Thomas Aquinas: Political Philosophy

The political philosophy of Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274), along with the broader
philosophical teaching of which it is part, stands at the crossroads between the Christian
gospel and theAristotelian political doctrine that was, in Aquinas time, newly discovered in
the Western world. In fact, Aquinas whole developed system is often understood to be
simply a modification of Aristotelian philosophy in light of the Christian gospel and with
special emphasis upon those questions most relevant to Christianity, such as the nature of
the divine, the human soul, and morality. This generalization would explain why Aquinas
seems to eschew, even neglect, the subject of politics. Unlike his medieval Jewish and
Islamic counterparts, Aquinas does not have to reconcile Aristotelianism with a concrete
political and legal code specified in the sacred writings of his religion. As far as he is
concerned, God no longer requires people to live according to the judicial precepts of the
Old Law (Summa Theologiae [hereafter ST], I-II, 104.3), and so the question of formulating
a comprehensive Christian political teaching that is faithful to biblical principles loses it
urgency if not its very possibility. Unlike Judaism and Islam, Christianity does not involve
specific requirements for conducting civil society. In fact, most Christians before Aquinas
time (such as St. Augustine) had interpreted Jesus assertion that we should render unto
Caesar the things that are Caesars (Matthew22:21) to mean that Christianity can flourish
in any political regime so long as its authorities permit believers to render unto God the
things that are Gods. Although Jesus claimed to be a king, he was quick to add that his
kingdom was not of this world (John 18:36), and whereas St. Paul had exhorted Christians
to obey the civil authorities and even to suffer injustice willingly, he never considered it
necessary to discuss the nature of political justice itself.
These observations perhaps explain why Aquinas, whose writings nearly all come in the
form of extremely well organized and systematic treatises, never completed a thematic
discussion of politics. His letter On Kingship (written as a favor to the king of Cyprus)
comes closest to fitting the description of a political treatise, and yet this brief and
unfinished work hardly presents a comprehensive treatment of political philosophy. Even
his commentary on Aristotles Politics is less than half complete, and it is debatable whether
this work is even intended to express Aquinas own political philosophy at all. This does not
mean, however, that Aquinas was uninterested in political philosophy or that he simply
relied on Aristotle to provide the missing political teaching that Christianity leaves out. Nor
does it mean that Aquinas does not have a political teaching. Although it is not expressed in
overtly political works, Aquinas thoughts on political philosophy may be found within
treatises that contain discussions of issues with far reaching political implications. In his
celebrated Summa Theologiae, for instance, Aquinas engages in long discussions of law, the
virtue of justice, the common good, economics, and the basis of morality. Even though not
presented in the context of a comprehensive political teaching, these texts provide a crucial
insight into Aquinas understanding of politics and the place of political philosophy within
his thought.
Table of Contents
1. Natural Law
2. The Political Nature of Man
3. Human Legislation
4. The Requirements of Justice
5. The Limitations of Politics
6. References and Further Reading
a. Primary Sources
i. Aquinas Political Writings in English
ii. Two Useful Collections of Aquinas Political Writings in English
b. Secondary Sources
. Books
i. Articles and Chapters
1. Natural Law
Aquinas celebrated doctrine of natural law no doubt plays a central role in his moral and
political teaching. According to Aquinas, everything in the terrestrial world is created by
God and endowed with a certain nature that defines what each sort of being is in its
essence. A things nature is detectable not only in its external appearance, but also and
more importantly through the natural inclinations which guide it to behave in conformity
with the particular nature it has. As Aquinas argues, Gods authorship and active role in
prescribing and sustaining the various natures included in creation may rightfully be called
a law. After defining law as an ordinance of reason for the common good, made by
someone who has care of the community, and promulgated. (ST, I-II, 90.4), Aquinas
explains that the entire universe is governed by the supreme lawgiver par excellence:
Granted that the world is ruled by Divine Providencethe whole community of the
universe is governed by Divine Reason. (ST, I-II, 91.1). Even though the world governed by
Gods providence is temporal and limited, Aquinas calls the law that governs it the eternal
law. Its eternal nature comes not from that to which it applies, but rather from whom the
law is derived, namely, God. As Aquinas explains, the very idea of the government of
things in God the Ruler of the universe, has the nature of a law. And since Divine Reasons
conception of things is not subject to time but is eternal, according to Prov. viii, 23this
kind of law must be called eternal. (Ibid.).
In the vast majority of cases, God governs his subjects through the eternal law without any
possibility that that law might be disobeyed. This, of course, is because most beings in the
universe (or at least in the natural world) do not possess the rational ability to act
consciously in a way that is contrary to the eternal law implanted in them. Completely
unique among natural things, however, are humans who, although completely subject to
divine providence and the eternal law, possess the power of free choice and therefore have a
radically different relation to that law. As Aquinas explains, among all others, the rational
creature is subject to Divine Providence in the most excellent way, in so far as it partakes of
a share of providence, by being provident both for itself, and for others. Wherefore, it has a
share of the Eternal Reason, whereby it has a natural inclination to its proper act and end.
(ST, I-II, 91.2). Because the rational creatures relation to the eternal law is so different
from that of any other created thing, Aquinas prefers to call the law that governs it by a
different name. Instead of saying that humans are under the eternal law, therefore, he says
they are under the natural law, and yet the natural law is nothing else than the rational
creatures participation of the eternal law (Ibid.). Another, equally accurate, way of stating
Aquinas position is that the natural law is the eternal law as it applies to human beings.
