[G.R. No. 133858.

August 12, 2003]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. HERMINIANO SATORRE @ EMIANO SATORRE, appellant.
D E C I S I O N
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J .:
Appellant Herminiano Satorre alias Emiano Satorre was charged with Murder in an information which reads:
That on or about the 25
th
day of May, 1997 at 2:00 oclock dawn, more or less, in Sitio Kamari, Barangay Calidngan, Municipality of
Carcar, Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to kill,
with the use of .38 paltik revolver and by means of treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack and shoot ROMERO PANTILGAN, hitting the latter at the head which caused his instantaneous death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
[1]

On arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty. Trial on the merits then ensued.
Gliceria Saraum, wife of the victim Romero Pantilgan, testified that at 2:00 a.m. of May 25, 1997, she and her two
children were asleep inside the house of her parents at Tagaytay, Calidngan, Carcar, Cebu. Her mother, Florida Saraum,
was also in the house. Her husband, Romero, went out to attend a fiesta. While she was asleep, she was awakened by a
gunshot. Gliceria got up and went out to the porch, where she found her dead husband lying on the ground. Blood oozed
out of a gunshot wound on his head.
Rufino Abayata, a barangay kagawad, testified that around 7:00 a.m. of May 25, 1997, his fellow barangay
kagawad, Pio Alvarado, fetched him from his house and, together, they went to verify a report regarding a dead person on
the porch of the Saraum residence. Upon confirming the incident, they reported the matter to the Carcar Police. Rufino
further narrated that appellants father, Abraham Satorre, informed them that it was appellant who shot Pantilgan. They
looked for appellant in the house of his brother, Felix Satorre, at Dumlog, Talisay, Cebu, but were told that he already
left. Nevertheless, appellants brothers, Margarito and Rosalio Satorre, went to Rufinos house and surrendered the gun
which was allegedly used in killing Pantilgan.
Flavio Gelle narrated that he accompanied appellant and his father, Abraham, to the Barangay Captain of Can-
asohan, Carcar, Cebu where appellant admitted killing Pantilgan. Thereafter, appellant was detained.
Corroborating Gelles story, Cynthia Castaares, Barangay Captain of Can-asuhan, Carcar, Cebu testified that
Abraham Satorre and Gelle brought appellant to her residence where he confessed having killed Pantilgan. Appellant
allegedly informed her that he killed Pantilgan because the latter struck him with a piece of wood. That same evening, she
went to the Carcar Police Station with appellant where she executed an affidavit. She further averred that appellant
voluntarily narrated that he killed Pantilgan with the use of a handgun which he wrestled from his possession.
Dr. Plebia Villanueva, Municipal Health Officer of Carcar, Cebu certified that the cause of Pantilgans death was
gunshot wound.
[2]

Bonifacio Ayag, NBI Ballistician, testified that the deformed bullet taken from Pantilgans head wound was fired from
the gun surrendered by appellants brothers to the Carcar Police.
[3]

Denying the charges against him, appellant claimed that he was asleep inside his house at the time of the
incident. He alleged that Rufino Abayata had a grudge against him because of an incident when he tied Rufinos cow to
prevent it from eating the corn in his farm. He denied having confessed to the killing of Pantilgan. He disclaimed ownership
over the paltik .38 revolver and stated that he could not even remember having surrendered a firearm to Castaares.
Abraham Satorre corroborated appellants testimony. He denied having accompanied appellant to Castaares house
to surrender him.
Appellants brother, Rosalio Satorre, claimed that he never accompanied appellant to Castaares house to
surrender. His other brother, Felix, also testified that he never surrendered any firearm to anybody.
After trial, the court a quo gave credence to the prosecutions evidence and rendered a decision convicting appellant of
Murder,
[4]
the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, accused Herminiano Satorre is found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder and is hereby imposed the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA, with accessory penalties of the
law; to indemnify the heirs of Romero Pantilgan in the sum of P50,000.00 and to pay the costs. The accused is, however, credited in full
during the whole period of his detention provided he will signify in writing that he will abide by all the rules and regulations of the
penitentiary.
SO ORDERED.
Appellant interposed this appeal, contending that the trial court erred: (1) in giving full faith and credence to the
testimonies of prosecution witnesses; (2) in proceeding with the trial of the instant case amounting to lack of due process
provided by law due to its denial of accuseds motion for preliminary investigation or reinvestigation; and (3) in rejecting the
testimony of the defenses witnesses.
The appeal has merit.
In particular, appellant claims that his alleged confession or admission, which was concocted by the Barangay
Captain, is inadmissible in evidence for being hearsay and for being obtained without a competent and independent counsel
of his choice. In effect, the quantum of evidence adduced by the prosecution was not sufficient to overcome the
constitutional presumption of innocence. The bare allegation that he confessed or admitted killing Romero Pantilgan is not
proof of guilt.
Rule 130, Section 26 of the Rules of Court defines an admission as an act, declaration or omission of a party as to a
relevant fact. A confession, on the other hand, under Section 33 of the same Rule is the declaration of an accused
acknowledging his guilt of the offense charged, or of any offense necessarily included therein. Both may be given in
evidence against the person admitting or confessing. On the whole, a confession, as distinguished from an admission, is a
declaration made at any time by a person, voluntarily and without compulsion or inducement, stating or acknowledging that
he had committed or participated in the commission of a crime.
[5]

Evidently, appellants alleged declaration owning up to the killing before the Barangay Captain was a
confession. Since the declaration was not put in writing and made out of court, it is an oral extrajudicial confession.
The nexus that connects appellant to the killing was his alleged oral extrajudicial confession given to Barangay
Captain Cynthia Castaares and two barangay kagawads. According to the trial court, their testimonies were positive and
convincing. Appellants retraction of his oral extrajudicial confession should not be given much credence in the assessment
of evidence. However, appellant disputes the admissibility and sufficiency of the testimonial evidence offered to prove the
alleged oral extrajudicial confession.
There is no question as to the admissibility of appellants alleged oral extrajudicial confession. Indeed, as far as
admissibility is concerned, Rule 130, Section 33 of the Rules of Court makes no distinction whether the confession is judicial
or extrajudicial.
The rationale for the admissibility of a confession is that if it is made freely and voluntarily, a confession constitutes
evidence of a high order since it is supported by the strong presumption that no sane person or one of normal mind will
deliberately and knowingly confess himself to be the perpetrator of a crime, unless prompted by truth and conscience.
[6]

Accordingly, the basic test for the validity of a confession is was it voluntarily and freely made. The term voluntary
means that the accused speaks of his free will and accord, without inducement of any kind, and with a full and complete
knowledge of the nature and consequences of the confession, and when the speaking is so free from influences affecting
the will of the accused, at the time the confession was made, that it renders it admissible in evidence against him.
[7]
Plainly,
the admissibility of a confession in evidence hinges on its voluntariness.
The voluntariness of a confession may be inferred from its language such that if, upon its face, the confession exhibits
no suspicious circumstances tending to cast doubt upon its integrity, it being replete with details which could only be
supplied by the accused reflecting spontaneity and coherence, it may be considered voluntary.
[8]
The problem with
appraising voluntariness occurs when the confession is an oral extrajudicial confession because the proof of voluntariness
cannot be inferred from the testimony of a witness who allegedly heard the confessant since there is no written proof that
such confession was voluntarily made. Neither can the confessant be appraised by the court since, precisely, it was made
outside the judicial proceeding. The problem posed therefore by an oral extrajudicial confession is not only the admissibility
of the testimony asserting or certifying that such confession was indeed made, but more significantly whether it was made
voluntarily.
On the question of whether a confession is made voluntarily, the age, character, and circumstances prevailing at the
time it was made must be considered. Much depends upon the situation and surroundings of the accused. This is the
position taken by the courts, whatever the theory of exclusion of incriminating statements may be. The intelligence of the
accused or want of it must also be taken into account. It must be shown that the defendant realized the import of his act.
[9]

In the case at bar, appellant was a 19-year old farmer who did not even finish first grade. Granting that he made the
confession in the presence of Barangay Captain Castaares, he may not have realized the full import of his confession and
its consequences. This is not to say that he is not capable of making the confession out of a desire to tell the truth if
prompted by his conscience. What we are saying is that due to the aforesaid personal circumstances of appellant, the
voluntariness of his alleged oral confession may not be definitively appraised and evaluated.
At any rate, an extrajudicial confession forms but a prima facie case against the party by whom it is made. Such
confessions are not conclusive proof of that which they state; it may be proved that they were uttered in ignorance, or levity,
or mistake; and hence, they are, at best, to be regarded as only cumulative proof which affords but a precarious support and
on which, when uncorroborated, a verdict cannot be permitted to rest.
[10]

Main prosecution witness Castaares testified that after appellants alleged oral confession, she brought the latter to
the office of the police at the Municipal Hall of Carcar, Cebu.
[11]
At the police station, Castaares was investigated, after
which she executed her sworn statement.
[12]
Also at the police station, appellant allegedly admitted before policemen that he
killed Pantilgan.
[13]
His statement was not taken nor was his confession reduced into writing. This circumstance alone casts
some doubt on the prosecutions account that appellant freely and voluntarily confessed killing Pantilgan. It raises questions
not only as to the voluntariness of the alleged confession, but also on whether appellant indeed made an oral confession.
To be sure, a confession is not required to be in any particular form. It may be oral or written, formal or informal in
character. It may be recorded on video tape, sound motion pictures, or tape.
[14]
However, while not required to be in writing
to be admissible in evidence, it is advisable, if not otherwise recorded by video tape or other means, to reduce the
confession to writing. This adds weight to the confession and helps convince the court that it was freely and voluntarily
made. If possible the confession, after being reduced to writing, should be read to the defendant, have it read by defendant,
have him sign it, and have it attested by witnesses.
[15]

The trial court gave credence to appellants oral extrajudicial confession relying on jurisprudence which we find are not
applicable. In the cases cited by the trial court,
[16]
the convictions were based on circumstantial evidence in addition to the
appellants confessions, or the extrajudicial confessions were reduced to writing and were replete with details which only
appellants could have supplied. In the case at bar, however, there was no circumstantial evidence to corroborate the
extrajudicial confession of appellant. More importantly, the said confession does not contain details which could have only
been known to appellant.
Furthermore, the events alleged in the confession are inconsistent with the physical evidence. According to Barangay
Captain Castaares, appellant narrated to her that during the struggle between him and the deceased, he fell to the ground
after the latter hit him on the head with a piece of wood. In the autopsy report, however, Dr. Plebia Villanueva found that the
entrance wound on the deceased was located at the top of the head or the crown, indicating that the victim was probably
lying down when he was shot.
[17]

Indeed, an extrajudicial confession will not support a conviction where it is uncorroborated. There must be such
corroboration that, when considered in connection with confession, will show the guilt of accused beyond a reasonable
doubt. Circumstantial evidence may be sufficient corroboration of a confession. It is not necessary that the supplementary
evidence be entirely free from variance with the extrajudicial confession, or that it show the place of offense or the
defendants identity or criminal agency. All facts and circumstances attending the particular offense charged are admissible
to corroborate extrajudicial confession.
[18]

Nonetheless, the fatal gun and the slug extracted from Pantilgans brain can not be considered as corroborative
evidence. While the slug embedded in Pantilgans brain came from the fatal gun, the prosecution was not able to
conclusively establish the ownership of the gun other than the bare testimony of prosecution witnesses that appellants
brothers surrendered the gun to them. This was denied by appellant and his brothers and there was no other proof linking
the gun to him.
On the whole, it appears that the trial court simply based appellants conviction on the testimonial evidence of
prosecution witnesses that appellant orally owned up to the killing. We cannot affirm appellants conviction on mere
testimonial evidence, considering that the voluntariness of said confession cannot be conclusively established because of
appellants personal circumstances and the failure of the police to reduce the alleged oral confession into writing. The
doubts surrounding the alleged oral confession, the conduct of the investigation as well as the inapplicable jurisprudential
precedents cited by the trial court do not lead to the same moral certainty of appellants guilt.
To conclude, it must be stressed that in our criminal justice system, the overriding consideration is not whether the
court doubts the innocence of the accused, but whether it entertains a reasonable doubt as to their guilt. Where there is no
moral certainty as to their guilt, they must be acquitted even though their innocence may be questionable. The constitutional
right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty can be overthrown only by proof beyond reasonable doubt.
[19]
In fact,
unless the prosecution discharges the burden of proving the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, the latter need
not even offer evidence in his behalf.
[20]

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, Cebu City, convicting
appellant Herminiano Satorre alias Emiano Satorre of Murder and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and to indemnify the heirs in the amount of P50,000.00 as well as costs, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. For lack
of evidence to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt, appellant Herminiano Satorre alias Emiano Satorre is ACQUITTED
and is ordered immediately RELEASED from confinement, unless he is lawfully held in custody for another cause.
SO ORDERED.
Vitug, Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), dissent, guilt of the appellant was proved beyond reasonable doubt.







[G.R. No. 144293. December 4, 2002]











JOSUE R. LADIANA, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
D E C I S I O N
PANGANIBAN, J .:
The Constitution bars the admission in evidence of any statement extracted by the police from the accused without the
assistance of competent and independent counsel during a custodial investigation. However, a counter-affidavit voluntarily
presented by the accused during the preliminary investigation, even if made without the assistance of counsel, may be used
as evidence against the affiant.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the April 10, 2000 Decision
[1]
and
August 4, 2000 Resolution
[2]
of the Sandiganbayan (First Division) in Criminal Case No. 16988. The dispositive portion of
the assailed Decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused JOSUE R. LADIANA GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
homicide and, in the absence of any modifying circumstance, sentencing the said accused to: (a) suffer an indeterminate sentence of
imprisonment of ten (10) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal, as
maximum[;] (b) suffer all the appropriate accessory penalties consequent thereto; (c) indemnify the heirs of the victim, Francisco San
Juan, in the total amount of Fifty Six Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P56,500.00); and (d) pay the costs.
[3]

The assailed Resolution denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.
Petitioner was originally charged with murder before the Sandiganbayan in an Information
[4]
dated August 5,
1991. However, the anti-graft court issued an Order
[5]
dated October 14, 1991, noting that besides the allegation that the
crime was allegedly committed by the accused while he was taking advantage of his official position, nothing else is in the
Information to indicate this fact so that, as the Information stands, nothing except a conclusion of fact exists to vest
jurisdiction [in] this Court over the accused and over the crime for which he is charged.
Further, the Order gave the government sufficient time to amend the Information to show adequate facts to vest the
Sandiganbayan with jurisdiction over the case. Subsequently, an Amended Information,
[6]
still charging petitioner with
murder, was filed on April 1, 1992. The accusatory portion reads as follows:
That on or about the 29
th
day of December 1989, in the Municipality of Lumban, Laguna, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, a public officer, being then a member of the Integrated National Police (INP now PNP)
assigned at the Lumban Police Station, Lumban, Laguna, acting in relation to his duty which is primarily to enforce peace and order
within his jurisdiction, taking advantage of his official position confronted Francisco San Juan why the latter was removing the steel
pipes which were previously placed to serve as barricade to prevent the entry of vehicles along P. Jacinto Street, Barangay Salac,
Lumban, Laguna, purposely to insure the safety of persons passing along the said street and when Francisco San Juan told the accused
that the latter has no business in stopping him, said accused who was armed with a firearm, with intent to kill and with treachery, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack and sho[o]t Francisco San Juan with the firearm hitting Francisco San Juan at
his head and neck inflicting upon him fatal wounds thereby causing the death of Francisco San Juan.
[7]

During his arraignment on May 8, 1992, petitioner, assisted by his counsel de parte,
[8]
pled not guilty.
[9]
After due trial,
the Sandiganbayan found him guilty of homicide, not murder.
The Facts
In their Memoranda, both the prosecution and the defense substantially relied upon the Sandiganbayans narration of
the facts as follows:
The prosecution presented five (5) witnesses, namely: Caridad M. San Juan, PO2 Leopoldo Cacalda, Dr. Rogelio M. Javan, SPO2
Percival A. Gabinete, and Maria T. Cortez. Their respective testimonies, in essence are as follows, to wit:
1. CARIDAD MARGALLO SAN JUAN (hereinafter, Caridad) declared that she is the wife of Francisco San Juan (hereinafter
Francisco), the victim in the case at bar. Caridad testified that Francisco was the Barangay Captain of Barangay Salac, Lumban,
Laguna, until he was shot and killed by accused Ladiana, who happens to be also a distant relative of the decedent.
Caridad recounted that, on December 29, 1989, she was in her house when an unidentified woman came and told her that her husband
was killed by accused Ladiana. She immediately called up her sister-in-law before rushing to Jacinto Street where the gruesome incident
allegedly transpired. Thereat, many people were milling around, and Caridad saw the lifeless body of Francisco lying in the middle of
the road and being examined by [SPO2] Percival A. Gabinete.
Caridad recalled that it was around 11:00 oclock a.m. when she reached the place of the subject incident. At that point in time, she
was not even allowed by the police to touch, much less get near to, the cadaver of Francisco. Caridad, expectedly, was crying and one of
her aunts advised her to go home.
Caridad maintained that she was aware that her husband was killed by accused Ladiana because this was what the woman actually told
her. Moreover, accused Ladiana had given himself up to the police authorities.
Caridad went on to narrate that, on December 30, 1989, she was at the police station, where she gave her written statement before police
investigator PFC Virgilio Halili (hereinafter, Halili).
Additionally, Caridad presented the Death Certificate of her husband and testified that he was eventually buried at the Lumban
Cemetery. She declared that she had incurred about Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) for the funeral, burial and other incidental
expenses by reason of the death of Francisco.
On cross-examination, Caridad testified that, on December 29, 1989, she was in her house and that she did not hear any gunshot
between 10:30 and 11:00 oclock a.m. Caridad also admitted she did not witness the killing of her husband.
On questions propounded by the Court, Caridad narrated that her husband suffered two gunshot wounds - one on the upper right temple
and the other on the left cheek. However, Caridad stated that she was told that the wounds were the entry and the exit points. She also
told the Court that her husband was wearing short pants at the time of his death and that she found some bruises on his knees.
Finally, Caridad recalled that, on the date of the incident, her husband was with his close friend, a certain Rodolfo Cabrera, and some
other persons, and that they went to Jacinto Street to repair the steel humps which were used to block the street during school days for the
protection and safety of the school children.
2. PO2 LEOPOLDO DE RAMOS CACALDA, JR. (hereinafter, CACALDA) declared that he is a policeman assigned at the
Lumban Police Station in Lumban, Laguna. He has been designated as the radio operator of the station since 1989.
Cacalda recounted that, on December 29, 1989, at around 11:00 oclock a.m., somebody, whose name he could no longer recall,
reported to him about an existing trouble along Jacinto Street in Barangay Salac Cacalda responded by going to the scene, where he was
accompanied by Alberto Mercado, a member of the CAGFIL. Thereat, Cacalda saw the lifeless body of Francisco lying face up on the
road. Cacalda did not examine the body of Francisco. He left the place of the incident when [SPO2] Percival A. Gabinete and other
policemen subsequently arrived.
Cacalda had gathered from the people milling around the body of Francisco that it was accused Ladiana who shot and killed
Francisco. Cacalda immediately left to look for accused Ladiana. However, he eventually saw accused Ladiana already inside the jail of
the police station and thereafter learned that said accused had surrendered to the police authority.
Cacalda recalled that he was later on investigated by Halili because he was the responding policeman who went to the scene of the
incident. Consequently, Cacalda executed a written statement in relation to the subject incident.
On cross-examination, Cacalda testified that he was a radio operator and not an investigator of the police station. He also testified that
he did not witness the incident subject matter of the case at bar.
Cacalda went on to testify that the people milling around the place of the incident told him that accused Ladiana had already
left. Because of this development, Cacalda proceeded to accused Ladianaa house but was told that he had already gone to the police
station. Cacalda accordingly went to the police station where he saw accused Ladiana already locked inside the jail. He also saw a stab
wound on accused Ladianas right bicep but he did not anymore ask him how he sustained the said injury.
3. DR. ROGELIO JAVAN y MAGRACIA (hereinafter, Javan) declared that he is a physician and the Municipal Health Officer of
Lumban, Laguna.
Javan recounted that he was the one who performed the necropsy on the cadaver of Francisco and that he had prepared the
corresponding reports and/or documents relating thereto. Javan made a sketch representing the anterior and posterior views of the body
of Francisco, and labeled and placed red markings on the gunshot wounds found on the said cadaver. The marking Gunshot wound A
is the point of entry, which is one (1) centimeter in diameter and situated two (2) inches behind the left ear. The marking Gunshot
wound B is the point of exit of Gunshot wound A, which is two (2) centimeters in diameter and found above the right cheekbone and
one (1) inch below the right eye. Javan also testified that there is another gunshot wound and the point of entry and exit are labeled as
Gunshot wound C and Gunshot wound D, respectively. Gunshot wound D is one and one-half (1-1/2) centimeters in diameter and
located at the left cheek, three and one-half (3-1/2) centimeters below the left eye, while Gunshot wound C is one (1) centimeter in
diameter and found at the right lateral aspect of the neck, at the level of the adams apple.
According to Javan, the assailant must be behind the victim when he inflicted Gunshot wound A. As regards Gunshot wound C, the
assailant likewise must be behind the victim, at a distance of more than twenty-four (24) inches away.
Lastly, Javan testified that he was not able to retrieve any bullet during the examination. However, judging from the size of the wound
and the point of entry, Javan opined that the firearm used was probably a caliber 38.
On questions propounded by the Court, Javan testified that Gunshot wound A could have been fired first because the trajectory is on
the same level so much so that the assailant and the victim could have been both standing. Javan inferred that Gunshot wound C could
have been inflicted while the victim was already falling down. Javan then stressed that both wounds are fatal in nature.
4. SPO2 PERCIVAL AMBROSIO GABINETE (hereinafter, Gabinete) declared that he is a police officer and a resident of No.
4055 Villa Josefina Subdivision, Sta. Cruz, Laguna.
The testimony of Gabinete was subsequently dispensed with, upon the admission of the defense that he was part of the group of
policemen who proceeded to the place of the subject incident and that he found the body of Francisco lying along the road. Additionally,
the defense admitted the existence of the receipt issued by Funeraria de Mesa dated January 3, 1990 in the sum of Six Thousand Five
Hundred Pesos (P6,500.00).
5. MARIO TALAVERA CORTEZ (hereinafter, Cortez) declared that he is a retired Assistant Prosecutor of Laguna.
Prior to the conduct of the examination-in-chief on Cortez, the defense counsel made an admission as to the authorship, authenticity,
and voluntariness of the execution of the counter-affidavit of accused Ladiana, which was subscribed and sworn to before Cortez. In
said counter-affidavit, accused Ladiana allegedly admitted to making the fatal shots on Francisco. However, accused Ladiana allegedly
did so in self-defense as Francisco was then purportedly attacking accused Ladiana and had, in fact, already inflicted a stab wound on the
arm of accused Ladiana.
However, Cortez emphasized that he was not the one who conducted the preliminary investigation of the complaint which led to the
filing of the subject case. Additionally, Cortez testified that he would not be able to anymore recognize the face of the affiant in the said
counter-affidavit, but maintained that there was a person who appeared and identified himself as Josue Ladiana before he affixed his
signature on the counter-affidavit.
After the presentation of Cortez, the prosecution filed its formal offer of evidence and rested its case.
On May 31, 1995, this Court issued a resolution admitting all the documentary evidence submitted by the prosecution.
On August 20, 1996, accused Ladiana filed a Motion for Leave of Court to File Demurrer to Evidence dated August 16, 1995, claiming
that: (i) a review of the documentary and testimonial evidence adduced by the prosecution allegedly failed to show that the accused is
guilty of the offense charged; (ii) at best, the evidence submitted by the prosecution are allegedly hearsay in character, considering that
the supposed eyewitness in the person of Rodolfo Cabrera was never presented in court; and (iii) the prosecution was allegedly merely
able to prove the fact of death of the victim, but not the identity of the person who caused said death.
On August 23, 1996, this Court issued an Order of even date holding that the filing of a demurrer to evidence is no longer appropriate
considering that accused Ladiana received a copy of this Courts resolution dated May 31, 1995 on the admission of the prosecutions
documentary exhibits as early as May 25, 1995.
On September 2, 1996, in view of his perception that the evidence submitted by the prosecution is allegedly inadequate to sustain a
conviction, accused Ladiana, through counsel, waived his right to present controverting evidence. Instead, he asked for time to file a
written memorandum. Thus, both parties were given time within which to do so, after which the case shall be deemed submitted for
resolution.
Thereafter, this Court received on October 25, 1996 by mail the Memorandum for the defense. As for the prosecution, it opted not to
file any.
[10]
(Citations omitted)
Ruling of the Sandiganbayan
The Sandiganbayan ruled that the prosecution had been able to establish the guilt of petitioner beyond reasonable
doubt. The court a quoheld that his Counter-Affidavit,
[11]
in which he had admitted to having fired the fatal shots that caused
the victims death,
[12]
may be used as evidence against him. It underscored the admission made by the defense as to the
authorship, the authenticity and the voluntariness of the execution of the Counter-Affidavit.
[13]
In short, it ruled that the
document had sufficiently established his responsibility for the death of the victim. However, it found no evidence of
treachery; thus, it convicted him of homicide only.
[14]

Hence, this Petition.
[15]

Issues
In his Memorandum, petitioner raises the following issues for this Courts consideration:
I. Whether or not the Sandiganbayan may convict the accused-petitioner beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide even in the
absence of any eyewitness who personally saw the sho[o]ting of the victim by the accused, basing it only on the testimony of the
prosecutor who had administered the oath on the Counter-affidavit filed by petitioner-accused.
II. Whether or not the prosecution has presented proof beyond reasonable doubt to overcome the constitutional presumption of
innocence of the accused and his right against self-incrimination on the basis of the Counter-affidavit whose execution was admitted by
the counsel of the petitioner, but not by the accused personally.
III. Whether or not the Counter-affidavit of the accused-petitioner which was considered by the Sandiganbayan in its decision as
similar to an extrajudicial confession may [be] admitted against him as evidenc[e] of guilt beyond reasonable doubt even if he was not
assi[s]ted then by counsel and while he was under custodial investigation.
IV. Whether or not the Sandiganbayan is constitutionally and legally correct in issuing the Order of August 23, 1996 denying the
Motion for Leave of Court to File Demurrer to Evidence dated August 16, 1995 filed by the accused in accordance with Sec. 15 of Rule
120 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure in relation to Rule XXI of the Revised Rules of Sandiganbayan.
V. Whether or not accused is entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender which fact was admitted by
the prosecution as it even used the same as proof of the guilt of the accused.
[16]

In short, petitioner raises the following questions in this appeal: (1) whether the Counter-Affidavit he executed during
the preliminary investigation of this case is admissible proof showing his complicity in the crime, (2) whether the
Sandiganbayan erred in denying his Motion for Leave to File a Demurrer to Evidence, and (3) whether he is entitled to the
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.
This Courts Ruling
The Petition is not meritorious.
First Issue:
Admissibility of Counter-Affidavit
Undeniably, the resolution of this case hinges mainly on the admissibility of the Counter-Affidavit
[17]
submitted by
petitioner during the preliminary investigation. He argues that no counsel was present when the Affidavit was executed. In
support of his argument, he cites the Constitution thus:
SEC. 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain
silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel,
he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.
[18]

It is well-settled that the foregoing legal formalities required by the fundamental law of the land apply only to extra-
judicial confessions or admissions obtained during custodial investigations.
[19]
Indeed, the rights enumerated in the
constitutional provision exist only in custodial interrogations, or in-custody interrogation of accused persons.
[20]

Custodial interrogation is the questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into
custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.
[21]

In the present case, petitioner admits that the questioned statements were made during the preliminary investigation,
not during the custodial investigation. However, he argues that the right to competent and independent counsel also applies
during preliminary investigations.
We disagree. A preliminary investigation is an inquiry or a proceeding to determine whether there is sufficient ground
to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed, and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof and
should be held for trial.
[22]

Evidently, a person undergoing preliminary investigation before the public prosecutor cannot be considered as being
under custodial investigation. In fact, this Court has unequivocally declared that a defendant on trial or under preliminary
investigation is not under custodial interrogation.
[23]
It explained as follows:
His [accused] interrogation by the police, if any there had been would already have been ended at the time of the filing of the criminal
case in court (or the public prosecutors office). Hence, with respect to a defendant in a criminal case already pending in court (or the
public prosecutors office), there is no occasion to speak of his right while under custodial interrogation laid down by the second and
subsequent sentences of Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution [now Section 12, Article III of the 1987 Constitution], for the
obvious reason that he is no longer under custodial interrogation.
[24]

There is no question that even in the absence of counsel, the admissions made by petitioner in his Counter-Affidavit
are not violative of his constitutional rights. It is clear from the undisputed facts that it was not exacted by the police while he
was under custody or interrogation. Hence, the constitutional rights of a person under custodial investigation as embodied in
Article III, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution, are not at issue in this case.
However, the accused -- whether in court or undergoing preliminary investigation before the public prosecutor --
unquestionably possess rights that must be safeguarded. These include: 1) the right to refuse to be made witnesses; 2) the
right not to have any prejudice whatsoever imputed to them by such refusal; 3) the right to testify on their own behalf, subj ect
to cross-examination by the prosecution; and 4) while testifying, the right to refuse to answer a specific question that tends
to incriminate them for some crime other than that for which they are being prosecuted.
[25]

We do not, however, agree with the Sandiganbayans characterization of petitioners Counter-Affidavit as an
extrajudicial confession. It is only an admission. Sections 26 and 33 of Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence
distinguish one from the other as follows:
SEC. 26. Admissions of a party. The act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against him.
SEC. 33. Confession. The declaration of an accused acknowledging his guilt of the offense charged, or of any offense necessarily
included therein, may be given in evidence against him.
In a confession, there is an acknowledgment of guilt; in an admission, there is merely a statement of fact not directly
involving an acknowledgment of guilt or of the criminal intent to commit the offense with which one is charged.
[26]
Thus, in
the case at bar, a statement by the accused admitting the commission of the act charged against him but denying that it was
done with criminal intent is an admission, not a confession.
[27]

The Counter-Affidavit in question contains an admission that petitioner actually shot the victim when the latter was
attacking him. We quote the pertinent portion:
[K]aya itong si Kapitan San Juan ay sumugod at hinawakan ako sa may leeg ng aking suot na T-shirt upang ako ay muling saksakin; sa
dahilang hindi ako makatakbo o makaiwas sa kabila ng aking pananalag hanggang magpaputok ako ng pasumala sa kanya; sa bilis ng
pangyayari ay hindi ko alam na siya ay tinamaan;
[28]

Through the above statement, petitioner admits shooting the victim -- which eventually led to the latters death -- but
denies having done it with any criminal intent. In fact, he claims he did it in self-defense. Nevertheless, whether categorized
as a confession or as an admission, it is admissible in evidence against him.
Further, we do not doubt the voluntariness of the Counter-Affidavit. Petitioner himself submitted it to the public
prosecutor to justify his actions in relation to the charges hurled against him. It escapes this Court how he can cavalierly
deny a document that he has voluntarily submitted and originally relied upon in his defense.
In general, admissions may be rebutted by confessing their untruth or by showing they were made by mistake. The
party may also establish that the response that formed the admission was made in a jocular, not a serious, manner; or that
the admission was made in ignorance of the true state of facts.
[29]
Yet, petitioner never offered any rationalization why such
admissions had been made, thus, leaving them unrebutted. In addition, admissions made under oath, as in the case at bar,
are evidence of great weight against the declarant. They throw on him the burden of showing a mistake.
[30]

Petitioner contends that nowhere in the transcripts of this case can it be found that he has admitted to the authorship,
the authenticity or the voluntariness of the Counter-Affidavit. We quote verbatim the proceedings in the Sandiganbayan:
PJ GARCHITORENA
Well, he will identify the person who took the oath before him. Will you deny that it was your client who
took the oath before the Fiscal at the preliminary investigation?
ATTY. ILAGAN
We will admit that, your Honor.
PJ GARCHITORENA
So in that case we will have no question about the authorship, authenticity and the voluntariness of the
execution of the counter-affidavit dated July 31, 1990? Companiero?
ATTY ILAGAN
Admitted, your Honor.
[31]

The admissions of petitioner made through his counsel cannot be any clearer. To be sure, the unbroken stream
of judicial dicta is that, in the conduct of their case, clients are bound by the actions of their counsels, save when the latters
negligence is so gross, reckless and inexcusable that the former are deprived of their day in court.
[32]
Also, clients, being
bound by the actions of their counsels, cannot complain that the result of the litigation might have been different had their
lawyers proceeded differently.
[33]
A counsel may err as to the competency of witnesses, the sufficiency and the relevance of
evidence, the proper defense, the burden of proof, the introduction or the withholding of witnesses or pieces of evidence, or
the manner of arguing the case. This Court, however, has ruled several times that those are not even proper grounds for a
new trial, unless the counsels incompetence is so gross that the clients are prevented from fairly presenting their case.
[34]

Having admitted that he had fatally shot the victim, petitioner had the duty of showing that the killing was justified, and
that the latter incurred no criminal liability therefor.
[35]
Petitioner should have relied on the strength of his own evidence and
not on the weakness of that for the prosecution. Even if his evidence be weak, it cannot be disbelieved after the accused
has admitted the killing.
[36]

Petitioner argues that it was the prosecution that indirectly raised the issue of self-defense. Hence, he could not be
bound by it. This argument deserves scant consideration. As discussed earlier, the declarations contained in his Counter-
Affidavit are admissions that may be used as evidence against him.
[37]
The Sandiganbayan did not unfairly presume that he
had indeed raised the theory of self-defense, because this argument had already been laid out in his Counter-Affidavit. No
presumption was necessary, because the admission was clear and unequivocal.
Neither do we believe petitioners claim that the anti-graft court miserably failed to give equal effect or treatment to all
the allegations found therein (Counter-Affidavit) choosing deliberately and without reasonable basis the parts which are
incriminating in character, and ignoring without sufficient legal basis the exculpatory assertions of the accused.
[38]

The unsubstantiated and uncorroborated statements of petitioner in his Counter-Affidavit are utterly insufficient to
discharge his burden of proving that the act of killing was justified. It is hornbook doctrine that self-defense must be proved
with certainty by sufficient, satisfactory and convincing evidence that excludes any vestige of criminal aggression on the part
of the person invoking it.
[39]
It cannot be entertained if it is uncorroborated by any separate and competent evidence, and it is
also doubtful.
[40]
The question whether the accused acted in self-defense is essentially a question of fact properly evaluated
by the lower court; in this case, the Sandiganbayan.
[41]

By itself, the Counter-Affidavit miserably fails to establish the requisites of self-defense enumerated in the law.
[42]
Had
petitioner been more vigilant in protecting his rights, he could have presented clear and cogent evidence to prove those
elements. But, as found by the court a quo, he not only failed to discharge the burden of proving the existence of the
justifying circumstance of self-defense; he did not even bother to present any evidence at all.
[43]
So, we do not see how the
Sandiganbayan could have been selective in its treatment of his Counter-Affidavit.
Verily, if the accused fails to discharge the burden of proving the existence of self-defense or of any other
circumstance that eliminates criminal liability, his conviction shall of necessity follow, on the basis of his admission of t he
killing.
[44]
Upholding this principle does not in any way violate his right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty. When he
admitted to having killed the victim, the burden of proving his innocence fell on him. It became his duty to establish by clear
and convincing evidence the lawful justification for the killing.
Therefore, petitioner can no longer invoke his constitutional right to be presumed innocent of the crime charged.
[45]
As
far as he is concerned, homicide has already been established. The fact of death and its cause were established by his
admissions coupled with the other prosecution evidence including the Certificate of Death,
[46]
the Certificate of Post-Mortem
Examination
[47]
and the Medico-Legal Findings.
[48]
The intent to kill is likewise presumed from the fact of death.
[49]

Second Issue:
Denial of Motion for Leave to File Demurrer
Petitioner then argues that the Sandiganbayan erred in not giving due course to his Motion for Leave to File Demurrer
to Evidence. He brands this denial as legally and constitutionally wrong.
[50]

We disagree. Prior leave to file a demurrer to evidence is discretionary upon the trial court.
[51]
And, unless there is
grave abuse amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in its denial, the trial courts resolution may not be disturbed.
[52]

Final Issue:
Voluntary Surrender
After vigorously arguing against his own Counter-Affidavit, petitioner, in a surprising change of tenor, implores this
Court to consider his voluntary surrender to the police authorities as a mitigating circumstance. He argues that two of the
prosecution witnesses testified that he had surrendered to the police authorities after the shooting incident.
[53]
To buttress his
argument, he contends that the main reason for his voluntary surrender is that he sincerely believe[d] that he was legally
justified in defending himself as a policeman when he fought the victim after he was attacked by the latter.
[54]
It goes without
saying that this statement only reaffirms the admissions contained in his Counter-Affidavit, which he so vehemently tried to
discredit.
For voluntary surrender to mitigate criminal liability, the following elements must concur: 1) the offender has not been
actually arrested, 2) the offender surrenders himself to a person in authority or to the latters agent, and 3) the surrender is
voluntary.
[55]
To be sufficient, the surrender must be spontaneous and made in a manner clearly indicating the intent of the
accused to surrender unconditionally, either because they acknowledge their guilt or wish to save the authorities the trouble
and the expense that will necessarily be incurred in searching for and capturing them.
[56]

The only pieces of evidence in support of the plea of voluntary surrender made by petitioner are statements made by
two (2) prosecution witnesses that they were allegedly told by other people that he had already gone to the police
station. There is no showing that he was not actually arrested; or that when he went to the police station, he surrendered
himself to a person in authority. Neither is there any finding that he has evinced a desire to own to any complicity in the
killing.
We have ruled in the past that the accused who had gone to the police headquarters merely to report the shooting
incident did not evince any desire to admit responsibility for the killing. Thus, he could not be deemed to have voluntarily
surrendered.
[57]
In the absence of sufficient and convincing proof showing the existence of indispensable circumstances, we
cannot appreciate voluntary surrender to mitigate petitioners penalty.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision and Resolution AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona, and Carpio-Morales, JJ., concur.
Puno, (Chairman), J., abroad on official business.

