55. GMA Network Inc. vs.

Movie and Television Review and classification

board
Facts:
Petitioner GMA Network, Inc. operates and manages the UHF television
station, EMC Channel 27. On January 7, 2000, respondent MTRCB issued an
order of suspension against petitioner for airing "Muro Ami: The Making"
without first securing a permit from it as provided in Section 7 of PD 1986.
3

The penalty of suspension was based on Memorandum Circular 98-17
dated December 15, 1998
4
which provided for the penalties for exhibiting
a program without a valid permit from the MTRCB.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the suspension order and, at the
same time, informed MTRCB that Channel 27 had complied with the
suspension order by going off the air since midnight of January 11, 2000. It
also filed a letter-protest which was merely "noted" by the MTRCB
thereby, in effect, denying both the motion for reconsideration and letter-
protest.
Petitioner then filed with the CA a petition for certiorari which was
dismissed in the now assailed June 18, 2001 decision. The January 7, 2000
suspension order issued by MTRCB was affirmed in toto.
Hence, this recourse.
Issue:
Whether or not Memorandum Circular No. 98-17 was enforceable and
binding on petitioner
Held:
The court held that while MTRCB had jurisdiction over the subject
program, Memorandum Circular 98-17, which was the basis of the
suspension order, was not binding on petitioner. The Administrative Code
of 1987, particularly Section 3 thereof, expressly requires each agency to
file with the Office of the National Administrative Register (ONAR) of the
University of the Philippines Law Center three certified copies of every rule
adopted by it. Administrative issuances which are not published or filed
with the ONAR are ineffective and may not be enforced.
9

Memorandum Circular No. 98-17, which provides for the penalties for the
first, second and third offenses for exhibiting programs without valid
permit to exhibit, has not been registered with the ONAR as of January 27,
2000.
10
Hence, the same is yet to be effective.
11
It is thus unenforceable
since it has not been filed in the ONAR.
12
Consequently, petitioner was not
bound by said circular and should not have been meted the sanction
provided thereunder.
56. Republic v. Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corp.

FACTS:
Pilipinas Shell corporation engaged in the business of refining
oil, marketing petroleum, and other related activities
Department of Energy government agency under the direct
control and supervision of the Office of the President mandated
to prepare, integrate, coordinate, supervise, and control all plans,
programs, projects, and activities of the Government relative to
energy exploration, development, utilization, distribution, and
conservation
Oil Price Stabilization Fund (OPSF) created under PD 1596 for
the purpose of minimizing frequent price changes of crude oil and
petroleum
LOI No. 1431 directed the utilization of the OPSF to reimburse
oil companies the additional costs of importation of crude oil and
petroleum
LOI No. 1441 mandated the Board of Energy to review and reset
prices of domestic products every two months to reflect the
prevailing prices of crude oil and petroleum
EO No. 137 amended PD 1965, expanding the sources and
utilization of the OPSF
The Office of Energy Affairs (now DOE) informed Pilipinas Shell
that the latters contributions to the OPSF were insufficient. The
OEA Audit Taskforce noted an underpayment of 14M. As a
consequence, a surcharge of 11M was imposed upon Pilipinas
Shell. The surcharge was imposed pursuant to a Department of
Finance Circular. The Circular is the contested issuance in the
case.
The OEA wrote another letter to Pilipinas Shell, advising the latter
of its additional underpayment of the foreign exchange risk fee in
the amount of 10M. Additionally, a surcharge of 2M was imposed.
Pilipinas Shell wrote a letter to the OEA, justifying that its
calculations for the transactions (for which DOE claimed
underpayment) were based on a valid interpretation of a
Department of Finance Order and a Department of Energy
Circular.
Pilipinas Shell paid the OE the full principal amount, but not the
surcharges.
The OEA wrote a letter to Pilipinas Shell, notifying it that it is
required to pay the OPSF a total of P18M for surcharges on the
late payment of foreign exchange risk charges.
The DOE reiterated its demand for Pilipinas Shell to settle the
surcharges due, else, the DOE would proceed against Pilipinas
Shells Irrevocable Standby Letter of Credit to recover its unpaid
surcharges.
Pilipinas Shell filed a Notice of Appeal before the Office of the
President. The Office of the President affirmed the conclusion of
the of the DOE. While it admitted that the implementation of the
Department of Finance Circular was contingent upon its
publication and filing with the ONAR, Pilipinas Shell failed to
adduce evidence of lack of compliance with such requirements.
Pilipinas Shells Motion for Reconsideration was denied.
CA reversed and ruled that the Department of Finance Circular
was ineffective for failure to comply with the requirement to file
with ONAR. Even if the Circular was issued by then Acting
Secretary of Finance long before the Administrative Code of 1987,
Sec. 3 of Chapter 2, Book 7 thereof specifies that rules already in
force on the date of the effectivity of the Administrative Code
must be filed within three months from the date of the effectivity
of the Code, otherwise, such rules cannot be the basis of any
sanction.