As the rule and measure of human behavior, the natural law provides the only possible
basis for morality and politics. Simply stated, the natural law guides human beings through
their fundamental inclinations toward the natural perfection that God, the author of the
natural law, intends for them. As we have seen, however, the human subjugation to the
eternal law (called the natural law) is always concomitant with a certain awareness the
human subject has of the law binding him. This awareness is crucial in Aquinas view. Since
one of the essential components of law is to be promulgated, the natural law would lose its
legal character if human beings did not have the principles of that law instilled in their
minds (ST, I-II, 90.4 ad 1). For this reason Aquinas considers the natural law to be a habit,
not in itself, but because the principles (or precepts) of the natural law are naturally held in
our minds by means of an intellectual habit, which Aquinas
calls synderesis. Synderisis denotes a natural knowledge held by all people instructing
them as to the fundamental moral requirements of their human nature. As Aquinas
explains, just as speculative knowledge requires there to be certain principles from which
one can draw further conclusions, so also practical and moral knowledge presupposes an
understanding of fundamental practical precepts from which more concrete moral
directives may be derived. Whereas Aquinas calls the habit by which human beings
understand the first moral principles (which are also the first principles of the natural
law) synderesis (ST, Ia, 79.12), he calls the act by which one applies that understanding to
concrete situations conscience (ST, Ia, 79.13). Therefore, by means of synderesis a man
would know that the act of adultery is morally wrong and contrary to the natural law. By an
act of conscience he would reason that intercourse with this particular woman that is not
his wife is an act of adultery and should therefore be avoided. Thus understood, the natural
law includes principles that are universally accessible regardless of time, place, or culture.
In Aquinas words, it is the same in all humans (ST, I-II, 94.4), unchangeable (ST, I-II,
94.5), and cannot be abolished from the hearts of men (ST, I-II, 94.6). It is in light of this
teaching that Aquinas interprets St. Pauls argument that the Gentiles who have not the
law do by nature what the law requires, they are a law to themselves, even though they do
not have the law. They show that what the law requires is written on their hearts. (Romans
2:14-16).
How are the precepts of the natural law derived? According to Aquinas, the very first
precept is that good is to be done and pursued and evil is to be avoided. (ST, I-II, 94.2). As
he explains, this principle serves the practical reason just as the principle of non-
contradiction serves the speculative reason. Just as the speculative intellect naturally
apprehends the fact that the same thing cannot be affirmed and denied at the same time,
the practical intellect apprehends that good is to be pursued and evil is to be avoided. By
definition, neither the first principle of speculative nor practical reason can be
demonstrated. Rather, they are principles without which human reasoning cannot
coherently draw any conclusions whatsoever. Otherwise stated, they are first principles
inasmuch as they are not derived from any prior practical or speculative knowledge. Still,
they are just as surely known as any other knowledge obtained through demonstrative
reasoning. In fact, they are naturally known and self-evident for the very same reason that
they are not subject to demonstration. This is important from Aquinas perspective because
all practical knowledge (including the moral and political sciences) must rest upon certain
principles before any valid conclusions are drawn. To return to the above example, a man
who recognizes the evil of adultery will only know that this act of adultery must be avoided
if he first understands the more fundamental precept that evil ought to be avoided in
general. No one can prove this general principle to him. He simply understands it by the
habit of synderesis.
Aquinas would be the first to recognize, of course, that the simple requirements of doing
good and avoiding evil fail to provide human beings with much content for pursuing the
moral life. How, one must ask, do we know what things actually are good and evil? In
response to this Aquinas argues that human beings must consult their natural inclinations.
Beyond the mere knowledge that good is to be pursued and evil avoided our natural
inclinations are the most fundamental guide to understanding where the natural law is
directing us. In other words, our natural inclinations reveal to us what the most
fundamental human goods are. As Aquinas explains, man first has natural inclinations in
accordance with the nature he has in common with all substancessuch as preserving
human life and warding off its obstacles. Secondly, there are inclinations we have in
common with other animals, such as sexual intercourse, the education of offspring and
so forth. And finally there are inclinations specific to mans rational nature, such as the
inclination to know the truth about God, to shun ignorance, and to live in society.
(Ibid.). It may seem strange that Aquinas would list the pursuit of sexual intercourse as
one of the natural inclinations supporting and defining the natural law. To be sure, Aquinas
recognizes that all the aforementioned inclinations are subject to the corruption of our
sinful nature. It is not morally good, therefore, simply to act on an inclination. One must
first recognize the natural purpose of a given inclination and only act upon it insofar as that
purpose is respected. This is why Aquinas is quick to add that all inclinations belong to the
natural law only insofar as they are ruled by reason. (ST, I-II, 94.2, ad 2). As someone is
inclined to sexual intercourse, for instance, he must also recognize that this natural good
must be pursued only within a certain context (that is, within marriage, open to the
possibility of procreation, etc.). If this natural order of reason is ignored, any natural good
(even knowledge [ST, II-II, 167]) can be pursued in an inappropriate way that is actually
contrary to the natural law.
2. The Political Nature of Man
As we have seen, Aquinas mentions that one of the natural goods to which human beings
are inclined is to live in society. This remark presents the ideal point of departure for one
of the most important teachings of Thomistic political philosophy, namely, the political
nature of man. This doctrine is taken primarily from the first book of
Aristotles Politics upon which Aquinas wrote an extensive commentary (although the
commentary is only completed through book 3, chapter 8 of Aristotles Politics, Aquinas
seems to have commented upon what he considered to be the Politics theoretical core.).
