Sino-Indian Border Dispute: The Impossible settlement, and need of a new

framework
Abstract:
Why have India and China failed to resolve their border disputes? This paper argues that
the current public discourse on the Sino-Indian border dispute, based on legal and
historical analysis, has paved way for an inconclusive and unending saga of conflicted
claims and accusations. The said discourse is strictly limited to analysing the Sino-Indian
border conflict of 1962, and examining either countrys responsibility for the war and their
border transgressions before and during the war. The primary purpose of the paper is to
showcase the futility of any such analysis that blames either India or China for the
continuing border crisis. For India and China to foster friendly ties, the dominant
discourses need to veer away from the regular blame game approach. This paper
suggests a rather holistic approach to view the border dispute, where the emphasis would
essentially be on the external international factors at play. Understanding these factors, as
the paper aims to, could lead to a de-escalated security situation between India and China,
and can possibly make way for a healthy competition.
1. Introduction
History is a contested space for political narrations, and no single country can lay
undisputed claim over the narratives of past happenings. Sino-Indian border dispute
falls under a similar realm of contested history. Despite sixteen rounds of talks between
India and China on the contentious boundary issue, both countries have till date failed
to come to agreeing terms on the issue of resolving border dispute. At the heart of this
dispute is the month-long 1962 Sino-Indian border conflict that continues to retain
significance to the tumultuous relationship between India and China. The uncertain or
ambiguous reasons that led to the 1962 conflict have hitherto troubled policymakers
from both the countries to negotiate any conclusive settlement. In popular discourses
about the conflict, both countries accused the other of aggression guided by
imperialistic ambitions. Whilst India accused China of unwarranted incursions and of
illegally occupying Aksai-Chin (Nehru 1963), China claimed to have acted in self-defence
and counter-charged India of being a regional hegemon (Enlai 1973).
This paper examines the epistemological framework of popular discourses on Sino-Indian
border conflict. To this end, the paper analyses several prominent scholarly writings that have
examined the conflict through historical verification of claims and legal analysis of boundary
disputes (Fisher et al. 1963; Dalvi 1969; Desai 1963; Noorani 1964; Rao 1962; Gupta
1974; Maxwell 1972; Lamb 1964; Anand 2012). Their works hold either of the two
countries accountable for having intruded into the other country, and therefore
responsible for the 1962 conflict. Scholarly writings like that of K.K. Rao (1962), M.W.
Fisher (1963) and A.G. Noorani (1963) support Indias claim, whilst writings of K. Gupta
(1974), N. Maxwell (1972) and A. Lamb (1964) support the claims of China on the issue of
border dispute. These writings suggest a theoretical underpinning of reductionist
theories, which implies that if the causes of conflict are removed then the effect (i.e.
existing boundary dispute) could also be removed (Hollis and Smith 1991: 106). More
pertinent, a neutral judgement on boundary issue based on legality and historicity
would resolve the border dispute between India and China. On further analysis, many of
these writings have their orientation in the individualist approach. Explained by Hollis
and Smith, this approach takes State as the central factor for explaining events (1991:
4). Accordingly, the causes of the conflict are with the State (i.e. India or China), where a
states motive, legality of claims and allegations of intrusion acquire central position.
This individualist approach, as the paper argues, has further deepened the existing
boundary dispute between India and China. The paper make no claims to provide any
factual reasons behind the 1962 conflict rather I attempt to challenge the state-centric
approach of the public discourses; in other words this paper argues that the existing
discourse on the conflict is bound to result in an inconclusive settlement between India
and China. For this purpose, this paper analyses the claims, allegations and motives of
both countries, to explore the flaws of this approach. As an alternative and more
appropriate paradigm to analyse the issue of boundary dispute, this paper extends the
analysis to the holistic approach. Explained by Hollis and Smith, holistic approach takes
various systematic and external forces into consideration; for instance, inter-state alliances,
balance of power and threats from nations other than those involved in a direct dispute
(Hollis and Smith 1991: 4). Unlike the individualistic approach where individual States
acquire central position, holistic approach focuses on the international structure of which the
States are part of. On Similar lines, Renaud Egreteau (2012) analyses the China-India
relationship through the conceptual framework of enduring international rivalries. This
paper argues for an extension of this theoretical model to better understand the
ongoing boundary dispute between the two countries.