ISSUE: Did the Department of Finance Circular comply with the
requirements for publication and filing? NO

RATIO:
Taada v. Tuvera All statutes shall be published as a condition
for their effectivity. Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and
executive orders promulgated by the President in the exercise of legislative
powers whenever delegated by the legislature/ Constitution.
Administrative regulations must also be published if their purpose is to
enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation.
Sec. 3, Chapter 2, Book 7, Administrative Code of 1987 Rules in
force on the date of effectivity of this Code which are not filed within three
months from the date shall not thereafter be the basis of any sanction
against any party or persons.
As per the Taada ruling, the Department of Finance Circular is
one of those issuances which should have been published before becoming
effective since it is intended to enforce PD 1956. The circular should also
comply with the requirement under Sec. 3, Chapter 2, Book 7 of the
Administrative Code filing with the ONAR in the University of the
Philippines Law Center for rules that are already in force at the time the
Administrative Code became effective. These requirements of publication
and filing were put in place as safeguards against abuses on the part of
lawmakers, and as guarantees to the constitutional right to due process
and information on matters of public concerns, and therefore, require
strict compliance.
Here, the Certifications prove that the Department of Finance
Circular and its amendatory rule have not been filed before said office.
Moreover, the Department of Energy was unable to controvert Pilipinas
Shells allegation that neither of the circulars were published in the Official
Gazette or in any newspaper of general circulation.Thus, failure to comply
with the requirements of publication and filing render the Department of
Finance Circular ineffective.
National Association of Electricity Consumers for Reforms v.
Energy Regulatory Board Both the requirements of publication and filing
of administrative issuances intended to enforce existing laws are
mandatory for the effectivity of said issuances.
The Department of Energy insists that the registration of the
Department of Finance Circular with the ONAR is no longer necessary since
Pilipinas Shell knew of its existence, despite its non-registration. However,
strict compliance with the requirements of publication cannot be annulled
by a mere allegation that parties were notified of the existence of the
implementing rules. In National Association of Electricity Consumers for
Reforms, the Court ruled that the fact that the parties participated in the
public consultation and submitted their respective comments is not
compliance with the rule.
The Department of Energy avers that the Department of Finance
Circular gains its vitality from the subsequent enactment of an Executive
Order which reiterates the power of the Secretary of Finance to
promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to implement the
Executive Order. However, the power of the Secretary of Finance to
promulgate rules and regulations is not under dispute. The issue is the
ineffectivity of his administrative issuance for non-compliance with the
requisite publication and filing.

RULING: CA affirmed.The Department of Finance Circular is ineffective.