[G.R. No. 146111. February 23, 2004]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. ROLENDO GAUDIA @ LENDOY or DODO, appellant.
D E C I S I O N
PUNO, J .:
There can be no greater violation of a persons right to feel safe and secure than the crime of rape. When one
commits such a horrible act on another, he degrades not only that persons body; more importantly, he defiles that persons
mind. When the victim is a little child, the act and the perpetrator himself assume a bestiality beyond the comprehension of
normal human beings. Yet, the law must apply equally upon saints and sinners alike, even to the most salacious ruffian.
Before us is the Decision
[1]
dated 10 July 2000 of Branch 19 of the Regional Trial Court of Digos, Davao del Sur,
finding appellant Rolendo Gaudia
[2]
guilty of the crime of rape, meting upon him the penalty of death, and ordering him to
pay to private complainant Remelyn Loyola the amounts of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) as moral damages, thirty
thousand pesos (P30,000.00) as exemplary damages, and costs of suit.
The Information filed against the accused-appellant reads as follows:
That on or about March 24, 1997 at about 6:30 oclock in the evening, in the Municipality of Hagonoy, Province of Davao del Sur,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by means of force and intimidation, did, then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with Remelyn Loyola, a minor, against her will to her damage and
prejudice.
The prosecution presented Remelyns mother, Amalia Loyola, as its primary witness. Amalia testified that on 24
March 1997, she left her two children Remelyn (3 1/2 years old)
[3]
and Kimberly (1 year old)
[4]
at their house in Clib, Hagonoy,
Davao del Sur to gather pigs food at Bulatukan. At the time, her husband was working in Tulunan, South Cotabato. At
about 4:00 in the afternoon, Amalia returned home and could not find Remelyn. She went to fetch water and proceeded to a
neighbor to ask about the whereabouts of Remelyn. Nobody could provide her any information. On her way home, she
shouted and called out Remelyns name. At about 6:00 p.m., Amalia heard Remelyn calling out to her, Ma, I am here,
from a grove of ipil-ipil trees.
[5]
Amalia rushed toward the place, but was met by Remelyn at the mango trees, some thirty
(30) meters from their house.
[6]
She found Remelyn crying, naked, nagbakaang (walking with her legs spread apart) and with
fresh and dried blood on her body. Ipil-ipil leaves clung to her forehead. Blood was oozing from her private organ. Amalia
brought Remelyn home and washed her. Upon closer inspection, she found a whitish mucus-like substance coming from
Remelyns private organ.
[7]

The following day, 2 March 1997, Amalia brought Remelyn to the house of a certain Tiya Coring, a quack doctor, for
treatment. Among the people present in the premises were the relatives and parents of the appellant.
[8]
The quack doctor
found both dried blood and fresh blood oozing in Remelyns vagina, and told Amalia, Hoy! Amalia, your daughter was being
(sic) raped.
[9]
At about 10:00 a.m., Tulon Mik, a neighbor, came and informed Amalia that he had seen the appellant pass
by her house and take Remelyn.
[10]
At this point, the parents of appellant told Amalia, Mal, let us talk about this matter, we
will just settle this, we are willing to pay the amount of P15,000.00, for the crime that my son committed.
[11]
Police officers
came and brought Amalia, Remelyn and two barangay officials (kagawads) to the police precinct of Hagonoy for
investigation. Amalias statement was taken.
[12]

On 25 March 1997, Amalia brought Remelyn to the Hagonoy Health Center in Davao del Sur. Dr. Patricio Hernane,
the municipal health officer,
[13]
conducted a genital examination of Remelyn, and made the following findings:
GENITAL EXAMINATION:
Absence of Pubic Hair (Tanner Stage I). No contusions are noted on the external genitalia. Dried blood are (sic) noted on the labia
minora. Fresh hymenal lacerations are noted at 12, 3, 6, 10 oclock (sic) are noted with fresh vaginal laceration noted at the posterior
commissure but not extending to the perineum. No lacerations were noted at the anal opening.
Speculum examination is not done because even exposure of the labia minora make the child cry. (sic)
CONCLUSION: Physical virginity lost.
[14]

The doctor opined that the lacerations could have been caused by the insertion of a foreign object, such as the penis
of a man.
[15]

On 26 March 1997, Amalia executed her affidavit complaint.
[16]
Amalia stated therein that Remelyn had told her Buang
Lendoy iya kong lugos.
[17]
(Meaning crazy lendoy he forced me in the Visayan dialect.) Amalia confirmed in her testimony
that two weeks after the incident, Remelyn told her, Ma, Lendoy is crazy, she (sic) brought me to the ipil-ipil trees.
[18]

The prosecution also presented Tulon Mik, Remelyns neighbor and a barangay kagawad in their area. Mik testified
that on 24 March 1997, at about 4:00 p.m., he and his wife were on their way home after registering at the COMELEC
office. They were in a hurry as their child was running a fever. Mik saw appellant carrying a small girl in his arms.
[19]
He
identified the little girl as Remelyn Loyola, daughter of Amalia Loyola. Appellant and Remelyn were on their way toward
the ipil-ipil trees.
[20]

The next morning, 25 March 1997, at about 7:00 a.m., a neighbor informed Mik that Remelyn had been raped. He
proceeded to the house of the quack doctor where Amalia brought Remelyn for examination. Amalia confirmed to Mik that
Remelyn had been raped. Mik told Amalia that appellant committed the crime. Mik then informed Barangay Official Rodrigo
Malud
[21]
and the other tanods of the incident. They were instructed to locate the appellant. They passed to the police the
information that appellant was in Barangay Mahayahay. The policemen came and took appellant for investigation.
[22]

The appellant, ROLENDO GAUDIA, interposed the defense of alibi. He averred that on 24 March 1997, at about 4:00
p.m., he went to the Barangay Center to register at the COMELEC for the National Elections. With him was Totong Loyola,
the brother-in-law of Amalia Loyola. They finished at 5:00 p.m., left and repaired to the house of Catalina Cabano,
appellants aunt, to ask for vinegar for their kinilaw (a dish composed of raw fish steeped in vinegar). They found Daylen
Cabano, the small grandchild of Catalina, alone at her house. Daylen was crying, hence, they brought her with them as they
proceeded to the place where Catalina was collecting tuba (fermented coconut wine). It was appellant who carried
Daylen.
[23]
They reached Catalinas place after 5:00 p.m. Thereafter, they went to the house of appellant. Dodo Malon and
appellants parents were in the house. At around 9:00 p.m., Totong and Dodo Malon left, after partaking of
the kinilaw. Appellant stayed home. The following morning (25 March 1997), appellant and Dodo Malon went to the river to
fish. At about 12:00 noon, appellant repaired to the house of his aunt, Victoria Gayod, in Mahayahay to drink tuba. He was
located by the police and investigated.
[24]
He claimed that it was Daylen and not the victim Remelyn whom he was carrying.
As corroborative witness, appellant presented Alex Totong Loyola. Totong testified that on 24 March 1997, at about
4:00 p.m., they registered as voters in the barangay. After registering, they went home to appellants house, but again left to
get vinegar from his aunt Catalina Cabano, for their kinilaw. In Catalinas house, they found her drunk husband, her 10-year
old daughter, and her 3-year old grandchild Daylen.
[25]
Catalinas daughter directed them to the place where she was
gathering tuba. As Daylen was crying, appellant carried her on their way to Catalina. It was then about 4:00 p.m. After
Catalina finished gathering tuba, the four of them appellant, Totong, Catalina and Daylen, left together and repaired to
Catalinas house for the vinegar. Appellant and Totong returned to appellants house where they spent the night.
[26]
Totong
woke up at 6:00 a.m. the following day, and left appellants house. Totong came to know of appellants arrest the following
day.
[27]

Catalina Cabano also corroborated appellants story. She relates that on 24 March 1997, she was gathering tuba, at a
place around 2 kilometers from her house. She left Maritess, her youngest child and Daylen, her grandchild, at her
house.
[28]
At about 5:30 p.m., appellant and Totong arrived. Appellant was carrying Daylen. They waited for Catalina to
finish gathering tuba until 6:00 p.m. Appellant and Totong went to the formers house, had a drinking spree, and then parted
ways at about 6:30 p.m. That night, according to Catalina, she talked to Tulon Mik at the premises near the house. Mik was
looking for Remelyn. At that time, appellant was already at the house of Catalinas younger sister, which is located across
the river, about 4 kilometers away.
[29]

After trial, the trial court found that there was sufficient circumstantial evidence to convict appellant for the crime of
rape with the qualifying circumstance that the victim was below seven years of age. Appellant was sentenced to death and
ordered to indemnify the victim the sums of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) as moral damages, thirty thousand pesos
(P30,000.00) as exemplary damages, and to pay the costs of suit.
In his Brief
[30]
to the Court, appellant assigned the following errors in the judgment of the trial court:
I.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT, ROLANDO (sic) GAUDIA DESPITE THE FACT
THAT HIS GUILT WAS NOT PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
II.
EVEN GRANTING WITHOUT ADMITTING THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANT IS GUILTY OF THE CRIME CHARGED, THE
TRIAL COURT STILL ERRED IN IMPOSING THE SUPREME PENALTY OF DEATH DESPITE THE FAILURE OF THE
PROSECUTION TO STATE WITH CERTAINTY THE QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF AGE IN THE INFORMATION.
We convict appellant for simple rape, and not for qualified rape.
Under Rule 133, Section 4 of the Revised Rules of Court, conviction may be based on circumstantial evidence
provided three requisites concur: (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are
derived are proven; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable
doubt. The ruling case law is that for circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to support a conviction, all circumstances must
be consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at the same time inconsistent
with the hypothesis that he is innocent and with every other rational hypothesis except that of guilt.
[31]

The first circumstantial evidence against the appellant is the testimony of prosecution witness Tulon Mik that at 4:00
p.m. on 24 March 1997, he saw him carrying Remelyn toward the direction of the ipil-ipil grove, some 130 meters from her
house.
[32]
As a neighbor and relative of Remelyns stepfather, Mik had sufficient familiarity with the child Remelyn. The
possibility that he could have been mistaken in identifying the victim is nil.
The second circumstantial evidence against the appellant is Amalias testimony that Remelyn emerged naked from the
same ipil-ipil grove, with ipil-ipil leaves clinging to her forehead. Remelyn was crying and walking with her legs spread far
apart. Remelyns private organ was bleeding and excreting a white mucus-like substance.
[33]

The third circumstantial evidence against appellant is Remelyns statement to her mother that it was appellant who had
brought her to theipil-ipil grove
[34]
and forced her to do something against her will.
[35]

There is no question that Remelyn was violated. After examining Remelyn, Dr. Patricio Hernane, the Municipal Health
Officer of Hagonoy, found her to have a broken hymen, as well as fresh vaginal lacerations.
From these, the culpability of the appellant can be inferred with moral certainty. All the aforementioned circumstances
have been indubitably proven, both by the testimonial and documentary evidence presented by the prosecution, and by the
inability of the appellant to discredit their veracity.
The attempt of appellant to discredit the circumstantial evidence against him is futile. Appellant contends, first, that
Tulon Miks testimony is weak, on the ground that Mik is a relative of the husband of Amalia.
[36]
He also questions the
credibility of Mik because of his failure to confront appellant when he saw him carrying Remelyn. Neither did Mik inform
Amalia about what he saw when Amalia was looking for Remelyn. Appellant insists that it was Daylen whom he carried and
not Remelyn. Second, he stresses the fact that Remelyn did not make any categorical statement that he sexually molested
her. Third, he maintains that the accusation of flight against him is false. Fourth, he avers that the offer of compromise by
his parents as tendered to Amalia Loyola should not be taken against him,
[37]
while the offer of compromise he allegedly
made to Amalias husband, as relayed by Amalia in her testimony, should be excluded as evidence for being
hearsay.
[38]
Finally, he submits that inconsistencies in the testimony of Alex Loyola and Cabano should not be counted
against him on the ground that any finding of guilt must rest on the strength of the prosecutions evidence.
We reject appellants arguments.
First, appellants attempt to discredit the testimony of Mik cannot succeed. It is true that Mik is a relative by affinity of
Amalia Loyola. It is hoary jurisprudence, however, that mere relationship to one of the parties, without a showing of any
other improper motive, is not sufficient basis to impair the credibility of the witness.
[39]
In the case at bar, appellant cannot
impute any ill motive for Mik to testify adversely against him.
Appellant questions the failure of Mik to challenge him why he was carrying Remelyn. Also, he assails Mik for failing
to inform Amalia Loyola of such a sight. Mik had an explanation for the inadvertence. He said his own child was down with
a fever, and he and his wife were hurrying home.
[40]
For this same reason, he revealed the fact that he saw appellant
carrying Remelyn toward the ipil-ipil grove only when he learned of Remelyns fate. But thereafter, he lost no time in
reporting the matter to the barangay chairman.
[41]
As a barangay kagawad, he also assisted in the pursuit and arrest of
appellant at Barangay Mahayahay.
[42]
These subsequent actions strengthen Miks credibility.
The trial court accorded more credence to Miks narration of the events over the testimonies of Cabano and Loyola. It
is a cornerstone of our jurisprudence that the trial judge's evaluation of the testimony of a witness and its factual findings are
accorded not only the highest respect, but also finality, unless some weighty circumstance has been ignored or
misunderstood which could alter the result of the judgment rendered. In the case at bar, there is no irregularity in the
assessment of evidence by the lower court. It granted utmost credibility to Miks testimony. Given the direct opportunity to
observe the witness on the stand, the trial judge was in a vantage position to assess his demeanor and determine if he was
telling the truth or not.
[43]
The trial court found Miks testimony more worthy of credence over those of Catalina and
Loyola. We have no reason to reverse its findings.
Next, appellant tried to capitalize on the fact that Remelyn never made any statement that he sexually molested
her. This is a specious argument. Remelyn had told her mother, Crazy Lendoy forced me.
[44]
Remelyn was 3 1/2 years old
at the time. At such an infantile age, she could not be expected to have a comprehension of the concept of rape. Studies
show that children, particularly very young children, make the perfect victims. They naturally follow the authority of adults
as the socialization process teaches children that adults are to be respected. The childs age and developmental level will
govern how much she comprehends about the abuse and therefore how much it affects her. If the child is too young to
understand what has happened to her, the effects will be minimized because she has no comprehension of the
consequences. Certainly, children have more problems in providing accounts of events because they do not understand
everything they experience. They do not have enough life experiences from which to draw upon in making sense of what
they see, hear, taste, smell and feel. Moreover, they have a limited vocabulary.
[45]
The fact that Remelyn called appellant
Buang or crazy shows that he did something which she knew was not right or proper. By saying iya kong lugos, Remelyn
clearly conveyed that he forced her to do something bad. With her limited comprehension, the child could not have a perfect
way of relating that she had been sexually abused. Finally, it must also be considered that there is no actual counterpart for
the word rape in Visayan parlance.
Appellants charge that the trial court erred when it ruled that he fled arrest, even if correct, is not pivotal to his
guilt. There are enough pieces of circumstantial evidence to convict him. Neither will it affect the penalty or the award of
damages rendered against him.
Similarly, appellants charge that the offers of compromise allegedly made by the parents of the appellant to Amalia,
and by the appellant himself to Amalias husband should not have been taken against him by the trial court, even if
sustained, will not exculpate him. To be sure, the offer of compromise allegedly made by appellant to Amalia Loyolas
husband is hearsay evidence, and of no probative value. It was only Amalia who testified as to the alleged offer,
[46]
and she
was not a party to the conversation which allegedly transpired at the Hagonoy Municipal Jail. A witness can only testify on
facts which are based on his personal knowledge or perception.
[47]
The offer of compromise allegedly made by the
appellants parents to Amalia may have been the subject of testimony
[48]
of Amalia. However, following the principle of res
inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet,
[49]
the actions of his parents cannot prejudice the appellant, since he was not a party
to the said conversation, nor was it shown that he was privy to the offer of compromise made by them to the mother of the
victim. They cannot be considered as evidence against appellant but we reiterate that these errors are not enough to
reverse the conviction of the appellant.
Appellants defense hardly impresses. It is interesting to note that appellant and his witnesses claim that it was at
around 5:00 p.m. when appellant carried the child Daylen toward her grandmother Catalina at the place where she was
gathering tuba. Mik testified that it was around 4:00 p.m. when he saw appellant carrying Remelyn toward the ipil-
ipil grove. Given the 130-meter distance between the ipil-ipil grove and the houses of appellant and of Amalia Loyola,
appellant could have easily taken Remelyn from her house, raped her at the ipil-ipil grove, and left her there, all in a matter
of a few minutes. Sometime past 4:00 p.m., he could then have returned to his house, and together with Alex Loyola,
proceeded to the COMELEC office to register, and did all the subsequent acts he claims to have done.
The Court also notes the inconsistencies in the testimonies of Catalina and Loyola. The discrepancies in the
witnesses narration as to the time of arrival of appellant at the place where Catalina was gathering tuba, his time of arrival at
his own house, and the time when Loyola and appellant actually parted ways, are not mere trivial details which could be
forgotten by witnesses because of the passage of time. To make matters worse, the appellants testimony was, at times,
contradicted by his own witnesses. Particularly telling was the conflict between appellants statement that Totong had
already left his house on the night of 24 March 1997 and Totong and Catalinas own averments that Totong had stayed the
night at appellants house. These contradictory testimonies only made more incredulous appellants tale.
We now review the penalty of death imposed upon appellant. In the case at bar, the Information states that appellant,
by means of force and intimidationwillfully, unlawfully and feloniously (had) carnal knowledge with Remelyn Loyola,
a minor, against her will to her damage and prejudice.
[50]
(emphasis ours) The Information did not allege that Remelyn was
below seven years old when she was violated. Appellant was therefore charged with simple rape, under Section 335 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659 (the Death Penalty Law). Upon its passage, R.A. No. 7659
introduced seven new attendant circumstances, which when present, will transform the crime to qualified rape, punishable
by death. We again stress that these new attendant circumstances must be properly pleaded in the information to justify the
imposition of the death penalty. The facts stated in the body of the information determine the crime for which the accused
stands charged and for which he must be tried.
[51]
The main purpose of requiring all the elements of a crime to be set out in
the information is to enable the accused to suitably prepare his defense. It would be a denial of the right of the accused to be
informed of the charges against him and, consequently, a denial of due process, if he is charged with simple rape and be
convicted of its qualified form punishable with death, although the attendant circumstance qualifying the offense and
resulting in capital punishment was not alleged in the indictment on which he was arraigned.
[52]

We now review the damages awarded by the trial court. Time and again, we have ruled that when there is a finding
that rape had been committed, the award of civil indemnity ex delicto is mandatory.
[53]
If the death penalty has been
imposed, the indemnity should be P75,000.00; otherwise the victim is entitled to P50,000.00 for each count of rape.
[54]
Thus,
the appellant is ordered to pay the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity to Remelyn Loyola.
[55]

We affirm the award of moral damages. This is automatically awarded in rape cases without need of further proof
other than the commission of the crime, as it is assumed that a rape victim has suffered moral injuries entitling her to such
an award.
[56]

We also find the award of exemplary damages made by the lower court in favor of complainant as proper because
complainant has been correctly granted moral damages and the offense against her was committed with the aggravating
circumstance
[57]
of age. However, the amount awarded must be reduced to P25,000.00 in line with prevailing
jurisprudence.
[58]

WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 19, of Digos, Davao del Sur in Criminal
Case No. 213(97) is hereby MODIFIED. Appellant is found guilty of the crime of simple rape, and is sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua. He is ordered to pay to complainant Remelyn Loyola the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity ex delicto, P50,000.00 as moral damages, andP25,000.00 as exemplary damages. Costs against the appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez,
Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, and Tinga, JJ., concur.














[G.R. No. 146584. July 12, 2004]
ERNESTO FRANCISCO y SPENOCILLA, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
D E C I S I O N
CALLEJO, SR., J .:
This is an appeal via a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision
[1]
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No.
19110 affirming the Decision
[2]
of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 22, finding petitioner Ernesto
Francisco guilty of violating Presidential Decree No. 1612, otherwise known as the Anti-Fencing Law, sentencing him to
suffer the penalty of ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayormaximum, as minimum, to twenty (20) years of reclusion
temporal maximum, as maximum, with the accessory penalties corresponding to the latter, and to pay the corresponding
value of the subject pieces of jewelry.
The Indictment
The petitioner was charged of violating P.D. No. 1612 under the Information filed on June 23, 1993, the accusatory
portion of which reads:
That in or about the month of November 1991, in the municipality of Meycauayan, Province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused Ernesto Francisco y Spenocilla, with intent to gain for himself, did then and there
wil[l]fully, unlawfully and feloniously buy, receive, possess and acquire from one Pacita Linghon y Liza, not the owner, several pieces
of jewelry, to wit:
One (1) pair of earrings (Heart Shape) --- P 400,000.00
One (1) White Gold Bracelet ---- 150,000.00
One (1) Diamond Ring ---- 100,000.00
One (1) Ring with Diamond ---- 5,000.00
with the total value of P655,000.00, belonging to Jovita Rodriguez y Cruz, which he knows, or should be known to him, to have been
derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft.
Contrary to law.
[3]

The petitioner was arraigned, with the assistance of counsel, and entered a plea of not guilty. Trial forthwith ensued.
The Case for the Prosecution
Jovita Rodriguez was a resident of Barangay Manggahan, Rodriguez, Rizal.
[4]
She was engaged in business as a
general contractor under the business name J.C. Rodriguez Contractors. Macario Linghon was one of her workers. She
and her husband, the former Municipal Mayor of Rodriguez, Rizal, acquired several pieces of jewelry which were placed
inside a locked cabinet in a locked room in their main house. Jovita hid the key to the cabinet inside the room. The couple
and their son resided inside a compound. They hired Pacita Linghon, Macarios sister, as one of their household helpers us
sometime in February 1989.
[5]
Pacita swept and cleaned the room periodically. Sometime in May 1991, she left the employ
of the Rodriguez family.
Sometime in the third week of October 1991, Pacita contacted her brother Macario, who resided in Sitio Baloongan,
Barangay Paltok, Meycauayan, Bulacan,
[6]
and asked him to sell some pieces of jewelry. She told Macario that a friend of
hers owned the jewelry.
[7]
Macario agreed. He then went to the shop of petitioner Ernesto Erning Francisco located at
Pacheco Street, Calvario, Meycauayan, Bulacan,
[8]
which had a poster outside that said, We buy gold. Macario entered the
shop, while Pacita stayed outside. Macario offered to sell to Ernesto two rings and one bracelet. Ernesto agreed to buy the
jewelry for P25,000, and paid the amount to Macario. He also gave Macario P300 as a tip.
[9]

Sometime in November 1991,
[10]
Pacita asked Macario anew to sell a pair of earrings. He agreed. He and a friend of
his went to the shop of Ernesto and offered to sell to Ernesto the pair of earrings for P18,000. The latter agreed and paid
Macario the amount. Ernesto gave a P200 tip to Macario. After these transactions, Macario saw the petitioner in his shop
for about five to six more times and received some amounts.
[11]

Sometime in November 1991, Jovita was asked to be a principal sponsor at a wedding. She was shocked when she
opened the locked cabinet containing her jewelry, and found that the box was empty. She noticed that the lock to the
cabinet was not broken. Among the pieces of jewelry missing were one pair of diamond heart-shaped earrings
worth P400,000; one heart-shaped diamond ring worth P100,000; one white gold bracelet with diamond stones
worth P150,000; and one ring with a small diamond stone worth P5,000. She suspected that it was Pacita who stole her
jewelry. She was, however, occupied with her business ventures that she had little time to gather evidence and charge
Pacita.
On August 19, 1992, Jovita filed a complaint for theft against Pacita and her mother Adoracion Linghon with the
Counter-Intelligence Group of the Philippine National Police in Camp Crame, Quezon City. She stated that she owned
several jewels, viz: one (1) heart-shaped pair of earrings with diamond worth P400,000; one (1) heart-shaped ring with
diamond worth P100,000; one (1) white gold bracelet with diamond stones worth P150,000; and, one (1) ring with a small
diamond stone worth P5,000. She also averred that Pacita had stolen the pieces of jewelry, and that she and her mother
Adoracion disposed of the same.
A team of police investigators, including PO1 Santiago Roldan, Jr. of the Counter-Intelligence Group, invited Pacita
and Adoracion to Camp Crame, Quezon City, for investigation in connection with Jovitas complaint. Pacita arrived in Camp
Crame without counsel and gave a sworn statement pointing to the petitioner as the person to whom she sold Jovitas
jewelry. On August 23, 1992, Pacita gave a sworn statement to PO1 Roldan, Jr., admitting that she sold one pair of heart-
shaped earrings with diamond, one white gold bracelet, one heart-shaped diamond ring, and one ring with big and small
stones to Mang Erning of Meycauayan, Bulacan, for the total price of P50,000 to cover the cost of her fathers operation
and for food. When asked about the full name of the person to whom the jewelry was sold, Pacita replied that she knew him
only as Mang Erning.
Pacita accompanied a group of five police officers, which included SPO1 Dremio Peralta and PO1 Roldan, Jr. to the
shop in Meycauayan, Bulacan. Pacita pointed to the petitioner as the Mang Erning who had purchased the jewelry from
her. The policemen alighted from their vehicle and invited the petitioner for questioning in Camp Crame. Upon his
insistence, the petitioner was brought to the police station of Meycauayan, Bulacan. When they were at the police station,
the petitioner, in the presence of SPO4 Valdez, offered an amount of P5,000 to the policemen as a bribe, for them not to
implicate him in the case. PO1 Roldan, Jr. rejected the offer.
[12]
They again invited the petitioner to go with them to Camp
Crame, but the petitioner refused and demanded that the policemen first secure a warrant for his arrest should they insist on
taking him with them.
[13]

Nevertheless, Pacita was charged with qualified theft in the Regional Trial Court of San Mateo, Rizal, Branch
76.
[14]
The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 2005. Adoracion was also charged with violating P.D. No. 1612 (Anti-
Fencing Law), docketed as Criminal Case No. 1992. The cases were consolidated and jointly tried.
Meanwhile, Jovita succeeded in convincing Macario to testify against the petitioner, assuring him that he would not be
prosecuted for violation of P.D. No. 1612. Macario agreed to testify against the petitioner.
PO1 Roldan, Jr. and SPO1 Peralta executed a joint affidavit on their investigation.
On September 1, 1992, Jovita executed a sworn statement in the office of the police station of Meycauayan, Bulacan,
charging the petitioner of buying stolen jewelry worth P655,000.
[15]
A criminal complaint against the petitioner for violation of
P.D. No. 1612 was filed in the Municipal Trial Court of Meycauayan, Bulacan, docketed as Criminal Case No. 92-
13841. During the preliminary investigation, Pacita and Macario testified that they sold a set of earrings, bracelet and two
rings to the petitioner for P50,000 at his shop in Meycauayan, Bulacan. According to Pacita, she found the jewelry
belonging to Jovita while she was cleaning the room in the house, and that she brought the jewelry home.
[16]
The court found
probable cause against the petitioner, and issued a warrant for his arrest.
On June 23, 1993, an Information was filed by the Provincial Prosecutor with the RTC charging the petitioner with
violating P.D. No. 1612.
In the meantime, on August 20, 1993, judgment was rendered by the RTC of San Mateo, Rizal, Branch 76, in Criminal
Cases Nos. 1992 and 2005, finding Pacita guilty of theft and Adoracion guilty of fencing under P.D. No. 1612, beyond
reasonable doubt. The decretal portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in these cases, as follows:
1. In Crim. Case No. 2005, finding accused Pacita Linghon y Liza GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of theft, as defined
and penalized under Art. 308 in relation to Art. 309 of the Revised Penal Code, and sentencing her to suffer the indeterminate sentence of
Nine (9) years and Four (4) months of prision mayor as minimum to Eighteen (18) years, Two (2) months and Twenty (20) days
of reclusion temporal as maximum, to return to complainant Jovita Rodriguez the unrecovered stolen pieces of jewelry subject of this
case and if restitution is not possible, to indemnify the said complainant in the amount of P1,300,000.00; and to pay the costs.
2. In Crim. Case No. 1992, finding accused Adoracion Linghon y Liza GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of violation
of PD 1612, otherwise known as the Anti-Fencing Law, and sentencing her to suffer imprisonment of Twelve (12) years of prision
mayor; to indemnify complainant Jovita Rodriguez in the amount of P45,000.00; and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
[17]

The Case for the Petitioner
The petitioner testified that he was a resident of Calvario, Meycauayan, Bulacan. He had a shop located at Pacheco
Street, Calvario, Meycauayan, Bulacan, where he bought and sold jewelry. He had been in this business since 1980.
[18]
He
did not transact with Pacita regarding Jovitas missing jewels.
[19]
In fact, he did not even know Jovita and met her only during
the preliminary investigation of the case before the MTC of Meycauayan, Bulacan. He, likewise, denied knowing Pacita
Linghon, and claimed that he first saw her when she accompanied some policemen in civilian clothes to his shop, where he
was thereafter invited to Camp Crame for investigation.
[20]
He saw Pacita again only during the preliminary investigation of
the case.
[21]
The petitioner also averred that he had no transaction with Macario of whatever nature.
[22]

The petitioner further testified that when the policemen in civilian clothes approached him in his shop, they asked who
Mang Erning was, as the sign in his shop carried such name. When he responded to the question, the policemen
identified themselves as members of the police force. The petitioner then gave them his full name.
[23]
When the policemen
invited him for questioning, he refused at first. Eventually, he agreed to be interrogated at the municipal hall, where the
policemen insisted on bringing him to Camp Crame. He told them that he would go with them only if they had a warrant of
arrest.
[24]
He denied ever offering any bribe to the policemen.
[25]

