Koha Digest # 20 (1994)

ALBANIA

THE ALBANIAN-GREEK RELATIONS HAVE THEIR SISYPHUS....

by ROBERT GORO/ Athens

The trial against six members of the Greek minority accused of treason by the Albanian
authorities, served as a pretext to the Greek authorities to increase their tone in the months'
long hindrance to Tirana.

The high tones of both sides could be considered as a characteristic of the relations between
Greece and Albania in the past years, and especially in the past year. Differing from the other
occasions, the present contest could be considered as the most decisive one in the future
relations between Tirana and Athens, for Greece undertook a concrete step which will cause
consequences to Albania in the present situation.

Within one month, the Greek representatives at the EU, vetoed twice the decision for
financial assistance worth 35 million ECU's destined for Albania- and concretely - according
to the official sources in Tirana- meant to pay social subsidies to over 400 thousand
unemployed Albanians. If Greece is only aiming at realizing the rights of the Greek minorities
in Albania then this would be half of the evil. However, if it was thought that by disabling the
Albanian government to provide social welfare for its unemployed population, social unrest
would be caused, then no comment is needed.

The discord in the relations between two countries doesn't have essential reasons to be. Those
are mainly misunderstandings and misinterpretations which intentionally or not, get
exaggerated dimensions and have dramatic influence in the normal development of these
relations. The reactions of Athens seem to be serious and determined at first sights, however
in essence, the Greek officials are unstable, because they themselves are not sure that their
arguments are convincing. Since the moment the indictment was made public, the Greeks
have opposed the act and have even denounced Albania to its Union partners, but have not
presented any counter-arguments which would beat the Albanian arguments, because as it
seems, they have no arguments at all. Or, because they know that the Albanians have the facts
which can declare the accused guilty as charged. Indirectly, this was in a way stated by the
port-parole of the Greek government as he was asked a question regarding the case:

JOURNALIST: The indictment contains a referral to several persons or unofficial institutions

with whom the accused have met, which takes us to the conclusion that Albania has
infiltrated its agents in Greece. Is the Government going to anything in this respect?

PORT-PAROLE: The Official organs are scrupulously discussing all the facts and they will
act accordingly...

"KOHA-s" correspondent to Athens asked the Port-parole of the Greek Government on what
was the posture of the Government towards the actions of the local nationalist circles, which
seem to be intensively implicated in the issue of the greek minority. He evaded the response
and repeated what was heard before that, "Greece wants good relations with Albania, but they

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must be based on the respect of the rule of law".

What is most strengthening the conviction that Athens is not determined enough to have a
tough posture towards Tirana, are the discrepancies of public statements and the instructions
of the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs. A circulating later sent to Greek representative
offices contains strange points of view regarding the actual situation in Greece and also the
official policy towards the Greek minority in Albania.

Thus, the legal prohibition of creation of parties on ethnic or religious basis in Albania, which
disabled the Greek minority organization OMONIA to participate in the 1992 elections, is not
a discrimination against the Greek minority, according to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as
long as this is valid for Albanians too. The Ministry is also of the opinion that OMONIA -six
of the accused were the most active in OMONIA- should cease existing, and that its members
should become members of Albanian political parties. It is also their opinion that in schools,
the majority of the subjects should be learned in Albanian, so in the future, the members of
the Greek minority could more easily become part of the Albanian society, and this theory
rejects part of the pretensions of the Greek governments including the Socialist one, regarding
the education of the minorities. Maybe these standpoints have to do with the fear that the
requests of the Greeks for their minority will come back as a boomerang with the request of
the Muslims living in the territory bordering with Turkey; but this issue must be object of a
thorough analysis. However, a thing should be reminded from last year, when one day after
the then Prime-minister Mitsotakis presented his famous six conditions to Tirana, two
independent Muslim MP's wrote a letter to the Greek president, in which they requested the
same things Mitsotakis was requesting for the Greek minority.

Athens has officially requested from Tirana to withdraw the accusation against the six
accused. Of course, this request will not be fulfilled by the Albanian government, if for
nothing else, then for dignity's sake.

However, with this request, maybe Athens is announcing the ruin of its relations with Tirana.
If this comes out to be true, both parties will have their own arguments to wash their hands
before the international community. The real harm will be done to the hundreds of thousands
of Albanian emigrants who were often scapegoats of the misunderstandings betwen Athens
and Tirana. Therefore, if it can be done again...No problem!

KOSOVA

THE HUNTING SEASON GOES ON

by GENC BAJGORA/Prishtina

There is no doubt that analysts and observers dealing with the situation in Kosova were not
surprised by the killing of Hasan Ramadani. In fact, some of them even find a link between
the Shajkovc case and the terrible killing of the six years' old Fidan Brestovci. In fact, in
criminology as well as in the professional propaganda, it is evident that "the new event
animates the old one", therefore taking this as a starting point and the negative effects that
Fidan's killing caused, there is no doubt that the specialized circles of the Serbian police
needed a new incident, which would set the Brestovci case back in history and orient the

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media in another "terrain".

In the aspect of International Law and International Criminal law, such elaborated acts of
massive repression, raised to the level of a specialized apparatus, could be considered as state
terrorism, in concrete cases.

In fact, even people with modest knowledge will have it clear who has perpetrated the act of
terrorism in the tragic case of Shajkovc. It had happened before that the Serbian authorities
had declared the Albanians, killed in demonstrations, as terrorists, including minors Ylfete
Humolli (Lupç), Shukrie Obërtinca (Lismir), Fatmir Uka (Pejë), brothers Badallaj (Zhur), etc.

Maybe the biggest surprise was the case of Hasan Ramadani, where the police even pretended
to create his terrorist biography. Even more, trying to present him as the murderer of Jetullah
Kuçi, Police Commander in Podujevë killed in very nebulous circumstances in March 1989.
However, the tendency to connect Hasan Ramadani to this event is absolutely not logical and
groundless for many reasons: first, if the police was going after Hasan Ramadani since 1989
(but not chasing him for the murder of Kuçi, but for participation in peaceful demonstrations)
and if the police knew that he was Kuçi's murderer, then why didn't it make it public? Then,
which were the reasons to hold other people in detention due to the suspicion that they
allegedly murdered Kuçi? Or why was the police searching a "TT" gun, stating that it was the
weapon that killed Kuçi, etc. etc.?

