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Master's Teses Teses and Dissertations
Spring 5-2014
Land As Power, An Analysis of Female Land
Inheritance and Intrahousehold Bargaining in
Rwanda
Eric Adebayo
eadebayo@dons.usfca.edu
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Recommended Citation
Adebayo, Eric, "Land As Power, An Analysis of Female Land Inheritance and Intrahousehold Bargaining in Rwanda" (2014). Master's
Teses. Paper 93.
Land As Power, An Analysis of Female Land Inheritance and Intrahousehold
Bargaining in Rwanda
Masters Thesis
International and Development Economics
Key Words: Intrahousehold Bargaining, Gender Equality, Household Model, Land
Inheritance, Rwandan Land Inheritance, Female Empowerment, Female Asset wnership
Eric Adebayo
Department of Economics
University of San rancisco
!"#$ %lton St&
San rancisco' (A )*""+
e,mail: eade!ayo"dons#us$ca#edu
May !$"*
Abstract: Do increased levels of female land inheritance lead to increases in female intrahousehold
bargaining power? Analysis of an expansive Rwandan household survey dataset from 20102011
suggests that female land inheritances are positively associated with female intrahousehold bargaining
power! "he results support the relative efficacy of intrahousehold bargaining models over that of unitary
household models! "he findings have implications for Rwandan lawma#ers debating changes to the
country$s %&uccession law' which ma#es gender discrimination in land inheritance illegal! "his is the first
paper of its #ind to estimate female land inheritance$s effect on bargaining power in Rwanda!
The a%thor -ishes to than. Dr& Eli/abeth Kat/' Dr& 0esse Anttila,1%2hes' Dr& 3r%ce Wydic.' Anna Kno4' the staff of
(hemoni4 and the USAID 5A6D 7ro8ect in 9-anda' the 6ational University of 9-anda ac%lty of 5a- and
Department of 3iolo2y' Erasme Uyi/eye' 7ierre Kolo-e' 0im Anderson' 3eth Kaplin' S%san and Michael Adebayo'
April Armstron2' and all of the other MSIDE( professors and collea2%es -ho have helped ma.e this paper possible&
I& I6T9:DU(TI:6
There has been m%ch literat%re -ritten on the effects of income distrib%tion on ho%sehold
e4pendit%res& It has been lar2ely established that ho%seholds do not ma4imi/e one 8oint %tility
f%nction' b%t ho%sehold e4pendit%res are determined thro%2h a bar2ainin2 process bet-een the
ho%sehold members' partic%larly the male and female head;s< of ho%sehold& Thro%2h analysis of
an e4pansive dataset from 9-anda' this paper see.s to determine -hether female land
inheritance has si2nificant impacts on the intraho%sehold bar2ainin2 po-er of -omen&
This topic of research can have implications for policyma.ers in areas -here land is a
ma8or so%rce of -ealth' and inheritance is a ma8or channel thro%2h -hich land is ac=%ired' s%ch
as in 9-anda& In all developin2 co%ntries' -omen o-n si2nificantly less land than men' even
tho%2h they ma.e %p abo%t half' and sometimes more than half of the pop%lation ;Deere' (& D&'
> Doss' (& 9&' !$$?<& The lar2e discrepancies bet-een male and female land o-nership present
e=%ity' efficiency' and economic concerns& It has been sho-n that traditional resistance to female
land o-nership can decrease prod%ction o%tp%t by divertin2 land and reso%rces a-ay from
female plots of land -hich -o%ld have relatively hi2her ret%rns to investment' onto male plots
;9od2ers > Menon' !$"!<& This resistance to female land o-nership based on the idea that
-omen are less s.illed farmers than men has been sho-n to be false ;9od2ers > Menon' !$"!<&
More e=%itable land allocation co%ld have positive impacts on food prod%ction' female n%trition'
children@s n%trition' and poverty levels in developin2 co%ntries ;9od2ers > Menon' !$"!<& This
analysis is the first of its .ind done in 9-anda' and adds to a relatively small area of literat%re
-hich analy/es the effects specifically of inherited land on bar2ainin2 po-er&
With the %se of the EI(A# ho%sehold livin2 conditions dataset' -hich collected a -ide
ran2e of information on almost "B'$$$ randomly,selected 9-andan ho%seholds from !$"$,!$""'
it is possible to reprod%ce the analysis of 1oddinot and 1addad ;"))"<' -ith sli2ht adaptation to
the c%rrent specific research =%estion&
:5S and tobit models are %sed in this analysis in an attempt to estimate the ca%sal effect
of increases in the ratio of female,inherited to total ho%sehold land' on the b%d2et shares spent on
vario%s 2oods -hich' accordin2 to the literat%re' are 2enerally preferred by female parents& The
analysis finds that increasin2 shares of ho%sehold land that is female inherited land are
conditionally correlated -ith increases in the proportion of ho%sehold b%d2et shares devoted to
female 2oods' and ne2atively correlated -ith b%d2et shares devoted to male 2oods& The findin2s
!
also s%22est that this is not d%e to s%bstit%tion of female 2oods for other 2oods' b%t evidence of
an increase in female bar2ainin2 po-er bro%2ht abo%t by asset o-nership&
Section t-o of the paper is a revie- of relevant literat%re coverin2 the bac.2ro%nd of
female land inheritance in 9-anda' theoretical ho%sehold bar2ainin2 models' and e4amples of
similar empirical analyses of female intraho%sehold bar2ainin2 po-er& Section three covers the
dataset and methodolo2y %sed in analy/in2 the data& Section fo%r contains descriptive statistics'
re2ression res%lts' and disc%ssion of the res%lts& Section five consists of concl%sions and policy
recommendations&
II& 5ITE9ATU9E 9EAIEW
In many r%ral areas of the developin2 -orld' land o-nership can be a lar2e determinant
of -hether or not someone lives in poverty& 5and scarcity has' at m%ltiple points in 9-anda@s
history' contrib%ted to violent conflicts -ithin the co%ntry' leadin2 to lar2e forced o%t,mi2rations
follo-ed by repatriations of 9-andans& In fact' tensions over increasin2ly ine=%itable land
distrib%tion are believed to have contrib%ted s%bstantially to the 2enocide of "))* ;AndrC' "))+<&
The ine=%itable distrib%tion of land creates partic%larly ac%te problems for -omen' -ho have not
2enerally been 2iven the same traditional' or official le2al protections of land o-nership as men&
After the "))* conflict' 9-anda@s remainin2 pop%lation -as +$D female d%e to the lar2e
loss of life and imprisonment of men ;7o-ley' !$$?<& These many ne- heads of ho%seholds
-ere' by 9-andan la- and c%stom' not 2enerally in line to inherit land from their deceased
fathers and brothers&
The 2ender,e=%itable distrib%tion of land is hi2hly important in shapin2 the f%t%re of
9-anda& The co%ntry has the hi2hest pop%lation density in AfricaE a relatively lar2e percenta2e
of 9-andan ho%seholds are headed by -omen as a res%lt of 9-anda@s t%m%lt%o%s historyE and
over )$D of the pop%lation relies on a2ric%lt%re for income and s%bsistence ;Kairaba' A&' >
Simons' 0& D&<&
The appeal of land o-nership is lar2e' as land is a prod%ctive compliment to r%ral labor'
-hich is often the most si2nificant inp%t that many poor r%ral ho%seholds can p%t to-ards
prod%ction& 5and can provide income' and titled land is often needed to 2ain access to credit
mar.ets ;3ins-an2er' ")F?<&
#
It has been sho-n that official land titlin2' and its associated property ri2hts protections'
can increase land val%es and investment in land& It can also increase economic activityGprosperity
for lando-ners and others in areas near titled land& Traditionally' 9-andan -omen have not
often o-ned land' as they -ere e4pected to be associated -ith' and reap the benefits of' the land
of either their fathers, or once they -ere married, the land of their h%sbands ;3%rnet' !$$"<&
Insec%re andGor informal o-nership of land can ind%ce less,than,optimal investments in
land' and lead to s%b,optimal amo%nts of labor and other inp%ts bein2 %sed for a2ric%lt%ral
c%ltivation& 1oldin2 proper title to land creates increased incentives to not only prod%ce optimal
amo%nts of a2ric%lt%ral prod%cts from land in the short r%n' b%t it also can help to ens%re that
s%stainable a2ric%lt%ral practices are employed in order to ens%re lon2 term viability of land
;1eltb%r2' !$$!<&
Under c%stomary 9-andan la-' -ith small re2ional variations' land has traditionally
almost al-ays been passed on from fathers to sons& Women are often 2iven %sa2e ri2hts to their
fathers@ land' a ri2ht -hich is %s%ally rescinded -hen she marries or -hen the land is needed for
other p%rposes& The main means by -hich -omen have access to land are thro%2h marria2e'
thro%2h small or symbolic 2ifts of land from family members' or thro%2h their father@s
landholdin2s& 5and that is 2ifted to -omen by family is sometimes done so -ith the .no-led2e
that she -ill not have si2nificant decision,ma.in2 po-er over the asset& They -o%ld not be able
to decide to 2ift' sell' rent' or b%ild %pon the land -itho%t the consent of a male' %s%ally a
-omen@s father' brother' or h%sband ;5an.horst and Aeldman' !$""<&
In order to rectify part of the problem of millions of -omen not havin2 property ri2hts to
the land -hich is so important to their -ell,bein2' the 2overnment altered 9-andan le2al code to
ban the ine=%itable distrib%tion of land bet-een males and females in land s%ccession& This la-'
The 5a- on Matrimonial 9e2imes and Inheritance of ")))' has become .no-n as the
HS%ccessionI or HInheritanceI la-& The la- 2ives da%2hters e=%al inheritance ri2hts to their
parents@ land' 2ives -ives e=%al ri2hts to common matrimonial property' and 2ives the -ido-s of
deceased men the ri2ht to inherit their property&
The S%ccession la- -as prom%l2ated in ")))' and so became le2ally bindin2 on all land
inheritances in 9-anda since then& Even so' traditional ne2ative vie-s of female o-nership of
land has %ndermined the pro2ress that the la- -as desi2ned to foster& Many -omen -ho attempt
to assert their ri2hts over land are met -ith resistance by family members and comm%nities' lac.
of s%pport from 2overnment bodies and co%rts' and corr%ption in le2al processes& In r%ral
9-anda' -omen often have very limited access to formal 8%dicial instit%tions& Accordin2 to an
*
9(6 0%stice > DCmocratie st%dy' abo%t " in *$ land disp%tes -hich started at the villa2e level
-ent to a formal co%rt' and abo%t *FD of formal cases -ere dismissed ;Aeldman and 5an.horst'
!$""<& or these reasons' many -omen do not attempt to assert their le2al ri2hts over land
;9W6' !$""<' and the traditional practice of passin2 land do-n to only male children is still
common&
The S%ccession la- -as passed for ethical concerns abo%t the inability of most -omen to
inherit land& This paper see.s to provide an analysis of potential economic and female bar2ainin2
po-er benefits -hich co%ld come from female land inheritance&
Many st%dies have sho-n that female empo-erment and increases in income' thro%2h
vectors s%ch as o-nership of land' helps to increase female health and ed%cation' as -ell as
increasin2 their children@s health and ed%cation o%tcomes ;1oddinot > 1addad' "))"<& Increases
in childhood health and ed%cation are positively correlated -ith lifetime earnin2s and social
mobility ;Josh' !$$+<& The h%man capital acc%m%lation associated -ith improved health and
ed%cation have been sho-n to be important in the development of lo- performin2 economies
;Stra%ss' "))F<&
Increases in female intraho%sehold bar2ainin2 po-er can provide an e4planation for the
channel thro%2h -hich increases in female -ealth leads to improvements in child health and
ed%cation o%tcomes& It has been sho-n that increased ho%sehold income shares controlled by
females contrib%tes to increases in ho%sehold b%d2et shares spent on ho%sehold 2oods' and
children@s ed%cation' and decreases in ho%sehold b%d2et shares spent on children@s clothin2& It is
also associated -ith decreases in income shares spent on alcohol and ci2arettes' 2oods -hich are
.no- to ca%se health problems and ne2ative e4ternalities ;1oddinot > 1addad' "))"' "))B<&
7ositive impacts on children@s health or ed%cational o%tcomes d%e to increased female
intraho%sehold bar2ainin2 po-er' as a res%lt of increased levels of female land inheritance' co%ld
provide le2islative 8%stification for stren2thenin2 the S%ccession la-' or enactin2 f%rther la-s
-hich attempt to increase levels of female land inheritance&
6ot all evidence points to increases in female income and asset o-nership havin2
positive impacts on thin2s -hich are important for development& Doep.e > Tertilt ;!$""< find
that' dependin2 on the conte4t' female empo-erment can act%ally hinder economic development&
The a%thors developed models of non,cooperative spo%sal decision,ma.in2 to model the effects
of policy interventions on the intra,ho%sehold allocation of ho%sehold p%blic 2oods& Thro%2h
their analysis' they fo%nd that income transfers tar2eted at -omen may not help children more
than if they had been tar2eted at men' d%e to the s%bstit%tion of 2oods li.e food' for other 2oods
B
li.e shelter& They also e4amined the implications for female empo-erment in terms of female
access to ne2ative 2oods s%ch as alcohol' tobacco' drin.in2 at bars' etc&' -hich are often
restricted for sale to men& When these restrictions are lifted thro%2h female empo-erment' and
-omen are allo-ed more access to HvicesI' this can have si2nificant ne2ative impacts on child
o%tcomes&
The a%thors ar2%e that even if female,tar2eted transfers increase investment in children'
this investment co%ld ta.e the form of mothers investin2 in a hi2her n%mber of children' rather
than investin2 more in each child& If fertility rates increase at 2reater rates than investment per
child' then these transfers co%ld have ne2ative conse=%ences for children' and 2eneral economic
development&
!&" %i&orce 'hreat Model
In a n%mber of pop%lar models of intraho%sehold reso%rce allocation' marria2e is a
central theme and channel thro%2h -hich o%tcomes are manifested& In t-o early ")F$s papers'
Manser > 3ro-n ;")F$< and McElroy > 1orney ;")F"< loo. at marria2e as a cooperative 2ame
-hich is solved thro%2h 6ash,style bar2ainin2 -hen spo%ses have differences of opinions'
specifically concernin2 reso%rce allocation& These models do a better 8ob of modelin2 reality
than %nitary ho%sehold models do' in that they not only ta.e into acco%nt the family@s total
reso%rces' and the set of o%tcomes available to them' b%t the models also e4plicitly incorporate
the amo%nts of reso%rces controlled by different family members' partic%larly the h%sband and
-ife& The distrib%tion of reso%rces ;income' land' etc&< bet-een the h%sband and -ife pair can
have si2nificant impacts on family o%tcomes ;Manser > 3ro-n' ")F$' McElroy > 1orney'
")F"<&
Manser and 3ro-n develop a n%mber of ne- models of ho%sehold decision ma.in2
-hich e4plicitly incl%de differences in the %tility f%nctions of different members of the
ho%sehold& They incl%ded the idea that some 2oods' s%ch as childcare or ho%sin2 are thin2s
-hich the entire family derives benefits from& In their models' the decision to marry is very m%ch
infl%enced by the fact that these Hho%sehold 2oodsI are available to married co%ples' b%t not
sin2le individ%als& ;Manser > 3ro-n' ")F$<&
Within the models' married co%ples or co%ples considerin2 2ettin2 married pool their
income as in previo%s models' ho-ever the co%ple doesn@t ma4imi/e a sin2le ho%sehold %tility
f%nction& They a2ree on a bar2ainin2 r%le -hich -ill be %sed to decide ho- best to %se the
ho%sehold@s reso%rces& In these bar2ainin2 models' it is ass%med that each party .no-s the tr%e
?