On November 29, 1995, the court rendered judgment finding the petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating
P.D. No. 1612. The decretal portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1. Finding the accused GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the violation of Pres. Decree No. 1612 (Anti-Fencing Law) and is
hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of 10 years and 1 day of prision mayor maximum, as minimum, to 20 years of reclusion
temporal maximum, as maximum, with the accessory penalties corresponding to the latter.
2. Ordering the accused to pay to private complainant Jovita Rodriguez the corresponding value of the subject items of jewelries
(sic):
one (1) pair of earrings, heart shaped P400,000.00
one (1) white gold bracelet 150,000.00
one (1) diamond ring 100,000.00
one (1) ring with diamond 5,000.00
TOTAL VALUE P655,000.00
with 6% interest on all amounts due from the filing of the information on June 23, 1993 until said amounts have been fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
[26]

The petitioner appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals contending that:
I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE TESTIMONY OF PROSECUTION WITNESSES ARE ALL
HEARSAY EVIDENCE.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE PROSECUTION EVIDENCE WAS NOT SUFFICIENT TO
CONVICT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN BELIEVING ON THE CONTRADICTING TESTIMONY (sic) OF PROSECUTION WITNESSES.
IV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN BELIEVING THE TESTIMONY OF A PROSECUTION WITNESS AS TO THE ALLEGED
ACCUSED-APPELLANTS OFFER OF BRIBE WITHOUT SHOW OF MONEY.
V
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
[27]

On December 29, 2000, the CA rendered judgment affirming the decision of the RTC.
[28]

The Present Petition
In the present recourse, petitioner Ernesto Francisco asserts that:
The Court of Appeals erred in sustaining the trial courts decision finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of the
(sic) Presidential Decree No. 1612, otherwise known as the Anti-Fencing Law.
The Court of Appeals erred in relying on the conflicting testimonies of prosecution witnesses, all of which consisted of hearsay
evidence.
[29]

The petitioner asserts that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt for the crime charged beyond reasonable doubt. He
avers that the prosecution failed to prove that Pacita stole the jewelry subject of the charge, and that Macario sold the sai d
pieces of jewelry to him. He, likewise, posits that the prosecution failed to present Pacita as its witness to prove that she
stole the pieces of jewelry and sold the same to him, and to adduce in evidence the jewelry allegedly sold to him. He
contends that the testimonies of Macario and PO1 Roldan, Jr., on his investigation of Jovitas complaint for theft, are
hearsay evidence. The appellant argues that assuming that Macario sold the subject jewelry to him, Macario had no
personal knowledge that the same belonged to Jovita. The petitioner avers that the testimony of Macario, the principal
witness of the prosecution, is inconsistent on substantial matters; hence, should not be given credence and probative
weight.
On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) maintains that the prosecution was able to prove all the
elements of the crime charged. It asserts that the first element was proved through Pacitas conviction for theft in Criminal
Case No. 2005; the second element was shown to exist with moral certainty via the testimony of Macario identifying the
petitioner as the one who bought the subject pieces of jewelry, corroborated by the testimony of PO1 Roldan, Jr.; and, the
third element was proven by evidence showing that the petitioner had been in the business of buying and selling jewelry for
a long period of time, and that he had the expertise to know the correct market price of the jewelry he purchased from
Macario and Pacita. The OSG asserts that the petitioner must have been put on his guard when the subject pieces of
jewelry worth P655,000 were sold to him for only P50,000.
[30]
It contends that the inconsistencies in the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses referred to by the petitioner were minor, and could not be made as a basis to disregard the trial
courts findings of facts, which are entitled to great respect and credit.
[31]

The Ruling of the Court
The petition is meritorious.
The essential elements of the crime of fencing are as follows: (1) a crime of robbery or theft has been committed; (2)
the accused, who is not a principal or accomplice in the commission of the crime of robbery or theft, buys, receives,
possesses, keeps, acquires, conceals, sells or disposes, or buys and sells, or in any manner deals in any article, item,
object or anything of value, which has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft; (3) the accused knew
or should have shown that the said article, item, object or anything of value has been derived from the proceeds of the crime
of robbery or theft; and, (4) there is, on the part of the accused, intent to gain for himself or for another.
[32]
Fencing is malum
prohibitum, and P.D. No. 1612 creates a prima facie presumption of fencing from evidence of possession by the accused of
any good, article, item, object or anything of value which has been the subject of robbery or theft, and prescribes a higher
penalty based on the value of the property.
[33]
The stolen property subject of the charge is not indispensable to prove
fencing. It is merely corroborative of the testimonies and other evidence adduced by the prosecution to prove the crime of
fencing.
We agree with the trial and appellate courts that the prosecution mustered the requisite quantum of evidence, on the
basis of the testimony of Jovita, that Pacita stole the subject jewelry from the locked cabinet in the main house of her then
employer. Jovita testified on her ownership of the jewelry and the loss thereof, and narrated that Pacita had access to the
cabinet containing the pieces of jewelry.
We, however, agree with the petitioner that the decision of the RTC of Rizal, Branch 76, in Criminal Case No. 2005
convicting Pacita of theft does not constitute proof against him in this case, that Pacita had, indeed, stolen the jewelry. There
is no showing that the said decision in Criminal Case No. 2005 was already final and executory when the trial court rendered
its decision in the instant case.
On the second element of the crime, the trial and appellate courts held that the prosecution proved the same beyond
reasonable doubt based on the testimony of Jovita during the trial in Criminal Cases Nos. 1992 and 2005; that Pacita had
confessed to Jovita that she sold some of the jewelry to the petitioner; the joint affidavit of PO1 Roldan, Jr. and SPO1
Peralta on their investigation of the complaint of Jovita; the testimony of PO1 Roldan, Jr. relating to said investigation; t he
RTC decision in Criminal Cases Nos. 1992 and 2005; the testimonies of Pacita and her brother Macario during the
preliminary investigation of Criminal Case No. 92-13841 before the MTC of Meycauayan as shown by the transcripts of the
stenographic notes taken during the proceedings; the supplemental sworn statement of Pacita on August 23, 1992 in Camp
Crame, Quezon City, and, the testimony of Macario before the trial court.
However, we find and so hold that
First. Jovitas testimony in Criminal Cases Nos. 1992 and 2005, that Pacita had confessed to her that she had sold
four pieces of jewelry to the petitioner, is inadmissible in evidence against the latter to prove the truth of the said admission.
It bears stressing that the petitioner was not a party in the said criminal cases. The well-entrenched rule is that only parties
to a case are bound by a judgment of the trial court. Strangers to a case are not bound by the judgment of said
case.
[34]
Jovita did not reiterate her testimony in the said criminal cases during the trial in the court a quo. The prosecution
did not present Pacita as witness therein to testify on the admission she purportedly made to Jovita; hence, the petitioner
was not able to cross-examine Pacita. The rule is that the acts or declarations of a person are not admissible in evidence
against a third party.
[35]

Second. The testimony of Pacita during the preliminary investigation in Criminal Case No. 92-13841, as well as her
supplemental affidavit, is, likewise, inadmissible against the petitioner since Pacita did not testify in the court a quo. The
petitioner was, thus, deprived of his constitutional right to confront and cross-examine a witness against him.
Third. The testimony of PO1 Roldan, Jr., that on August 23, 1992, Pacita pointed to the petitioner, while the latter was
having a drinking spree, as the person who bought the subject jewelry from her, is indeed admissible in evidence against the
petitioner. It is, likewise, corroborative of the testimony of Macario. However, such testimony is admissible only to prove
such fact - that Pacita pointed to the petitioner as the person to whom she sold the subject jewelry; it is inadmissible to prove
the truth of Pacitas declaration to the policemen, that the petitioner was the one who purchased the jewelry from her. It must
be stressed that the policemen had no personal knowledge of the said sale, and, more importantly, Pacita did not testify in
the court a quo. Indeed, the petitioner was deprived of his right to cross-examine Pacita on the truth of what she told the
policemen.
Fourth. On the other hand, the testimony of Macario during the preliminary investigation of Criminal Case No. 92-
13841 is admissible in evidence against the petitioner since he testified for the prosecution and was cross-examined on his
testimony during the preliminary investigation.
In fine, the only evidence of the prosecution to prove that the petitioner purchased the jewelry from Macario and Pacita
are the following: the testimony and affidavit of PO1 Roldan, Jr.; and, the testimony of Macario during the preliminary
investigation and trial in the court a quo.
Although the well-entrenched rule is that the testimony of a single witness is sufficient on which to anchor a judgment
of conviction, it is required that such testimony must be credible and reliable.
[36]
In this case, we find the testimony of
Macario to be dubious; hence, barren of probative weight.
Macario admitted when he testified in the court a quo that his testimony during the preliminary investigation in Criminal
Case No. 92-13841 and his testimony in the court a quo were inconsistent. He even admitted that some portions of his
testimony on direct examination in the court a quo were inconsistent with his testimony on cross-examination and on re-
direct examination. These admissions are buttressed by the records of the case, which show that such inconsistencies
pertained to material points and not merely to minor matters. Thus, during the preliminary investigation in Criminal Case No.
92-13841, Macario admitted that on October 10, 1991, he and his sister Pacita sold two rings and one bracelet to the
petitioner for P25,000, while in November 1991, he and Pacita sold a pair of earrings to the petitioner for P25,000. On direct
examination in the court a quo, Macario testified that he and Pacita sold the earrings to the petitioner in May 1992, not in
November 1991, and only for P18,000. On cross-examination, Macario testified that he and his sister Pacita went to the
petitioners shop in Meycauayan, Bulacan and sold the subject jewelry on both occasions. On further cross-examination,
Macario changed his testimony anew, and declared that he sold the jewelry to the petitioner for P18,000 and not P25,000;
only to change his testimony again, and declare that he sold the jewelry for P25,000. However, Macario testified during the
preliminary investigation in Criminal Case No. 92-13841 that when he transacted with the petitioner for the second time, he
was with a friend, and not with his sister Pacita. On redirect examination, Macario declared that in October 1991, he and
Pacita sold four (4) pieces of jewelry, namely, two rings, one bracelet and a pair of earrings, contrary to his testimony on
direct examination. He also testified that he and his sister sold the earrings in November 1991. Because of the contradicting
accounts made by Macario, the court made the following observations:
Court
q According to you, you were nalilito but you gave the correct answer, you are not nalilito here but you gave
the wrong answer. Bakit ganoon, sabi mo nalilito ka roon (sic) pero ang sagot mo pala tama. Dito hindi ka
naman nalilito, bakit mali. Bakit ka nalilito eh tama iyongP25,000.00. Hindi ka nalilito, mali ang sabi mo.
a Because I am scare[d] here thats why I gave the wrong answer.
q You better think about it.
a I was confused, Sir.
[37]

The testimonies of Macario are even contrary to the averments of the Information, that the petitioner received the said
jewelry from Pacita.
Assuming, for the nonce, that the petitioner purchased the said jewelry from Macario, there is no evidence on record
that the petitioner knew that they were stolen. Significantly, even Macario did not know that the jewelry was stolen. He
testified that his sister Pacita told him before he sold the jewelry to the petitioner that they belonged to a friend of hers.
Atty. Lerio
Q At that time you and your sister sold those jewels to Mang Erning did do you know already [that] it was
Mrs. Rodriguez who is the owner of those jewels?
A No, Sir, I do not know.
Q And who do you know was the owner of that jewels and that time you and your sister sold those jewels to
Mang Erning?
A According to my sister, it is (sic) owned by a friend of hers.
Court
Q How did you come to know of this Mang Erning?
A Only at that time when we brought the jewels.
Q But previous to that, do you know him?
A No.
[38]

Macario learned, after the case against Pacita had already been filed in the trial court, that the jewelry was, after all,
owned by Jovita. However, he failed to inform the petitioner that the said jewelry was stolen. Following is the testimony of
Macario:
Atty. Lerio
Q When you learned that those jewels were owned by Mrs. Rodriguez, did you, if at all, informed (sic) Mang
Erning about it?
Court
Q No basis, when did you come to know that the jewels belong to Mrs. Rodriguez?
A In 1992, when my sister already had a case.
Q What did you do when you come (sic) to know about that?
A I was not able to do anything but just to help my sister with her case and also to help the case of Mrs.
Rodriguez.
Atty. Lerio
Q After that, after knowing that these jewels are (sic) owned by Mrs. Rodriguez, was there any occasion where
you (sic) able to inform Mang Erning that those jewels were owned by Mrs. Rodriguez?
A No more, I have no more time.
[39]

The prosecution cannot even validly argue that the petitioner should have known which pieces of jewelry were stolen,
considering that Macario was selling the same for P50,000 when the said pieces stolen from Jovita were alleged to be
worth P655,000. This is so because the prosecution failed to adduce sufficient competent evidence to prove the value of the
said stolen articles. The prosecution relied solely on the bare and uncorroborated testimony of Jovita, that they were
worth P655,000:
Atty. Lerio
Q Now, will you tell this Court some of those jewels which you own?
A I own several jewels and the one (sic) in question are: 1-pair of earrings, diamond heart-
shaped P400,000.00; 1-ring, heart-shaped diamond worth P100,000.00; 1-bracelet, white gold full of
stones, diamond worth P150,000.00; 1-diamond ring with small stones worth P5,000.00. So, all in all, the
jewelry is (sic) worth P665,000.00.
[40]

When asked by the trial court to declare the present market value of the stolen jewelry, Jovita merely declared:
Atty. Lerio
Q Now again, when did you acquire those jewels if you can still remember?
A I remember several years ago when my husband is (sic) alive.
Court
Q Please tell the court, [is] the market value of the jewels the same today?
A No, that is (sic) the market value several years ago.
Q So, can you explain [if] the market value, more or less, [is] the same today?
A No. The price, if we will appraise now, is much bigger.
[41]

When required by the petitioner, through counsel, to bring to the court any receipts reflecting the price of the pieces of
jewelry to show that she purchased the same, Jovita answered that she had no such receipts. Thus:
Court
Q You bought it from [a] private person?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Atty. Bernal
Q What then is your proof that you bought these jewelries (sic) from a private person?
Atty. Lerio
That was already answered, Your Honor. She said, no receipt.
[42]

In People v. Paraiso,
[43]
we cited our ruling in People v. Marcos
[44]
that an ordinary witness cannot establish the value
of jewelry, nor may the courts take judicial notice of the value of the same:
[A]nd as we have ruled in the case of People vs. Antonio Marcos, an ordinary witness cannot establish the value of jewelry and the
trial court can only take judicial notice of the value of goods which are matters of public knowledge or are capable of unquestionable
demonstration. The value of jewelry is not a matter of public knowledge nor is it capable of unquestionable demonstration and in the
absence of receipts or any other competent evidence besides the self-serving valuation made by the prosecution, we cannot award the
reparation for the stolen jewelry.
[45]

It bears stressing that, in the absence of direct evidence that the accused had knowledge that the jewelry was stolen,
the prosecution is burdened to prove facts and circumstances from which it can be concluded that the accused should have
known that the property sold to him were stolen. This requirement serves two basic purposes: (a) to prove one of the
elements of the crime of fencing; and, (b) to enable the trial court to determine the imposable penalty for the crime, since the
penalty depends on the value of the property; otherwise, the court will fix the value of the property at P5.00, conformably to
our ruling in People v. Dator:
[46]

In the absence of a conclusive or definite proof relative to their value, this Court fixed the value of the bag and its contents at P100.00
based on the attendant circumstances of the case. More pertinently, in the case of People vs. Reyes, this Court held that if there is no
available evidence to prove the value of the stolen property or that the prosecution failed to prove it, the corresponding penalty to be
imposed on the accused-appellant should be the minimum penalty corresponding to theft involving the value of P5.00.
[47]

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR
No. 19110 affirming the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 22, is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The petitioner is ACQUITTED of the crime of violating P.D. No. 1612 for the prosecutions failure to prove his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Quisumbing, Austria-Martinez, and Tinga, JJ., concur.












[G.R. No. 144621. May 9, 2003]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. ISAGANI GUITTAP y PENGSON (Acquitted), WILFREDO MORELOS y
CRUZ (Acquitted), CESAR OSABEL @ DANILO MURILLO @ DANNY @ SONNY VISAYA @ BENJIE
CANETE, ARIEL DADOR y DE CHAVEZ (Discharge), DECENA MASINAG VDA. DE RAMOS, LUISITO
GUILLING @ LUISITO (Acquitted), and JOHN DOE @ PURCINO, accused.
DECENA MASINAG VDA. DE RAMOS, appellant.
D E C I S I O N
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J .:
Appellant Decena Masinag Vda. de Ramos assails the decision
[1]
of the Regional Trial Court of Lucena City, Branch
60, in Criminal Case No. 92-387, finding her and accused Cesar Osabel guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Robbery with Homicide and sentencing each of them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, with all the accessory
penalties provided by law, and to indemnify the heirs of the victims the amounts of P100,000.00 as civil indemnity and
P67,800.00 as actual damages.
On September 1, 1992, an Amended Information for Robbery with Double Homicide was filed against appellant
Masinag, Isagani Guittap y Pengson, Wilfredo Morelos y Cruz, Cesar Osabel,
[2]
Ariel Dador y De Chavez, Luisito Guilling
and John Doe @ Purcino. The accusatory portion of the information reads:
That on or about the 17
th
day of July 1992, in the City of Lucena, Province of Quezon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused, conspiring and confederating with one another, armed with bladed weapons, by means of violence,
and with intent to gain, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry away certain personal items, to wit:
one (1) solid gold ring valued at P8,000.00
one (1) diamond ring valued at P40,000.00
one (1) necklace with pendant valued at P2,000.00
cash money in the amount of P4,500.00
one (1) samsonite bag valued at P650.00
one (1) .22 Cal. Squibbman with SN 64130 valued at P5,000.00
one (1) pair of sandal valued at P650.00
one (1) music mate (karaoke) valued at P5,000.00
one (1) jacket (adidas) valued at P1,000.00; and
one (1) pair of shoes valued at P1,000.00
with a total value of P67,800.00, owned by and belonging to spouses Romualdo Jael and Lionela
[3]
Caringal, without the consent and
against the will of the latter, to the damage and prejudice of the aforementioned offended parties in the aforestated sum of P67,800.00,
Philippine Currency, and, on the same occasion of such robbery, the said accused, conspiring and confederating with one another, armed
with the same bladed weapons, taking advantage of superior strength, and employing means to weaken the defense or of means or
persons to insure or afford impunity, and with intent to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously stab both of said
spouses Romualdo Jael and Lionela Caringal thereby inflicting upon the latter several fatal wounds which directly caused the death of
the aforenamed spouses.
Contrary to law.
[4]

Upon arraignment, appellant Masinag pleaded not guilty. Trial on the merits thereafter ensued. Accused Ariel Dador
was discharged as a state witness while accused Purcino remained at large.
On February 15, 2000, the trial court rendered its decision, the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this court finds Cesar Osabel and Decena Masinag GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of robbery with homicide and they are sentenced to RECLUSION PERPETUA with all the accessory penalties provided by law. For
insufficiency of evidence, the accused Isagani Guittap, Wilfrido Morelos and Luisito Guilling are hereby ACQUITTED.
The accused Cesar Osabel and Decena Masinag are also ordered to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Romualdo Jael and Leonila
Caringal Jael in the amount of (P100,000.00) One Hundred Thousand Pesos plus actual damages of (P67,800.00) Sixty Thousand and
Eight Hundred Pesos, Philippine Currency.
SO ORDERED.
[5]

During the trial, state witness Ariel Dador testified that in the evening of July 15, 1992, Cesar Osabel asked him and a
certain Purcino to go with him to see appellant Masinag at her house in Isabang, Lucena City. When they got there, Osabel
and Masinag entered a room while Dador and Purcino waited outside the house. On their way home, Osabel explained to
Dador and Purcino that he and Masinag planned to rob the spouses Romualdo and Leonila Jael. He further told them that
according to Masinag, the spouses were old and rich, and they were easy to rob because only their daughter lived with them
in their house.
The following day, at 7:00 p.m., Dador, Osabel, and Purcino went to the house of the Jael spouses to execute the
plan. Osabel and Purcino went inside while Dador stayed outside and positioned himself approximately 30 meters away
from the house. Moments later, he heard a woman shouting for help from inside the house. After two hours, Osabel and
Purcino came out, carrying with them one karaoke machine and one rifle. Osabels hands were bloodied. He explained that
he had to tie both the victims hands with the power cord of a television set before he repeatedly stabbed them. He killed the
spouses so they can not report the robbery to the authorities.
Osabel ordered Dador to hire a tricycle while he and Purcino waited inside the garage of a bus line. However, when
Dador returned with the tricycle, the two were no longer there. He proceeded to the house of Osabel and found him there
with Purcino. They were counting the money they got from the victims. They gave him P300.00. Later, when Dador
accompanied the two to Sta. Cruz, Manila to dispose of the karaoke machine, he received another P500.00. Osabel had the
rifle repaired in Gulang-Gulang, Lucena City.
Dador and Osabel were subsequently arrested for the killing of a certain Cesar M. Sante. During the investigation,
Dador executed an extrajudicial confession admitting complicity in the robbery and killing of the Jael spouses and implicating
appellant and Osabel in said crime. The confession was given with the assistance of Atty. Rey Oliver Alejandrino, a former
Regional Director of the Human Rights Commission Office. Thereafter, Osabel likewise executed an extrajudicial
confession of his and appellants involvement in the robbery and killing of the Jaels, also with the assistance of Atty.
Alejandrino.
Simeon Tabor, a neighbor of the Jaels, testified that at 8:00 in the morning of July 17, 1992, he noticed that the
victims, who were known to be early risers, had not come out of their house. He started calling them but there was no
response. He instructed his son to fetch the victims son, SPO1 Lamberto Jael. When the latter arrived, they all went inside
the house and found bloodstains on the floor leading to the bathroom. Tabor opened the bathroom door and found the
lifeless bodies of the victims.
Dr. Vicente F. Martinez performed the post-mortem examination on the bodies of the victims and testified that since
rigor mortis had set in at the back of the neck of the victims, Romualdo Jael died between six to eight hours before the
examination while Leonila Jael died before midnight of July 16, 1992. The cause of death of the victims was massive shock
secondary to massive hemorrhage and multiple stab wounds.
Appellant Masinag, for her part, denied involvement in the robbery and homicide. She testified that she knew the
victims because their houses were about a kilometer apart. She and Osabel were friends because he courted her, but they
never had a romantic relationship. She further claimed that the last time she saw Osabel was six months prior to the
incident. She did not know Dador and Guilling at the time of the incident. According to her, it is not true that she harbored
resentment against the victims because they berated her son for stealing their daughters handbag. On the whole, she
denied any participation in a conspiracy to rob and kill the victims.
From the decision convicting appellant Masinag and Osabel, only the former appealed, based on the lone assigned
error:
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN FINDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT OF CONSPIRING WITH HER CO-ACCUSED TO COMMIT THE CRIME OF ROBBERY WITH
HOMICIDE DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF HER ACTUAL PARTICIPATION IN THE COMMISSION OF THE SAID CRIME.
The appeal is meritorious.
While it is our policy to accord proper deference to the factual findings of the trial court,
[6]
owing to their unique
opportunity to observe the witnesses firsthand and note their demeanor, conduct, and attitude under grueling
examination,
[7]
where there exist facts or circumstances of weight and influence which have been ignored or misconstrued,
or where the trial court acted arbitrarily in its appreciation of facts,
[8]
we may disregard its findings.
Appellant contends that the extrajudicial confessions of Osabel and Dador were insufficient to establish with moral
certainty her participation in the conspiracy. Firstly, Dador was not present to hear appellant instigate the group to rob the
Jael spouses. He only came to know about the plan when Osabel told him on their way home. Thus, Dador had no
personal knowledge of how the plan to rob was actually made and of appellants participation thereof. Secondly, while
Osabel initially implicated her in his extrajudicial confession as one of the conspirators, he repudiated this later in open court
when he testified that he was forced to execute his statements by means of violence.
On direct examination, Dador narrated what transpired in the house of appellant on July 15, 1992, to wit:
PROSECUTOR GARCIA:
Q. And do you remember the subject or subjects of that conversation that transpired among you?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Please tell us what was the subject or subjects of the conversation that transpired among you on July 15,
1992 at the house of Decena Masinag?
A. The subject of our conversation there was the robbing of Sps. Jael, sir.
Q. How did that conversation begin with respect to the proposed robbery of Sps. Jael?
A. It was only the two (2) who planned that supposed robbery, Daniel Murillo and Decena Masinag, sir.
Q. And why were you able to say that it was Danilo Murillo and Decena Masinag who planned the robbery?
A. Because they were the only ones who were inside the house and far from us and they were inside
the room, sir.
x x x x x x x x x
Q. On that night, July 15, 1992 did you ever have any occasion to talk with Decena Masinag together
with your companions Danilo Murillo and Purcino?
A. No, sir.
Q. Was there any occasion on the same date that Decena Masinag talk to you?
ATTY. FLORES:
Already answered, your Honor.
COURT:
Witness, may answer.
WITNESS:
None, sir. (emphasis ours)
[9]

We find that the foregoing testimony of Dador was not based on his own personal knowledge but from what Osabel
told him. He admitted that he was never near appellant and that he did not talk to her about the plan when they were at her
house on July 15, 1992. Thus, his statements are hearsay and does not prove appellants participation in the conspiracy.
Under Rule 130, Section 36 of the Rules of Court, a witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his own
personal knowledge,i.e., which are derived from his own perception; otherwise, such testimony would be hearsay. Hearsay
evidence is defined as evidence not of what the witness knows himself but of what he has heard from others.
[10]
The
hearsay rule bars the testimony of a witness who merely recites what someone else has told him, whether orally or in
writing.
[11]
In Sanvicente v. People,
[12]
we held that when evidence is based on what was supposedly told the witness, the
same is without any evidentiary weight for being patently hearsay. Familiar and fundamental is the rule that hearsay
testimony is inadmissible as evidence.
[13]

Osabels extrajudicial confession is likewise inadmissible against appellant. The res inter alios acta rule provides that
the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another.
[14]
Consequently, an extrajudicial
confession is binding only upon the confessant and is not admissible against his co-accused. The reason for the rule is that,
on a principle of good faith and mutual convenience, a mans own acts are binding upon himself, and are evidence against
him. So are his conduct and declarations. Yet it would not only be rightly inconvenient, but also manifestly unjust, that a
man should be bound by the acts of mere unauthorized strangers; and if a party ought not to be bound by the acts of
strangers, neither ought their acts or conduct be used as evidence against him.
[15]

The rule on admissions made by a conspirator, while an exception to the foregoing, does not apply in this case. In
order for such admission to be admissible against a co-accused, Section 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court requires that
there must be independent evidence aside from the extrajudicial confession to prove conspiracy. In the case at bar, apart
from Osabels extrajudicial confession, no other evidence of appellants alleged participation in the conspiracy was
presented by the prosecution. There being no independent evidence to prove it, her culpability was not sufficiently
established.
Unavailing also is rule that an extrajudicial confession may be admissible when it is used as a corroborative evidence
of other facts that tend to establish the guilt of his co-accused. The implication of this rule is that there must be a finding of
other circumstantial evidence which, when taken together with the confession, establishes the guilt of a co-accused beyond
reasonable doubt.
[16]
As earlier stated, there is no other prosecution evidence, direct or circumstantial, which the extrajudicial
confession may corroborate.
In People v. Berroya,
[17]
we held that to hold an accused liable as co-principal by reason of conspiracy, he must be
shown to have performed an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the conspiracy. That overt act may consist of active
participation in the actual commission of the crime itself, or it may consist of moral assistance to his co-conspirators by being
present at the time of the commission of the crime, or by exerting moral ascendancy over the other co-conspirators by
moving them to execute or implement the conspiracy.
In the case at bar, no overt act was established to prove that appellant shared with and concurred in the criminal
design of Osabel, Dador and Purcino. Assuming that she had knowledge of the conspiracy or she acquiesced in or agreed
to it, still, absent any active participation in the commission of the crime in furtherance of the conspiracy, mere knowledge,
acquiescence in or agreement to cooperate is not sufficient to constitute one as a party to a conspiracy.
[18]
Conspiracy
transcends mere companionship.
[19]

Conspiracy must be proved as convincingly as the criminal act itself. Like any element of the offense charged,
conspiracy must be established by proof beyond reasonable doubt.
[20]
Direct proof of a previous agreement need not be
established, for conspiracy may be deduced from the acts of appellant pointing to a joint purpose, concerted action and
community of interest. Nevertheless, except in the case of the mastermind of a crime, it must also be shown that appellant
performed an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy.
[21]

All told, the prosecution failed to establish the guilt of appellant with moral certainty. Its evidence falls short of the
quantum of proof required for conviction. Accordingly, the constitutional presumption of appellants innocence must be
upheld and she must be acquitted.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the appealed decision of the Regional Trial Court of Lucena City, Branch 60 in
Criminal Case No. 92-487, insofar only as it finds appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with
Homicide, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellant Decena Masinag Vda. De Ramos is ACQUITTED of the crime of
Robbery with Homicide. She is ORDERED RELEASED unless there are other lawful causes for her continued
detention. The Director of Prisons is DIRECTED to inform this Court, within five (5) days from notice, of the date and time
when appellant is released pursuant to this Decision.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Vitug, Carpio and Azcuna, JJ., concur.



Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 108253 February 23, 1994
LYDIA L. GERALDEZ, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and KENSTAR TRAVEL CORPORATION, respondents.
Natividad T. Perez for petitioner.
Bito, Lozada, Ortega & Castillo for private respondent.