Regarding the Kuçi case, it must be said that the majority of the participants in the peaceful
demonstrations that day in Podujevë, as well as Kuçi's Albanian colleagues, claim that it was
certain that he was killed by the Serbian Secret Police. Somehow, the same day Kuçi was
killed, a Serbian policeman was shot-dead in Mitrovica. However, it is certain that the killing
of both policemen is very mysterious and that any expert on ballistics, according to our
experts, could confirm that these were done by professionals. And how well prepared was
Ramadani to use a weapon was obvious in the duel he had with the police, where he was the
only mortal victim.

Maybe the background of the whole accusation regarding the Kuçi case was the intention of
causing a conflict between two families.

The most bizarre scene in the Shajkovc tragic case was after H. Ramadani was killed and
when his children managed to get his body out of the burning house.

"I was assisted by my brothers and sisters to take the corpse out, and we break a cordon of
policemen. I was afraid that the body would burn. So I tried to cover his body, and the
policemen wouldn't let me. They were kicking the corpse...", says Ramadani's daughter
Fidajete (19). However, the villagers identified one of the most bizarre policemen as Milos
Nikolic, from Surkis, a village not far from Shajkovc. "Some years ago, when Nikolic was
members of the Socialist Youth League, his collaborators referred to him as `a good boy'",
says a peasant.

What happened with Nikolic? According to an article published in "Jedinstvo", it is stated

that on the night between Wednesday and Thursday (August 15 and 16), somebody threw a
"Molotov cocktail" to his house, with the intention to burn it...Further on, Nikolic speaks of a
very unconvincing attempt against his life, making an allusion that this was a kind of vendetta
for what had happened in Shajkovc. To tell the truth, and based on what he claims but also on

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other circumstances, it was evident that with this manoeuvre the intention was to draw the
attention of the public to the other side, and convince the public that Ramadani "was really a
terrorist" and that in Llap and Kosova there are more terrorists, etc. This case, naturally, could
still justify another action of the Serbian police in which another Albanian could be killed.

Lately, the public has ascertained that hunting of Albanians is still continuing. It is more than
sure that the hunting season will still go on.

INTERVIEW

FATOS NANO, Chairman of the Socialist Party of Albania

NEITHER WITH COMMUNISM NOR ANTI-COMMUNISM

Interviewed by RIFAT BUZUKU/Tirana

The Chairman of the Socialist Party of Albania, Fatos Nano was arrested one year ago, and is
presently serving his 12 years' prison sentence he got from Albanian justice, which accused
him of corruption and abuse of the Italian humanitarian aid. Nano and his Party have denied
the accusations, claiming that his conviction is a matter of political dispute between the ruling
and his opposition parties.

One thing is very clear: the "Nano case" has become a thorn-crown to the Albanian
democracy. It is mentioned when it comes to Albania's membership in the European Council
and its integration in other international institutions, always putting a dark shadow on the
future prospects of Albania and the Albanians.

Nano's answers were forwarded to us by his attorney Përparim Sanxhaku, by the end of July.

KOHA: Before and after the trial you have denied all accusations regarding the "misuse of the
Italian relief", and you have claimed that you were arrested by order of President Berisha. If
this is true, how do you explain his reasons for doing this?

NANO: You know that this accusation is no longer accepted even by the ones who ordered
the framed trial. The fact that my arrest was ordered by Berisha, and is still under his control,
is proven by a list of facts and circumstances which became public and were never officially
denied. These have followed the "Nano case" since when I was arrested, during the biased
trial and serious procedural violations during investigations, the often change of the
indictment, in the clearly illegal verdicts of both courts, as well as the misinformation of the
public on my case, along with the political formulation of the accusation and my "guilt" made
by Berisha proper, as well as other leaders of the country and the Democratic Party, which
have always preceded the actions of the Judiciary.

The reasons why Berisha undertook this step are many, and not all of them are under his
control. I will just mention three of them:

First of all, Berisha was sponsored to get to power because of political motives and interests
which are as old as the "conflicts" among Albanians during this century, and as wild as the

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internal, regional and global conflicts which were an obstacle to the solution of the Albanian
national issue, before and after the Cold War. I found out about these motives and denounced
them bravely, naming them an obstacle to build the future. And this I said first to the sponsors
and then to Berisha personally.

Second, the democratic culture of Berisha is as mangled as is of the whole generation

educated under the Communist dictatorship, whilst his personal character expresses even
more the tendency of identifying the rule of law with the autocratic rule, to understand an
opposition debate as a personal revenge. Friendly, I tried to make him aware of these
Albanian defects, and I was "recompensed" in such a hostile manner.

Thirdly, Berisha and the people surrounding him, accept political pluralism as a decoration,
because they act according to the conviction that the strategic interests can be accomplished
only through a "strong rule" and in a relatively long-term, period, without having the threat of
periodical free elections. Since, because of well known circumstances, two political poles
were created in Albania, the Democratic and Socialist parties, which struggled for democracy
with two different programs, and in which case the Socialist Party was more successful
because it started having more followers, Berisha attacked me in order to subjugate the
others, in order to make the opposition completely formal. It is obvious that he made a serious
mistake, because this modern political struggle is not subject to the "canonic laws", but the
European democratic principles. This is why the "Nano case" has been internationalized as a
political matter.

KOHA: Before you were arrested, you made several statements published in "Zëri i Popullit"
and there you denounced the actions of the American Ambassador to Tirana, Rayerson. Why
were your relations so bad, and was there any confrontation between you, Rayerson and
Berisha?

NANO: Rayerson came to Tirana from Belgrade, where he specialized on the protection of
global American interests in the region, in the period and climate of the Cold War. As far as I
was concerned, it was not my intention to have bad relations with him, because I couldn't
work against the official policy of the Government I presided regarding the normalization of
relations with the US on March 15, 1991, a policy which allowed Rayerson to come to
Albania. It seems as if he had prejudice towards the Socialist Party and myself, according to
the old-fashioned MacCarthist and anti-Communist concepts, which are fully anachronic to
the young Albanian politicians. Even more, with his uncovered anti-Communism, he
supported an ex-Communist, who is as ordinary as his fellows; I am referring to Berisha. On
the other hand, I had come out in public with the motto that Albania can't be neither with
Communism nor anti-Communism!

