Brandom

9/1/09
Two Dogmas Notes
1. Modern empiricism has been conditioned in large part by two dogmas.
a) One is a belie in some !ndamental clea"age between tr!ths which are analytic# or
gro!nded in meanings independently o matters o act and tr!ths which are synthetic# or
gro!nded in act.
b) The other dogma is reductionism$ the belie that each meaning!l statement is e%!i"alent
to some logical constr!ct !pon terms which reer to immediate e&perience.
Both dogmas# ' shall arg!e# are ill o!nded. One eect o abandoning them is# as we shall see# a
bl!rring o the s!pposed bo!ndary between spec!lati"e metaphysics and nat!ral science. (nother
eect is a shit toward pragmatism. )'ntro*
BB: Overall essay can be thought of, like Gaul, as falling into three parts:
Part One, the first dogma (analytic/synthetic, language/theory, meanng/belief,
concept/fact): the small circle of interdefinable terms that analyticity! belongs to:
analyticity, definability, synonymy, (conceptual) necessity, interchangeability salva
veritate "but in #hat conte$ts%& ': #hat #ould it take to break out of this circle% (hat
#ould count as doing so% ): (ould need to sho# #hat practical difference it #ould
make to take or treat t#o e$pressios as synonymous* Possible e$ample (from +,):
analytic statements are unrevisable, held come what may* -esponse: but #e can
imagine revising them (e*g* .cats are mammals/, by the discovery that cats are 0ilarys)*
1o the 2uestion becomes #hat difference there is in practice bet#een change of
meaning and change of belief* 3laim: only distinction in the vicinity is one of degree (cf*
.closeness to the periphery/)*
Part 4#o, the second dogma (empiricist reductionism, ultimately semantic atomism
(re2uired by epistemological atomism): 0ere the main claim is that it is a mistake to
think of sentences (statements "so as to allo# for tokenings #ith inde$ical or
demonstrative elements as the units, rather than sentence5types&) as having empirical
significance, or indeed, meaning, all on their o#n, .apart from their relations to their
fello#s*/ 6eaning #ould at least need to determine inferential role: #hat #ould count as
evidence for or against a claim, and #hat it #ould provide evidence for or against* But
(.the 7uhem point/), #hat is evidence for and against a claim depends on #hat other
commitments are available to serve as au$iliary hypotheses or collateral premises in the
argument* "8ote that this argument does not depend on understanding the concept of
evidence in an empiricist #ay*& 3onclusion: the meaning of a claim depends on #hat
else one believes, or #hat other facts there are* 1o #e cannot separate meaning from
belief, language from theory, concept from fact*
Part 4hree, therapy for the diagnosis in Parts One and 4#o:
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a) holism
b) pragmatism (more radical than that of 9e#is or 3arnap, because not limited to
synthetic and e$cepting analytic ones,
c) #ith a residual empiricism of posits to cope practically #ith e$perience* 4his is #hat
under#rites his assimilation of ontology to science: both are a matter of useful posits*
Part One
'$ +rom Meaning to ,ynonymy
-. we m!st disting!ish e%!ally between the meaning o a general term and its e&tension. The
general terms .creat!re with a heart. and .creat!re with a /idney#. e.g.# are perhaps ali/e in
e&tension b!t !nli/e in meaning. )'*
0. Th!s rom the point o "iew o the doctrine o meaning it ma/es no sense to say o the act!al
indi"id!al# who is at once a man and a biped# that his rationality is essential and his two1
leggedness accidental or "ice "ersa. Things had essences# or (ristotle# b!t only ling!istic
orms ha"e meanings. Meaning is what essence becomes when it is divorced from the
object of reference and wedded to the word. )'*
2. +or the theory o meaning the most conspic!o!s %!estion is as to the nat!re o its ob3ects$
what sort o things are meanings4 )5 will say that the cash "al!e o this %!estion is a matter
o sameness o meaning$ synonomy. 6"ent!ally# we7ll see this as a maniestation o his
pragmatism. 8e will want to /now$ what m!st one do in order thereby to be taking or
treating two e&pressions as ha"ing the same meaning 9 being synonymo!s4 )'* :( elt
need or meant entities may deri"e rom an earlier ail!re to appreciate that meaning and
reerence are distinct.
Deinitions$
;. 7efinitions reporting selected instances of synonymy come then as reports upon
usage* ",,& 7ef!s either a) report antecedent synonymies (and so can!t help us
understand #hat they are) or b) establish synonymies.
