Maoist insurgency and guerrilla warfare

and state response, part-I

Posted by: Shri. Maloy Krishna Dhar

Several readers and visitors ventilated their genuine and perceived anguish about Maoist
threat to the country and the alleged poor state of counterinsurgency operations by the Union
and State Law & Order and Intelligence agencies. The subject is vast with protracted
historical background and hundreds of books and research papers are available on the subject.
Detailed researches have been carried out by the US, UK, French, Greek and etc countries’
armies and intelligence apparatuses. The Indian army has also its Counterinsurgency doctrine
which was developed in the light of experiences of Pakistan inspired tribal hoards attacking
Kashmir in I947, Naga insurgency since 1948, other insurgencies in the Northeastern States,
Punjab and Kashmir. The prime intelligence agencies of India and the State intelligence
agencies are yet to formulate cohesive counterinsurgency and anti-guerrilla policies with
symmetric adjustment with the doctrine developed by the armed forces.

Insurgency is organized armed rebellion by non-state players either for overthrowing the
legally constituted State, or secede or establish free zones by paralyzing the state machineries
and by establishing total ‘Mass Control’ on the populace and destroying legally constituted
and mandated “Mass Control” mechanism of the State. This brief definition includes certain
factors which are of paramount importance.

“In a Guerrilla warfare affected territory presence of the following basic elements are
absolutely necessary:

1. A given territory, normally backward rural, mountainous and topographically not easily
accessible.

2. There must be Peoples in that territory who have been neglected by the political
administration, denied balanced developments, equal rights with the developed parts of the
country, oppressed, depressed and who have been totally alienated from the system.

3. Ideologically inspired party and leadership to exploit the disillusioned Peoples.

4. Erosion of government “Mass Control” and gradual establishment of “mass Control” by the
guerrilla forces, through propaganda, armed action against the government forces, penal
action against the Peoples who refuse to submit to the guerrillas, and

5. Armed guerrilla groups, who have access to arms supply, People’s patronage, support from
sections of intellectuals and human rights activists.”

Of these four important elements the most important one is the concept of “Mass Control.”
The kernel of the Mass Control is mutual interrelation between the Peoples, the tools of
governance and the responsibility of the State as mandated by the Constitution and
empowered by the law to ensure balanced equal growth of economy, equal dispensation of
wealth, equal social justice and equal amount of response of the State to the security and lives
of the peoples.
Over years due to certain aberration in the mandated principles and actions by the State
regional, ethnic, and economic balances have been distorted. Certain areas and peoples grow
faster causing serious imbalances in certain sectors of the populace, regions and ethnic
groups. Over years the peoples suffering from the impact of imbalances, inequality, social and
economic justice tend to lose their FAITH in the capability of the legally constituted
governments to protect, preserve and promote them as homogenous parts of the entire State.
Imbalanced growth and urban-centric economic growth, neglect of the rural-agrarian sectors
and ethnic regions, generate tectonic shift between the State and the peoples who develop
doubt on the capability of the State in ensuring equal edification.

Through these gaps gradual erosion of “Mass Control” starts taking shape which is exploited
by certain political thinkers and organized groups who believe that by applying sustained
campaign, agitation and armed depredation they can develop “Counter Mass Control” on the
peoples and congregate a parallel force that can challenge the established State. Certain
political ideologies like Leninism, Maoism etc are borrowed to give ideological cover to the
“Counter Mass Control” movements. Considered and crafty use of violence on the state
governing tools gradually help in destroying state control and establishment of control by the
rebellious forces. Systematic erosion of state authority allows FAITH and TRUST on the
rebellious groups, who often punish the people by using violence and instill a parallel growth
of FAITH and TRUST on the capability of the rebellious groups to deliver to them that State
could not. The concept of “Mass Control” and “Counter Mass Control” is the kernel of
insurgency and guerrilla warfare. People’s power, desire to challenge the State and their
capability in destroying TRUST in the established government and promote their own control
on areas and bases decide the course of insurgency and guerrilla warfare and success and
failure of counterinsurgency strategies.

Before we enter into other aspects of counterinsurgency and guerrilla warfare it is better we
try to understand the peoples and groups which are marketed as Maoists and Naxals. In an
earlier article ‘Maoist Apparatus And Bridging The Old Fault Line’ published on July 2008, I
had drawn attention of the readers to various causes that give triggering effect to the growth
of Naxalism and Maoist movement. Therefore, I would try to project the various groups
which are active (ideologically and militarily) in different states.