To this end, the paper has been divided into four sections first, looks into the disputed
boundary claims of India and China; second looks into the allegations of aggression by
both countries; third problematizes the individualist approach; the fourth section brings
in the holistic approach, also the enduring international rivalries to better understand
the dispute. This paper concludes by claiming that the holistic approach is a better way
to analyse the Sino-Indian border dispute towards envisioning any settlement between
India and China on border dispute.
2. Disputed Claims by India and China: An Individualist Approach
The individualist approach views conflict in abstraction, as an exclusive inter-state
event. Within this framework, scholars on Sino-India border conflict attribute the
causes of war to either of the two countries. Their scholarly writings can broadly be
categorized into two schools of thought one that blames China for the conflict, and the
other that blames India. Scholars supporting Indias claim characterized the 1962
conflict, primarily, as a result of Chinese aggression and betrayal against India (Fisher et
al. 1963; Dalvi 1969; Desai 1963; Noorani 1964). Other factors, namely- the naivety of
Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru in trusting the Chinese (Anand 2012: 231), and
failure on the part of political leadership to strengthen the military forces, remain
derivatives of the primal factor i.e. Chinese aggression. On the other hand, scholars
supporting Chinas claim rejected all of Indias allegations and accused India of behaving
in an imperialist fashion (Lamb 1964; Maxwell 1972). Underlying both countries claim
was the assertion of legitimacy on the border issue.
This section brings forth a scholarly conversation of claims and counterclaims on the
legitimacy of boundary issue between India and China. The readings in this section are
important to explore the usability of individualistic approach.
2.1. Indias Claim on Contested Boundary
The contested boundary areas between India and China can be categorized into the
eastern sector, where the famous McMahon Line lies; the middle sector, which is
between the states of Punjab, Himachal Pradesh, and Uttar Pradesh of India, and the
Tibet region of China; and the western sector, which is in the Ladakh area of Kashmir
[Aksai Chin], and through which China built a 100-mile highway linking Chinas Tibet
region with the Chinese province of Sinkiang (Lu 1986: 3). While the middle sector
witnessed the first round of diplomatic squabble, the eastern and western sector
emerged as the hotbeds of conflict (Anand 2012: 3). According to the Indian claims, the
conflict of 1962 resulted in loss of the Indian territory of Aksai Chin (in western sector)
to China, while in the eastern sector the Chinese forces overran more than hundred
miles into the country before withdrawing (Lu 1986). India claims authority over these
disputed boundary areas, and considers China as an illegal occupant of Indias Aksai
Chin.
Indias claim in the western sector can be traced back to the Ladakh Tibet treaty of 17
September, 1842 (Noorani 2011: 12), which was concluded between the Dogra ruler
Gulab Singh of Kashmir and the Lama Guru of Tibet, and that the treaty had been
acknowledged by the Chinese government in the year 1847 (Lu 1986: 90). The
agreement declared Dogras as the legitimate rulers of Ladakh, and that the old
established frontiers between the two parties were to be accepted (Noorani 2011: 12).
Since then, Ladakh has been an integral part of Kashmir (Rao 1962: 382). Post-
independence, after Kashmir acceded to the Indian union, India claims to have
sovereign rights over the areas of Kashmir which included Ladakh and Aksai Chin.
Treaties aside, India claims to have a traditional integrity with areas in the western
sector (Pardesi 2012: 190). Such claims are based on the pertinent references made to
these areas in the ancient Indian religious texts of Ramayana, Mahabharata and
Upanishads (Rao 1962). On the question of effective jurisdiction, India claims that
because of the geographical location and topographical features of western sector
Indian government did not expect any kind of aggression across its frontier in this
sector, [therefore] it did not think it was necessary to set up checkposts right up to the
Sino-Indian border (Lu 1986: 101).