<8ere the deiniend!m becomes synonymo!s with the deiniens simply beca!se it has been
created e&pressly or the p!rpose o being synonymo!s with the deiniens. 8ere we ha"e a
really transparent case o synonymy created by deinition= wo!ld that all species o
synonymy were as intelligible. +or the rest# deinition rests on synonymy rather than
e&plaining it.>
?. B!t these correlations are not arbitrary. They are s!pposed to show how the primiti"e
notations can accomplish all p!rposes# sa"e bre"ity and con"enience# o the red!ndant
lang!age. 8ence the deiniend!m and its deiniens may be e&pected# in each case# to bc
related in one or another o the three ways lately noted.
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a) The deiniens may be a aith!l paraphrase o the deiniend!m into the narrower notation#
preser"ing a direct synonymy as o antecedent !sage=
b) or the deiniens may# in the spirit o e&plication# impro"e !pon the antecedent !sage o
the deiniend!m=
c) or inally# the deiniend!m may be a newly created notation# newly endowed with
meaning here and now.
'n ormal and inormal wor/ ali/e# th!s# we ind that deinition 11 e&cept in the e&treme case o
the e&plicitly con"entional introd!ction o new notation 11 hinges on prior relationships o
synonymy.
'''. ,ynonymy as 'nterchangeability salva veritate
@. the synonymy o two ling!istic orms consists simply in their interchangeability in all
conte&ts witho!t change o tr!th "al!e= interchangeability# in AeibniB.s phrase# salva veritate
)'''*.
B!t it is not %!ite tr!e that the synonyms .bachelor. and .!nmarried man. are e"erywhere
interchangeable salva veritate. Tr!ths which become alse !nder s!bstit!tion o
.!nmarried man. or .bachelor. are easily constr!cted with help o .bachelor o arts. or
.bachelor.s b!ttons.. (lso with help o %!otation# th!s$
.Bachelor. has less than ten letters.
,!ch co!nterinstances can# howe"er# perhaps be set aside by treating the phrases .bachelor o
arts. and .bachelor.s b!ttons. and the %!otation CbachelorC each as a single indi"isible word and
then stip!lating that the interchangeabilitysalva veritate which is to be the to!chstone o
synonymy is not s!pposed to apply to ragmentary occ!rrences inside o a word. )'''*
"BB: 3hurch!s e$ample: .8o one has ever doubted that everyone #ho believes that
gorse is gorse believes that gorse is fur:e*/&
D. The condition o interchangeability salva veritate "aries in its orce with "ariations in the
richness o the lang!age at hand. The abo"e arg!ment s!pposes we are wor/ing with a
lang!age rich eno!gh to contain the adverb 'necessarily#. this ad"erb being so constr!ed as
to yield tr!th when and only when applied to an analytic statement. B!t can we condone a
lang!age which contains s!ch an ad"erb4 Does the ad"erb really ma/e sense4 To s!ppose
that it does is to s!ppose that we ha"e already made satisactory sense o .analytic.. )'''*
9. )Master (rg!ment o Eart One$* O!r arg!ment is not latly circ!lar# b!t something li/e it. 't
has the orm# ig!rati"ely spea/ing# o a closed c!r"e in space.
10. ,o we m!st recogniBe that interchangeability salva veritate# i constr!ed in relation to an
e&tensional lang!age# is not a s!icient condition o cogniti"e synonymy in the sense needed
or deri"ing analyticity. )'''*
11. (nalyticity at irst seemed most nat!rally deinable by appeal to a realm o
meanings. On reinement# the appeal to meanings ga"e way to an appeal to synonymy
or deinition. B!t deinition t!rned o!t to be a will1o.1the1wisp# and synonymy t!rned
o!t to be best !nderstood only by dint o a prior appeal to analyticity itsel. ,o we are
bac/ at the problem o analyticity.
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1-. +rom the point o "iew o the problem o analyticity the notion o an artiicial
lang!age with semantical r!les is a feu follet par ercellence. ,emantical r!les
determining the analytic statements o an artiicial lang!age are o interest only in so
ar as we already !nderstand the notion o analyticity= they are o no help in gaining
this !nderstanding. )'F*
Part Two:
10. 'n the co!rse o these somber relections we ha"e ta/en a dim "iew irst o the notion o
meaning# then o the notion o cogniti"e synonymy$ and inally o the notion o analyticity.
)F*
12. ,o# i the "eriication theory can be accepted as an ade%!ate acco!nt o statement
synonymy# the notion o analyticity is sa"ed ater all. 8owe"er# let !s relect.
