1.

LAWYERS AGAINST MONOPOLY AND POVERTY

Lawyers Against Monopoly and Poverty (LAMP) assailed the constitutionality of of the Priority Development
Assistance Fund (PDAF) as provided for in Republic Act (R.A.) 9206 or the General Appropriations Act for 2004 (GAA of
2004). For LAMP, this situation runs afoul against the principle of separation of powers because in receiving and,
thereafter, spending funds for their chosen projects, the Members of Congress in effect intrude into an executive function.
In other words, they cannot directly spend the funds, the appropriation for which was made by them. In their individual
capacities, the Members of Congress cannot virtually tell or dictate upon the Executive Department how to spend
taxpayers money.
[7]
Further, the authority to propose and select projects does not pertain to legislation. It is, in fact, a
non-legislative function devoid of constitutional sanction,
[8]
and, therefore, impermissible and must be considered nothing
less than malfeasance. The proposal and identification of the projects do not involve the making of laws or the repeal and
amendment thereof, which is the only function given to the Congress by the Constitution. Verily, the power of
appropriation granted to Congress as a collegial body, does not include the power of the Members thereof to individually
propose, select and identify which projects are to be actually implemented and funded - a function which essentially and
exclusively pertains to the Executive Department.
[9]
By allowing the Members of Congress to receive direct allotment
from the fund, to propose and identify projects to be funded and to perform the actual spending of the fund, the
implementation of the PDAF provision becomes legally infirm and constitutionally repugnant.
For their part, the respondents
[10]
contend that the petition miserably lacks legal and factual grounds. Although
they admit that PDAF traced its roots to CDF,
[11]
they argue that the former should not be equated with pork barrel, which
has gained a derogatory meaning referring to government projects affording political opportunism.
[12]
In the petition, no
proof of this was offered. It cannot be gainsaid then that the petition cannot stand on inconclusive media reports,
assumptions and conjectures alone. Without probative value, media reports cited by the petitioner deserve scant
consideration especially the accusation that corrupt legislators have allegedly proposed cuts or slashes from their pork
barrel. Hence, the Court should decline the petitioners plea to take judicial notice of the supposed iniquity of PDAF
because there is no concrete proof that PDAF, in the guise of pork barrel, is a source of dirty money for unscrupulous
lawmakers and other officials who tend to misuse their allocations. These facts have no attributes of sufficient notoriety
or general recognition accepted by the public without qualification, to be subjected to judicial notice. This applies, a
fortiori, to the claim that Members of Congress are beneficiaries of commissions (kickbacks) taken out of the PDAF
allocations and releases and preferred by favored contractors representing from 20% to 50% of the approved budget for a
particular project.
[13]
Suffice it to say, the perceptions of LAMP on the implementation of PDAF must not be based on
mere speculations circulated in the news media preaching the evils of pork barrel. Failing to present even an iota of proof
that the DBM Secretary has been releasing lump sums from PDAF directly or indirectly to individual Members of
Congress, the petition falls short of its cause.

ISSUE: Whether or not the mandatory requisites for judicial review are met.

RULING:
Like almost all powers conferred by the Constitution, the power of judicial review is subject to limitations, to wit:
(1) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging the
act must have the standing to question the validity of the subject act or issuance; otherwise stated, he must have a
personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its
enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the issue of
constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.
In this case, the petitioner contested the implementation of an alleged unconstitutional statute, as citizens and
taxpayers. Undeniably, as taxpayers, LAMP would somehow be adversely affected by this. This affords ripeness to the
present controversy.
For LAMP, this is the right to recover public funds possibly misapplied by no less than the Members of
Congress. The possibility that this injury was indeed committed cannot be discounted. The petition complains of illegal
disbursement of public funds derived from taxation and this is sufficient reason to say that there indeed exists a definite,
concrete, real or substantial controversy before the Court.
In public suits, the plaintiff, representing the general public, asserts a public right in assailing an allegedly illegal
official action. The plaintiff may be a person who is affected no differently from any other person, and could be suing as a
stranger, or as a citizen or taxpayer.
[20]
Thus, taxpayers have been allowed to sue where there is a claim that public
funds are illegally disbursed or that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or that public funds are
wasted through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law.
Here, the sufficient interest preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation required in taxpayers
suits is established. Thus, in the claim that PDAF funds have been illegally disbursed and wasted through the
enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law, LAMP should be allowed to sue.