Middle sector, though relatively less-conflict-prone than the other two sectors, was the
emerging point of diplomatic imbroglio and military confrontation between India and
China. Indias claim on these areas, especially in the disputed lands of Chuva, Shipki La
Pass, Sang, Tsungsha, Barahoti, Sangchamalla and Lapthal (Lu 1986:105), was based on
effective jurisdiction. In support of its claim, the Indian government produced evidence
such as assessments of land, revenue, and other taxes, census operations, maintenance
of schools, construction of roads, and establishments of checkposts in this sector (Lu
1986: 105). Further, the Panchsheel Agreement between India and China in 1954, as
per Indias claim, symbolized Chinas acknowledgement of Indias authority in the
middle sector. Distinguished scholar C RajaMohan claims that the Panchsheel Agreement
was essentially a trade accord between India and China on the issue of Indian trade with
Tibet. The agreement specified six passes in the middle sector through which the trade
and pilgrimage were to be carried out. India claims that these specifications in the
agreement were an unofficial demarcation of border passes between China and India
(Fisher et al. 1963: 85).
In the eastern sector, the Indian claim goes back to the famous Simla Conference of
1913-1914. The conference was hosted by the British authorities to conclude an
agreement between China and Tibet on the boundary question between Outer Tibet
(nominally under Chinese suzerainty but administered completely by Lhasa
government) and Inner Tibet (Tibetan-populated areas where Chinese writ would run)
(Anand 2012: 234). Indian government claims that the plenipotentiaries of Tibet and
China came to a mutually accepted solution (Desai 1963: 108), and the British India
plenipotentiary Sir Henry McMahon acknowledged Chinas suzerainty over Tibet on
the condition of Tibetan autonomy (Eekelen 1964: 19). In addition, Sir Arthur McMahon
brokered a separate deal with Tibet that specified the boundary between Tibet and
India (Eekelen 1964: 16). The final draft of the conference, which enlisted all the
boundary resolutions between India, China and Tibet, was agreed to by all the three
concerned parties. India claims that the Simla conference concluded in the official
demarcation of boundary between India and Tibet, what came to be known as
McMahon Line.
However, as pointed by scholars supporting Chinas claim, there were evidences that
contradicted Indias legalistic assertions.
2.2. Chinas Claim: Refuting Indias Assertions
Refuting all of Indias legalistic claims, China claimed that there had been no official
demarcation of the boundary between China and India. However, China did
acknowledge that a traditional customary boundary line had long taken shape on the
basis of the extent of each sides administrative jurisdiction (Enlai 1973: 3) and it was
on the basis of this traditional boundary line that China claimed authority over Aksai
Chin in the western sector. Further, India was found unaware of the Chinese presence in
the Aksai Chin region and of the construction of gigantic highway in this region until
1958 (Enlai 1973: 10), which evidently dismisses Indias jurisdiction on this area
(Anand 2012). On the question of treaty, China claimed to have never ratified the
Ladakh Tibet treaty of 1842. Moreover, as China claimed, the Ladakh Tibet treaty
was essentially a peace treaty, which had no specification on the boundary question (Lu
1986: 91; Noorani 2011).
In the middle sector, China claimed that the areas in question fell within the traditional
boundary line of China, and in its support produced land-conferring documents,
taxation papers, and census records (Lu 1986: 105). Refuting Indias claim about the
Panchsheel Agreement of 1954 declaring border passes between the two countries,
China claimed that the boundary question was not touched on at all in the agreement
(Lu 1986: 93).