,tatement synonymy is said to be li/eness o method o empirical conirmation or
inirmation. G!st what are these methods which are to be compared or li/eness4
Hhat# in other words# is the nat!re o the relationship between a statement and the
e&periences which contrib!te to or detract rom its conirmation4 )F*
1;. radical reductionism. 6"ery meaning!l statement is held to be translatable into a statement
Itr!e or alse) abo!t immediate e&perience. )F*
1?. B!t the dogma o red!ctionism has# in a s!btler and more ten!o!s orm# contin!ed to
inl!ence the tho!ght o empiricists. The notion lingers that to each statement# or each
synthetic statement# there is associated a !ni%!e range o possible sensory e"ents s!ch that
the occ!rrence o any o them wo!ld add to the li/elihood o tr!th o the statement# and that
there is associated also another !ni%!e range o possible sensory e"ents whose occ!rrence
wo!ld detract rom that li/elihood. This notion is o co!rse implicit in the "eriication theory
o meaning. )F*
1@. The dogma o red!ctionism s!r"i"es in the s!pposition that each statement, taken in
isolation from its fellows, can admit of confirmation or infirmation at all. My
co!nters!ggestion# iss!ing essentially rom Jarnap.s doctrine o the physical world in
the Aufbau# is that our statements about the eternal world face the tribunal of sense
eperience not individually but only as a corporate body. )F*
1D. the one dogma clearly supports the other in this way$ as long as it is ta/en to be
signiicant in general to spea/ o the conirmation and inirmation o a statement# it
seems signiicant to spea/ also o a limiting /ind o statement which is "ac!o!sly
conirmed# ipso facto# come what may= and s!ch a statement is analytic. )F*
19.Part Three:
-0. it is nonsense# and the root o m!ch nonsense# to spea/ o a ling!istic component and a
act!al component in the tr!th o any indi"id!al statement. Ta/en collecti"ely# science has its
do!ble dependence !pon lang!age and e&perience= b!t this d!ality is not signiicantly
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traceable into the statements o science ta/en one by one. )F*
-1. The totality o o!r so1called /nowledge or belies# rom the most cas!al matters o geography
and history to the proo!ndest laws o atomic physics or e"en o p!re mathematics and logic#
is a man1made abric which impinges on e&perience only along the edges. Or# to change the
ig!re# total science is li/e a ield o orce whose bo!ndary conditions are e&perience. (
conlict with e&perience at the periphery occasions read3!stments in the interior o the ield.
Tr!th "al!es ha"e to be redistrib!ted o"er some o o!r statements. Ke1e"al!ation o some
statements entails re1e"al!ation o others# beca!se o their logical interconnections !! the
logical laws being in turn simply certain further statements of the system, certain
further elements of the field" "BB: ,s this really intelligible% 3f* ;ripke on the la# of
noncontradiction: (hat reason could one have to give it up% (hy not <ust keep it
too%* 8a"ing re1e"al!ated one statement we m!st re1e"al!ate some others# whether they be
statements logically connected with the irst or whether they be the statements o logical
connections themsel"es. B!t the total ield is so !ndetermined by its bo!ndary conditions#
e&perience# that there is m!ch latit!de o choice as to what statements to re1e"al!ate in the
light o any single contrary e&perience. No partic!lar e&periences are lin/ed with any
partic!lar statements in the interior o the ield# e&cept indirectly thro!gh considerations o
e%!ilibri!m aecting the ield as a whole. )F'*
--. (ny statement can be held tr!e come what may# i we ma/e drastic eno!gh ad3!stments
elsewhere in the system. 6"en a statement "ery close to the periphery can be held tr!e in the
ace o recalcitrant e&perience by pleading hall!cination or by amending certain statements
o the /ind called logical laws. Jon"ersely# by the same to/en# no statement is imm!ne to
re"ision. )F'*
-0. (s an empiricist ' contin!e to thin/ o the concept!al scheme o science as a tool#
!ltimately# or predicting !t!re e&perience in the light o past e&perience. Ehysical
ob3ects are concept!ally imported into the sit!ation as con"enient intermediaries 11
not by deinition in terms o e&perience# b!t simply as irred!cible posits comparable#
epistemologically# to the gods o 8omer. :in point o epistemological ooting the
physical ob3ects and the gods dier only in degree and not in /ind. Both sorts o
entities enter o!r conception only as c!lt!ral posits. The myth o physical ob3ects is
epistemologically s!perior to most in that it has pro"ed more eicacio!s than other
myths as a de"ice or wor/ing a manageable str!ct!re into the l!& o e&perience.
)F'*
-2. Ontological %!estions# !nder this "iew# are on a par with %!estions o nat!ral science. )F'*
-;. Jarnap# Aewis# and others ta/e a pragmatic stand on the %!estion o choosing
between lang!age orms# scientiic ramewor/s= b!t their pragmatism lea"es o at the
imagined bo!ndary between the analytic and the synthetic. 'n rep!diating s!ch a
bo!ndary ' espo!se a more thoro!gh pragmatism. 6ach man is gi"en a scientiic
heritage pl!s a contin!ing barrage o sensory stim!lation= and the considerations
which g!ide him in warping his scientiic heritage to it his contin!ing sensory
promptings are# where rational# pragmatic. )F'*
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