Crime in the World of 1990 203

CRIME IN THE WORLD

OF 1990
Leslie T. Wilkins
If the political and the inconsequential are to be distinguished
from social dangers, if laws and regulations are to be functional
for society and not just for the law makers-then there is a need
to define crime in terms of an up-dated value system. Once this
is recognised, then there is a little less danger that the confusion
will persist in peoples minds over the fact that just because what
we are doing about crime has increased by leaps and bounds,
so it follows that the total amount of crime is increasing by a
similar amount.
APART from projections of the probable population of prisons (to facilitate the
building programmes) and similar types of estimation, there seems to be a
surprising paucity of projections in the field of jurisprudence, law and crimi-
nology. There is nothing that considers the more fundamental issues of value
systems, likely changes in moral standards and biochemical or medical
technology.
It seemed that it might be a sound policy for criminologists and jurists to
devote some time and thought (and even research) to problems which are not
yet with us and which we can only project with considerable uncertainty. It
seemed probable, however, that this view would not be universally shared.
Are not our present-day problems, it might well be asked, so pressing and
demanding that we should give every priority to research relevant to today?
Some might even suggest that unless we can approach a solution of current
problems in crime there may be no future worth planning for. But clearly this
last form of argument involves in itself a loose prediction of the future.
It is more appropriate to ask-can we ever work our way out of our present
problems without consideration of the future? This is very doubtful. Many
critics of research complain that by the time a project is completed the results
are already out-of-date. Although this might be so, it is a necessary concomitant
of an emphasis on current problems. In other words, we are in the mess we
are in today because research in the past was too much devoted to problems
which were then current.
Leslie T. Wilkins, currently Professor of Criminal Justice, State University of New York, Albany, USA,
was previously Dean of the School of Criminology, University of California at Berkeley.
FUTURES Sept ember 1970
204 Crime in the World of 1990
If we accept the necessity for considering the future in our current research
plans and projects, then it seems to follow that we should attempt also to apply
research methods to our projections. If the intuitive approach is not adequate
for current problems and we call for research, then the intuitive approach would
seem to be inadequate for projections for the future. It was impossible to find
any research in the criminological sector which had even gone so far as to
modify and apply the projection techniques used in, say, econometrics.
Much of what the future has in store for us has a high level of probability.
There would seem to be no way of preventing many technological developments
from becoming available in the market place, office or home even if we wished
to do so. Many persons are attempting to prevent supersonic flight, and they
may be correct in seeking reasonable restrictions, but it is a King Canute kind
of act to try to prevent it.
Rather than devote time and energy in attempting to prevent technological
development we might be advised to consider carefully now, rather than later,
its probable impact on our social institutions and individual health. It might
be reasonable to try to insist that as a development becomes more and more
probable, more and more resources should be devoted to assessment of the
consequences.
The impact of advancing technology on law
Law, as one of the major institutions for social control, must surely become
involved with many of the consequences of advancing technology. Yet, while
the boards of businesses are asking questions about the future, the main questions
asked by the bench are about precedents. Is this appropriate? Can it be argued
that while rational decisions about things and events must be referred forwards
in time, questions about morals and social values should be referred backwards
in time? This is an impossible case to defend. Projecting the future, guessing
the future, attempting to influence the future and planning for the future
whatever it might be, are now accepted practices in many areas of human
endeavour. The efficient assessment of our present activities can be carried out
only by reference to our expectations of the future.
For those concerned with education, particularly professional training, the
problem of what to teach cannot be solved without implicitly or explicitly
taking into account the probable future states of the profession or business.
If we are training students in terms of current procedures-a form of sophisti-
cated apprenticeship-we are implicitly taking the view that the future will not
be very different from now; but the students now leaving our universities will be
managing institutions and involved in a world very different from now. It will
have to be a very different world if it is to stand any chance of existing. Change
is not only inevitable, it is desirable !
Some of the difficulties the criminologists experience in relation to past,
present and future arise from the close proximity of our field to that of ethics.
We have not distinguished adequately between the desirable and the probable.