I had several contests with Rayerson in different occasions in diplomatic celebrations,

because he wouldn't find the time to call back and exchange opinions and informations.

KOHA: When you were arrested, the Socialist Party has stated that you will continue to be its
Chairman. How are you accomplishing your function, when it is well known that the
conditions of isolation are very difficult?

NANO: The political parties are political movements, and not just a structure and
administrative hierarchy. The leaders of the movement are either supported or left behind by
it, which creates the difference between the real leaders and the speculators.

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My political activity, even though my detention, trial and persecution have expressed the clear
political character, has never stopped, even more, it has increased in these difficult conditions
of isolation. Responding to the situation, the people, instead of giving up on me and the
Socialist Party, on the contrary, they joined in, even in larger numbers. The symbol of my
resistance became a symbol of people resisting against the violence and arbitrariness of
"Berisha's regime" (as named by a Resolution of the European Parliament). Thanks to the
excellent assistance of my comrades, I have managed to lead the party from prison. My
persecutors made a small "mistake", when they didn't take away my optic glasses from me
and gave me a pencil and paper. The other can be solved: all you need is will and courage.

KOHA: How do you look upon the policy of the present Government?

NANO: In three words I have called it "Policy of conflicts", because: -in its program it never
defined itself clearly standing on the ground, but it simply applied the monetary schemes
given to it by foreign experts and counsellors. These schemes are often just conjunctural,
experimental and with contradicting effects, and are especially harmful to the activation of
the intellectual and natural riches and employment. These schemes were imposed on all
Albanians by the force of "the majority", without a serious evaluation by intellectuals or local
institutions, thus making any other alternative of the opposition impossible.

This, I don't express just as man from the opposition, because in the whole of the former
Communist East, all policies and models of transition had to be elaborated very carefully.
This also goes for the economic reform and opening to the world market, and especially in
Albania, where the centralization and the isolation reached an extreme, which doesn't mean
that Albanians today should be treated as people from the jungle or as "army in barracks".

In practice, the rule of the Democratic Party, in the three levels, degenerated, unfortunately,
into conflicts of interests and unstoppable corruption, because its leadership surrendered
before the pressure of the social groups without any moral principles and lack of necessary
culture: of people who on every turn-point in history try to grab as much as possible, starting
from the "pioneers" of the adventure, up to dangerous criminals. In this confusion, the
Democratic Party had three main political currents, which brought it to power, sheltered
under the same program: idealist and moderate intellectuals, former political prisoners in
Communism and finally the Ballists and Zogists (Nationalists and Royalists)! The conclusion,
which is linked to the inability of Berisha to support the progressive faction (a result of his
wish for personal power!) is evident today: in order to safeguard the Democratic Party and
keep by all means the disputable power of its actual leadership, he has become partner to the
ordinary crime, starting from the take-away of the free vote, up to the illegal ownership,
financial corruption and crisis of institutions.

The international relations, the policy of the actual Government is full "political and financial
sell-out", which has temporarily closed and deeply compromised the European integration of
Albania, the solution of the national issue and the policy of good neighbors, where the
long-term interests of the Albanians are found.

Briefly, in a region burdened with dangerous conflicts, Albanians are deep into conflicts and
misunderstandings which take up to killing one-another, to a situation in which anyone can
play with them.

This adventure, must not last any longer!

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KOHA: How do you look upon the Albanian problem as a whole?

NANO: To me and the political program of the Socialist Party, the national issue is cardinal,
it has absolute priority, which should determine the strategy, tactics, politics of reformations
and choosing allies. As a whole-national problem, its solution seeks a national program and
strategy, in which all political forces, state institutions, NGO's, political initiatives and social
movements of the whole Albanian space should contribute. In our concept and program, this
solution departs from the democratization and inclusions of all Albanians and their
institutions in contemporary civilization, elevating the institutions of political, cultural,
scientific, religious and social understanding and cooperation, as well as aims at the
integration of Albania in the Euro-Atlantic institutions, starting from good regional
cooperation which would enable the all-Albanian real integration, as citizens of Europe,
wherever they life. This is our political philosophy, the reality is completely different, but we
don't agree with the present situation and the created mess, neither with the monopolization of
these capital problems by one political grouping, inside or out, by excluding the others. This
struggle doesn't bare elbows, lobbies nor estates!

KOHA: You know the situation of Albanians outside the Republic of Albania, in Kosova,
Macedonia... and what do you think about the posture of the Albanian government towards
these regions?

NANO: Of course I follow the situation with concern. I can't say that the things are all right
(despite the satellite propaganda!), when Albanians on all their lands continue to be killed,
arrested, violated against and denied their fundamental rights and freedoms. In front of this
situation, I couldn't say that the actual government is acting the way it should, but neither can
I claim that this serious situation burdened with debts from the past could be solved by this or
only one government. The actual national crisis can't be overcome only by one alternative, be
it the "Albanianized Ghandism" or whatever derives from the "subjugated sell-out". Doesn't
the situation of Albanians in Macedonia prove this, or the "rigorously determined" prospects
coming from global centers regarding Kosova, prove that the actual policy has failed, at least
in time.

If not, then which are the main preoccupations and engagements of the great powers and
international institutions; the genocide in Rwanda or the one in Kosova?! Albanians are really
no murderers, nor cannibals and should be admired for their civilization, but you see the
international order of the post-Cold War era has found itself "unprepared" to save the
civilized people and had its hands cuffed by the barbarians! This is how much the elimination
among Albanians is costing us. This is why it is urgent for us to convene in the National
Reconciliation Assembly, to finally make the world aware of our requests!

KOHA: What do you think of the trials against the other former politicians, especially the
conviction of Ramiz Alia?

NANO: It was a pharse and even Albanians are laughing at this "shame". The confrontation
should have been political and harsh, because the old system created wounds that can't be
easily healed! However, criminals should have their crime proven juridically or with material
proof, and not "political literature"!