CURRENT MAOIST OR MAO-INFLENCED ORGANISATIONS IN INDIA

1. Communist League of India CLI(ML): Founded Feb 20, 1978 as a split off from CPI
(ML) COC
2. Communist Party of India (Maoist) People’s War: Formed in Sept.21, 2004 as a merger
of CPI (ML) and MCC (I). The largest and important revolutionary party. Engaged in
guerrilla warfare.
3. Communist Party of India (M-L): Formed in January 2005 by merger of CPI (ML-
Sanyal Group) and CPI (ML) Red Flag. A Right-Centre organisation.
4. CPI ML Bhaijee Group: Active in Bihar.
5. CPI (ML) Central Team: Formed 1977. In 1994 the Punjab section merged with other
Groups to form CPRCI (ML).
6. CPI (ML) (Janashakti, Rajanna group, Ranadheer group, Chandra Pulla, Reddy
Group, Other factions): Six ML groups merged in 199form this outfit. Takes part Guerrilla
warfare.
7. CPI (ML) Samvad
8. CPI (ML) Liberation: Continuation of main CPI (ML). Probably the largest group
believes in electoral process. Active in West Bengal, Assam and Bihar.
9. CPI (ML) Mahadev Mukherjee: Split from CPI (ML) 2nd CC. Doctrinaire and believe in
Lin Biao line of revolution.
10. CPI (ML) Maharashtra
11. CPI (ML) Nai Pahal
12. CPI (ML) Naxalbari: CPI (ML) Rauf group, CPI (ML) MUC merged with this group.
Affiliated to CCOMPOSA and RIM.
13. CPI (ML) New Democracy: Formed in 1988 by Yatendra Kumar. Active in Bihar.
Believes in armed struggle.
14. CPI (ML) New Proletarian.
15. CPI (ML) Organizing Committee: Active in Bihar under B. N. Sharma
16. CPI (ML) Praja Pratighatana: Engaged in Armed struggle.
17. CPI (ML) Prajashakti-People’s Power: Engaged in armed struggle.
18. CPI (ML) Pratighatna, Phani Bagchi faction: Engaged in armed struggle.
19. CPI (ML)Provisional Central Committee: Formed in 1977 after merger with CPI (ML)
of Satya Narayan Singh group. Follows centrist line.
20. CPI (ML) Shantipal: Formed in 1972. Active in Northern West Bengal and Bihar.
21. Communist Party of United States of India: Split from Janashakti in 1977 and engaged
in armed struggle.
22. Communist Party Reorganization Centre Of India (ML): Amalgamation of several
groups. Advocates of armed revolution.
23. Communist Biplabi Kendra aka Communist Revolutionary Centre.
24. Communist Revolutionary League of India: Ashim Chatterjee group. Leans towards
social democracy.
25.Marxist- Leninist Committee: Eastern Andhra Pradesh, not engaged in armed struggle.
26. Revolutionary Communist Centre (Marxist-Leninist-Maoist): RCCI merged with
MCCI in 2003. Logged to CCOMPOSA.
27.Revolutionary Socialist Party Of India (ML): Formed in 1969.
28.Unity Centre Of Communist Revolutionaries of India: Formed in 1975 by T. Nagi
Redd and D. V. Rao. Believes in Mass revolutionary line.

Other Regional Revolutionary Organisations having Maoist influence

1. Jharkhand Liberation Tigers: Linked to Jharkhand Liberation Front. Believes in armed

struggle.
2. Kangleipak Communist Party Manipur: Split group from PREPAK
3. NSCN (I-M): Nagaland and parts of Manipur and Assam.
4. People’s Liberation Army: Armed force of People’s Liberation Front. Formed in 1978.
5. People’s Revolutionary Army of Kangleipak: Formed in 1977. Believes in armed
struggle. Has Maoist link.
6. Revolutionary People’s Front Of Manipur: Formed in 1979, an armed Maoist group.
7. Tamil Nadu Marxist-Leninist Party.
8. Tritiya Prastuti Committee: Counter revolutionary split from PWG in 2002.
9. United Liberation Front of Assam: Separatist group having Maoist tinge.

Besides the above there are about 22 old and non-functional Maoist groups of which the
important are: Revolutionary Communist Centre, India (Maoist), Marxist Communist Party of
India, Maoist Communist Centre (India), Maoist Communist Centre (MCC), CPI (ML)
Second Central Committee, CPI (ML-Sanyal Group), CPI (ML) Red Flag, CPI (ML) People’s
War Group, All India Coordination Committee of Communist Revolutionaries etc.
National/International Associations:

Coordination Committee of Maoist Parties and Organizations of South Asia (CCOMPOSA).

Formed in June 2001 the main constituents are:

* Bangladesh Samyabadi Dal (M-L)