57. PEOPLE VS. QUE PO LAY
FACTS: Appellant who was in possession of foreign exchange consisting of
U.S. dollars, U.S. checks and U.S. money orders failed to sell the same to
the Central Bank through its agents within one day following the receipt of
such foreign exchange as required by Central Bank Circular No. 20.
Appellant appeals on the claim that the said circular had no force or effect
because the same was not published in the official Gazette prior to the act
or omission imputed to said appellant. The Solicitor General counters that
Commonwealth Act. No. 638 and 2930 do not require the publication in
the Official Gazette of said circular issued for the implementation of a law
in order to have force and effect.
ISSUE: Whether or not circulars and regulations should be published in
order to have force and effect.
HELD: Yes, circulars and regulations especially like Circular No. 20 of the
Central Bank which prescribes a penalty for its violation should be
published before becoming effective. Before the public is bound by its
contents, especially its penal provisions, a law, regulation or circular must
first be published and the people officially and specifically informed of said
contents and its penalties.
58. People vs. Maceren
Facts:
On March 7, 1969 Jose Buenaventura, Godofredo Reyes, Benjamin Reyes,
Nazario Aquino and Carlito del Rosario were charged by a Constabulary
investigator in the municipal court of Sta. Cruz, Laguna with having
violated Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84-1. It was alleged in the
complaint that the five accused in the morning of March 1, 1969 resorted
to electro fishing in the waters of Barrio San Pablo Norte, Sta. Cruz using a
device or equipment to catch fish thru electric current which thereby
destroy any aquatic animals within its current reach, to the detriment and
prejudice of the populace. The municipal court quashed the complaint and
the CFI affirmed such dismissal. Hence this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the 1967 regulation, penalizing electro fishing in fresh
water fisheries, promulgated by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries under the old Fisheries Law
and the law creating the Fisheries Commission is valid.
Held:
No. The court held that the that the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries exceeded their authority in
issuing Fisheries Administrative Orders Nos. 84 and 84-1 and that those
orders are not warranted under the Fisheries Commission, Republic Act
No. 3512.
The reason is that the Fisheries Law does not expressly prohibit electro
fishing. As electro fishing is not banned under that law, the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries are
powerless to penalize it. In other words, Administrative Orders Nos. 84 and
84-1, in penalizing electro fishing, are devoid of any legal basis.
Had the lawmaking body intended to punish electro fishing, a penal
provision to that effect could have been easily embodied in the old
Fisheries Law. Administrative regulations adopted under legislative
authority by a particular department must be in harmony with the
provisions of the law, and should be for the sole purpose of carrying into
effect its general provisions. By such regulations, of course, the law itself
cannot be extended to amend or expand the statutory requirements or to
embrace matters not covered by the statute.
73. YNCHAUSTI STEAMSHIP COMPANY vs. THE PUBLIC UTILITY
COMMISSIONER and THE BOARD OF APPEAL
Facts: The petitioner is a shipping company now operating the
steamship Venus, which was formerly used on the Manila-Vigan-Currimao-
Aparri route. At its request and by virtue of a decision of the Public Utility
Commissioner October 13, 1920, authority was given to take the
steamship Venus from that route and use it on the Manila-Iloilo route on
certain
November 10, 1920, the petitioner applied to the Commissioner to change
the sailing schedule of the steamship, so as to leave Manila Wednesday at
4 p. m. and Iloilo Saturday p.m
November 18, 1920, the petitioner applied to the Commissioner for a
temporary permit to use the sailing date proposed in the change pending
the hearing, and the Commissioner then issued a temporary permit for two
trips, the first on November 24, and the second on December 1, 1920,
which was later extended until the final decision was rendered.
As a result on July 27, 1922, the Public Utility Commissioner rendered a
decision in which the temporary permit was revoked, and it was ordered
that the steamshipVenus strictly comply with the decision of the
Commissioner rendered on October 13, 1920, in case No. 1947. His
decision was later affirmed by the Board, from which petitioner appeals to
this court, claiming that the respondents erred:
Issue: WON the Public Utility Commissioner is empowered by law to
control the sailing schedules of ships operating as common carriers in the
inter-island trade in the manner attempted in this case.
RULING: The legal force and effect of the argument for the petitioner is
that section 19 above quoted is not a delegation of legislative authority,
and, for such reason, is invalid. The language of the section is clear,
positive and certain. It expressly says that no public utility by land or water
shall ever make any permanent change in its time tables, its service or
sailing schedules without the approval of the Commission first had and
obtained. That carries with it and implies legislative power vested in the
Commission to fix sailing schedules as a condition precedent to the
granting of a license to do business; otherwise, that portion of section 19
would be a nullity. It is clear that the Legislature intended to vest that
power in the Commission. The remaining question is whether or not the
Legislature itself has the power to fix the sailing schedules. In a certain
sense the waterways of the Philippine Islands correspond to its roads and
highways. No case direct in point has been cited by counsel on either side,
and in so far as we are advised, the important question here has never
been decided by any court, hence, it is one of first impression in this court.
The whole tenor and trend of modern legislation is to vest the Public Utility
Commission with power to regulate and control the operation of public
utilities under reasonable rules and regulations in the interests of the
public. That was the purpose of the amendment. Here, as elsewhere, the
Commission is vested with a large, discretionary, administrative power,
and, as a general rule, courts will not interfere with the exercise of that
discretion when it is just and reasonable and founded upon a legal right. In
the instant case, a large amount of testimony was taken upon all of the
questions of fact involved. Upon which the Commissioner found against
the petitioner. The Legislature has, in legal effect, vested the
Commissioner with power to fix sailing schedules of ships and after an
exhaustive hearing, the Commissioner found that it would be against the
interest of the public to grant the proposed change in the sailing schedule
of the steamship Venus. We are not prepared to say that the law is
unconstitutional. Neither can we say, as a matter of law, that the findings
of the Commissioner are not sustained by the evidence, or that they were
made "in excess of the jurisdiction conferred upon them by law."
The writ is denied and the ruling of the Commissioner sustained.
74. VIGAN ELECTRIC LIGHT COMPANY, INC. vs. THE PUBLIC SERVICE
COMMISSION G.R. No. L-19850 January 30, 1964