In respect to Ramiz Alia, I think that his trial and conviction is not signifying enough for the
new political class which is ruling the country and which aims at building a democratic

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society. First, because Alia was and remains product of the system which has been
condemned by time, and a person like Ramiz Alia can't be condemned for the failures of the
system. Ramiz Alia was beaten by time. While he didn't use the arms against his present
opponents, they proved to be weak and did the opposite; but they also created very dangerous
precedents for themselves!

KOHA: Before you got arrested, you were considered to be the most serious opponent to
Berisha. Do you think you will ever reach his position?

NANO: If it were only that, it would be easy, because having competition in a democracy,
where there is a market of ideas, the competition between alternatives and individuals is the
engine of development. But I was qualified a traitor by Berisha and this is why I am in prison,
and this is not my place, of course! I don't think that there is anyone envying Berisha on his
post, as he has misused it, same as in the past! The "oppression" he has introduced, should be
eradicated as soon as possible.

KOHA: What would be the priorities, according to you?

NANO: I said it all, starting from the last thing I said, but the burden would be to big, because
that big are the mistakes of "Berisha's regime". However, I will be loyal till the end, and say
that I have sincerely suggested and requested two things from Berisha, and many things
depend on this:

1. I have asked him to overcome the parties, and come to the position of the constitution of
the symbol of national unity!

2. I have asked him to help his party lead the country properly during transition!

But, the ones who have applied these principles and are in power today, don't have Albanian
names. I will mention Mandela and Havel, knowing that there must be more.

There is a new and more capable political generation coming,in the world and Albania too,
looking forward into the future.

KOSOVA

THE PROBLEM EXISTS, WORK GOES ON

by MEHMET HYSENI

The discord of the political leadership of Kosova continues with an increasing intensity. The
Albanian media are flooded with statements, truths, and different spicy details offered by the
creators, participants, witnesses or analysts of the political and public reality of Kosova. It
was expected that the President of the Republic of Kosova, Ibrahim Rugova, would arbitrate
in the dispute which caused public discord. It was also expected that he would at least request
an end to the public campaigns against one another, and to stop taking the dirty laundry out.
This was expected from Rugova because of the competencies he has and because of the fact
that all participants refer to him and ask him to declare himself about the issue. But, nothing

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of this happened.

The discord, the largest since the establishment of the political parties in the post-Communist
period, continue and as time goes by, there are more and more people involved in this.

Cursorily, the discords started in the Representing Office of Kosova in Tirana regarding the
fact who would be its Head. At first sight, it seems as if we are referring to a political career,
i.e. a political post. Two people have pretensions to one post, and the Office in Tirana can
employ more people, however it can employ only one boss, i.e. one Head of Office, or
making it even more clearly, only one Ambassador of Kosova in Tirana. It seems as if this
post were so important, especially for the people concerned, that the "Embassy" had to been
taken over by force.

This is enough to upset the Albanian public and the supporters of the Albanian issue. If the
accusations on the abuse of the Fund of the Republic of Kosova, the purchase of villas, on the
Government that doesn't function or doesn't exist any longer, on the fact that in some
segments it was worked with dubious people which has caused massive arrests are added to
this, then these are all elements that should cause high alert.

It can not be concealed any longer that something is going wrong in the Albanian political
scene. The existing situation proper, proves this. In a macro plan this case can be seen in the
non-constitution of the Parliament of Kosova, the non-election of the new Kosova
Government, the non-functioning of the institutional life of the Republic of Kosova, the
non-functioning of the institution of the President of the Republic of Kosova, etc.

Its is now clear that the causes are also internal, i.e. they are centered in the discrepancies
between the senior leaders in Kosova. Differing from earlier disputes, now we are dealing
with discrepancies within the LDK, i.e. the people of its orientation who achieve different
functions. In the ordinary slang this is known as war of fractions, but having the
consequences in mind, this is a confrontation in the wide Kosovan plane and even wider.

The solution to this confrontation will influence the direction of the solution to Kosova's
problem.

One segment in all of this is not that clear. Why go public? Why isn't the institutional path,
the regular procedure to overcome and solve problems, chosen?

Taking into account the level of our public, but also its modest possibility to create politics
and its modest influence in decision-making, then it is hard to understand why was all the
matter presented to the public. The dilemma still remains: why did Kolaj go public after he
took over the office and when he could work without any obstacles?

Why did Zogaj go public after he left the Office, and even more questions arise when he
claims that he is victim of the Prime-minister and President of Kosova. And then, the
question arises why Bukoshi, Hivzi Islami, Ramush Tahiri, Hafiz Gagica, Shkëlzen Maliqi
and others spoke in public about this issue.

It seems as if this is washing hands in public, to animate the public opinion, but also taking
practical steps "let me say it before he does", "let me get through with my truth".

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It also seems that someone considers that he has unjustly lost his position in the political
hierarchy, and thus wants to make some noise. And, in the relation of political forces, one of
those forces considers that it has no chances to accomplish its purposes through the
institutional way, therefore wants to disqualify its opponent in public.

It is not clear why was Albania chosen, why the Representing Office in Tirana, to do all what
is being done?

In a hypothetical situation lets take that one side believes one of the truths presented, or in the
worst of the cases, it believes all the truths, then, what should be done? What did the actors of
this event think to achieve? Whose was the decision to go public? It can be supposed that
Kolaj, since he can't come back to Kosova, by animating the public wants to eradicate his
own options and wants to force the President to take determined steps, the way other eight
members of the Presidency of the LDK had requested when they had signed their
resignations, as a condition to solve the problems with Prime-minister Bukoshi.

It could also be supposed that Kolaj does this in collaboration with his followers in the LDK
and outside of it, before the elections of the Presidency of the LDK. He probably aims at
informing the membership, in this excessive way, about his point of view and the discordance
with Bukoshi.

There is another option circulating, and that is that Kolaj informed the President about his
intentions, in order to, after the public disqualification of the Prime-minister, have it easier to
replace him and elect the new Government. This thesis is supported by the minimization of
the problem, as well as the ascertainment that mandates of the Government and Parliament
have expired and that both have been dissolved, whilst the Government is working according
to a Presidential decree, for there is a need for the Government to keep on functioning. If this
is true, then the public should expect more accusations against the Government and the
Prime-minister.

The question arises whether things can be kept under control, because it is probable that the
parties will be careful about how far can criticism go, how far can be things uncovered and
not damage the strategy of the solution of the political issue.