* Ceylon Communist Party (Maoist), Sri Lanka
* Communist Party of East Bengal (M-L) Bangladesh
* Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist)
* Communist Party of India (M-L) People’s War
* Communist Party of India (M-L) Naxalbari
* Maobadi Punorgathan Kendro of PBSP Bangladesh
* Maoist Communist Centre (India)
* Purba Bangla Sarbohara Party, PBSP CC Bangladesh
* Revolutionary Communist Centre India (Marxist-Leninist-Maoist)
* Revolutionary Communist Centre India (Maoist), Merged into MCC (I) in 2003.
* Revolutionary Internationalist Movement (RIM): The RIM was formed in 1984.
Signatories of the Declaration of the Revolutionary Internationalist Movement and
Participating Organisations in RIM (From A World to Win, #29, (2002), p. 88):
* Ceylon Communist Party (Maoist)
* Communist Party of Afghanistan
* Communist Party of Bangladesh (M-L) BSD(ML)
* Communist Party of India (M-L) Naxalbari
* Communist Party of Iran (Marxist-Leninist-Maoist)
* Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist)
* Communist Party of Peru
* Communist Party of Turkey Marxist-Leninist
* Maoist Communist Centre (India) [Merged with CPI (ML) People’s War to form the
CPI (Maoist) in Sept. 2004.
* Maoist Communist Party Italy
* Marxist-Leninist Communist Organisation of Tunisia
* Proletarian Party of Purba Bangla (PBSP) Bangladesh
* Revolutionary Communist Group of Colombia
* Revolutionary Communist Party, USA.

(Materials collated from Massline.info.)

I have highlighted the facts of existence of Maoist groups in the Northeast and Bangladesh as
well as Nepal to emphasize the fact that sophisticated weapons are inducted by the Indian
Maoists from Chinese arms peddling mafia through the Maoists in Manipur, Nagaland and
Assam. The Bangladesh based Maoist parties mostly active in the western part of the country
are in cahoots with the Indian Maoists. They work as a conduit for supplying Chinese
weapons to the Indian Maoists in India. Moreover, the Indian Maoists are suspected to receive
financial assistance from the international community of Maoist organisations. International
connectivity of the Indian movement is pointer to the rise of second phase of export of Maoist
ideology by China. The first wave was generated by USSR inspiration and support. It would
not be proper to evaluate the Indian Maoists as a mushroom growth. The seeds were sown in
Andhra Pradesh under USSR inspiration, sprouted as Naxal Movement in West Bengal and
several revisions and ideological twists have coagulated the Maoist movement to a spearhead
with serious threat to the established system.
The Maoists earlier received weapons and explosives from LTTE sources through Tamilnadu
and Andhra Pradesh coastal areas. Other reliable ground sources indicate that arms of Chinese
origin are also inducted by the Indian Maoists by sea route for which the areas from Haldia,
Kasba Naiaringarh (Midnapore) areas to areas like Khantapara, Baripada, Remuna. Balikuda
and Berhanpur areas in Orissa are used by the armed guerrilla groups.

The Maoist movement is highly splintered but there is working coordination between groups
active in West Bengal, Bihar, Jharkhand, Orissa, Andhra Pradesh, Chattisgarh and
Maharashtra. The CPI (Maoist) is by far the largest of these, incorporating as it does the two
largest pre-merger groups engaged in guerrilla warfare. However, the Rajanna group of
Janashkti is also apparently quite active. According to an article in the Hindustan Times (May
9, 2002], “Of various radical leftists, People’s War Group and Maoist Communist Centre are
most ferociously pursuing the Marx-Lenin and Mao-inspired protracted people’s war in at
least seven states of India.” The article went on to say that their connections with the
developing revolution in Nepal, and “reports of their bid to carve out a corridor from some
areas of MP, AP, Bihar and UP up to Nepal have alarmed Indian government. There are some
groups which are in favour of reformist line and participation inn the electoral process.

And in between these two extremes there is a whole large middle ground. Many of the
organizations here favor what they call the “mass revolutionary line” or “Mao’s mass line”. I
believe that most of these groups favor people’s war (and/or mass insurrection) at some point,
but they think the ground is not yet prepared for it, at least in most places in India. Among the
“mass revolutionary line” groups are:

* CPI (ML), a new party formed with the merger of CPI(ML) Red Flag and CPI(ML)-
Sanyal Group in January 2005.
* Unity Centre of Communist Revolutionaries of India (M-L)
* CPI (M-L) New Democracy- but this group seems to be leaning more to the left and
toward guerrilla warfare now.
* Communist Party Reorganization Centre of India (M-L)
* Many smaller groups.

Many of the revolutionary groups in India have diverse currents of political opinion within
them, and it has been a frequent occurrence for a section of a party in one of these three main
groups to split off and join up with a party in one of the other three main groups. It seems that
no party or group has yet been able to demonstrate to a majority of the communist
revolutionaries of India that it has figured out the best path to revolution.

The above are brief accounts of the Maoist groups which have influenced the course of
political history of India since 1966-67 with the Naxalbari movement. Greater details cannot
be incorporated due to constraint of space.