Chinas claim in the eastern sector was based on the effective administrative jurisdiction
of Tibet over the areas of NEFA, Tawang in particular. The Tawang tract was inhabited
mostly by Monpas who followed Tibetan Buddhism, [and] the Tawang monastery
collected taxes and dues for its parent Drepung monastery of Lhasa [in Tibet] (Anand
2012: 235). Prior to 1914, the boundary between British Assam and Tawang Tract was
well known (Lamb 1964: 121), and it was only on February 2, 1951 that India took over
Tawang (Gupta 1974: 11). In claiming the Twang tract, China refuted to having agreed
to the McMahon Line in the past. China claimed that the McMahon Line was the result of
a secret exchange of notes between the British and Tibetan plenipotentiaries, and that
the treaty was never officially ratified by China (Gupta 1974: 29, 62). Also, the British
Indian government was legally debarred from singing a bilateral agreement with Tibet
because of the prohibitory clauses of the Anglo-Russian Convention (1907) (Gupta
1974: 29). Scholars have also argued against the very authenticity of Indias claim on
McMahon Line (Gupta 1974; Maxwell 1972; Anand 2012). These scholars claim that the
Simla Agreement of 1913-14 was never a success, and McMahon himself had admitted
that: It is with great regret that I leave India without having secured the formal
adherence of the Chinese government to a Tripartite Agreement (Maxwell 1972: 37-
38). It was only in 1938, under the instructions of the Foreign Secretary of British India
Sir Olaf Caroe, that the Simla Conference was declared a partial success which had
fixed the North Eastern frontier of India (Gupta 1974: ix). Volume XIV of the Aitchisons
treaties, which contained the Simla Agreement and based on which the Indian
government made its claim in the eastern sector, was re-produced in 1938 with an
imprint of 1929 containing fabricated information, while all the original copies of the
volume were recalled and destroyed (Gupta 1974: 29; Maxwell 1972: 44; Anand 2012:
236).
On the whole, both countries claimed to have legitimate rights on the disputed border
areas, and accused the other of violating into their territorial spaces.
3. Allegations of Aggression: The Blame-Game
In the context of Sino-Indian conflict, attributing blame to either of the two countries
would require a three-layered process: first of claiming legitimacy over the disputed
areas, followed by alleging the other country of aggression for intruding in those
disputed areas, and finally claiming the other country to be expansionist. Based on the
self-perceived legitimacy over boundary claims, both countries accused each other of
aggressive intrusions. In this section, the paper briefly summarizes the scholarly
writings on allegations and counter-allegations of aggression between India and China,
and the charges of expansionism against each other.
3.1. Allegations by India Expansionist China
As per the Indian claims, incidents of Chinese intrusion were reported since 1954 with
the first being reported in Barahoti in the middle sector. However, these reports never
crossed the threshold of diplomatic squabbling. The first major incident that drew
public attention occurred on September 1958, when an Indian patrol party was
allegedly detained by the Chinese forces in Aksai Chin for nearly five weeks, during
which they were subjected to ill treatment (Noorani 1963: 22). It was in the same year
that the Indian government lodged a protest against China for having trespassed on
Indias Ladakh region and built the Sinkiang-Tibet Highway through it without the
knowledge of the government of India (Lu 1986: 65). The first major military
confrontation, as charged by India, occurred on August 7, 1959, when an approximate of
200 Chinese soldiers crossed into Indias Khinzemane and refused to withdraw. The
situation was further aggravated when the Chinese soldiers allegedly crossed into
Indias Kongka Pass on October 21, 1959, and opened fire on Indian soldiers causing
seventeen deaths (Lu 1986: 67).
In light of growing Chinese threat and non-conclusive diplomacy, the Indian
government embarked on the Forward Policy according to which Indian soldiers were
to establish posts in the frontier areas of the boundary to keep the enemy [Chinese
soldiers] in check. A large scale military confrontation had resumed by July 21, 1962
when the Chinese troops allegedly attacked an Indian patrol party in the region of Chip
Chap River (Lu 1986: 69). In addition, the Indian government accused the Chinese
forces for having established several military posts inside the Indian territory. The
situation reached a critical phase when the Chinese forces allegedly attacked the Indian
posts in Indias Che Dong area on October 9, 1962, causing seventeen deaths. Days later,
on the 20
th
of October, 1962, the Chinese forces launched a massive attack on the Indian
frontiers along the Kechilang River and in the Khinzemane area in the eastern sector,
and the Galwan Valley and the Chip Chap Valley in the western sector (Lu 1986: 72).