preferences of both parties' as the t-o parties are li.ely to .no- one another -ell& The a%thors
re=%ire that their models meet three criteria& The model m%st yield pareto optimal o%tcomes' the
bar2ainin2 o%tcomes m%st be independent to the labels of each party ;h%sband' -ife' etc&<' and
any o%tcomes reached have to be %nchan2ed by linear' affine transformations of the t-o parties@
%tility f%nctions&
Thro%2h these ass%mptions' and e4amination of a n%mber of ho%sehold bar2ainin2
models' the a%thors arrive at the concl%sion that if' 2iven a positive e4o2eno%s shoc. to an
individ%al' ;perhaps a raise in income or inheritance of land< that individ%al@s Hthreat pointI -ill
be moved& Their threat of divorce is stron2er and more credible beca%se' 2iven a divorce' they
-o%ld be better off than they -o%ld have been before the shoc.& That individ%al havin2 a better
o%tside option in the event of a divorce allo-s them to e4ert relatively more infl%ence over
ho%sehold decisions ;Manser > 3ro-n' ")F$<&
In a s%bse=%ent paper' McElroy and 1orney e4amined implications specifically for the
6ash bar2ainin2 ho%sehold model& Instead of loo.in2 at the demand for marria2e -ith m%ltiple
models' the a%thors analy/ed empirical implications of the 6ash bar2ainin2 frame-or.' and
tested the hypothesis that the bar2ainin2 model -o%ld yield the same res%lts as the HneoclassicalI
%nitary ho%sehold model ;McElroy > 1orney' ")F"<&
The a%thors ass%me' as others before them' that each ho%sehold consists of a h%sband and
-ife pair -ho ma.e all of the ho%sehold decisions& In the neoclassical model' one -o%ld ass%me
that the ho%sehold pools income and ma4imi/es their family %tility f%nction' b%t in the 6ash
model' each individ%al has their o-n %tility f%nction' and ho%sehold reso%rces are allocated
based on bar2ainin2 -ithin the ho%sehold&
In a n%mber of cases' the a%thors find that the 6ash model yields the same comparative
statics as the neoclassical model' 2iven certain ass%mptions abo%t threat points and their level of
dependence on prices and the non-a2e incomes of the individ%als& 1o-ever' in a previo%s paper'
the a%thors fo%nd empirical evidence that the res%lts of a 6ash bar2ainin2 system do not
conver2e to those of the neoclassical one& They ta.e this to mean that there is m%ch to be 2ained
by loo.in2 at the -or.in2s of ho%seholds thro%2h the 6ash bar2ainin2 lens' since it seems to
e4plain more of -hat 2oes on in real ho%seholds' and in finer detail& This ne- bar2ainin2
frame-or. has many empirical %ses' as it can be %sed to e4amine implications of e4o2eno%s
chan2es in ta4es and transfers -hich chan2e the non-a2e income of' and prices faced by' each
spo%se in a marria2e ;McElroy > 1orney' ")F"<&
+
Each individ%al@s control of reso%rces is important in the previo%sly mentioned models'
beca%se the bar2ainin2 in the 2ames depends on the stren2th of each individ%al@s Kthreat pointsK&
The better the divorced option for an individ%al' the stron2er that individ%al@s threat points -ithin
the marria2e' and the more of the individ%al@s preferences -ill be reflected in the event%al
bar2ainin2 o%tcome of the family&
While divorce is one -ay that a marria2e bet-een t-o disa2reein2 spo%ses can 2o' it is
not the only -ay& Some marria2es co%ld end %p in non,cooperative e=%ilibria' still remainin2 as
in,tact marria2es&
!&! (eparate (pheres Model
An adaptation of the Divorce Threat intraho%sehold bar2ainin2 theory comes from a "))#
paper by 5%ndber2 and 7olla.& The a%thors compare the ideas of t-o cash transfer schemes
aimed at helpin2 t-o,parent families -ith children& In one pro2ram the cash -o%ld be 2iven to
the mother in the family' and in the other scheme' cash -o%ld be 2iven to the father& 3ased on
3ec.er@s Altr%ism model of intraho%sehold reso%rce allocation' both pro2rams sho%ld have
e4actly the same effect' since the ho%seholds -o%ld be ass%med to be ma4imi/in2 the same
sin2le %tility f%nction no matter -ho receives the cash transfer ;3ec.er' ")F"<&
They developed a Kseparate spheresK bar2ainin2 model as opposed to the Kdivorce threat
modelK of h%sband and -ife ho%seholds& The threat point of this model is not the dissol%tion of
the marria2e thro%2h divorce' b%t a non cooperative marria2e e=%ilibri%m& This non cooperative
e=%ilibri%m may end %p as the final e=%ilibri%m d%e to transaction costs of transferrin2 -ealth
-ithin the ho%sehold ;5%ndber2 > 7olla.' "))#<&
In a non cooperative e=%ilibri%m' family p%blic 2oods' 2oods that can be cons%med by
everyone in the family' are %nder,s%pplied and the family co%ld reali/e -elfare 2ains by
en2a2in2 in cooperation& This cooperation can often loo. li.e the speciali/ation of each member
of the ho%sehold in certain responsibilities& :ften' traditional 2ender roles serve as a -ay to more
efficiently divide labor& If each member of the ho%sehold is responsible for providin2 some
amo%nt of every family p%blic 2ood' s%ch as family income' or childcare' the lac. of
speciali/ation can lo-er the overall provision of these 2oods&
The Hseparate,spheresI e=%ilibri%m is one in -hich the h%sband and -ife are each -holly
responsible for providin2 a different set of ho%sehold 2oods& In non cooperative marria2es' this
division of labor is reached thro%2h social e4pectations of 2ender roles& The cooperative
bar2ainin2 e=%ilibri%m is the case -here the t-o individ%als can ma.e bindin2 and enforceable
F
a2reements -ithin marria2e' re2ardin2 the division of labor& The creation' ne2otiation' and
enforcement of s%ch a2reements can have transaction costs& These costs are avoided -hen the
non cooperative e=%ilibri%m is reached' and the e=%ilibri%m is stabili/ed by social norms of
2ender roles& This non cooperative e=%ilibri%m is the startin2 point from -hich threat,point
bar2ainin2 can ta.e place ;5%ndber2 > 7olla.' "))#<&
This model' -hile %sin2 some of the same nomenclat%re as divorce threat models'
reaches different concl%sions& In the separate spheres model' the amo%nt of reso%rces controlled
by each party does not have an effect on the e=%ilibri%m level of family p%blic 2oods provided'
or e=%ilibri%m %tility levels of the contrib%tors to those 2oods& These properties hold for all
sol%tions e4cept corner sol%tions' -here one member of the h%sband,-ife pair contrib%tes /ero
to the provision of a ho%sehold 2ood&
In the divorce threat model' the main threat point is divorce' -hereas in the separate
spheres model' divorce is ass%med to be prohibitively costly' or impossible' so that the non
cooperative e=%ilibri%m is the main threat point ;5%ndber2 > 7olla.' "))#<&
In the version of the model -hich incl%des bindin2 and enforceable pren%ptial
a2reements on intraho%sehold transfer levels' each child allo-ance scheme ;one in -hich the
mother is paid' and another in -hich the father is paid< -ill have an indistin2%ishable effect' as
lon2 as the family is not at a corner sol%tion& If the mother is the only individ%al providin2 the
p%blic 2ood Hchild careI' then -hich child allo-ance scheme is %sed has a lar2e effect on her
threat point& In this model' the h%sband is the only income 2enerator' and essentially Hp%rchasesI
childcare services from the -ife via income transfers to her&
The a%thors find that in the lon2 r%n' any redistrib%tion effects of child allo-ances can be
%ndone in the marria2e mar.et' if bindin2 and costlessly,enforceable pren%ptial a2reements can
be made by prospective marria2e co%ples& In a marria2e mar.et -itho%t these pren%ptial
a2reements' chan2in2 from a child allo-ance scheme that 2ives fathers money to one -hich
2ives mothers money can have si2nificant effects on the n%mber of marria2es -hich happen'
ta.in2 into acco%nt the relevant n%mber of men and -omen -ho -ish to marry ;5%ndber2 >
7olla.' "))#<&
!&# Empirical (tudies
While theories of intraho%sehold reso%rce allocation have been aro%nd for decades'
ri2oro%s empirical testin2 of those theories' partic%larly in developin2 conte4ts' is a relatively
)
recent phenomenon& There is research bein2 done on -hat the implications of individ%al levels of
reso%rce control are on family spendin2 habits&
A n%mber of a%thors have e4plored the effects of income distrib%tion on ho%sehold
e4pendit%re on 2oods& They 2enerally find that an increased share of income attrib%ted to a
female head of ho%sehold ;-ife' mother' etc&< ca%ses increases in spendin2 on ho%sehold p%blic
2oods' children@s primary and secondary ed%cation' and food ;D%flo > Udry' !$$*' 1odinot >
1addad' "))"' L%is%mbin2 > de 5a 3riMre' !$$$<&
A more Hfemale,centricI b%ndle of 2oods co%ld be arrived at thro%2h the ho%sehold@s
bar2ainin2 process d%e to an increased level of female bar2ainin2 po-er attrib%ted to her havin2
a hi2her share of the ho%sehold@s landholdin2s& There is evidence to s%pport this idea in Mason
;"))F< in -hich the a%thor finds that females in India and Thailand have increased decision,
ma.in2 po-er -hen they o-n land ;Mason' "))F<&
The advent of the bar2ainin2 po-er model as an alternative to the %nitary ho%sehold
model has been a si2nificant advance in the field of intraho%sehold bar2ainin2' and helped to
e4plain the patterns of behavior -hich are observed by families all over the developin2 -orld&
The efficacy of the bar2ainin2 model has been s%pported in related literat%re& In partic%lar' a
!$$# paper by L%is%mbin2 and Mal%ccio %ses vario%s data sets from 3an2ladesh' Ethiopia'
Indonesia' and So%th Africa to test the relative predictive po-er of the %nitary and bar2ainin2
ho%sehold models& The a%thors find that the %nitary model is not a valid predictor of ho%sehold
e4pendit%res&
While the a%thors -ere not able to concl%de that any partic%lar bar2ainin2 model -as the
best predictor of empirical behavior' they -ere able to find evidence that different reso%rce
allocations as -ell as both h%man and non,h%man capital acc%m%lated by h%sbands and -ives
did have effects on the amo%nt of reso%rces devoted by a family to different 2oods' s%ch as
female child ed%cation& There -ere conflictin2 res%lts in different conte4ts re2ardin2 the effects
of increased mother@s or father@s assets on female ed%cation& This res%lt s%22ests that there is
indeed bar2ainin2 2oin2 on bet-een h%sbands and -ives -hich res%lts in decisions abo%t family
e4pendit%res' and that this process is affected by meas%rable individ%al attrib%tes' s%ch as level
of ed%cation' income' etc& ;L%is%mbin2 and Mal%ccio' !$$#<&
A%thor Keera Allendorf' in a !$$+ paper' -rites abo%t the effects of female land
o-nership on ho%sehold decision ma.in2 and early life o%tcomes for children& Usin2 !$$" D1S
data from 6epal' the a%thor finds that yo%n2 children of -omen -ho o-n land are si2nificantly
"$
less li.ely to be %nder-ei2ht d%e to ne2ative n%trition o%tcomes' and -omen -ho o-n land are
si2nificantly more li.ely to have ho%sehold decision,ma.in2 a%thority ;Allendorf' !$$+<&
The a%thor %ses an intraho%sehold bar2ainin2 frame-or. to e4amine differences in
intraho%sehold bar2ainin2 po-er' as revealed by ans-ers to D1S =%estions abo%t -ho in the
ho%sehold has final decision po-er over * partic%lar important ho%sehold decisions& :nce a
meas%re of bar2ainin2 po-er is attained' that data is compared to child health o%tcomes'
partic%larly children@s -ei2ht,for,a2e' as this is a 2ood indicator of yo%n2 child health& The
theory s%22ests that -omen have hi2her preferences than men for child,related 2oods' and are
more li.ely to bar2ain for ho%sehold reso%rce allocation in favor of children@s n%trition and
health& This hypothesis is s%pported by the o%tcomes of the a%thor@s analysis ;Allendorf' !$$+<&
The a%thors find that +$D of -omen -ho o-n land ma.e at least one of fo%r ma8or
ho%sehold decisions alone or 8ointly' compared -ith *FD of -omen in ho%seholds in -hich
someone else o-ns land' and ?$D of -omen in ho%seholds -hich don@t o-n land& Women -ho
o-n land themselves are more li.ely than their landless co%nterparts to be the sole decider on at
least one of the fo%r decisions&
The a%thor also finds that only FD of children of land,o-nin2 mothers are %nder-ei2ht'
as opposed to "*D of children of mothers -ho don@t o-n land& 9e2ression analysis of children
bein2 %nder-ei2ht a2ainst female empo-erment s%22est that children are abo%t B$D less li.ely
to be %nder-ei2ht if their mother is a lando-ner& These res%lts' and the theoretical frame-or.