REGALADO, J .:
Our tourism industry is not only big business; it is a revenue support of the nation's economy. It has become a matter of public interest as to call for its promotion and
regulation on a cabinet level. We have special laws and policies for visiting tourists, but such protective concern has not been equally extended to Filipino tourists going
abroad. Thus, with the limited judicial relief available within the ambit of present laws, our tourists often prefer who fail to deliver on their undertakings. This case illustrates the
recourse of one such tourist who refused to forget.
An action for damages by reason of contractual breach was filed by petitioner Lydia L. Geraldez against private respondent Kenstar Travel Corporation, docketed as Civil
Case No. Q-90-4649 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 80.
1
After the parties failed to arrive at an amicable settlement, trial on the merits ensued.
Culling from the records thereof, we find that sometime in October, 1989, Petitioner came to know about pri vate respondent from numerous advertisements in newspapers of
general circulation regarding tours in Europe. She then contacted private respondent by phone and the latter sent its representative, Alberto Vito Cruz, who gave her the
brochure for the tour and later discussed its highlights. The European tours offered were classified into four, and petitioner chose the classificati on denominated as "VOLARE
3" covering a 22-day tour of Europe for $2,990.00. She paid the total equivalent amount of P190,000.00 charged by private respondent for her and her sister, Dolores.
Petitioner claimed that, during the tour, she was very uneasy and disappointed when it turned out that, contrary to what was stated in the brochure, there was no European
tour manager for their group of tourists, the hotels in which she and the group were bullited were not first-class, the UGC Leather Factory which was specifically added as a
highlight of the tour was not visited, and the Filipino lady tour guide by private respondent was a first timer, that is, she was performing her duties and responsibilities as such
for the first time.
2

In said action before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, petitioner likewise moved for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment against private respondent on the
ground that it committed fraud in contracting an obligation, as contemplated in Section 1(d), Rule 57 of the Rules of Court, to which no opposition by the latter appears on the
record. This was granted by the court a quo
3
but the preliminary attachment was subsequently lifted upon the filing by private respondent of a counterbond amounting to
P990,000.00.
4

During the pendency of said civil case for damages, petitioner also filed other complaints before the Department of Tourism i n DOT Case No. 90-121 and the Securities and
Exchange Commission in PED Case No. 90-3738,
5
wherein, according to petitioner, herein private respondent was meted out a fine of P10,000.00 by the Commission and
P5,000.00 by the Department,
6
which facts are not disputed by private respondent in its comment on the present petition.
On July 9, 1991, the court a quo rendered its decision
7
ordering private respondent to pay petitioner P500.000.00 as moral damages, P200,000.00 as nominal damages,
P300,000.00 as exemplary damages, P50,000.00 as and for attorney's fees, and the costs of the suit.
8
On appeal, respondent court
9
deleted the award for moral and
exemplary damages, and reduced the awards for nominal damages and attorney's fees to P30,000.00 and P10,000.00, respectively.
10

Hence, the instant petition from which, after sifting through the blades of contentions alternately thrust and parried in the exchanges of the parties, the pivotal issue that
emerges is whether or not private respondent acted in bad faith or with gross negligence in discharging its obligations under the contract.
Both the respondent court and the court a quo agree that private respondent failed to comply faithfully with its commitments under the Volare 3 tour program, more particul arly
in not providing the members of the tour group with a European tour manger whose duty, inter alia, was to explain the points of interest of and familiarize the tour group with
the places they would visit in Europe, and in assigning instead a first timer Filipino tour guide, in the person of Rowena Zapanta,
11
to perform that role which definitely requires
experience and knowledge of such places. It is likewise undisputed that while the group was able to pay a visit to the site of the UGC Leather Factory, they were brought there
at a very late hour such that the factory was already closed and they were unable to make purchases at supposedly discounted prices.
12
As to the first-class hotels, however,
while the court a quo found that the hotels were not fist-class, respondent court believed otherwise, or that, at least, there was substantial compliance with such a
representation.
While clearly there was therefore a violation of the rights of petitioner under the aforementioned circumstances, respondent court, contrary to the findings of the trial court,
ruled that no malice or bad faith could be imputed to private respondent, hence there is no justification for the award of moral and exemplary damages. Furthermore, it held
that while petitioner is entitled to nominal damages, the amount awarded by the trial court was unconscionable since petitioner did not suffer actual or substantial damage from
the breach of contract,
13
hence its reduction of such award as hereinbefore stated.
After thorough and painstaking scrutiny of the case records of both the trial and appellate courts, we are satisfactorily convinced, and so hold, that private respondent did
commit fraudulent misrepresentations amounting to bad faith, to the prejudice of petitioner and the members of the tour group.
By providing the Volare 3 tourist group, of which petitioner was a member, with an inexperienced and a first timer tour escort, private respondent manifested its indifference to
the convenience, satisfaction and peace of mind of its clients during the trip, despite its express commitment to provide such facilities under the Volare 3 Tour Program which
had the grandiose slogan "Let your heart sing.
14

Evidently, an inexperienced tour escort, who admittedly had not even theretofore been to Europe,
15
cannot effectively acquaint the tourists with the interesting areas in the
cities and places included in the program, or to promptly render necessary assistance, especially where the latter are complete strangers thereto, like witnesses Luz Sui Haw
and her husband who went to Europe for their honeymoon.
16

We agree with petitioner that the selection of Zapanta as the group's tour guide was deliberate and conscious choice on the part of private respondent in order to afford her an
on-the-job training and equip her with the proper opportunities so as to later qualify her as an "experienced" tour guide and eventually be an asset of respondent
corporation.
17
Unfortunately, this resulted in a virtual project experimentation with petitioner and the members of the tour as the unwitting participants.
We are, therefore, one with respondent court in faulting private respondent's choice of Zapanta as a qualified tour guide for the Volare 3 tour package. It brooks no argument
that to be true to its undertakings, private respondent should have selected an experienced European tour guide, or it could have allowed Zapanta to go merely as an
understudy under the guidance, control and supervision of an experienced and competent European or Filipino tour guide,
18
who could give her the desired training.
Moreover, a tour guide is supposed to attend to the routinary needs of the tourists, not only when the latter ask for assistance but at the moment such need becomes
apparent. In other words, the tour guide, especially by reason of her experience in previous tours, must be able to anticipate the possible needs and problems of the tourists
instead of waiting for them to bring it to her attention. While this is stating the obvious, it is her duty to see to it that basic personal necessities such as soap, towels and other
daily amenities are provided by the hotels. It is also expected of her to see to it that the tourists are provided with sanit ary surroundings and to actively arrange for medical
attention in case of accidents, as what befell petitioner's sister and wherein the siblings had to practically fend for themselves since, after merely calling for an ambulance,
Zapanta left with the other tour participants.
19

Zapanta fell far short of the performance expected by the tour group, her testimony in open court being revelatory of her inexperience even on the basic function of a tour
guide, to wit:
Q Now, are you aware that there were times that the tourists under the "Volare 3" were not provided with soap and towels?
A They did not tell me that but I was able to ask them later on but then nobody is complaining.
20
. . . .
The inability of the group to visit the leather factory is likewise reflective of the neglect and ineptness of Zapanta in att entively following the itinerary of the day. This
incompetence must necessarily be traced to the lack of due diligence on the part of private respondent in the selection of it s employees. It is true that among the thirty-two
destinations, which included twenty-three cities and special visits to nine tourist spots, this was the only place that was not visited.
21
It must be noted, however, that the visit to
the UGC Leather Factory was one of the highlights
22
of the Volare 3 program which even had to be specifically inserted in the itinerary, hence it was incumbent upon the
organizers of the tour to take special efforts to ensure the same. Besides, petitioner did expect much from the visit to that factory since it was represented by private
respondent that quality leather goods could be bought there at lower prices.
23

Private respondent represents Zapanta's act of making daily overseas calls to Manila as an exercise of prudence and diligence on the latter's part as a tour guide.
24
It further
claims that these calls were needed so that it could monitor the progress of the tour and respond to any problem immediately.
25
We are not persuaded. The truth of the matter
is that Zapanta, as an inexperienced trainee-on-the-job, was required to make these calls to private respondent for the latter to gauge her ability in coping with her first
assignment and to provide instructions to her.
26

Clearly, therefore, private respondent's choice of Zapanta as the tour guide is a manifest disregard of its specific assurances to the tour group, resulting in agitation and
anxiety on their part, and which deliberate omission is contrary to the elementary rules of good faith and fair play. It is extremely doubtful if any group of Filipino tourists would
knowingly agree to be used in effect as guinea pigs in an employees' training program of a travel agency, to be conducted in unfamiliar European countries with their diverse
cultures, lifestyles and languages.
On the matter of the European tour manager, private respondent's advertisement in its tour contract declares and represents as follows:
FILIPINO TOUR ESCORT!
He will accompany you throughout Europe. He speaks your language, shares your culture and feels your excitement.
He won't be alone because you will also be accompanied by a . . .
EUROPEAN TOUR MANAGER!
You get the best of both worlds. Having done so may tours in the past with people like you, he knows your sentiments, too. So knowledgeable
about Europe, there is hardly a question he can't answer.
27

Private respondent contends that the term "European Tour Manager" does not refer to an individual but to an organization, allegedly the Kuoni Travel of Switzerland which
supposedly prepared the itinerary for its "Volare Europe Tour," negotiated with all the hotels in Europe, selected tourist spots and historical places to visit, and appointed
experienced local tour guides for the tour group.
28

We regret this unseemly quibbling which perforce cannot be allowed to pass judicial muster.
A cursory reading of said advertisement will readily reveal the express representation that the contemplated European tour manager is a natural person, and not a juridical one
as private respondent asserts. A corporate entity could not possibly accompany the members of the tour group to places in Europe; neither can it answer questions from the
tourists during the tour. Of course, it is absurd that if a tourist would want to know how he could possibly go to the nearest store or supermarket, he would still have to call
Kuoni Travel of Switzerland.
Furthermore, both lower courts observed, and we uphold their observations, that indeed private respondent had the obligation to provide the tour group not only with a
European tour manger, but also with local European tour guides. The latter, parenthetically, were likewise never made available.
29
Zapanta claims that she was accompanied
by a European local tour guide in most of the major cities in Europe. We entertain serious doubts on, and accordingly reject, this pretension for she could not even remember
the name of said European tour guide.
30
If such a guide really existed, it is incredible why she could not even identify the former when she testified a year later, despite the
length of their sojourn and the duration of their association.
As to why the word "he" was used in the aforequoted advertisement, private respondent maintains that the pronoun "he" also includes the word "it," as where it is used as a
"nominative case form in general statements (as in statutes) to include females, fictitious persons (as corporations)."
31
We are constrained to reject this submission as
patently strained and untenable. As already demonstrated, it is incredible that the word "he" was used by private respondent to denote an artificial or corporate being. From its
advertisement, it is beyond cavil that the import of the word "he" is a natural and not a juridical person. There is no need for further interpretation when the wordings are clear.
The meaning that will determine the legal effect of a contract is that which is arrived at by objective standards; one is bound, not by what he subjectively intends, but by what
he leads others reasonably to think he intends.
32

In an obvious but hopeless attempt to arrive at a possible justification, private respondent further contends that it explained the concept of a European tour manager to its
clients at the pre-departure briefing, which petitioner did not attend.
33
Significantly, however, private respondent failed to present even one member of the tour group to
substantiate its claim. It is a basic rule of evidence that a party must prove his own affirmative allegations.
34
Besides, if it was really its intention to provide a juridical European
tour manager, it could not have kept on promising its tourists during the tour that a European tour manager would come,
35
supposedly to join and assist them.
Veering to another line of defense, private respondent seeks sanctuary in the delimitation of its responsibility as printed on the face of its brochure on the Volare 3 program, to
wit:
RESPONSIBILITIES: KENSTAR TRAVEL CORPORATION, YOUR TRAVEL AGENT, THEIR EMPLOYEES OR SUB-AGENTS SHALL BE
RESPONSIBLE ONLY FOR BOOKING AND MAKING ARRANGEMENTS AS YOUR AGENTS. Kenstar Travel Corporation, your travel Agent,
their employees or sub-agents assume no responsibility or liability arising out of or in connection with the services or lack of services, of any train,
vessel, other conveyance or station whatsoever in the performance of their duty to the passengers or guests, neither will they be responsible for
any act, error or omission, or of any damages, injury, loss, accident, delay or irregularity which may be occasioned by reason (of) or any defect
in . . . lodging place or any facilities . . . . (Emphasis by private respondent.)
36

While, generally, the terms of a contract result from the mutual formulation thereof by the parties thereto, it is of common knowledge that there are certain contracts almost all
the provisions of which have been drafted by only one party, usually a corporation. Such contracts are called contracts of adhesion, because the only participation of the party
is the affixing of his signature or his "adhesion" thereto.
37
In situations like these, when a party imposes upon another a ready-made form of contract,
38
and the other is
reduced to the alternative of taking it or leaving it, giving no room for negotiation and depriving the latter of the opportunity to bargain on equal footing, a contract of adhesion
results. While it is true that an adhesion contract is not necessarily void, it must nevertheless be construed stri ctly against the one who drafted the same.
39
This is especially
true where the stipulations are printed in fine letters and are hardly legible as is the case of the tour contract
40
involved in the present controversy.
Yet, even assuming arguendo that the contractual limitation aforequoted is enforceable, private respondent still cannot be exculpated for the reason that responsi bility arising
from fraudulent acts, as in the instant case, cannot be stipulated against by reason of public policy. Consequently, for the foregoing reasons, private respondent cannot rely on
its defense of "substantial compliance" with the contract.
Private respondent submits likewise that the tour was satisfactory, considering that only petitioner, out of eighteen partici pants in the Volare 3 Tour Program, actually
complained.
41
We cannot accept this argument. Section 28, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court declares that the rights of a party cannot be prej udiced by an act, declaration,
or omission of another, a statutory adaptation of the first branch of the hornbook rule of res inter alios acta
42
which we do not have to belabor here.
Besides, it is a commonly known fact that there are tourists who, although the tour was far from what the tour operator undertook under the contract, choose to remain silent
and forego recourse to a suit just to avoid the expenses, hassle and rancor of litigation, and not because the tour was in accord with was promised. One does not relish adding
to the bitter memory of a misadventure the unpleasantness of another extended confrontation. Furthermore, contrary to private respondent's assertion, not only petitioner but
two other members of the tour group, Luz Sui Haw and Ercilla Ampil, confirmed petitioner's complaints when they testified as witnesses for her as plaintiff in the court below.
43

Private respondent likewise committed a grave misrepresentation when it assured in its Volare 3 tour package that the hotels it had chosen would provide the tourists
complete amenities and were conveniently located along the way for the daily itineraries.
44
It turned out that some of the hotels were not sufficiently equipped with even the
basic facilities and were at a distance from the cities covered by the projected tour. Petitioner testified on her disgust wi th the conditions and locations of the hotels, thus:
Q And that these bathrooms ha(ve) bath tub(s) and hot and cold shower(s)?
A Not all, sir.
Q Did they also provide soap and towels?
A Not all, sir, some (had) no toilet paper.
45

Q Which one?
A The 2 stars, the 3 stars and some 4 stars (sic) hotels.
Q What I am saying . . .
A You are asking a question? I am answering you. 2 stars, 3 stars and some 4 stars (sic) hotels, no soap, toilet paper and
(the) bowl
stinks. . . .
Q And that except for the fact that some of these four star hotels were outside the city they provided you with the comfort?
A Not all, sir.
Q Can you mention some which did not provide you that comfort?
A For example, if Ramada Hotel Venezia is in Quezon City, our hotel is in Meycauayan. And if Florence or Ferenze is in
manila, our hotel is in Muntinlupa.
46

A One more hotel, sir, in Barcelona, Hotel Saint Jacques is also outside the city. Suppose Barcelona is in Quezon City, our
hotel is in Marilao. We looked for this hotel inside the city of Barcelona for three (3) hours. We wasted our time looking for
almost all the hotels and places where to eat. That is the kind of tour that you have.
47

Luz Sui Haw, who availed of the Volare 3 tour package with her husband for their honeymoon, shared the sentiments of petitioner and testified as follows:
Q . . . Will you kindly tell us why the hotels where you stayed are not considered first class hotels?
A Because the hotels where we went, sir, (are) far from the City and the materials used are not first class and at times there
were no towels and soap. And the two (2) hotels in Nevers and Florence the conditions (are) very worse (sic).
48

Q Considering that you are honeymooners together with your husband, what (were) your feelings when you found out that the
condition were not fulfilled by the defendant?
A I would like to be very honest. I got sick when I reached Florence and half of my body got itch (sic). I think for a
honeymooner I would like to emphasize that we should enjoy that day of our life and it seems my feet kept on itching because
of the condition of the hotel. And I was so dissatisfied because the European Tour Manager was not around there (were)
beautiful promises. They kept on telling us that a European Tour Manager will come over; until our Paris tour was ended there
was no European tour manager.
49

xxx xxx xxx
Q You will file an action against the defendant because there was a disruption of your happiness, in your honeymoon, is that
correct?
A That is one of my causes of (sic) coming up here. Secondly, i was very dissatisfied (with) the condition. Thirdly, that Volare
89 it says it will let your heart sing. That is not true. There was no European tour (manager) and the highlights of the tour
(were) very poor. The hotels were worse (sic) hotels.
50

Q All the conditions of the hotels as you . . .
A Not all but as stated in the brochure that it is first class hotel. The first class hotels state that all things are beauti ful and it is
neat and clean with complete amenities and I encountered the Luxembourg hotel which is quite very dilapidated because of
the flooring when you step on the side "kumikiring" and the cabinets (are) antiques and as honeymooners we don't want to be
disturbed or seen.
51

Q None of these are first class hotels?
A Yes, sir.
Q So, for example Ramada Hotel Venezia which according to Miss Geraldez is first class hotel is not first class hotel?
A Yes, sir.
Q You share the opinion of Miss Geraldez?
A Yes, sir.
Q The same is true with Grand Hotel Palatino which is not a first class hotel?
A Yes, sir.
Q And Hotel Delta Florence is not first class hotel?
A That is how I got my itch, sir. Seven (7) days of itch.
Q How about Hotel Saint-Jacquez, Paris?
A It is far from the city. It is not first class hotel.
Q So with Hotel Le Prieure Du Coeur de Jesus neither a first class hotel?
A Yes, sir.
Q Hotel De Nevers is not a first class hotel?
A Yes, sir.
Q Hotel Roc Blanc Andorra is not a first class hotel?
A Yes, sir.
Q Saint Just Hotel, Barcelona is not a first class hotel?
A Yes, sir.
Q Hotel Pullman Nice neither is not a first class hotel?
A Yes, sir.
Q Hotel Prinz Eugen and Austrotel are not first class hotels?
A Yes, sir.
52

Private respondent cannot escape responsibility by seeking refuge under the listing of first-class hotels in publications like the "Official Hotel and Resort Guide" and Worldwide
Hotel Guide."
53
Kuoni Travel, its tour operator,
54
which prepared the hotel listings, is a European-based travel agency
55
and, as such, could have easily verified the matter of
first-class accommodations. Nor can it logically claim that the first-class hotels in Europe may not necessarily be the first-class hotels here in the Philippines.
56
It is reasonable
for petitioner to assume that the promised first-class hotels are equivalent to what are considered first-class hotels in Manila. Even assuming arguendo that there is indeed a
difference in classifications, it cannot be gainsaid that a first-class hotel could at the very least provide basic necessities and sanitary accommodations. We are accordingly not
at all impressed by private respondent's attempts to trivialize the complaints thereon by petitioner and her companions.
In a last ditch effort to justify its choice of the hotels, private respondent contends that it merely provided such "first class" hotels which are commensurate to the tourists
budget, or which were, under the given circumstances, the "best for their money." It postulated that it could not have offered better hostelry when the consideration paid for
hotel accommodations by the tour participants was only so much,
57
and the tour price of $2,990.00 covers a European tour for 22 days inclusive of lower room rates and
meals.
58
this is implausible, self-serving and borders on sophistry.
The fact that the tourists were to pay a supposedly lower amount, such that private respondent allegedly retained hardly enough as reasonable profit,
59
does not justify a
substandard form of service in return. It was private respondent, in the first place, which fixed the charges for the package tour and determined the services that could be
availed of corresponding to such price. Hence, it cannot now be heard to complain that it only made a putative marginal profi t out of the transaction. if it could not provide the
tour participants with first-class lodgings on the basis of the amount that they paid, it could and should have instead increased the price to enable it t o arrange for the promised
first-class accommodations.
On the foregoing considerations, respondent court erred in deleting the award for moral and exemplary damages. Moral damages may be awarded in breaches of contract
where the obligor acted fraudulently or in bad faith.
60
From the facts earlier narrated, private respondent can be faulted with fraud in the inducement, which is employed by a
party to a contract in securing the consent of the other.
This fraud or dolo which is present or employed at the time of birth or perfection of a contract may either be dolocausante or dolo incidente. The first, or causal fraud referred
to in Article 1338, are those deceptions or misrepresentations of a serious character employed by one party and without which the other party would not have entered into the
contract. Dolo incidente, or incidental fraud which is referred to in Article 1344, are those which are not serious in character and without which the other party would still have
entered into the contract.
61
Dolo causante determines or is the essential cause of the consent, while dolo incidente refers only to some particular or accident of the
obligations.
62
The effects of dolo causante are the nullity of the contract and the indemnification of damages,
63
and dolo incidente also obliges the person employing it to pay
damages.
64

In either case, whether private respondent has committed dolo causante or dolo incidente by making misrepresentations in its contracts with petitioner and other members of
the tour group, which deceptions became patent in the light of after-events when, contrary to its representations, it employed an inexperienced tour guide, housed the tourist
group in substandard hotels, and reneged on its promise of a European tour manager and the visit to the leather factory, it i s indubitably liable for damages to petitioner.
In the belief that an experienced tour escort and a European tour manager would accompany them, with the concomitant reassuring and comfort ing thought of having security
and assistance readily at hand, petitioner was induced to join the Volare 3 tourists, instead of travelling alone
65
She likewise suffered serious anxiety and distress when the
group was unable to visit the leather factory and when she did not receive first-class accommodations in their lodgings which were misrepresented as first-class hotels. These,
to our mind, justify the award for moral damages, which are in the category of an award designed to compensate the claimant for that injury which she had suffered, and not
as a penalty on the wrongdoer,
66
we believe that an award of P100,000.00 is sufficient and reasonable.
When moral damages are awarded, especially for fraudulent conduct, exemplary damages may also be decreed. Exemplary damages are imposed by way of example or
correction for the public good, in addition to moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages. According to the code Commission, exemplary damages are required by
public policy, for wanton acts must be suppressed.
67
An award, therefore, of P50,000.00 is called for to deter travel agencies from resorting to advertisements and
enticements with the intention of realizing considerable profit at the expense of the public, without ensuring compliance with t heir express commitments. While, under the
present state of the law, extraordinary diligence is not required in travel or tour contracts, such as that in the case at bar, the travel agency acting as tour operator must
nevertheless be held to strict accounting for contracted services, considering the public interest in tourism, whether in the local or in the international scene. Consequently, we
have to likewise reject the theory of private respondent that the promise it made in the tour brochure may be regarded only as "commendatory trade talk."
68

With regard to the honorarium for counsel as an item of damages, since we are awarding moral and exemplary damages,
69
and considering the legal importance of the
instant litigation and the efforts of counsel evident from the records of three levels of the judicial hierarchy, we favorabl y consider the amount of P20,000.00 therefor.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of respondent Court of Appeals is hereby SET ASIDE, and another one rendered, ordering private respondent Kenstar
Travel Corporation to pay petitioner Lydia L. Geraldez the sums of P100,000.00 by way of moral damages, P50,000.00 as exemplary damages, and P20,000.00 as and for
attorney's fees, with costs against private respondent. The award for nominal damages is hereby deleted.
Padilla, Nocon and Puno, JJ., concur.
Narvasa, C.J., took no part.










[G.R. No. 119005. December 2, 1996]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. SABAS RAQUEL, VALERIANO RAQUEL and
AMADOPONCE, accused, SABAS RAQUEL and VALERIANO RAQUEL, accused-appellants.
D E C I S I O N
REGALADO, J .:
The court a quo found herein accused-appellants Sabas Raquel and Valeriano Raquel, as well as accused Amado
Ponce, guilty of the crime of robbery with homicide and sentenced them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, to pay
the heirs of Agapito Gambalan, Jr. the sum of P50,000.00 as indemnity for his death, and the amount of P1,500.00
representing the value of the stolen revolver.
[1]
The Raquel brothers now plead for their absolution in this appellate review.
In an information dated August 27, 1986, the aforementioned accused were indicted for robbery with homicide before the
Regional Trial Court of Kabacan, Cotabato, Branch 16,
[2]
allegedly committed on July 4, 1986 in Barangay Osias of the
Municipality of Kabacan.
Upon arraignment thereafter, all the accused pleaded not guilty. While trial was in progress, however, and before he
could give his testimony, accused Amado Ponce escaped from jail.
[3]

The factual antecedents of the case for the People, as borne out by the evidence of record and with page references to
the transcripts of the court hearings, are summarized by the Solicitor General in the appellees brief:
At midnight of July 4, 1986, tragedy visited the peaceful lives of spouses Juliet and Agapito Gambalan, Jr. Thinking of a neighbor in
need, Agapito attended to the person knocking at the backdoor of their kitchen. Much to his surprise, heavily armed men emerged at the
door, declared a hold-up and fired their guns at him. (pp. 4-6, TSN, January 25, 1988)
Juliet went out of their room after hearing gunshots and saw her husbands lifeless (sic) while a man took her husbands gun and left
hurriedly. (p. 7, ibid.)
She shouted for help at their window and saw a man fall beside their water pump while two (2) other men ran away. (p. 9, ibid.)
George Jovillano responded to Juliets plea for help. He reported the incident to the police. The police came and found one of the
perpetrators of the crime wounded and lying at about 8 meters from the victims house. He was identified as Amado Ponce. (pp. 5-7,
TSN, October 21, 1987; pp. 8-9, TSN, March 21, 1988)
Amado Ponce was first treated at a clinic before he was brought to the police station. (p. 27, ibid.)
Amado Ponce revealed to P/Sgt. Andal S. Pangato that appellants Sabas and Valeriano Raquel were the perpetrators of the crime and
that they may be found in their residence. However, the police failed to find them there since appellants fled immediately after the
shooting incident. (pp. 12-14, ibid.)
Appellants were later on apprehended on different occasions. (pp. 5-6, TSN, April 2, 1991)
[4]

Upon the other hand, appellants relied on alibi as their defense, on the bases of facts which are presented in their brief in
this wise:
Accused Valeriano Raquel testified that on July 2, 1986, with the permission of his parents he left Paatan, Kabacan, Cotabato and
went to Tunggol Pagalungan, Maguindanao. He stayed in the house of his sister-in-law, the wife of his deceased brother. Together with
Boy Madriaga and Corazon Corpuz, he harvested palay on July 3 and 4. On July 5, while he was still asle(ep), police authorities
accompanied by his father arrested him and brought him to the municipal jail of Kabacan, Cotabato. He already heard the name of
accused Amado Ponce, to be an owner of a parcel of land in Paatan.
On cross-examination, he admitted that their house and that of Gambalan are located in the same Barangay. Before July 4, he
entertained no grudge against victim Agapito Gambalan. (TSN, April 2, 1991, pp. 2-20)
Antonio Raquel, 64 years old, testified that on July 2, 1986 he was at home when his son Valeriano Raquel told him that he was
going to Tunggol, Pagalungan, Maguindanao to harvest palay. On (the) same date, his other son, Sabas Raquel, also asked his permission
to leave since the latter, a soldier, was going to his place of assignment at Pagadian. On July 5, 1986, several policemen came over to his
house, looking for his two (2) sons. He gave them pictures of his sons and even accompanied them to Tunggol where they arrested his
son Valeriano. (TSN, April 3, 1991, pp. 3-26)
T/Sgt. Natalio Zafra, of the 102 Brigade, Aurora, Zamboanga, testified that on July 4, 1986, he was assigned in the 2nd Infantry
Battalion, First Infantry Division, Maria Cristina, Iligan City. Sabas Raquel was under his division then, and was on duty on July 4,
1986. (TSN, Nov. 6, 1992, pp. 2-20).
[5]

On August 10, 1993, the trial court, as stated at the outset, rendered judgment finding all of the accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime charged and sentenced them accordingly.
[6]

Not satisfied therewith, herein appellants filed a notice of appeal wherein they manifested that they were appealing the
decision to the Court of Appeals.
[7]
The lower court ordered the transmittal of the records of the case to the Court of
Appeals.
[8]
In view of the penalty imposed, the Court of Appeals properly forwarded the same to us.
[9]

Before us, the defense submits a lone assignment of error, i.e., that the trial court erred in convicting accused Sabas
Raquel and Valeriano Raquel of the crime charged, despite absence of evidence positively implicating them as the
perpetrators of the crime.
We find such submission to be meritorious. A careful review and objective appraisal of the evidence convinces us that
the prosecution failed to establish beyond reasonable doubt the real identities of the perpetrators of, much less the
participation of herein appellants in, the crime charged.
The lone eyewitness, Juliet Gambalan, was not able to identify the assailants of her husband. In her testimony on direct
examination in court she declared as follows:
Q: You said you shouted right after the incident and pip (sic) at the window, did you see any when you pip (sic) at
the window?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: What did you see if you were able to see anything?

A: I saw a person who fel(l) down beside the water pump and I saw again two (2) persons who were running
away, sir.

Q: Were you able to identify this persons who fel(l) down near the jetmatic pump and two (2) persons running
away?
x x x

Q: Now, you said somebody fel(l) down near the jetmatic pump, who is this person?

A: I do not know sir. I have known that he was Amado Ponce when the Police arrived.
[10]
(Italics ours.)
On cross-examination she further testified:
Q: For the first time when you shouted for help, where were you?

A: I was at the Veranda sir and I started shouting while going to our room.

Q: In fact you have no way (of) identifying that one person who was mask(ed) and got the gun of your husband
because he was mask(ed), is that not right?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: In fact, you saw only this one person got inside to your house and got this gun?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And this Amado Ponce cannot be the person who have got this gun inside?
FISCAL DIZON:
Already answered.
She was not able to identify, your Honor.
Q: You only saw this Amado Ponce when (h)e was presented to you by the police, is that right?
A: Yes, sir.
[11]

x x x
Q: You testified in direct testimony you pip (sic) in jalousie after you shouted for help and you saw two (2)
person(s) running, is that right?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Now, you saw these persons running on the road, is that not right?
A: I saw them running sir going around.
Q: These two (2) persons were running going around?
A: They were running towards the road.
ATTY. DIVINO:
Going to the road.
Q: And you cannot identify these two (2) persons running towards the road?
A: No, sir.
[12]
(Emphases supplied.)
Even the corroborating witness, George Jovillano, in his testimony made no mention of who shot Agapito Gambalan. In
fact, in his sworn statement executed in the Investigation Section of the Kabacan Police Station on July 5, 1986, he declared
that:
19 Q: By the way, when you saw three persons passing about 5 meters away from where you were then
drinking, what have you noticed about them, if you ever noticed any?
19 A: I noticed that one of the men ha(d) long firearm which was partly covered by a maong jacket. The
other one wore a hat locally known as kipis meaning a hat made of cloth with leaves protruding above the
forehead and seemed to be holding something which I failed to recognize. The other one wore a shortpant
with a somewhat white T-shirt with markings and there was a white T-shirt covering his head and a part of
his face as he was head-down during that time.
20 Q: Did you recognize any of these men?
19 A: No. Because they walked fast.
[13]
(Italics supplied.)
A thorough review of the records of this case readily revealed that the identification of herein appellants as the culprits
was based chiefly on the extrajudicial statement of accused Amado Ponce pointing to them as his co-perpetrators of the
crime. As earlier stated, the said accused escaped from jail before he could testify in court and he has been at large since
then.
The extrajudicial statements of an accused implicating a co-accused may not be utilized against the latter, unless these
are repeated in open court. If the accused never had the opportunity to cross-examine his co-accused on the latters
extrajudicial statements, it is elementary that the same are hearsay as against said accused.
[14]
That is exactly the situation,
and the disadvantaged plight of appellants, in the case at bar.
Extreme caution should be exercised by the courts in dealing with the confession of an accused which implicates his co-
accused. A distinction, obviously, should be made between extrajudicial and judicial confessions. The former deprives the
other accused of the opportunity to cross-examine the confessant, while in the latter his confession is thrown wide open for
cross-examination and rebuttal.
[15]

The res inter alios rule ordains that the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of
another. An extrajudicial confession is binding only upon the confessant and is not admissible against his co-accused. The
reason for the rule is that, on a principle of good faith and mutual convenience, a mans own acts are binding upon himself,
and are evidence against him. So are his conduct and declarations. Yet it would not only be rightly inconvenient, but also
manifestly unjust, that a man should be bound by the acts of mere unauthorized strangers; and if a party ought not to be
bound by the acts of strangers, neither ought their acts or conduct be used as evidence against him.
[16]

Although the above-stated rule admits of certain jurisprudential exceptions,
[17]
those exceptions do not however apply to
the present case.
Firstly, except for that extrajudicial statement of accused Amado Ponce, there exists no evidence whatsoever linking
appellants to the crime. In fact, the testimony of police Sgt. Andal S. Pangato that appellant Sabas Raquel was wounded
and went to the clinic of Dr. Anulao for treatment using the name Dante Clemente,
[18]
was negated by Dr. Anulao himself
who testified that he treated no person by the name of Danny Clemente.
[19]

Secondly, this extrajudicial statement, ironically relied upon as prosecution evidence, was made in violati on of the
constitutional rights of accused Amado Ponce. This was unwittingly admitted in the testimony of the same Sgt. Andal S.
Pangato who was the chief of the intelligence and investigation section of their police station:
Q: During the investigation did you inform him (of) his constitutional right while on the process of investigation?
A: No sir, because my purpose was only to get the information from him. . . . And after that I checked the
information that he gave.
Q: Of course, you know very well that the accused should be assisted by counsel?
A: What I know is if when a person is under investigation you have in mind to investigate as to against (sic) him,
and you have to inform his constitutional right but if the purpose is to interrogate him to acquire information
which will lead to the identity of the other accused we do not need to inform him.
Q: Dont you know that under the case of PP vs. Galit, the accused should be (re)presented by counsel that is the
ruling of the Supreme Court?
A: I do not know if it is actually the same as this case.
Q: But it is a fact that you did not even inform him (of) his right?
A: No sir.
Q: At the time when you asked him he has no counsel.
A: No counsel, sir.
[20]

Extrajudicial statements made during custodial investigation without the assistance of counsel are inadmissible and
cannot be considered in the adjudication of the case. While the right to counsel may be waived, such waiver must be made
with the assistance of counsel.
[21]
These rights, both constitutional and statutory in source and foundation, were never
observed.
A conviction in a criminal case must rest on nothing less than a moral certainty of guilt.
[22]
Without the positive
identification of appellants, the evidence of the prosecution is not sufficient to overcome the presumption of innocence
guaranteed by the Bill of Rights to them.
[23]
While admittedly the alibi of appellants may be assailable, the evidence of the
prosecution is probatively low in substance and evidentiarily barred in part. The prosecution cannot use the weakness of the
defense to enhance its case; it must rely on the strength of its own evidence. In fact, alibi need not be inquired into where
the prosecutions evidence is weak.
[24]

It would not even have been necessary to stress that every reasonable doubt in criminal cases must be resolved in favor
of the accused. The requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt calls for moral certainty of guilt. In the instant case, the
test of moral certainty was neither met nor were the standards therefor fulfilled.
WHEREFORE, on reasonable doubt, the appealed judgment is REVERSED and accused-appellants Sabas Raquel and
Valeriano Raquel are hereby ACQUITTED of the offense charged, with costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Romero, Puno, Mendoza, and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.