Taking into account the almost independent media, then things can hardly be kept under
control. The lack of the feeling of responsibility towards what is said and the post that is held,
only add some more fuel to the fire. It seems as if in the majority of cases we are dealing with
free-lancers who consider that can say anything, even things they are not competent for.

It is also interesting to see whether the actors of the event consider that they should keep on in
the political scene. Is it that they consider that they prove their high level when they state
things in public and threaten one-another with death? Is it maybe that the forcible takeover of
the Office in Tirana is considered to be a success? How is the establishment of diplomatic
relations with other states thought to be achieved? How is the opening of new offices in the
world imagined, if we have such problems in the only state that recognizes our state? Is
listing the concrete abuses of the "opponent" a success? Is it still expected from the people to
give financial contributions to a state if there is doubt that the money is misused? What if
everything that Anton Kolaj claims comes out to be true? What should be done then?...

After it has been said that the mandates of the Parliament and Government have expired, the

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only remaining state institution in Kosova is that of the President of the Republic (if the
President deceases or is incapable of acting, then he should be replaced by the Speaker of the
Parliament or by the Government by authorization of the Parliament or the President, until
new or extraordinary elections). The President, works through decrees in emergency
situations, and has the ways to regulate the whole institutional life in Kosova.

The President, by proposal of the Government, i.e. Prime-minister, appoints the Ambassadors
of Kosova in other countries. Therefore, the issue of the Offices can be solved institutionally.
After what has happened in Tirana, none of the Offices of Kosova in the world are really
functioning. All of them have to be reorganized, Regulations must be adopted, their opening
must be institutionalized and the Heads of Offices must be appointed.

The Government and Prime-minister can now also be appointed by the President. The dispute
about the Bukoshi Government can be solved in the way that Bukoshi would still remain
Prime-minister, because of his experience and continuance, and by electing new ministers or
a whole new Government. It can also be determined to work in Kosova or abroad, or even in
a combined fashion.

The Fund of the Republic can be consolidated with the election of its Board, which would
apply the financial means based on a special decree on the Fund.

Everyone's work can be evaluated by the competent organs and in a regular procedure. Maybe
there is no need to alarm the public and take sides in a conflict, if for nothing else, then
because all are working in conditions of classic occupation. From all of this, it is evident that
the institution of the President can solve all the problems in the situation we are presently
living. If the President is the only institution of the Republic of Kosova, then it remains to be
activated.

KOSOVA

KOSOVA DOESN'T TRUST TEARS

by ASTRIT SALIHU & DUKAGJIN GORANI/Prishtina

The shots during nighttime that ended with the life of the 6 years old boy Fidan Brestovci and
seriously wounded his mother, without any pretext, sealed the crime which, by its method and
tragedy, is as unbelievable that incomprehensive. The routinely reply of the police officials
`Mistake. It was done by one of our boys...', almost sounds as an expression of a comical
governmental fair-play - if it weren't part of the tragic system of endless and senseless
violence against Albanians. This case, as many other cases of crimes against us, as was the
beating almost to death of hundreds of innocent people during the ill-famed Gllogovc '93,
when the tragic duel between policemen became an excuse for expedition of violence - only
arguments the thesis of the (growing) lack of pretexts for violence - and the fusion of the
beautiful and the useful, of course expressed in the formula "duel + violence against
Albanians".

"...I met him one day after he was taken to the police. He was beaten so much that he couldn't
walk. After the violence applied against him, he was thrown outside the gate of the police

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station. He was found by a passer-by, on the ground, and was taken to the hospital. He had no
broken bones, but had internal injuries. He was professionally beaten..."

(The beating of Sami Kurteshi, activist of the Council for the Defence of Human Rights and
Freedoms on July 7, 1993. Statement of Adem Demaçi)

How logical and strategic can this application of police repression against Kosova Albanians
be? It would be too much to say that what is happening in Kosova is an attempt of
accomplishing long-term purposes of the Serbian state on Kosovan territories.

However, how much is the terror against a population a result of synchronized strategy, and
how and up to what level could it be composed by doses of sadism of uniformed individuals
or groups which call themselves policemen?

Many facts and data of the Council for the Defence of Human Rights and Freedoms
(CDHRF), together with many reports of its complementing organizations (Kosova Helsinki
Committee, etc), speak of two types of state violence against Albanians. The victims of this
violence are engaged to prove the theory of the systematic state terror with one sole aim -
whilst the other party will try to present the crimes against the Albanian population in Kosova
"as tragic and unintentional mistakes" of the units engaged to destroy the mental and physical
health of the Albanians.

Going through the incomplete data of the CDHRF in Prishtina (members of the Council often
claim that the data is incomplete because a large number of cases of repression have not been
evidenced at all, due to objective reasons), it is evident that in all aspects, covering the whole
society and territory, the violence against Albanians is present almost proportionally.

These facts, starting from 1992 and up to the first semester of this year, prove a statistical
consistency comprising all societal strata (regardless of sex or age) under police treatment.
Thus, the forms of manifestation of violence among the population remain the same as in the
past years. Apart from this, in the Kosovan space, violence was manifested (with small
differences) almost the same way in all municipalities, and this fact breaks the created
conviction that urban centers (as is Prishtina and outskirts), are less affected, allegedly
because of the strategy of the state, or because it is trying to evade the unnecessary publicity.

However, the lack of thorough analyses made by our experts, has as consequence the
unanswered question on the existence of the continuance and the existence of a system of
violence in Kosova and against Kosova.

The data provided by the CDHRF, regardless of the fact that not all cases of violence and
repression were included, allows outlining another very important fact which supports the
above. The coverage of all municipalities in the total number of evidenced repressive acts is
almost proportional and in no municipality could it be claimed that the applied violence is
more or less intensive. For example, in the last year's report of the CDHRF, which includes a
part of the cases evidenced from Aug. 1992 until August 1993, it is evident that no
municipality dominates over others in this aspect. When analyzing the data, we find out the
percentage in municipalities which are as dominant in population. For example, the town of
Prishtina has evidenced 406 cases of violence, which makes 12.56%. However, if to this
figure we add all repression occurred in the municipality of Prishtina (including Podujeva),
then this number increases to 26.84%. A very similar situation occurs in Mitrovica, where

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after including Vushtrri (Vuçitërnë) the percentage reaches 22.15%. According to CDHRF,
the town of Peja participates with 8.12%, Prizren with 21.90%, Ferizaj with 6.64%, Gllogovc
with 5,90% and Gjilan with 3.68%.