Following the Philosopher Aquinas believes that political society (civitas) emerges from
the needs and aspirations of human nature itself. Thus understood, it is not an invention of
human ingenuity (as in the political teachings of modern social contract theorists) nor an
artificial construction designed to make up for human natures shortcomings. It is, rather, a
prompting of nature itself that sets humans apart from all other natural creatures. To be
sure, political society is not simply given by nature. It is rather something to which human
beings naturally aspire and which is necessary for the full perfection of their existence. The
capacity for political society is not natural to man, therefore, in the same way as the five
senses are natural. The naturalness of politics is more appropriately compared to the
naturalness of moral virtue (Commentary on the Politics, Book 1, Lesson 1 [40]). Even
though human beings are inclined to moral virtue, acquiring the virtues nonetheless
requires both education and habituation. In the same way, even though human beings are
inclined to live in political societies, such societies must still be established, built, and
maintained by human industry. To be fully human is to live in political society, and Aquinas
makes a great deal of Aristotles claim that one who is separated from society so as to be
completely a-political must be either sub-human or super-human, either a beast or a god.
(Aristotles Politics, 1253a27; Cf. AquinasCommentary, Book 1, Lesson 1 [39]).
Aquinas admits, of course, that political society is not the only natural community. The
family is natural in perhaps an even stronger sense and is prior to political society. The
priority of the family, however, is not a priority of importance, since politics aims at a
higher and nobler good than the family. It is rather a priority of development. In other
words, politics surpasses all other communities in dignity while at the same time depending
upon and presupposing the family. On this point Aquinas follows Aristotles explanation of
how political society develops from other lower societies including both the family and the
village. The human family comes into existence from the nearly universal tendency of males
and females joining together for purposes of procreation. Humans share with other animals
(and even plants) a natural appetite to leave after them another being like themselves,
(Commentary on the Politics, Book 1, Lesson 1 [18]) and immediately see the utility if not
the necessity of both parents remaining available to provide for the needs of the children
and one another. As families grow in size and number there also seems to be a tendency for
them to gravitate towards one another and form villages. The reasons for this are primarily
utilitarian. Whereas the household suffices for providing the daily necessities of life, the
village is necessary for providing non-daily commodities (Commentary on the Politics,
Book 1, Lesson 1 [27]). What Aquinas and Aristotle seem to have in mind in describing the
emergence of the village is the division of labor. Whereas humans can reproduce and
survive quite easily in families, life becomes much more productive and affluent when
families come together in villages, since one man can now specialize in a certain task while
fulfilling his familys remaining material needs through barter and trade.
Despite the villages usefulness to man, it nevertheless leaves him incomplete. This is partly
because the village is still relatively small and so the effectiveness of the division of labor
remains limited. Much more useful is the conglomeration of several villages, which
provides a wider variety of commodities and specializations to be shared by means of
exchange (Commentary on the Politics Book 1, Lesson 1 [31]). This is one reason why the
village is eclipsed by political society, which proves much more useful to human beings
because of its greater size and much more elaborate governmental structure. There is,
however, a far more important reason why political society comes into existence. In
addition to yielding greater protection and economic benefits, it also enhances the moral
and intellectual lives of human beings. By identifying with a political community, human
beings begin to see the world in broader terms than the mere satisfaction of their bodily
desires and physical needs. Whereas the residents of the village better serve their individual
interests, the goal of the political community becomes the good of the whole, or the
common good, which Aquinas claims (following Aristotle) is better and more divine than
the good of the individual. (Commentary on the Politics, Book 1, Lesson 1 [11]). The
political community is thus understood as the first community (larger than the family) for
which the individual makes great sacrifices, since it is not merely a larger cooperative
venture for mutual economic benefit. It is, rather, the social setting in which man truly
finds his highest natural fulfillment. In this sense, the political community, even though not
directed to the individual good, better serves the individual by promoting a life of virtue in
which human existence can be greatly ennobled. It is in this context that Aquinas argues
(again following Aristotle) that although political society originally comes into being for the
sake of living, it exists for the sake of living well. (Commentary on the Politics, Book 1,
Lesson 1 [31]).
Aquinas takes Aristotles argument that political society transcends the village and
completes human social existence to prove that the city is natural. Similar, but not identical,
to this claim is Aquinas further assertion that man is by nature a civic and social animal.
(ST, I-II, 72.4). To support this, Aquinas refers us to Aristotles observation that human
beings are the only animals possessing the ability to exercise speech. Not to be confused
with mere voice (vox), speech (loquutio) involves the communication of thoughts and
concepts between persons (ST, I-II, 72.4). Whereas voice is found in many different animals
that communicate their immediate desires and aversions to one another (seen in the dogs
bark and the lions roar) speech includes a conscious conception of what one is saying
(Commentary on the Politics, Book 1, Lecture 1 [36]). By means of speech, therefore,
human beings may collectively deliberate on core civic matters regarding what is useful
and what is harmful, as well as the just and the unjust. (Commentary on the Politics,
Book 1, Lecture 1 [37]). Whereas other animals exhibit a certain social tendency (as bees
instinctively work to preserve their hive), only humans are social in the sense that they
cooperate through speech to pursue a common understanding of justice, virtue, and the
good. Since speech is the outward expression of his inner rationality, man is political by
nature for the same reason he is naturally rational.
The fact that man is a naturally political animal has far-reaching implications. In addition
to being a father, a mother, a farmer, or a teacher, a human being is more importantly
identified as a citizen. Achieving genuine human excellence, therefore, most always means
achieving excellence as a citizen of some political society (Aquinas does mention the
possibility that someones supernatural calling may necessitate that they live outside of
political society. As examples of such people, he mentions John the Baptist and Blessed
Anthony the hermit. See his Commentary on the Politics, Book 1, Lecture 1 [35].). To be
sure, the requirements of good citizenship vary from regime to regime, but more generally
conceived the good citizen is the one that places the common good above his own private
good and acts accordingly. In doing so, such a person exhibits the virtue of legal justice
whereby all of his actions are referred in one way or another to the common good of his
particular society (ST, II-II, 58.5). Following the progression of Aristotles discussion of
citizenship, however, Aquinas recognizes a certain difficulty in assigning an unqualifiedly
high value to citizenship. What sense does it make to speak of a good citizen in a bad
regime? One does not need to consider the worst sorts of regimes to see the difficulty
inherent in achieving good citizenship. In any regime that is less than perfect there always
remains the possibility that promoting the interests of the regime and promoting the
common good may not be the same. To be sure, good men are often called to stand up
heroically against tyrants (ST, II-II, 42.2, ad 3), but the full potential of the good citizen will
never be realized unless he lives in best of all possible regimes. In other words, only in the
best regime do the good citizen and the good human being coincide (Commentary on the
Politics, Book 3, Lecture 3 [366]). In fact, even the best regime will fall short of producing a
multitude of good citizens, since no society exists where everyone is virtuous (Commentary
on the Politics, Book 3, Lecture 3 [367]).