Chinas offensive ended on the 21
st
of November, 1962, after it withdrew from the
eastern sector to positions twenty kilometres behind the line of actual control which
existed between China and India on November 7, 1959 (Lu 1986: 74), while occupying
Aksai Chin in the western sector.
For scholars supporting Indias claim, this attack confirmed their views on China as an
expansionist state. Their writings further claimed that Chinas expansionist plans were
up for open display in the 1950s when Chinese Liberation Army entered Tibet (Dalvi
1969: 6), grossly violating the terms of Simla Agreement (1913-14) and seeking to
restore the territorial extent and eminence the Manchu Empire enjoyed in its heyday
(Bhutani 2012: 110). Noorani summed up Chinas expansionist behaviour alleging that
the Chinese were aware of the legal boundaries with India however they were anxious
to change them by grabbing our [Indian] territory and imposing on us [India] a
settlement which could legalize their gains (Noorani 1963: 48).
3.2. Counter-allegations by China Imperial India
China refuted all of Indias charges of aggression, and counter-charged the Indian forces
of intruding into the claimed Chinese territory. On the first incident of military
confrontation, China accused the Indian forces for having intruded into Wu-Je (called
Hoti [Barahoti] by India) on June 29, 1954 (Lu 1986: 64). On the Aksai Chin incident of
1958, China claimed that the area was well within the Chinese territory and it were the
Indian soldiers who had intruded in their (Chinas) region. Refuting all similar
accusations of aggression, China claimed that they were the victims of Indian intrusion
instead. On the accusation of war against India, China refuted Indias allegation and
claimed to have acted in self-defence against the provocative Indias forward policy.
Further, scholars supporting Chinas claim accused India of embarking on an
expansionist policy since independence, which was evident in its (Indias) relation
towards Bhutan, Sikkim and Nepal in the late 1940s and early 1950s (Maxwell 1972:
60). Pardesi quotes from Chinas official Foreign Language Press: [Nehrus ambition
since mid-1940s was the] establishment of a great empire unprecedented in Indias
history [that would] far surpass that of the colonial system set up in Asia in the past by
the British empire (Pardesi 2012: 195). Summed up by Peking Review, India sought to
impose on China a unilaterally defined boundary which it inherited from British
imperialism (Peking Review September 15, 1949: 3).
Scholars stand firm on their grounds of accusation against either China or India, and this
has further perpetuated longevity of the Sino-Indian border dispute. The two different
schools of thought are yet to find a common ground, and this irreconcilability
problematizes the individualistic approach.
4. Problematizing the Individualistic Approach
The individualistic framework requires a state-centric analysis, and takes into
consideration the States motive as a causal factor for any inter-state event. In
contextualizing the 1962 conflict, both countries accused the other of harbouring
expansionist ambitions. However, the evidence points otherwise. In the case of China,
the country had in the past made peaceful boundary settlements and even surrendered
claim on extensive tracts of land, as was evident from the Sino-Burmese treaty of 1960
(Lamb 1964: 4-5). Whilst in Indias case, the country displayed exceptional restraint in
acquiring the territory of Goa, which evidently belied the claims of Indian expansionism.
Also, Nehrus rejection of Ayub Khans offer to form a joint defence with Pakistan
against China was evident of Indias effort to prevent war and not be expansionist
(Trivedi 1977: 166).
Evidently, the threats were misplaced by both the countries, and misperceptions about
expansionism had little factual grounding. As pointed by Garver, the two factors
decisive in Chinas decision of war against India were a) A perceived need to punish
and end perceived Indian efforts to undermine Chinese control of Tibet, and b) A
perceived need to punish and end perceived Indian aggression, which was derived from
the first factor (Garver 2006: 86-87). Whilst China was mistaken in perceiving the
Tibetan threat to have emerged from India (Garver 2006), Indias aggressive policies
(Forward Policy) were based on misconceptions about Chinese expansionist policies on
Indian claimed borders.