%sed to arrive at them are f%rther evidence of the %tility of non,%nitary intraho%sehold bar2ainin2
models&
While female land o-nership is a relatively -ell,st%died topic' there have not been many
st%dies of female inheritance and its effects on female bar2ainin2 po-er& There has yet to be a
p%blished st%dy -hich specifically e4amines female land inheritance@s effect on bar2ainin2
po-er in 9-anda& In areas of the -orld -here inheritance is the main method of land
ac=%isition' land inheritance patterns may be more e4planatory than land o-nership patterns in
2eneral& This paper see.s to fill that 2ap in the literat%re specifically in the 9-andan conte4t&
III& MET1:D:5:JN
The data %sed in this paper are ta.en from the 9-andan EI(A# ;En=%Ote IntC2rale s%r les
(onditions de Aie des mCna2es<' or the inte2rated ho%sehold livin2 conditions s%rvey& This
s%rvey -as carried o%t nation-ide' in all #$ of 9-anda@s districts& The s%rvey covered "*'#$F
""
ho%seholds& The data collection -as carried o%t over the period of abo%t one year' from
6ovember !
nd
' !$"$ %ntil :ctober !*
th
' !$""& The EI(A s%rveys are done every B years in order
to 2a%2e the pro2ress of poverty alleviation in the co%ntry ;6IS9' !$"!<&
The samplin2 -as carried o%t %sin2 a t-o,sta2e stratified method& Ailla2es to be sampled
-ere selected %sin2 a 7robability 7roportional to Si/e randomi/ed selection techni=%e& This
techni=%e allo-s for random selection of villa2es' -hile also %p,-ei2htin2 the chances of lar2er
villa2es bein2 selected into the sample' as those lar2er villa2es are tho%2ht to have a lar2er
impact on the total pop%lation sample& This techni=%e is %sed in many types of statistical
samples' partic%larly -hen the cl%sterin2 %nits have very different si/es ;6IS9' !$"!<& D%e to
this samplin2 style' all analysis in this paper %ses probability,-ei2hted re2ression&
After the villa2es -ere selected' nine ho%seholds -ere selected in each villa2e -ithin the
Ki2ali (ity province' and t-elve ho%seholds -ere selected in each villa2e -ithin the other fo%r
provinces ;6orth' So%th' East' West<& 1o%seholds -ere selected based on a list of
d-ellin2sGaddresses& The response rate for the selected ho%seholds -as =%ite hi2h' at )FD& A
ne2li2ible n%mber of ho%ses -ere e4cl%ded from the sample d%e to deaths' abandoned ho%ses'
destroyed ho%ses' or lac. of a competent family member present in the ho%se able to complete
the s%rvey& :nce the samplin2 -as completed' and the data compiled' -ei2hts -ere 2iven to each
ho%sehold e=%al to the inverse of its probability of bein2 selected into the sample& This -as in
order to ma.e any analysis of the ho%sehold data more representative of the total pop%lation& or
the respondents of the EI(A#' the data incl%ded demo2raphic information s%ch as a2e' 2ender'
land o-nership data on plots' birth district' district of residence' marital stat%s' and schoolin2
information&
5and inheritance is a lo2ical choice for this analysis beca%se it is a si2nificant event in
life' and it is not s%b8ect to si2nificant recall bias' and is still the most si2nificant form of -ealth
in r%ral 9-anda& As -ell' land -hich has been divested post,"))) is covered by the S%ccess la-'
and so parents are bo%nd by the la- in divestin2 land to their children e=%ally' somethin2 -hich
can@t be avoided by alterin2 a -ill&
The proportion of total ho%sehold e4pendit%res devoted to 2oods -hich are preferred by
a partic%lar party in the ho%sehold is %sed as an indicator of the level of bar2ainin2 po-er that
the party has -ithin the ho%sehold& A hi2her ratio of female 2oods e4pendit%res to total
ho%sehold e4pendit%res' ceteris parib%s' s%22ests a hi2her level of female bar2ainin2 po-er& In
order to determine the effect that female land inheritance may have on a family@s reso%rce
allocation habits' a simple empirical analysis strate2y -ill be %sed& This strate2y is similar to the
"!
one employed in 1oddinot > 1addad ;"))B<& The a%thors %sed ho%sehold income and
e4pendit%re data in (Pte D@Ivoire to test the %nitary ho%sehold theory a2ainst a cooperative
bar2ainin2 model& They ass%med' as in the divorce threat models' that the t-o ;male and female<
heads of a ho%sehold have differin2 preferences' and different shares of the ho%sehold@s total
assets&
The a%thors s%22est that non,-a2e H%nearned incomeI is a 2ood meas%re of asset control'
and in this case the %nearned income is replaced by 9-andan land holdin2s& 5and holdin2s are a
2ood meas%re of asset control' as the stren2th of threat points not only depends on the act%al
contrib%tion of each family member to the ho%sehold@s total assets' b%t the perceived
contrib%tion& 5and holdin2s are very visible assets to other family members' and partic%larly in
very a2ric%lt%re,dependent 9-anda they provide si2nificantly val%able e4tra,marital income
options for the o-ner;s<&
The e4pendit%re f%nctions -hich are estimated ta.e the follo-in2 formE
Y
j
=
j
+
1 j
( lpcexp)+
2 j
(lsize)+

r=1
R1

rj

(
dem
r
)
+

s=1
S

sj

(
z
s
)
+
3 j
( PFEM )+
j
N
8
Q e4pendit%res on the 8th type of 2oodG total ho%sehold e4pendit%resE
lpce4p Q lo2 of per capita e4pendit%resE
lsi)e Q lo2 of ho%sehold si/e ;n%mber of family members<E
dem
r
* proportion of demo2raphic 2ro%p 8 in the ho%seholdE
/
s
Q a vector of d%mmy variables' incl%des variables for ho%sehold district of residence' -hether
or not the h%sband or -ife attended any school' and the a2es of the h%sband and -ife' as -ell as
the si/e of each ho%sehold@s total landholdin2sE
7EM Q proportion of total land holdin2s -hich are female inherited land& ;emale Inherited
5and G Total 1o%sehold 5and<
R
8
Q the error term

j
,
1 j
,
2 j
,
3 j
,
rj
, and
sj
are parameters to be estimated.
1o%sehold e4pendit%res have been 2ro%ped into ei2ht different cate2ories incl%din2
men@s 2oods' -omen@s 2oods' children@s 2oods' 2eneral ad%lt@s 2oods' ho%sehold 2oods' other
2oods' and food& In an analysis of this type' the mar.et val%e of cons%med food sho%ld be
entered into the food e4pendit%res cate2ory& This data represents the opport%nity cost of
"#
cons%mption' and so is incl%ded& The female and male 2oods cate2ories -ere created by
determinin2 -hich co%ld be 2enerally attrib%ted to %se by either males or females& Joods -hich
-ere ambi2%o%s in this nat%re' and not clearly ho%sehold 2oods -ere placed in the HAd%lt
JoodsI cate2ory& i2%re " sho-s the 2oods -hich -ere incl%ded in the Hemale JoodsI
cate2ory and the HMale JoodsI cate2ory&
i2%re "& emale Joods and Male Joods (ate2ories
lpce4p is the nat%ral lo2 of the s%m of all e4pendit%res divided by the si/e of the
ho%sehold& The members of the ho%seholds -ere assi2ned to one of "? cate2ories based %pon
their a2e' 2ender' and position in the family& The n%mber of each type of person -as then divided
by the ho%sehold si/e' to 2et the proportion of that demo2raphic cate2ory in each ho%sehold&
Each ho%sehold@s total female,associated land inheritances -ere divided by the ho%sehold@s total
land holdin2s' to 2et the female,controlled share of land assets' 7EM&
It is possible to disa22re2ate the o-nership and method of ac=%isition of land parcels' as
the EI(A# =%estionnaire as.ed abo%t land o-nership of each ho%sehold member individ%ally'
and abo%t ho- the land -as ac=%ired& Unfort%nately the data does not incl%de information abo%t
the dates of land transfers' the dates of marria2es' or the dates of death for many parents&
In order for the relationship to be established as ca%sal' the variation in land inheritance
sho%ld be e4o2eno%s to the error terms in the re2ressions& It is possible that a certain level of
e4o2eneity holds' as -omen in 9-anda don@t 2enerally ma.e the decision abo%t ho- m%ch land
to inherit& emale land inheritances are a f%nction of a -oman@s family@s landholdin2s' her
parents@ beliefs' her n%mber of siblin2s' and other thin2s beyond her control& There are
%ndo%btedly some parts of the error term -hich are correlated -ith female land inheritances& The
"*
Goods in Female Goods Category Goods in Male Goods Category
Fabric for Women Fabric for Men
Wrap Around Cloth for Women Men's Garments
Women's Garments Men's Underwear
Women's Underwear Men's Tailoring
Women's Tailoring Men's Footwear
Women's Footwear Men's Clothing Accessories
Women's Clothing Accessories Watches
Jewelry
andbags
!ressing Tables "#anity Table$
=%estion is not i$ estimates are biased b%t simply !y how much# This is' ho-ever' a common
caveat of every microeconomic analysis ever %nderta.en&
3eca%se of the iss%es of endo2eneity' this analysis is ripe for the %se of estimation
techni=%es -hich remove this endo2eneity' s%ch as difference,in,difference or instr%mental
variables approaches&
A difference,in,difference techni=%e can be %sed -ith panel or pooled cross,sectional
datasets& 1o-ever' the different ro%nds of the s%rvey -o%ld need to incl%de the same covariates'
land inheritanceGo-nership information' and detailed e4pendit%res data& Unfort%nately' the
previo%s ro%nds of the EI(A ;ro%nds " and !< do not incl%de any information abo%t land
o-nership' and very limited e4pendit%re data& or this reason' this analysis is %nable to incl%de a
difference,in,differences analysis&
An instr%mental variables techni=%e co%ld be %sed to p%r2e the estimates of endo2eneity&
A variable -hich is correlated -ith female land inheritance' b%t %ncorrelated -ith all other
%nobservables that affect female intraho%sehold bar2ainin2 po-erE that variable co%ld be %sed in
place of 7EM in order to 2et %nbiased estimates of the effect of land inheritance on
intraho%sehold bar2ainin2 po-er& This e4tra Hinstr%mental variableI -o%ld need to be
infl%encin2 female intraho%sehold bar2ainin2 po-er thro%2h no other channel than land
inheritance&
IA& DATA A6D DIS(USSI:6
+#, (ummary (tatistics
Descriptive statistics for the dataset are represented in table " of the Appendi4& After
limitin2 the data to only h%sband,and,-ife ho%seholds -ith children' F)#* ho%seholds remain in
the sample %sed for analysis& :f these' FB!B ho%seholds incl%de at least one lando-ner& There
are B?B) ho%seholds -hich have both h%sband and -ife -ho -ent to school& There are +F+
ho%seholds in -hich both h%sband and -ife -ho have never been to school& The mean family
si/e is B&BF people' -ith the avera2e n%mber of children bein2 !&?F& The avera2e n%mber of male
children per ho%sehold is "&#B' and the avera2e n%mber of female children is very similar at "&#*&
Avera2e school e4pendit%res per year per ho%sehold are !#F$&$B 9-andan rancs ;9W<
-ith the avera2e school,related spendin2 on all female children in the ho%sehold bein2 "!!?&)"
9W and the avera2e for male children bein2 sli2htly less at ""B#&"* 9W&
"B
The avera2e amo%nt of landholdin2s per ho%sehold is &?! hectares& There is a si2nificant
ran2e of landholdin2s per ho%sehold' -ith the minim%m bein2 of co%rse /ero' and the ma4im%m
that any one ho%sehold o-ns bein2 ?? hectares& The avera2e amo%nt of inherited land per
ho%sehold is &!B ha' -ith the ma4im%m bein2 ## ha& The avera2e female land holdin2s per
ho%sehold is &$+ ha' -ith the ma4im%m bein2 ""&"B ha& The avera2e amo%nt of female inherited
land per ho%sehold is &$# ha -ith the ma4im%m bein2 +&+ ha& These n%mbers are =%ite a bit
smaller than the avera2e male inherited land -hich is &!! ha' and the ma4im%m male inherited
land per ho%sehold -hich is ## ha& The avera2e proportion of ho%sehold land controlled by
females is abo%t "BD' and the avera2e proportion of land per ho%sehold -hich is female
inherited land is ?D& or "!$) ho%seholds' female land is "$$D of the land they o-n' and for
"?? ho%seholds' "$$D of their land is female inherited land& See fi2%re # for a 2raphical
representation of avera2e levels of different types of land per ho%sehold in the sample& See fi2%re
* for a 2raphical representation of means of different types of female,o-ned land as a proportion
of total ho%sehold land in the sample&
All income and e4pendit%re data are calc%lated %sin2 information for the "! months
covered in the s%rvey& This is li.ely a representative set of information abo%t the 2eneral level of
assets and e4pendit%res associated -ith each ho%sehold& The avera2e proportion of total
e4pendit%res on school e4penses is "D& The avera2e for ad%lt male 2oods is FD' female 2oods
""D' child 2oods FD' ho%seholds 2oods "FD' and ad%lt 2oods in 2eneral !?D&
"?
i2%re #& Mean Aal%es for Types of 1o%sehold 5andholdin2s
i2%re *& Mean 7roportion of 1o%sehold 5and that is emale 5and in the Sample
"+
+#- Regression Results
All main re2ressions reported %se o%tcome variables -hich are the proportion of
ho%sehold total e4pendit%res devoted to the vario%s 2ood types&
When the ratio of female inherited land to ho%sehold land is 2raphed a2ainst the
predicted val%es of ho%sehold b%d2et share devoted to female 2oods' one can see a clear positive
relationship bet-een the t-o& 3elo- is the 2raph -ith )BD confidence intervals in fi2%re B& The
predicted val%es come from the main :5S re2ression specification -hich isE
Y
j
=
j
+
1 j
( lpcexp)+
2 j
(lsize)+

r=1
R1

rj

(
dem
r
)
+

s=1
S

sj

(
z
s
)
+
3 j
( PFEM )+
j
Where N
8
is the ratio of female 2oods e4pendit%res to total ho%sehold e4pendit%res' and
the rest of the variables are as previo%sly e4plained& This is also the specification for the main
:5SG Tobit re2ression models&
i2%re B& 7ositive relationship bet-een female inherited land and b%d2et share of female 2oods&
"F
All coefficients in re2ression o%tp%t tables represent percenta2es in their c%rrent form ;e4&
a coefficient of !&B means that for a %nit increase in the independent variable' the dependent
variable increases by !&BD<& (oefficients on family demo2raphic composition variables and
district indicator variables are s%ppressed& The main concern -as the impact that the 7EM
-o%ld have on the b%d2et share of female 2oods and male 2oods' as s%bstit%tion into the former
from the latter -o%ld be an indicator of female preferences bein2 reflected in ho%sehold
cons%mption decisions&
Tobit models -ere %sed -hen censorin2 at /ero -as a concernE in the cases of school
e4pendit%res' and food p%rchases& :ther-ise' :5S re2ressions -ere %sed& The main re2ression
estimates s%22est that the proportion of a ho%sehold@s landholdin2s made %p of female inherited
land ;7EM< has a si2nificantly positive relationship -ith the ho%sehold b%d2et share devoted to
female 2oods' and food e4pendit%res' and a ne2ative si2nificant relationship -ith b%d2et share
devoted to male 2oods&
or a " %nit increase in the ;7EM<' there is an associated increase of "&*!D on the
b%d2et share devoted to female 2oods ;si2nificant at the "D level<' and a +&)#D ;si2nificant at
the BD level< increase of the share spent on food& While observin2 these increases' a decrease in
the b%d2et share devoted to male 2oods of &+"D ;si2nificant at the "$D level< is observed& These
findin2s are consistent -ith the presence of female,preferential cons%mption shifts bro%2ht abo%t
by increases in the share of ho%sehold assets controlled by females' as fo%nd in previo%s
research& The res%lts of these re2ressions are fo%nd in table ?&
All of the ho%seholds -ho do not o-n land -ere removed from the sample' and the same
analysis -as performed' in order to see if the res%lts are driven by systematic differences
bet-een ho%seholds -ith and -itho%t land& The model s%22ests that for this sample' a " %nit
increase in 7EM is associated -ith an increase in the proportion of the b%d2et spent on female
2oods by "&#)D ;si2nificant at the "D level< and decreases the male 2oods b%d2et share by &+!D
;si2nificant at the "$D level<& These res%lts are sho-n in table +& This s%22ests that amon2 the
lando-nin2 pop%lation' increased female land inheritance is associated -ith increased female
bar2ainin2 po-er&
Usin2 the 7EM as the main independent variable in this analysis seems int%itive&
1o-ever' -hen loo.in2 for a lin. bet-een asset o-nership and hi2her levels of bar2ainin2
po-er' the independent variable of concern -as specified in different -ays' to see if a common
theme -o%ld emer2e& If female bar2ainin2 po-er is increased thro%2h a -oman havin2 hi2her
")
levels of assets' then other meas%res of relative asset levels sho%ld sho- the same pattern that
7EM does&
In order to e4plore this' 7EM is replaced -ith the ratio of all female land ;not simply
female inherited land< to all ho%sehold land' in the re2ression specifications& The estimation
ret%rns a coefficient of &BF ;si2nificant at the "D level< for the female 2oods o%tcome' ,&B!