Since the armed struggle by several groups have challenged the authority of the legally
constituted governments in the name of Maoist ideology, it is necessary to have a brief
glimpse into the tenets preached by Mao Zedong. According to him: “The general features of
orthodox hostilities, that is, the war of position and the war of movement, differ
fundamentally from guerrilla warfare. There are other readily apparent differences such as
those in organization, armament, equipment supply, tactics, command; in conception of the
terms ‘front’ and ‘rear’; in the matter of military responsibilities.” Mao Zedong on Guerrilla
Warfare.”
Mao’s tenets observe that in guerrilla warfare, select the tactic of seeming to come from the
east and attacking from the west; avoid the solid, attack the hollow; attack; withdraw; deliver
a lightning blow, seek a lightning decision. When guerrillas engage a stronger enemy, they
withdraw when he advances; harass him when he stops; strike him when he is weary; pursue
him when he withdraws. In guerilla strategy, the enemy’s rear, flanks, and other vulnerable
spots are his vital points, and there he must be harassed, attacked, dispersed, exhausted and
annihilated. Only in this way can guerrillas carry out their mission of independent guerrilla
action and coordination with the effort of the regular armies. But, in spite of the most
complete preparation, there can be no victory if mistakes are made in the matter of command.

Mao also says: “What is basic guerrilla strategy? Guerrilla strategy must be based primarily
on alertness, mobility, and attack. It must be adjusted to the enemy situation, the terrain, the
existing lines of communication, the relative strengths, the weather and the situation of the
people.” Ibid.

The general features of orthodox hostilities, that is, the war of position and the war of
movement, differ fundamentally from guerrilla warfare. There are other differences such as
those in organization, armament, equipment supply, tactics, command; in conception of the
terms ‘front’ and ‘rear’; in the matter of military responsibilities.

When considered from the point of view of total numbers, guerrilla units are small and many,
as individual combat units, they may vary in size from the smallest, of few individuals or
several hundred men, to the battalion or the regiment, of several thousand. This is not the case
in regularly organized units.

A primary feature of guerrilla operations is their dependence upon the people themselves to
organize battalions and other units. As a result of this, organization depends largely upon
local circumstances. In the case of initial guerrilla groups, the standard of equipment was of a
low order and they depended for their sustenance primarily upon what the locality affords.
Later they achieved success in procuring sophisticated weapons. The strategy of guerrilla
warfare is manifestly unlike that employed in orthodox operations, as the basic tactic of the
former is constant activity and movement. There is in guerrilla warfare no such thing as a
decisive battle; there is nothing comparable to the fixed, passive defence that characterizes
orthodox war. In guerrilla warfare, the transformation of a moving situation into a positional
defensive situation never arises. The general features of reconnaissance, partial deployment,
general deployment, and development of the attack that are usual in mobile warfare are not
common in guerrilla war. The guerrillas establish preliminary and solid bases and through
“Mass Control” mechanism gradually establish free areas and several free areas join together
to dominate territories. When we discuss the terms ‘front’ and ‘rear’ it must be remembered,
that while guerrillas do have bases, their primary field of activity is in the enemy’s rear areas.
They themselves have no rear. As to the matter of military responsibilities, those of the
guerrillas are to exterminate small forces of the enemy; to harass and weaken large forces; to
attack enemy lines of communications; to establish bases capable of supporting independent
operations in the enemy’s rear, to force the enemy to disperse his strength and go for
splintered deployment which lead to better ambushing capability for the guerrilla forces

There are several considerations on which the insurgency and guerrilla warfare are evolved.
Main points of consideration are: How guerrilla bands are formed, organized how to arm and
train them and which elements of the populace should be considered as the hardcore elements
of the movement? In the Indian context Charu Mazumdar had initially chosen the landless
laborers, deprived tea garden employees who were mostly of tribal stock. Later he moved on
to the idea of mass killing and urban guerrilla warfare. Now the pattern is to create bases in
deprived rural areas, amongst the depressed classes and castes, forest dwelling tribals. The
leadership is measured up by the standards laid down by Mao Zedong: They must be well
educated in theories of class struggle, tenets of Lenin and Mao, well versed with the mood of
the people and have better understanding of the basics of forming bases, selecting people to
initial guerrilla groups, arranging weapons and lead the organized bands to isolated skirmishes
with small police and paramilitary forces. From that basic concept the present day Maoist
groups have graduated to establishing chains of bases, operating from the rear and flank of the
enemy (state forces), procuring sophisticated weapons and explosive devices and even
mounting surprise attack on sizeable police and paramilitary forces.