2. Guingona vs. Court of Appeals

Facts:
This case is an offshoot of the investigation conducted by the government in the last quarter of 1995, which
delved into the alleged participation of national and local officials in jueteng and other forms of illegal gambling. Although
the Court of Appeals upheld the admission into the Witness Protection Program of Potenciano A. Roque, who claimed
personal knowledge of such gambling activities, the secretary of justice nonetheless challenges the side opinion of the
appellate court that the testimony of the witness must, as a condition precedent to his admission into said Program, be
shown to be capable of substantial corroboration in its material points. The justice secretary claims that such
corroboration need not be demonstrated prior to or simultaneous with the witness admission into the Program, as long as
such requirement can be demonstrated when he actually testifies in court. However, inasmuch as Roque has already
been admitted into the Program and has actually finished testifying, the issue presented by petitioners has become moot.
Issue:
Whether or not the mandatory requisites for judicial review are met.

Ruling:
In the case at bar, it is at once apparent that petitioners are not requesting that this Court reverse the ruling of the
appellate court and disallow the admission in evidence of Respondent Roques testimony, inasmuch as the assailed
Decision does not appear to be in conflict with any of their present claims. Petitioners filed this suit out of fear that the
assailed Decision would frustrate the purpose of said law, which is to encourage witnesses to come out and testify. But
their apprehension is neither justified nor exemplified by this particular case. A mere apprehension does not give rise to a
justiciable controversy.
After finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the government prosecutors, Respondent Court allowed the
admission of Roque into the Program. In fact, Roque had already testified in court against the private respondent. Thus,
the propriety of Roques admission into the Program is already a moot and academic issue that clearly does not warrant
judicial review.
Manifestly, this petition involves neither any right that was violated nor any claims that conflict. In fact, no affirmative
relief is being sought in this case. The Court concurs with the opinion of counsel for private respondent that this action is
a purely academic exercise, which has no relevance to the criminal cases against Respondent Pineda. After the
assailed Decision had been rendered, trial in those cases proceeded in earnest, and Roque testified in all of them. Said
counsel filed his Memorandum only to satisfy his academic interest on how the State machinery will deal with witnesses
who are admittedly guilty of the crimes but are discharged to testify against their co-accused.
Petitioners failed not only to present an actual controversy, but also to show a case ripe for adjudication. Hence, any
resolution that this Court might make in this case would constitute an attempt at abstraction that can only lead to barren
legal dialectics and sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities.
Thus, any judgment that this Court may render on the instant petition would be merely an academic disquisition on a
hypothetical problem. Until it can be shown that an actual controversy exists, courts have no jurisdiction to render a
binding decision.