"...When the shooting started, the brothers were in the garden together with rest of the
family...Three policemen shot at them from a distance of 100 meters. The brothers tried to
escape the shooting by running around the garden. I saw how Sefer was falling on the ground,
crying..."

(The killing of Sefer Çukovci (16), Cërnillë, Ferizaj. August 25, 1993)

The Albanian children are not only not spared, but also threatened by the same violence, and
this is best proven by the number of tortured, maltreated, wounded or killed children, which is
not small if compared to the total number of the grown-up population. For example,
according to data available for 1993 and until July of 1994, it comes our that 266 children
have been subject to violence and repression. The violence in schools, the presence of
children during the search of homes and the torturing of the members of the families, the
statistical data of their participation as victims of violence are almost the same compared to
the general repression in municipalities. Thus, Prishtina has had 27.73% and Peja 27.88% of
the total number of children subject to violence in 1993. In 1994, the oscillation is small in
both cases (Prishtina 21.26% and Peja 21.25%), which can be explained by the fact that the
new school year has not started yet, which means that the "Season of Violence '94" in
Kosova, has not ended yet.

If trying to determine the technology of violence and repression against Albanians, many
similarities in the methodology of the application of violence can be found in the case of
children compared to the rest of the population. In 107 cases, the presence of physical torture
against children is present in 37.5% of the cases. The percentage of arrests of children
reaches 15.69% whilst 63% of children's arrest are followed up by physical torture!

Children are also subject to mental torture: in 1993 it was in 21.51% of the cases, and the
situation this year is very similar to the data provided for last year. What is also very specific
in the segment of the violence against Albanian children is their participation in the "hostage"
category, which is present in more than 10% of the cases. Grounded on the data available, the
conclusion is that taking a child as hostage at the police station has become an ordinary
routine in all police stations throughout Kosova.

On the other hand, women represent the second largest category of the population affected by
the police violence. The applicative model is the same, when compared to the other part of
the population. The spectre of the forms of repression against women is combined: 23,40% of
women participate in the category of physical torture and arrests and 63.60% of women were
mistreated during the search of homes.

"...I heard a man yelling: "Confess that you have a weapon!" and a tired voice replying: "I
swear on my children...I don't have any". Whilst the yelling of policemen mixed with the
man's suffering cries, I had the premunition that it will end tragically. Suddenly it all
stopped...The next day we found out that he had been killed..."

(The killing of Arif Krasniqi in the Prizren Police Station. Witness- Salajdin Braha (55) -
convict).

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"The Weapon Gathering Action" - an ill-famed project of the Communist era in the '50-ies,
has been revitalized in the past two years and for the time being, is first on the list of the
forms of violence. The raids and searches of homes and villages in Kosova with the alleged
purpose to "disarm the armed Albanian people", and effective combination of forms of
repression starting from physical and mental tortures and up to killings and wounding, is
applied. During the arms' search punishing expeditions, in cases where there is and there is
not any weapons, all without any exemptions, are subject to repression. If the children and
women are not tortured directly, then at least they will witness the tragic events of criminality
against them and their families which will reflect in different traumatic forms. Out of 406
cases of violence against Albanians between Aug. 1992 and Aug. 1993, 97 of them were
cases of tortures because of the search of weapons. In over 90% of cases of violence during
the search of weapons, are characterized with serious tortures and long-lasting injuries. This
action is constantly applied throughout the whole territory of Kosova. According to the data
of the CDHRF and the Kosova Helsinki Committee, the real intensity of this action started
after the CSCE mission was expelled from Kosova in June 1993. Just as comparison, it is
necessary to state that during the past year, CDHRF has evidenced "only" 2.305 cases of
"searches" and arrests and 3.395 cases of police interventions; in the first half of this year,
there were a total of 2.261 cases of searches of weapons, 2.068 cases of arrests and 3.493
cases of police interventions, which explains that the increasing trend of the repression in this
aspect has almost doubled compared to last year.

"...It was 12:15 when I heard someone strongly knocking on the door. There were two
policemen with automatic guns and a civilian (a Serb) who forcibly entered the apartment...I
called the police. The police inspector insisted to speak to the person who wanted my
apartment. After he took the handset, he started yelling: "I will go straight to Belgrade and tell
them that you are working in favor of the Siptars!!!...I was threatened that if I don't leave the
apartment within half an hour, he will call someone who will rape me and my daughter..."

(Statement of E.F. a widow from Mitrovica, evicted from her apartment by a Bosnian Serb).

Not analyzing other forms of repression, such is the massive dismissal of Albanians (about
150 thousand), the takeover of the scientific, economic, cultural, information, sports,
educational, university, etc., institutions, the eviction of Albanians from their apartments is
one of the most drastic forms. 237 Albanians families have been evicted. If the average
family in Kosova counts between 6-7 members, then it comes out that about 1.650 people
have been evicted. In this category, Prishtina participates with 27.04%, Prizren with 27.10%
and other municipalities with lower percentage. All these numeric "disproportions" could be
interpreted by the fact that the eviction dominates in municipalities where there were more
apartments. However, based on the data provided by former provincial institutions (which
claimed that there were 13% of Serbs living in Kosova), which claimed that 30% of Serbs
had apartments, then it is for sure that the situation of the "discriminated" Serbs (!) in Kosova,
is improving in this area.

"...One of the officers of the secret police held my head against the wall, while other four
were beating me on the legs. Afterwards, they used rubber sticks and started hitting me in the
back and kidneys. I was sure that I would die. They told me to raise my hand when I decide to
admit all of it..."

(Statement of a political prisoner - Prison of Prishtina)

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The unproven "fronts" for the "...liberation of Kosova", severe tortures during investigating
proceedings, framed trials and sentences of over ten years of prison, seem to close the
damned circle of the exterminating purposes of the Serbs and the presentation of the Albanian
people of Kosova as people of terrorist tendencies. After a couple of waves of massive arrests
undertaken in the past two years, the number of Albanians arrested for "political activity"
reached 52 in 1993 (sentenced from 1-10 years of prison) and 21 in 1994. It must be
mentioned that over 100 people have been also arrested during this period, and the majority
of them were former political prisoners. 68 people have been indicted, but their trials have not
ended yet.