FACTS: This is an original action for certiorari to annul an order of
respondent Public Service Commission ordering the reduction of rates of
Vigan Electric Light Co. PSC averred that Vigan Electric making a net
operating profit in excess of the allowable return of 12% on its invested
capital, and that it is in the public interest and in consonance with Section
3 of Republic Act No. 3043 that reduction of its rates to the extent of its
excess revenue be put into effect immediately. Vigan Electric contended
that the reduction of rate is unconstitutional because it has been ordered
without notice and hearing, thus issued without due process of law. In
defense, PSC maintains that rate-fixing is a legislative function; that
legislative or rule-making powers may constitutionally be exercised
without previous notice of hearing; and that the decision in Ang Tibay vs.
Court of Industrial Relations (69 Phil., 635) in which we held that such
notice and hearing are essential to the validity of a decision of the Public
Service Commission is not in point because, unlike the order complained
of which respondent claims to be legislative in nature the Ang Tibay
case referred to a proceeding involving the exercise of judicial functions.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Congress validly delegated legislative power to
the PSC?

HELD: No. Congress has not delegated, and cannot delegate legislative
powers to the Public Service Commission. Consistently with the principle of
separation of powers, which underlies our constitutional system, legislative
powers may not be delegated except to local governments, and only to
matters purely of local concern. However, Congress may delegate to
administrative agencies of the government the power to supply the details
in the execution or enforcement of a policy laid down by it which is
complete in itself. Such law is not deemed complete unless it lays down a
standard or pattern sufficiently fixed or determinate, or, at least,
determinable without requiring another legislation, to guide the
administrative body concerned in the performance of its duty to
implement or enforce said Policy. Otherwise, there would be no
reasonable means to ascertain whether or not said body has acted within
the scope of its authority, and, as a consequence, the power of legislation
would eventually be exercised by a branch of the Government other than
thatin which it is lodged by the Constitution, in violation, not only of the
allocation of powers therein made, but, also, of the principle of separation
of powers. Although the rule-making power and even the power to fix
rates when such rules and/or rates are meant to apply to all enterprises
of a given kind throughout the Philippines may partake of a legislative
character, such is not the nature of the order complained of. Indeed, the
same applies exclusively to petitioner herein. What is more, it is predicated
upon the finding of fact based upon a report submitted by the General
Auditing Office that petitioner is making a profit of more than 12% of its
invested capital, which is denied by petitioner. Obviously, the latter is
entitled to cross-examine the maker of said report, and to introduce
evidence to disprove the contents thereof and/or explain or complement
the same, as well as to refute the conclusion drawn therefrom by the
respondent. In other words, in making said finding of fact, respondent
performed a functionpartaking of a quasi-judicial character the valid
exercise of which demands previous notice and hearing.

75. Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation vs Alcuaz
By virtue of RA 5514, Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation was
granted a franchise to establish, construct, maintain and operate in the
Philippines, at such places as the grantee may select, station or stations
and associated equipment and facilities for international satellite
communications. Under this franchise, it was likewise granted the
authority to construct and operate such ground facilities as needed to
deliver telecommunications services from the communications satellite
system and ground terminal or terminals. Under Sec 5 of the same law,
PhilComSat was exempt from the jurisdiction, control and regulation of the
Public Service Commission later known as the National
Telecommunications Commission. However, EO 196 was later proclaimed
and the same has placed PhilComSat under the jurisdiction of NTC.
Consequently, PhilComSat has to acquire permit to operate from NTC in
order to continue operating its existing satellites. NTC gave the necessary
permit but it however directed PhilComSat to reduce its current rates by
15%. NTC based its power to fix the rates on EO 546. PhilComSat assailed
the said directive and holds that the enabling act (EO 546) of respondent
NTC empowering it to fix rates for public service communications does not
provide the necessary standards constitutionally required hence there is an
undue delegation of legislative power, particularly the adjudicatory powers
of NTC. PhilComSat asserts that nowhere in the provisions of EO 546,
providing for the creation of respondent NTC and granting its rate-fixing
powers, nor of EO 196, placing petitioner under the jurisdiction of
respondent NTC, can it be inferred that respondent NTC is guided by any
standard in the exercise of its rate-fixing and adjudicatory powers.
PhilComSat subsequently clarified its said submission to mean that the
order mandating a reduction of certain rates is undue delegation not of
legislative but of quasi-judicial power to respondent NTC, the exercise of
which allegedly requires an express conferment by the legislative body.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is an undue delegation of power.
HELD: Fundamental is the rule that delegation of legislative power may be
sustained only upon the ground that some standard for its exercise is
provided and that the legislature in making the delegation has prescribed
the manner of the exercise of the delegated power. Therefore, when the
administrative agency concerned, NTC in this case, establishes a rate, its
act must both be non-confiscatory and must have been established in the
manner prescribed by the legislature; otherwise, in the absence of a fixed
standard, the delegation of power becomes unconstitutional. In case of a
delegation of rate-fixing power, the only standard which the legislature is
required to prescribe for the guidance of the administrative authority is
that the rate be reasonable and just. However, it has been held that even
in the absence of an express requirement as to reasonableness, this
standard may be implied. In the case at bar, the fixed rate is found to be of
merit and reasonable.
76. MIAA vs Airspan Corp
Facts: Petitioner issued Resolution No. 97-51[3] announcing an increase in
the rentals of its terminal buildings, VIP lounge, other airport buildings and
land, as well as check-in and concessions counters. Business concessions,
particularly concessionaire privilege fees, were also increased.
On April 2, 1998, petitioner passed Resolution No. 98-30[4] adopting
twenty percent (20%) of the increase recommended by Punongbayan and
Araullo,[5] to take effect immediately on June 1, 1998. Thus, petitioner
issued the corresponding Administrative Order No. 1, Series of 1998 to
reflect the new schedule of fees, charges, and rates.[6]
On February 5, 1999, petitioner issued Resolution No. 99-11,[7] which
further increased the other airport fees and charges, specifically for
parking and porterage services, and the rentals for hangars. Accordingly,
petitioner amended Administrative Order No. 1, Series of 1998.
Respondents requested that the implementation of the new fees, charges,
and rates be deferred due to lack of prior notice and hearing. The request
was denied. Petitioner likewise refused to renew the identification cards of
respondents personnel, and vehicle stickers to prevent entry to the
premises.
ISSUE: WON Petitioner MIAA can validly raise without prior notice and
public hearing the fees, charges, and rates subject of its Resolutions Nos.
98-30 and 99-11?
RULING: Under the original Charter of the MIAA, petitioner was given
blanket authority to adjust its fees, charges, and rates. However, E.O. No.
903 limited such authority to a mere recommendatory power. Hence,
petitioners Charter itself, as amended, directly vests the power to
determine revision of fees, charges, and rates in the ministry head and
even requires approval of the Cabinet.
Worth noting, its Charter, established MIAA as an attached agency of the
Ministry of Transportation and Communications (now Department of
Transportation and Communications). Hence, the ministry head who has
the power to determine the revision of fees, charges, and rates of the
MIAA is now the DOTC Secretary. Clearly, petitioner has no authority to
increase its fees, charges, or rates as the power to do so is vested solely in
the DOTC Secretary, although petitioners prerogative to recommend
possible increases thereon is of course recognized.
As an attached agency of the DOTC, the MIAA is governed by the
Administrative Code of 1987. The Administrative Code specifically requires
notice and public hearing in the fixing of rates. It follows that the rate
increases imposed by petitioner are invalid for lack of the required prior
notice and public hearing. They are also ultra vires because, to begin with,
petitioner is not the official authorized to increase the subject fees,
charges, or rates, but rather the DOTC Secretary.
77. Gonzalo Sy Trading vs Central Bank
Facts: The petitioner-appellant is a trading company engaged in the
importation of fresh fruits like oranges, grapes, apples and lemons from
the different parts of the world for the last nineteen years. It wrote to the
Deputy Governor of the Central Bank of the Philippines, Mr. Amado R.
Brias requesting authority to import from the country of Japan on "no-
dollar" basis fresh fruits in the total amount of US$715,000.00.
Mr. Julian D. Mercado, the Executive Assistant to Deputy Governor Brias
denied the request
Petitioner-appellant sought a reconsideration of the denial thru Deputy
Governor Amado R. Brias explaining that their case is a very special one
and different from regular importation.
The Monetary Board of the Central Bank issued Resolution No. 2038
approving petitioner-appellant's request for Special Import Permit on No-
Dollar Basis.
Thereafter petitioner-appellant made his first importation from Japan.
Petitioner-appellant requested from Deputy Governor Amado R. Brias "an
amendment of the country of origin of our importations to include other
countries except communist countries" since the fresh fruits from Japan
"are seasonal (and) our shippers cannot fully fill up our requirements to
comply with their total commitments to us without procuring from other
sources like Australia, Taiwan, U.S.A. and other countries with whom we
have trade relations."
Then, on April 17, 1970, the Assistant to the Governor, Mr. Cesar Lomotan,
informed the Prudential Bank and Trust Company that the authority
granted to petitioner-appellant under MB Resolution No. 2038 was
intended only for the Christmas season of 1968 and does not extend
through 1969. Petitioner-appellant notified Mr. Cesar Lomotan that the
Prudential Bank and Trust Company refused to issue them any release
certificate for their importations. On June 10, 1970, Deputy Governor
Amado R. Brias wrote petitioner-appellant that its request cannot be
given due course, inviting attention to the basic letter of November 19,
1969, informing it that the Special Import Permit was intended only for the
Christmas season of 1968 and does not extend through 1969.
The Collector of Customs for the Port of Manila, Mr. Jose T. Viduya, issued
warrants of seizure and detention.
On July 30, 1970, the Collector of Customs issued a notice for the auction
sale of the confiscated June 1970 shipment. Whereupon, petitioner-
appellant, along with another importer, Tomas Y. de Leon, commenced an
injunction suit before the Court of First Instance of Manila against the
Commissioner and Collector of Customs for the Port of Manila.
.ISSUE: WON the permit granted to petitioner is valid
RULING: We rule that the Special Import Permit granted to petitioner-
appellant on November 19, 1968, allowing it to import fresh fruits from
Japan on a "no-dollar" basis, has already lost its validity when the
questioned importations of June and September, 1970 were made.
It is one of the first principles in the field of administrative law that a
license or a permit is not a contract between the sovereignty and the
licensee or permitee, and is not a property in any constitutional sense, as
to which the constitutional prescription against impairment of the
obligation of contracts may extend. A license is rather in the nature of a
special privilege, of a permission or authority to do what is within its terms.
It is not in any way vested, permanent, or absolute. A license granted by
the State is always revocable. As a necessary consequence of its main
power to grant license or permit, the State or its instrumentalities have the
correlative power to revoke or recall the same. And this power to revoke
can only be restrained by an explicit contract upon good consideration to
that effect. The absence of an expiry date in, a license does not make it
perpetual. Notwithstanding that absence, the license cannot last beyond
the life of the basic authority under which it was issued.
The series of correspondence exchanged between petitioner-appellant and
respondent-appellee in the case at bar plainly reveals that the Special
Import Permit granted to petitioner-appellant covers only the Christmas
season of 1968. As reflected in its first letter, dated September 28, 1968,
the cause or the compelling reason why petitioner-appellant sought for the
Special Import Permit on No-Dollar Basis was because the importation of
fresh fruits calls for 175% Special Time Deposit for 120 days and "(w)ith the
fast approaching Christmas season," petitioner-appellant "cannot cope
with the demands of [its] buyers of fresh fruits under this requirement
imposed on importers." Upon denial of its request, petitioner-appellant
explained to Deputy Governor Amado R. Brias in its letter of October 22,
1968 that their "..., case is a very special one" and that "... this item of fresh
apples is very much needed in the coming Christmas season ..."
Complementary to this letter, petitioner-appellant pointed out to the
Monetary Board in its letter of November 6, 1968 that "the items called for
such as apples, oranges and grapes are perishable in nature and cannot be
stored for a longer period of time, and the main purpose of this
importation is to serve the requirements during the Christmas Season." As a
result, the conclusion becomes inevitable that the Special Import Permit
thus granted lasts only until the Christmas Season of 1968.