Criteria have been set in terms of desired goals, vaguely expressed without
concern for future probable states. Objectives have been described for the
criminal justice system on moral, dogmatic or expedient grounds, and without
FUTURES Sept ember 1970
Crime in the World of 1990 205
reference to probability. Indeed, jurisprudence has considerable difficulties with
the calculus of probabilities. Yet it seems that probabilities must be a factor even
in moral judgments. The artist, priest, or mystic may be expected to imagine an
end state (goal) which is not necessarily probable. But the businessman, if he
is to survive, does not have this freedom of the imagination. Consider, for
example, a person who has purchased with his life savings a small corner news-
paper store. Would he be advised to select as his model the chain store magnet?
If he is to plan wisely, he will examine the total set of probable outcomes. He
will consider which of these probable outcomes seem to be the more desirable.
He will relate his assessment of his present strategy and his future planning
conjointly to the level of probability and desirability of these outcomes.
The assessment of the desirability of the outcomes or end states is usually a
moral judgment. But it is a bounded moral judgment. It could be argued even
that only those moral judgments which take account of the boundary con-
ditions are, in fact, morally sound. It is the results of projection (estimation of
the probable futures) which enable us to put our moral judgments into
perspective-the perspective of responsible, intelligent social beings. It is only
when this is done that we have the basis for moral, rational action.
In human affairs, most of us seem to be optimists. We seem to be committed
to the belief that any goal which can be specified in principle, is capable of
attainment. If we can imagine ourselves there (wherever there might be)
we seem automatically to assume that a way there is possible. If a way there
exists (and this is by no means always likely to be the case) then it is probable
that several ways there exist. It is possible to draw more than one line between
where we are now and our goal. It may be worth while to examine these kinds
of problems and to try to find the critical path. But again, that we seem
disinclined to do. Yet, concomitant with our general optimism in human affairs,
we lack any clear view of our goals. It is far easier to think about heaven than
to consider carefully the ways of getting there.
In the hard practical world it is often a far better strategy to think of things
that we would rather avoid than those that we would like to experience.
An avoidance strategy may be a lot easier to work out. Perhaps we might select
as our rational decision model the strategy which minimises the probability
of the maximum harm.
The nature of goals in the criminal justice system
Who among criminologists, lawyers, social scientists, social workers or even
politicians would wish to set a goal of a crimeless society? Some, perhaps for
purposes of oratory, but none for purposes of planning. Some might think the
goal of a crimeless society was a desirable one but impossible of attainment.
The majority would agree with Durkheim that crime (or rather the definition
of crime) is necessary in a society which is to function in a manner which we
understand to be a social system. A perfect society would not be a functioning
society. The literary writers who have given us a number of utopias have not
been very sophisticated on this point. The function of the definition of deviance
is boundary setting for the social system. How else could boundaries be set?
Perhaps to most utopia writers, crime and an ideal seem a contradiction of
FUTURES Sept ember 1970
206 &me in the World of 1990
terms. This, of course, may be so while we see society as a closed system rather
than an open system.
Tolerating variety in the social system
The trouble with the pursuit of an ideal is that the concept of an ideal does not
accommodate the idea of variety. If an ideal is right, then everything which
does not conform to this ideal singular state is not right: human beings and the
physical world proliferate variety. In variety reside the necessary elements for
adaptation. If man ceases to be an adaptive being; if man does not find it
possible to adapt still faster to the changes he is himself generating, then like
the other creatures before him who failed to adapt he will become extinct.
Some scientists believe that the process of extinction is already at an irreversible
point. There is an analogy with the physical world here. Our problems of
physical ecological imbalance which are now among the most disturbing
features noted by the physical sciences, result, some physicists say, from mans
seeking to conquer nature rather than to co-operate with it. Nature is too
complex to control; its variety too great; but co-operation might be possible.
Similarly, our social systems are too complex; we are characterised by infinite
variety both as individuals and as groups; attempts to reduce this variety by
trying to force us into a pattern which is seen as ideal can result only in dangerous
failure.
It seems reasonable to conclude that the quantity of variety in a system will
be greater when that system is subject to rapid change. Change over a period
of time is very similar to variety at a point in time. If this is so, then there is
more need now to find social control and management methods which can
accommodate variety.