If the aggressive policies of either state were in response to misperceived threats, who
is to be blamed for the 1962 conflict? Misperceived threats? As mentioned earlier, this
paper does not intend to explore the causes of the conflict, rather attempts to provide a
different approach that would better understand the dispute towards a possible
settlement. To this end, a more pertinent question to ask would be why did India and
China perceived threat against each other in the first place, and why does this
misperception continue in the present context?
In this section, the paper proceeds to problematize the claims made by both countries
as an inconclusive chapter, and in the latter part the paper argues against the
individualistic approach.
The individualistic approach does not take into account the anarchic world order,
where no single country can play adjudicators and impose unilateral decisions on other
countries. Attributing blame on either of the two countries, as seen in earlier sections,
would be inconsequential given their equally substantive claims and allegations, and
absence of any third party jurist to decide on arguments between India and China. Also,
there exist no factual grounds against which the claims and accusations of either
country could be verified. This problematizes the model of blame-attribution within the
individualistic approach, as the blame-game is bound to result in perpetuating the
conflicted relationship between India and China.
On the other hand, the extensive legal arguments by scholars from the two schools of
thought have further substantiated both countries claim that what we demand is
rightfully ours. Such claims have limited the bargaining potential of both countries
leadership on the negotiating table. Especially in India, where democratic governance
compels the political leadership to consider public opinion, substantive claims of
legitimacy on boundary areas have stalled any possibility of compromise. Moreover,
negotiations over the boundary issue are deemed as a sign of weakness, and in the case
of India the leaderships decision to not negotiate is to demonstrate toughness (Mastro
2012: 78). This non-compromising posture by both India and China, backed by legal
documents to prove their claims on the border areas, has pronounced an inconclusive
verdict towards an unbiased judgement of the boundary dispute.
The individualistic framework is limited to charting out probable causes of the Sino-
Indian border dispute that have further deepened the conflicted relationship, however
it fails to explain as to why these causes emerged in the first place. Towards alleviating
the tensions between India and China, the analysis requires going beyond the state-
centred individualistic approach.
5. Holistic Approach and Enduring International Rivalry
The holistic approach, as an alternative to the state-centred framework, centralizes on
the international structure of the anarchic world. On theoretical grounds, this approach
is underlined by Kenneth Waltzs theory of neo-realism that focuses on the
international system to analyse inter-state conflicts (Waltz 2001). The predominant
assumption within this framework is that of prevailing anarchy, and the states are
sovereign units acting to the best of their prudence (Hollis and Smith 1991: 98). The
prevailing anarchical structure, as explained by Hollis and Smith, imposes on all states a
security dilemma, whereby they have to ensure their own security without increasing
the fears of other states (Hollis and Smith 1991: 98).
In the context of Sino-Indian border dispute, the framework aptly explains the mutual
threat perceptions of China and India, from an international standpoint. The policies of
India and China during and after the 1962 incident (till today) are stemmed in the
systemic factors of power rivalry, presence/absence of alliances and balance of military
power. For China, India (in the 1962 conflict) acted in cahoots with the Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA) of the US to promote treasonable activities by reactionary
elements in the Tibetan society against China (Peking Review May 5, 1959: 7). China
perceived this collusion between India and US as an imperial attempt to prevent its rise
by meddling in the affairs of Tibet. Aptly summed up by Liu: From the Chinese
perspective, continued CIA-Nationalist activities in Tibet could be logically linked with
Indias uncompromising stance and risky forward pushes beyond the line of actual
control (Liu 1994: 39). Whilst in Indias perception, threat surfaced in the
neighbourhood after the disruption of status-quo i.e. Tibetan autonomy, and rise of
China as a powerful state. Tibet had been a buffer zone for India since the colonial
times, and an abrupt removal of this buffer was bound to have security implications on
India (Dalvi 1969: 6). Such concerns were raised by Indian politicians Sardar
Vallabhbhai Patel, Frank Anthony, Durga Bai, and Shyama Prasad Mookerjee who
urged the Indian government to protect the Tibetan autonomy (Jetly 1979: 16-18; Dalvi
1969: 6-7).