;si2nificant at the "D level< for the male 2oods o%tcome' and a coefficient of ?&#+ ;si2nificant at
the "D level< for the food e4pendit%res o%tcome& These are of relatively similar ma2nit%des and
si2nificance levels -ith the estimates from the main 7EM model& These coefficients are
reported in table F&
To f%rther test the theory that female asset shares affect intraho%sehold b%d2etary
allocations' the sample is limited to only -omen -ho -ere %nder the a2e of ## at the time of the
s%rvey& These -omen -o%ld have been yo%n2er than !" ;the median a2e of marria2e in 9-anda<
at the time of the passa2e of the S%ccession la-& Marria2e is a time -hen 9-andans are li.ely to
inherit land from their parents& Even tho%2h the data do not sho- si2nificant increases in land
inheritance rates in -omen -ho are more li.ely to have inherited %nder the S%ccession la-' land
inheritances s%b8ect to the S%ccession la- are potentially more e4o2eno%s since the 2overnment
has le2ally stripped a-ay a 2ood deal of the discretion that parents have -hen decidin2 -hich
children to 2ive land to& It -o%ld be more evidence in favor of the lin. bet-een female land
inheritances and bar2ainin2 po-er if these ho%seholds sho- the same pattern as the 2eneral
sample&
The data for these yo%n2er -omen@s ho%seholds does sho- a relatively similar pattern to
the previo%s estimates& The estimations sho- that for a " %nit increase in the 7EM' there is an
associated "&!+D ;si2nificant at the "$D level< increase in the proportion of the b%d2et spent on
female 2oods& The point estimate on male 2oods is ,&?"& This estimate is not statistically
si2nificant at conventional levels' ho-ever it is ne2ative and of a similar ma2nit%de observed in
the previo%s estimations& These res%lts are sho-n in table )&
!$
When the ratio of female inherited land to male inherited land is %sed as the independent
variable' -e see a positive and si2nificant relationship bet-een that and the b%d2et share spent
on ho%sehold 2oods ;"&?! si2nificant at the "$D level<' and a ne2ative and si2nificant
relationship -ith the ratio and the b%d2et share spent on male 2oods ;,&+B si2nificant at the "D
level<& These res%lts are presented in table "$
"
&
When this independent variable is t-ea.ed sli2htly and becomes female inherited land
over total inherited land' instead of the ratio of male and female inherited land ;-hich li.ely has
differential effects at different levels of total ho%sehold land< the familiar pattern reemer2es&
When %sin2 female inherited land as a proportion of the ho%sehold@s total inherited landholdin2s'
estimates sho- that this ratio has a positive and si2nificant relationship -ith female 2oods
b%d2et share ;coefficient &?! si2nificant at the BD level< and a ne2ative and si2nificant
relationship -ith male 2oods b%d2et share ;coefficient ,&+) si2nificant at the "D level<& These
res%lts are presented in table ""&
To f%rther test the idea that asset control contrib%tes to bar2ainin2 po-er' it ma.es sense
to e4amine the relationship that male land control has -ith b%d2et shares& 3ased on the previo%s
analysis' -e -o%ld e4pect to see an increase in land share controlled by the male head of
ho%sehold associated -ith hi2her levels of male 2oods p%rchases' and lo-er levels of female
2oods p%rchases&
When the ratio of male land to total ho%sehold land is %sed in place of 7EM' -e do see
the reverse pattern of ho%sehold e4pendit%res& The ratio of male land to ho%sehold land has a
positive and si2nificant relationship -ith b%d2et share of male 2oods ;coefficient &?! si2nificant
at the "D level< and a ne2ative and si2nificant relationship -ith b%d2et share of female 2oods
;coefficient ,&B) si2nificant at the "D level<& The res%lts of these estimations is in table "!& This
provides f%rther s%pport for the proposition that land o-nership can translate into bar2ainin2
po-er -ithin 9-andan ho%seholds
!
&
1o-ever' -hen male inherited land over total ho%sehold land is the main independent
variable' re2ressions sho- that it has a positive relationship -ith b%d2et share of male 2oods'
female 2oods' and food' -ith no si2nificant ne2ative relationship -ith any of the b%d2et shares&
" There is a very lar2e ne2ative and hi2hly statistically si2nificant coefficient on food e4pendit%res ;,"##&!) si2nificant at the "D
level<& This coefficient is relatively lar2e and in an %ne4pected direction& 7erhaps this is a sp%rio%s res%lt' ;somethin2 -hich is the
res%lt of the fact that the dataset doesn@t incl%de many val%es for the val%e of food 2ro-n and cons%med< or one -hich spea.s to
potential differences in the types of crops -hich are 2ro-n on male vs female inherited land& If female land is more li.ely to be
%sed for s%bsistence farmin2' then increasin2 the share of inherited land that belon2s to females co%ld red%ce the amo%nt that a
ho%sehold spends on o%tside food&
! The coefficient on food is positive' )&"* and si2nificant at the "D level' f%rther lendin2 s%pport to the idea that perhaps the
o-nership of different parcels of land has an effect on the o%tside food e4pendit%res of ho%seholds in 9-anda& While this
=%estion is an interestin2 one' it is o%tside of the scope of this paper&
!"
The coefficient on male 2oods ;&)* si2nificant at the "D level< is s%bstantially hi2her than the
coefficient on female 2oods ;&BB si2nificant at the BD level<' potentially revealin2 a male,2oods
bias correlated -ith a hi2her ratio of male inherited land to ho%sehold land& The res%lts of these
re2ressions are sho-n in table "#&
The positive coefficients on male and female 2oods co%ld be d%e to the fact that males
are often the heads of ho%sehold' and e4pected to provide 2oods for all members of the
ho%sehold by 9-andan c%stom and c%lt%re& Men -ho are 2iven lar2er endo-ments of land are
li.ely made economically better off than those -hich receive smaller endo-ments' and th%s
more able to provide 2oods for themselves and other members of their ho%seholds&
This res%lt co%ld also be d%e to the possibility that male children are 2iven relatively
more prod%ctive land than female children' -hether beca%se of a male child bias' or the fact that
they are often e4pected to have to provide for an entire ho%sehold& If the land -hich men inherit
is on avera2e more prod%ctive than the land that -omen inherit' then increased levels of male
inherited land in a ho%sehold@s landholdin2s co%ld lead to an overall increase in income' and to
increased cons%mption of 2oods -hich other members of the ho%sehold mi2ht en8oy& In order to
st%dy this f%rther' variables -hich capt%re hetero2eneity amon2 land parcels ;r%22edness' soil
=%ality' etc&< co%ld be %sed' b%t these sorts of variables -ere not incl%ded in the EI(A#&
*&# Instrumental .aria!les Approach
The %se of an e4o2eno%s so%rce of variation in this analysis -o%ld 2reatly improve the
confidence in the estimates 2iven& A n%mber of instr%mental variables -ere created in an attempt
to identify e4o2eno%s variation in the independent variable' and deal -ith any present
endo2eneity bias&
An indicator variable -as created for those ho%seholds -ith -ives -ho -o%ld have been
more li.ely to inherit %nder the S%ccession la-' based %pon the median a2e of marria2e in
9-anda' -hich is !"& The variable ta.es the val%e of " if the -oman -as yo%n2er than !" at the
time of the passa2e of the S%ccession la- in ")))' other-ise it ta.es the val%e of /ero& When this
-as re2ressed on -hether or not a female inherited land' and then re2ressed on the amo%nt of
land that a female inherited' the coefficients -ere both ne2ative and si2nificant& These estimates
are sho-n in table !& Addin2 in district controls leaves the coefficients ne2ative and si2nificant'
as sho-n in table #& When controls for the a2e of h%sband or -ife are added' the coefficients lose
all si2nificance& These estimates are sho-n in table * and table B& It seems that there is not very
lar2e predictive po-er of inheritances in the a2e of female heads of ho%sehold&
!!
It seems pla%sible that the different districts of 9-anda co%ld sho- si2nificantly different
inheritance patterns d%e to varyin2 levels of .no-led2e andGor enforcement of the S%ccession
la-' and that -omen from partic%lar districts mi2ht be more li.ely to inherit land' and posses
hi2her levels of intraho%sehold bar2ainin2 po-er& It -o%ld be %sef%l to be able to %se this type of
re2ional variation in de,facto inheritance r%les as a so%rce of e4o2eno%s variation in inheritances'
as a%thors 1eath and Tan do in their paper on the labor mar.et implications of the 1ind%
S%ccession 5a- in India ;1eath > Tan' !$"*<&
In order to e4plore this' the mean val%es of total female land' total female inherited land'
and female inherited land as a proportion of total ho%sehold land amon2 others -ere calc%lated
for each of the #$ 9-andan districts& A sample of these n%mbers are reported belo- in fi2%re !&
i2%re !& H1i2h InheritanceI Districts
Ja.en.e' 6yama2be' Kamonyi' and 6yamashe.e districts all -ill be refered to as Hhi2h
inheritanceI districts beca%se the avera2e ratio of ho%sehold land that is female inherited land in
each of the districts is over ten percent' -ith the e4ception of 6yamashe.e at )&# percent& The
avera2e levels of total female land' and the avera2e ratio of female inherited land to male
inherited land are also relatively hi2h in these districts&
Usin2 a simple probit model -ith basic controls' an indicator variable correspondin2 to
the female ho%sehold head@s land inheritance -as re2ressed on an indicator variable -hich e=%als
" if the ho%sehold resides in a hi2h inheritance district& The estimates sho- that residin2 in one
of these districts has a statistically si2nificant positive relationship -ith land inheritance& These
estimates are sho-n in fi2%re #&
!#
Means Gakenke Nyamagbe Kamonyi Nyamasheke Nyagatare Gicumbi Nyabihu Ngororero Nyarugenge
Total Female %and &'&() &'*++ &'*,, &'*,, &'**& &'*&( &'*-* &'*&- &'&.+
Female /nherited %and &'&.- &'&+) &'&0+ &'&.( &'&*- &'&+* &'&,- &'&)& &'&,-
Fem %and1 Total %and &'*2& &',0, &',+, &',&& &'*)- &'*+2 &',-* &'*&- &',-2
Fem /nher %and1 Total %and &'*&, &'*+& &'*-+ &'&2- &'&*. &'&02 &'&+- &'&)- &'&+.
Fem /nher1 Male /nher &'&&* &'&&2 &'&&& &'&&. &'&&& &'&*& &'&&& &'&&* &'&&.
Fem %and1 Male %and &'*(* &'&,, &'&&. &'&&+ &'&&, &'&*& &'&&& &'&&. &'&+&
Fem /nher 1 Male /nher &'*(0 &',+0 &',.( &'*2. &',&& &'*+0 &'*0, &'&2( &'-*+
i2%re #& 9e2ion Associated With 5and Inheritance
The Hhi2h inheritanceI indicator variable -as %sed as a pro4y variable in the main
re2ression specification in place of the ratio of female inherited land to ho%sehold land& This' or
any so%rce of variation co%ld only be considered e4o2eno%s if it affects land inheritances' b%t
does not affect intraho%sehold bar2ainin2 po-er thro%2h any channel other than land
inheritances& or this variable to provide e4o2eno%s variation' the ass%mption m%st be made that
the differences in inheritance rates re2ionally are as 2ood as random ;potentially from e4o2eno%s
differences in the implementation or .no-led2e level abo%t the S%ccession la-<&
The estimates of this re2ression specification do not follo- the same pattern as the
previo%s estimates& Table "* sho-s the res%lts' and sho- that residin2 in a hi2h inheritance
district is positively and si2nificantly correlated -ith school e4pendit%res' and ho%sehold
e4pendit%res' and ne2atively and si2nificantly correlated -ith child 2oods e4pendit%res& It does
not seem to affect the b%d2et share spent on male or female 2oods in any si2nificant -ay& These
estimates are =%ite similar to -hat -as fo%nd in 1oddinot > 1addad "))"' "))B&
!*
Inheritance Predicted by Region
"*$
%A34%5 Female /nherited %and6
%og of per capita e7penditures &'*-888
"&'&*$
%og of family si9e &',.888
"&'&+$
usband 5chool &'&)
"&'&.$
Wife 5chool &'*,888
"&'&.$
usband's Age &'&*888
"&'&&$
Wife's Age :&'&&8
"&'&&$
Total ousehold %and :&'*,888
"&'&,$
igh /nheritance !istrict6 &'-)888
"&'&.$
;bser<ations (=+,.