103.GUYS WALA AKONG MAKITANG CASE NIYA. PURO DOCTRINE LANG. -_-
104. CERVANTES VS. AUDITOR-GENERAL G.R. No. L-4043 May 26, 1952
FACTS: Cenon Cervantes, Manager of the National Abaca and Other Fibers
Corporation (NAFCO) receiving P15,000 salary a year, assailed the decision
of the Auditor General denying his claim for quarters allowance. By a
resolution of the Board of Directors of NAFCO, Cervantes was granted
quarters allowance of not exceeding P400 a month effective the first of
August, 1949. The resolution was disapproved by the Control Committee
of the Government Enterprises on strength of the recommendation of the
NAFCO auditor, concurred in by the Auditor General, because of the
following reasons: (1) that quarters allowance constituted additional
compensation prohibited by the charter of the NAFCO, which fixes the
salary of the general manager thereof at the sum not to exceed P15,000 a
year, and (2) that the precarious financial condition of the corporation did
not warrant the granting of such allowance.
The President promulgated Executive Order No. 93 creating the
Government Enterprises Council creating the Control Committee of the
Government Enterprises pursuant to Republic Act No. 51 approved by
Congress authorizing the President of the Philippines, among other things,
to effect such reforms and changes in government owned and controlled
corporations for the purpose of promoting simplicity, economy and
efficiency in their operation.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 51 is unconstitutional on the ground that it is an
undue delegation of legislative power.
HELD: No. The rule is that so long as the Legislature "lays down a policy
and a standard is established by the statute" there is no undue delegation.
(11 Am. Jur. 957). Republic Act No. 51 in authorizing the President of the
Philippines, among others, to make reforms and changes in government-
controlled corporations, lays down a standard and policy that the purpose
shall be to meet the exigencies attendant upon the establishment of the
free and independent government of the Philippines and to promote
simplicity, economy and efficiency in their operations. The standard was
set and the policy fixed. The President had to carry the mandate. This he
did by promulgating the executive order in question which, tested by the
rule above cited, does not constitute an undue delegation of legislative
power.
105. People v. Jolliffe
Facts:
esiding
in Hongkong, the son of a former Chancellor of the West China Union
University and had been Trade Commissioner for Canada in Shanghai &
Hongkong. He was from a reputable family & is quite well-known. He made
several trips to Manila, sometimes for business trips, sometimes to meet
his wife & children who would be passing through.
know if he was going to be paid. He was paid in gold which he hid under his
shirt. When he was going to his hotel room, he was accosted by a woman
secret service agent, Amanda Arimbay, and was brought to a search room.
He tried to prevent the gold from being found but eventually, 4 pcs of gold
bullion and a 100$ travellers check was found on him. He offered to settle
the case by bribing the agents.