3. John Hay Peoples Alternative Coalition vs. Lim
[GR 119775, 24 October 2003]

Facts:
Republic Act 7227, entitled "An Act Accellerating the Conversion of Military Reservations into other Productive
uses, Creating the Bases Conversion and Development Authority for this Purpose, Providing Funds Therefor and for other
purposes," otherwise known as the "Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992," was enacted on 13 March 1992.
The law set out the policy of the government to accelerate the sound and balanced conversion into alternative productive
uses of the former military bases under the 1947 Philippines-United States of America Military Bases Agreement, namely,
the Clark and Subic military reservations as well as their extensions including the John Hay Station (Camp John Hay) in
the City of Baguio. RA 7227 created the Bases Conversion and Development Authority' (BCDA), vesting it with powers
pertaining to the multifarious aspects of carrying out the ultimate objective of utilizing the base areas in accordance with
the declared government policy. RA 7227 likewise created the Subic Special Economic [and Free Port] Zone (Subic SEZ)
the metes and bounds of which were to be delineated in a proclamation to be issued by the President of the Philippines;
and granted the Subic SEZ incentives ranging from tax and duty-free importations, exemption of businesses therein from
local and national taxes, to other hall-narks of a liberalized financial and business climate. RA 7227 expressly gave
authority to the President to create through executive proclamation, subject to the concurrence of the local government
units directly affected, other Special Economic Zones (SEZ) in the areas covered respectively by the Clark military
reservation, the Wallace Air Station in San Fernando, La Union, and Camp John Hay.
BCDA entered into a Memorandum of Agreement and Escrow Agreement with Tuntex (B.V.L) Co., Ltd. (TUNTEX)
and Asiaworld Internationale Group, Inc. (ASIAWORLD), private corporations registered under the laws of the British
Virgin Islands, preparatory to the formation of a joint venture for the development of Poro Point in La Union and Camp
John Hay as premier tourist destinations and recreation centers. 4 months later BCDA, TUNTEX and ASIAWORLD
executed a Joint Venture Agreements whereby they bound themselves to put up a joint venture company known as the
Baguio International Development and Management Corporation which would lease areas within Camp John Hay and
Poro Point for the purpose of turning such places into principal tourist and recreation spots, as originally envisioned by the
parties under their AZemorandmn of Agreement. The Baguio City government meanwhile passed a number of resolutions
in response to the actions taken by BCDA as owner and administrator of Camp John Hay. By Resolution of 29 September
1993, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Baguio City officially asked BCDA to exclude all the barangays partly or totally
located within Camp John Hay from the reach or coverage of any plan or program for its development. By a subsequent
Resolution dated 19 January 1994, the sanggunian sought from BCDA an abdication, waiver or quitclaim of its ownership
over the home lots being occupied by residents of 9 barangays surrounding the military reservation. Still by another
resolution passed on 21 February 1994, the sanggunian adopted and submitted to BCDA a 15-point concept for the
development of Camp John Hay. The sanggunian's vision expressed, among other things, a kind of development that
affords protection to the environment, the making of a family-oriented type of tourist destination, priority in employment
opportunities for Baguio residents and free access to the base area, guaranteed participation of the city government in the
management and operation of the camp, exclusion of the previously named nine barangays from the area for
development, and liability for local taxes of businesses to be established within the camp." BCDA, TUNTEX and
ASIAWORLD agreed to some, but rejected or modified the other proposals of the sanggunian." They stressed the need to
declare Camp John Hay a SEZ as a condition precedent to its full development in accordance with the mandate of RA
7227. On 11 May 1994, the sanggunian passed a resolution requesting the Mayor to order the determination of realty
taxes which may otherwise be collected from real properties of Camp John Hay. The resolution was intended to
intelligently guide the sanggunian in determining its position on whether Camp John Hay be declared a SEZ, the
sanggunian being of the view that such declaration would exempt the camp's property and the economic activity therein
from local or national taxation. More than a month later, however, the sanggunian passed Resolution 255, (Series of
1994)," seeking and supporting, subject to its concurrence, the issuance by then President Ramos of a presidential
proclamation declaring an area of 285.1 hectares of the camp as a SEZ in accordance with the provisions of RA 7227.
Together with this resolution was submitted a draft of the proposed proclamation for consideration by the President. On 5
July 1994 then President Ramos issued Proclamation 420 (series of 1994), "creating and designating a portion of the area
covered by the former Camp John Hay as the John Hay Special Economic Zone pursuant to Republic Act 7227." The
John Hay Peoples Alternative Coalition, et. al. filed the petition for prohibition, mandamus and declaratory relief with
prayer for a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary injunction on 25 April 1995 challenging, in the
main, the constitutionality or validity of Proclamation 420 as well as the legality of the Memorandum of Agreement and
Joint Venture Agreement between the BCDA, and TUNTEX and ASIAWORLD.

Issue:
Whether the petitioners have legal standing in filing the case questioning the validity of Presidential Proclamation
420.