Just to prove how far framing a process can go, here are the statements of the defending
attorneys: "...during investigating proceedings we are not allowed to contact our clients,
which, even according to the Serbian laws is illegal...In the meantime, our defendants are so
brutally beaten that they are not even able to respond to our questions...". Or, "...It has
happened that we have requested the exclusion of the public prosecutor, and that this request
has been decided over by his deputy (!) who came from Belgrade...!?", etc. etc.

In order to complete the facts and data, as well as explain the motives and tendencies of the
creation and functioning of such a system of violence in Kosova, a connection of the events
and political processes in the former Yugoslavia, especially in Serbia, and the evidence of
violence and repression in Kosova, and its oscillations and frequency in time, must be found.
The application of a principle, when any social-economic implosion in Serbia would reflect
with substantial violence against Albanians, is evident. However, based on the data available
at the CDHRF, it is impossible to derive the escalation of violence within this context, for
they lack analyses.

...

"None of them has open wounds. It seems as if the police is taking care of not causing
haemorrhage to the arrested..." says a doctor in charge of healing the victims of police
brutality in Kosova.

However, for those who are forced to live under daily repression - the wounds are open-wide
since long ago.

EDITORIAL

IN VINO...

by VETON SURROI

In order to find out the truth about the post-Communist Albania you must either be drunk or
listen to the analysis of a drunken man. A friend of mine from Albania told me this two
months ago. His condition when he said this, is imaginable.

My friend must have probably thought of the extra-sensitiveness of the senses caused by the
alcohol, but when I think again of this non-conventional ascertainment, I have to remember
that Albania as a state, history and people, produces more temptations than the registered

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population of this state can take. A strange combination of Catholic Mediterranean, Islamic
winds, the Eastern Communist cold and post-Communist bannanary. And, naturally, all of
these, placed on the backs of the heirs of the Balkans' Adam and Eve, who even today are
trying to find the lost paradise.

The second reason why my friend mentioned alcohol, could be the high level of contradicting
informations coming from Albania. On one hand we have a state which is highly valued for
the increase of industrial production and maybe the only Balkan state which has been
experiencing the revaluation of its currency in the past year and a half. On the other hand, this
is a state to which the return of refugees from Greece can cause survival problems. In the
same way, that of links of contradictions, we can speak of a post-Communist democracy
which is building a new society with a relatively big success (compared to the conditions it is
being developed in), and on the other hand there are more frequent news on more intensive
and frequent political changes coloured with more radicalized tones amongst one another.
And, there are also accusations about the strong rule, comprised in the new term -
"Democraturship". These contradictions, as my friend's reason would be, could not be
understood even by a sober head.

I don't know whether the fact that in this issue of "KOHA" we are publishing the interview
with Fatos Nano, the Socialist leader convicted for corruption, could be understood by my
friend. As such, for one party Nano is the reincarnated devil, the others consider him a martyr,
the third ones see him as a crook who profited on the last days of government, for a part of
the European public, he is a former Communist leader who has become a victim of revenge.
Maybe a shrewd mind would reveal why is Nano found in all these characteristics at the same
time, but from our professional aspect, Fatos Nano is, however, anything that could be
interesting for journalism: an event. And the events can't be helped by sympathies or
antipathies, they must be evidenced, as must Mr. Nano's opinion from jail, because it
represents a part of the Albanian public opinion.

Of course, Mr. Nano is not Albania. And not everything written in a magazine, is Kosova.
Nor is the brutal duel about the Representing Office in Tirana, which we could read about,
Albania or Kosova. They are all parts of the mosaic. But when they are presented to the
public opinion, they are enlightened. I believe that there is no need for drunkenness to
understand the truth.

MACEDONIA

WHY IS THE ALBANIAN BOYCOTT QUESTIONED

by ISO RUSI/Shkup

As it is expected, the Assembly of the Republic of Macedonia will, during September, decide
about the celebration of Parliamentarian elections. Even though the electoral campaign has
practically started (the sessions of the parliament were used for party propaganda needs, and
lately all events are used for this purpose: starting from sports events up to the celebration of
different anniversaries), the next two months will be the most fervent. If in the past elections,
twenty parties participated, which was enough to divide the electorate, for these elections, the
participation of sixty parties has been announced. It is very clear that the majority of them

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will be left out of the competition, because they will not be able to present 1000 signatures of
their members, however this fact enables the attempts to create new coalitions.

The strongest party, the ruling Social-Democratic League (SDL) has not yet announced its
participation in coalition. SDL has a very strong card its playing on and wants to take
advantage of fully - the President of the Republic Gligorov who enjoys absolute popularity is
its member, and the Party usually refers to him in any public statement. The other members of
the coalition - the Liberals and the Socialists -having nightmares about their identity, rating
and membership, would more gladly participate in the elections along with their present
coalition partners. There is a very clear danger that they will win less seats in the Parliament,
which would mean that they wouldn't participate in Government any longer, which is hardly
acceptable to them and especially to their leaders. SDL seems to still be calculating about the
possible electoral victory, therefore is not rushing to accept the proposals of the coalition
partners.