5tandard errors in parentheses
888 p>&'&*= 88 p>&'&+= 8 p>&'*
When a ! sta2e least s=%ares estimation method is %sed -ith the same hi2h inheritance
district variable as an instr%ment for 7EM' the res%lts are also similar to those fo%nd by
1oddinot > 1addad' -ith the e4ception of the food coefficient& The res%lts' -hich are sho-n in
table "B' sho- a positive and si2nificant relationship bet-een ;instr%mented< 7EM and school
e4pendit%res' female school e4pendit%res' and ho%sehold 2oods& They also sho- that it has a
ne2ative and si2nificant relationship -ith child 2oods' and food e4pendit%res& The similarity
bet-een these res%lts' and those of previo%s research 2ive hope that this instr%ment co%ld be
providin2 a so%rce of e4o2eno%s variation thro%2h -hich -e can see the effects that increased
female inheritance has on b%d2et shares spent on different types of 2oods& It is li.ely' ho-ever'
that livin2 in the hi2h inheritance districts is also correlated -ith other factors -hich infl%ence
female intraho%sehold bar2ainin2 po-er' and that the instr%ment does not meet the strict
e4cl%sion restriction&
Usef%l instr%ments can sometimes be created by e4aminin2 the effects of the arbitrary'
hetero2eneo%s implementation of a la- or policy& :ften a la- or policy affects behavior' and it is
impossible or %nli.ely that individ%als have selected into bein2 affected by s%ch& This creates the
opport%nity to %se the la-Gpolicy r%le as an instr%ment for the endo2eno%s behavior -hich it
mi2ht predict& An e4ample of this is in 1eath > Tan' !$"* -here the a%thors %se the differences
in 1ind% S%ccession 5a- amendment timin2 in Indian states to estimate the effect that increased
land inheritances has on female participation in labor mar.ets& The -omen -ere affected
differently by the la-;s<' b%t -ere not self,selectin2 into or o%t of areas -hich -ere or -eren@t
affected by the la-& This' alon2 -ith the a2e of -omen at marria2e -ere %sed as instr%ments for
land inheritances&
In a f%rther search for an instr%ment' the literat%re concernin2 the implementation and
enforcement of the S%ccession la- -as revie-ed& Also' the literat%re concernin2 the 5and
Ten%re 9e2%lari/ation 7ro2ram ;5T97< -as e4amined& The 5T97 -as a process thro%2h -hich
the 9-andan 2overnment re2istered and recorded the location' dimensions and o-nership of
every sin2le parcel of land in the co%ntry ;Kairaba > Simons' ;n&d&<<& The 2overnment also
recorded -hich property -as 8ointly o-ned by h%sbands and -ives' as -ell as officially
recordin2 f%t%re inheritors of land& This la-' alon2 -ith the S%ccession la- are believed to have
si2nificant effects on the propensity for -omen to inherit land& 9esearchers in 9-anda have
sho-n that simply the official reco2nition of c%rrent or f%t%re land o-nership has 2iven -omen
hope that they -ill not be discriminated a2ainst in land inheritances and -hen assertin2
inheritance ri2hts in co%rt ;Kairaba > Simons' n&d&' JM:' !$"*<&
!B
In the case of 9-anda' the 5T97 -as implemented %niformly nation-ide' and -hile it
has li.ely had an impact on inheritances' does not provide any re2ional variation -hich co%ld be
e4ploited& 1o-ever' the creation of another instr%mental variable comes from the variance in the
level of .no-led2e of the S%ccession la- in different districts& The more prevalent the
.no-led2e of the la- amon2 the female pop%lation in a district' theoretically' the more li.ely
those -omen -o%ld be to %se the la- to ens%re that they inherit land& emale .no-led2e of the
S%ccession la- is hi2hly infl%enced in r%ral areas by television and radio advertisements' alon2
-ith ne-spaper and other print campai2ns see.in2 to increase a-areness of its e4istence ;JM:'
!$"*<& These campai2ns are carried o%t thro%2ho%t 9-anda' and it is ass%med that e4pos%re to
them is as 2ood as random&
The 9-andan Jender Monitorin2 :ffice ;JM:< is an arm of the 9-andan central
2overnment -hich st%dies iss%es of 2ender ine=%ality and 2ender,based violence and implements
pro2rams aimed at alleviatin2 s%ch ine=%alities& Their -ebsite states that the HJM: is a
re2%latory body for the compliance of 2ender principles and mechanisms of eradications and
fi2htin2 2ender based violence in 9-andaI ;JM:' !$"*<& The JM: released a report in !$""
-hich -as the res%lt of a research effort aimed at %nderstandin2 iss%es re2ardin2 the
implementation of the S%ccession la-& The a%thors of the report established that amon2 the "B
districts s%rveyed' Kamonyi' Jic%mbi' 6ya2atare' Jasabo' Kirehe' and 3%rera all had over #$D
of the female respondents ans-er that they -ere a-are of the e4istence of the S%ccession la-&
The other s%rveyed districts had female S%ccession la- .no-led2e rates sometimes as lo- as
"$&#D& The ? districts -ith the hi2hest .no-led2e rates are referred to as Hhi2h .no-led2eI
districts&
After limitin2 the sample to the "B districts -hich -ere incl%ded in the JM: st%dy' a
simple probit model is %sed to estimate the affect that livin2 in one of the hi2h .no-led2e
districts has on the propensity of inheritin2 land' and then an :5S model -as %sed to see if
livin2 in a hi2h .no-led2e district predicts the si/e of inherited parcels& The res%lts of these
re2ressions are sho- in table "?& This e4ercise reveals that livin2 in a hi2h .no-led2e district
does not seem to correlate very stron2ly -ith a hi2her propensity to inherit land for females' nor
does it seem to correlate at all -ith inheritin2 lar2er parcels of land& There is a positive and
si2nificant coefficient on -hether or not a female inherits land' b%t smaller than e4pected& There
is no si2nificant relationship bet-een parcel si/e and livin2 in a hi2h .no-led2e district&
Usin2 a !,sta2e least s=%ares re2ression method' the variable for -hether or not a
ho%sehold is in a hi2h .no-led2e district is %sed as an instr%ment for 7EM& The res%lts of these
!?
re2ressions are sho-n in table "+& These estimates sho- that ;instr%mented< 7EM has no
statistically si2nificant relationship -ith any of the o%tcome b%d2et shares other than a small
ne2ative coefficient on female 2oods ;,&!+ si2nificant at the "$D level<& This ma.es sense' as the
hi2h .no-led2e indicator variable did not stron2ly correlate -ith levels of inheritance or
inheritance si/e& Unfort%nately' this aven%e of in=%iry did not prove to be an effective strate2y
for revealin2 a relationship bet-een female land inheritance and intraho%sehold bar2ainin2
po-er& 1o-ever' the res%lt that increased female .no-led2e of the S%ccession la- is not
si2nificantly correlated to inheritances in a stron2 -ay' is interestin2 to .no-& This idea co%ld be
the basis of a paper in and of itself' and -arrants f%rther data collection and research&
*&* %istri!ution o$ Error 'erms
There is al-ays concern abo%t the possibility that estimation res%lts co%ld be driven by
heteros.edasticity of error terms& To test for this' (oo.,Weisber2 tests for heteros.edasticity
-ere performed on each of the re2ression specifications& The tests al-ays ret%rned p,val%es of
/ero' -hich lead to re8ection of the n%ll hypothesis that the variance of errors in the data is
constant&
In order to f%rther verify this' a scatter plot -as created -ith the resid%als of the 7EM
on female 2oods re2ression& This sho-s that the variance of the errors is not constant& The 2raph
also incl%des a non,parametric 2raph of the avera2e of the resid%als -ith )BD confidence
intervals& That 2raph is sho-n in fi2%re B& It is d%e to the res%lts of these tests' that all re2ression
specifications -ere %sed -ith heteros.edasticity,rob%st standard errors&
(oncerns abo%t the non,normality of errors -ere ass%a2ed thro%2h 2raphin2 them in a
histo2ram& The error terms are =%ite normally distrib%ted& The res%lts of this proced%re is sho-n
in fi2%re ?&
!+
i2%re B& 1eteros.edasticity of Errors
i2%re ?& 6ormality of Errors
!F
There is the li.elihood that endo2eneity bet-een the independent and dependent
variables co%ld ca%se bias in the coefficient estimates& The bias co%ld be lar2e or small' ho-ever'
it is not 2%aranteed to chan2e the direction of the point estimates& This is consistent -ith
L%is%mbin2 > de 5a 3riMre ;!$$$<' -here the a%thors fo%nd that not controllin2 for endo2eneity'
bet-een assets bro%2ht to marria2e and intraho%sehold bar2ainin2 po-er' co%ld lead to bias in
estimates of the effect of the former on the latter& They %sed an instr%mental variable approach to
p%r2e their estimates of some amo%nt of endo2eneity by %sin2 family characteristics as
instr%ments for assets bro%2ht to marria2e& This -o%ld have been the ideal approach for the
c%rrent analysis& 1o-ever' m%lti,2enerational family data for the s%b8ects in the EI(A# sample
is not available& While the a%thors establish that estimates of this nat%re can be biased by
endo2eneity' the si2ns of their estimates did not chan2e d%e to s%ch bias&
The %se of instr%mental variables in the c%rrent analysis has so%2ht to p%r2e some of the
endo2eneity from the ori2inal estimates' ho-ever' d%e to the lac. of a very stron2 instr%ment
-hich meets the e4cl%sion restriction' the s%ccess in this realm -as limited&
The pattern in the main re2ression specifications' of a positive relationship of 7EM -ith
female 2oods alon2 -ith the ne2ative relationship -ith male 2oods' is consistent -ith predictions
of a divorce threat intraho%sehold bar2ainin2 model& The divorce threat model predicts that
females -ith lar2er shares of ho%sehold assets sho%ld be able to e4ert more infl%ence on the
reso%rce allocation decision;s< of their ho%seholds' ca%sin2 them to arrive at cons%mption
b%ndles more in line -ith their preferences& Analysis of the data sho-s that -hen female
inherited land ma.es %p a lar2er percenta2e of ho%sehold assets' ho%seholds tend to spend hi2her
shares of income on female 2oods and smaller shares on male 2oods' theoretically increasin2 the
-elfare of female heads of ho%sehold&
It co%ld be possible that females -ith hi2her shares of inherited land are for some reason
systematically increasin2 female 2oods cons%mption by for2oin2 cons%mption of other 2oods
-hich they prefer' s%ch as child schoolin2 or ho%sehold 2oods& If this -ere the case' positive and
si2nificant coefficients on 7EM for female 2oods mi2ht be seen' -hile also seein2 ne2ative and
si2nificant coefficients on 2oods that females have been sho-n to hi2hly val%e' s%ch as child
schoolin2& 1o-ever' there -as not stron2 evidence fo%nd in the data to s%22est that this is
happenin2& The only s%bstit%tion seems to be female 2oods for male 2oods' -hich s%22ests that
females are increasin2 their cons%mption of 2oods mainly thro%2h relative increases in
bar2ainin2 po-er&
!)
A& (:6(5USI:6
This paper has e4plored -hether or not increased female asset o-nership has an effect on
female intraho%sehold bar2ainin2 po-er in 9-anda& M%ch of the literat%re s%22ests that
ho%seholds do not pool their incomes and ma4imi/e a 8oint %tility f%nction' b%t that ho%sehold
reso%rce allocation is the res%lt of bar2ainin2 bet-een ho%sehold members ;2enerally a h%sband
and -ife as the male and female heads of ho%sehold<&
Thro%2h re2ression analysis of a representative ho%sehold s%rvey dataset from 9-anda'
this paper has sho-n that increasin2 female land inheritance as a share of total ho%sehold
landholdin2s is associated -ith a shift in cons%mption to-ards female 2oods and a-ay from
male 2oods in 9-andan ho%seholds& The findin2s are consistent -ith other papers -hich have
e4amined similar research =%estions' and -ith the predictions of a divorce,threat intraho%sehold
6ash,bar2ainin2 model& This is evidence in favor of the predictive po-er of bar2ainin2 models
in describin2 ho%sehold reso%rce allocation& It is also proposed that these increases in female
2oods cons%mption are the res%lt of bar2ainin2 po-er dynamics' and not d%e to females
s%bstit%tin2 child ed%cation' or ho%sehold 2oods for their o-n cons%mption of 2oods&
Thro%2h an instr%mental variable analysis' most of the findin2s of 1oddinot and 1addad
"))" and "))B -ere replicated' sho-in2 increases in the instr%mented 7EM variable to be
related to increased cons%mption of schoolin2' partic%larly female schoolin2' and ho%sehold
2oods' -hile also sho-in2 a decrease in cons%mption of child 2oods&
There is hesitation to claim that a ca%sal lin. has been definitively identified bet-een
female land inheritances and increases in bar2ainin2 po-er' as inferred from 2oods e4pendit%res&
To do so -o%ld re=%ire more ade=%ately addressin2 the iss%es of endo2eneity -hich s%rro%nd
land inheritance data& Si2nificant effort -as made in order to %se an instr%mental variables
approach to arrive at a ca%sal interpretation of estimates' -ith limited s%ccess&
1o-ever' in the main specifications' the si2nificance' ma2nit%de and direction of the
main coefficients of interest stay relatively constant -hen the sample is limited to only
lando-ners or only -omen -ho -o%ld li.ely inherit after the S%ccession la-' and by chan2in2
the independent variable of interest to different meas%res of relative land o-nership& This
s%22ests that there is a relationship bet-een female asset control' partic%larly inherited land' and
female intraho%sehold bar2ainin2 po-er&
#$
With more detailed familial and historical data for each individ%al in the EI(A# s%rvey'
f%t%re research co%ld p%r2e si2nificant endo2eneity from these types of estimates& In order to
more finely e4amine the b%d2et,share effects of female land inheritance' more detailed data
collection abo%t ho%sehold p%rchases co%ld be %sed to create an increased n%mber of more
specifically defined e4pendit%re share cate2ories&
This research f%rthers the literat%re of intraho%sehold bar2ainin2 in developin2 co%ntries'
ho%sehold reso%rce allocation models ;%nitary vs& 6ash,bar2ainin2<' and female land inheritance&
It is the first st%dy -hich e4amines ho- female inheritance affects intraho%sehold bar2ainin2
po-er of 9-andan -omen& It adds to a relatively small body of literat%re concerned -ith asset
control and intraho%sehold bar2ainin2 in developin2 co%ntries in 2eneral&
1oddinot and 1addad' in their "))B paper %sed %nearned income data and e4pendit%re
data to e4plore ho- asset control affects ho%sehold b%d2et allocation& The c%rrent paper is the
first to %se the EI(A# dataset to analy/e land inheritance and ho%sehold b%d2et allocations in a
similar fashion& This analysis is also some-hat novel in that it %ses land,type ratios as the
independent variation& L%is%mbin2 > de la 3riMre perform a very similar analysis to the c%rrent
one' e4cept they -ere able to %se stron2 instr%ments for assets bro%2ht to marria2e' p%r2in2
some of the inherent endo2eneity bet-een asset control and intraho%sehold bar2ainin2 po-er&
This research paper provides a startin2 point for f%t%re researchers of 9-anda -ho -ill
hopef%lly and li.ely have access to richer ;perhaps panel< datasets' allo-in2 them to more
effectively deal -ith endo2eneity bias&
In an effort to follo- L%is%mbin2 > de la 3riMre and 1eath > Tan in %sin2 an instr%ment
to p%r2e endo2eneity' this paper so%2ht to find a pla%sible so%rce of e4o2eneity -hich -o%ld
serve in place of the ratio of female inherited land to total ho%sehold land& The fact that the
.no-led2e of the S%ccession la- does not seem to be a stron2 predictor of land inheritances is
an interestin2 res%lt in and of itself' even if it proved to be an ineffective instr%mental variable&
Allendorf@s !$$+ paper concernin2 female land o-nership' child o%tcomes' and female decision
ma.in2 po-er li.ely s%ffers from similar endo2eneity concerns& The paper presents a compellin2
story li.e this one' -hich has si2nificant implications for the individ%als involved& The fact that
this paper and Allendorf@s papers e4plain parallel themes of female land control bein2 positively
associated -ith intraho%sehold bar2ainin2 po-er lends e4ternal validity to the concl%sions of
both& This paper lends s%pport to the idea that asset control does have si2nificant implications for
female bar2ainin2 po-er -hich the emer2in2 literat%re seems to 2enerally be corroboratin2&
#"
Increases in female bar2ainin2 po-er -ithin and o%tside of ho%seholds is a 2oal of many
9-andan advocacy 2ro%ps see.in2 to f%rther female empo-erment& These or2ani/ations co%ld
benefit from the .no-led2e that asset o-nership is a stron2 predictor of female decision,ma.in2
po-er& They co%ld do -ell by promotin2 female land o-nership and inheritance in the interest of
improvin2 the life o%tcomes of 9-andan -omen& The 2overnment of 9-anda is c%rrently
e4aminin2 chan2es to its HS%ccession la-I and -o%ld benefit from an analysis s%ch as this' in
order to %nderstand the positive female empo-erment o%tcomes -hich can res%lt from increased
protections of female inheritance ri2hts&
It is still debatable' -hether or not increases in female empo-erment are 2ood for overall
economic development of a co%ntry& The 9-andan 2overnment -ill need to -ei2h the possibility
of slo-in2 economic development a2ainst the benefits of promotin2 female empo-erment'
-hich many vie- as a val%able 2oal intrinsically' and -hich can have si2nificant positive effects
on children@s o%tcomes& In the lon2 r%n' the children of relatively more,empo-ered -omen co%ld
live lon2er and more s%ccessf%l lives' addin2 to the economic development of 9-anda'
potentially more than ma.in2 %p for any c%rrent economic slo-do-n -hich mi2ht be lin.ed to
shiftin2 asset control to -omen&
#!