Most of our systems of social organisation emerged in periods when the rate
of change was relatively slow. Change, particularly rapid change, makes
prediction of human behaviour more difficult because the utility of experience
is reduced. This is one of the features of the phenomenon termed the generation
gap--
and, of course, there are many other gaps. Conforming behaviour is
predictable behaviour. Thus, the simplest means whereby predictability of
individual behaviour can be obtained is by reduction of variety of that behaviour.
The implicit belief seems to be that if we had enough laws, and if everybody
obeyed these laws, then we would be able to predict.
It is interesting that we use the term law to describe the process whereby we
seek to reduce variety in human behaviour. There is an implied association
with laws (as we describe certain scientific statements) in the physical world.
But physical laws must accommodate the variety of the natural system. True,
we see nature as law abiding and, to such an extent that when we find it not
to be so, we immediately change our statements of the laws to take account of
the new perceptions of the events described. Laws of nature do not restrict the
variety or complexity of the natural system, rather they provide a means for
prediction through the richness of their information. We certainly have no
ways for punishing nature when it does not follow our laws! The most elegant
statements of natural laws are not only rich in information, but most concise.
Criminal law, unlike scientific laws, may not be intended to summarise
FUTURES Sept ember 1970
Crime in the World of 1990 207
observations of actual behaviour. Few, if any, jurists would claim this as its
function. We have, then, two uses of the same word with two entirely different
meanings, and any analogies between the two will be highly dangerous.
Few social systems can tolerate much variety. The hundred flowers which
Mao once said were to be permitted to bloom, did not live long; and, of course,
he may never have intended this picturesque phrase to mean a tolerance for
variety within the system of Chinese communism. The hundred flowers were
expected to be all of one form and colour. Yet, as we have noted, our society
proliferates variety and it is impossible to consider the idea of progress without
the contingent idea of diversity. Variety possesses the information content
necessary to permit and facilitate adaptation.
If todays younger generation were to behave as the previous generation
behaved when their age, such behaviour would undoubtedly be dysfunctional
and unadaptive in the very different conditions of today. Change and variety
must be built into our social organisations, and the organisations must be
capable of change. The prediction of probable change can facilitate smooth
progression from stage to stage. Adjustment to change when it is forced upon a
society by dramatic incidents, serious conflict or a breakdown of the local
structure is, obviously, undesirable. Yet, perhaps, this kind of event has been
the main vehicle for change in recent years. Prison reform has achieved less than
prison riots; black militancy has obtained a pay-off; violence tends to be
rewarded and reinforced. Yet violence is obsolete as a means for problem
solving. Violence seems to have a natural tendency to escalate, and we know
little of the techniques of de-escalation, either in individual, small group or
national and international conflict situations. The decision-making process
should reduce (not eliminate) uncertainty; it is not necessary to reduce variety,
indeed it may be dangerous to do so.
The impact of changing values on the 1990s
The very large rise in recorded crime in the last few years has troubled most
countries. In England, for example, while the incarceration rate did not change
apart from small random fluctuations between the two Great Wars, from 1945
to date it has increased by more than 300%. It is clear that what we are doing
about crime has increased by leaps and bounds; it is a little less certain that the
total amount of crime has increased by a similar amount. Much depends upon
our reference. If the cost of living legally increases, and we have to increase our
productivity to keep pace, then, surely the cost of illegal living also increases!
If we measure the increase in crimes against property against the increase in the
availability of goods, say, as evidenced by increases in the gross national
product, the increase in the crime rate is less dramatic. Of equal importance to
what the criminal does is what society does about him-in other words-
decisions about criminals are as important as criminals decisions. As Peter
McNaughton-Smith has observed, Perhaps we do not so much have a drug
problem, as a drug-problem problem. What we decide to do about crime may
be an important factor in its increase. We tend to focus on the assumption that
since we do not like crime, whatever we do about it must tend to decrease it;
but this is a non-sequitur.
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208 Crime in the World of 1990
There has been a trend recently in the USA to try to do something about
social evils which, according to sociological theory, are causes of crime. This
may be a self-defeating strategy. Social ills should be dealt with not because
they give rise to crime, but because they are social ills. There is little doubt that
if the present trend towards emphasis on law and order continues, the court
system will break down. In the major metropolitan areas it has already broken
down, although various expedient substitutes have been extemporised.