[G.R. No. 138470. April 1, 2003]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. ARTEMIO GARCIA y CRUZ, JR. and REGALADO
BERNABE yORBE, accused.
REGALADO BERNABE y ORBE, appellant.
D E C I S I O N
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J .:
This is an appeal from the decision
[1]
dated March 10, 1999 of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch
21, in Criminal Case No. 830-M-98, finding Artemio Garcia y Cruz, Jr. and Regalado Bernabe y Orbe guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Carnapping with Homicide and sentencing them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
On June 3, 1998, Artemio Garcia, Jr. and Regalado Bernabe were charged with the crime of Carnapping with
Homicide as defined in Republic Act No. 6539. The Information against them reads:
That on or about the 21
st
day of December, 1996, in the municipality of San Rafael, province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating together and helping with each other, with
intent of gain, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and by means of violence and intimidation, forcibly take from the
driver Wilfredo Elis a brand new Toyota Tamaraw FX with Plate No. UJL-761 owned by Fernando Ignacio;
That during the commission of the offense, or by reason thereof, the said accused, armed with bladed weapons, conspiring, confederating
and helping each other, did then and there, with intent to kill, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab Wilfredo Elis
in different parts of his body causing mortal wounds which directly resulted in his death.
Contrary to law.
[2]

Upon arraignment, both accused pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. Thereafter, the case was tried on the
merits.
It appears from the record that on December 17, 1996, Joselito Cortez, a taxicab operator based in Marilao, Bulacan,
was approached by Garcia and Bernabe because they wanted to borrow his brand new Mitsubishi L300 van for their trip to
the Bicol region. Cortez refused, saying that the van was unavailable.
Instead, he got in touch with Ferdinand Ignacio, who had just purchased a brand new Toyota Tamaraw FX for
P475,500.00.
[3]
Ignacio agreed to lease his vehicle to Cortez for two days at the daily rate of P2,000.00. Bernabe and
Garcia, on the other hand, rented the vehicle from Cortez for P4,000.00 a day inclusive of the P500.00 drivers fee. They
agreed to pay the rental fee upon their return from Bicol.
[4]

In the early morning of December 18, 1996, Cortez and his driver, Wilfredo Elis, picked up Ignacios Tamaraw FX at
his residence in Meycauayan, Bulacan. Elis drove the same back to Marilao, Bulacan and, at 8:00 a.m., he and the two
accused left for Bicol.
[5]

Four days passed without a word from Garcia and Bernabe. Cortez began to worry about the vehicle he had borrowed
from Ferdinand Ignacio so he informed the Barangay Captain of Saog, Marilao, Bulacan. Meanwhile, Elis wife, Nancy,
approached Cortez and asked where her husband was.
[6]

In the afternoon of December 23, 1996, SPO2 Emmanuel Lapurga of the Moncada, Tarlac Police notified the Chief of
Police that two suspicious looking persons were seen selling a vehicle in Anao, Tarlac at the grossly inadequate price of
P50,000.00. The Chief of Police immediately formed a team,
[7]
but when they reached Anao, Tarlac, they found out that the
two accused had already left for Nampicuan, Nueva Ecija. The team thereafter coordinated with the Nueva Ecija
Police. The two accused were seen in front of a store in Brgy. Pangayan, Nampicuan, Nueva Ecija. When they failed to
produce documents of ownership over the Tamaraw FX, they were brought to the Moncada Police Station for investigation.
[8]

Garcia and Bernabe admitted to the Moncada Police that they attempted to sell the Tamaraw FX belonging to
Ferdinand Ignacio. In the early morning of December 24, 1996, a joint team of police officers composed of members of the
Moncada and Marilao Police, together with the Barangay Captain of Saog, Marilao, Bulacan, were accompanied by Cortez
to Moncada, Tarlac, where the latter positively identified Ignacios Tamaraw FX.
Cortez went to visit Garcia and Bernabe in detention. They admitted to him that they stabbed Elis and dumped him
along the highway near the sabana in San Rafael, Bulacan. They claimed that they were compelled to eliminate Elis when
he refused to join their plan to sell the Tamaraw FX. Garcia brought the policemen, together with Cortez and the Barangay
Captain, to San Rafael, Bulacan where he pointed to the place where they killed Elis. However, the police were unable to
find Elis body. After returning to Moncada, Cortez immediately inspected the interior of the vehicle and found bloodstains
on the side and back of the drivers seat. He also found several personal items belonging to Elis, such as his clothes and
drivers license,
[9]
as well as Garcias bag which contained bonnets, tear gas, the warranty card and the car registration
papers.
[10]

On December 29, 1996, the Moncada police received information that a male cadaver was found in San Rafael,
Bulacan, submerged in mud ten meters away from where they searched earlier. The cadaver was identified as that of
Wilfredo Elis by his wife, Nancy.
[11]

Dr. Benito Caballero, Municipal Health Officer and Medico-Legal Officer of the province of Bulacan, who performed the
autopsy, found four stab wounds in the posterior, one stab wound in the lateral and one on the left side of the thorax. He
opined that the wounds which penetrated the abdomen and lungs were fatal.
[12]

In their defense, Garcia and Bernabe alleged that they agreed to rent the subject vehicle for a period of five days from
December 18, 1996; that Garcia and Elis had a fight because the latter allegedly did not want to go with them to Nueva
Ecija; that Elis, while driving the Tamaraw FX, bumped a passenger jeepney along Baliuag Highway; that they left Elis along
the Baliuag Highway at 3:30 a.m. so he can inform Cortez that they were already in Bulacan and were en route to Nueva
Ecija to have the dented portion of the vehicle fixed.
[13]

After trial, the court a quo rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, all premises considered, this Court finds and so holds that the prosecution has been able to establish the accuseds
criminal culpability. In view thereof, Artemio Garcia y Cruz, Jr. and Regalado Bernabe y Orbe are hereby found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the special complex crime of Carnapping with Homicide in violation of Republic Act No. 6539 as amended by
Republic Act No. 7659. Accordingly, absent any circumstances that will aggravate the commission thereof, both of them are hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua. Further, both accused are hereby ordered jointly and severally to indemnify the
heirs of Wilfredo Elis, the sum of P50,000.00; to pay them the amount of P100,000.00 for moral damages; P15,290.00 for actual/
compensatory damages; and P250,000.00 for loss of earnings.
With costs against the accused.
SO ORDERED.
[14]

Both accused appealed from the decision of the trial court. On March 31, 2000, accused Garcia filed an Urgent Motion
to Withdraw Appeal,
[15]
which was granted in a Resolution dated September 27, 2000.
Appellant Bernabe raises the following assignment of errors:
I
THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT ALL THE ELEMENTS OF CARNAPPING AS DEFINED IN
REPUBLIC ACT 6539 (ANTI-CARNAPPING ACT) AS AMENDED ARE PRESENT AND DULY PROVEN.
IITHE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANT BERNABE WAS PART OF AN
ALLEGED CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT CARNAPPING.
IIITHE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT BERNABE ON THE BASIS OF HIS
ALLEGED ADMISSION OF THE CRIME TO PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS.
Republic Act No. 6539, otherwise known as An Act Preventing and Penalizing Carnapping, defines carnapping as
the taking, with intent to gain, of a motor vehicle belonging to another without the latters consent, or by means of violence
against or intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things.
[16]
More specifically, the elements of the crime are as
follows:
1. That there is an actual taking of the vehicle;
2. That the offender intends to gain from the taking of the vehicle;
3. That the vehicle belongs to a person other than the offender himself;
4. That the taking is without the consent of the owner thereof; or that the taking was committed by means of violence against or
intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things.
[17]

A careful examination of the evidence presented shows that all the elements of carnapping were proved in this case.
Unlawful taking is the taking of a vehicle without the consent of the owner, or by means of violence against or
intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things; it is deemed complete from the moment the offender gains
possession of the thing, even if he has no opportunity to dispose of the same.
[18]

In the case at bar, it cannot be denied that the nature of the appellants possession of the Tamaraw FX was initially
lawful. Nevertheless, the unlawful killing of the deceased for the purpose of taking the vehicle radically transformed the
character of said possession into an unlawful one. Cortez categorically stated that during his first visit to the Moncada Police
Station where appellant and his co-accused were detained, the two separately admitted to him that they killed the deceased
when the latter refused to join their plan to sell the vehicle. Their confession, having been freely and voluntarily given to
Cortez, a private individual, is admissible against the appellant.
[19]
Thus, the duration of the lease of the Tamaraw FX,
whether for an indefinite period as contended by the defense, or only for 4 days, as claimed by the prosecution, has no
bearing on the culpability of the appellant. It does not matter whether the unlawful taking occurred within the period of the
lease. What is decisive here is the purpose of appellant and his co-accused in killing the victim. Such is the vital point on
which the crime and the nature thereof is to be determined. To reiterate, the prosecution was able to establish that appellant
and his co-accused stabbed the victim to death because he refused to join them in their plan to appropriate the vehicle. This
undoubtedly satisfied the element of unlawful taking through violence, rendering appellant liable for the crime charged.
Moreover, it must be stressed that the acts committed by appellant constituted the crime of carnapping even if the
deceased was the driver of the vehicle and not the owner. The settled rule is that, in crimes of unlawful taking of property
through intimidation or violence, it is not necessary that the person unlawfully divested of the personal property be the owner
thereof. What is simply required is that the property taken does not belong to the offender. Actual possession of the
property by the person dispossessed suffices. So long as there is apoderamiento of personal property from another against
the latter's will through violence or intimidation, with animo de lucro, unlawful taking of a property belonging to another is
imputable to the offender.
[20]

Furthermore, at the time of their apprehension, appellant Bernabe and Garcia were unable to give a plausible
explanation why they still had the Tamaraw FX in their possession. Appellant Bernabe claims that he and his co-accused
went to Nampicuan, Nueva Ecija to have the dent on the vehicle repaired. Garcia, on the other hand, testified that there was
no such damage. A person in possession of a stolen article is presumed guilty of having illegally and unlawfully taken the
same unless he can satisfactorily explain his possession of the thing.
[21]

Appellant contends that he did not conspire with his co-accused to commit the crime of carnapping.
Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and
decide to commit it. Conspiracy need not be proved by direct evidence and may be inferred from the conduct of the accused
before, during and after the commission of the crime,
[22]
which are indicative of a joint purpose, concerted action and
concurrence of sentiments.
[23]
In conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all. Conspiracy is present when one concurs with the
criminal design of another, indicated by the performance of an overt act leading to the crime committed. It may be deduced
from the mode and manner in which the offense was perpetrated.
[24]

In the case at bar, it was sufficiently proved that Garcia and Bernabe, through Joselito Cortez, hired the brand new
Toyota Tamaraw FX belonging to Ferdinand Ignacio for their trip to Bicol; that at 8:00 a.m. of December 18, 1996, they left
for Bicol on board the Tamaraw FX driven by Elis; that on December 23, 1996, SPO2 Emmanuel Lapurga of Moncada,
Tarlac reported to the Chief of Police that two suspiciously looking persons, who turned out to be Garcia and Bernabe were
offering to sell a brand new Toyota Tamaraw FX for a mere P50,000.00 in Anao, Tarlac; and that the two were finally
apprehended with the subject vehicle at Nampicuan, Nueva Ecija by elements of the Tarlac and Nueva Ecija Police.
While there may be no direct evidence of the commission of the crime, the foregoing constitute circumstantial evidence
sufficient to warrant Garcias and Bernabes conviction. The following requisites for circumstantial evidence to sustain a
conviction were met, to wit: (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are
proven; and (3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
[25]
The
circumstances indeed form an unbroken chain which leads to a fair and reasonable conclusion that Bernabe and Garcia
were the perpetrators of the crime. It has been held that facts and circumstances consistent with guilt and inconsistent with
innocence constitute evidence which, in weight and probative force, may surpass even direct evidence in its effect upon the
court.
[26]

The records show that Garcia and Bernabe admitted to Cortez and Ignacio that they were responsible for taking the
vehicle and killing the victim, Elis. On December 24, 1996, Cortez went to the Moncada Municipal Jail and talked to them
while they were detained. Both admitted to him that they forcibly took the said vehicle from Elis, stabbed him and thereafter
dumped him at San Rafael, Bulacan.
[27]
Subsequently, on December 26, 1996, Cortez and Ignacio went to Moncada and
confronted the two in their cells. Garcia admitted to Cortez and Ignacio that they stole the vehicle because they were in dire
need of money, while Bernabe kept quiet.
[28]

Appellant Bernabe maintains that the trial court erred in admitting in evidence his admission to Cortez and Ignacio on
the grounds that (a) he did not make such admission; (b) the admission made by Garcia should not prejudice him; and (c)
assuming he made such admission, it should be excluded for having been made under duress and intimidation.
[29]

In People v. Andan,
[30]
it was held that the constitutional procedures on custodial investigation do not apply to a
spontaneous statement, not elicited through questioning by the authorities, but given in an ordinary manner whereby
appellant orally admitted having committed the crime. What the Constitution bars is the compulsory disclosure of
incriminating facts or confessions. The rights under Article III, Section 12 of the Constitution are guaranteed to preclude the
slightest use of coercion by the state as would lead the accused to admit something false, and not to prevent him from freely
and voluntarily telling the truth. Hence, appellants voluntary admission to Cortez that he and his co-accused conspired in
killing the deceased when the latter opposed their plan to sell the vehicle is admissible as evidence against him.
Anent Garcias extrajudicial confession implicating appellant in the commission of the offense, it appears that the latter
did not oppose or affirm Garcias statement. Neither did he make an attempt to refute the same insofar as his participation
in the commission of the crime was concerned. As correctly observed by the Office of the Solicitor General, he cannot
invoke his silence during this crucial moment as his right. He ought to speak and failing to do so, his silence weighs heavily
on him. Thus, it was not accused-appellants Garcias admission that prejudiced accused-appellant Bernabe, but his own
silence when it was such as naturally to call for action or comment if not true.
[31]

Rule 130, Section 32 of the Rules of Court provides that an act or declaration made in the presence and within the
hearing or observation of a party who does or says nothing when the act or declaration is such as naturally to call for action
or comment if not true, and when proper and possible for him to do so, may be given in evidence against him.
We likewise find no merit in the allegation that duress was employed on appellant. Suffice it to state that such bare
allegation of force and duress is not enough to prove that he was indeed tortured to admit complicity in the offense charged.
The penalty for carnapping is provided in Section 14 of RA 6539, as amended by Section 20 of RA 7659, to wit:
Sec. 14. Penalty for Carnapping.- Any person who is found guilty of carnapping, as this term is defined in Section Two of this Act,
shall, irrespective of the value of motor vehicle taken, be punished by imprisonment for not less than fourteen years and eight months
and not more than seventeen years and four months, when the carnapping is committed without violence or intimidation of persons, or
force upon things; and by imprisonment for not less than seventeen years and four months and not more than thirty years, when the
carnapping is committed by means of violence against or intimidation of any person, or force upon things; and the penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death shall be imposed when the owner, driver or occupant of the carnapped motor vehicle is killed or raped in the course
of the commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof.
[32]
(Emphasis supplied)
Hence, the trial court correctly imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua on appellant Bernabe and his co-accused,
Garcia.
The award by the trial court of P50,000.00 in favor of the heirs of the victim should be affirmed. When death occurs as
a result of a crime, the heirs of the deceased are entitled to such amount as indemnity for the death, without need of any
evidence of proof of damages.
[33]
This is in addition to the actual damages of P15,290.50 which was duly substantiated by
proof.
[34]
We, however, reduce the award of moral damages to P50,000.00, in line with current jurisprudence.
[35]

Lastly, we find the court a quos award of P250,000.00 for loss of earning capacity to be without basis. Nancy testified
that her husband Wilfredo was earning P600.00 a day prior to his death,
[36]
however, she failed to produce evidence to
substantiate her claim. As held in the case of People v. Panabang,
[37]
a self-serving statement is not enough; the
indemnification for loss of earning capacity must be duly proven.
WHEREFORE, the decision dated March 10, 1999, of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 21, finding
appellant Regaldo Bernabe y Orbe guilty of Carnapping with Homicide, sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua, and ordering him to pay the heirs of the victim, Wilfredo Elis, the sums of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and
P15,290.00 as actual damages, is AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS: Appellant is further ordered to pay the
heirs of the victim, Wilfredo Elis, moral damages in the reduced amount of P50,000.00. The award of P250,000.00 for loss
of earnings is DELETED for lack of factualbasis.Costs deofficioSO ORDERED.Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Vitug, Carpio,
and Azcuna, JJ., concur.






















[G.R. No. 144293. December 4, 2002]
JOSUE R. LADIANA, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
D E C I S I O N
PANGANIBAN, J .:
The Constitution bars the admission in evidence of any statement extracted by the police from the accused without the
assistance of competent and independent counsel during a custodial investigation. However, a counter-affidavit voluntarily
presented by the accused during the preliminary investigation, even if made without the assistance of counsel, may be used
as evidence against the affiant.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the April 10, 2000 Decision
[1]
and
August 4, 2000 Resolution
[2]
of the Sandiganbayan (First Division) in Criminal Case No. 16988. The dispositive portion of
the assailed Decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused JOSUE R. LADIANA GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
homicide and, in the absence of any modifying circumstance, sentencing the said accused to: (a) suffer an indeterminate sentence of
imprisonment of ten (10) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal, as
maximum[;] (b) suffer all the appropriate accessory penalties consequent thereto; (c) indemnify the heirs of the victim, Francisco San
Juan, in the total amount of Fifty Six Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P56,500.00); and (d) pay the costs.
[3]

The assailed Resolution denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.
Petitioner was originally charged with murder before the Sandiganbayan in an Information
[4]
dated August 5,
1991. However, the anti-graft court issued an Order
[5]
dated October 14, 1991, noting that besides the allegation that the
crime was allegedly committed by the accused while he was taking advantage of his official position, nothing else is in the
Information to indicate this fact so that, as the Information stands, nothing except a conclusion of fact exists to vest
jurisdiction [in] this Court over the accused and over the crime for which he is charged.
Further, the Order gave the government sufficient time to amend the Information to show adequate facts to vest the
Sandiganbayan with jurisdiction over the case. Subsequently, an Amended Information,
[6]
still charging petitioner with
murder, was filed on April 1, 1992. The accusatory portion reads as follows:
That on or about the 29
th
day of December 1989, in the Municipality of Lumban, Laguna, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, a public officer, being then a member of the Integrated National Police (INP now PNP)
assigned at the Lumban Police Station, Lumban, Laguna, acting in relation to his duty which is primarily to enforce peace and order
within his jurisdiction, taking advantage of his official position confronted Francisco San Juan why the latter was removing the steel
pipes which were previously placed to serve as barricade to prevent the entry of vehicles along P. Jacinto Street, Barangay Salac,
Lumban, Laguna, purposely to insure the safety of persons passing along the said street and when Francisco San Juan told the accused
that the latter has no business in stopping him, said accused who was armed with a firearm, with intent to kill and with treachery, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack and sho[o]t Francisco San Juan with the firearm hitting Francisco San Juan at
his head and neck inflicting upon him fatal wounds thereby causing the death of Francisco San Juan.
[7]

During his arraignment on May 8, 1992, petitioner, assisted by his counsel de parte,
[8]
pled not guilty.
[9]
After due trial,
the Sandiganbayan found him guilty of homicide, not murder.
The Facts
In their Memoranda, both the prosecution and the defense substantially relied upon the Sandiganbayans narration of
the facts as follows:
The prosecution presented five (5) witnesses, namely: Caridad M. San Juan, PO2 Leopoldo Cacalda, Dr. Rogelio M. Javan, SPO2
Percival A. Gabinete, and Maria T. Cortez. Their respective testimonies, in essence are as follows, to wit:
1. CARIDAD MARGALLO SAN JUAN (hereinafter, Caridad) declared that she is the wife of Francisco San Juan (hereinafter
Francisco), the victim in the case at bar. Caridad testified that Francisco was the Barangay Captain of Barangay Salac, Lumban,
Laguna, until he was shot and killed by accused Ladiana, who happens to be also a distant relative of the decedent.
Caridad recounted that, on December 29, 1989, she was in her house when an unidentified woman came and told her that her husband
was killed by accused Ladiana. She immediately called up her sister-in-law before rushing to Jacinto Street where the gruesome incident
allegedly transpired. Thereat, many people were milling around, and Caridad saw the lifeless body of Francisco lying in the middle of
the road and being examined by [SPO2] Percival A. Gabinete.
Caridad recalled that it was around 11:00 oclock a.m. when she reached the place of the subject incident. At that point in time, she
was not even allowed by the police to touch, much less get near to, the cadaver of Francisco. Caridad, expectedly, was crying and one of
her aunts advised her to go home.
Caridad maintained that she was aware that her husband was killed by accused Ladiana because this was what the woman actually told
her. Moreover, accused Ladiana had given himself up to the police authorities.
Caridad went on to narrate that, on December 30, 1989, she was at the police station, where she gave her written statement before police
investigator PFC Virgilio Halili (hereinafter, Halili).
Additionally, Caridad presented the Death Certificate of her husband and testified that he was eventually buried at the Lumban
Cemetery. She declared that she had incurred about Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) for the funeral, burial and other incidental
expenses by reason of the death of Francisco.
On cross-examination, Caridad testified that, on December 29, 1989, she was in her house and that she did not hear any gunshot
between 10:30 and 11:00 oclock a.m. Caridad also admitted she did not witness the killing of her husband.
On questions propounded by the Court, Caridad narrated that her husband suffered two gunshot wounds - one on the upper right temple
and the other on the left cheek. However, Caridad stated that she was told that the wounds were the entry and the exit points. She also
told the Court that her husband was wearing short pants at the time of his death and that she found some bruises on his knees.
Finally, Caridad recalled that, on the date of the incident, her husband was with his close friend, a certain Rodolfo Cabrera, and some
other persons, and that they went to Jacinto Street to repair the steel humps which were used to block the street during school days for the
protection and safety of the school children.
2. PO2 LEOPOLDO DE RAMOS CACALDA, JR. (hereinafter, CACALDA) declared that he is a policeman assigned at the
Lumban Police Station in Lumban, Laguna. He has been designated as the radio operator of the station since 1989.
Cacalda recounted that, on December 29, 1989, at around 11:00 oclock a.m., somebody, whose name he could no longer recall,
reported to him about an existing trouble along Jacinto Street in Barangay Salac Cacalda responded by going to the scene, where he was
accompanied by Alberto Mercado, a member of the CAGFIL. Thereat, Cacalda saw the lifeless body of Francisco lying face up on the
road. Cacalda did not examine the body of Francisco. He left the place of the incident when [SPO2] Percival A. Gabinete and other
policemen subsequently arrived.
Cacalda had gathered from the people milling around the body of Francisco that it was accused Ladiana who shot and killed
Francisco. Cacalda immediately left to look for accused Ladiana. However, he eventually saw accused Ladiana already inside the jail of
the police station and thereafter learned that said accused had surrendered to the police authority.
Cacalda recalled that he was later on investigated by Halili because he was the responding policeman who went to the scene of the
incident. Consequently, Cacalda executed a written statement in relation to the subject incident.
On cross-examination, Cacalda testified that he was a radio operator and not an investigator of the police station. He also testified that
he did not witness the incident subject matter of the case at bar.
Cacalda went on to testify that the people milling around the place of the incident told him that accused Ladiana had already
left. Because of this development, Cacalda proceeded to accused Ladianaa house but was told that he had already gone to the police
station. Cacalda accordingly went to the police station where he saw accused Ladiana already locked inside the jail. He also saw a stab
wound on accused Ladianas right bicep but he did not anymore ask him how he sustained the said injury.
3. DR. ROGELIO JAVAN y MAGRACIA (hereinafter, Javan) declared that he is a physician and the Municipal Health Officer of
Lumban, Laguna.
Javan recounted that he was the one who performed the necropsy on the cadaver of Francisco and that he had prepared the
corresponding reports and/or documents relating thereto. Javan made a sketch representing the anterior and posterior views of the body
of Francisco, and labeled and placed red markings on the gunshot wounds found on the said cadaver. The marking Gunshot wound A
is the point of entry, which is one (1) centimeter in diameter and situated two (2) inches behind the left ear. The marking Gunshot
wound B is the point of exit of Gunshot wound A, which is two (2) centimeters in diameter and found above the right cheekbone and
one (1) inch below the right eye. Javan also testified that there is another gunshot wound and the point of entry and exit are labeled as
Gunshot wound C and Gunshot wound D, respectively. Gunshot wound D is one and one-half (1-1/2) centimeters in diameter and
located at the left cheek, three and one-half (3-1/2) centimeters below the left eye, while Gunshot wound C is one (1) centimeter in
diameter and found at the right lateral aspect of the neck, at the level of the adams apple.
According to Javan, the assailant must be behind the victim when he inflicted Gunshot wound A. As regards Gunshot wound C, the
assailant likewise must be behind the victim, at a distance of more than twenty-four (24) inches away.
Lastly, Javan testified that he was not able to retrieve any bullet during the examination. However, judging from the size of the wound
and the point of entry, Javan opined that the firearm used was probably a caliber 38.
On questions propounded by the Court, Javan testified that Gunshot wound A could have been fired first because the trajectory is on
the same level so much so that the assailant and the victim could have been both standing. Javan inferred that Gunshot wound C could
have been inflicted while the victim was already falling down. Javan then stressed that both wounds are fatal in nature.
4. SPO2 PERCIVAL AMBROSIO GABINETE (hereinafter, Gabinete) declared that he is a police officer and a resident of No.
4055 Villa Josefina Subdivision, Sta. Cruz, Laguna.
The testimony of Gabinete was subsequently dispensed with, upon the admission of the defense that he was part of the group of
policemen who proceeded to the place of the subject incident and that he found the body of Francisco lying along the road. Additionally,
the defense admitted the existence of the receipt issued by Funeraria de Mesa dated January 3, 1990 in the sum of Six Thousand Five
Hundred Pesos (P6,500.00).
5. MARIO TALAVERA CORTEZ (hereinafter, Cortez) declared that he is a retired Assistant Prosecutor of Laguna.
Prior to the conduct of the examination-in-chief on Cortez, the defense counsel made an admission as to the authorship, authenticity,
and voluntariness of the execution of the counter-affidavit of accused Ladiana, which was subscribed and sworn to before Cortez. In
said counter-affidavit, accused Ladiana allegedly admitted to making the fatal shots on Francisco. However, accused Ladiana allegedly
did so in self-defense as Francisco was then purportedly attacking accused Ladiana and had, in fact, already inflicted a stab wound on the
arm of accused Ladiana.
However, Cortez emphasized that he was not the one who conducted the preliminary investigation of the complaint which led to the
filing of the subject case. Additionally, Cortez testified that he would not be able to anymore recognize the face of the affiant in the said
counter-affidavit, but maintained that there was a person who appeared and identified himself as Josue Ladiana before he affixed his
signature on the counter-affidavit.
After the presentation of Cortez, the prosecution filed its formal offer of evidence and rested its case.
On May 31, 1995, this Court issued a resolution admitting all the documentary evidence submitted by the prosecution.
On August 20, 1996, accused Ladiana filed a Motion for Leave of Court to File Demurrer to Evidence dated August 16, 1995, claiming
that: (i) a review of the documentary and testimonial evidence adduced by the prosecution allegedly failed to show that the accused is
guilty of the offense charged; (ii) at best, the evidence submitted by the prosecution are allegedly hearsay in character, considering that
the supposed eyewitness in the person of Rodolfo Cabrera was never presented in court; and (iii) the prosecution was allegedly merely
able to prove the fact of death of the victim, but not the identity of the person who caused said death.
On August 23, 1996, this Court issued an Order of even date holding that the filing of a demurrer to evidence is no longer appropriate
considering that accused Ladiana received a copy of this Courts resolution dated May 31, 1995 on the admission of the prosecutions
documentary exhibits as early as May 25, 1995.
On September 2, 1996, in view of his perception that the evidence submitted by the prosecution is allegedly inadequate to sustain a
conviction, accused Ladiana, through counsel, waived his right to present controverting evidence. Instead, he asked for time to file a
written memorandum. Thus, both parties were given time within which to do so, after which the case shall be deemed submitted for
resolution.
Thereafter, this Court received on October 25, 1996 by mail the Memorandum for the defense. As for the prosecution, it opted not to
file any.
[10]
(Citations omitted)
Ruling of the Sandiganbayan
The Sandiganbayan ruled that the prosecution had been able to establish the guilt of petitioner beyond reasonable
doubt. The court a quoheld that his Counter-Affidavit,
[11]
in which he had admitted to having fired the fatal shots that caused
the victims death,
[12]
may be used as evidence against him. It underscored the admission made by the defense as to the
authorship, the authenticity and the voluntariness of the execution of the Counter-Affidavit.
[13]
In short, it ruled that the
document had sufficiently established his responsibility for the death of the victim. However, it found no evidence of
treachery; thus, it convicted him of homicide only.
[14]

Hence, this Petition.
[15]

Issues
In his Memorandum, petitioner raises the following issues for this Courts consideration:
I. Whether or not the Sandiganbayan may convict the accused-petitioner beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide even in the
absence of any eyewitness who personally saw the sho[o]ting of the victim by the accused, basing it only on the testimony of the
prosecutor who had administered the oath on the Counter-affidavit filed by petitioner-accused.
II. Whether or not the prosecution has presented proof beyond reasonable doubt to overcome the constitutional presumption of
innocence of the accused and his right against self-incrimination on the basis of the Counter-affidavit whose execution was admitted by
the counsel of the petitioner, but not by the accused personally.
III. Whether or not the Counter-affidavit of the accused-petitioner which was considered by the Sandiganbayan in its decision as
similar to an extrajudicial confession may [be] admitted against him as evidenc[e] of guilt beyond reasonable doubt even if he was not
assi[s]ted then by counsel and while he was under custodial investigation.
IV. Whether or not the Sandiganbayan is constitutionally and legally correct in issuing the Order of August 23, 1996 denying the
Motion for Leave of Court to File Demurrer to Evidence dated August 16, 1995 filed by the accused in accordance with Sec. 15 of Rule
120 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure in relation to Rule XXI of the Revised Rules of Sandiganbayan.
V. Whether or not accused is entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender which fact was admitted by
the prosecution as it even used the same as proof of the guilt of the accused.
[16]

In short, petitioner raises the following questions in this appeal: (1) whether the Counter-Affidavit he executed during
the preliminary investigation of this case is admissible proof showing his complicity in the crime, (2) whether the
Sandiganbayan erred in denying his Motion for Leave to File a Demurrer to Evidence, and (3) whether he is entitled to the
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.
This Courts Ruling
The Petition is not meritorious.
First Issue:
Admissibility of Counter-Affidavit
Undeniably, the resolution of this case hinges mainly on the admissibility of the Counter-Affidavit
[17]
submitted by
petitioner during the preliminary investigation. He argues that no counsel was present when the Affidavit was executed. In
support of his argument, he cites the Constitution thus:
SEC. 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain
silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel,
he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
x x x x x x x x x
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.
[18]

It is well-settled that the foregoing legal formalities required by the fundamental law of the land apply only to extra-
judicial confessions or admissions obtained during custodial investigations.
[19]
Indeed, the rights enumerated in the
constitutional provision exist only in custodial interrogations, or in-custody interrogation of accused persons.
[20]

Custodial interrogation is the questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into
custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.
[21]

In the present case, petitioner admits that the questioned statements were made during the preliminary investigation,
not during the custodial investigation. However, he argues that the right to competent and independent counsel also applies
during preliminary investigations.
We disagree. A preliminary investigation is an inquiry or a proceeding to determine whether there is sufficient ground
to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed, and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof and
should be held for trial.
[22]

Evidently, a person undergoing preliminary investigation before the public prosecutor cannot be considered as being
under custodial investigation. In fact, this Court has unequivocally declared that a defendant on trial or under preliminary
investigation is not under custodial interrogation.
[23]
It explained as follows:
His [accused] interrogation by the police, if any there had been would already have been ended at the time of the filing of the criminal
case in court (or the public prosecutors office). Hence, with respect to a defendant in a criminal case already pending in court (or the
public prosecutors office), there is no occasion to speak of his right while under custodial interrogation laid down by the second and
subsequent sentences of Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution [now Section 12, Article III of the 1987 Constitution], for the
obvious reason that he is no longer under custodial interrogation.
[24]

There is no question that even in the absence of counsel, the admissions made by petitioner in his Counter-Affidavit
are not violative of his constitutional rights. It is clear from the undisputed facts that it was not exacted by the police while he
was under custody or interrogation. Hence, the constitutional rights of a person under custodial investigation as embodied in
Article III, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution, are not at issue in this case.
However, the accused -- whether in court or undergoing preliminary investigation before the public prosecutor --
unquestionably possess rights that must be safeguarded. These include: 1) the right to refuse to be made witnesses; 2) the
right not to have any prejudice whatsoever imputed to them by such refusal; 3) the right to testify on their own behalf, subject
to cross-examination by the prosecution; and 4) while testifying, the right to refuse to answer a specific question that tends
to incriminate them for some crime other than that for which they are being prosecuted.
[25]

We do not, however, agree with the Sandiganbayans characterization of petitioners Counter-Affidavit as an
extrajudicial confession. It is only an admission. Sections 26 and 33 of Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence
distinguish one from the other as follows:
SEC. 26. Admissions of a party. The act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against him.
SEC. 33. Confession. The declaration of an accused acknowledging his guilt of the offense charged, or of any offense necessarily
included therein, may be given in evidence against him.
In a confession, there is an acknowledgment of guilt; in an admission, there is merely a statement of fact not directly
involving an acknowledgment of guilt or of the criminal intent to commit the offense with which one is charged.
[26]
Thus, in
the case at bar, a statement by the accused admitting the commission of the act charged against him but denying that it was
done with criminal intent is an admission, not a confession.
[27]

The Counter-Affidavit in question contains an admission that petitioner actually shot the victim when the latter was
attacking him. We quote the pertinent portion:
[K]aya itong si Kapitan San Juan ay sumugod at hinawakan ako sa may leeg ng aking suot na T-shirt upang ako ay muling saksakin; sa
dahilang hindi ako makatakbo o makaiwas sa kabila ng aking pananalag hanggang magpaputok ako ng pasumala sa kanya; sa bilis ng
pangyayari ay hindi ko alam na siya ay tinamaan;
[28]

Through the above statement, petitioner admits shooting the victim -- which eventually led to the latters death -- but
denies having done it with any criminal intent. In fact, he claims he did it in self-defense. Nevertheless, whether categorized
as a confession or as an admission, it is admissible in evidence against him.
Further, we do not doubt the voluntariness of the Counter-Affidavit. Petitioner himself submitted it to the public
prosecutor to justify his actions in relation to the charges hurled against him. It escapes this Court how he can cavalierly
deny a document that he has voluntarily submitted and originally relied upon in his defense.
In general, admissions may be rebutted by confessing their untruth or by showing they were made by mistake. The
party may also establish that the response that formed the admission was made in a jocular, not a serious, manner; or that
the admission was made in ignorance of the true state of facts.
[29]
Yet, petitioner never offered any rationalization why such
admissions had been made, thus, leaving them unrebutted. In addition, admissions made under oath, as in the case at bar,
are evidence of great weight against the declarant. They throw on him the burden of showing a mistake.
[30]

Petitioner contends that nowhere in the transcripts of this case can it be found that he has admitted to the authorship,
the authenticity or the voluntariness of the Counter-Affidavit. We quote verbatim the proceedings in the Sandiganbayan:
PJ GARCHITORENA
Well, he will identify the person who took the oath before him. Will you deny that it was your client who
took the oath before the Fiscal at the preliminary investigation?
ATTY. ILAGAN
We will admit that, your Honor.
PJ GARCHITORENA
So in that case we will have no question about the authorship, authenticity and the voluntariness of the
execution of the counter-affidavit dated July 31, 1990? Companiero?
ATTY ILAGAN
Admitted, your Honor.
[31]

The admissions of petitioner made through his counsel cannot be any clearer. To be sure, the unbroken stream
of judicial dicta is that, in the conduct of their case, clients are bound by the actions of their counsels, save when the latters
negligence is so gross, reckless and inexcusable that the former are deprived of their day in court.
[32]
Also, clients, being
bound by the actions of their counsels, cannot complain that the result of the litigation might have been different had their
lawyers proceeded differently.
[33]
A counsel may err as to the competency of witnesses, the sufficiency and the relevance of
evidence, the proper defense, the burden of proof, the introduction or the withholding of witnesses or pieces of evidence, or
the manner of arguing the case. This Court, however, has ruled several times that those are not even proper grounds for a
new trial, unless the counsels incompetence is so gross that the clients are prevented from fairly presenting their case.
[34]

