, Aug. 22, 2006; SeealsoInternational Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. theSecretaryof Labor, supra; CirtekEmployeesLabor Union-FFW
v. CirtekElectronics, Inc., G.R. No. 190515, Nov. 15, 2010.
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h.Returntoworkorder,partofassumption/certificationorderevenifnotexpresslystatedtherein.
ItisclearfromtheprovisionofArticle263[g]thatthemomenttheDOLESecretaryassumesjurisdictionovera
labor dispute involving national interest or certifies it to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration, such assumption or
certificationhastheeffectofautomaticallyenjoiningtheintendedorimpendingstrike.Itisthusnotnecessaryforthe
DOLESecretarytoissueanotherorderdirectingthestrikerstoreturntowork.Themereissuanceofanassumptionor
certification order automatically carries with it a returntowork order, even if the directive to return to work is not
expresslystatedtherein.
356
Thus, it is error for striking workers to continue with their strike alleging absence of a returntowork order
since Article 263 [g] is clear that once an assumption/certification order is issued, strikes are enjoined or, if one has
alreadytakenplace,allstrikersshouldimmediatelyreturntowork.
357
i.Natureofreturntoworkorder.
Areturntoworkorderisnotoffensivetotheconstitutionalprovisionagainstinvoluntaryservitude.
358
Itmust
bedischargedasadutyevenagainsttheworkerswill.Theworkermustreturntohisjobtogetherwithhiscoworkersso
thattheoperationofthecompanycanberesumedanditcancontinueservingthepublicandpromotingitsinterest.Itis
executory in character and should be strictly complied with by the parties even during the pendency of any petition
questioningitsvalidityinordertomaintainthestatusquowhilethedeterminationisbeingmade.
359
j.Someprinciplesonreturntoworkorder.
1. Returntoworkorderisenforceableirrespectiveofthelegalityofthestrike.
360
2. Uponassumptionorcertification,thepartiesshouldreverttothestatusquoantelitemwhichreferstothe
stateofthingsasitwasbeforethelabordisputeorthestateofaffairsexistingatthetimeofthefilingofthe
case.Itisthelastactual,peacefulanduncontestedstatusthatprecededtheactualcontroversy.
361
3. Retrenched or redundant employees whose termination brought about the labor dispute are included in
thereturntoworkorder.
362
4. Toimplementthereturntoworkorder,thenormisactualreinstatement.However,payrollreinstatement
in lieuof actual reinstatement may properlybe resortedtowhen special circumstances existthat render
actual reinstatement impracticable or otherwise not conducive to attaining the purposes of the law.
Examples:
a. University of Sto. Tomas v. NLRC, [G.R. No. 89920, October 18, 1990, 190 SCRA 758], where the
teachers ordered to return to work could not be given back their academic assignments since the
returntowork order of the DOLE Secretary was issued in the middle of the first semester of the
academic year. The NLRC, to which the labor dispute was certified, was, therefore, faced with a
situationwherethestrikingteachers wereentitledtoareturntoworkorder,buttheuniversitycould
not immediately reinstate them since it would be impracticable and detrimental to the students to
change teachers at that point. The Supreme Court affirmed the validity of the payroll reinstatement
orderoftheNLRCandruledthattheNLRCdidnotcommitgraveabuseofdiscretioninprovidingforthe
alternativeremedyofpayrollreinstatement.ItobservedthattheNLRCwasonlytryingitsbesttowork
outasatisfactoryadhocsolutiontoafesteringandseriousproblem.
b. University of Immaculate Concepcion, Inc. v. The Honorable Secretary of Labor, [G.R. No. 151379,
January 14, 2005], where it was pronounced that while payroll reinstatement is not allowed under
Article263[g]asthephraseunder thesametermsandconditionsembodiedthereinmakesitclear
that the norm is actual reinstatement, payroll reinstatement in lieu of actual reinstatement may,
however,bejustified,asanexceptiontotherule,whenspecialcircumstancesexistthatrenderactual
reinstatement impracticable or otherwise not conducive to attaining the purposes of the law. The
specialcircumstancesintheinstantcasenodoubtrefertothefinaldecisionofthepanelofarbitrators
astotheconfidentialnatureofthepositionsofthetwelve(12)privaterespondents,therebyrendering
theiractualandphysicalreinstatementimpracticableandmorelikelytoexacerbatethesituation.The
payrollreinstatementinlieuofactualreinstatement,therefore,appearsjustifiedasanexceptiontothe
ruleuntilthevalidityoftheirterminationisfinallyresolved.
5. Nonwaiver of demands upon voluntary return to work. The act of the strikers in voluntarily returning to
workdoesnotresultinthewaiveroftheiroriginaldemands.Suchactofreturningtoworkonlymeansthat
theydesistedfromthestrikewhichdesistanceisapersonalactofthestrikersandcannotbeusedagainst
theunionandinterpretedasawaiverbyitof itsoriginaldemandsforwhichthestrikewasadoptedasa
weapon.
363
6. Filingofamotionforreconsiderationdoesnotaffecttheenforcementofareturntoworkorder.
364
7. Intransigencetoareturntoworkordermustbedulyprovedtoholdanemployeeliabletherefor.
365