Mao had suggested that all the people in an area should arm themselves and be organized
into two groups. One of these groups is a combat group, the other a self-defence unit with
limited military quality. Regular combatant guerrillas are organized into one of three general
types of units. The first of these is the small unit, the platoon or company. In each given
territory, three to six units may be organized. The second type is the battalion of two to four
companies. One such unit should be organized in each dominated territory. While the unit
fundamentally belongs to the designated area in it was organized for, it may operate in other
areas as well. While in areas other than its own, it must operate in conjunction with local
units in order to take advantage of their manpower, their knowledge of local terrain and local
customs, and their information of the enemy. According to him each of the units has its own
peculiarities of organization. A squad, the smallest unit, may have the strength of from nine to
eleven men, including the leader and the assistant leader. Its arms may be from two to five
rapid firing rifles, with the remaining men armed with rifles, other kinds of weapons and even
spears, or big swords. Two to four such squads form a platoon. This too has a leader and an
assistant leader, and when acting independently, it is assigned a political officer to carry on
political propaganda work. The platoon may have about ten rifles, with the remainder of its
four of such units from a company, which, like the platoon, has a leader, an assistant leader,
and a political officer. All these units are under the direct supervision of the military
commanders of the areas in which they operate.
The war field is a learning university for the guerrilla forces. Leaders emerge from
continuous engagement with the enemy (State). They have immaculate information gathering
mechanism, identified routes to advance and disperse but to reunite and mount fresh attacks.
They create informers in the security forces and clear up the base areas and ‘free territories’
of enemy (State) intelligence personnel and do not hesitate to eliminate such villagers who
are suspected as government informers. Normally the guerrillas do not torture the people, but
in cases where the populace is not cooperative they establish ‘Mass Control” on them by
selected killing and attacking police forces in or around such villages which obviously invite
retaliation from the administration.

This cycle of gradual denudation of government authority by burning schools, health centres,
demolishing bridges, culverts telephone and telegraph lines and attacking isolated railway
stations give impression to the people that they can no more TRUST the State for their
protection. They seek protection from the guerrilla forces. This methodology of scorched
earth policy helped the guerrillas to establish firm control on public psychology and
occupation of vast tracts of areas, like the Lalgarh in West Bengal. The forces have
apparently cleared the area but the Maoist guerrillas have the capability to strike at will.
Similar situation has been created in areas of Jharkhand, Chattisgarh and parts of Andhra
Pradesh and Maharashtra. The security forces are present in the affected areas like whales
in the sea; the guerrillas are present as fish in water.
Since the subject is very vast it would be necessary to understand the basics of Counter
Insurgency and Counter Guerrilla warfare. Counterinsurgency, COIN in US combat lingo,
requires joint forces to both fight and build sequentially or simultaneously, depending on the
security situation and political will of the rulers of the day. The balance of these operations
must be appropriate to accomplish the current phase’s objectives. Offensive and defensive
operations in counterinsurgency that are predominantly aimed at insurgent combatants are
counter-guerrilla operations. Insurgents, according to Mao’s thesis do not fight frontal warfare
till they are able to take the weakened State on in open engagement. Hence, they are
dependent on guerrilla warfare.

Stability operations are fundamental to counterinsurgency warfare. Stability operations

address the core grievances of insurgency as well as drivers of conflict and are essential to
long-term success. In India the emphasis so far has been on better police operations aided by
the paramilitary forces. The Union and the State governments hardly underscore the needs for
bridging the mind boggling imbalances, economic neglect, lack of developmental activities
and exploitation of the rural masses and the forest dwellers by the bourgeoisie political
leaders and the bureaucrats. Corruption in the system of administration is as lethal as the
Maoist guerrillas. Without positive political, economic and social developments and
corruption free administration the present phase of Maoist guerrilla warfare cannot be
combated even if the State creates large Commando and operational forces.

To emphasize the Maoist concept of aggregation of factors and forces that go in making
guerrilla warfare successful is narrated in bullet form:

* Survey and analysis of the target base, weaknesses of the government machineries
and degree of deprivation and state of hostility dominating the populace.
* Arousing and organizing the people and getting them involved in isolated
skirmishes, prolonged agitation and defiance of governmental authority.
* Achieving internal political unification of the peoples, indoctrinate them and set up
example of viability of violence in achieving what was denied to them by the tools of
governance.
* Establishing bases in areas where “Mass Control” of the government is
comparatively weak.
* Exploit poor economic conditions of the peoples, and start works to mitigate their
grievances as much as possible; play Robin Hood.
* Accrue own strength by training the cadre who mostly belong to proletariat classes.
* Educated, hardworking, enlightened and incorruptible leadership from the top to
lowest formation.
* Equipping own forces with lethal weapons, including modern weapons, explosives,
training them in making and exploding IEDs.
* Rigorous training to fight in squad, platoon and company formations; teaching the
principles of guerrilla warfare-attacking the enemy from rear and flank and frontal
attack when own strength accrues to battalion and regiment level.
* Creation of intelligence gathering mechanism and establishment of communication
facility.
* Survey of the target of attack and explaining the modus of attack with element of
surprise.
* Destroying enemy’s (government’s) strength and imposition of “rule of law” of the
guerrilla forces.
* Gain more territory (liberate) and enlarge the bases.
* Create liberated zone and interconnect bases under own forces as well as parallel
 forces of liberation struggle.
* Collaboration with forces with similar objectives and obtain foreign help towards
ideological as well as logistic support.