Evidently, the policies pursued by both countries were in response to threats arising
from the systemic factors rooted in the anarchic world. The two countries rivalled
against each other to bring the balance of power in their favour. Even today, Indias
growing relationship with the U.S. is seen by China as a western attempt to stall Chinas
global rise, and to counter any such attempts China has vigorously helped Pakistan in
matters that are opposed to India (especially on the nuclear issue). On the other hand,
India sees Chinas collusion with the Pakistan and other neighbouring countries as an
attempt to limit India in regional affairs. Any military or infrastructural developments
on either side of the border only gives rise to the already existing security dilemma
between India and China.
But how can a holistic understanding help improve relations between India and China?
For one, it shifts the focus from boundary dispute as a reason of ongoing conflict to the
several systemic factors. The boundary dispute, based on legal and evidential analysis,
is inconclusive to pronounce a verdict on who should acquire the disputed areas.
However, understanding the systemic factors would help explain why the dispute
escalated to the levels of conflict, and why it continues to trouble the Sino-Indian
relations. On a more specific note for policy recommendation, India and China could
maintain status-quo in regard to border areas while strengthening relations in other
fields of cooperation.
Egreteau explains this ongoing Sino-Indian rivalry through the conceptual framework of
Enduring International Rivalry (Egreteau 2012). The concept has been borrowed from
Diehls work on enduring rivalries that takes three factors into consideration
conflicting goals, longevity of the rivalry and spatial consistency (Diehl 1998). India and
China, since the early 1950s, had their relations go south (Egreteau 2012), and the three
components of enduring rivalry perfectly fit their conflicted relationship. However, the
approach distinguishes between rivalry and an escalated rivalry i.e. conflict. Though the
Sino-Indian relations have been analysed through the concept of rivalry, this doesnt
mean that the relationship is bound to end up in conflict. A better understanding of the
situation could de-escalate the rivalry between India and China into a healthy
competitive relation.
The holistic approach and the concept of Enduring International Rivalry provides an
analytical framework to better understand the Sino-Indian dispute and hence could
assuage the existing security dilemma between India and China, and could possibly de-
escalate the conflicted relationship to normalcy.
6. Conclusion
Solutions to any problem depend on how well the problem is understood. In the context
of Sino-Indian dispute, the 1962 war continues to mar the relationship between India
and China. A better understanding of the conflict would presumably help to de-escalate
tensions between the two countries. In this direction, the paper has explored the
academic writings on the topic, and their contribution towards the solution.
Majority of scholarly writings have taken an individualist approach to analyse the
causes of the Sino-Indian conflict. Working within this approach, the scholars have
limited their analyses to inter-state activities, and have concluded their research by
attributing blame to either of the countries for the conflict. This paper makes a thorough
summary of the various writings and their analysis on the topic. Further, the paper
problematizes this approach for being inconclusive and deepening the conflicted
relationship between India and China.
This paper proceeds to suggest holistic approach as an appropriate framework to
better understand the conflict and the ongoing dispute, and examine the Sino-Indian
dispute through the conceptual lenses of enduring international rivalry. Further
researches on the topic of Sino-Indian border dispute, through the analytical framework
of holistic approach, would help to understand the conflicted relationship between
India and China in a better perspective.