356
Steel Corporationof thePhilippinesv. SCPEmployeesUnionNational Federationof Labor Unions, G.R. Nos. 169829-30, April 16, 2008; CalambaMedical Center, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 176484, Nov. 25, 2008.
357
Id..
358
PhilippineRefiningCompanyWorkers Unionvs. PhilippineRefiningCompany, G.R. No. L-1668, March29, 1948, 80Phil. 533; KaisahanngmgaManggagawasaKahoysaPilipinasv. GotamcoSawmill, G.R. No. L-1573, March29, 1948, 80Phil. 521.
359
MarcopperMiningCorporationv. Brillantes, G.R. No. 119381, March11, 1996; Unionof FilipinoEmployeesv. NestlePhilippines, Inc., G.R. No. 88710-13, Dec. 19, 1990, citedinNo. 033, Primer onStrike, PicketingandLockout; No. 23, GuidelinesGoverningLaborRelations; Sarmiento
v. Tuico, G.R. Nos. 75271-73, June27, 1988, 162SCRA676.
360
Unionof FiliproEmployeesv. NestlePhilippines, Inc., G.R. No. 88710-13, Dec. 19, 1990.
361
OverseasWorkers WelfareAdministrationv. Chavez, G.R. No. 169802, June8, 2007.
362
PLDTv. ManggagawangKomunikasyonsaPilipinas, [G.R. No. 162783, July14, 2005].
363
BisayaLandTransportationCo., Inc. v. CIR, G.R. No. L-10114, Nov. 26, 1957, 102Phil. 438.
364
(TelefunkenSemiconductorsEmployeesUnion-FFWv. Secretaryof Labor andEmployment, G.R. Nos. 122743and127215, Dec. 12, 1997, 283SCRA145.
365
CalambaMedical Center, Inc. v. NLRC, [G.R. No. 176484, November25, 2008].
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8. Theextensionofthereturntoworkorderandtheadmissionofallstrikingworkersbythecompany,cannot
inanywaybeconsideredawaiverthattheunionofficerscanusetonegateliabilityfortheirillegalactions
ofdefyingthefirstreturntoworkorderandforcommissionofillegalactsinthecourseofthestrike.
366
2.NATUREOFASSUMPTIONORDERORCERTIFICATIONORDER.
a.Apolicepowermeasure.
ThepowertoissueassumptionorcertificationordersisanextraordinaryauthoritygrantedtothePresidentor
theSecretaryofLaborandEmployment,theexerciseofwhichshouldbestrictlylimitedtonationalinterestcases.
367
Itisinthenatureofapolicepowermeasure.Thisisdoneforthepromotionofthecommongoodconsidering
thataprolongedstrikeorlockoutcanbeinimicaltothenationaleconomy.TheDOLESecretaryismandatedtoactto
maintainindustrialpeace.Thus,hisassumingjurisdictionoveralabordisputeorhiscertificationthereoftotheNLRCfor
compulsoryarbitrationisnotintendedtoimpedetheworkersrighttostrikebuttoobtainaspeedysettlementofthe
dispute.
368
Having been enacted pursuant to the police power of the State, Article 263 [g] requires that the powers
thereunderbeexercisedonlyinlabordisputesinvolvingindustriesindispensabletothenationalinterest.
369
Aprolonged
strikeorlockoutcanbeinimicaltothenationaleconomyand,therefore,thesituationisimbuedwithpublicnecessity
andinvolvestherightoftheStateandthepublictoselfprotection.
370
b.Grantofassumption/certificationpowerisfortheprotectionoftheState,notoflabornorofemployer.
Consequent to such exercise of police power, it is provided under Article 263 [g] that all workers must
immediatelyreturntoworkandallemployersmustreadmitallofthemunderthesametermsandconditionsprevailing
beforethestrikeorlockout.Thelawusestheprecisephraseofunderthesametermsandconditions,revealingthatit
contemplates only actual reinstatement.This is in keeping with the rationale that any work stoppage or slowdown in
thatparticularindustrycanbeinimicaltothenationaleconomy.ItisclearthatArticle263[g]wasnotwrittentoprotect
labor from the excesses of management, nor was it written to ease management from expenses, which it normally
incurs during a work stoppage or slowdown.It is an error to view the assumption order of the DOLE Secretary as a
measuretoprotectthestrikingworkersfromanyretaliatoryactionfromtheemployer.Thislawwaswrittenasameans
tobeusedbytheStatetoprotectitselffromanemergencyorcrisis.Itisnotforlabor,norisitformanagement.
371
.
3.EFFECTOFDEFIANCEOFASSUMPTIONORCERTIFICATIONORDERS.
a.EffectofdefianceofassumptionorcertificationordersoftheDOLESecretary.
The defiance by the union, its officers and members of the Labor Secretary's assumption of jurisdiction or
certificationorderconstitutesavalidgroundfordismissal.
372
Thefollowingarethejustificationsforthedefiantemployeesdismissal:
1. AstrikethatisundertakenaftertheissuancebytheDOLESecretaryofanassumptionorcertificationorder
becomes a prohibited activity and thus illegal. The striking union officers and members, as a result, are
deemedtohavelosttheiremploymentstatusforhavingknowinglyparticipatedinanillegalstrike.
2. Fromthemomentaworkerdefiesareturntoworkorder,heisdeemedtohaveabandonedhisjob.
373
3. Bystagingastrikeaftertheassumptionorcertificationforcompulsoryarbitration,theworkersforfeittheir
righttobereadmittedtowork,having,ineffect,abandonedtheiremployment.
374
b.Alldefiantstrikers,regardlessofwhethertheyareofficersorordinarymembers,aredeemeddismissed.
Thisdoctrineisapplicabletoallstrikingemployees,whetheraunionofficeroramember.Thishasbeenthe
consistentrulingoftheSupremeCourtinalonglineofcasesspanningseveraldecades.OncetheSecretaryofLaborand
Employment assumes jurisdiction over a labor dispute or certifies it to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration, such
jurisdictionshouldnotbeinterferedwithbytheapplicationofthecoerciveprocessesofastrikeorlockout.Anydefiance
thereofisavalidgroundforthelossofemploymentstatus.
375
The workers defying a returntowork order issued in connection with the assumption or certification by the
SecretaryofLaborandEmploymentmay,infact,besubjectednotonlytoimmediatedisciplinaryactionsuchasdismissal
orlossofemploymentstatusbuttocriminalprosecutionaswell.
376
Thedefiantstrikerscouldbevalidlyreplaced.
377
c.Periodofdefianceofthereturntoworkorder,notmaterial;defianceoflessthanone(1)day,sufficientto
effectterminationofdefiantstrikers.
The length of time within which the returntowork order was defied by the strikers is not significant in
determiningtheirliabilityforthelegalconsequencesthereof.Thefollowingcasesareillustrativeofthisrule:
1. UniversityofSanAgustinEmployeesUnionFFWv.TheCA,[G.R.No.169632,March28,2006],theperiod
ofdefiancewasfrom8:45a.m.to5:25p.m.onSeptember19,2003.