9EE9E6(ES
Allendorf' K& ;!$$+<& Do -omen@s land ri2hts promote empo-erment and child health in nepalS&
/orld %e&elopment' 01;""<' ")+B,")FF&
AndrC' (& and 7lattea%' 0&,7& ;"))+< 5and 9elations Under Unbearable Stress: 9-anda
(a%2ht in the Malth%sian Trap& 2ournal o$ Human Beha&ior and rgani)ation#
3ec.er' J& ;")F"<& Altr%ism in the family and selfishness in the mar.et place& Economica'
+3;"F)<' ","B&
3ins-an2er' 1& 7& and 9osen/-ei2' M& 9& ;")F?< 3ehavioral and Material Determinants
of 7rod%ction 9elations in A2ric%lt%re& 0o%rnal of Development St%dies' !!' #' B$# T
#)&
3ro-nin2' M&' 3o%r2%i2non' &' (hiappori' 7& A&' > 5echene' A& ;"))*<& Income and o%tcomes,a
str%ct%ral model of intraho%sehold allocation& 0 7olit Econ' "$!;?<' "$?+,"$)?&
3%rnet' 0& E& ;!$$"<& Women@s 5and 9i2hts In 9-anda& 'he /omen and Land (tudies& 9etrieved
from http:GG---&la-&emory&ed%G-andlGWAl,st%diesGr-anda&htm
Deere' (& D&' > Doss' (& 9& ;!$$?<& The 2ender asset 2ap: What do -e .no- and -hy does it
matterS& eminist Economics' "!;",!<' ",B$&
Doep.e' M&' > Tertilt' M& ;!$""<& Does female empo-erment promote economic developmentS
;6o& B?#+<& Disc%ssion paper seriesGGorsch%n2sinstit%t /%r U%.%nft der Arbeit&
D%flo' E&' > Udry' (& ;!$$*<& Intraho%sehold reso%rce allocation in (ote d@Ivoire: Social norms'
separate acco%nts and cons%mption choices ;6o& -"$*)F<& 6ational 3%rea% of Economic
9esearch&
Jhosh' A& ;!$$+<& 'he e$$ect o$ land re$orms on long term health and well4!eing in India
;Wor.in2 paper<&
##
JM:' ;!$"*<& 9etrieved May +' !$"*' from http:GG---&2mo&2ov&r-Ginde4&phpSidQ"+
1eath' Tan' ;!$"*<& Intraho%sehold 3ar2ainin2' emale A%tonomy' and 5abor S%pply: Theory
and Evidence from India ;Wor.in2 paper<&
1eltber2' 9asm%s& ;!$$!<& 7roperty 9i2hts and 6at%ral 9eso%rce Mana2ement in Developin2
(o%ntries& 0o%rnal of Economic S%rveys "?;!<: "F)T!"*&
1oddinott' 0&' > 1addad' 5& ;"))"<& 1o%sehold E4pendit%res' (hild Anthropometric Stat%s and
the Intraho%sehold Division of Income: Evidence from the (ote dIvoire& 9esearch
7ro2ram in Development St%dies Disc%ssion 7aper' "BB' ++,)?&
1oddinott' 0&' > 1addad' 5& ;"))B<& Does female income share infl%ence ho%sehold
e4pendit%resS Evidence from (Pte d@Ivoire& :4ford 3%lletin of Economics and
Statistics' B+;"<' ++,)?&
Kairaba' A&' > Simons' 0& D& ;n&d&<& Impact o$ the Land Re$orm on the Land Rights And
Economic 5o&erty Reduction o$ the Ma6ority Rural Especially /omen /ho %epend on
Land $or their Li&elihood ;9eport by the 9-anda Initiative for S%stainable
Development<&
5an.horst' Marco and M%riel Aeldman& HEn2a2in2 -ith c%stomary la- to create scope for
reali/in2 -omens formally protected land ri2hts in 9-anda&I Wor.in2 -ith
c%stomary 8%stice systems: 7ost,conflict and fra2ile states& 1arper' Erica& 9ome:
International Development 5a- :r2ani/ation' !$""&
5%ndber2' S&' > 7olla.' 9& A& ;"))#<& Separate spheres bar2ainin2 and the marria2e mar.et&
0o%rnal of 7olitical Economy' )FF,"$"$&
Manser' M&' > 3ro-n' M& ;")F$<& Marria2e and ho%sehold decision,ma.in2:a bar2ainin2
analysis& International Economic Re&iew' -,;"<' #",**&
#*
Mason' Karen& "))F& HWives Economic Decision,Ma.in2 7o-er in the amily: ive Asian
(o%ntries'I in Karen Mason ;ed&<' The (han2in2 amily in (omparative 7erspective:
Asia and the United States' 1onol%l%: East,West (enter' pp& "$B,"##&
McElroy' M&' > 1orney' M& ;")F"<& 6ash,bar2ained ho%sehold decisions: To-ard a
2enerali/ation of the theory of demand& International Economic Re&iew' --;!<' ###,#*)&
7o-ley' E& ;!$$?<& 9-anda: The Impact of Women 5e2islators on 7olicy :%tcomes Affectin2
(hildren and amilies ;3ac.2ro%nd 7aper<& U6I(E&
L%is%mbin2' A&' > de 5a 3riMre' 3& ;!$$$<& Women@s assets and intraho%sehold allocation in
r%ral 3an2ladesh: Testin2 meas%res of bar2ainin2 po-er& Washin2ton: International
ood 7olicy 9esearch Instit%te&
L%is%mbin2' A&' > Mal%ccio' 0& ;!$$#<& 9eso%rces at marria2e and intraho%sehold allocation:
Evidence from 3an2ladesh' Ethiopia' Indonesia' and So%th Africa& :4ford 3%lletin :f
Economics And Statistics' ?B;#<' !F#,#!+&
9od2ers' N&' > Menon' 6& ;!$"!<& A meta,analysis of land ri2hts and -omens economic -ell,
bein2 & Unp%blished man%script' 9%t2ers University' 6e- 3r%ns-ic.' 60 9etrieved from
http:GGpeople&brandeis&ed%GVnmenonG Draft$"WS%rveyWofW5andW9i2htsWandWWomen&pdf
Stra%ss' 0&' and Thomas' D& ;"))F<& 1ealth' n%trition' and economic development& 0o%rnal of
economic literat%re' +??TF"+&
Udry' (hristopher& "))?& HJender' A2ric%lt%ral 7rod%ction' and the Theory of the 1o%sehold'I
0o%rnal of 7olitical Economy "$* ;B<: "$"$,"$*?&
#B
Appendi4
Table "& S%mmary Statistics
#?
(ariable ) *ean &D *in *ax
+amily &i,e -./0 1!1- 1!.1 / 22
2 +emale 3hildren -./0 1!/0 1!1- 0 -
2 *ale 3hildren -./0 1!/1 1!1- 0 4
2 All 3hildren -./0 2!5- 1!5- 0 10
&chool 6xpenditures -./0 2/-0!01 12012!.- 0 240000
+emale &chool 6xpenditures -./0 1225!.1 420-!1/ 0 1-.000
*ale &chool 6xpenditures -./0 111/!10 4..5!-4 0 240000
7ousehold "otal 8and -./0 0!52 1!01 0 55
7ousehold +emale 8and -./0 0!04 0!/4 0 11!11
7ousehold 9nherited 8and -./0 0!21 0!-1 0 //
7ousehold +emale 9nherited land -./0 0!0/ 0!1. 0 4!4
7ousehold *ale 9nherited land -./0 0!22 0!4. 0 //
:roportion of 7ousehold 8and that is;
+emale 8and -./0 0!11 0!/1 0 1
+emale 9nherited 8and -./0 0!05 0!2 0 1
:roportion of 7ousehold 6xpenditures that are;
&chool 6xpenditures -./0 0!.1 /!11 0 .2!.-
+emale &chool 6xpenditures -./0 0!0. 2!0 0 .2!.-
*ale &chool 6xpenditures -./0 0!04 2!/4 0 51!51
Adult *ale <oods -./0 -!0- 1!.1 0 10
Adult +emale <oods -./0 11!0. 5!-5 0 05!//
3hild <oods -./0 4!-4 4!22 0 42
7ousehold <oods -./0 14!40 11!-1 0 ..!..
<eneral Adult <oods -./0 21!1- 11!1. 0 ..!5-
:roportion of household that are;
+emales= age 0 to 10 -./0 0!1- 0!15 0 0!41
+emales= age 11 to 20 -./0 0!0. 0!12 0 0!5
+emales= age 21 to /0 -./0 0!0- 0!12 0 0!14
+emales= age /1 to 00 -./0 0!05 0!1 0 0!0
+emales= age 01 to 10 -./0 0!00 0!04 0 0!0
+emales= age 11 to 50 -./0 0!0/ 0!04 0 0!//
+emales= age 51 to 40 -./0 0!01 0!01 0 0!//
+emales over 40 -./0 0!01 0!01 0 0!//
*ales= age 0 to 10 -./0 0!1- 0!15 0 0!41
*ales= age 11 to 20 -./0 0!1 0!1/ 0 0!54
*ales= age 21 to /0 -./0 0!11 0!1/ 0 0!5
*ales= age /1 to 00 -./0 0!05 0!0. 0 0!1
*ales= age 01 to 10 -./0 0!0/ 0!04 0 0!//
*ales= age 11 to 50 -./0 0!02 0!05 0 0!//
*ales= age 51 to 40 -./0 0!01 0!00 0 0!//
*ales over 40 -./0 0 0!0/ 0 0!//
+emale 3hildren 0 to 5 -./0 0!12 0!10 0 0!54
+emale 3hildren 4 to 12 -./0 0!04 0!11 0 0!5
+emale 3hildren 1/ to 1- -./0 0!00 0!0- 0 0!5
*ale 3hildren 0 to 5 -./0 0!12 0!11 0 0!54
*ale 3hildren 4 to 12 -./0 0!04 0!11 0 0!5
*ale 3hildren 1/ to 1- -./0 0!00 0!0- 0 0!1
Table !& Affects of A2e on emale 5and Inheritance
#+
Affects of Age on Female Land Inheritance
"*$ ",$
?robit ;%5
#A@/A3%45 /nherited %and Aes1Bo 5i9e of /nherited ?arcels
:&',-888 :&'&,888
"&'&)$ "&'&&$
%og of family si9e &'&* &'&*
"&'&0$ "&'&*$
usband 5chool :&'**8 :&'&*
"&'&)$ "&'&*$
Wife 5chool :&'&) :&'&*
"&'&+$ "&'&*$
Total ousehold %and :&'&* &'&,88
"&'&,$ "&'&*$
!istrict Controls
;bser<ations (=2-. (=2-.
@:sCuared &'&,
888 p>&'&*= 88 p>&'&+= 8 p>&'*
Female %iDely to ha<e been married
after the 5uccession law
@obust standard errors in
parentheses
Table #& Affects of A2e on emale 5and Inheritance -ith District (ontrols
#F
Affects of Age on Female Land Inheritance
"*$ ",$
?robit ;%5
#A@/A3%45 /nherited %and Aes1Bo 5i9e of /nherited ?arcels
:&',,888 :&'&*888
"&'&+$ "&'&&$
%og of family si9e &'&, &'&*
"&'&0$ "&'&*$
usband 5chool :&'*&8 :&'&&
"&'&)$ "&'&*$
Wife 5chool :&'&) :&'&*8
"&'&+$ "&'&*$
Total ousehold %and &'&& &'&,88
"&'&*$ "&'&*$
!istrict Controls E E
;bser<ations (=2-. (=2-.
@:sCuared &'&-
@obust standard errors in parentheses
888 p>&'&*= 88 p>&'&+= 8 p>&'*
Female %iDely to ha<e been
married after the 5uccession law
Table *& Affects of A2e on emale 5and Inheritance' District and 1%sband@s A2e (ontrols
#)
Affects of Age on Female Land Inheritance
"*$ ",$
?robit ;%5
#A@/A3%45 /nherited %and Aes1Bo 5i9e of /nherited ?arcels
:&'&) :&'&&
"&'&)$ "&'&*$
%og of family si9e &'&- &'&*
"&'&0$ "&'&*$
usband 5chool :&'&0 :&'&&
"&'&)$ "&'&*$
Wife 5chool &'&& :&'&*
"&'&+$ "&'&*$
Total ousehold %and :&'&& &'&,88
"&'&*$ "&'&*$
usband's Age &'&*888 &'&&888
"&'&&$ "&'&&$
!istrict Controls E E
;bser<ations (=2-. (=2-.
@:sCuared &'&-
@obust standard errors in parentheses
888 p>&'&*= 88 p>&'&+= 8 p>&'*
Female %iDely to ha<e been married
after the 5uccession law
Table B& Affects of A2e on emale 5and Inheritance' District and Wife@s A2e (ontrols
*$
Affects of Age on Female Land Inheritance
"*$ ",$
?robit ;%5
#A@/A3%45 /nherited %and Aes1Bo 5i9e of /nherited ?arcels
:&'&. &'&&
"&'&0$ "&'&*$
%og of family si9e &'&+ &'&*
"&'&0$ "&'&*$
usband 5chool :&'&( :&'&&
"&'&)$ "&'&*$
Wife 5chool &'&& :&'&*
"&'&)$ "&'&*$
Total ousehold %and :&'&& &'&,88
"&'&*$ "&'&*$
Wife's Age &'&*888 &'&&888
"&'&&$ "&'&&$
!istrict Controls E E
;bser<ations (=2-. (=2-.