Held:
It is settled that when questions of constitutional significance are raised, the court can exercise its power of
judicial review only if the following requisites are present: (1) the existence of an actual and appropriate case; (2) a
personal and substantial interest of the party raising the constitutional question; (3) the exercise of judicial review is
pleaded at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the constitutional question is the lis mota of the case." RA 7227 expressly
requires the concurrence of the affected local government units to the creation of SEZs out of all the base areas in the
country.'" The grant by the law on local government units of the right of concurrence on the bases' conversion is
equivalent to vesting a legal standing on them, for it is in effect a recognition of the real interests that communities nearby
or surrounding a particular base area have in its utilization. Thus, the interest of petitioners, being inhabitants of Baguio, in
assailing the legality of Proclamation 420, is personal and substantial such that they have sustained or will sustain direct
injury as a result of the government act being challenged." Theirs is a material interest, an interest in issue affected by the
proclamation and not merely an interest in the question involved or an incidental interest," for what is at stake in the
enforcement of Proclamation 420 is the very economic and social existence of the people of Baguio City. Moreover,
Petitioners Edilberto T. Claravall and Lilia G. Yaranon were duly elected councilors of Baguio at the time, engaged in the
local governance of Baguio City and whose duties included deciding for and on behalf of their constituents the question of
whether to concur with the declaration of a portion of the area covered by Camp John Hay as a SEZ. Certainly then,
Claravall and Yaranon, as city officials who voted against" the sanggunian Resolution No. 255 (Series of 1994) supporting
the issuance of the now challenged Proclamation 420, have legal standing to bring the present petition.







4. Province of Batangas vs. Romulo

FACTS:
In 1998, then President Estrada issued EO No. 48 establishing the Program for Devolution Adjustment and Equalization
to enhance the capabilities of LGUs in the discharge of the functions and services devolved to them through the LGC.
The Oversight Committee under Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora passed Resolutions No. OCD-99-005,
OCD-99-006 and OCD-99-003 which were approved by Pres. Estrada on October 6, 1999. The guidelines formulated by
the Oversight Committee required the LGUs to identify the projects eligible for funding under the portion of LGSEF and
submit the project proposals and other requirements to the DILG for appraisal before the Committee serves notice to the
DBM for the subsequent release of the corresponding funds.
Hon. Herminaldo Mandanas, Governor of Batangas, petitioned to declare unconstitutional and void certain
provisos contained in the General Appropriations Acts (GAAs) of 1999, 2000, and 2001, insofar as they uniformly
earmarked for each corresponding year the amount of P5billion for the Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) for the Local
Government Service Equalization Fund (LGSEF) & imposed conditions for the release thereof.
The petitioner allegedly has no legal standing to bring the suit because it has not suffered any injury. In fact, the
petitioner's "just share" has even increased. Pursuant to Section 285 of the Local Government Code of 1991, the share of
the provinces is 23%. OCD Nos. 99-005, 99-006 and 99-003 gave the provinces 40% of P2 billion of the LGSEF. OCD
Nos. 2000-023 and 2001-029 apportioned 26% of P3.5 billion to the provinces. On the other hand, OCD No. 2001-001
allocated 25% of P3 billion to the provinces. Thus, the petitioner has not suffered any injury in the implementation of the
assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000 and 2001 and the OCD resolutions.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner has a Locus Standi.

HELD:
The petitioner has locus standi to maintain the present suit
The gist of the question of standing is whether a party has "alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so
largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions."
9
Accordingly, it has been held that the interest of a
party assailing the constitutionality of a statute must be direct and personal. Such party must be able to show, not only
that the law or any government act is invalid, but also that he has sustained or is in imminent danger of sustaining some
direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way. It must appear
that the person complaining has been or is about to be denied some right or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled or
that he is about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute or act complained of.
10