366
BagongPagkakaisangManggagawangTriumphInternational v. Secretaryof theDepartment of LaborandEmployment, [G.R. Nos. 167401and167407, July5, 2010].
367
No. 22, GuidelinesGoverningLaborRelations.
368
SeePhiltreadWorkersUnion[PTWU] v. Confesor, G.R. No. 117169, March12, 1997, 269SCRA293.
369
PhilippineSchool of BusinessAdministration-Manilav. Noriel, G.R. No. L-80648, Aug. 15, 1988, 164SCRA402; Sarmientov. Tuico, G.R. Nos. 75271-73, June27, 1988, 162SCRA676; PhilippineAirlines, Inc. v. Secretaryof LaborandEmployment, G.R. No. 88210, Jan. 23, 1991, 193
SCRA223.
370
PhimcoIndustries, Inc. v. Brillantes, G.R. No. 120751, March17, 1999, 304SCRA747, 763.
371
ManilaDiamondHotel Employees Unionv. CA, G.R. No. 140518, Dec. 16, 2004.
372
BagongPagkakaisangManggagawangTriumphInternational v. Secretaryof theDepartment of LaborandEmployment, G.R. Nos. 167401and167407, July5, 2010.
373
Article263[g], Labor Code; Section5, RuleXXII, BookV, RulestoImplement theLabor Code, asamendedbyDepartment Order No. 40-03, Seriesof 2003, [Feb. 17, 2003], andasfurther amendedbyDepartment Order No. 40-A-03[March12, 2003]; PhilippineAirlines, Inc. v.
Brillantes, G.R. No. 119360, Oct. 10, 1997, 280SCRA515.
374
Steel Corporationof thePhilippinesv. SCPEmployeesUnionNational Federationof Labor Unions, G.R. Nos. 169829-30, April 16, 2008.
375
ManilaHotel EmployeesAssociationv. ManilaHotel Corp., G.R. No. 154591, March5, 2007, citingGrandBoulevardHotel v. GLOWHRAIN, G.R. No. 153664, July18, 2003, 406SCRA688, 710; TelefunkenSemiconductorsEmployeesUnion-FFWv. CA, G.R. Nos. 143013-14, Dec.
18, 2000, 348SCRA565, 582; FFWv. Inciong, G.R. No. 49983, April 20, 1982, 208SCRA157, 165.
376
SanJuandeDiosEducational FoundationEmployeesUnionAFWv. SanJuandeDiosEducational Foundation, Inc. [Hospital], G.R. No. 143341, May28, 2004.
377
Marcopper MiningCorporationv. Brillantes, G.R. No. 119381, March11, 1996, 254SCRA595; AlliedBankingCorporationv. NLRC, G.R. No. 119381, March11, 1996, 258SCRA724.
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2.FederationofFreeWorkersv.Inciong,[G.R.No.L49983,April20,1992],theperiodofdefiancewasonly
nine(9)days.
3. Sarmientov.Tuico,[G.R.No.7527173,June27,1988],theperiodofdefiancewasforfive(5)months.
d.Nopracticeofgiving24hourstostrikerswithinwhichtoreturntowork.
InthesamecaseofUniversityofSanAgustin[supra],itwasheldthatthereisnosuchpracticeofgivingthe
strikerstwentyfourhours(24)withinwhichtoreturntowork.Thereisnolaworjurisprudencerecognizingthispractice.
To cast doubt on the regularity of the aforesaid service of the two orders issued by the DOLE Secretary,
petitionersinthesamecaseofTelefunken[supra]citeSection1,RuleIXoftheNLRCManualonExecutionofJudgment,
towit:
Section1.HoursandDaysWhenWritShallBeServed.Writofexecutionshallbeserved
atanyday,exceptSaturdays,Sundaysandholidays,betweenthehoursofeightinthemorningand
fiveintheafternoon.xxx
TheSupremeCourt,however,declaredthattheabovecitedruleisnotapplicabletothecaseatbarinasmuch
asSections1and4,RuleIIIofthesameNLRCManualprovidethatsuchexecutionshallissueonlyuponajudgmentor
orderthatfinallydisposesofanactionorproceeding.TheassumptionandreturntoworkordersissuedbytheDOLE
SecretaryarenotthekindoforderscontemplatedinthesaidruleoftheNLRCbecausesuchordersdidnotyetfinally
disposeofthelabordispute.
e.Someprinciplesondefianceoftheassumption/certificationorder.
1. Theassumption/certificationordermaybeservedatanytimeoftheday.
378
2. If both parties have acted in pari delicto in that the employer is guilty of illegal lockout and the union is
culpable for illegal strike, the dismissal of the striking employees is unwarranted and their reinstatement
shouldbeorderedasamatterofcourse.
379
3. Absent any notice to the union of the assumption/certification order, the strike does not automatically
becomeillegal.
380
4. Serviceoftheassumption/certificationorderandreturntoworkorderontheguardondutyinsteadofthe
presidentoftheunionwhowasauthorizedtoreceivethesameisnotvalid.
381
Butifthestrikersandtheir
counselweredulyservedwiththeassumptionorderandhadactuallyadmittedthisfactintheirpleadings
andduringthemandatoryconferencebeforetheNLRC,theserviceofsaidorderisdeemedvalid.
382
5. Therefusaltoacknowledgereceiptofsuchordersandotherprocessesisanapparentattempttofrustrate
the endsofjustice,hence, invalid. The union cannotbe allowed to thwartthe efficacy ofthe assumption
and returntowork orders issued in the national interest through the simple expediency of refusing to
acknowledgereceiptthereof.
383
=================================
i. Illegal Strike
(1) Liability of officers of the unions
(2) Liability of ordinary workers
(3) Waiver of illegality of strike
=================================
1.PARTICIPATIONINLAWFULSTRIKE.
Thedeclarationoractualconductofastrikedoesnotresultintheseveranceoftheemploymentrelationship
norarenunciationthereof.Theemploymentrelationshipismerelysuspendedduringtheperiodofworkstoppage.
384
An
employeewhoparticipatesinalawfulstrikeisnotdeemedtohaveabandonedhisemploymentbutismerelyexercising
hisrighttoselforganizationpreciselytoprotecthisrightsasanemployeeand/ortoobtainbetterworkingconditions.
385
Suchparticipationshouldnotconstitutesufficientgroundfortheterminationofhisemploymentevenifareplacement
hasalreadybeenhiredbytheemployerduringsuchlawfulstrike.
386
2.PARTICIPATIONINILLEGALSTRIKE.
a.Distinctionintheliabilitybetweenunionofficersandordinaryunionmembers.
1.Unionofficers.
Themerefindingordeclarationofillegalityofastrikewillresultintheterminationofallunionofficers.Itisnot
requiredthattheofficersshouldcommitanillegalduringthestrike.
387