The great political emphasis on law and order has consequences not only
for the offender or would-be offender; indeed, it is possible that the most
serious effect is upon the law-abiding citizen. We are moving towards a time
when the middle-class form of living will look similar to that of the mediaeval
lords of the manors. Already in New York City there are apartment blocks
which function as the Norman castle-closed circuit television monitors the
entrance ; guards further check each visitor; locks are electronic; and patrols
move around continuously-a striking similarity to the moat, walls and
battlements of centuries past. The trend is set in the direction of abandonment
of the streets at night to outlaws, and this results not so much from what we
have or have not done about criminals, but is best considered as the result of a
deviation-amplification process related to the fear generated in the law-abiding
citizen. If the citizen is not on the streets, his place cannot be taken by
uniformed officers of the state.
It will take us a long time to learn to distinguish the political and inconse-
quential from social danger; to substitute as a criterion for criminal law, the
socially dangerous for the socially annoying or morally disapproved. A large
body of our laws and regulations are functional for the law-makers, but not for
the s0ciety.i What are the major dangers for society? The main threats today,
and in the immediate future, tend to be invisible. They arise from the increasing
size of the total environment, the increased interdependence of the parts and the
unpredictable connections between them. This is a result of the accelerating
and unevenness of change. 2 A few figures: New York City disposes of garbage
which fills seven miles of rail trucks in one day; Londons incinerator deals
with 700 trucks a day; San Francisco (a relatively small city) dumps 1500 tonnes
a day in its Bay. There are also the dangers of pesticides, of thermal pollution
as well as atomic waste pollution, and of the threat to our existence of the
ecological imbalance. This is a social threat indeed. The major dangers now
result from collective guilt, rather than individual misbehaviour. Yet our
social institutions and the law find this a difficult concept. We spend millions
fiddling with marijuana use while the Rome of our society heads for burning.
The next few years will, undoubtedly, see a great increase in the conglomerate
financing and control of business. A financial power elite may well exceed the
power of elected governments. Information and its handling constitute a power
as important, or even more important than horse-power. Informational power
is purchased through the funding of research. Curbs on official spending reduce
the power of elected officials to purchase research and obtain access to informa-
tion on behalf of the people they represent. There will be an increasing tendency
for information to be possessed by private corporations and conglomerates.
How can we be assured that this information power is accessible to the people?
There are traces in some contemporary Western societies that private power
FUTURES Sept ember 1970
will not be restricted to the use of information, but extend to the use of more
conventional force in situations which the elected officers of the state would
not be prepared to use. In England, surprisingly enough, there have already
been instances of private forces, armed similarly to the police and wearing
similar types of uniforms being used by private organisations to deal with
demonstrators in situations where the police authorities did not consider action
was called for. Dissatisfaction with the police on the part of the unorganised
members of the public is one thing, but on the part of organisations it is more
insidious.
Money, for the individual member of our society is, without saying, an
important commodi~. Money in its old (and obsolescent form) is issued by the
government, but more transactions are now made by means of credit cards for
which the determination of the character of the individual is in control of private
organisations.
The trend towards more and more power over the individual being in the
hands of non-elected organisations may be expected to continue. In itself this
may not be undesirable. If the private organisations concerned comply with the
general ethic of the society, they might perform more efficiently than an official
body. Our problem is to ensure that the general ethic is stated and maintained.
These examples are somewhat specific. Similar examples could be found from
many other areas. Medical scientists expect, for example, that not only will
drugs to dissolve gall stones be available before 1980, but also new, more
varied and more reliable drugs for control of fatigue, relaxation, alertness,
mood, personality, perceptions and fantasies.3 Who is going to be given the
right or to have the duty to see that these substances are not misused? What will
we mean by misuse ? When these substances are actually available, will it be
possible to state the serious questions in any different terms from those in which
they can now be stated? If not, should we not begin now to consider them?
Does not this prognosis put some of our present policies into different per-
spective? The rate of change is so great that few of our projections on the basis
of current states of knowledge may be expected to be late in arrival.
An article in the June 1969 issue of Futzlres noted that among expected com-
puter developments was the following: Policing of individual vehicles by
combined radar detection and computer record of violations-licence number,
excess speed, etc; expected date: 198L4 Before this date, oral input to com-
puter, laser memories, laser transmission of information and computers learning
from experience; and again, much, much more.