The Court holds that the petitioner possesses the requisite standing to maintain the present suit. The petitioner, a
local government unit, seeks relief in order to protect or vindicate an interest of its own, and of the other LGUs. This
interest pertains to the LGUs' share in the national taxes or the IRA. The petitioner's constitutional claim is, in substance,
that the assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000 and 2001, and the OCD resolutions contravene Section 6, Article X
of the Constitution, mandating the "automatic release" to the LGUs of their share in the national taxes. Further, the injury
that the petitioner claims to suffer is the diminution of its share in the IRA, as provided under Section 285 of the Local
Government Code of 1991, occasioned by the implementation of the assailed measures. These allegations are sufficient
to grant the petitioner standing to question the validity of the assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000 and 2001, and
the OCD resolutions as the petitioner clearly has "a plain, direct and adequate interest" in the manner and distribution of
the IRA among the LGUs.

5. Prof. Randolf S. David vs. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
G.R. No. 171396, May 3, 2006

FACTS:

These seven (7) consolidated petitions for certiorari and prohibition allege that in issuing Presidential Proclamation No.
1017 (PP 1017) and General Order No. 5 (G.O. No. 5), President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo committed grave abuse of
discretion. Petitioners contend that respondent officials of the Government, in their professed efforts to defend and
preserve democratic institutions, are actually trampling upon the very freedom guaranteed and protected by the
Constitution. Hence, such issuances are void for being unconstitutional.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners have a locus standi.
HELD:

The locus standi of petitioners in G.R. No. 171396, particularly David and Llamas, is beyond doubt. They alleged
"direct injury" resulting from "illegal arrest" and "unlawful search" committed by police operatives pursuant to PP 1017.
Rightly so, the Solicitor General does not question their legal standing.
Locus standi is defined as "a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question."
37
In private suits, standing is
governed by the "real-parties-in interest" rule as contained in Section 2, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended. It provides that "every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest."
Accordingly, the "real-party-in interest" is "the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or the
party entitled to the avails of the suit."
38
Succinctly put, the plaintiffs standing is based on his own right to the relief sought.
The difficulty of determining locus standi arises in public suits. Here, the plaintiff who asserts a "public right" in assailing
an allegedly illegal official action, does so as a representative of the general public. He may be a person who is affected
no differently from any other person. He could be suing as a "stranger," or in the category of a "citizen," or taxpayer." In
either case, he has to adequately show that he is entitled to seek judicial protection. In other words, he has to make out a
sufficient interest in the vindication of the public order and the securing of relief as a "citizen" or "taxpayer.
By way of summary, the following rules may be culled from the cases decided by this Court. Taxpayers, voters, concerned
citizens, and legislators may be accorded standing to sue, provided that the following requirements are met:
(1) the cases involve constitutional issues;
(2) for taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal disbursement of public funds or that the tax measure is
unconstitutional;
(3) for voters, there must be a showing of obvious interest in the validity of the election law in question;
(4) for concerned citizens, there must be a showing that the issues raised are of transcendental importance which
must be settled early; and
(5) for legislators, there must be a claim that the official action complained of infringes upon their prerogatives as
legislators.
Significantly, recent decisions show a certain toughening in the Courts attitude toward legal standing.
6. Montesclaros vs. Commission on Elections
G.R. No. 152295July 9, 2002CARPIO, J.