378
TelefunkenSemiconductors EmployeesUnion-FFWv. Secretaryof Labor andEmployment, [G.R. Nos. 122743and127215, December 12, 1997, 283SCRA145].
379
PhilippineAirlines, Inc. v. Brillantes, [G.R. No. 119360, October10, 1997, 280SCRA515].
380
PNOCDockyardandEngineeringCorporationv. NLRC, [G.R. No. 118223, June26, 1998, 291SCRA231, 237-246].
381
Id.
382
ManilaHotel EmployeesAssociationv. ManilaHotel Corp., [G.R. No. 154591, March5, 2007].
383
Navalev. CA, [G.R. No. 109957, February20, 1996, 253SCRA705].
384
RexTaxicabCo. v. CIR, 40O. G. 138, 70Phil. 621.
385
No. 029, PrimeronStrike, PicketingandLockout.
386
Article264[a], LaborCode; No. 030, Primer onStrike, PicketingandLockout.
387
PhimcoIndustries, Inc. v. PhimcoIndustriesLaborAssociation[PILA], G.R. No. 170830, Aug. 11, 2010.
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2.Ordinaryunionmembers.
Themerefindingordeclarationofillegalityofastrikewillnotresultinterminationofordinaryunionmembers.
For an ordinary union member to suffertermination, it mustbeshownthathehascommitted illegal actsduring the
strike.
388
Thereasonforthisdistinctionisthattheunionofficershavethedutytoguidetheirmemberstorespectthe
law.Ifinsteadofdoingso,theofficersurgedthememberstoviolatethelawanddefythedulyconstitutedauthorities,
theirdismissalfromtheserviceisajustpenaltyorsanctionfortheirunlawfulact.Theirresponsibilityasmainplayersin
anillegalstrikeisgreaterthanthatoftheordinaryunionmembersand,therefore,limitingthepenaltyofdismissalonly
fortheformerforparticipationinanillegalstrikeisinorder.
389
b.Someprinciplesonillegalityofastrike.
1. Forpurposesofdeterminingwhotheunionofficersareinthematterofascertainingwhotodismiss,the
certificationsastotheunionofficersissuedbytheChiefoftheLaborOrganizationDivisionoftheBureauof
Labor Relations (BLR), being public records, enjoy the presumption of regularity and deserve weight and
probativevalue.Thus,intheabsenceofaclearandconvincingevidencethattheyareflawed,theyshould
betakenontheirfacevalue.
390
2. ThefactthattheemployeesaresignatoriestotheCBAdoesnotsufficientlyestablishtheirstatusasunion
officers during the illegal strike. Neither were their active roles during the bargaining negotiations be
consideredasevidenceoftheirbeingunionofficers.
391
3. Only the union officers during the period of illegal strike are liable.
392
if the employees acted as union
officersafterastrike,theymaynotbeheldliableand,therefore,couldnotbeterminatedintheircapacity
assuch.
393
4. Shopstewardsareunionofficers.
394
Hence,theyshouldbeterminateduponthedeclarationoftheillegality
ofthestrike.
395
5. Unionofficersmaybedismisseddespitethefactthattheillegalstrikewasstagedonlyfor1day.
396
6. If the dispositive portion of the decision failed to mention the names of union officers, resort should be
madetothetextofthedecision.
397
7. Wholesaleforfeitureofemploymentstatusisnotallowed.Themerefilingofchargesagainstanemployee
forallegedillegalactsduringastrikedoesnotbyitselfjustifyhisdismissal.Thechargesmustbeprovedin
aninvestigationdulycalledforthatpurpose,wheretheemployeeshouldbegivenanopportunitytodefend
himself.Thisholdstrueeveniftheallegedgroundconstitutesacriminaloffense.
398
8. Theemployercannotjustunceremoniouslydismissahundredofitsemployeesintheabsenceofclearand
convincingproofthatthesepeoplewereindeedguiltyoftheactschargedandthen,afterwards,gotocourt
toseekvalidationofthedismissalitwhimsicallyexecuted.Thatcertainlycannotbeallowed.
399
3.PARTICIPATIONINTHECOMMISSIONOFILLEGALACTSDURINGASTRIKE.
a.Legalityorillegalityofstrike,immaterial.
Asfarasliabilityforcommissionofillegalactsduringthestrike,theissueoflegalityorillegalityofthestrikeis
irrelevant.Aslongastheunionmembercommitsanillegalactinastrike,beitlegalorillegal,hisemploymentcanbe
terminated.
400
b.MeaningofillegalactsunderArticle264[a].
The term illegal actsunder Article 264 [a] may encompass a number of acts that violate existing labor or
criminallaws,suchasthefollowing:
(1) ViolationofArticle264[e]oftheLaborCodewhichprovidesthat[n]opersonengagedinpicketingshall
commitanyactofviolence,coercionorintimidationorobstructthefreeingresstooregressfromthe
employerspremisesforlawfulpurposes,orobstructpublicthoroughfares.
(2) Commissionofcrimesandotherunlawfulactsincarryingoutthestrike.
401
(3) Violationofanyorder,prohibition,orinjunctionissuedbytheDOLESecretaryorNLRCinconnectionwith
theassumptionofjurisdictionorcertificationorderunderArticle263[g]oftheLaborCode.
402
Thisenumerationisnotexclusiveasjurisprudenceaboundwherethetermillegalactshasbeeninterpreted
andconstruedtocoverotherbreachesofexistinglaws.
c.Meresubstantialevidencerequiredtoholdstrikersguiltyofcommissionofillegalacts.
Whileinallcases,itisrequiredthatthestrikermustbeidentified,butproofbeyondreasonabledoubtisnot
required; substantial evidence, available under the attendant circumstances, suffices to justify the imposition of the