Naturally, the opposition is elaborating its electoral strategy. But it seems as if the problem of
dissolution and exclusiveness do not offer them much chances for creating a wide coalition.
The things have not changed compared to the first elections. Then, as it is now, there is a list
of small parties which consider themselves to be representatives of Macedonian national
interests and consider all the others to be traitors, and such coalitions have less chances to be.
However, rumors about the possible coalition between the Democratic Party of Petar Gosev
and the shaken VMRO-DPMNE, relativize such standpoint. Even if realized, what would
such a coalition bring in the elections? Gosev, whose party is rising, would finally prove that
his transformation from the Communist apparatus, through the reformed Communist and
Social-democrat, is nevertheless directed towards the well-known cliche - a Communist who
by playing with national feelings turned into a nationalist. Therefore the question arises
whether there is any reason to form a coalition with a party which has suffered many internal
problems and has lost much of its influence. It is another issue that in his party there are
many members who have quit the VMRO-DPMNE. All calculations, analyses of the possible
results of the future elections, without any exclusions, foresee that the only sure moment in
the elections is the Albanian part of the electorate. No one but the Albanians, can count on
those votes, even though the Albanian electorate will not be as homogenous as last time. It is
still not clear which of the PPD fractions has real chances to win the majority of the Albanian
votes, and the Macedonian parties are very interested in the outcome. It is also strange that the
Albanian political factor is not looked upon, as "moderate radicals" lately. It is clear that
neither PPD, which is member of the actual governing coalition, nor the Macedonian parties
are willing to speak of the continuation of the eventual coalition after the elections. The
Macedonian parties, which are conscious that they will not win because of the partition of the
electorate, feel that they must cultivate partnership with those who have assured votes, are
reluctant to say this out loud, fearing that they could give their opponents a reason to further
be accused of treason. PPD and the new leadership announce that they will not join anyone in
electoral coalition, and will try to see what success they can reach on their own. Is this a
premunition that they can gain the majority of Albanians votes, remains to be seen.

But, let's go back to the new posture taken regarding the Albanian political factor. The weekly
magazine "Puls", which has the reputation of being a conveyer of official viewpoints,
published days ago an article called: "Boycott or bloodless war", in which it analyses the
possibility of the boycott of the next elections by the Albanians and their parties. Without any
concrete reason for such a dilemma, all possible theoretical situations are elaborated and it is
insisted on the fact that the boycott could be achieved. As if it was wished, because in their

- 17 -
statements, Abdurrahman Haliti (PPD) and Iliaz Halimi (People's Democratic Party), in
which the first one says that his party will participate and that they were preparing themselves
for it, and the second one insists on the adoption of the electoral laws (especially that of the
electoral units) and criticizes the government, none of them speaks of the possibility of the
boycott. That this article was not published by chance, because of the lack of interesting
topics to elaborate, is obviously proven in the interview of Iliaz Halimi in the daily "Vecer",
in which he decisively says: "I would rather say that I am not sure of the motives of insisting
on this idea. Maybe someone has planned this idea and is for the time being, only causing
sparks, in order to make it a dominant opinion of the Albanian political parties. In other
words, maybe someone would like it to happen, and I will disappoint you, because this will
not happen, especially not to the PPD."

In the past four years, the posture of Macedonian side towards the Albanian parties has
changed evidently. It has evolved from total mistrust to the position of having Albanians as
coalition partners.

Even though since the beginning the so called left wing and center parties always promoted
the character of the civil society, every time there was a delicate situation in which the
Albanians were part of it, the declared posture was lost in the calculations of the daily policy
that any cooperation with the Albanians would cause a loss of votes for the SDL. It could be
even said that there are not many Macedonian parties that would be willing to come out in
public with the political platform stating that coexistence with full human rights and freedoms
for all of its citizens is their aim. The fame about the possible boycott, is similar to the one
about the census and especially now with the removal of Albanian inscriptions from all shops
in Tetova, meanwhile in Shkupi there are almost no inscriptions even in Macedonian, because
the Latin alphabet and English are in fashion, and all of this resembles the spite not to learn
any lesson from life.

ALBANIA-GREECE

THE MOUSE RUNNING THROUGH MOUSTACHES

by BATON HAXHIU/Prishtina

The trial in Tirana against six accused of espionage, was only a slip for Tirana and Athens to
start a war of press communiques which pretends to be very dangerous for the peace in the
Balkans. This became even more serious after the violation of the air space of Albania by a
Greek airplane, and the distribution of 5000 pamphlets whose message was to threat the
territorial integrity of Albania and a call to oust the Albanian legitimate government.

The problem of the deterioration of the situation goes way back, when the Greek government
along with the Greek Orthodox Church crucified the Albanian refugees. It is an intentional
policy aiming at enforcing the propaganda about the alleged 400 thousand members of the
Greek minority in Albania. The silence regarding this act of genocide by the Albanian
government, in order to evade social unrest, could be evaluated as a political mistake of a
country which has not a determined posture to defend the national sovereignty and dignity.

The Albanian government hesitated when it came to the appointment of the head of the

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Orthodox Church, a Greek, when all the allowed norms were violated and when the
involvement in internal affairs of Albania started.

The expulsion of Albanian refugees, in its political nature, was and accidental case and the
first serious deterioration of the relations betwen two countries. The tolerance, and the
anaemic reaction and action of the Albanian state resulted with the penetration of Greek
commando forces in Peshkëpi and the murder of the Albanian soldiers. This political-terrorist
continuity of the Greek state was a shameful and premeditated provocation. And again, there
was no adequate reaction. The campaigns of the Greek government continued with the
initiation of the trial against the accused for espionage. The fact that they belong to the Greek
minority is less important, because they have violated the law of Albania and not Greece.

A partial participation of international observers and the noise that Greece is making about
the whole case, proves that destabilising the situation in Albania is stimulated by an
anti-Albanian campaign prepared beforehand. Along the request for the interruption of the
trial which could prove the direct involvement of the Greek government in the case of
Peshkëpi, Greece warns that it will expel the rest of the Albanian refugees. The
counter-actions resulted with 13 thousand expelled and four corpses of Albanian youngsters,
victims of the Greek anti-Albanian hysteria. President Berisha declares that Albania is ready
to give the deserved response, which seems to be the only way and language to be used
against the concrete actions and the coordinated policy of Greece. Greece is creating
non-existing problems and attempts to make the situation in the region even more tense,
detaching Albania from the Kosova problem and disabling Albania to influence the decisions
regarding the Balkans.

It is naive to believe that the deterioration of the relations between Tirana and Athens was
animated by the trial in Tirana, because this was only an excuse that Greece used for
expressing its political hysteria. The Serbian and Greek governments presented themselves in
this occasion as allies, because it is of the convenience of both to have problems in the
Balkans, and both see the Albanian state and people as the object of the attacks.

Maybe the Albanian state will not keep silence as the old man who saw a mouse run through
his moustache: it is not a big problem when a mouse runs through the moustaches, but the
problem is that it will learn the path and will never stop.

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