o He was arrested for violating RA 265: An Act Establishing The Central
Bank Of The Philippines, Defining Its Powers In The Administration Of The
Monetary And Banking System, Amending The Pertinent Provisions Of The
Administrative Code With Respect To The Currency And The Bureau Of
Banking, And For Other Purposes
o Sec 34 of said act states: Whenever anyone wilfully violates this Act or
any order, instruction, etc. legally issued by the Monetary Board, he/she
shall be punished by a fine and by imprisonment.
o Note that when he was arrested, there was already CB Circular 21: Any
person desiring to export gold bullions must obtain a license from the
Central Bank.

legation
of legislative power.

Issue/Held: Is CB Circular 21 valid? YES.
Ratio:
Re: Delegation of Legislative Power
to local govts. HOWEVER, it is one thing to delegate the power (1) to
determine what the law shall be; and another thing (2) to delegate the
authority to fix the details in the execution or enforcement of a policy set
out in the law itself.
law authorizing the delegation furnishes a reasonable standard which
sufficiently marks the field within which the Administrator is to act so that
it may be known whether he has kept within it in compliance with the
legislative will.

Re: Application to this case
the President the power:
o To subject to licensing all transactions in gold and foreign exchange to
protect the international reserve of the Central Bank during an exchange
crisis and to give the Monetary Board and the Government time to take
constructive measures to combat such crisis.
o The Board is also authorized to take such appropriate remedial
measures to protect the international stability of the peso, whether the
international reserve is falling, as a result of payment or remittances
abroad which, in the opinion of the Monetary Board, are contrary to the
national welfare.
the law creating the Central Bank, which are (Sec 2 RA 265):
o To maintain monetary stability in the Philippines;
o To promote a rising level of production, employment and real income in
the Philippines.
to vest in the delegated
authority the character of administrative details in the enforcement of the
law and to place the grant of authority BEYOND the category of a
delegation of legislative powers

Appeal denied.
106. Ang Tibay vs. CIR, 69 Phil 635
Facts: Ang Tibay was a manufacturer of rubber slippers.

There was a shortage of leather soles, and it was necessary to temporarily
lay off members of the National Labor Union.

According to the Union however, this was merely a scheme to
systematically terminate the employees from work, and that the shortage
of soles is unsupported. It claims that Ang Tibay is guilty of ULP because
the owner, Teodoro, is discriminating against the National Labor Union,
and unjustly favoring the National Workers Brotherhood, which was
allegedly sympathetic to the employer.

The petitioner, Ang Tibay, has filed an opposition both to the motion for
reconsideration of the respondent Court of Industrial Relations and to the
motion for new trial of the respondent National Labor Union, Inc.

Issue: Whether or not special courts like Court of Industrial Relations
should observe due process.

Held: Yes. The Court of Industrial Relations is not narrowly constrained by
technical rules of procedure, and Commonwealth Act No. 103 requires it to
act according to justice and equity and substantial merits of the case,
without regard to technicalities or legal evidence but may inform its mind
in such manner as it may deem just and equitable.