388
StamfordMarketingCorp., v. Julian, G.R. No. 145496, Feb. 24, 2004.
389
SolidbankCorporationv. Gamier, G.R. No. 159460, Nov. 15, 2010.
390
Coca-ColaBottlersPhils, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 123491, Nov. 27, 1998, 299SCRA410.
391
Id.
392
LapandayWorkersUnionv. NLRC, 248SCRA95, 106.
393
Coca-ColaBottlersPhils, Inc. v. NLRC, [supra].
394
SantaRosaCoca-ColaPlant EmployeesUnionv. Coca-ColaBottlersPhils., Inc., [G.R. Nos. 164302-03, January24, 2007].
395
C. Alcantara&Sons, Inc. v. CA, [G.R. No. 155109, September29, 2010].
396
SamahangManggagawasaSulpicioLines, Inc. NAFLUv. SulpicioLines, Inc., [G.R. No. 140992, March25, 2004].
397
NissanMotorsPhilippines, Inc. v. Secretaryof LaborandEmployment, [G.R. Nos. 158190-91, October31, 2006].
398
TelefunkenSemiconductors EmployeesUnion-FFWv. Secretaryof Labor andEmployment, [G.R. Nos. 122743and127215, December 12, 1997, 283SCRA145].
399
TimesTransportationCo., Inc. v. NLRC, [G.R. Nos. 148500-01, November 29, 2006].
400
ToyotaMotor Phils. Corp. WorkersAssociation[TMPCWA] v. NLRC, G.R. Nos. 158786&158789, Oct. 19, 2007; SeealsoShell Oil WorkersUnionv. Shell Companyof thePhilippines, G.R. No. L-28607, May31, 1971, 43SCRA224; Chuav. NLRC, G.R. No. 105775, Feb. 8, 1993,
218SCRA545.
401
National BreweryandAlliedIndustriesLaborUnionv. SanMiguel Brewery, Inc., G.R. No. L- 19017, December27, 1963, 9SCRA847.
402
ToyotaMotorPhils. Corp. WorkersAssociation[TMPCWA] v. NLRC, [G.R. Nos. 158786and158789, October19, 2007].
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penaltyofdismissalonparticipatingworkersandunionofficers.
403
Forthispurpose,theindividualidentityoftheunion
memberswhoparticipatedinthecommissionofillegalactsmaybeprovedthruaffidavitsandphotographs.
404
Photographs alone, however, will not suffice. In Arellano University Employees and Workers Union v. CA,
[G.R. No. 139940, September 19, 2006], while the university adduced photographs showing the strikers picketing
outside its premises, it failed to identify who they were. It thus failed to meet the substantiality of evidence test
applicableindismissalcases.
d.Someprinciplesoncommissionofillegalactsinthecourseofthestrike.
1. Liabilityforillegalactsshouldbedeterminedonanindividualbasis.Inallcases,theerringstrikersmustbe
identified individually although proof beyond reasonable doubt is not required. Substantial evidence
available under the attendant circumstances which may justify the imposition of the penalty of dismissal
maysuffice.
405
Simplyreferringtothemasstrikers,orcomplainantsinthiscaseisnotenoughtojustify
theirdismissal.
406
2. Onlymemberswhoareidentifiedashavingparticipatedinthecommissionofillegalactsareliable.Those
whodidnotparticipateshouldnotbeblamedtherefor.
407
3. Toeffectivelyholdordinaryunionmembersliable,thosewhoparticipatedinthecommissionofillegalacts
must not only be identified but the specific illegal acts they each committed should be described with
particularity.
408
Examples:
a. NationalUnionofWorkersintheHotel,RestaurantandAlliedIndustries[NUWHRAINAPLIUF]Dusit
HotelNikkoChapterv.TheHonorableCA,[G.R.Nos.163942and166295,November11,2008],while
theHotelwasabletoprovebeforetheNLRCthatthestrikersblockedtheingresstoandegressfromthe
premises of the Hotel, but it failed to specifically point out the participation of each of the union
membersinthecommissionofillegalactsduringthepicketandthestrike.Forthislapseinjudgmentor
diligence,thesixtyone(61)ordinaryunionmemberswereorderedreinstated.
b. Solidbank Corporation v.Gamier, [G.R. No. 159460, November 15, 2010], the dismissal of the
respondentunionmemberswasdeclaredunjustifiedinviewoftheabsenceofaclearshowingthatthey
committedspecificillegalactsduringthemassactionsandconcertedworkboycott.Petitionershavenot
adducedevidenceonsuchillegalactscommittedbyeachoftheindividualrespondentswhoareunion
members. Instead, petitioners simply point to their admitted participation in the mass actions which
theyknewtobeillegal,beinginviolationoftheSecretarysassumptionorder.
4. Dismissalofthecriminalcasefiledbyreasonoftheillegalactscommittedinthecourseofthestrikedoes
notextinguishliabilityundertheLaborCode.
409
Nordoessuchdismissalbartheadmissionoftheaffidavits,
documents,andphotospresentedtoestablishtheiridentityandguiltduringthehearingofthepetitionto
declarethestrikeillegal.Thetechnicalgroundsthattheunionmayinterposefordenyingadmissionofthe
photosarealsonotbindingontheNLRC.
4.WAIVEROFILLEGALITYOFSTRIKE.
a.Waiver,meaning.
Awaiverisavoluntaryandintentionalrelinquishmentorabandonmentofaknownlegalrightorprivilege.A
waiver to be valid and effective, must be couched in clear and unequivocal terms which leave no doubt as to the
intentionofapartytogiveuparightorbenefitwhichlegallypertainstohim.Hence,themanagementprerogativeto
disciplineemployeesandimposepunishmentisalegalrightwhichcannot,asageneralrule,beimpliedlywaived.
410
b.Employersactofcondonation.
Anemployersactofcondonationorforgivenessoftheeffectsofawrongfulactcommittedbyanemployeeis
aneffectivewaiverofhisrighttodisciplineordismissthelatter.
Condonation may be express or implied. While the inaction of an employer may not be considered as an
impliedactofcondonationifthereisnoclearproofthathehasknowledgeoftheemployeeswrongfulact,however,if
suchinactionoccursafterthediscoveryofsuchwrongfulactsoastogivetheimpressionorinferencethattheemployer
hascondonedthesame,theemployercannolongerinvokesuchwrongfulactasagroundtoterminatetheemployee.
Itshouldbeunderscored,however,thatthecondonationofonewrongfulactdoesnot,inanyway,involvethe
condonationofotherwrongfulactsforwhichtheemployermaystillproceedagainsttheerringemployee.
InterphilLaboratoriesEmployeesUnionFFWv.InterphilLaboratories,Inc.,[G.R.No.142824,December19,
2001],
In this illegal strike case, one of the issues raised is whether the act of the employer in paying substantial
separation package to some officers of the union during the pendency of the illegal strike case (which ultimately was
declaredillegalbytheSupremeCourt)maybeconsideredasanactofcondonationoftheillegalactscommittedinthe