But what is the best regime? Following Aristotle, Aquinas argues that all regimes can be
divided into six basic types, which are determined according to two criteria: how the regime
is ruled and whether or not it is ruled justly (that is, for the common good). As he explains,
political rule may be exercised by the multitude, by a select few, or by one person. If the
regime is ruled justly, it is called a monarchy or kingship when ruled by one single
individual, an aristocracy when ruled by a few, and a polity or republic when ruled by the
multitude. If, on the other hand, a regime is ruled unjustly (that is, for the sake of the
ruler(s) and not for the common weal), it is called a tyranny when ruled by one, an
oligarchy when ruled by a few, and a democracy when ruled by the multitude (On Kingship,
Book 1, Chapter 1;Commentary on the Politics, Book 3, Lecture 6 [393-394]). Simply
Stated, the best regime is monarchy. Aquinas argument for this is drawn from a mixture of
philosophical and theological observations. Inasmuch as the goal of any ruler should be the
unity of peace, the regime is better governed by one person rather than by many. For this
end is much more efficaciously secured by a single wise authority who is not burdened by
having to deliberate with others who may be less wise and who may stand in the way of
effective governance. As Aquinas observes in his letter On Kingship, any governing body
comprised of many must always strive to act as one in order to move the regime closer to
the intended goal. In this sense, therefore, the less perfect regimes tend to imitate
monarchy in which unanimity of rule is realized at once and without obstruction (On
Kingship, Book 1, Chapter 2). This conclusion is confirmed by the example of nature, which
always does what is best. For the many powers of the human soul are governed by a single
power, i.e., reason. A hive of bees is ruled by a single bee, i.e., the queen. And most
convincingly of all, the universe is governed by the single authority of God, Maker and
Ruler of all things. As art is called to imitate nature, human society is therefore best that is
governed by a single authority of a eminently wise and just monarch who resembles God as
much as humanly possible.
Aquinas is well aware, of course, that such a monarch is not always available in political
societies, and even where he is available it is not always guaranteed that the conditions will
be right to grant him the political authority he ought to wield. Even worse, there is always
the danger that the monarch will be corrupted and become a tyrant. In this case the best of
all regimes has the greatest tendency to become the worst. This is why, whereas monarchy
is the best regime simply speaking, it is not always the best regime in a particular time and
place, which is to say it is certainly not always the best possible regime. Therefore, Aquinas
outlines in the Summa Theologiae a more modest proposal whereby political rule is
somewhat decentralized. The regime that he recommends takes the positive dimensions of
all three good regimes. Whereas it has a monarch at its head, it is also governed by
others possessing a certain degree of authority who may advise the monarch while
curbing any tyrannical tendencies he may have. Finally, Aquinas suggests that the entire
multitude of citizens should be responsible for selecting the monarch and should all be
candidates for political authority themselves. Whereas the best regime simply speaking is
monarchy, the best possible regime seems to be the mixed government that incorporates
the positive dimensions of monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy (In the Summa
Theologiae, Aquinas appears to use the name of democracy in place of Aristotles
conception of polity.). To support this conclusion, Aquinas is able to cite the Hebrew form
of government established by God in the Old Testament. Whereas Moses (and his
successors) ruled the Jews as a monarch, there also existed a council of seventy-two elders
which provided an element of aristocracy. Inasmuch as the rulers were selected from
among the people, this sacred regime of the Bible also incorporated a certain dimension of
democracy (ST, I-II, 105.1).
3. Human Legislation
The fact that regimes may vary according to time and place is a perfect example of the fact
that not every moral or political directive is specified by nature. In fact, Aquinas is eager to
point out that the natural law, while providing the fundamental basis for human action and
politics, fails to provide specific requirements for all the details of human social existence.
For example, whereas the natural law does provide certain general standards of economic
justice (which we shall consider later on), it does not give a preferred form of currency.
There is no natural law that requires how often public roads should be repaired, or whether
military service will be mandatory or voluntary. Whereas Aquinas argues that the natural
law requires criminals to be punished for injustices such as murder, theft, and assault, there
is no natural specification as to precisely what kinds of punishments ought to be imposed
for these crimes. Even though, as Aquinas recognizes, these details do not pertain directly
to whether a regime is good or bad, human social life would be impossible to maintain
without attention to such detail. Such is the role, according to Aquinas, of human law (ST,
I-II, 91.3).
This is not to suggest, of course, that human laws only concern those matters which may
just as easily be decided one way or another. Within a particular socio-political context, it
may indeed be a terrible mistake to make military service compulsory or in another context
to punish treason with leniency, even though the natural law does not specify which
situations call for which measures. Additionally, human law is necessary to enforce the
moral and political requirements of the natural law that may go unheeded. Even though the
precepts of the natural law are available to human reason when it considers matters rightly,
not all human beings use their practical reason to its fullest capacity and some act
maliciously even when they happen to know better. And because the natural law does not
simply enforce itself, the basic requirements of justice must be bolstered by an organized
and civilized human authority (ST, I-II, 95.1). Accordingly, human laws serve two purposes.