I do not want to chronicle the global history of Guerrilla warfare reportedly originating with
Napoleon Bonaparte’s occupation of Spain. The USA counts the beginning of
counterinsurgency and guerrilla warfare from the time of its involvement in Vietnam War; the
UK counts the beginning with its counterinsurgency operations in the Malaya peninsula. India
has vast history of tackling insurgency and guerrilla warfare in Nagaland, Manipur, Mizoram,
Assam, Punjab and Kashmir. In addition, the Maoist apparatuses have started developing as a
new political challenge, which is not based on ethnicity. This ideology based insurgency is
spread over vast areas in West Bengal, Bihar, Jharkhand, Chattisgarh, Orissa, Andhra
Pradesh, Kerala, Karnataka and Maharashtra. The “Red Dagger”, as the phenomenon is
perceived, has posed serious threats to the overall security of the country.

This requires some comments on the counterinsurgency warfare and Guerrilla warfare by the
legally constituted governments in India. Having had the opportunity of serving in various
insurgency and guerrilla warfare theaters of the country nearly for one and half decade I
would like to explain the Indian modus operandi in counterinsurgency operations. The
evolution of the Nagaland and Manipur models were different from the Assam and Punjab
models. In Nagaland and parts of Naga inhabited areas of Manipur the influence of the legally
constituted government exercised minimum “Mass Control” mechanism. The well organised
underground political and armed movement had established ‘population control’ significantly.
This was possible because of minimum or negative presence of civil administration in the
modern concept of State presence. Indian and local officers ruled like colonial masters and
they paid very little or no attention to the economic, social, developmental and other aspects
of state control activities. Because of sparse spread of civil and police administration in
adverse topographical regions the dictates of the rebels ran without hindrance. The rebels
occupied the higher peaks, gullies in between rough and tough routes and forest hideouts.
Often they operated from within well fortified stockade with observation posts. Almost the
entire populace in bases created by the underground acted as informers for the rebels.

Police forces were not trained in operations in mountainous terrain and they possessed Second
World War firearms and prehistoric wireless communications system. The insurgents had in
possession sophisticated weapons and communication system supplied by Pakistan and
China. Later the paramilitary and regular army established minimum company strength posts
in viable locations, and the Village Volunteer Force raised from among the locals and trained
by Indian governmental authorities established stockade fortifications in high peak locations
and near about the villages known to be loyal to the guerrillas. With betterment of troop
deployment and induction of better weapons and communication system the VVF,
paramilitary and army contingents gradually dislodged the insurgents from their established
bases, reestablished governmental “Mass Control” mechanism and writ of the legal
authorities.

The local police forces were better trained and supplied with modern weapons. But the role
played by the VVF and Central Intelligence agencies helped the operating forces with
auxiliary people’s army and intelligence support. By 1973 the Guerrilla warfare movement in
Manipur and Nagaland were brought under considerable control. Creation of Bangladesh,
decimation of the Manipur valley movement and signing of the Shillong Accord between the
Government of India and the Naga rebels in 1975 marked the end of the first phase of anti-
guerrilla movement. The present phase resurfaced after 1980 for various combinations which
is not the subject of discussion in this treatise. The core elements of the operations consisted
of Peoples’ support like the VVF and Village Guards, better human intelligence, squad and
company strength operations against the rebel hideouts and targeted elimination of high
profile leaders. Route columns, jungle patrols with support of helicopter borne sighting and
fighting support had tilted the balance in favour of Indian forces.

In Assam the experience was different. Starting with the All Assam Student’s Union
movements against illegal immigrants from East Bengal/Pakistan and Bangladesh and better
economic deal had vitiated general mood of the people. The prolonged movement itself
established some kind of “Mass Control” in urban and rural areas in favour of the protagonists
of the AASU movement. The United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) had readymade
grounds to influence the alienated mass psyche to support to the insurgents. In a way, barring
certain areas in the Barrack Valley and Brahmaputra Valley the entire Assam could be treated
as “bases” for the ULFA. The insurgents received weapons and training from China and
Bangladesh/Pakistan sources. Over short period they grouped the volunteers to battalion and
brigade formations with strop training centres and command positions. Assam police was not
trained and equipped to tackle the ULFA offensive and gain of more territories. Operation
Bajrang and Rhino were conceived by the Indian intelligence agency and the armed forces of
the Eastern Command. Having had the opportunity of being a shadow partner in these
operations, I realized that initial battalion and brigade level thrust of the Indian army on the
basis of appreciable HUMINT had dispersed the ULFA from their bases and territories. The
dispersed groups went over to Myanmar areas and obtained help from the Chinese, some
leadership elements took refuge in Bangladesh and the operational forces were forced to
operate as isolated guerrilla units. It was a stupendous job to militarily dislodge the ULFA
from its bases clearing grounds for the political decision makers to implement “Mass Control”
measures. Over time the Assam police and intelligence also graduated to combat readiness to
fight the ULFA guerrilla forces.

The Union government and the state governments in Assam and Nagaland have been able to
provide some developmental opportunities and political, economic and industrial impetus.
However, in Manipur the political masters have miserably failed to dislodge the guerrilla
forces from the valley and hill hideouts and the insurgents still control the peoples’ psyche
and the governments continue to buy somewhat uneasy peace by closing eyes to ‘tax
collection’ by the insurgents from all segments of the people. They run parallel governments.
Presence of Army and invigorated police action provide some façade of constitutional
governance in doomed Manipur. The Union government and the governing political parties
have failed miserably the people of Manipur.