403
PhimcoIndustries, Inc. v. PhimcoIndustriesLaborAssociation[PILA], G.R. No. 170830, Aug. 11, 2010, citingAsso. of Independent UnionsinthePhil. v. NLRC, 364Phil. 697, 707[1999].
404
405
SolidbankCorporationv. Gamier, G.R. No. 159460, Nov. 15, 2010; SeealsoC. Alcantara&Sons, Inc. v. CA, G.R. No. 155109, Sept. 29, 2010.
406
Associationof Independent UnionsinthePhilippines[AIUP] v. NLRC, G.R. No. 120505, March25, 1999, 305SCRA219; 364Phil. 697, 707; G&STransport Corp. v. Infante, G.R. No. 160303, Sept. 13, 2007.
407
408
G&STransport Corp. v. Infante, [G.R. No. 160303, September13, 2007].
409
C. Alcantara&Sons, Inc. v. CA, G.R. No. 155109, Sept. 29, 2010.
410
R.B. Michael Pressv. Galit, [G.R. No. 153510, February13, 2008].
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course of the illegal strike consisting of overtime boycott and work slowdown. The High Tribunal ruled in the
negative:
Finally, the Court cannot agree with the proposition that respondent company, in
extendingsubstantialseparationpackagetosomeofficersofpetitionerunionduringthependency
ofthiscase,ineffect,condonedtheillegalactstheycommitted.
Respondent company correctly postured that at the time these union officers obtained
theirseparationbenefits,theywerestillconsideredemployeesofthecompany.Hence,thecompany
was merely complying with its legal obligations. Respondent company could have withheld these
benefits pending the final resolution of this case. Yet, considering perhaps the financial hardships
experiencedbyitsemployeesandtheeconomicsituationprevailing,respondentcompanychoseto
let its employees avail of their separation benefits. The Court view's the gesture of respondent
companyasanactofgenerosityforwhichitshouldnotbepunished.
i.Compliancewithreturntoworkorderdoesnotmeanwaiverofillegalityofstrike;exception.
Areturntoworkorderdoesnothavetheeffectofrenderingasmootandacademictheissueofthelegalityof
thestrike.
411
However, according to TransAsia Shipping Lines, Inc. Unlicensed Crews Employees Union Associated
Labor Unions [TASLIALU] v. CA, [G.R. No. 145428, July 7, 2004], an employer may be considered to have waived its
righttoproceed againstthe strikingemployees forallegedcommissionofillegalactsduring the strike when, duringa
conferencebeforetheChairmanoftheNLRC,itagreedtoreinstatethemandcomplyfullywiththereturntoworkorder
issuedbytheDOLESecretary.
412
=================================
j. Injunctions
(1) Requisites for Labor Injunctions
(2) Innocent Bystander Rule
=================================
1.INJUNCTIONINSTRIKEORLOCKOUTCASES.
a.Injunctionprohibited.
Article 254 of the Labor Code explicitly provides that no temporary or permanent injunction or restraining
order in any case involving or growing out of labor disputes shall be issued by any court or other entity, except as
otherwiseprovidedinArticles218(referringtotheinjunctionpoweroftheNLRC)and264(referringtotheprohibited
activities during a strike or lockout) of the same Code. Deserving of similar exception is Article 263 [g] (referring to
assumption/certificationpoweroftheDOLESecretaryinnationalinterestcases).
413
b.Strikesorlockoutsmaynotbeenjoined;exceptions.
Asageneralrule,strikesandlockoutsthatarevalidlydeclaredenjoytheprotectionofthelawandcannotbe
enjoinedunlessillegalactsarecommittedorthreatenedtobecommittedinthecoursethereof.Thispolicyapplieseven
ifthestrikeappearstobeillegalinnature.Therationaleforthispolicyistheprotectionextendedtotherighttostrike
under the Constitution and the law. It is basically treated as a weapon that the law guarantees to employees for the
advancementoftheirinterestandfortheirprotection.
414
Exceptions.
However, in some cases, injunctions issued to enjoin the conduct of the strike itself and not only the
commissionofillegalorprohibitedactsinthecoursethereof,wereheldtobevalid.
SanMiguelCorporationv.NLRC,[G.R.No.119293,June10,2003].
TheSupremeCourtruledthatinjunctionmaybeissuednotonlyagainstthecommissionofillegalactsinthe
courseofthestrikebutagainstthestrikeitself.Inthiscase,thenoticeofstrikefiledbytheunionhasbeenconverted
intoapreventivemediationcase.Havingbeensoconverted,astrikecannolongerbestagedbasedonsaidnotice.Upon
such conversion, the legal effect is that there is no more notice of strike to speak of. When the NCMB ordered the
preventivemediation,theunionhadthereuponlostthenoticeofstrikeithadfiled.However,theNCMBwhicheffected
theconversionhas,underthelaw,nocoercivepowersofinjunction.Consequently,petitionercompanyintheinstant
case sought recourse from the NLRC. The NLRC, however, issued a TRO only for the free ingress to and egress from
petitionersplants,butdidnotenjointheconductoftheunlawfulstrikeitself.Itignoredthefatallackofnoticeofstrike