Having admitted that he had fatally shot the victim, petitioner had the duty of showing that the killing was justified, and
that the latter incurred no criminal liability therefor.
[35]
Petitioner should have relied on the strength of his own evidence and
not on the weakness of that for the prosecution. Even if his evidence be weak, it cannot be disbelieved after the accused
has admitted the killing.
[36]

Petitioner argues that it was the prosecution that indirectly raised the issue of self-defense. Hence, he could not be
bound by it. This argument deserves scant consideration. As discussed earlier, the declarations contained in his Counter-
Affidavit are admissions that may be used as evidence against him.
[37]
The Sandiganbayan did not unfairly presume that he
had indeed raised the theory of self-defense, because this argument had already been laid out in his Counter-Affidavit. No
presumption was necessary, because the admission was clear and unequivocal.
Neither do we believe petitioners claim that the anti-graft court miserably failed to give equal effect or treatment to all
the allegations found therein (Counter-Affidavit) choosing deliberately and without reasonable basis the parts which are
incriminating in character, and ignoring without sufficient legal basis the exculpatory assertions of the accused.
[38]

The unsubstantiated and uncorroborated statements of petitioner in his Counter-Affidavit are utterly insufficient to
discharge his burden of proving that the act of killing was justified. It is hornbook doctrine that self-defense must be proved
with certainty by sufficient, satisfactory and convincing evidence that excludes any vestige of criminal aggression on the part
of the person invoking it.
[39]
It cannot be entertained if it is uncorroborated by any separate and competent evidence, and it is
also doubtful.
[40]
The question whether the accused acted in self-defense is essentially a question of fact properly evaluated
by the lower court; in this case, the Sandiganbayan.
[41]

By itself, the Counter-Affidavit miserably fails to establish the requisites of self-defense enumerated in the law.
[42]
Had
petitioner been more vigilant in protecting his rights, he could have presented clear and cogent evidence to prove those
elements. But, as found by the court a quo, he not only failed to discharge the burden of proving the existence of the
justifying circumstance of self-defense; he did not even bother to present any evidence at all.
[43]
So, we do not see how the
Sandiganbayan could have been selective in its treatment of his Counter-Affidavit.
Verily, if the accused fails to discharge the burden of proving the existence of self-defense or of any other
circumstance that eliminates criminal liability, his conviction shall of necessity follow, on the basis of his admission of the
killing.
[44]
Upholding this principle does not in any way violate his right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty. When he
admitted to having killed the victim, the burden of proving his innocence fell on him. It became his duty to establish by clear
and convincing evidence the lawful justification for the killing.
Therefore, petitioner can no longer invoke his constitutional right to be presumed innocent of the crime charged.
[45]
As
far as he is concerned, homicide has already been established. The fact of death and its cause were established by his
admissions coupled with the other prosecution evidence including the Certificate of Death,
[46]
the Certificate of Post-Mortem
Examination
[47]
and the Medico-Legal Findings.
[48]
The intent to kill is likewise presumed from the fact of death.
[49]

Second Issue:
Denial of Motion for Leave to File Demurrer
Petitioner then argues that the Sandiganbayan erred in not giving due course to his Motion for Leave to File Demurrer
to Evidence. He brands this denial as legally and constitutionally wrong.
[50]

We disagree. Prior leave to file a demurrer to evidence is discretionary upon the trial court.
[51]
And, unless there is
grave abuse amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in its denial, the trial courts resolution may not be disturbed.
[52]

Final Issue:
Voluntary Surrender
After vigorously arguing against his own Counter-Affidavit, petitioner, in a surprising change of tenor, implores this
Court to consider his voluntary surrender to the police authorities as a mitigating circumstance. He argues that two of the
prosecution witnesses testified that he had surrendered to the police authorities after the shooting incident.
[53]
To buttress his
argument, he contends that the main reason for his voluntary surrender is that he sincerely believe[d] that he was legally
justified in defending himself as a policeman when he fought the victim after he was attacked by the latter.
[54]
It goes without
saying that this statement only reaffirms the admissions contained in his Counter-Affidavit, which he so vehemently tried to
discredit.
For voluntary surrender to mitigate criminal liability, the following elements must concur: 1) the offender has not been
actually arrested, 2) the offender surrenders himself to a person in authority or to the latters agent, and 3) the surrender is
voluntary.
[55]
To be sufficient, the surrender must be spontaneous and made in a manner clearly indicating the intent of the
accused to surrender unconditionally, either because they acknowledge their guilt or wish to save the authorities the trouble
and the expense that will necessarily be incurred in searching for and capturing them.
[56]

The only pieces of evidence in support of the plea of voluntary surrender made by petitioner are statements made by
two (2) prosecution witnesses that they were allegedly told by other people that he had already gone to the police
station. There is no showing that he was not actually arrested; or that when he went to the police station, he surrendered
himself to a person in authority. Neither is there any finding that he has evinced a desire to own to any complicity in the
killing.
We have ruled in the past that the accused who had gone to the police headquarters merely to report the shooting
incident did not evince any desire to admit responsibility for the killing. Thus, he could not be deemed to have voluntarily
surrendered.
[57]
In the absence of sufficient and convincing proof showing the existence of indispensable circumstances, we
cannot appreciate voluntary surrender to mitigate petitioners penalty.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision and Resolution AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona, and Carpio-Morales, JJ., concur.
Puno, (Chairman), J., abroad on official business.

[G.R. No. 157984. July 8, 2004]
MOISES SIMANGAN, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
D E C I S I O N
CALLEJO, SR., J .:
Before us is a petition for review of the Decision
[1]
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 11971 and its Resolution
denying the petitioners motion for reconsideration of the said decision.
The Antecedents
The petitioner Moises Simangan and Loreto Bergado were charged with murder in an Information filed with the Circuit
Criminal Court in Cagayan, the accusatory portion of which reads:
That on or about February 10, 1980, in the municipality of Solana, province of Cagayan, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the said accused, Moises Simangan y Trinidad and Loreto Bergado y Rigor alias Boy, together with Bening Gomabong (sic), who
is still at large and not yet apprehended, and two (2) John Does, who were not identified, armed with guns and knives, conspiring
together and helping one another, with intent to kill; with evident premeditation and with treachery, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab one Ernesto Flores, inflicting upon him several wounds on his body which caused his
death.
Contrary to law.
[2]

The accused, assisted by counsel, were duly arraigned, and pleaded not guilty to the charge.
The Case for the Prosecution
At 8:00 p.m. on February 10, 1980, the petitioner, Loreto Bergado, Bening Gumabong and two other male persons
arrived at the store of the spouses Ernesto Flores and Sofronia Saquing in Barangay Maasin, Solana, Cagayan. The Flores
Spouses, along with fifteen-year-old Lorna Saquing, Sofronias niece, were then having dinner. The five men were in fatigue
uniforms and were armed with long firearms. When they knocked on the door, Lorna responded and inquired what they
wanted, and she was told that they wanted to buy cigarettes. Ernesto and Sofronia entertained the men, two of whom were
their neighbors, Loreto Bergado and Bening Gumabong.
Momentarily, the petitioner asked Ernesto to go with them to serve as a guide. In response, Ernesto invited the men to
sleep at their house, but the latter refused. Ernesto then agreed to accompany the visitors. The petitioner warned Ernesto
and Sofronia not to tell anyone that they had been to the store. As they were leaving, Romeo Galano, the couples helper at
the store, arrived. Ernesto ordered Romeo to go with him, and the latter did as he was told. However, at about 9:00 p.m.,
Romeo returned to the store and told Sofronia that Ernesto had sent him back to get money, matches and cigarettes. He
also told Sofronia that he and Ernesto were seated as they conversed with each other. Sofronia gaveP50.00, a box of
matches and a ream of Hope cigarettes. Romeo left the store at about 9:30 p.m.
[3]
Ernesto did not return that evening.
[4]

The next morning, Romeo Balunggaya arrived at Sofronias house and told her that Ernesto was dead, and that his
body had been found about three hundred (300) meters away. Sofronia and Lorna rushed to the place, and found Ernestos
body near the creek.
[5]
Ernesto was lying on the ground, face down, with his hands tied behind his back. Police investigators
Pagulayan and Caronan arrived, along with a photographer. Pictures of the victim were taken.
[6]

Dr. Anastacia Taguba, the Municipal Health Officer, performed an autopsy of the cadaver and found that the victim
sustained multiple stabwounds. She concluded that the victim died because of shock due to massive internal and external
hemorrhage from multiple stab wounds.
[7]
She also signed the Certificate of Death of Ernesto.
[8]

On February 18, 1980, Fernando Saquing attended his classes in civil engineering at the St. Louis University in
Tuguegarao, Cagayan. He noticed his seatmate and close friend, petitioner Moises Simangan, writing on a piece of paper.
He grabbed the paper, read it, and saw that the petitioner had written the following: Andres Buena alias Ka Ren, Cely
Pea alias Ka Laarni, Moises Simangan alias Ka Ronie Ledesma. The petitioner warned Fernando not to divulge his secret
to anybody.
[9]

On February 24, 1980, Fernando and the petitioner were on their way home from their ROTC classes at the St. Louis
University. The petitioner then narrated to Fernando that at about 7:00 p.m. on February 10, 1980, after buying cigarettes
from a store, the store-owner agreed to go with him and his four companions. The petitioner revealed that they brought the
victim over to the place where twenty of his other comrades were waiting. He also told Fernando that he and his
companions stabbed the victim over and over again, and tasted the latters blood so that they would not get sick. The
petitioner warned that if Fernando divulged to anyone what he had just revealed, he (the petitioner), would drink his blood,
too.
[10]

The petitioner did not know that Fernando was the first cousin of Sofronia, the widow of Ernesto Flores, who was, in
turn, the store-owner referred to by Moises.
[11]
Fernando immediately told Sofronia what the petitioner had told him.
On March 21, 24 and 25, 1980, Sofronia, Fernando and Lorna gave their respective statements
[12]
to Sgt. Quirino
Espiritu of the Philippine Constabulary in Tuguegarao, Cagayan, in which they identified Moises as one of Ernestos
assailants.
The Case for the Defense
The petitioner denied any involvement in the killing of Ernesto. He testified that on the day that Ernesto was killed, he
was in his boarding house in Tuguegarao. He was the classmate of Fernando at the St. Louis University in Tuguegarao,
Cagayan, where they were enrolled in the civil engineering course.
[13]
Sometime in February 1980, Fernando asked him
about Andres Balbuena who was from Solana, Cagayan. A week later, he was arrested on suspicions that he had
something to do with the death of Ernesto.
[14]
Fernando, who was in the PC barracks, pointed to him as one of the assailants
of Ernesto. He was surprised at Fernandos accusation.
[15]

The petitioner also denied knowing Loreto Bergado, claiming that he only met the latter at the provincial jail.
[16]
He had
not been to Barangay Maasin, Solana.
The accused Loreto Bergado also denied killing Ernesto. He testified that he did not know Ernesto and the latters
wife, Sofronia. On February 10, 1980, he was in his house at Nangalasauan, Amulung, Cagayan. After waking up the next
day, he went to his farm.
[17]

To corroborate his testimony, Bergado presented his neighbor, Feliciano Trinidad, who testified that after his classes
on February 10, 1980, he went out of their house at Barangay Nangalasauan, Amulung, Cagayan, to get a breath of fresh
air. He then saw Bergado and spoke with him until 9:00 p.m.
[18]

Cornelia Trinidad corroborated the testimony of the petitioner that she boarded in the house of Rosendo Tuddao in
February 1980.
The defense also presented Leona Balunggaya, who testified that between 4:00 and 5:00 a.m. on February 11, 1980,
Sofronia and Leon Rigor arrived at their house, crying. Sofronia inquired if Ernesto had passed by, because her husband
had not slept in their house. Balunggaya replied in the negative. When Balunggaya asked Sofronia if she recognized the
armed men who were with her husband, Sofronia replied that she did not because their faces were new to her.
[19]
Aside from
their house, there were no other houses in the vicinity of Sofronias place. Right after Sofronia and Leon had left, she and
her husband Romeo went to their farm to drive away the birds and saw the cadaver of Ernesto, about three hundred (300)
meters away.
After trial, the court rendered judgment finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of homicide. The decretal
portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the accused Moises Simangan y Trinidad and Loreto Bergado y Rigor having been found by the Court guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide defined and penalized under Art. 249 of the Revised Penal code, and considering the presence
of two aggravating circumstances, are hereby sentenced each to an indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and one (1) day ofreclusion temporal, as maximum, to indemnify the heirs
of the victim Ernesto Flores the sum of P30,000.00, proportionately and to pay costs pro rata.
SO ORDERED.
[20]

On appeal to the Court of Appeals, it rendered judgment, affirming with modification, the decision of the trial court. It
found the testimonies of Sofronia, Lorna, and Fernando, credible and entitled to full probative weight.
The Present Petition
Petitioner Moises Simangan filed the instant petition for review on certiorari, asserting that:
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN BELIEVING THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES AND DISREGARDING THE EVIDENCE FOR
THE DEFENSE.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF
HOMICIDE.
[21]

The petitioner contends that the prosecution failed to adduce circumstantial evidence sufficient to prove his guilt of the
crime of homicide beyond reasonable doubt. He asserts that Sofronia and Lorna pointed to and identified him only upon the
prodding of Fernando, who told Sofronia that he (the petitioner) had admitted to stabbing and killing the victim together wit h
twenty of his other companions. The petitioner contends that the testimony of Fernando is hearsay, as he had no personal
knowledge that he was one of those who killed the victim.
On the other hand, the Court of Appeals declared in its assailed decision that the array of circumstantial evidence
adduced by the prosecution constitutes proof beyond cavil that the petitioner was one of those who killed the victim. As
catalogued by the appellate court:
(1) at about 8:00 oclock in the evening of February 10, 1980, accused Moises Simangan, Loreto Bergado,
Bening Gumabong and two unidentified companions each of whom were armed with long rifles, went to the
store of the victim Ernesto Flores at Sitio Masin (sic), Iraga, Solana and bought cigarettes;
(2) that Moises Simangan asked Ernesto Flores to guide Simangan, Bergado, Gumabong and their two
companions on their way to the road;
(3) that Simangan, Bergado and their two companions, together with Ernesto Flores and Romeo Galano, were
out of the house;
(4) that Simangan warned Sofronia and Lorna not to tell anybody that he and his companions went to the house;
(5) that five days after the death of Ernesto, Simangan became worried when told by his classmate Fernando
Saquing that several persons were arrested at Nangalasauan, Amulung, for the death of Ernesto;
(6) that two weeks after the death of the victim, Simangan admitted to Fernando that he and twenty others had
just killed a person in Masin, (sic)Iraga, Solana, after the victim accompanied them to show them the way;
(7) and that Fernando was warned not to relate it to any other person with the threat that if it will be known by
others, Simangan will drink his blood.
[22]

The Ruling of the Court
We find the contention of the petitioner to be unmeritorious. Sofronia narrated in detail how the petitioner and his
companions, armed with long firearms, managed to convince Ernesto to go with them and be their guide on the
road. Sofronia pointed to and identified the petitioner in open court. Thus:
Q On February 10, 1980, at 8:00, do you recall where you were?
A Yes, Sir.
Q Where were you?
A We were at home, Sir.
Q And you mentioned . . . and who were your companions at that time?
A My husband, my sister Lorna Saquing, my daughter, Sir.
Q What is the name of your daughter?
A Jannet, Sir.
Q How old was she at that time?
A Two (2) years old, Sir.
Q What is the name of your sister?
A Lorna, Sir.
Q And your husband?
A Ernesto Flores, Sir.
Q What were you doing at that time?
A Eating, Sir.
Q Where is your house located?
A Masim (sic), Solana, Cagayan, Sir.
Q Do you recall of anything unusual that happened on February 10, 1980, when you were actually eating with
your family, if any?
A On February 10, 1980, while we were actually taking our supper, there was a person who went to buy
cigarette in our store and it was my sister Lorna who went to open the store and saw five persons holding
gun (sic), Sir.
Q Where is your store located?
A In Masim (sic), Solana, Cagayan, Sir.
Q Is your store also a part of your house where you live-in (sic)?
A Yes, Sir.
Q When these five persons came to your house and Lorna Saquing, your sister, was the one who opened the
door, what happened next?
A When those five persons entered our store, Lorna came to us in the kitchen and called for us and the three
of us proceeded to the store and looked to those five persons, Sir.
Q And what happened next when you went to see those five persons?
A We saw five persons with long firearms, Sir.
Q Do you know the names of those five persons whom you saw?
A I know the three of them only, Sir.
Q What are the names of these three persons whom you know?
A Moises Simangan, Boy Bergado and Bening Bungabong (sic), Sir.
Q This Bening Bungabong (sic), if he is in court, can you point him out?
A No, he is not here in court, Sir.
Q Yes, but this Loreto Bergado, if you can see him in the courtroom, can you point him out?
A Yes, Sir.
INTERPRETER:
Witness pointing to that person in brown t-shirt who identified himself to be Loreto Bergado y Rigor when he was
pointed to by the witness.
Q How about this person by the name of Moises Simangan, will you look around the courtroom and see if he is
here?
A He is there, Sir.
INTERPRETER:
Witness pointing to a person seated in the courtroom who stood up when he was pointed to by the witness and
identified himself to be Moises Simangan y Trinidad.
[23]

The petitioner even warned Sofronia and Ernesto not to tell anyone that he and his companions had been in their
house:
Q And when Moises Simangan came to know that your barangay captain in Iraga was Mr. Mario Marsan, what
happened next, if any?
A Then Moises Simangan requested my husband to accompany them to the road because Moises Simangan
is new in our place, Sir.
Q And what did your husband say, if any?
A Then my husband told them if it will be alright for them, they may sleep in the house, Sir.
Q And what did he say?
A Then Moises Simangan answered my husband that: we cannot sleep in your place because we might be
late tomorrow, Sir.
Q And what happened next?
A And then Moises Simangan told us not to tell anybody about their going to our store, Sir.
Q And when Moises Simangan warned you not to tell anybody about their presence in your place, what
happened next, if any?
A Then my husband told me that he would accompany them to the road, Sir.
Q And when your husband told you that he would bring them to the road, what happened next, if any?
A And then Moises Simangan and his companions took my husband to the road and not long afterwards, my
boy by the name of Romeo Galano, went back to the store and told me that my husband told him to go
back to get money and cigarette and also [a] match, Sir.
Q And what time did they take away your husband from your house?
A 8:00 oclock in the evening, Sir.
Q Was it exactly 8:00 oclock or past 8:00?
A Past 8:00, it could be past 8:00 oclock already, Sir.
[24]

Lorna also testified that when she attended to the petitioner and his companions, she saw their faces:
Q Now, while at about that time on February 10, 1980, do you remember any unusual incident that happened
in the house of your sister?
A Yes, Sir.
Q What was that incident that happened?
A On that evening, Sir, while we were eating I heard a voice calling outside or I heard someone calling outside
with the word Diyos Apo and when I finished eating, I went inside the house and asked who was that, and
nobody answered, and so, what I did was to open the door and I was surprised there were five armed men
at our door who went inside our house.
Q You said that these five men who entered the house were armed, will you please tell this Honorable Court
what were their arms?
A All the five men who entered our house were armed with long rifle each of them (sic).
Q Now, do you know the identity of these five armed men who entered the house where you were staying?
ATTY. VELASCO:
The question is vague, Your Honor.
Whether he refers to the present or at that time of the incident.
COURT:
Reformed. (sic)
FISCAL HERNANDO:
Q At the time of the incident, of these five armed men who entered the house of your sister upon your opening
the door, do you know the identity of these five armed men or any of them?
A Yes, Sir, I know them.
Q Will you please tell this Honorable Court who were they?
A Moises Simangan, Boy Bergado, Bening Gumabong and two others whom I do not know.
Q You said that at the time you opened the door and these five men entered, you already knew three of them,
namely Moises Simangan, Bening Gumabong and Boy Bergado, why do you know them?
A I was able to recognize them, Sir, through their faces.
Q Why were they familiar to you?
A When I opened the door, Sir, and the five armed men entered our house, I stared at their faces.
Q Will you please answer my question, why were you able or why were you familiar with the faces of these
men when they entered the house of your sister that evening of February 10, 1980?
ATTY. SORIANO:
She answered, I saw their faces.
COURT:
Witness may answer.
A These Boy Bergado and Bening Gumabong were my barcada in Maasim, Solana, Cagayan.
FISCAL HERNANDO:
Q What do you mean by saying that Gumabong and Bergado were your barcada?
A They were my companions, Sir.
Q For how long were they your barcada before the incident?
A Three years, Sir.
Q Now, with respect to Moises Simangan, why do you say that his face is familiar to you at the time of the
incident?
A I stared at his face because he was new in our place.
[25]

It was only when Fernando told his cousin Sofronia that the petitioner had admitted to being one of those who
inveigled Ernesto into going with them, and thereafter killed the victim, that she and Lorna heard the petitioners name for
the first time.
Q Now, do you know, I withdraw that question, Your Honor. How about Moises Simangan, did you know him
already before February 10, 1980?
A No, Sir.
Q Why do you know his name then?
A I came to know his name when Moises Simangan informed Fernando, my cousin, about those things that
they have done to my husband, but Fernando did not mention to him that I am his cousin and it was
Fernando, my cousin, who informed me about his name, Sir.
[26]

The testimony of Fernando, that the petitioner admitted to him that he was one of the victims killers, is not
hearsay. The testimony of Fernando was offered to prove the petitioners extrajudicial admission of his involvement in the
killing of Ernesto. Such admission is an admission against personal interest, and is admissible against the petitioner.
[27]

We note that the petitioner admitted during trial that he and Fernando were classmates in a civil engineering subject at
St. Louis University, and in the ROTC training. The petitioner also admitted that he and Fernando were friends. Hence, it
was not impossible for the petitioner to have revealed his involvement in the killing to Fernando. The petitioner did not
hesitate to inform Fernando that he and his companions had killed Ernesto because an informer had told them that Ernesto
was bad. The testimony of Fernando reads, viz:
Q What else did he tell you?
ATTY. SORIANO:
May we ask the witness that he be directed to speak louder.
COURT:
You speak louder.
A There, Sir.
FISCAL HERNANDO:
Q And what was that?
A He informed me that they had just killed a person in Maasim (sic), Solana, Cagayan and we threw him
beside a creek. And I asked Moises Simangan, How come that that person is bad, and he answered me,
We had an informer who is their neighbor.
FISCAL HERNANDO:
Q Now, you said that there were some companions of Moises Simangan because he used the word WE,
were you able to find out from him how many persons were those who perpetrated the crime in
Maasim (sic), Solana, Cagayan, as you stated recently?
ATTY. SORIANO:
May we request that witness should stop.
FISCAL HERNANDO:
That is the narration, Your Honor.
ATTY. SORIANO:
May we request that the narration should be in a question and answer (sic).
COURT:
Continue.
A What Moises Simangan narrated to me, Sir, is We were five persons who went to the store of that person
and (sic) to buy cigarette. At the time the persons were waiting in the store and after we bought the
cigarette, we let the person accompany us on our way because we do not know the way and then Moises
Simangan brought the person to the place where there were twenty persons waiting who were their
companions and then they stabbed the person and in stabbing, each person tasted the blood (sic) that,
according to Moises Simangan, they will not get sick.
FISCAL HERNANDO:
Q Did you or did you not ask him what time of the day or night was that?
A No, Sir. When they visited the house of the victim to buy cigarette I was informed by Moises Simangan that
it was 7:30 in the evening.
Q Now, after having revealed to you all these things, do you remember if Moises Simangan told you anything
else?
A Yes, Sir.
Q What did he tell you?
A He told me that Nanding, I now warn you, and you know me, once they know these, I am going to drink
your blood.
[28]

The petitioners alibi and denial of the crime charged cannot prevail over the positive and straightforward identification
made by Lorna and Sofronia that he was one of the armed men who left with Ernesto, coupled with the petitioners own
admission that he was one of the victims assailants. We note that there is no evidence, nor any showing of any ill-motive
on the part of Lorna, Sofronia and Fernando to prevaricate. In fact, the petitioner and Fernando were close friends. Thus,
the presumption is that the said witness acted in good faith; hence, their testimonies must be accorded credence and full
probative weight.
The three witnesses cannot be faulted, and their credibility denigrated for giving their statements to Sgt. Espiritu of the
Philippine Constabulary only on March 21 to 25, 1980. As copiously explained by the Court of Appeals:
Appellants attempt to cast doubt on the credibility of [the] positive identification made by Sofronia and Lorna that they were among
those five (5) armed persons who took along the victim Ernesto Flores on the pretext that appellant Simangan being new to the place
would need said victim to guide him on the road. Both Lorna and Sofronia knew personally appellant Bergado and Gumabong being
Lornas former friends and Sofronias neighbors. On the other hand, the delay in revealing the identities of appellants Bergado and
Simangan had been sufficiently explained. It must be recalled that appellant Simangan had made a stern warning before they left that
Sofronia and Lorna should not tell anybody about their presence in the place that night. Those men being then armed and determined to
take along with them the victim out on the road, even threatening Sofronia and Lorna not to divulge the incident to others, there was
strong reason for said witnesses to keep mum on the identities of appellants even when the police investigators arrived the following
morning and asked them about the names of the five (5) persons or at least any of them they had recognized. It is understandable when a
witness does not immediately report the identity of the offender after a startling occurrence, more so when he is related to the victim as
this makes it all the more traumatic. It is, likewise, understandable for a witness to fear for his safety especially when town mates are
involved in the commission of the crime. Even if the principal witnesses, Lorna and Sofronia, did not witness the actual killing of
Ernesto Flores, the circumstances that the latter was last seen alive together with the appellants and Gumabong, along with two (2) other
unidentified companions that night who were armed with guns, that he was never to return home that night, and his dead body discovered
in a nearby field, lying face down on the ground, both his arms tied at his back with multiple stab wounds on his neck and back the
combination of these circumstances leave no doubt on their minds that those five (5) persons were responsible for Ernestos gruesome
death and such conviction was enough to temporarily silence them from revealing immediately to the police investigators the identities
of appellant Bergado and Gumabong, and subsequently, Simangan.
[29]

In sum, then, we find and so rule that the appellate court correctly affirmed the decision of the trial court convicting the
petitioner of homicide. However, the appellate court erred in appreciating against the petitioner the aggravating
circumstances of cruelty and nighttime. In the first place, such circumstances were not alleged in the Information as
mandated by Section 8, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
[30]
Although the petitioner committed the
crime before the effectivity date of said Rules, the same should be applied retroactively as it is favorable to him.
[31]

Moreover, the crime is not aggravated by cruelty simply because the victim sustained ten stab wounds, three of which
were fatal. For cruelty to be considered as an aggravating circumstance, there must be proof that, in inflicting several stab
wounds on the victim, the perpetrator intended to exacerbate the pain and suffering of the victim.
[32]
The number of wounds
inflicted on the victim is not proof of cruelty.
Consequently, then, the penalty imposed by the trial court on the petitioner must be modified. There being no
modifying circumstances attendant to the crime, the maximum of the indeterminate penalty shall be taken from the medium
period of the imposable penalty of homicide which is reclusion temporal. The minimum of the indeterminate penalty shall be
taken from the full range of the penalty lower by one degree forreclusion temporal, which is prision mayor.
IN LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The assailed decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 11971 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. The petitioner is hereby sentenced an indeterminate
penalty of from Ten (10) Years and One (1) Day of prision mayor in its maximum period, as minimum, to Sixteen (16) Years
of reclusion temporal in its medium period, as maximum.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Quisumbing, Austria-Martinez, and Tinga, JJ., concur






















[G. R. No. 146202. July 14, 2004]
RUFINA PATIS FACTORY, and JESUS LUCAS, SR. petitioners, vs. JUAN ALUSITAIN, respondent.
D E C I S I O N
CARPIO MORALES, J .:
From the June 23, 2000 Decision
[1]
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 54722 affirming that of the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) awarding retirement benefits in the amount of P88,595.00 to respondent Juan
Alusitain (Alusitain), petitioners Rufina Patis Factory and Jesus Lucas, Sr. (Lucas) come to this Court on a petition for review
on certiorari.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
In March 1948, Alusitain was hired as a laborer at the Rufina Patis Factory owned and operated by petitioner
Lucas. After close to forty three years or on February 19, 1991, Alusitain admittedly tendered his letter of resignation which
is quoted verbatim:
February 19, 1991
TO: MR. JESUS LUCAS, JR.
ASSISTANT MANAGER
RUFINA PATIS FACTORY
Gentlemen:
I would like to tender my separation letter as a laborer, from your good company effective this 20
th
of February 1991. May I take this
opportunity to extent my heartfelt thanks to you for having given me the chance to commit myself to work in your factory from which I
owe varied experiences that has made a part of me and be what I am today. Anticipating your outmost consideration on this matter. I
remain.
VERY TRULY YOURS,
(Signed)
JUAN A. ALUSITAIN
RECEIVED THE ABOVE SEPARATION LETTER ON THIS DAY, FEBRUARY 20, 1991.
(Signed)
BY: JESUS R. LUCAS, JR.
Assistant Manager
[2]

On May 22, 1991, Alusitain executed a duly notarized affidavit of separation from employment and submitted the same
on even date to the Pensions Department of the Social Security System (SSS). The affidavit reads:
Republic of the Philippines )SSS
Quezon City )
AFFIDAVIT OF SEPARATION FROM EMPLOYMENT
I, JUAN ASERAS ALUSITAIN of legal age, 63, Filipino and residing at Int. 18 Flores St., Mal. Mla, after having [been] sworn to in
accordance with law hereby depose and state;
1. That I am [a] bonafide member of the Social Security System with SSS Number 03-0107252-0
2. That I was separated from my last employer RUFINA PATIS FACTORY with address at 290 C. Arellano St.,
Malabon, Metro Manila on 2-20-91 and thereafter, I was never again re-employed.
3. That I cannot secure a certification of separation from my last employer because I have not reached the company
applicable age of retirement.
4. That I am executing this affidavit to attest to the truth of the foregoing facts and to support my retirement paper.
FURTHER AFFIANT SAYETH NAUGHT.
(Signed)
Affiant
[3]

On January 7, 1993, Republic Act No. 7641 (R.A. 7641),
[4]
AN ACT AMENDING ARTICLE 287 OF PRESIDENTIAL
DECREE NO. 442, AS AMENDED OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE LABOR CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, BY PROVIDING
FOR RETIREMENT PAY TO QUALIFIED PRIVATE SECTOR EMPLOYEES IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY RETIRMENT
PLAN IN THE ESTABLISHMENT, took effect
[5]
providing, among other things, thusly:
Art. 287. Retirement. Any employee may be retired upon reaching the retirement age established in the collective bargaining
agreement or other applicable employment contract.
x x x
In the absence of a retirement plan or agreement providing for retirement benefits of employees in the establishment, an employee upon
reaching the age of sixty (60) years or more, but not beyond sixty five (65) years which is hereby declared the compulsory retirement
age, who has served at least five (5) years in the said establishment, may retire and shall be entitled to retirement pay equivalent to at
least one half (
1
/2) month salary for every year of service, a fraction of at least six (6) months being considered as one whole year.
Unless the parties provide for broader inclusions, the term one half (
1
/2) month salary shall mean fifteen (15) days plus one twelfth (
1
/12)
of the 13th month pay and the cash equivalent of not more than five (5) days of service incentive leaves.
x x x
Violation of this provision is hereby declared unlawful and subject to the penal provisions under Article 288 of this Code.
[6]

Sometime in 1995, Alusitain, claiming that he retired from the company on January 31, 1995, having reached the age
of 65
[7]
and due to poor health, verbally demanded from petitioner Lucas for the payment of his retirement benefits. By his
computation, he claimed that he was entitled to P86,710.00
[8]
broken down as follows:
Retirement Benefits = month salary for every year of service
One-half month salary = P1,885.00
Years of Service = 47 years
Retirement Benefits = P86,710.00
[9]

Petitioner Lucas, however, refused to pay the retirement benefits of Alusitain, prompting the latter to make a written
demand on September 20, 1995. Lucas, however, remained adamant in his refusal to give in to Alusitains demands.
Having failed to arrive at an amicable settlement, Alusitain filed on November 17, 1995 a complaint before the NLRC
against petitioners Rufina Patis Factory and Lucas for non-payment of retirement benefits. The complaint was docketed as
NLRC Case No. 00-11-07474-95.
Petitioners maintained that Alusitain had resigned from the company on February 19, 1991 per his letter of resignation
and the Affidavit of Separation dated May 22, 1991.
[10]

On the other hand, while respondent admitted having tendered his letter of resignation on February 19, 1991 and
executed the Affidavit of Separation on May 22, 1991,
[11]
he nevertheless maintained that he continued working for
petitioners until January 1995, the date of actual retirement, due to illness and old age, and that he merely accomplished the
foregoing documents in compliance with the requirements of the SSS in order to avail of his retirement benefits.
[12]