@:sCuared &'&-
@obust standard errors in parentheses
888 p>&'&*= 88 p>&'&+= 8 p>&'*
Female %iDely to ha<e been married
after the 5uccession law
Table ?& 9atio of emale Inherited 5and to Total 1o%sehold 5and
*"
Female Inherited Land oer !ousehold Land " Full #am$le
"*$ "-$ "+$ "0$ "($ "2$ "*&$ "**$
Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit
Female Male Female Male Child ousehold
#A@/A3%45 5chool 5chool 5chool Goods Goods Goods Goods Food
:&',0888 :&'** :&'*. :*'*.888 :&'&( :*'.0888 *'-+888 :('&.888
"&'&2$ "&'&($ "&'&2$ "&'&($ "&'&2$ "&'*,$ "&',0$ "*'&,$
%og of family si9e +'*+888 .'+0888 -'2(888 :*'+-888 &'&, ,'2-888 *'-) :2'+,888
"&'),$ "&').$ "&').$ "&'.)$ "&'.-$ "&'+&$ "*'*)$ "-'))$
usband 5chool &'-. &',+ &'-. &'*. &'&- &'*, :*')0888 :+'(0
"&',.$ "&',.$ "&',.$ "&',*$ "&'*($ "&',-$ "&'+&$ "-'(*$
Wife 5chool &'-(8 &',- &',. :&'.)88 :&'-)88 &'-. &'*, &'0-
"&',,$ "&',&$ "&',-$ "&',&$ "&'*0$ "&',-$ "&'..$ "-'(,$
usband's Age :&'&, :&'&- &'&- &'&* :&'&, &'&* :&'&& &'.-8
"&'&,$ "&'&,$ "&'&,$ "&'&,$ "&'&,$ "&'&,$ "&'&+$ "&',.$
Wife's Age &'&. &'&- &'&- :&'&.8 &'&, &'&)88 :&'&. &'&2
"&'&-$ "&'&,$ "&'&,$ "&'&,$ "&'&,$ "&'&-$ "&'&+$ "&',,$
Total ousehold %and :&'&* &'&. :&'&+ :&'*.888 :&'**88 :&'&. :&'.0888 &'),
"&'&)$ "&'&+$ "&'&)$ "&'&+$ "&'&+$ "&'&+$ "&'*.$ "&'..$
:&'*- :&'.& &'-+ *'.,888 :&'0*8 :&'&, &')0 0'2-88
"&'.+$ "&'.,$ "&'.,$ "&'.)$ "&'-2$ "&'.)$ "&'2*$ "-'+-$
;bser<ations (=2-- (=2-- (=2-- (=2-- (=2-- (=2-- (=2-- (=2--
@:sCuared &'** &'&0 &'*- &'&.
@obust standard errors in parentheses
888 p>&'&*= 88 p>&'&+= 8 p>&'*
%og of per capita
e7penditures
Female /nherited %and 1
Total ousehold %and
Table +& 9atio of emale Inherited 5and to Total 1o%sehold 5and T 5andless E4cl%ded
*!
Female Inherited Land oer !ousehold Land " Lando%ners
"*$ ",$ "-$ ".$ "+$ ")$ "0$ "($
Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit
Female Male Female Male Child ousehold
#A@/A3%45 5chool 5chool 5chool Goods Goods Goods Goods Food
:&',&88 :&'&) :&'&2 :*'*.888 :&'&) :*'+,888 *'-0888 :('(2888
"&'&2$ "&'&($ "&'&2$ "&'&($ "&'&2$ "&'*,$ "&',($ "&'(($
%og of family si9e +'*,888 .'+(888 -'(,888 :*'+0888 :&'*. ,'2*888 *',0 :+'*(
"&')+$ "&')0$ "&')0$ "&'.($ "&'.+$ "&'+-$ "*',*$ "-'*0$
usband 5chool &'-& &',* &'-. &'&2 &'&* &'** :*'0(888 :.'+)
"&',.$ "&',.$ "&',.$ "&',*$ "&'*($ "&',-$ "&'+*$ "-'*&$
Wife 5chool &'-+ &',* &'*2 :&'.(88 :&'-288 &'-0 &'&0 :,'))
"&',,$ "&',&$ "&',-$ "&',&$ "&'*0$ "&',-$ "&'..$ "-'-,$
usband's Age :&'&, :&'&, &'&. &'&* :&'&* &'&, :&'&, &'*+
"&'&,$ "&'&,$ "&'&,$ "&'&,$ "&'&,$ "&'&,$ "&'&+$ "&',-$
Wife's Age &'&. &'&, &'&- :&'&.8 &'&* &'&+88 :&'&+ &'*,
"&'&,$ "&'&,$ "&'&,$ "&'&,$ "&'&,$ "&'&-$ "&'&+$ "&',&$
Total ousehold %and :&'&, &'&- :&'&+ :&'*.888 :&'**88 :&'&. :&'.2888 &',&
"&'&)$ "&'&+$ "&'&)$ "&'&+$ "&'&+$ "&'&+$ "&'*.$ "&',-$
:&'*- :&'.& &'-+ *'-2888 :&'0,8 :&'&& &'.0 :-'-+
"&'.+$ "&'.,$ "&'.*$ "&'.)$ "&'-2$ "&'.)$ "&'2*$ "-',+$
;bser<ations (=+,. (=+,. (=+,. (=+,. (=+,. (=+,. (=+,. (=+,.
@:sCuared &'** &'&0 &'*- &'&.
@obust standard errors in parentheses
888 p>&'&*= 88 p>&'&+= 8 p>&'*
%og of per capita
e7penditures
Female /nherited %and 1
Total ousehold %and
Table F& All emale 5and over Total 1o%sehold 5and
*#
All Female Land &er 'otal !ousehold Land " Full #am$le
"*$ "-$ "+$ "0$ "($ "2$ "*&$ "**$
Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit
Female Male Female Male Child ousehold
#A@/A3%45 5chool 5chool 5chool Goods Goods Goods Goods Food
:&',0888 :&'*& :&'*+ :*'*)888 :&'&) :*'.0888 *'--888 :('-*888
"&'&2$ "&'&($ "&'&2$ "&'&($ "&'&2$ "&'*,$ "&',0$ "*'&,$
%og of family si9e +'*+888 .'+0888 -'2(888 :*'+.888 &'&. ,'2,888 *'-+ :*&'2)888
"&'),$ "&').$ "&').$ "&'.)$ "&'.-$ "&'+&$ "*'*)$ "-'(*$
usband 5chool &'-. &',) &'-. &'*, &'&. &'*, :*')(888 :)'*,
"&',.$ "&',.$ "&',.$ "&',*$ "&'*($ "&',-$ "&'+&$ "-'(-$
Wife 5chool &'-(8 &',, &',. :&'.(88 :&'-+88 &'-. &'** &'&,
"&',,$ "&',&$ "&',-$ "&',&$ "&'*0$ "&',-$ "&'..$ "-'(+$
usband's Age :&'&, :&'&- &'&- &'&* :&'&, &'&* :&'&* &'+&88
"&'&,$ "&'&,$ "&'&,$ "&'&,$ "&'&,$ "&'&,$ "&'&+$ "&',+$
Wife's Age &'&. &'&- &'&- :&'&.8 &'&, &'&)88 :&'&. &'&2
"&'&-$ "&'&,$ "&'&,$ "&'&,$ "&'&,$ "&'&-$ "&'&+$ "&',-$
Total ousehold %and :&'&* &'&. :&'&+ :&'*-88 :&'**88 :&'&. :&'.0888 &')2
"&'&)$ "&'&+$ "&'&)$ "&'&+$ "&'&+$ "&'&+$ "&'*.$ "&'.)$
&'&* &'&. &'*& &'+(888 :&'+,888 &'&) &'-0 )'-0888
"&',)$ "&',-$ "&',0$ "&',,$ "&',&$ "&',.$ "&'+-$ "*').$
;bser<ations (=2-- (=2-- (=2-- (=2-- (=2-- (=2-- (=2-- (=2--
@:sCuared &'** &'&0 &'*- &'&.
@obust standard errors in parentheses
888 p>&'&*= 88 p>&'&+= 8 p>&'*
%og of per capita
e7penditures
Total female land1 Total
h land
Table )& Women 5i.ely Inherited Under the S%ccession 5a-
**
Likely Inherited After La% Passed #am$le
"*$ "-$ "+$ "0$ "($ "2$ "*&$ "**$
Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit
Female Male Female Male Child ousehold
#A@/A3%45 5chool 5chool 5chool Goods Goods Goods Goods Food
:&'-+888 :&'-*888 :&'*, :*'*&888 &'&, :*'**888 *'-,888 :0'+-888
"&'&2$ "&'**$ "&'&($ "&'*,$ "&'*)$ "&'&2$ "&'.&$ "*')+$
%og of family si9e ,'--888 ,'0.888 *'),888 :-'&)888 :&'+- -',,888 .'),88 :2'.,8
"&'++$ "&')-$ "&'.,$ "&'0*$ "&'00$ "&')&$ ",'-*$ "+')2$
usband 5chool &'*. &',- &'*2 &'*- &',) &'-+ :,'.-88 :*&'228
"&',.$ "&',($ "&'*2$ "&'-+$ "&'-&$ "&',+$ "&'2($ ")',&$
Wife 5chool &',0 &'*+ &',( :&',2 :&'.. &'-0 &'&+ .'+0
"&',,$ "&',+$ "&',*$ "&'--$ "&'-*$ "&',-$ "&'02$ ")'&*$
usband's Age &'&& :&'&- &'&. :&'&. :&'&. &'&+8 :&'&2 &'+&
"&'&-$ "&'&,$ "&'&-$ "&'&.$ "&'&-$ "&'&-$ "&'&2$ "&'.($
Wife's Age &'*.888 &'*0888 &'&+ :&'&0 &'&) &'&* :&'*) &'.&
"&'&.$ "&'&+$ "&'&.$ "&'&+$ "&'&+$ "&'&.$ "&'*-$ "&'+0$
Total ousehold %and :&'&) :&'&, :&'&+ :&'*)8 :&'**8 :&'&( :&'.+888 &'.(
"&'&+$ "&'&+$ "&'&.$ "&'&2$ "&'&)$ "&'&0$ "&'*0$ "&'-+$
&')& &')+ &'-- *',08 :&')* :&'-+ *'(+ ('+0
"&'-2$ "&'..$ "&'-*$ "&'0-$ "&')&$ "&'.)$ "*'+,$ "+'))$
;bser<ations .=*)* .=*)* .=*)* .=*)* .=*)* .=*)* .=*)* .=*)*
@:sCuared &'*, &'&) &'*& &'&+
@obust standard errors in parentheses
888 p>&'&*= 88 p>&'&+= 8 p>&'*
%og of per capita
e7penditures
Female /nherited %and 1
Total ousehold %and
Table "$& emale Inherited 5and over Male Inherited 5and
*B
Female Inherited Land oer Male Inherited Land " Lando%ners
"*$ "-$ "+$ "0$ "($ "2$ "*&$ "**$
Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit
Female Male Female Male Child ousehold
#A@/A3%45 5chool 5chool 5chool Goods Goods Goods Goods Food
:&'&2 &'&+ :&'&, :*'&*888 :&'** :*'.+888 &'.2 :*+'))888
"&'*,$ "&'*,$ "&'**$ "&'**$ "&'*,$ "&'**$ "&'-*$ "*'0-$
%og of family si9e )'*.888 +'0-888 .'&0888 :*'&28 :&'.0 ,'*)888 *'(. +'&0
"&'2($ "*'&)$ "&'2.$ "&')+$ "&')&$ "&')2$ "*'.)$ "2'+,$
usband 5chool &'&* &'&( &'*, &'.& :&'&0 &'*, :*'2,888 :.'-,
"&'-&$ "&'--$ "&',2$ "&',0$ "&',-$ "&',($ "&')+$ ".')-$
Wife 5chool &'.08 &'*) &'.& :&'0)888 :&',. &'&* &'*( 0'&(
"&',0$ "&',($ "&',)$ "&',+$ "&',,$ "&',)$ "&'+-$ ".'),$
usband's Age :&'&+ :&'&+ &'&* &'&* :&'&& :&'&& :&'&& &'&(
"&'&-$ "&'&-$ "&'&-$ "&'&-$ "&'&-$ "&'&-$ "&'&)$ "&'.)$
Wife's Age &'&+ &'&* &'&+ :&'&(888 &'&. &'*&888 :&'&, :&'.(
"&'&.$ "&'&.$ "&'&.$ "&'&-$ "&'&,$ "&'&-$ "&'&)$ "&'.&$
Total ousehold %and :&'&+ :&'&& :&'&0 :&'&28 :&'&) &'&+ :&'-0888 :&'*088
"&'&0$ "&'&0$ "&'&)$ "&'&+$ "&'&.$ "&'&+$ "&'*-$ "&'&($
:&')0 :&',+ :&'., :&'*& :&'0+888 :&'*) *'),8 :*--',2888
"&'0)$ "&'+($ "&'))$ "&'-&$ "&',($ "&'.2$ "&'(.$ ".&',,$
;bser<ations +=,++ +=,++ +=,++ +=,++ +=,++ +=,++ +=,++ +=,++
@:sCuared &'*& &'&( &'*- &'&.
@obust standard errors in parentheses
888 p>&'&*= 88 p>&'&+= 8 p>&'*
%og of per capita
e7penditures
Female /nherited %and1
Male /nherited %and
Table ""& emale Inherited 5and over Total Inherited 5and

*?
Female Inherited Land oer 'otal Inherited Land " Lando%ners
"*$ ",$ "-$ ".$ "+$ ")$ "0$ "($
Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit
Female Male Female Male Child ousehold
#A@/A3%45 5chool 5chool 5chool Goods Goods Goods Goods Food
:&'*. &'&+ :&'&2 :*'&)888 :&'&, :*'.0888 &'+-8 :*+'&*888
"&'**$ "&'**$ "&'*&$ "&'*&$ "&'**$ "&'*&$ "&'-*$ "*'+-$
%og of family si9e )'*.888 +'.2888 .'-,888 :*',088 :&'*) ,',,888 *'-* *&'+*8
"&'()$ "&'2-$ "&'(-$ "&')-$ "&'+0$ "&')+$ "*'-.$ "+'))$
usband 5chool &'&* &'&( &'*. &',( :&'&. &'** :,'&&888 :*'+)
"&',2$ "&'-&$ "&',($ "&',)$ "&',,$ "&',)$ "&')&$ ".'.-$
Wife 5chool &'+,88 &',) &'-( :&'))888 :&',0 &'*2 &',) -'2&
"&',)$ "&',+$ "&',+$ "&',.$ "&',*$ "&',+$ "&'.2$ "-'0-$
usband's Age :&'&+8 :&'&+8 &'&, &'&, :&'&, :&'&& &'&* :&'-2
"&'&-$ "&'&-$ "&'&-$ "&'&-$ "&'&-$ "&'&-$ "&'&)$ "&'-)$
Wife's Age &'&- &'&* &'&- :&'&088 &'&- &'&2888 :&'&. :&',-
"&'&-$ "&'&-$ "&'&-$ "&'&-$ "&'&,$ "&'&-$ "&'&)$ "&',0$
Total ousehold %and :&'&. &'&& :&'&+ :&'&288 :&'&(88 &'&+ :&'-2888 :&'*2888
"&'&0$ "&'&)$ "&'&)$ "&'&+$ "&'&.$ "&'&+$ "&'*.$ "&'&0$
:&'&- :&'** &',, &'),88 :&'02888 &'*- :&'-0 :**'.+888
"&'-.$ "&'-,$ "&'--$ "&'-*$ "&',0$ "&'-*$ "&').$ ",'0)$
;bser<ations )=&,- )=&,- )=&,- )=&,- )=&,- )=&,- )=&,- )=&,-
@:sCuared &'&2 &'&( &'*- &'&.