411
InsurefcoPaperPulpandProject WorkersUnionv. InsularSugarRefiningCorp., G.R. Nos. L-7594andL-7596, Sept. 8, 1954, 95Phil. 761.
412
SeealsoReformist Unionof R.B. Liner, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 120482, Jan. 27, 1997, 266SCRA713.
413
Article254, asamendedbyBatasPambansaBilang227, June1, 1982; SeeSection14, RuleXXII, BookVthereof, asamendedbyDepartment OrderNo. 40-03, Seriesof 2003wherethereisreferencetoArticle263insteadof Article264.
414
CaltexRefineryEmployeesAssociation[PAFLU] v. Lucero, G.R. No. L-15338, 4SCRA1196.
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consequenttotheconversionthereofintoapreventivemediationcase.Article264[a]oftheLaborCodeexplicitlystates
thatadeclarationofstrikewithoutfirsthavingfiledtherequirednoticeisaprohibitedactivity,whichmaybeprevented
throughaninjunctioninaccordancewithArticle254ofthesameCode.Clearly,publicrespondentshouldhavegranted
theinjunctiverelieftopreventthegravedamagebroughtaboutbytheunlawfulstrike.
415
SanMiguelCorporationv.NLRC,
[G.R.No.99266,March2,1999,304SCRA1],
Inthiscase,thesameissueofNLRCsdutytoenjoinanunlawfulstrikewasraised.TheSupremeCourtruled
thattheNLRCcommittedgraveabuseofdiscretionwhenitdeniedthepetitionforinjunctiontorestraintheunionfrom
declaringastrikebasedonnonstrikeablegrounds.
ILawatBuklodngManggagawa[IBM]v.NLRC,
[G.R.No.91980,June27,1991,198SCRA586].
ItwasheldherethatitisthelegaldutyandobligationoftheNLRCtoenjoinapartialstrikestagedinviolation
ofthelaw.FailuretopromptlyissueaninjunctionbytheNLRCwaslikewiseheldthereintobeanabuseofdiscretion.
BulletinPublishingv.Sanchez,[G.R.No.74425,October7,1986].
Here,aninjunctionwasallowedagainstthestrikewhichwasstagedtocompeltheemployertoignorethelaw.
Thereasonisthatwhentradeunionismandstrikesareusedinviolationofthelaw,misusethereofcanbethesubjectof
judicialintervention.
2.INJUNCTIONINPICKETING.
a.Picketingmaynotbeenjoined;exceptions.
As a general rule, injunction cannot be issued against the conduct of picketing by the workers. Under our
constitutionalsetup,picketingisconsideredpartofthefreedomofspeechdulyguaranteedbytheConstitution.
416
However,exceptedfromthislegalproscriptionarethefollowingsituations:
1.Wherepicketingiscarriedoutthroughtheuseofillegalmeans.
417
2.Wherepicketinginvolvestheuseofviolenceandotherillegalacts.
418
3.Wherepicketingaffectstherightsofthirdpartiesandinjunctionbecomesnecessarytoprotectsuchrights.
419
b.INNOCENTBYSTANDERRULE.
Picketingstrikerscannotpreventemployeesofothercompaniesfromusingthesamepremisesbeingpicketed.
Apicketinglaborunionhasnorighttopreventemployeesofanothercompanywhichisnottheiremployer,fromgetting
in and out of its rented premises, otherwise, it will be held liable for damages for its acts against an innocent
bystander.
420
Under the Innocent Bystander Rule, the thirdparty employers or innocent bystanders who have no
employeremployeerelationship with thepicketingstrikers,may applyforinjunction withthe regularcourtstoenjoin
theconductofthepicket.Absentsuchemployeremployeerelationship,theNLRCcannotentertainsuchapplicationfor
injunctionfrominnocentbystanders.