References:
Anand, D. (2012) Remembering 1962 Sino-Indian Border War: Politics of Memory,
Journal of Defence Studies, Vol. 6, No. 4. Pgs. 229-248
Bhutani, S.K. (2012) Sino-Indian War, 1962 and the Role of Great Powers, Journal of
Defence Studies, Vol. 6, No. 4. Pgs. 109-124
Dalvi, J.P. (1969) Himalayan Blunder: The curtain-raiser to the Sino-Indian War of 1962,
Bombay: Thacker & Company
Desai, B.K. (1963) Sino-Indian Relations, in Karnik, V.B. (Eds.) China Invades India: The
Story of Invasion against the Background of Chinese History and Sino-Indian Relations,
New Delhi: Allied Publishers. Pgs. 103-177
Diehl, P.F. (1998) Introduction: An overview and Some Theoretical Guidelines in Diehl,
P.F. (Eds) The Dynamics of Enduring Rivalries, Urbana: University of Illinois Press. Pgs. 1-
25
Eekelen, W.F.V. (1964) Indian Foreign Policy and the Border Dispute with China, Hague:
Martinus Nijhoff
Egreteau, R. (2012) The China-India Rivalry Reconceptualized, Asian Journal of Political
Science, Vol. 20, No. 1. Pgs. 1-22
Enlai, Z. (1973) Premier Chou En-Lais Letter to the leaders of Asian and African Countries
on the Sino-Indian Boundary Question, Peking: Foreign Language Press
Fisher, M.W., Rose, L.E., and Huttenback, R.A. (1963) Himalayan Battleground: Sino-
Indian Rivalry in Ladakh, London: Pall Mall Press
Ganguly, S. (2004) India and China: Border Issues, Domestic Integration, and
International Security, in Frankel, F.R. (Eds.) The India-China relationship: What the
United States Needs to Know, New York: Columbia University Press. Pgs. 103-133
Garver, J.W. (2006) Chinas decision for War with India in 1962, in Johnstan, A.I. and
Ross, R.S. (Eds.) New Directions in the Study of Chinas Foreign Policy, Stanford: Stanford
University Press. Pgs. 86-130
Gupta, K. (1974) The Hidden History of the Sino-Indian Frontier, Calcutta: Minerva
Associates
Hoffmann, S.A. (1990) India and the China Crisis, London: University of California Press
Hollis, M. and Smith, S. (1991) Explaining and Understanding International Relations,
Oxford: Clarendon Press
Jetly, N. (1979) India China Relations, 1947-1977: A Study of Parliaments Role in the
Making of Foreign Policy, New Delhi: Radiant Publishers
Kalha, R.S. (2012) Tibet as a Factor in Sino-Indian Relations: Past and Present, Journal
of Defence Studies, Vol. 6, No. 4. Pgs. 7-26
Lall, J. (1989) Aksaichin and Sino-Indian Conflict, New Delhi: Allied Publishers
Lamb, A. (1964) The China-India Border: The Origins of the Disputed Boundaries, London:
Oxford University Press
Liu, C.H. (1986) The Sino-Indian Border Dispute: A Legal Study, New York: Greenwood
Press
Lu, X. (1994) The Sino-Indian Border Dispute and Sino-Indian Relations, Lanham:
University Press of America
Mastro, O.S. (2012) The Great Divide: Chinese and Indian views on Negotiations, 1959-
62, Journal of Defence Studies, Vol. 6, No. 4. Pgs. 71-108
Maxwell, N. (1972) Indias China War, England: Penguin Books
Nehru, J. (1963) Changing India, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 41, No. 3. Pgs. 453-465
Noorani, A.G. (1963) Our Credulity and Negligence, Bombay: Conway
Noorani, A.G. (2011) India-China boundary problem, 1846-1947: History and Diplomacy,
Oxford: Oxford University Press
Pardesi, M.S. (2012) The Legacy of Chinas India Policy, Journal of Defence Studies, Vol.
6, No. 4. Pgs. 189-206
Peking Review (March 31, 1959) All of China Supports Government Action in Putting
Down Rebellion in Tibet, Vol. II, No. 13
Peking Review (April 29, 1959) Chinese people will not Tolerate Foreign Intervention
in Tibet, Vol. II, No. 17
Peking Review (May 5, 1959) Kalimpong: A Link between Tibetan Rebels and Indian
Expansionists, Vol. I, No. 18
Peking Review (September 15, 1959) The Crux of the Boundary Question, Vol. I, No. 37
Rao, K.K. (1962) The Sino-Indian Boundary Question and International Law, The
International and Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 11, No. 2. Pgs. 375-415
Trivedi, R.N. (1977) Sino-Indian Border Dispute and its Impact on Indo-Pakistan
Relations, New Delhi: Associated Publishing Houses
Waltz, K.N. (2001) Man, the state, and war: A theoretical analysis, New York: Columbia
University Press