Types of moral values likely to characterise the future
If we are to deal ahead of time with the technological developments that will
surely be with us, we need to know whether in our research and deliberations
we should use current value systems or not. If our current value systems are to
be modified, then the kinds of solutions which might be appropriate could differ.
Where can we find the information which could indicate the lead or
pipeline in which changing moral values might be identified? It is, perhaps,
in the voices of the under-30s. They will be in charge of the society when these
projections are realised. Will they change their views and as they get to our
FUTURES September 1970
210 Crime in the World of 1990
age look on life as we now do ? If they do, then surely man will become extinct.
On this assumption, let us try to make some assessment of the values against
which deviance and crime of 1990 will be measured.
Every person whom we determine as deviant is, to some degree commenting
by his actions, not only upon himself, but also upon his society. In some deviant
acts the degree of comment on society may be the major element, in others
it may be a very small element. But even persons adjudged as insane reflect in
their insanity something of the culture and their environment. We might try
to hear some of the comment, even although we may deprecate the language of
theft, assault, drug use or demonstration in which it is expressed. The message
(however encoded) may be important.
Some young persons say that what they are about is revolution. They say
that we are a violent society and that we have got our values screwed up,
Carl Oglesby has described a process of changes through which a revolutionary
develops. An early stage is that of prayer and petition.5 At this stage, the
individual seeks to appeal to an authority which is higher than that which he
sees as responsible for his condition. At this stage, he believes that there are some
persons of authority who know what is right and who would assist him if only
they knew his situation. The appeal is often that of incantation and quasi-
religious. Underlying this stage of belief is the assumption that there is some
view of justice within the social system which accords with the petitioner. He
feels that he can get into touch with that power, and that such contact would
be adequate. Without developing this further at the moment let us try to relate
this to law and morals.
The similarity between this form of belief and that of religious beliefs will be
self-evident. God is good-good, that is, in absolute terms, hence, in terms which
are meaningful to us as individuals. If God is supremely powerful and just and
if He has His representatives in our modern society, then we cannot revolt
against an authority which we see as the ultimate court of appeal. If our
concept of law, justice and right are summarised into a belief in one God, and
our God is also the God of those in power, then we must accept those in authority
in His name. But if this simple structure begins to break down : if God (our God)
is not on the side of those in power over us: or if there is no God : or if He is
irrelevant, then the situation begins to look very different. The approach from
prayer, incantation and appeal seems invalid.
In the light of this analysis it is possible to interpret part of an essay by one
of my students. The sad fact, he wrote, is that we . . . are beginning to
come to grips with the realities of American life; the incantory petition to
authority . . . will not change anything. The reason, stated too simply, is that
there is no just king. One cannot appeal to a higher justice which does not
exist. It may be noted that the claim that justice does not exist within the
structure relies equally on the concept ofjustice. To be able to say that tjustice
does not exist presupposes that we know what justice is, and that what exists
is not that. Does it seem paradoxical that a belief in justice leads to the
development of a revolutionary viewpoint ?
Again, quoting the same student, . . . the incantation of appeal must
become protest and resistance if we are to avoid the co-option, invisibility and
sheer impotence that have been our experience. Alternative responses are, of
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Crime in the World of 1990 211
course, opting out of the system and seeking whatever satisfactions are possible
within oneself or from a sub-cultural setting as independent as possible of the
social order one abhors.
It was earlier suggested we should listen to young people who say things like
this, We should seek to decode anti-social behaviour and find the message.
Many seem not to agree. However, it should be noted that while repression of
dissent may provide a period of quiessence, it will only be at great cost and in
the end prove dysfunctional.
Decoding information youth transmits about society
As the hackneyed phrase has it, there is a communication gap and a generation
gap; more, there is a conceptual gap. It is not hard to suggest some reasons
for this.
Law, for its rationale, relates to ethics, but operationally the legal system is
an integral part of the political system. Law is what legislators legislate. In
countries where political regimes have obtained power and are such that the
majority of the world population would consider them to be immoral, the
judiciary has not long been able to hold out against the attack from the political
powers. By this it is not to say that crime is nothing more than politics, rather,
the connection between law and ethical considerations is effected through the
political system. The legal system is modulated by the political system and the
political system is modulated by the value systems of the society. The legal
system has some small room for manoeuvre independent of the political system,
but not much. The more closely the legal system is considered by the public
to be associated with the political system, the more open to challenge are the
legal concepts on the part of those who do not accept the philosophy of the
party in power.