END OF DISCUSSION ON
TOPIC G. LABOR RELATIONS LAW

oooooooooOoOooooooooo

415
SeealsoPALv. Drilon, G.R. No. 88210, Jan. 23, 1991, 193SCRA223.
416
Morterav. CIR, G.R. No. L-1340, Oct. 13, 1947, 79Phil. 345.
417
Morterav. CIR, G.R. No. L-1340, Oct. 13, 1947, 79Phil. 345.
418
PAFLUv. Barot, G.R. No. L-9281, Sept. 28, 1956, 99Phil. 1008; CaltexFilipinoManagersandSupervisorsAssociationv. CIR, G.R. Nos. L-30632-33, April 11, 1972, 44SCRA350.
419
PAFLUv. Cloribel, G.R. No. L-25878, March28, 1969, 27SCRA465.
420
PhilcomEmployeesUnionv. PhilippineGlobal Communications, G.R. No. 144315, July17, 2006; LiwaywayPublications, Inc. v. Permanent ConcreteWorkersUnion, G.R. No. L-25003, Oct. 23, 1981, 195Phil. 51.

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Relevant Provisions: Book V, Labor Code

3. The separation of unions doctrine

Relevant Provisions: Articles 250 to 253, Article 248, Labor Code

In establishments where no legitimate labor organization exists, labormanagement committees may be

Bluesky bargaining means making exaggerated or unreasonable proposals.

Relevant Provision: Article 248, Labor Code

Relevant Provision: Article 249, Labor Code

Under Article249 [c], it is anunfair laborpracticeforadulycertified soleand exclusivebargaining union, its

Relevant Provisions: Articles 263 and 264, Labor Code

Relevant Provisions: Articles 263 and 264, Labor Code

Relevant Provision: Article 264, Labor Code

Relevant Provision: Article 254, Labor Code

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