By Decision
[13]
of February 6, 1997, Executive Labor Arbiter Valentin C. Guanio upheld Alusitains position in this wise:
After carefully considering the respective submissions of the parties and the evidence they adduced in support of their opposing claims,
this Office rules in favor of the complainant.
To substantiate his allegation that he had continued working for the respondents even after his supposed resignation on February 19,
1991, the complainant submitted in evidence his sworn statement and that of his eldest daughter, Gloria Alusitain. In his affidavit, the
complainant swore that: Bagamat ako ay pensionado ng SSS, ako ay patuloy na naglilingkod/nagtratrabaho sa kompanya ng Rufina
Patis Factory hanggang noong buwan ng Enero 1995. By way of corroboration, his daughter on the other hand, stated under oath that
since elementary school (sic), she was the one who brought food to her father at work in the Rufina Patis Factory; and that the last time
she brought him food at the said factory was in the month of January 1995.
While the foregoing statements may appear to be self-serving, still they have the ring of truth. From experience, it is quite common that
the eldest daughter would be tasked with the duty of taking lunch to her father at work. Besides, the respondents failed to controvert
these sworn declarations by submitting their counter-affidavits. If it is true that the complainant had in fact stopped working on February
1991, the respondents could have produced a number of witnesses who could have attested to this. Hence, their failure to submit even a
single affidavit does not speak well of their credibility in this regard.
Thus, this Office finds that the complainant had executed the letter of resignation and affidavit of separation from employment in 1991
only for the purpose of securing a pension from the SSS, but that despite this he remained in the employ of the respondents until his
actual retirement on January 31, 1995, two years after the effectivity of Republic Act 7641 on January 7, 1993. At the time of his
retirement, the complainant was already sixty-five (65) years of age and had served the respondent company for forty-seven (47) years
and therefore, he is legally entitled to the retirement benefits granted by R.A. 7641 which is one-half (1/2) month salary for every year of
service which as computed will amount to a total of P88,595.00 (P1,885.00 x 47 years).
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the respondents Rufina Patis Factory and Jesus Lucas,
Sr., jointly and severally to pay complainant Juan Alusitain his retirement benefits in the amount of P88,595.00.
SO ORDERED.
[14]

On appeal, the NLRC, by Resolution
[15]
of May 17, 1999, affirmed the Labor Arbiters decision.
Aggrieved by the NLRC resolution, petitioners brought the case on certiorari
[16]
to the Court of Appeals which, by the
assailed decision, dismissed it, holding that the NLRC committed no error much less any grave abuse of discretion
[17]
as
Alusitain was able to sufficiently establish that his letter of resignation and Affidavit of Separation were executed only for the
purpose of securing a pension from the SSS and that he remained in the employ of petitioners.
[18]

Their motion for reconsideration having been denied by the Court of Appeals by Resolution
[19]
of December 6, 2000,
petitioners lodged the present petition.
[20]

Petitioners argue that the appellate court erred when it did not give weight and probative value to Alusitains letter of
resignation and Affidavit of Separation, choosing instead to give credence to his self-serving sworn statement and that of his
daughter that he remained in the employ of petitioners until January 31, 1995.
Petitioners assert that the Affidavit of Separation, being a public document, is entitled to full faith and credit upon its
face, and proof is required to assail and controvert the same, citing Cacho v. Court of Appeals
[21]
and Arrieta v. Llosa.
[22]

Petitioners further assert that the appellate court erred in applying retroactively R.A. 7641 as said law does not
expressly provide for such retroactive application and to do so would defeat the clear intent of Congress. Furthermore,
petitioners insist that the case of Oro Enterprises, Inc. v. NLRC
[23]
is inapplicable and submit that what is controlling is the
case of J.V. Angeles Construction Corp. v. NLRC
[24]
where this Court held that before R.A. 7641 could be given retroactive
effect, the claimant should still be an employee of the employer at the time the said law took effect,.
The petition is impressed with merit.
This Court held in Oro
[25]
that R.A. 7641 should be given retroactive effect, viz:
R.A. 7641 is undoubtedly a social legislation. The law has been enacted as a labor protection measure and as a curative statute that
absent a retirement plan devised by, an agreement with, or a voluntary grant from, an employer can respond, in part at least, to the
financial well-being of workers during their twilight years soon following their life of labor. There should be little doubt about the fact
that the law can apply to labor contracts still existing at the time the statute has taken effect, and that its benefits can be reckoned not only
from the date of the laws enactment but retroactively to the time said employment contracts have started. . .
[26]
(Underscoring supplied)
The doctrine enunciated in Oro has been clarified in several cases. In CJC Trading, Inc. v. NLRC,
[27]
this Court,
speaking through Justice Florentino Feliciano, held that R.A. 7641 may be given retroactive effect where (1) the claimant for
retirement benefits was still the employee of the employer at the time the statute took effect; and (2) the claimant had
complied with the requirements for eligibility under the statute for such retirement benefits.
[28]
These twin requirements for
the retroactive application of R.A. 7641 have been reiterated in Philippine Scout Veterans Security and Investigation Agency
v. NLRC,
[29]
Cabcaban v. NLRC,
[30]
J.V. Angeles Construction Corporation v. NLRC,
[31]
and Manuel L. Quezon University v.
NLRC.
[32]

It is thus clear that in order for respondent to claim retirement benefits from petitioner Rufina Patis Factory, he has to
prove that he was its employee at the time R.A. 7641 took effect.
As a general rule, the factual findings and conclusions of quasi-judicial agencies such as the NLRC are, on appeal,
accorded great weight and even finality, unless petitioners are able to show that the NLRC arbitrarily disregarded the
evidence before it or misapprehended evidence of such nature as to compel a contrary conclusion if properly appreciated.
[33]

In affirming the decision of the NLRC and the Labor Arbiter, the Court of Appeals disregarded Alusitains letter of
resignation and Affidavit of Separation and gave weight to his and his daughters sworn statements that he remained in the
employ of petitioners until January 31, 1995.
It is a basic rule in evidence, however, that the burden of proof is on the part of the party who makes the
allegations
[34]
ei incumbit probatio,qui dicit, non qui negat.
[35]
If he claims a right granted by law, he must prove his claim
by competent evidence, relying on the strength of his own evidence and not upon the weakness of that of his opponent.
In the case at bar, it was incumbent on Alusitain to prove that he retired on January 31, 1995 and not on February 20,
1991 as indicated on his letter of resignation. As the following discussion will show, he utterly failed to discharge the onus.
Respondents letter of resignation and May 22, 1991 Affidavit of Separation which he admittedly voluntarily executed
constitute admissions against his own interest.
[36]
The said documents belie his claim that he retired on January 31,
1995. Being an admission against interest, the documents are the best evidence which affords the greatest certainty of the
facts in dispute.
[37]
The rationale for the rule is based on the presumption that no man would declare anything against himself
unless such declaration was true.
[38]
Thus, it is fair to presume that the declaration corresponds with the truth, and it is his
fault if it does not.
[39]

While these two documents may have facilitated the release of Alusitains retirement benefits from the SSS, hence,
beneficial to him at that time, they may still be considered admissions against interest since the disserving quality of the
admission is judged as of the time it is used or offered in evidence and not when such admission is made.
[40]
Thus, it matters
not that the admission is self-serving when it was made, so long as it is against respondents present claim.
[41]

No doubt, admissions against interest may be refuted by the declarant.
[42]
It bears stressing, however, that Alusitains
Affidavit of Separation filed with the SSS is a notarial document,
[43]
hence, prima facie evidence
[44]
of the facts expressed
therein.
[45]

Since notarial documents have in their favor the presumption of regularity, to contradict the facts stated therein, there
must be evidence that is clear, convincing and more than merely preponderant.
[46]

Alusitain explains through his subsequent sworn statement that he only executed these two documents in order to
obtain his retirement benefits from the SSS. His daughter, also by sworn statement, corroborates his explanation. His
position does not persuade.
In order for a declarant to impugn a notarial document which he himself executed, it is not enough for him to merel y
execute a subsequent notarial document. What the law requires in order to contradict the facts stated in a notarial
document is clear and convincing evidence. The subsequent notarial documents executed by respondent and his daughter
fall short of this standard.
The case of Reyes v. Zaballero
[47]
is instructive. In said case, the creditor executed on December 1, 1944 a notarial
document stating that he was releasing a real estate mortgage as the debtor had already paid his debt. On even date, the
creditor subsequently executed an affidavit without the debtors knowledge stating that he had accepted the payment under
protest and obligado por las circunstancias actuales. This Court held that the creditors statement in his affidavit that he
received the money obligado por las circunstancias actuales is self-serving evidence.
[48]

A contrary rule would undermine the confidence of the public in the integrity of notarial documents. In Dequito v.
Llamas,
[49]
this Court held:
After executing the affidavit voluntarily wherein he made admissions and declarations against his own interest under the solemnity of an
oath, he cannot be allowed to spurn them and undo what he has done. He cannot, even with great repentance, retrieve the body he
forsook and now wishes to live.
[50]

Neither is the sworn statement of Alusitains daughter sufficient to prove that he indeed retired on January 31,
1995. The February 6, 1997 Decision of Labor Arbiter Guanio relates the material portion of the sworn statement of
Alusitains daughter as follows:
. . . By way of corroboration, his daughter on the other hand, stated under oath that since elementary school (sic), she was the one who
brought food to her father at work in the Rufina Patis Factory; and that the last time she brought him food at the said factory was in
the month of January 1995.
[51]
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Alusitains daughter did not state, however, that her father worked for petitioner Rufina Patis Factory until his alleged
retirement on January 31, 1995. All she said was that the last time she brought him food at the factory was in January
1995. To conclude that Alusitain was still employed on January 1995 from the mere fact that his daughter brought him food
at the Rufina Patis Factory is non sequitur.
Lastly, while it is evident that Alusitains subsequent sworn statement is in the nature of a retraction of his May 22,
1991 Affidavit of Separation, such retraction does not necessarily negate the affidavit. For retractions are generally
unreliable and looked upon with considerable disfavor by the courts as they can easily be fabricated. Thus, before
accepting a retraction, it is necessary to examine the circumstances surrounding it and possible motives for reversing the
previous declaration, as these motives may not necessarily be in consonance with the truth. To automatically adopt them
hook, line and sinker would allow unscrupulous individuals to throw wide open the doors to fraud.
In the case at bar, Alusitains retraction is highly suspect. Other than his bare and self-serving allegations and the
sworn statement of his daughter which, as reflected above, cannot be relied upon, he has not shown any scintilla of
evidence that he was employed with petitioner Rufina Patis Factory at the time R.A. 7641 took effect. He did not produce
any documentary evidence such as pay slips, income tax return, his identification card, or any other independent evidence
to substantiate his claim.
While the NLRC and its Labor Arbiters are not bound by technical rules of procedure and evidence in the adjudication
of cases,
[52]
this should not be construed as a license to disregard fundamental rules on evidence in proving ones
allegations.
[53]

In fine, Alusitain having failed to prove that he was an employee of petitioner at the time R.A. 7641 took effect, his
claim for retirement benefits thereunder must be disallowed.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals June 23, 2000 Decision and December 6, 2000
Resolution in CA-G.R. SP No. 54722 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.Vitug, (Chairman), Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Corona, JJ., concur.

[4]
Republic Act No. 7641 was the legislatures reaction to Llora Motors v. Drilon (179 SCRA 175, 181-182 [1989]) where this
Court had interpreted Art. 287 of the Labor Code as not being a source of retirement benefits if there was no collective
bargaining agreement or voluntary company policy granting such benefit. Thus, this Court through Justice Florentino
Feliciano said:
Our Labor Code has only one article that deals with the subject of retirement from the service. Article 287 of the
Code reads as follows:
Article 287. Retirement. Any employee may be retired upon reaching the retirement age established in
the Collective Bargaining Agreement or other applicable employment contract.
In case of retirement, the employee shall be entitled to receive such retirement benefits as he may have
earned under existing laws and any collective bargaining or other agreement. (Italics in the original)
Examination of Article 287 above shows that entitlement to retirement benefits may accrue either (a) under existing laws or
(b) under a collective bargaining agreement or other employment contract. It is at once apparent that Article 287
does not itself purport to impose any obligation upon employers to set up a retirement schemefor their
employees over and above that already established under existing laws. In other words, Article 287 recognizes
that existing laws already provide for a scheme by which retirement benefits may be earned or accrue in favor of
employees, as part of a broader social security system that provides not only for retirement benefits but also death
and funeral benefits, permanent disability benefits, sickness benefits and maternity leave benefits. As is
commonplace knowledge, the Social Security Act provides for retirement benefits which essentially consist of the
right to receive a monthly pension for the rest of the covered employees life provided that: (1) such employee had
paid at least one hundred twenty (120) monthly contributions prior to retirement; and (2) has reached the age of
sixty (60) years (if his salary is less than P300.00 a month) or 65 years. The retirement scheme here established
is compulsory and contributory in character on the part of both the employer and the employee, backed up by
criminal sanctions and administered by a large and elaborate bureaucracy. (Italics in the original; citation omitted
In order to overturn the effect of the Llora Motors ruling, House Bill No. 317 was introduced in the House of Representatives
which was later consolidated with the Senate version Senate Bill No. 132. Representative Alberto S. Veloso
states the following in his House Bills explanatory note:
When the Labor Code came into effect in 1974, retirement pay had, as a matter of course, been granted to employees in the
private sector when they reach the age of sixty (60) years. This had practically been the rule observed by
employers in the country pursuant to the rules and regulations issued by the then Minister of Labor and
Employment to implement the provisions of the Labor Code, more particularly, where there is no provision for the
same in the collective bargaining agreement or retirement plan of the establishment.
At present, however, such benefit of retirement pay is no longer available where there is no collective agreement thereon or
any retirement plan at all. This is so because, in a decision of the Supreme Court (Llora Motors vs. Drilon and
NLRC, et al., G.R. No. 82895, November 7, 1989), it was held that the grant of such benefit under the rules
implementing the Labor Code is not supported by any express provision of the Labor Code itself. In short, there is
no specific statutory basis for the grant of retirement benefits for employees in the private sector reaching the age
of 60 years.
Since the time of such nullification by the Supreme Court of said implementing rules on retirement pay for private sector
employees, many employers simply refuse or neglect to adopt any retirement plan for their workers, obviously
emboldened by the thought that, after said ruling, there is no longer any legal compulsion to grant such retirement
benefits. In our continuous quest to promote social justice, unfair situations like this, productive of grievance or
irritants in the labor-management relations, must immediately be corrected or remedied by legislation.
[5]
J.V. Angeles Construction Corporation v. NLRC, 305 SCRA 734, 736 (1999); Cabcaban v. NLRC, 277 SCRA 671, 677
(1997); Pantranco North Express, Inc. v. NLRC, 259 SCRA 161, 173 (1996); Oro Enterprises, Inc. v. NLRC, 238
SCRA 105, 108 (1994).
[6]
LABOR CODE, art. 287, as amended by Rep. Act No. 7641 (1993).
[7]
It should be noted that in respondent Alusitains May 22, 1991 affidavit of separation from employment he stated that he
was 63 years old. But in his position paper which he submitted to the Labor Arbiter, he stated that he was 65
years old on January 31, 1995 the date of his alleged retirement. (Court of Appeals Rollo at 48)
[8]
Court of Appeals Rollo at 48.
[9]
It should be noted that respondent Alusitain miscomputed his retirement benefits. P1,885.00 multiplied by 47 is
not P86,710.00 but P88,595.00.

















[G.R. No. 56294. May 20, 1991.]
SMITH BELL AND COMPANY (PHILIPPINES), INC. and TOKYO MARINE AND FIRE
INSURANCE CO., INC., Petitioners, v. THE COURT OF APPEALS and CARLOS A. GO THONG
AND CO.,Respondents.

Bito, Misa & Lozada, for Petitioners.

Rodriguez, Relova & Associates for Private Respondent.


SYLLABUS


1. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; JUDGMENT; SUPREME COURT NOT COMPELLED TO ADOPT A
DEFINITE AND STRINGENT RULE ON HOW ITS JUDGMENT SHALL BE FRAMED; EFFECT OF
DISMISSAL OR GRANT OF A PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI BY A MINUTE RESOLUTION OF
THE COURT. That this Court denied Go Thongs Petition for Review in a minute Resolution did not
in any way diminish the legal significance of the denial so decreed by this Court. The Supreme Court
is not compelled to adopt a definite and stringent rule on how its judgment shall be framed. It has
long been settled that this Court has discretion to decide whether a "minute resolution" should be
used in lieu of a full-blown decision in any particular case and that a minute Resolution of dismissal
of a Petition for Review on Certiorari constitutes an adjudication on the merits of the controversy or
subject matter of the Petition. It has been stressed by the Court that the grant of due course to a
Petition for Review is "not a matter of right, but of sound judicial discretion; and so there is no need
to fully explain the Courts denial. For one thing, the facts and law are already mentioned in the
Court of Appeals opinion." A minute Resolution denying a Petition for Review of a Decision of the
Court of Appeals can only mean that the Supreme Court agrees with or adopts the findings and
conclusions of the Court of Appeals, in other words, that the Decision sought to be reviewed and set
aside is correct.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; RES JUDICATA; ABSENCE OF IDENTITY OF SUBJECT MATTER, THERE BEING
SUBSTANTIAL IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND IDENTITY OF CAUSE OF ACTION, WILL NOT PRECLUDE
APPLICATION THEREOF. It is conceded by petitioners that the subject matters of the two (2)
suits were not identical, in the sense that the cargo which had been damaged in the one case and
for which indemnity was sought, was not the very same cargo which had been damaged in the
other case indemnity for which was also sought. The cause of action was, however, the same in the
two (2) cases, i.e., the same right of the cargo owners to the safety and integrity of their cargo had
been violated by the same casualty, the ramming of the "Yotai Maru" by the "Don Carlos." The
judgments in both cases were final judgments on the merits rendered by the two (2) divisions of the
Court of Appeals and by the Supreme Court, the jurisdiction of which has not been questioned.
Under the circumstances, we believe that the absence of identity of subject matter, there being
substantial identity of parties and identity of cause of action, will not preclude the application of res
judicata.

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. In the case at bar, the issue of which vessel ("Don Carlos" or
"Yotai Maru") had been negligent, or so negligent as to have proximately caused the collision
between them, was an issue that was actually, directly and expressly raised, controverted and
litigated in C.A.-G.R. No. 61320-R. Reyes, L.B., J. resolved that issue in his Decision and held the
"Don Carlos" to have been negligent rather than the "Yotai Maru" and, as already noted, that
Decision was affirmed by this Court in G.R. No. L-48839 in a Resolution dated 6 December 1978.
The Reyes Decision thus became final and executory approximately two (2) years before the Sison
Decision, which is assailed in the case at bar, was promulgated. Applying the rule of conclusiveness
of judgment, the question of which vessel had been negligent in the collision between the two (2)
vessels, had no long been settled by this Court and could no longer be relitigated in C.A.-G.R. No.
61206-R. Private respondent Go Thong was certainly bound by the ruling or judgment of Reyes,
L.B., J. and that of this Court. The Court of Appeals fell into clear and reversible error when it
disregarded the Decision of this Court affirming the Reyes Decision.

4. ID.; EVIDENCE; ADMISSIONS; RULE ON COMPROMISES, EXPLAINED; RULE ANCHORED ON
PUBLIC POLICY THAT INCIDENCE OF LITIGATION SHOULD BE REDUCED AND ITS DURATION
SHORTENED TO THE MAXIMUM EXTENT FEASIBLE. The familiar rule is that "an offer of
compromise is not an admission that anything is due, and is not admissible in evidence against the
person making the offer." A compromise is an agreement between two (2) or more persons who, in
order to forestall or put an end to a law suit, adjust their differences by mutual consent, an
adjustment which every one of them prefers to the hope of gaining more, balanced by the danger of
losing more. An offer to compromise does not, in legal contemplation, involve an admission on the
part of a defendant that he is legally liable, not on the part of a plaintiff that his claim or demand is
groundless or even doubtful, since the compromise is arrived at precisely with a view to avoiding
further controversy and saving the expenses of litigation. It is of the very nature of an offer of
compromise that it is made tentatively, hypothetically and in contemplation of mutual concessions.
The above rule on compromises is anchored on public policy of the most insistent and basic kind:
that the incidence of litigation should be reduced and its duration shortened to the maximum extent
feasible.

5. CIVIL LAW; QUASI-DELICT; NEGLIGENCE; FACTORS CONSTITUTIVE THEREOF WHICH
NEGLIGENCE WAS THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE COLLISION; FIRST FACTOR WAS FAILURE ON
THE PART OF PRIVATE RESPONDENTS VESSEL TO COMPLY WITH RULES 18(a) AND 28 (c) OF THE
INTERNATIONAL RULES OF THE ROAD. The Court believes that there are three (3) principal
factors which are constitutive of negligence on the part of the "Don Carlos," which negligence was
the proximate cause of the collision. The first of these factors was the failure of the "Don Carlos" to
comply with the requirements of Rule 18 (a) of the International Rules of the Road ("Rules"), which
provides as follows:" (a) When two power-driven vessels are meeting end on, or nearly end on, so
as to involve risk of collision, each shall alter her course to starboard, so that each may pass on the
port side of the other. The "Don Carlos" also violated Rule 28 (c) for it failed to give the required
signal of two (2) short horn blasts meaning "I am altering my course to port." When the "Yotai
Maru" saw that the "Don Carlos" was turning to port, the master of the "Yotai Maru" ordered the
vessel turned "hard starboard" at 3:45 a.m. and stopped her engines; at about 3:46 a.m., the
"Yotai Maru" went "full astern engine." The collision occurred at exactly 3:50 a.m.

6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; SECOND FACTOR WAS FAILURE ON THE PART OF PRIVATE RESPONDENTS
VESSEL TO HAVE ON BOARD A "PROPER LOOK-OUT" ; CASE AT BAR. The second circumstance
constitutive of negligence on the part of the "Don Carlos" was its failure to have on board that night
a "proper look-out" as required by Rule I (B) of the International Rules of the Road. Under Rule 29
of the same set of Rules, all consequences arising from the failure of the "Don Carlos" to keep a
"proper look-out" must be born by the "Don Carlos." In the case at bar, the failure of the "Don
Carlos" to recognize in a timely manner the risk of collision with the "Yotai Maru" coming in from the
opposite direction, was at least in part due to the failure of the "Don Carlos" to maintain a proper
look-out.

7. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; THIRD FACTOR RELATES TO THE FACT THAT THE SECOND MATE WAS,
IMMEDIATELY BEFORE AND DURING THE COLLISION, IN COMMAND OF PRIVATE RESPONDENTS
VESSEL. The third factor constitutive of negligence on the part of the "Don Carlos" relates to the
fact that Second Mate Benito German was, immediately before and during the collision, in command
of the "Don Carlos." Second Mate German simply did not have the level of experience, judgment
and skill essential for recognizing and coping with the risk of collision as it presented itself that early
morning when the "Don Carlos," running at maximum speed and having just overtaken the "Don
Francisco" then approximately one mile behind to the starboard side of the "Don Carlos," found
itself head-on or nearly head-on vis-a-vis the "Yotai Maru." It is essential to point out that this
situation was created by the "Don Carlos" itself.
2.
D E C I S I O N


FELICIANO, J.:


In the early morning of 3 May 1970 at exactly 0350 hours, on the approaches to the port of Manila near
Caballo Island, a collision took place between the M/V "Don Carlos," an inter-island vessel owned and
operated by private respondent Carlos A. Go Thong and Company ("Go Thong"), and the M/S "Yotai Maru,"
a merchant vessel of Japanese registry. The "Don Carlos" was then sailing south bound leaving the port of
Manila for Cebu, while the "Yotai Maru" was approaching the port of Manila, coming in from Kobe, Japan.
The bow of the "Don Carlos" rammed the portside (left side) of the "Yotai Maru" inflicting a three (3) cm.
gaping hole on her portside near Hatch No. 3, through which seawater rushed in and flooded that hatch and
her bottom tanks, damaging all the cargo stowed therein.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

The consignees of the damaged cargo got paid by their insurance companies. The insurance companies in
turn, having been subrogated to the interests of the consignees of the damaged cargo, commenced actions
against private respondent Go Thong for damages sustained by the various shipments in the then Court of
First Instance of Manila.

Two (2) cases were filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila. The first case, Civil Case No. 82567, was
commenced or 13 March 1971 by petitioner Smith Bell and Company (Philippines), Inc. and Sumitomo
Marine and Fire Insurance Company Ltd., against private respondent Go Thong, in Branch 3, which was
presided over by Judge Bernardo P. Fernandez. The second case, Civil Case No. 82556, was filed on 15
March 1971 by petitioners Smith Bell and Company (Philippines), Inc. and Tokyo Marine and Fire Insurance
Company, Inc. against private respondent Go Thong in Branch 4, which was presided over by then Judge,
later Associate Justice of this Court, Serafin R. Cuevas.chanrobles law library : red

Civil Cases Nos. 82567 (Judge Fernandez) and 82556 (Judge Cuevas) were tried under the same issues and
evidence relating to the collision between the "Don Carlos" and the "Yotai Maru" the parties in both cases
having agreed that the evidence on the collision presented in one case would be simply adopted in the
other. In both cases, the Manila Court of First Instance held that the officers and crew of the "Don Carlos"
had been negligent, that such negligence was the proximate cause of the collision and accordingly held
respondent Go Thong liable for damages to the plaintiff insurance companies. Judge Fernandez awarded the
insurance companies P19,889.79 with legal interest plus P3,000.00 as attorneys fees; while Judge Cuevas
awarded the plaintiff insurance companies on two (2) claims US$68,640.00 or its equivalent in Philippine
currency plus attorneys fees of P30,000.00, and P19,163.02 plus P5,000.00 as attorneys fees, respectively.

The decision of Judge Fernandez in Civil Case No. 82567 was appealed by respondent Go Thong to the Court
of Appeals, and the appeal was there docketed as C.A.-G.R. No. 61320-R. The decision of Judge Cuevas in
Civil Case No. 82556 was also appealed by Go Thong to the Court of Appeals, the appeal being docketed as
C.A.-G.R. No. 61206-R. Substantially identical assignments of errors were made by Go Thong in the two (2)
appealed cases before the Court of Appeals.

In C.A.-G.R. No. 61320-R, the Court of Appeals through Reyes, L.B., J., rendered a Decision on 8 August
1978 affirming the Decision of Judge Fernandez. Private respondent Go Thong moved for reconsideration,
without success. Go Thong then went to the Supreme Court on Petition for Review, the Petition being
docketed as G.R. No. L-48839 ("Carlos A. Go Thong and Company v. Smith Bell and Company [Philippines],
Inc., Et. Al."). In its Resolution dated 6 December 1978, this Court, having considered "the allegations,
issues and arguments adduced in the Petition for Review onCertiorari, of the Decision of the Court of
Appeals as well as respondents comment", denied the Petition for lack of merit. Go Thong filed a Motion for
Reconsideration; the Motion was denied by this Court on 24 January 1979.

In the other (Cuevas) case, C.A.-G.R. No. 61206-R, the Court of Appeals, on 26 November 1980 (or almost
two [2] years after the Decision of Reyes, L.B., J., in C.A.-G.R. No. 61320-R, had been affirmed by the
Supreme Court on Petition for Review) through Sison, P.V., J., reversed the Cuevas Decision and held the
officers of the "Yotai Maru" at fault in the collision with the "Don Carlos," and dismissed the insurance
companies complaint. Herein petitioners asked for reconsideration, to no avail.

The insurance companies are now before us on Petition for Review on Certiorari, assailing the Decision of
Sison, P.V., J., in C.A.-G.R. No. 61206-R. Petitioners principal contentions are:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library
a. that the Sison Decision had disregarded the rule of res judicata;

b. that Sison P.V., J., was in serious and reversible error in accepting Go Thongs defense that the question
of fault on the part of the "Yotai Maru" had been settled by the compromise agreement between the owner
of the "Yotai Maru" and Go Thong as owner of the "Don Carlos;" and

c. that Sison, P.V., J., was in serious and reversible error in holding that the "Yotai Maru" had been negligent
and at fault in the collision with the "Don Carlos."cralaw virtua1aw library
The first contention of petitioners is that Sison, P.V., J. in rendering his questioned Decision, failed to apply
the rule of res judicata. Petitioners maintain that the Resolution of the Supreme Court dated 6 December
1978 in G.R. No. 48839 which dismissed Go Thongs Petition for Review of the Decision of Reyes, L.B., J., in
C.A.-G.R. No. 61320-R, had effectively settled the question of liability on the part of the "Don Carlos." Under
the doctrine of res judicata, petitioners contend, Sison, P.V., J. should have followed the Reyes, L.B., J.
Decision since the latter had been affirmed by the Supreme Court and had become final and executory long
before the Sison Decision was rendered.

Private respondent Go Thong, upon the other hand, argues that the Supreme Court, in rendering its minute
Resolution in G.R. No. L-48839, had merely dismissed Go Thongs Petition for Review of the Reyes, L.B., J.
Decision for lack of merit but had not affirmed in toto that Decision. Private respondent, in other words,
purports to distinguish between denial of a Petition for Review for lack of merit and affirmance of the Court
of Appeals Decision. Thus, Go Thong concludes, this Court did not hold that the "Don Carlos" had been
negligent in the collision.

Private respondents argument must be rejected. That this Court denied Go Thongs Petition for Review in a
minute Resolution did not in any way diminish the legal significance of the denial so decreed by this Court.
The Supreme Court is not compelled to adopt a definite and stringent rule on how its judgment shall be
framed. 1 It has long been settled that this Court has discretion to decide whether a "minute resolution"
should be used in lieu of a full-blown decision in any particular case and that a minute Resolution of
dismissal of a Petition for Review on Certiorari constitutes an adjudication on the merits of the controversy
or subject matter of the Petition. 2 It has been stressed by the Court that the grant of due course to a
Petition for Review is "not a matter of light, but of sound judicial discretion; and so there is no need to fully
explain the Courts denial. For one thing, the facts and law are already mentioned in the Court of Appeals
opinion." 3 A minute Resolution denying a Petition for Review of a Decision of the Court of Appeals can only
mean that the Supreme Court agrees with or adopts the findings and conclusions of the Court of Appeals, in
other words, that the Decision sought to be reviewed and set aside is correct. 4

Private respondent Go Thong argues also that the rule of res judicata cannot be invoked in the instant case
whether in respect of the Decision of Reyes, L.B., J. or in respect of the Resolution of the Supreme Court in
G.R. No. L-48839, for the reason that there was no identity of parties and no identity of cause of action
between C.A.-G.R. No. 61206-R and C.A.-G.R. No. 61320-R.

The parties in C.A.-G.R. No. 61320-R where the decision of Judge Fernandez was affirmed, involved Smith
Bell and Company (Philippines), Inc., and Sumitomo Marine and Fire Insurance Co., Ltd. while the
petitioners in the instant case (plaintiffs below) are Smith Bell and Co. (Philippines), Inc. and Tokyo Marine
and Fire Insurance Co., Ltd. In other words, there was a common petitioner in the two (2) cases, although
the co-petitioner in one was an insurance company different from the insurance company co-petitioner in
the other case. It should be noted, moreover, that the co-petitioner in both cases was an insurance
company and that both petitioners in the two (2) cases represented the same interest, i.e., the cargo
owners interest as against the hull interest or the interest of the shipowner. More importantly, both cases
had been brought against the same defendant, private respondent Go Thong, the owner of the vessel "Don
Carlos." In sum, C.A.-G.R. No. 61320-R and C.A.-G.R. No. 61206-R exhibited substantial identity of
parties.chanrobles law library : red

It is conceded by petitioners that the subject matters of the two (2) suits were not identical, in the sense
that the cargo which had been damaged in the one case and for which indemnity was sought, was not the
very same cargo which had been damaged in the other case indemnity for which was also sought. The cause
of action was, however, the same in the two (2) cases, i.e., the same right of the cargo owners to the safety
and integrity of their cargo had been violated by the same casualty, the ramming of the "Yotai Maru" by the
"Don Carlos." The judgments in both cases were final judgments on the merits rendered by the two (2)
divisions of the Court of Appeals and by the Supreme Court, the jurisdiction of which has not been
questioned.

Under the circumstances, we believe that the absence of identity of subject matter, there being substantial
identity of parties and identity of cause of action, will not preclude the application of res judicata. 5

In Tingson v. Court of Appeals, 6 the Court distinguished one from the other the two (2) concepts embraced
in the principle of res judicata, i.e., "bar by former judgment" and "conclusiveness of judgment:"

"There is no question that where as between the first case where the judgment is rendered and the second
case where such judgment is invoked, there is identity of parties, subject-matter and cause of action, the
judgment on the merits in the first case constitutes an absolute bar to the subsequent action not only as to
every matter which was offered and received to sustain or defeat the claim or demand, but also as to any
other admissible matter which might have been offered for that purpose and to all matters that could have
been adjudged in that case. This is designated as bar by former judgment.

But where the second action between the same parties is upon a different claim or demand, the judgment in
the prior action operates as an estoppel only as to those matters in issue or points controverted, upon the
determination of which the finding or judgment was rendered. In fine, the previous judgment is conclusive in
the second case, only as those matters actually and directly controverted and determined and not as to
matters merely involved therein. This is the rule on conclusiveness of judgment embodied in subdivision (c)
of Section 49 of Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court." 7 (Citations omitted) (Emphasis supplied)

In Lopez v. Reyes, 8 the Court elaborated further the distinction between bar by former judgment which
bars the prosecution of a second action upon the same claim, demand or cause of action, and
conclusiveness of judgment which bars the relitigation of particular facts or issues in another litigation
between the same parties on a different claim or cause of action:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The doctrine of res judicata has two aspects. The first is the effect of a judgment as a bar to the
prosecution of a second action upon the same claim, demand or cause of action. The second aspect is that it
precludes the relitigation of a particular fact or issues in another action between the same parties on a
different claim or cause of action.