Some minorities have always tended to challenge the authority of the current
law on grounds of a higher allegiance. This is the position of many young today.
They do this with a level of conviction and in such proportions that they are
seen as both immoral and unpatriotic. One of the reasons they can so protest
is that they see law as dependent upon political factors rather than on divine
or other acceptable authority. Democracy, if it could be believed to exist, might
provide a basis of ethical support for law, but the political system is considered
to be only called a democracy. The present political system is seen as the
tyranny of the majority over the minorities. Power is achieved, it is thought, by
manipulation of mass media, money and bureaucracies. Thus a crisis in
confidence in politics is becoming a crisis in law and order.
This process implies a different concept of the basis of law from that which
we may see as acceptable; nevertheless, it seems to be irreversible. We cannot go
back to some divine right of kings, nor expect a revival of the church, the
extended family or other doctrinal support. Rather we must follow the challenge
of the new patterns of thought and see where these might lead. Myths are
beginning to loose their grip. The first myth challenged by youth is that God
(rather than politics) provides the basis of law. Empiricism and phenomenology
lead to this point.
We must accept as a fact that young persons see the present world differently
FUTURES Sept ember 1970
212 Crime in the World of 1990
from those who are older. We may be looking at the same things, but young
persons interpret phenomena with reference to a different set of experiences.
They are the first generation to experience no times prior to the mass com-
munication media of television; they are the first generation to experience from
the first time they can begin to appreciate what war means, that mankind has
the undoubted potential to destroy itself; they are the first generation to begin
life within a world which evidences the four dimensions of space; they are the
first generation to experience the implications of uncertainty and probability as
a general principle.
Changes in the physical ecology are evident. We have recently been warned
of the complexities of ecological balance and begun to know how critical it is
for survival. But this is not all. We are not only influenced by the changing
physical ecology, but bound up with technological development are changes
in our verbal or linguistic ecology. Certainly those who use visual analogies as a
vehicle for their thought find the available resources greatly enriched. Similarly,
our verbal ecology has been enriched as a direct result of the physical develop-
ments. A child does not tend now to ask how far one place is from another, but
how long the journey will take. Time has replaced distances as a measure in
many respects of ordinary life. Those people who have tried to help their
children with their new mathematics will have some idea of the conceptual
gap. As the language to describe and operate with the new technology has been
added to our vocabularies, so has increased the verbal store available for
thinking about anything else, even morals and values. We cannot separate the
warp of speech and thought relating to technology from the weft of speech and
thought about any other problems which we may wish to consider. Not even
the older generation can now find it possible to think according to the manner
and style of thought which they used before they thought as they now think.
What is here termed the linguistic eco-system within which young persons
function differs markedly from that of the older generation. Moral principles
have conveniently been taught by means of metaphor and analogy-the
Kingdom of Heaven is like unto . . . Remember too, the concept of justice
as a blindfolded maiden with scales to balance and assess weights. Thus, it
seems reasonable to claim that moral principles have depended for their
communication upon the linguistic and physical ecology in which those who
taught and those who learned then lived. Moral principles have also been
generally expressed in simple dichotomies-wrong and right; true and false;
responsible and not responsible; guilty and not guilty; saved and unsaved;
Christian and heathen; and so on. But then too, in the world of scientific thought
less than a century ago there was cause and effect and a simple determinism
underlay the models.
Today the only occasions when a young person is likely to experience the
language of black and white-the simple two-value logic-is when he goes to
church, or to court.
We have at the present time one form of language (or set of linguistic
conventions) in which we find it necessary to express our moral concepts, and a
different language, a new one, to describe the fields of knowledge.
When our models of the universe were simple, the earlier language was
adequate to describe and conceptualise the issues with which we were concerned.
FUTURES September 1970
Crime in the World of 1990 213
We could then use the same language for morals issues and scientific issues.
It is only recently that we have had to utilise probabilistic models, stochastic
processes and cybernetics models as forms of explanation.