First, they provide the missing details that the natural law leaves out due to its generality.
Secondly, they compel those under the law to observe those standards of justice and
morality even about which the natural law does specify. This second function of human law
leads Aquinas to a crucial distinction. After asking whether human laws are derived from
the natural law, he argues that, although all human laws are derived from the natural law in
a certain sense, some are more directly derived than others. The distinction he invokes is
that between human laws which constitute conclusions from principles of natural law and
those which constitute determinations from the natural law. Human laws are considered
conclusions from the natural law when they pertain to those matters about which the
natural law offers a clear precept. To use Aquinas own example, that one must not kill may
be derived as a conclusion from the principle that one should do harm to no man. (ST, I-II,
95.2). Thus, human laws must include prohibitions against murder, assault, and the like
even though such actions are already prohibited by the natural law. At the same time,
however, the natural law does not specify exactly how a murderer must be punished,
whether (for example) by means of banishment, the death penalty, or imprisonment. Such
details depend upon a number of factors that prudent legislators and judges must take into
consideration apart from their understanding of the general principles of natural justice.
According to Aquinas, those dictates of natural reason which human beings should
recognize as directly pertaining to the natural law, and which are therefore common
principles of human law in many different regimes, are embodied in something called the
law of nations [ius gentium]. Strictly speaking, the law of nations is a human law derived
as a set of conclusions from the natural law. On the other hand, the law of nations is not the
law of any particular regime and for this reason is sometimes equated with the natural law
itself. For Aquinas treatment of the law of nations (see ST, I-II, 95.4 and ST, II-II, 57.3).
Such details are the bases of human laws that Aquinas calls determinations from the
natural law. It is important to note that both conclusions and determinations are based on
the natural law in some way, for the question of how a murderer or a thief ought to be
punished would be meaningless without the more general requirement (found in the
natural law itself) that injustice must be met with a punishment that in some way fits the
crime. To consider the matter by way of analogy, we may take note of Aquinas own
example in the Summa Theologiae. As he explains, legislators rely upon their
understanding of the natural law in the same way that craftsmen must use the general
form of a house before they build a particular house to which many architectural details
may be added (ST, I-II, 95.2). To press the analogy further, just as all houses must be built
according to certain general principles (e.g., all houses must have a roof, a foundation,
windows, at least one door, etc.), so also all political regimes must enforce certain human
laws as conclusions from the natural law (e.g., prohibitions against murder, theft, adultery,
and assault). In the same way, just as a house under construction may exhibit a wide array
of details not belonging to the general form of a house (e.g., some houses have a brick
foundation and some are on a concrete slab, some are heated with oil and some with
natural gas, etc.), so also political regimes may vary according to similarly non-essential
details that Aquinas would call determinations of the natural law (e.g., determining specific
punishments for specific crimes).
In Aquinas view, human laws are essential for the maintenance of any organized and
civilized society. At the same time, however, Aquinas understands human laws to be
somewhat limited in scope. Several passages in the Summa Theologiae testify to this,
including Aquinas comparison between human law and divine law. As he explains, the very
reason why divine law is necessary pertains directly to those areas where human law (and
even natural law) fall short. The most obvious example of this is the simple fact that human
laws may be in error. Regardless of whether they are intended to be conclusions or
determinations of the natural law, human laws are made by fallible human beings and may
often tend to hinder the common good rather than promote it. Secondly, Aquinas argues
that, given certain circumstances, some human laws may simply fail to apply. This does not
necessarily mean that such laws are unjust or even erroneously enacted. Aquinas suggests,
rather, that there sometimes arise situations in which securing the common good requires
actions that violate the letter of the law. For example, a law that requires the city gates to
remain closed during certain times may need to be broken to allow citizens to enter as they
are pursued by enemy forces (ST, I-II, 96.6; II-II, 120.1). Thirdly, Aquinas explains that
human law is unable to direct the interior acts of a mans soul. As a result, human law has a
difficult time directing people toward the path of virtue, since genuine human goodness
depends not only on external actions but upon interior movements of the soul, which are
hidden. This is not to say that the coercive power of human law may not play some role in
leading people to virtue, or even that virtue should not be an express goal of human law
(that virtue is an express goal of human law, see ST, I-II, 92.1, 95.1.). It only means that the
power of human law is limited by the fallible intellects of the human beings who enforce it
and who only see a persons external actions. Finally, human law is unable to punish or
forbid all evil deeds. (ST, I-II, 91.4). By this Aquinas means that human laws must
concentrate upon hindering those sorts of behaviors that are most damaging to the
commonwealth. Aquinas elaborates upon this by saying that the political community would
do away with many good things if it attempted to forbid all vices and punish every act that
is judged to be immoral. Thus understood, human legislators must remember that most of
their subjects need to be governed in relation to their limited capacity for virtue. As a result,
human laws do not forbid all vices, from which the virtuous abstain, but only the more
grievous vices, from which it is possible for the majority to abstain; and chiefly those that
are to the hurt of others, without the prohibition of which human society could not be
maintained: thus human law prohibits murder, theft, and suchlike. (ST, I-II, 96.2).
4. The Requirements of Justice
As we have seen, Aquinas argument for the necessity of human law includes the
observation that some human beings require an additional coercive incentive to respect and
promote the common good. By means of the law, those who show hostility to their fellow
citizens are restrained from their evildoing through force and fear, and may even
eventually come to do willingly what hitherto they did from fear, and become virtuous.