There are cardinal primary rights which must be respected even in
proceedings of this character. The first of these rights is the right to a
hearing, which includes the right of the party interested or affected to
present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof. Not only
must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce
evidence tending to establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal
must consider the evidence presented. While the duty to deliberate does
not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a necessity which
cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to support its
decision. Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or
conclusion, but the evidence must be substantial. The decision must be
rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained
in the record and disclosed to the parties affected. The Court of Industrial
Relations or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own
independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not
simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision. The
Court of Industrial Relations should, in all controversial questions, render
its decision in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can know
the various issues involved, and the reasons for the decisions rendered.
The performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority conferred
upon it.
107. ASPREC VS. ITCHON
FACTS
-Private respondent Jacinto Hernandez (Hernandez) filed an administrative
complaint against Cleto Asprec for unprofessional conduct with the Respondent
Board of Examiners for Surveyors. Allegedly, Hernandez and Asprec entered
into an agreement wherein Asprec would survey Hernandez lot in Camarines
Sur and would deliver to the latter a plan approved by the Director of Lands
w/n 3 months after completion of the survey, and procure the issuance of a CTC
to the lot w/n 6 months after the plans approval. However, even if Hernandez
paid the agreed amount, Asprec did not deliver the plan, and the alleged plan
duly delivered and approved was for one Damian Alhambra, and the plan
submitted was merely a certified copy of the plan. It should also be noted that
during the proceedings in the Board of Examiners, Asprec/his counsel had
many times been absent, late, sickwhich caused the delay of the proceedings.
-Respondent Board: For Hernandez: (1) no actual survey of the land made; (2)
money was paid; Asprec was guilty of deceit and thus violated the Code of
Ethics for surveyors, his certificate of registration as private land
surveyor REVOKED and required to be surrendered.
-Asprec filed petition with the CFI of Camarines Sur for certiorari to annul the
orders revoking his surveyors certificate of registration; mandamus to compel
the Board to conduct a formal hearing of the complaint against him; and
prohibition, to stop execution of the orders to surrender said certificate. The
preliminary injunction prayed for was rejected below
-CFI: dismiss with costs
ISSUES
1. WON Asprec was denied due process in not being able to participate in the
hearing
2. WON the proceedings before the Board, being quasi-criminal in nature, was
valid granted Asprec absented himself from it
3. WON the decision of the Board rendered upon a motion for judgment on the
pleadings valid
(other issues were more on Civpro than Admin so not included)
HELD
1. NO
Ratio. Presence of a party at a trial is not always the essence of due process.
Really all that the law requires to satisfy adherence to this Constitutional
precept is that the parties be given notice of the trial, an opportunity to be
heard.
Reasoning. Petitioner has had more than ample opportunity to defend himself
before the Board. As he and counsel did not appear at the last and stipulated
date of hearing, he cannot look to the law or to a judicial tribunal to whipsaw
the Board into giving him a new one. He cannot raise his voice in protest
against the act of the Board in proceeding in his and his counsel's absence. And
this because without cause or reason, without any excuse at all, counsel and
client have chosen to shy away from the trial.
2. YES
Ratio. Where the respondent in a petition for contempt failed to appear on the
date set for the hearing, of which he was previously notified, it was held that he
was not deprived of his day in court when the judge ordered him arrested
unless he pay the support he was adjudged to give, he having been given an
opportunity to be heard. Similarly, the defendant's failure to appear with the
counsel of his choice at the trial, notwithstanding repeated postponements and
the warning that failure to so appear would be deemed a waiver of the right to
present evidence in his defense and the case will be submitted for decision on
the evidence submitted by the prosecution, was a sufficient justification for the
court to proceed and render judgment upon evidence before it.
3. YES
Ratio. A rule so long respected, because it is buttressed upon reason and
authority, is that technical rules of court practice, procedure and evidence are
not to be applied with rigidity in administrative proceedings. We should have in
mind the nature of administrative bodies, the character of the duties they are
required to perform, the purposes for which they are organized, the persons
who compose them. Here, we are concerned with members of a board of
surveyors technical men but not necessarily trained law men. In this
posture, it is quite reasonable to assume that their proceedings may not be
conducted with that degree of exactness or with such scrupulous observance of
the complex technical rules expected in a legal battle before a court of justice.
Their acts should not be measured by the same yardstick exacted of a judge in a
court of law. So much leeway is given an investigating administrative body.
Reasoning. The plan allegedly made by Asprec was not the plan of an original
survey but a mere copy from another plan. Both the plans were submitted to
the Board. So it is, that when counsel for Hernandez manifested that all the
evidence against petitioner was submitted to the Board and that for that reason
he was resting his case, he evidently had in mind the admissions in the
pleadings and the plans and decisions and report here noted. And, the motion
for judgment on the pleadings was a mere follow-up of the manifestation just
adverted to. As the trial court well observed, counsel for respondent Hernandez
did not present a motion for judgment on the pleadings in the strict sense of the
word, but "a motion which for lack of another expression, he called a motion
for judgment on the pleadings." Lack of observance of this technicality which
does not quarrel with a fair concept of justice should be overlooked.
Disposition. Upon the view we take of this case, the decision is hereby affirmed.
Costs against petitioner.