Punjab experienced another format of counterinsurgency and anti-guerrilla warfare. Punjab

police was well trained and motivated than the police forces in Nagaland, Manipur and
Assam. Police as well as central intelligence agencies had accessed better HUMINT to
support police and paramilitary operations. Known as traditional fighters the elements of Sikh
terrorists were trained by some ex-army personnel, Pakistan and were equipped by Pakistan
mainly. The Pakistani military intelligence, the ISI provided international connectivity with
the Sikh Diaspora who also funded the movement. For about three years the insurgents were
able to establish “Mass Control” through armed terror and also through religious preaching by
the pro-separatist religious leaders, granthis, pathis and dhaddi and kirtani jathas. Police and
paramilitary forces operated from new bases established in the heart areas of the bases of the
guerrilla forces. Their task was facilitated as most the groups were disjointed and operated in
defined areas in central (majha) and southern (malwa) and northern (doaba) areas of Punjab.
Pakistan tried to bring some cohesion by assisting the Panthik Committees formed by some
leading ideologues and commanders of the armed groups. But the writ of the PC was more
ignored than abided by the guerilla forces. The religious fountainheads of the insurgency
movement were also splintered.

Indian forces operated in squad, platoon and company detachments with able assistance from
intelligence agencies and even from the peoples who were not loyal to the “Mass Control”
measures of the insurgents. Their main mistake was to pull all their force in and around the
Golden Temple. If Operation Blue Star (1984) had provided impetus to the disorganized
terror groups to graduate to insurgent guerrilla detachments, the 1987 efforts of the militants
to run the movement from within the Golden Temple invited doom for themselves. Operation
Black Thunder was better conceived and supported by intelligence and the splintered groups
gradually were either eliminated or succumbed to pressure to surrender and negotiate. Some
core elements escaped to Pakistan. The Khalistan movement was based on religious bigotry
that was exploited by Pakistan and some elements of the Diaspora. Of all the anti-guerrilla
operations the Punjab experience was most successful.

The contemporary anti Maoist operations are deficient when contrasted with other global
operations and even operations in Punjab, Assam and Nagaland. In the entire “Red Corridor”
area the conventional police forces and the supporting paramilitary forces operate under
commands of district police authorities and supervision of Director General of Police and
other hierarchical formations. Police Stations are the main hubs of operations with basic
structures like police outposts and detachments specially deployed for fighting the Maoists.
Regular and special police patrol parties try to dominate certain areas mostly traversing along
frequented roads and tracks. Police Stations in most of the affected areas are located in
substandard, unfortified building, dilapidated rented accommodations. Some of the outposts
are awfully understaffed and unsecured. Often such police stations are understaffed and are
exposed to sudden attack and overrunning by the Maoist guerrillas. The police force mostly
carries antiquated weapons against modern weaponry of the guerrillas. While the guerrillas set
up ambushes on the basis of inside information, the police forces set up anticipatory ambushes
without specific intelligence. The guerrillas have the capacity to take the police by surprise,
hit and retreat only to attack again. The police forces are yet to graduate to the level of trained
commando guerrillas. Only trained guerrillas can fight the outlawed guerrillas.

The paramilitary forces assisting the police and the recently introduced Cobra Commando
Force are generally encamped near about police stations, special encampments. Being outside
forces and not acclimatized with the terrain and the populace they try to operate by
developing own intelligence or intelligence generated by State police. Chattisgarh has
experimented with Salwa Judum (a peoples’ volunteer force) not yet trained by professional
anti-guerrilla experts and not well armed to face the Maoist forces. There were furors from
civil and human rights organisation against Salwa Judum and even the courts intervened.
They all forget the in case the Maoists have the assumed right to impose “Mass Control” by
force the peoples’ have also rights to organize themselves and form resistance groups to
protect their constitutional and individual rights. The activists who oppose the Salwa Judum
should not forget that peoples’ participation in the form of the VVF, Village Guards, Home
Guards and Special Police Officers etc had contributed significantly in combating the
insurgents and guerrillas in Nagaland, Mizoram, Manipur, Assam and Punjab. This pattern of
peoples’ resistance forces is an integral part of anti-guerrilla warfare. It is a pity that the States
in the “Red Corridor” have not yet learnt lessons from global efforts in combating insurgents
and guerrilla forces and suffer from misplaced political perceptions of keeping the peoples’
power unused thus exposing the Maoists to impose their “Mass Control” on the people.
Such misplaced political maneuvers offer opportunity to the Maoists to spread their tentacles,
enlarging their bases and occupying more territories. The present political approach is
contradictory to established theories and practices of effective anti-counterinsurgency and
anti-guerrilla operations. Not the police alone but the combined powers of the police and the
peoples can alone isolate the guerrilla forces. There is no law in the country to prevent the
governments in recruiting Special Police Constables and Officers, Home Guards and Village
Volunteer Force. The Courts and the human rights groups have a role to monitor HR abuses.
It may also be remembered that counterinsurgency and anti-Guerrilla warfare have always
been at cross-roads with the rights groups. In a war situation the State has an obligatory duty
under the constitution to protect lives and properties and rule of law by waging war against
the insurgents.