(ST, I-II, 95.1). During this discussion, Aquinas mentions two specific dimensions of the
common good that are of particular concern to human legislation. The first of these is
peace. By this term (pax), Aquinas means something considerably more mundane than
any sort of inner peace or spiritual tranquility that one finds as a result of moral or
intellectual perfection. Instead, he seems to have in mind the requirements for maintaining
a social order in which citizens are free from the aggression of wrongdoers and other
preventable threats to safety or livelihood. In addition to preserving social order at its most
basic level, however, Aquinas also makes clear in the above passage that human law should
strive to instill virtue, and specifically that kind of virtue which has to do with the
common good of society. In other words, human law is interested in instilling virtues
insofar as those virtues perfect human beings in their dealings with fellow citizens and the
broader community as a whole. Later in the Summa Theologiae, Aquinas calls this kind of
virtue legal justice. (ST, II-II.58.5-6; Commentary on Aristotles Nicomachean Ethics,
Book 5, Lecture 2).
According to Aquinas, legal justice is the political virtue par excellence. Contrary to what its
name appears to signify, this virtue does not imply simple obedience to the law. It means,
rather, an inner disposition of the human will by which those possessing it refer all their
actions to the common good (Aquinas follows Aristotle in calling it legal justice because
the law, too, has the common good as its proper object. See his Commentary on Aristotles
Nicomachean Ethics, Book 5, Lecture 2 [902]). Thus understood, Aquinas (again following
Aristotle) considers it to be a general virtue. By this he means that legal justice embraces
any act of virtue whatsoever, so long as the agent refers his action to legal justices proper
object. To use Aquinas example, fortitude is normally considered to be a virtue distinct
from justice, since fortitude deals with the perfection of the irascible appetite and a persons
ability to overcome fear, whereas justice deals with the perfection of the will and a persons
dealings with others. However, a particular act of fortitude may be referred to the common
good as its object and thus become an act of justice as well. For example, a soldier who
rushes into battle displays fortitude by overcoming his fear of death, but he also displays
justice if he is motivated by a love for the common good of the society he protects.
Considered specifically, his action is courageous. Considered generally, it is an act of justice.
As Aquinas explains, the good of any virtue, whether such virtue direct man in relation to
himself, or in relation to certain other individual persons, is referable to the common good,
to which justice directs: so that all acts of virtue can pertain to justice, insofar as it directs
man to the common good. (ST, II-II, 58.5).
In addition to considering justice generally, however, Aquinas also considers it as a
particular virtue of its own. This seems to explain why he mentions in a later discussion of
human legislation that the law should promote justice in addition to peace and virtue (ST,
I-II, 96.3). Regardless of the fact that justice is a virtue that legislators would like to instill
within their citizens, the law also seeks to preserve justice as a certain kind of fairness. This
becomes clearer when one considers Aquinas discussion of right (ius), which he
characterizes as the object of justice considered as a particular virtue, and which must be
safeguarded by the law regardless of whether legislators have succeeded in implanting
the virtue of justice in the souls of their citizens. Strictly speaking, ius is understood by
Aquinas as synonymous withiustum, or that which is just in a particular situation (ST, II-II,
57.1). Aside from making their citizens just by cultivating in them the perpetual and
constant will to render to each one his right [ius], (ST, II-II, 58.1) legislators and judges
ensure that the ius of particular situations between individuals is established or restored,
that each person receives what is due to him such that a certain equality is maintained
among citizens. When a judge orders a person to pay $100 to another for a service
rendered, for example, that judge reestablishes the equality of their relationship before the
service was performed. In such a case, the $100 owed to the provider of the service is
his ius, which must be returned if justice in this case is to be accomplished. Again, this is
not a sense of justice according to which the one paying his debt necessarily exhibits
the virtue of justice, but in the sense that his actions (proceeding from any motivation
whatsoever) reestablish that certain equality which can only be restored if the one who owes
renders no more and no less of his debt to the one who is owed. To exhibit the virtue of
justice, therefore, is much more than to perform an action that reestablishes the equality of
justice or renders to someone his ius, and yet without the notion of ius, Aquinas concept of
justice as a virtue would be unintelligible. This is why the concept of ius lies especially at the
core of that part of justice which Aquinas characterizes as particular. In contrast to the
general virtue of legal justice, which directs the acts of the other specific virtues to the
common good, particular justice always includes some person or group who owes some sort
of identifiable debt to another.
In explaining the details of particular justice, Aquinas further distinguishes between
commutative justice and distributive justice. The example above involving one person
owing $100 to another for a service rendered would be an example of commutative justice,
because it involves one private individuals debt to another private individual. It may
happen, however, that something is owed to a person by the community as a whole. In this
case the community distributes things according to what each individual deserves. An
example of this sort of debt would be found in the realm of punitive justice. Since the
punishment of criminals is not a matter pertaining to private citizens, but society as a whole
(ST, I-II, 92.2 ad 3), a political community owes a certain amount of punishment that must
be inflicted upon a criminal if the equality of justice is to be restored. The degree of
punishment, furthermore, constitutes the ius of the particular situation. Therefore, just as
in matters of exchange, where it would be unjust to fall short of or exceed the ius between
buyers and sellers, it would likewise be unjust for a society to punish more or less than the
criminal deserves. In addition to punishment, a political society may distribute such things
as wealth, honor, material necessities, or work. As Aquinas explains, however, distributive
justice seldom requires that society render an equal amount (good or bad) to its members.
Following Aristotles teaching in the Nicomachean Ethics, Aquinas argues that the ius of
distributive justice must be calculated according to a geometrical proportion. By this he
simply means that more should be given to those who deserve more and less to those who
deserve less. To return to the example of punishment, it would be gravely unfair to punish a
murderer with the same penalty as a shoplifter. The equality that justice requires must be
considered proportionally in the sense that greater punishments for greater crimes (and
lesser punishments for lesser crimes) do in fact constitute equal treatment (Summa Contra
Gentiles, III.142 [2]). Such is not the case in matters of commutative justice such as buying
and selling, which Aquinas says must follow an arithmetic proportion. By this Aquinas
simply means that the good or service provided must be proportional to the value of the
currency or commodity for which it is exchanged (ST, II-II, 61.2;Commentary on
Aristotles Nicomachean Ethics, Book 5, Lecture 5).