A relationship which the culture can accommodate must exist between our
value system and its means of expression and our system of knowledge. Persons
and societies who have not arrived at such an accommodation will experience
conflict and disorganisation. Our young people are facing these issues. Some
theologians may claim that we must exist with two different languages; that
values systems are essentially dichotomous. But even if this formulation can be
sustained, the point about the necessity of an accommodation still holds. The
conflict of conceptual systems (one derived from our enriched vocabulary
resulting from technological development, the other the two-value logic of
morals and religion) is one of the possible explanations of the present state of
malaise of the law and the judicial systems of advanced countries. The dis-
crepancy between the two forms of language is most apparent to the young,
and particularly to those among them who are the more highly educated. It is
not surprising, therefore, that major difficulties are experienced by (and with)
the best students and the best universities.
Would it not be a better strategy to seek to join them in their endeavour to
find a set of moral values appropriate to our time, rather than classifying them
as deviants, rebels, unpatriotic, or any of the other terms of abuse which are
commonly heard? Are the values of the Anglo-Saxon Protestant ethic adequate
for the future? Come to that, are they adequate for the present?
Moral values for the future
What are the values of the Protestant ethic? Trist has listed four corner-stones
of our traditional morality: achievement, self-control, independence, and
endurance of distress (grin and bear it).6 What then are the values of the
dissidents ? Trist (who specifically rejects the views of Marcuse), notes these as :
self-actualisation, self-expression, inter-dependence, and a capacity for joy.
Not all of these two sets are in conflict; perhaps the most difficult to reconcile is
that of the new value ofinterdependence as against the old value of independence.
Of course there will be crime in 1990; but it is to be hoped (if not projected)
that it will then be defined in terms of up-dated value systems.
What about the process of transition ? We are already late. It is difficult to
estimate whether we can adapt quickly enough. Perhaps the impact of other
systems in society upon the legal system will force an acceleration in the needed
change. The recent interventions of systems engineers and management scien-
tists would lead one to hope that this may be so. But we must be careful that
these new techniques are harnessed to a value system that is not out-of-date.
It is possible to use computer technology to do fast and badly what has previously
been done badly and slowly. If we programme our computers to do faster,
cheaper, more accurately and far less personally that which is being done
personally, we may have a trade-off which represents a distinct loss and a great
danger.
Adaptation to change over time is closely related to variety at a point in time.
If we cannot cope with variety now, we may cut off the very growing points of
FUTURES Sept ember 1970
214 Crime in the World of 1990
society and wreck our chances for change and adaptation. We do not need more
conformity with existing norms, but more of the beauty of functional variety.
We do not need more effort to be given to finding out who is to blame, but
more effort to enrich the complexity of our social control processes through the
use of information. We must take great care to avoid in the future the creation
of problems through our methods of seeking to eliminate them.
We must work for both more democracy and more technology at one and the
same time. This will be difficult, but it is essential for survival of our society as
we know it.
There are many problems which we should take out of the field of criminal
justice and work upon them as though they were problems in management
science. There are others where the contribution of legal philosophy is small but
important, and in these kinds of problems we must find ways to co-ordinate a
variety of approaches. We must explore the consequences of applying the
models afforded by stochastic processes, epidemiology, information and
decision theory, and in general look at the criminal justice area as an open
system-and not only as a system.
In short, the need is for planning; for consideration of the probabilities of
future outcomes in terms of their perceived desirability; a need for serious,
scientific planning.
References
1. I. Gerver and J. Bensman, Crime and Punishment in the Factory, in B.
Rosenberg, I. Gerver, F. W. Howton, Eds, Mass Society in Crisis (New York,
Macmillan, 1964)
2. E. Trist, Urban North America, World Congress on Mental Health, Edinburgh,
1969
3. A. Douglas Bender, Alvin E. Strack, George W. Ebright, and George von
Haunalter, Delphic Study Examines Developments in Medicine, Futures,
Vol. 1, No. 4, pp. 289-303
4. Chrestem A. Bjerrum, Forecasts of Computer Developments and Applications
1968-2000, Futures, Vol. 1, No. 4, pp. 331-338
5. Carl Oglesby, Containment and Change (New York, Macmillan, 1967)
6. E. Trist, op tit
FUTURES Sept ember 1970