@obust standard errors in parentheses
888 p>&'&*= 88 p>&'&+= 8 p>&'*
%og of per capita
e7penditures
Female /nherited %and1
Total /nherited %and
Table "!& All Male 5and over Total 1o%sehold 5and
*+
All Male Land oer !ousehold Land " Lando%ners
"*$ ",$ "-$ ".$ "+$ ")$ "0$ "($
Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit
Female Male Female Male Child ousehold
#A@/A3%45 5chool 5chool 5chool Goods Goods Goods Goods Food
:&',&88 :&'&+ :&'&2 :*'*0888 :&'&. :*'+,888 *'-0888 :('))888
"&'&2$ "&'&($ "&'&2$ "&'&($ "&'*&$ "&'*,$ "&',($ "&'(+$
%og of family si9e +'*-888 .'+2888 -'(,888 :*')&888 :&'&2 ,'(2888 *',2 :*',)
"&')+$ "&')0$ "&'))$ "&'.($ "&'.+$ "&'+-$ "*',*$ "-'*($
usband 5chool &'-& &',* &'-. &'&( &'&, &'** :*'0(888 :.'&+
"&',.$ "&',.$ "&',.$ "&',*$ "&'*($ "&',-$ "&'+*$ ",'2)$
Wife 5chool &'-+ &',* &'*2 :&'+&88 :&'-088 &'-0 &'&0 :,'*)
"&',,$ "&',&$ "&',-$ "&',&$ "&'*0$ "&',-$ "&'..$ "-'*&$
usband's Age :&'&, :&'&, &'&. &'&* :&'&* &'&* :&'&* &'&*
"&'&,$ "&'&,$ "&'&,$ "&'&,$ "&'&,$ "&'&,$ "&'&+$ "&',*$
Wife's Age &'&. &'&, &'&- :&'&.8 &'&* &'&+88 :&'&+ &'*.
"&'&,$ "&'&,$ "&'&,$ "&'&,$ "&'&,$ "&'&-$ "&'&+$ "&'*($
Total ousehold %and :&'&, &'&- :&'&+ :&'*.888 :&'*,88 :&'&- :&'.2888 &'&.
"&'&)$ "&'&+$ "&'&)$ "&'&+$ "&'&+$ "&'&+$ "&'*.$ "&'*0$
Male land1 Total hh land &'&0 &'&+ :&'&, :&'+2888 &'),888 :&'*2 &'&0 2'*.888
"&',)$ "&',-$ "&',)$ "&',-$ "&',&$ "&',+$ "&'++$ "*'+,$
;bser<ations (=+,. (=+,. (=+,. (=+,. (=+,. (=+,. (=+,. (=+,.
@:sCuared &'** &'&0 &'*- &'&.
@obust standard errors in parentheses
888 p>&'&*= 88 p>&'&+= 8 p>&'*
%og of per capita
e7penditures
Table "#& Male Inherited 5and over Total 1o%sehold 5and
*F
Male Inherited Land oer !ousehold Land " Lando%ners
"*$ ",$ "-$ ".$ "+$ ")$ "0$ "($
Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit
Female Male Female Male Child ousehold
#A@/A3%45 5chool 5chool 5chool Goods Goods Goods Goods Food
:&',&88 :&'&) :&'&2 :*'*-888 :&'&* :*'+*888 *'.&888 :('-+888
"&'&2$ "&'&($ "&'&2$ "&'&2$ "&'*&$ "&'*-$ "&',2$ "&'(.$
%og of family si9e +'**888 .'+0888 -'(.888 :*'.0888 :&'&+ ,'2*888 *'-) :,'&)
"&').$ "&')0$ "&'))$ "&'.2$ "&'.+$ "&'+,$ "*',*$ "-'&0$
usband 5chool &'-& &',* &'-. &'&0 :&'&& &'** :*'02888 :.'*0
"&',.$ "&',.$ "&',.$ "&',*$ "&'*($ "&',-$ "&'+*$ ",'2($
Wife 5chool &'-+ &',& &',& :&'.088 :&'-+88 &'-0 &'*& :&'*,
"&',,$ "&',&$ "&',-$ "&',&$ "&'*0$ "&',-$ "&'..$ "-'*&$
usband's Age :&'&, :&'&, &'&. &'&* :&'&* &'&, :&'&* &'&2
"&'&,$ "&'&,$ "&'&,$ "&'&,$ "&'&,$ "&'&,$ "&'&+$ "&',*$
Wife's Age &'&. &'&, &'&- :&'&+88 &'&* &'&+88 :&'&+ &'&0
"&'&,$ "&'&,$ "&'&,$ "&'&,$ "&'&,$ "&'&-$ "&'&+$ "&'*($
Total ousehold %and :&'&, &'&- :&'&+ :&'*+888 :&'**88 :&'&. :&'.2888 &'*(
"&'&)$ "&'&+$ "&'&)$ "&'&+$ "&'&+$ "&'&+$ "&'*.$ "&',&$
:&'&+ :&'*- &'** &'++88 &'2.888 &'&) &')) *-'(-888
"&',)$ "&',+$ "&',+$ "&',-$ "&'*2$ "&',)$ "&'+-$ ",'.)$
;bser<ations (=+,. (=+,. (=+,. (=+,. (=+,. (=+,. (=+,. (=+,.
@:sCuared &'** &'&( &'*- &'&.
@obust standard errors in parentheses
888 p>&'&*= 88 p>&'&+= 8 p>&'*
%og of per capita
e7penditures
Male inherited land 1
Total hh land
Table "*& 3%d2et Shares Affected by H1i2h InheritanceI Districts
*)
(udget #hare Affected (y )!igh Inheritance) *istricts
"*$ "-$ "+$ "0$ "($ "2$ "*&$ "**$
Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit
Female Male Female Male Child ousehold
#A@/A3%45 5chool 5chool 5chool Goods Goods Goods Goods Food
%og of per capita e7penditures &'&- &'*& &'*, :*',*888 :&'*, :*'+&888 *'-*888 2',0888
"&'&2$ "&'&($ "&'&2$ "&'&($ "&'&2$ "&'*,$ "&',)$ "&'2*$
%og of family si9e +',0888 .'))888 -'2+888 :*'+&888 :&'-, ,'0*888 *'*2 **'.-88
"&')+$ "&'))$ "&')0$ "&'.2$ "&'..$ "&'+-$ "*',&$ "+'))$
usband 5chool &',. &'*0 &',0 &'&2 &'&) &'*, :*'00888 :-'-,
"&',+$ "&',.$ "&',.$ "&',*$ "&'*($ "&',-$ "&'+*$ "-',*$
Wife 5chool &'-08 &',0 &'*) :&'++888 :&'.&88 &'-& &',( *,'*2888
"&',,$ "&',&$ "&',-$ "&',&$ "&'*0$ "&',-$ "&'..$ "-'**$
usband's Age :&'&* :&'&, &'&.8 &'&* :&'&, &'&, :&'&* &'0+888
"&'&,$ "&'&,$ "&'&,$ "&'&,$ "&'&,$ "&'&-$ "&'&+$ "&',($
Wife's Age &'&, &'&* &'&, :&'&.8 &'&, &'&)88 :&'&+ :&'*-
"&'&,$ "&'&,$ "&'&,$ "&'&,$ "&'&,$ "&'&-$ "&'&+$ "&'-*$
Total ousehold %and :&'&( :&'&& :&'**8 :&'*.888 :&'*&88 :&'&* :&'..888 :&'*0
"&'&)$ "&'&)$ "&'&0$ "&'&+$ "&'&.$ "&'&+$ "&'*,$ "&'(-$
igh /nheritance !istrict6 *'.+888 *',&888 &'2-888 :&'*) &'*( :*'*.888 *'-(888 :,).'*(
"&',0$ "&',($ "&',+$ "&',-$ "&'*2$ "&',.$ "&'+-$ "&'&&$
;bser<ations (=+,. (=+,. (=+,. (=+,. (=+,. (=+,. (=+,. (=+,.
@:sCuared &'&( &'&+ &'*, &'&,
@obust standard errors in parentheses
888 p>&'&*= 88 p>&'&+= 8 p>&'*
Table "B& ! Sta2e 5east S=%ares Estimation %sin2 H1i2h InheritanceI Districts as Instr%ment
B$
I+ " (udget #hare Affected (y )!igh Inheritance) *istricts
"*$ ",$ "-$ ".$ "+$ ")$ "0$ "($
Female Male Female Male Child ousehold
#A@/A3%45 5chool 5chool 5chool Goods Goods Goods Goods Food
:&'*0888 :&'&(888 :&'&2888 :*',.888 :&'&2 :*'0&888 *'+)888 :&'&+
"&'&.$ "&'&-$ "&'&-$ "&'*&$ "&'*&$ "&'*)$ "&'-*$ "&'&($
%og of family si9e &'2*888 &'+.888 &'-08 :*'.&888 :&'., -'-)888 &'.& &'*,
"&',($ "&'*)$ "&',&$ "&'+,$ "&'.)$ "&')+$ "*'-.$ "&'.0$
usband 5chool &'*+ &'&0 &'&( &'&) &'&2 :&'&0 :*'+-888 :&'.-8
"&'*&$ "&'&0$ "&'&0$ "&',,$ "&'*($ "&',0$ "&'++$ "&',.$
Wife 5chool &',,88 &'*)88 &'&) :&'++888 :&'.&88 &',( &'-* &',)
"&'*&$ "&'&)$ "&'&0$ "&',&$ "&'*($ "&',)$ "&'.0$ "&'*($
usband's Age &'&& :&'&& &'&* &'&* :&'&, &'&- :&'&- &'&)88
"&'&*$ "&'&*$ "&'&*$ "&'&,$ "&'&,$ "&'&-$ "&'&+$ "&'&,$
Wife's Age &'&,8 &'&,88 &'&& :&'&+88 &'&, &'&- :&'&- :&'&&
"&'&*$ "&'&*$ "&'&*$ "&'&,$ "&'&,$ "&'&-$ "&'&+$ "&'&-$
Total ousehold %and &'&& &'&, :&'&, :&'*+888 :&'&288 :&'&0 :&'-)888 &'&&
"&'&,$ "&'&,$ "&'&*$ "&'&+$ "&'&.$ "&'&0$ "&'*,$ "&'&($
-'(&8 ,'0*8 *'&2 :,')* ,'2. :*(')2888 ,,'0+88 :*.'00888
",'&)$ "*'++$ "*',0$ "-'(0$ "-',,$ ".'0-$ "2'-0$ ",'+)$
;bser<ations (=+,. (=+,. (=+,. (=+,. (=+,. (=+,. (=+,. (=+,.
@:sCuared &'&. &'&0 &'&.
@obust standard errors in parentheses
888 p>&'&*= 88 p>&'&+= 8 p>&'*
%og of per capita
e7penditures
Female /nherited %and 1
Total ousehold %and
Table "?& H1i2h Kno-led2eI Districts 7rediction of 5and Inheritance
B"
Affects of )!igh KNo%ledge) *istricts on Female Land Inheritance
"*$ ",$
?robit ;%5
#A@/A3%45 /nherited %and Aes1Bo 5i9e of /nherited ?arcels
igh Fnowledge !istrict6 &'*-88 &'&*
"&'&0$ "&'&*$
%og of per capita e7penditures :&'&)8 &'&&
"&'&-$ "&'&&$
%og of family si9e &'*, &'&,88
"&'&2$ "&'&*$
usband 5chool :&'&. &'&*
"&'&2$ "&'&*$
Wife 5chool &'&& :&'&*
"&'&($ "&'&*$
usband's Age &'&& :&'&&
"&'&&$ "&'&&$
Wife's Age &'&* &'&&88
"&'&&$ "&'&&$
Total ousehold %and :&'&. &'&*
"&'&.$ "&'&&$
;bser<ations .=,+* .=,+*
@:sCuared &'&,
@obust standard errors in parentheses
888 p>&'&*= 88 p>&'&+= 8 p>&'*
Table "+& ! Sta2e 5east S=%ares Estimation %sin2 H1i2h Kno-led2eI Districts as Instr%ment
B!
I+ " (udget #hare Affected (y )!igh Kno%ledge) *istricts
"*$ ",$ "-$ ".$ "+$ ")$ "0$ "($
Female Male Female Male Child ousehold
#A@/A3%45 5chool 5chool 5chool Goods Goods Goods Goods Food
)'+0 *'&* +'+) :.(',* :.*'.+8 --'() +*'*- (,'&(8
"0'*2$ "-'++$ "+'0,$ ",2'2-$ ",.'&($ ",0'&,$ ".*'+,$ ".)')0$
:&'&2 :&'*&8 &'&* :,'&&888 :&'0.88 :*'&.888 *'2-888 *',+8
"&'**$ "&'&)$ "&'&($ "&'.*$ "&'-+$ "&'-,$ "&'))$ "&').$
%og of family si9e &'), &'++88 &'&0 &'-+ &'2+ *'-. :&'0. :.'.*
"&'+.$ "&',)$ "&'..$ "*'2($ "*'+2$ "*'+0$ ",'(&$ ",'2+$
usband 5chool &'&2 &'&, &'&( :&'&- :&'.2 &'0+ :&'(. &'*&
"&'*0$ "&'*&$ "&'*,$ "&'0+$ "&'),$ "&'))$ "&'20$ "*'*($
Wife 5chool &',. &'*08 &'&( :&'.) :&')* &',* :&'** &'2)
"&'*0$ "&'&2$ "&'*-$ "&')($ "&'+)$ "&')*$ "&'(2$ "*'&0$
usband's Age :&'&& :&'&* &'&& &'&( &'&) :&'&2 :&'*& :&'&+
"&'&,$ "&'&*$ "&'&*$ "&'&($ "&'&)$ "&'&)$ "&'**$ "&'**$
Wife's Age &'&- &'&* &'&* :&'&) &'&* &'*&8 &'&* &'&2
"&'&,$ "&'&*$ "&'&*$ "&'&)$ "&'&+$ "&'&+$ "&'&($ "&'*&$
Total ousehold %and :&'&& :&'&& &'&& :&',08 :&'*) &'&+ :&'-& &'-)
"&'&-$ "&'&,$ "&'&,$ "&'*+$ "&'**$ "&'*&$ "&',*$ "&',-$
;bser<ations .=,+* .=,+* .=,+* .=,+* .=,+* .=,+* .=,+* .=,+*
@:sCuared &'&.
@obust standard errors in parentheses
888 p>&'&*= 88 p>&'&+= 8 p>&'*
Female /nherited %and 1
Total ousehold %and
%og of per capita
e7penditures
%ll (hart of i2%re !&
B#
B*