To observe how this teaching is applied to particular situations in the political community,
it is helpful to consider Aquinas famous discussion of usury. Usury inherently constitutes a
violation of commutative justice, according to Aquinas, because it creates an unfair
inequality among those private individuals in society. Aquinas logic is extremely
straightforward. If I lend someone $1000 there exists a $1000 disparity in his favor. The
fact that he owes me this sum of money means that there now exists a ius that obliges him
to pay me back the money he borrowed. If, however, I charge him a 10 percent fee for the
use of the money lent, I require him to pay back $100 more than he originally borrowed.
According to Aquinas, by doing this I would be charging him $100 more than what I am
entitled to receive. Since he only borrowed $1000, he should only have to pay me back
$1000.
Aquinas condemnation of usury has little to do with the idea that money should only be
lent from the motive of generosity (even if this happens to be a consequence). It is, rather,
based on his notion of the nature of money itself. Contrary to most modern economic
theories, Aquinas understands money to be nothing more than a medium for exchanging
commodities and thus subject to the requirements of commutative justice. Any use of
money beyond this purpose distorts its original function. If money can ever be considered a
commodity in its own right, it should be compared to those commodities whose use
consists in their consumption. (ST, II-II, 78.1). Its exchange value is more akin to
something like food or wine than to a house or a tool. When someone lends his house to be
used, it makes perfect sense to charge rent and also to repossess the house when the
allotted time for renting has expired. On the other hand, it would be quite unreasonable for
a grocer to charge a fee for his food and then additionally to demand the food back after it is
used. As Aquinas explains, the exchange value of money should be considered more like
food than a house: Now money, according to the Philosopher, was invented chiefly for the
purpose of exchange: and consequently the proper and principal use of money is
consumption or alienation whereby it is sunk in exchange. Hence it is by its very nature
unlawful to take payment for the use of money lent. (It is necessary to add that Aquinas
does allow lenders to require an additional fee under two conditions. The first would be if
money is lent to someone entering a business venture in which the lender shares some of
the risk [periculum]. If, for example, I lend someone $1000 to invest in renting a vineyard,
I am entitled to a share in his profits so long as I also agree to lose some or all of my money
if the investment yields a net loss [ST, II-II, 78.2, ad 5]. Secondly, I may charge an
additional fee for money lent if lending causes me to suffer some loss that I would have
otherwise avoided. For example, if my loan of $1000 to a friend in need prevents me from
paying my rent and thus incurring a $100 late fee, I may justly demand $1100 in return to
cover my losses [ST, II-II, 78.2, ad 1]). Again, Aquinas condemns usury because it exceeds
the ius that justice requires to exist between individuals. The same injustice would exist if
one were to take advantage of a buyers desperation by selling a product for more than its
value or to take advantage of a sellers desperation by buying something for less than its
value (ST, II-II, 77.1). In either case someone falls short of or exceeds the ius of a given
situation, which is inherently contrary the equality that justice requires.
5. The Limitations of Politics
As we have seen, much of Aquinas political teaching is adapted from the Aristotelian
political science which he studied in great detail and which he largely embraced. Perhaps
the most central Aristotelian political doctrine in Aquinas view is the inherent goodness
and naturalness of political society. It is also necessary to understand, however, that in
addition to being good and natural political society is also limited in several important
respects, not all of which would have been pointed out by Aristotle but are unique to
Aquinas teaching. As we have already seen, Aquinas believes that the human laws
governing political societies must be somewhat limited in scope. For example, the fact that
something like the practice of usury is unjust does not necessarily mean that political
society can or should forbid it: Human laws leave certain things unpunished, on account of
the condition of those who are imperfect, and who would be deprived of many advantages,
if all sins were strictly forbidden and punishments appointed for them. (ST, II-II, 78.1 ad
3). In this argument, Aquinas is making the simple point that human law is incapable of
regulating every dimension of social life. Perhaps he would elaborate that attempting to
police the practice of usury may in some cases hinder a societys ability to prevent more
serious crimes like murder, assault, and robbery (ST, I-II, 96.2). This is due to the limited
nature of human law and political society itself and is one of the reasons why God has
wisely chosen to apply his own divine law to human affairs. In addition to its infallibility
and the fact that it applies to the interior movements of mans soul, divine law is able to
punish all vices while demanding the moral perfection from humans that God expects (ST,
I-II, 91.4). Human law, on the other hand, must often settle for preventing only those things
that imperil the immediate safety of those protected by it. This is not to say that human law
does not also look to promote virtue, but the virtues it succeeds in instilling seldom fulfill
the full moral capabilities of human citizens.
Secondly, Aquinas definition of natural law as the human participation in the eternal law
also indicates something emphatically trans-political about human nature that cannot be
found in the Aristotelian doctrine to which Aquinas largely adapted his own. Whereas
Aristotle had argued for the existence of a natural standard of morality, he never suggested
an overarching human community with a supreme lawgiver, and yet this is precisely what
Aquinas teaching explicitly affirms (ST, I-II, 91.1-2). Not only is the natural law a
universally binding law for all humans in all places (something that Aristotle never
recognized), it also points to the existence of a God that consciously and providently
governs human affairs as a whole (also something absent from the Aristotelian teaching).