The general rule precluding the relitigation of material facts or questions which were in issue and
adjudicated in former action are commonly applied to all matters essentially connected with the subject
matter of the litigation. Thus, it extends to questions necessarily involved in an issue, and necessarily
adjudicated, or necessarily implied in the final judgment, although no specific finding may have been made
in reference thereto, and although such matters were directly referred to in the pleadings and were not
actually or formally presented. Under this rule; if the record of the former trial shows that the judgment
could not have been rendered without deciding the particular matter, it will be considered as having settled
that matter as to all future actions between the parties, and if a judgment necessarily presupposes certain
premises, they are as conclusive as the judgment itself. Reasons for the rule are that a judgment is an
adjudication on all the matters which are essential to support it, and that every proposition assumed or
decided by the court leading up to the final conclusion and upon which such conclusion is based is as
effectually passed upon as the ultimate question which is finally solved." 9 (Citations omitted) (Emphasis
supplied)

In the case at bar, the issue of which vessel ("Don Carlos" or "Yotai Maru") had been negligent, or so
negligent as to have proximately caused the collision between them, was an issue that was actually, directly
and expressly raised, controverted and litigated in C.A.-G.R. No. 61320-R. Reyes, L.B., J., resolved that
issue in his Decision and held the "Don Carlos" to have been negligent rather than the "Yotai Maru" and, as
already noted, that Decision was affirmed by this Court in G.R. No. L-48839 in a Resolution dated 6
December 1978. The Reyes Decision thus became final and executory approximately two (2) years before
the Sison Decision, which is assailed in the case at bar, was promulgated. Applying the rule of
conclusiveness of judgment, the question of which vessel had been negligent in the collision between the
two (2) vessels, had long been settled by this Court and could no longer be relitigated in C.A.-G.R. No.
61206-R. Private respondent Go Thong was certainly bound by the ruling or judgment of Reyes, L.B., J. and
that of this Court. The Court of Appeals fell into clear and reversible error when it disregarded the Decision
of this Court affirming the Reyes Decision. 10

Private respondent Go Thong also argues that a compromise agreement entered into between Sanyo
Shipping Company as owner of the "Yotai Maru" and Go Thong as owner of the "Don Carlos," under which
the former paid P268,000.00 to the latter effectively settled that the "Yotai Maru" had been at fault. This
argument is wanting in both factual basis and legal substance. True it is that by virtue of the compromise
agreement, the owner of the "Yotai Maru" paid a sum of money to the owner of the "Don Carlos." Nowhere,
however, in the compromise agreement did the owner of the "Yotai Maru" admit or concede that the "Yotai
Maru" had been at fault in the collision. The familiar rule is that "an offer of compromise is not an admission
that anything is due, and is not admissible in evidence against the person making the offer." 11 A
compromise is an agreement between two (2) or more persons who, in order to forestall or put an end to a
law suit, adjust their differences by mutual consent, an adjustment which everyone of them prefers to the
hope of gaining more, balanced by the danger of losing more. 12 An offer to compromise does not, in legal
contemplation, involve an admission on the part of a defendant that he is legally liable, nor on the part of a
plaintiff that his claim or demand is groundless or even doubtful, since the compromise is arrived at
precisely with a view to avoiding further controversy and saving the expenses of litigation. 13 It is of the
very nature of an offer of compromise that it is made tentatively, hypothetically and in contemplation of
mutual concessions. 14 The above rule on compromises is anchored on public policy of the most insistent
and basic kind; that the incidence of litigation should be reduced and its duration shortened to the maximum
extent feasible.

The collision between the "Yotai Maru" and the "Don Carlos" spawned not only sets of litigations but also
administrative proceedings before the Board of Marine Inquiry ("BMI"). The collision was the subject matter
of an investigation by the BMI in BMI Case No. 228. On 12 July 1971, the BMI, through Commodore
Leovegildo L. Gantioki, found both vessels to have been negligent in the collision.

Both parties moved for reconsideration of the BMIs decision. The Motions for Reconsideration were resolved
by the Philippine Coast Guard ("PCG") nine (9) years later, in an order dated 19 May 1980 issued by PCG
Commandant, Commodore Simeon M. Alejandro. The dispositive portion of the PCG decision read as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Premises considered, the Decision dated July 12, 1971 is hereby reconsidered and amended absolving the
officers of YOTAI MARU from responsibility for the collision. This Headquarters finds no reason to modify the
penalties imposed upon the officers of Don Carlos. (Annex C, Reply, September 5, 1981)." 15

Go Thong filed a second Motion for Reconsideration; this was denied by the PCG in an order dated
September 1980.

Go Thong sought to appeal to the then Ministry of National Defense from the orders of the PCG by filing with
the PCG on 6 January 1981 a motion for a 30-day extension from 7 January 1981 within which to submit its
record on appeal. On 4 February 1981, Go Thong filed a second urgent motion for another extension of
thirty (30) days from 7 February 1981. On 12 March 1981, Go Thong filed a motion for a final extension of
time and filed its record on appeal on 17 March 1981. The PCG noted that Go Thongs record on appeal was
filed late, that is, seven (7) days after the last extension granted by the PCG had expired. Nevertheless, on
1 July 1981 (after the Petition for Review onCertiorari in the case at bar had been filed with this Court), the
Ministry of Defense rendered a decision reversing and setting aside the 19 May 1980 decision of the PCG.

The owners of the "Yotai Maru" then filed with the Office of the President a Motion for Reconsideration of the
Defense Ministrys decision. The Office of the President rendered a decision dated 17 April 1986 denying the
Motion for Reconsideration. The decision of the Office of the President correctly recognized that Go Thong
had failed to appeal in a seasonable manner:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"MV DON CARLOS filed her Notice of Appeal on January 5, 1981. However, the records also show beyond
peradventure of doubt that the PCG Commandants decision of May 19, 1980, had already become final and
executory when MV DON CARLOS filed her Record on Appeal on March 17, 1981, and when the motion for
third extension was filed after the expiry date.

Under Paragraphs (c), (d), (e) and (f), Chapter XVI, of the Philippine Merchant Marine Rules and
Regulations, decisions of the PCG Commandant shall be final unless, within thirty (30) days after receipt of a
copy thereof, an appeal to the Minister of National Defense is filed and perfected by the filing of a notice of
appeal and a record on appeal. Such administrative regulation has the force and effect of law, and the
failure of MV DON CARLOS to comply therewith rendered the PCG Commandants decision on May 19,
1980, as final and executory, (Antique Sawmills, Inc. v. Zayco, 17 SCRA 316; Deslata v. Executive
Secretary, 19 SCRA 487; Macailing v. Andrada, 31 SCRA 126.) (Annex A, Go Thongs Manifestation and
Motion for Early Resolution, November 24, 1986)." 16 (Emphasis supplied)

Nonetheless, acting under the misapprehension that certain "supervening" events had taken place, the
Office of the President held that the Minister of National Defense could validly modify or alter the PCG
Commandants decision:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"However, the records likewise show that, on November 26, 1980, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision
in CA-G.R. No. 61206-R (Smith Bell & Co., Inc., Et. Al. v. Carlos A. Go Thong & Co.) holding that the
proximate cause of the collision between MV DON CARLOS AND MS YOTAI MARU was the negligence,
failure and error of judgment of the officers of MS YOTAI MARU. Earlier, or on February 27, 1976, the Court
of First Instance of Cebu rendered a decision in Civil Case No. R-11973 (Carlos A. Go Thong v. San-yo
Marine Co.) holding that MS YOTAI MARU was solely responsible for the collision, which decision was upheld
by the Court of Appeals.

The foregoing judicial pronouncements rendered after the finality of the PCG Commandants decision of May
19, 1980, were supervening causes or reasons that rendered the PCG Commandants decision as no longer
enforceable and entitled MV DON CARLOS to request the Minister of National Defense to modify or alter the
questioned decision to harmonize the same with justice and the facts. (De la Costa v. Cleofas, 67 Phil. 686;
City of Bututan v. Ortiz, 3 SCRA 659; Candelario v. Canizarez, 4 SCRA 738; Abellana v. Dosdos, 13 SCRA
244). Under such precise circumstances, the Minister of National Defense may validly modify or alter the
PCG commandants decision. (Sec. 37, Act 4007; Secs. 79(c) and 550, Revised Administrative Code;
Province of Pangasinan v. Secretary of Public Works and Communications, 30 SCRA 134; Estrella v.
Orendain, 37 SCRA 640)." 17 (Emphasis supplied)

The multiple misapprehensions under which the Office of the President labored, were the
following:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

It took account of the Decision of Sison, P.V., J. in C.A.-G.R. No. 61206-R, the very decision that is the
subject of review in the Petition at bar and therefore not final. At the same time, the Office of the President
either ignored or was unaware of the Reyes, L.B., J., Decision in C.A.-G.R. No 61320-R finding the "Don
Carlos" solely liable for the collision, and of the fact that that Decision had been affirmed by the Supreme
Court and had long ago become final and executory. A third misapprehension of the Office of the President
related to a decision in a Cebu Court of First Instance litigation which had been settled by the compromise
agreement between the Sanyo Marine Company and Go Thong. The Office of the President mistakenly
believed that the Cebu Court of First Instance had rendered a decision holding the "Yotai Maru" solely
responsible for the collision, when in truth the Cebu court had rendered a judgment of dismissal on the basis
of the compromise agreement. The Cebu decision was not, of course, appealed to the Court of
Appeals.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

It thus appears that the decision of the Office of the President upholding the belated reversal by the Ministry
of National Defense of the PCGS decision holding the "Don Carlos" solely liable for the collision, is so deeply
flawed as not to warrant any further examination. Upon the other hand, the basic decision of the PCG
holding the "Don Carlos" solely negligent in the collision remains in effect.
II


In their Petition for Review, petitioners assail the finding and conclusion of the Sison Decision, that the
"Yotai Maru" was negligent and at fault in the collision, rather than the "Don Carlos." In view of the
conclusions reached in Part I above, it may not be strictly necessary to deal with the issue of the correctness
of the Sison Decision in this respect. The Court considers, nonetheless, that in view of the conflicting
conclusions reached by Reyes, L.B., J., on the one hand, and Sison, P.V., J., on the other, and since in
affirming the Reyes Decision, the Court did not engage in a detailed written examination of the question of
which vessel had been negligent, and in view of the importance of the issues of admiralty law involved, the
Court should undertake a careful review of the record of the case at bar and discuss those issues in extenso.

The decision of Judge Cuevas in Civil Case No. 82556 is marked by careful analysis of the evidence
concerning the collision. It is worth underscoring that the findings of fact of Judge Fernandez in Civil Case
No. 82567 (which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in the Reyes Decision and by this Court in G.R. No.
L-48839) are just about identical with the findings of Judge Cuevas. Examining the facts as found by Judge
Cuevas, the Court believes that there are three (3) principal factors which are constitutive of negligence on
the part of the "Don Carlos," which negligence was the proximate cause of the collision.

The first of these factors was the failure of the "Don Carlos" to comply with the requirements of Rule 18 (a)
of the International Rules of the Road ("Rules"), 18 which provides as follows

"(a) When two power-driven vessels are meeting end on, or nearly end on, so as to involve risk of collision,
each shall alter her course to starboard, so that each may pass on the port side of the other. This Rule only
applies to cases where vessels are meeting end on or nearly end on, in such a manner as to involve risk of
collision, end does not apply to two vessels which must, if both keep on their respective course, pass clear
of each other. The only cases to which it does apply are when each of two vessels is end on, or nearly end
on, to the other; in other words, to cases in which, by day, each vessel sees the masts of the other in a line
or nearly in a line with her own; and by night to cases in which each vessel is in such a position as to see
both the sidelights of the other. It does not apply, by day, to cases in which a vessel sees another ahead
crossing her own course; or, by night, to cases where the red light of one vessel is opposed to the red light
of the other or where the green light of one vessel is opposed to the green light of the other or where a red
light without a green light or a green light without a red light is seen ahead, or where both green and red
lights are seen anywhere but ahead." (Emphasis supplied)

The evidence on this factor was summarized by Judge Cuevas in the following
manner:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Plaintiffs and defendants evidence seem to agree that each vessel made a visual sighting of each other ten
minute before the collision which occurred at 0350. Germans version of the incident that followed, was that
Don Carlos was proceeding directly to [a] meeting [on an] end-on or nearly end-on situation (Exh. S,
page 8). He also testified that Yotai Marus headlights were nearly in line at 0340 A.M. (t.s.n, June 6,
1974) clearly indicating that both vessels were sailing on exactly opposite paths (t.s.n. June 6, 1974, page
56). Rule 18 (a) of the International Rules of the Road provides as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
x x x


And yet German altered Don Carlos course by five degrees to the left at 0343 hours instead of to the right
(t.s.n. June 6, 1974, pages 4445) which maneuver was the error that caused the collision in question. Why
German did so is likewise explained by the evidence on record.Don Carlos was overtaking another vessel,
the Don Francisco and was then at the starboard (right side) of the aforesaid vessel at 3.40 a.m. It was in
the process of overtaking Don Francisco that Don Carlos was finally brought into a situation where he was
meeting end-on or nearly end -on Yotai Maru thus involving risk of collision. Hence, German in his
testimony before the Board of Marine Inquiry stated:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Atty. Chung:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

You said in answer to the cross-examination that you took a change of course to the left. Why did you not
take a course to the right instead?

German:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

I did not take any course to the right because the other vessel was in my mind at the starboard side
following me. Besides, I dont want to get risk of the Caballo Island (Exh. 2, pages 209 and 210)." 19
(Emphasis supplied).

For her part, the "Yotai Maru" did comply with its obligations under Rule 18 (a). As the "Yotai Maru" found
herself on an "end-on" or a "nearly end-on" situation vis-a-vis the "Don Carlos," and as the distance
between them was rapidly shrinking, the "Yotai Maru" turned starboard (to its right) and at the same time
gave the required signal consisting of one short horn blast. The "Don Carlos" turned to portside (to its left),
instead of turning to starboard as demanded by Rule 18 (a). The "Don Carlos" also violated Rule 28 (c) for it
failed to give the required signal of two (2) short horn blasts meaning "I am altering my course to port."
When the "Yotai Maru" saw that the "Don Carlos" was turning to port, the master of the "Yotai Maru"
ordered the vessel turned "hard starboard" at 3:45 a.m. and stopped her engines; at about 3:46 a.m. the
"Yotai Maru" went "full astern engine." 20 The collision occurred at exactly 3:50 a.m.

The second circumstance constitutive of negligence on the part of the "Don Carlos" was its failure to have on
board that might a "proper look-out" as required by Rule I (B). Under Rule 29 of the same set of Rules, all
consequences arising from the failure of the "Don Carlos" to keep a "proper look-out" must be borne by the
"Don Carlos." Judge Cuevas summary of the evidence said:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The evidence on record likewise discloses very convincingly that Don Carlos did not have a look-out
whose sole and only duty is only to act as such . . ." 21

A "proper look-out" is one who has been trained as such and who is given no other duty save to act as a
look-out and who is stationed where he can see and hear best and maintain good communication with the
officer in charge of the vessel, and who must, of course, be vigilant. Judge Cuevas
wrote:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The look-out should have no other duty to perform. (Chamberlain v. Ward, 21, N.O.W. 62, U.S. 548, 571).
He has only one duty, that which its name implies to keep a look-out. So a deckhand who has other
duties, is not a proper look-out (Brooklyn Perry Co. v. U.S., 122, Fed. 696). The navigating officer is not a
sufficient look-out (Larcen B. Myrtle, 44 Fed. 779) Griffin on Collision, pages 277-278). Neither the
captain nor the [helmsman] in the pilothouse can be considered to be a look-out within the meaning of the
maritime law. Nor should he be stationed in the bridge. He should be as near as practicable to the surface of
the water so as to be able to see low-lying lights (Griffin on Collision, page 273).

On the strength of the foregoing authorities, which do not appear to be disputed even by the defendant, it is
hardly probable that neither German or Leo Enriquez may qualify as look-out in the real sense of the
word." 22 (Emphasis supplied).

In the case at bar, the failure of the "Don Carlos" to recognize in a timely manner the risk of collision with
the "Yotai Maru" coming in from the opposite direction, was at least in part due to the failure of the "Don
Carlos" to maintain a proper look-out.

The third factor constitutive of negligence on the part of the "Don Carlos" relates to the fact that Second
Mate Benito German was, immediately before and during the collision, in command of the "Don Carlos."
Judge Cuevas summed up the evidence on this point in the following manner:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The evidence on record clearly discloses that Don Carlos was, at the time of the collision and immediately
prior thereto, under the command of Benito German, a second mate although its captain, Captain Rivera,
was very much in the said vessel at the time. The defendants evidence appears bereft of any explanation as
to why second mate German was at the helm of the aforesaid vessel when Captain Rivera did not appear to
be under any disability at the time. In this connection, Article [633] of the Code of Commerce
provides:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Art. [633] The second mate shall take command of the vessel in case of the inability or disqualification of
the captain and sailing mate, assuming, in such case, their powers and liability.

The fact that second mate German was allowed to be in command of Don Carlos and not the chief or the
sailing mate in the absence of Captain Rivera, gives rise to no other conclusion except that said vessel [had]
no chief mate. Otherwise, the defense evidence should have at least explained why it was German, only a
second mate, who was at the helm of the vessel Don Carlos at the time of the fatal collision.

But that is not all. Worst still aside from Germans being only a second mate, is his apparent lack of
sufficient knowledge of the basic and generally established rules of navigation. For instance he appeared
unaware of the necessity of employing a look-out (t.s.n. June 6, 1974, page 27) which is manifest even in
his testimony before the Board of Marine Inquiry on the same subject (Exh. 2, page 209). There is,
therefore, every reasonable ground to believe that his inability to grasp actual situation and the implication
brought about by inadequacy of experience and technical know-how was mainly responsible and decidedly
accounted for the collision of the vessels involved in this case . . ." 23 (Emphasis supplied)

Second Mate German simply did not have the level of experience, judgment and skill essential for
recognizing and coping with the risk of collision as it presented itself that early morning when the "Don
Carlos," running at maximum speed and having just overtaken the "Don Francisco" then approximately one
mile behind to the starboard side of the "Don Carlos," found itself head-on or nearly head on vis-a-vis the
"Yotai Maru." It is essential to point out that this situation was created by the "Don Carlos" itself.

The Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. No. 61206-R did not make any findings of fact which contradicted the
findings of fact made by Judge Cuevas. What Sison, P.V., J. actually did was to disregard all the facts found
by Judge Cuevas, and discussed above and, astonishingly, found a duty on the "Yotai Maru" alone to avoid
collision with and to give way to the "Don Carlos." Sison, P.V., J., wrote:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"At a distance of eight (8) miles and with ten (10) minutes before the impact, [Katoh] and Chonabayashi
had ample time to adopt effective precautionary measures to steer away from the Philippine vessel,
particularly because both [Katoh] and Chonabayashi also deposed that at the time they had first eyesight of
the Don Carlos there was still no danger at all of a collision. Having sighted the Don Carlos at a
comparatively safe distance no danger at all of a collision the Japanese ship should have observed
with the highest diligence the course and movements of the Philippine interisland vessel as to enable the
former to adopt such precautions as will necessarily prevent a collision, or give way, and in case of a
collision, the former is prima facie at fault. In G. Urrutia & Co. v. Baco River Plantation Co., 26 Phil. 632, the
Supreme Court held:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Nautical rules require that where a steamship and sailing vessel are approaching each other from opposite
directions, or on intersecting lines, the steamship, from the moment the sailing vessel is seen, shall watch
with the highest diligence her course and movements so as to enable it to adopt such timely means of
precaution as will necessarily prevent the two boats from coming in contact. (Emphasis supplied)

At 3:44 p.m., or 4 minutes after first sighting the Don Carlos, or 6 minutes before contact time,
Chonabayashi revealed that the Yotai Maru gave a one-blast whistle to inform the Philippine vessel that the
Japanese ship was turning to starboard or to the right and that there was no blast or a proper signal from
the Don Carlos (pp. 67-68. Deposition of Chonabayashi, List of Exhibits). The absence of a reply signal
from the Don Carlos placed the Yotai Maru in a situation of doubt as to the course the Don Carlos would
take. Such being the case, it was the duty of the Japanese officers to stop, reverse or come to a standstill
until the course of the Don Carlos has been determined and the risk of a collision removed (The Sabine, 21
F (2d) 121, 124, cited in Standard Vacuum, etc. v. Cebu Stevedoring, etc., 5 C.A.R. 2d 853, 861-862) . . ."
24 (Emphasis supplied).

The Court is unable to agree with the view thus taken by Sison, P.V., J. By imposing an exclusive obligation
upon one of the vessels, the "Yotai Maru," to avoid the collision, the Court of Appeals not only chose to
overlook all the above facts constitutive of negligence on the part of the "Don Carlos;" it also in effect used
the very negligence on the part of the "Don Carlos;" to absolve it from responsibility and to shift that
responsibility exclusively onto the "Yotai Maru" the vessel which had observed carefully the mandate of Rule
18 (a). Moreover, G. Urrutia and Company v. Baco River Plantation Company 25 invoked by the Court of
Appeals seems simply inappropriate and inapplicable. For the collision in the Urrutia case was between a
sailing vessel, on the one hand, and a power-driven vessel, on the other; the Rules, of course, imposed a
special duty on the power-driven vessel to watch the movements of a sailing vessel, the latter being
necessarily much slower and much less maneuverable than the power-driven one. In the case at bar, both
the "Don Carlos" and the "Yotai Maru" were power-driven and both were equipped with radar; the maximum
speed of the "Yotai Maru" was thirteen (13) knots while that of the "Don Carlos" was eleven (11) knots.
Moreover, as already noted, the "Yotai Maru" precisely took last minute measures to avert collision as it saw
the "Don Carlos" turning to portside: the "Yotai Maru" turned "hard starboard" and stopped its engines and
then put its engines "full astern."cralaw virtua1aw library

Thus, the Court agrees with Judge Cuevas (just as it had agreed with Reyes, L.B., J.), with Judge Fernandez
and Nocon, J., 26 that the "Don Carlos" had been negligent and that its negligence was the sole proximate
cause of the collision and of the resulting damages.

FOR ALL THE FOREGOING, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 26 November 1980 in C.A.-G.R. No.
61206-R is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The decision of the trial court dated 22 September 1975 is
hereby REINSTATED and AFFIRMED in its entirety. Costs against privateRespondent.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento,
Grio-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.



[G.R. Nos. 136870-72. January 28, 2003]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. WILSON SALVADOR y GAGARIN, accused-appellant.
D E C I S I O N
PUNO, J .:
Before us is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cauayan, Isabela, Branch 19, in Criminal Case
No. 19-1191 promulgated on October 20, 1998, finding accused-appellant Wilson Salvador y Gagarin guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of rape.
[1]

The Information in Crim. Case No. 19-1191 states:
That on or about the 30
th
day of August, 1995, in the municipality of San Mateo, province of Isabela, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, by means of force and intimidation, and with lewd designs, did then and there,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, lay (sic) with; and have carnal knowledge with (sic) one Myra S. Aucena, against her will and
consent.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
[2]

Accused pleaded not guilty upon arraignment and underwent trial.
It appears from the evidence that private complainant, Myra S. Aucena, is the niece of the accused, being the
daughter of his older sister, Lydia Salvador. She was two years of age when her mother died in 1979. Her paternal
grandparents brought her up in Manaoag, Pangasinan where she stayed until she finished her secondary education. After
graduation from high school, the brothers of her late mother, namely, Maximo, Wenceslao and Nestor, all surnamed
Salvador, offered to send her to college. It was agreed that she stay with her maternal grandmother, Priscila Salvador, at the
latters residence at Salinungan East, San Mateo, Isabela to facilitate her studies.
[3]
She transferred there around March
1995.
[4]

Priscilas house consists of two stories. Priscila slept at the ground floor, while accused Wilson, Priscilas son and
Myras uncle, slept at the second floor. The second floor has only one room but is divided into two sleeping quarters by a
collapsible divider. Myra used to sleep with her grandmother Priscila. However, in August 1995, she was advised by Priscila,
who was then sick, to sleep upstairs to avoid being contaminated by her illness. Accused Wilson slept on a bed at one side
while Myra slept on the bamboo floor at the other side of the divider.
[5]

Myra testified that in the early evening of August 30, 1995, she was awakened by a heavy weight on top of her. She
recognized the person to be accused Wilson, her uncle. She froze because the accused was poking a knife at her right
neck, at the same time telling her saan ka nga agriyao ta no agriyao ka patayin ka (Dont shout or else I will kill
you).
[6]
Accused kissed all parts of her body while she was still dressed. Thereafter, still holding the knife with his left hand,
accused removed her shirt, short pants, panty and bra with his right hand. He mashed her breasts, forcibly separated her
two legs and succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her. Having been seized with fear, she was not able to do
anything but cry after the accused was done with his bastardly act. This abuse was repeated on several occasions for over a
year during her stay with her grandmother and the accused.
[7]

Myra stopped living in the house of her grandmother when another uncle, Nestor Salvador, took her and brought her to
his house in Calamagui, Ilagan, Isabela on January 19, 1997. On February 24, 1997, her father, Sisenando Aucena, fetched
her from Nestors house because his younger son, Luther John, suspected that something was wrong with her. While there,
Sisenando noticed her pregnancy. Myra thus had to reveal the ordeal she underwent in the hands of the accused. She gave
birth to Cherry May on June 20, 1997 as a result of the forced coitus.
Sisenando Aucena, the father of Myra, testified as to the efforts of Dolores Ramones, Panting Manuel, Sangguniang
member Pulig, Sangguniang member Fermin, Nestor Salvador, Santiago Manguba, Maura Salvador, Angelito Manguba and
Kagawad Dominador Bonalos, relatives of the accused, to seek a compromise agreement or settlement of the case of the
accused. They first offered to give the land supposed to be inherited by his (Sisenandos) children. They also offered to give
the land that was supposed to be inherited by Wilson Salvador. However, the relatives did not comply with their promise so
the settlement did not materialize.
Accused-appellant denied the rape charge and alleged that it was Myra who seduced him and that what occurred was
consented sexual intercourse as they shared a romantic relationship. He claimed that it was Myra who first came to his bed
to sleep with him in the month of July 1995. He scolded her but eventually, they developed mutual love for each other and
thus had numerous consented sex. He also denied knowledge of the offer of compromise of his relatives. He allegedly did
not authorize them to enter into any settlement with Sisenando.
[8]

As aforestated, the trial court rendered a joint decision convicting the accused on one count of rape committed on
August 30, 1995, and acquitting him from the two other counts committed on September 6, 1995 and October 4, 1996, the
dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape committed on 30 August 1995 and charged in Criminal Case
No. 19-1191, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and to indemnify the offended party, Myra S. Aucena in the
amount of P200,000.00; and
2. For failure of the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, acquitting him from the offense charged in
Criminal Cases Nos. 19-1189 and 1190.
Costs against the accused.
SO ORDERED.
[9]

From this decision, the accused-appellant interposed the present appeal, raising the following assignment of errors:
I.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE CRIME OF RAPE SINCE NO FORCE
WAS EMPLOYED IN THE COMMISSION OF THE CRIME.
II.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT DESPITE THE FAILURE OF THE
PROSECUTION TO ESTABLISH THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
[10]

The appeal has no merit.
At the time the acts were committed by the accused, rape was punished under Article 335, paragraph 1 of the Revised
Penal Code. It can be committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
a.) Through force, threat or intimidation;
x x x x x x x x x.
The gravamen of rape is carnal knowledge of a woman against her will or without her consent.
[11]

Appellant argues that the trial court erred when it failed to appreciate the fact that the victim did not offer any
resistance against the alleged sexual assault made by the accused-appellant. He contends that during the act, the victim
never shouted for help nor created any commotion that could have aroused her grandmother into coming to her aid. These
circumstances, according to him, show that no force was employed by the accused and that what happened was the
product of two (2) persons freely and voluntarily consenting to each others advances.
[12]

We disagree. The evidence is clear that accused forced Myra to have sexual intercourse. She testified:
Atty. Garcia:
Q: While the accused was having sexual intercourse with you, did you not resist him?
A: Yes, sir, I resisted.
Q: How did you resist your uncle?
A: I boxed him, sir.
Q: With your resistance, was your uncle successful in having sexual intercourse with you?
A: Yes, sir.
[13]

It is also shown that the victim was cowed into submission because of the knife poked at her right neck by the
accused. She was also warned: saan ka nga agriyao ta no agriyao ka patayin ka, translated: Dont shout or else I will kill
you.
[14]

Furthermore, the fact that the accused is the uncle of the victim bolsters the presence of intimidation. It was found by
the trial court that the victim looked upon the accused as her father.
[15]
For a young lass from the province, this circumstance
is sufficient to shut her up and give in to the whims of the accused.
The accused also contends that the delay of two (2) years in reporting the acts charged rendered the truth of her
charge doubtful.
[16]

Again, we do not agree. The silence of the victim for a period of time does not necessarily indicate a baseless and
fabricated charge.
[17]
This Court has often ruled that delay in reporting rape incidents in the face of threats of physical
violence cannot be taken against the victim.
[18]
Rape victims prefer to suffer in private than reveal their ordeal to the public
and suffer the humiliation and simultaneously risk the rapists making good the threat to hurt them.
[19]
Myra explained why
she opted to suffer in silence, viz:
Atty. Garcia:
Q: Those things did to you by your uncle, did you report them to any authorities?
A: Because I was afraid then, sir, I did not report.
Q: Why were you afraid?
A: Because of his threat to kill me, sir.
[20]

Atty. Labog:
Q: You felt sorry for what happened to you the first time, August 30, 1995?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: But you did not tell this experience you had on August 30, 1995 to your lola?
A: No sir, because I was afraid.
Q: You were afraid of the accused?
A: Yes, sir.
Atty. Garcia:
Q: You said that you did not tell your lola (about) what happened to you on the night of August 30, 1995, why
were you afraid?
A: Because of the threat of my uncle that he is going to kill me and my brother, sir.
Q: When did he make the threat?
A: After having sexual intercourse with me, sir.
[21]

The defense of consensual intercourse merits no consideration. The accused has the burden of establishing by
convincing proof his affirmative defense of an alleged romantic relationship.
[22]
The sweetheart theory hardly deserves any
attention when an accused does not present any evidence, such as love letters, gifts, pictures and the like to show that
indeed, he and the private complainant were sweethearts.
[23]
In the case at bar, the accused was unable to present even an
iota of proof to substantiate his claim that he and the complainant are sweethearts. This was brought out in his cross-
examination:
Atty. Garcia:
Q: You said that you have this relationship as sweethearts to (sic) the complainant Myra Aucena, is it not?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Before you became sweethearts, you courted her, of course?
A: Our relationship just developed, sir.
Q: Yes, but before that relationship developed, of course you courted her?
A: I did not court her, it was (sic) just developed, sir.
Q: When did you start to have this sweethearts (sic) relationship with Myra?
A: Last week of July 1995, sir.

Q: At (sic) this duration of time from July 1995 to January 1997, you as sweethearts with Myra, do you have
momentous remembrance given by each other in consideration of being a (sic) sweethearts?
A: None, sir.
Q: But you know of course the birthday of Myra?
A: Yes, sir, January 17.
Q: Likewise you know the year?
A: January 17, but I cannot remember the year, sir.
Q: So that (during) the duration of your sweethearts (sic) with Myra from July 1995 to January 1997, you
celebrated her birthday 1996 and 1997 when she was with you?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And during that this (sic) occasion as sweethearts, do you give (a) gift to Myra?
A: None, sir.
Q: How about Myra, does Myra knows (sic) your birthday?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And when you celebrated your birthday, Myra gave you (a) gift as a token of his (sic) love to you?
A: None, sir.
Q: And of course, as shown (sic) of your love and devotion with (sic) Myra, you even gave material love, money
and other gifts?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: But Myra in return never gave you any gift?
A: None, sir.
Q: Even during (C)hristmas and (V)alentines (D)ay, she never gave you any greeting card or any gift, is it not
(sic)?
A: None, sir.
Q: During the duration of your sweethearts (sic) relationship from July 1995 to January 1997, she did not give
you any love letter expressing her love to you?
A: None, sir.
[24]

We likewise agree with the argument of the Office of the Solicitor General that even if the trial court acquitted the
accused of the subsequent acts of sexual intercourse on the ground that these were already consensual, the ensuing
voluntary relationship does not cure the force and intimidation which appellant employed in the initial act constituting one
charge for rape.
[25]
Well-entrenched is the principle that each act of rape is considered separate and distinct from one
another.
[26]
Thus, even if the subsequent acts of sexual intercourse between the accused and the complainant were to be
considered as consensual, still this does not negate the fact that their first sexual encounter due to force, constitutes a
ground for one charge of rape.
Lastly, the offer of settlement made by the relatives of the accused to Myras father further militates against the
innocence of the accused. Indeed, an offer of compromise by the accused in criminal cases, except those involving quasi-
offenses or those allowed by law to be compromised, may be received in evidence as an implied admission of guilt.
[27]

Undoubtedly, rape is not a quasi-offense. Thus, the testimony of Sisenando, complainants father, that the relatives of
the accused made two offers to settle with the knowledge of the accused, should be taken as an implied admission of the
guilt of the accused, thus:
Atty. Garcia:
Q: Why did this group come to you on November 22, 1997?
A: They went to our house in order to settle the fault of Wilson Salvador.
Q: And you said they came to offer settlement, what did they offer?
A: The first offer is that they are going to give the land supposed to be inherited by my children.
Q: And you said that is the first offer, was there any other offer?
A: The second offer is that the land supposed to be inherited by Wilson Salvador be offered as payment.
Q: Did you come to know if these persons were authorized by Wilson Salvador to talk to you?
A: Before we had a conversation, I asked first if Wilson Salvador and his mother knows (sic) about their offer
and they said yes.
Q: With whom did you inquire (about) that information among the persons who came to you?
A: Nelson Salvador, sir.
[28]

With regard the monetary award, law and justice dictate that upon the finding of the fact of rape, the award of civil
indemnity ex delictobecomes mandatory. However, we find the trial courts award of P200,000.00 as excessive. Consonant
with decided cases, we reduce the civil indemnity to P50,000.00.
[29]
We also grant P50,000.00 as moral damages, without
need of proof,
[30]
and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages, to discourage abuse of young girls, especially by their relatives.
[31]

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cauayan, Isabela, Branch 19, in Criminal Case No.
19-1191, finding accused-appellant Wilson Salvador y Gagarin guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape
committed on August 30, 1995, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua is AFFIRMED, with
modification that the accused is ordered to pay the victim civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00, moral damages
of P50,000.00, and exemplary damages of P25,000.00.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona and Carpio-Morales, JJ., concur.