Lack of Human Intelligence, penetration inside the Guerrilla formations, lack of facilities to
usefully apply Technical and Electronic intelligence and even Image Intelligence impede the
ongoing operations. Helicopter borne surveillance, gathering aerial data by using micro aerial
vehicles (MAV) are yet to be conceived and implemented by the respective State police
forces. Without such Technical Intelligence aids to the ground forces the State is forced to
operate like blind scapegoats to be sacrificed by the guerrillas armed to the teeth. Their
intelligence network is superior to the state intelligence apparatuses.

Insurgency and guerrilla warfare are complex, dynamic, and adaptive. They can rapidly shift,
split, combine, and reorganize. They can take the state forces by surprise, lay ambush, mine
tracks and even fire mortar shells and rocket propelled grenades.

The present global ambience is typified by a volatile international environment, persistent

conflict, and increasing state fragility. Long-standing external and internal tensions tend to
exacerbate or create core grievances within some states, resulting in political strife, instability,
or even insurgency. Moreover, some transnational terrorists/extremists with radical political
and religious ideologies may intrude in weak or poorly governed states to form a wider, more
networked threat. India is not a failed stets like Afghanistan and a collapsing state like
Pakistan. However, India has several festering insurgencies and guerrilla groups inspired by
Maoist ideology and certain ethnic demands.

Insurgents seek to gain power to overthrow or force change of a governing authority.

Insurgency is an internal threat that uses subversion and violence to reach political ends.
Conversely, counterinsurgents seek to defeat insurgents and address core grievances to
prevent insurgency’s expansion or regeneration. Typically the insurgents will solicit or be
offered some type of support from state or non-state actors, which can include transnational
terrorists who take advantage of the situation for their own benefit.

Counterinsurgency is comprehensive civilian and military efforts taken to simultaneously

defeat and contain insurgency and address the core grievances of the people.
Counterinsurgency is primarily political and incorporates a wide range of activities, of which
security is only one. Unified action by the political rulers, bureaucrats, industrial and business
houses is required to successfully conduct wholesome operations and should include
simultaneous police (military) action and developmental activities. Civilian agencies should
redress grievances of the people. The State police and polices forces of the Union may jointly
and simultaneously attack the armed groups, weaken them and force them to come to the
negotiation tables. In multi-party political democracy different political parties should not
work at cross purposes. For example, the CPM government in West Bengal has woken up late
to the Maoist menace. Whereas the Trinamool Congress is opposed to joint state and central
police action. Political differences and vote bank compulsions should not create additional
space for the Maoist guerrillas. The intellectuals suffering from misplaced human rights
concerns may also like to consider that war against the state compels the State to live by the
constitutional mandate and maintain law and order and protect lives and properties of the
people by waging war against the Maoists, who use war to grab state power through violent
means.

Successful counterinsurgency operations require comprehensive knowledge of the operational

environment including an understanding of the insurgents, the scope of the insurgency, any
external supporting elements, and possible support from outside players, which may benefit
from a protracted conflict and especially the relevant population. Insurgency typically
succeeds or fails based on the support of the population. These basic understandings are
primary requirements before launching anti-guerrilla operations. The political masters must
understand that police action is not the only answer to insurgency.

There are some prerequisites for an insurgency to be successful in an area—i. a vulnerable

population, ii. leadership available for direction, and iii. lack of government control. When all
three prerequisites exist in an area, insurgency can operate with some freedom of movement,
gain the support of the people, and become entrenched over time. A population is vulnerable
if the people have real or perceived grievances that insurgents can exploit. If insurgents can
recruit, co-opt, or coerce local leaders or the local leaders are part of the insurgency, these
leaders can direct the frustrations of the populace. Real or perceived lack of governmental
control can allow insurgents to operate with little or no interference from security forces or
other agencies. Unfortunately, in India the peoples in the Maoist affected areas have been
historically neglected in pre and post independence years. Mere invocation of police action
cannot help regaining of “Mass Control”. The political governments must implements people
oriented developmental and economic policies and provide all facilities as provided to the
urban areas.

The counterinsurgency and anti-guerrilla warfare is a multifaceted subject dealt with

differentiated strategy and tactics by different countries. As far as real life counterinsurgency
and anti-guerrilla warfare tactics and strategies in India and application of superior military
program to demoralize and disperse the guerrilla forces are concerned, I propose to share the
global thoughts, Indian experiences and my personal understanding of the ground situation in
the next part of this essay. Till than the readers may like to enjoy this rather longish treatise.