Without such divine origins, the natural law would lose its legal character, since under
Aquinas own definition there can be no law that does not derive from someone who has
care of the community. (ST, I-II, 90.3-4) Hence the very existence of natural law implies a
more universal community under God that transcends political society. This is also
apparent by looking at the epistemological basis of Aquinas natural law theory. As we have
seen, human beings know the precepts of the natural law by a natural habit Aquinas
calls synderesis. Whereas these precepts may be reinforced by the political community,
they are first promulgated by nature itself and instilled in mans mind by the hand of God.
They owe nothing, therefore, to political society for their content. This is considerably
different from the Aristotelian doctrine that includes no teaching regarding the self-evident
first principles of natural morality upon which Aquinas natural law theory stands or falls
and that seems to suggest (contrary to Aquinas view) that no universally binding law even
exists that is not somewhat subject to change from regime to regime (Nicomachean Ethics,
1134b33). This difference points out in a particularly striking way the un-Aristotelian
character of Aquinas insistence that all regimes, whether they realize it or not, are under
Gods supreme authority and owe the binding force of their laws to the more fundamental
natural law of which God is the sole author.
Finally, political society as Aquinas understands it is limited in an even further sense. We
may observe this by returning to Aquinas claim that political society is natural. In one
sense, of course, this affirmation of Aristotles teaching constitutes a very high exaltation of
the political. Only by living in political society is man capable of achieving his full natural
potential. Thus understood politics is no mere instrumental good (as in the teachings of
modern political thinkers such as Hobbes and Locke), but is part of the very fabric of the
human person, and thus the individuals participation in political society is a great intrinsic
good for the individual as well as for society. On the other hand, the characterization of
politics as natural also means for Aquinas that it falls short of mans ultimate supernatural
end. For this reason Aquinas never ceases to remind us that, although politics is natural to
man and constitutes an important aspect of the natural law, man is not ordained to the
body politic according to all that he is and has. (ST, I-II, 21.4 ad 3). By this Aquinas means
that beyond the fulfillment of the natural law, the active participation in political society,
and even the exercise of the moral virtues, human beings find their complete perfection and
happiness only in beatitudethe supernatural end to which they are called. Of course,
beatitude is only fully completed in the afterlife (ST, I-II, 5.3), but even in his terrestrial
existence man is called upon to exercise a supernatural perfection made possible through
his active cooperation with Gods grace. Precisely because it is a natural institution, political
society is not equipped to guide human beings toward the attainment of this higher
supernatural vocation. In this respect it must yield to the Church, which (unlike political
society) is divinely established and primarily concerned with the distribution of divine grace
and the salvation of souls (On Kingship, Book I, Chapters 14-15). Again, to say that political
society is merely natural is not to suggest that it should only concern mans basic natural
needs such as food, shelter, and safety. The common good that political authorities pursue
includes the maintenance of a just society where individual citizens may flourish physically
as well as morally. Politics thus promotes the natural virtues (most of all justice), which are
themselves the human souls preparation for the reception of divine grace and the infusion
of the supernatural virtues of faith, hope, and, above all, charity. The best one can hope
from political society is that citizens will be well disposed to receive the grace available to
them through the Church, which transcends politics both in its universality as well as in the
finality of its purpose.
6. References and Further Reading
a. Primary Sources
i. Aquinas Political Writings in English
Summa Contra Gentiles, vol. III. 1975. Trans. Vernon Bourke. Notre Dame: University of
Notre Dame Press.
Summa Theologiae. 1981. Trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province. Westminster:
Christian Classics.
Commentary on Aristotles Nicomachean Ethics. 1993. Trans. C. I. Litzinger, O. P. Notre
Dame, IN: Dumb Ox Books.
Commentary on Aristotles Politics. 1963. Trans. Ernest L. Fortin and Peter D. ONeill.
In Medieval Political Philosophy: A Sourcebook, eds. Ralph Lerner and Muhsin Mahdi.
Toronto, ON: The Free Press of Glencoe.
Commentary on Aristotles Politics. 2007. Trans. Richard Regan. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett
Publishing.
On the Governance of Rulers. 1943. Trans. Gerald B. Phelan. London: Sheed and Ward
Publishers.
ii. Two Useful Collections of Aquinas Political Writings in English
On Law, Morality, and Politics. 2002. Trans. Richard Regan. Indianapolis: Hackett
Publishing.
Aquinas: Political Writings. 2002. Trans. R.W. Dyson. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
b. Secondary Sources
i. Books
Oscar, Brown. 1981. Natural rectitude and divine law in Aquinas: an approach to an
integral interpretation of the Thomistic Doctrine of Law. Toronto: Pontifical Institute of
Mediaeval Studies.
Di Blasi, Fulvio. 2006. God and the Natural Law: A Rereading of Thomas Aquinas. South
Bend, IN: St. Augustines Press.
Finnis, John. 1998. Aquinas: Moral, Political and Legal Theory. Oxford University Press.
Gilby, Thomas. 1958. The Political Thought of Thomas Aquinas. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press.
Hall, Pamela M. 1994. Narrative and the Natural Law: An Interpretation of Thomistic
Ethics. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press.
Kempsall, M.S. 1999. The Common Good in Late Medieval Political Thought. Oxford
University Press.
Keys, Mary M. 2006. Aquinas, Aristotle, and the Promise of the Common
Good. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Malloy, Michael P. 1985. Civil Authority in Medieval Philosophy: Lombard, Aquinas, and
Bonaventure. Lanham: University Press of America.
Maritain, Jacques. 1951. Man and the State. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Maritain, Jacques. 1947. The Person and the Common Good. New York: Scribners.
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McInerny, Ralph. 1997. Ethica Thomistica: The Moral Philosophy of Thomas
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Bleakley, Holly Hamilton. 1999. The Art of Ruling in Aquinas De Regimine
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the Summa Theologiae, 1-2, Question 94, Article 2, Natural Law Forum 10: 168-201.
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