Facts:
The Commission on Elections, on December 4, 2001 issued Resolution Nos. 4713 and 4714 to govern the SK elections
on May 6, 2002. On February 18, 2002, petitioner Antoniette V.C. Montesclaros sent a letter to the COMELEC,
demanding that the SK elections be held as scheduled on May 6, 2002. She also urged the COMELEC to respond to her
letter within 10 days upon receipt of the letter, otherwise, she will seek judicial relief. On the other hand, then COMELEC
Chairman Alfredo L. Benipayo, wrote letters dated 20 February 2002 to the Speaker of the House and the Senate
President about the status of pending bills on the SK and Barangay elections. In his letters, the COMELEC Chairman
intimated that it was operationally very difficult to hold both elections simultaneously in May 2002. Instead, he
expressed support for the bill of Senator Franklin Drilon that proposed to hold the Barangay elections in May 2002 and
postpone the SK elections to November 2002.Instead of receiving a response letter, petitioners received a copy of
COMELEC En Banc Resolution 4763 dated February 5, 2002 recommending to Congress the postponement of the SK
elections to November 2002 but holding the Barangay elections in May 2002 as scheduled. Eventually, on March 6, 2002,
the Senate and the House of Representatives passed their respective bills postponing the SK elections. On March 11,
2002, the Bicameral Conference Committee of the Senate and the House came out with a Report recommending
approval of the reconciled bill consolidating Senate Bill 2050 and House Bill 4456. The Bicameral Committees
consolidated bill reset the SK and Barangay elections to 15 July 2002 and lowered the membership age in the SKto at
least 15 but not more than 18 years of age. On this same date, Montesclaros filed the petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus with prayer for a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction, seeking to prevent the postponement of
the SK elections originally scheduled 6 May 2002 and also to prevent the reduction of the age requirement for
membership in the SK. The consolidated bill was approved by the Senate and the House of Representatives and later on
signed into law by the President.

Issue:
Whether or not there is an actual controversy in the case which seeks to prevent a postponement of the6 May 2002 SK
elections, and which seeks to prevent Congress from enacting into law a proposed bill loweringthe membership age in the
SK.

Ruling:
At first, the Court takes judicial notice of the following events that have transpired since petitioners filed this petition.
These are as follows: 1. The May 6, 2002 SK elections and May 13, 2002 Barangay elections were not held as
scheduled.2. Congress enacted RA No. 9164 which provides that voters and candidates for the SK elections must be "at
least 15 but less than 18 years of age on the day of the election."

RA No. 9164 also provides that there shall be a synchronized SK and Barangay elections on July 15, 2002.3. The
COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 4846, the rules and regulations for the conduct of the July15, 2002 synchronized
SK and Barangay elections.

In this case, the court mentioned the requisites which must be complied with for the Court to exercise its power of judicial
review. These are (1) the existence of an actual and appropriate case or controversy; (2) a personal and substantial
interest of the party raising the constitutional question; (3) the exercise of judicial review is pleaded at the earliest
opportunity; and (4) the constitutional question is the
lis mota of the case. The Court ruled that in this case there is no actual controversy requiring the exercise of the power of
judicial review. While seeking to prevent a postponement of SK elections, petitioners are but amenable to a resetting of
the SK elections to any date not later than 15 July 2002, the date which RA 9164 has reset the SK elections. This only
shows that with respect to the date of the SK elections, there is therefore no actual controversy requiring judicial
intervention. Also, their prayer to prevent Congress from enacting into law a proposed bill lowering the membership age in
the SK does not present an actual justiciable controversy. According to the Court, a proposed bill is not subject to judicial
review because it is not a law. A proposed bill creates no right and imposes no duty legally enforceable by the Court. A
proposed bill, having no legal effect, violates no constitutional right or duty. The Court has no power to declare a proposed
bill constitutional or unconstitutional because that would be in the nature of rendering an advisory opinion on a proposed
act of Congress. The power of judicial review cannot be exercised in vacuo. It also emphasized that there can be no
justiciable controversy involving the constitutionality of a proposed bill. The Court can exercise its power of judicial review
only after a law is enacted, not before. It also noted that under the separation of powers, the Court can neither restrain
Congress from passing any lawnor dictate to Congress the object or subject of bills that Congress should enact into
law.The Court cannot also direct the COMELEC to allow over-aged voters to vote or be voted for in an election that is
limited under RA No. 9164 to youths at least 15 but less than 18 years old. A law is needed to allow all those who have
turned more than 21 years old on or after May 6, 2002 to participate in the July 15, 2002 SK elections. Petitioners' remedy
is legislation, not judicial intervention. Regarding petitioners personal and substantial interest, the Court ruled that
petitioners have no such rights or interests in maintaining the suit. The Court stated that a party must show that he has
been, or is about to be denied some personal right or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled.

A party must also show that he has a real interest in the suit. By "real interest" is meant a present substantial interest, as
distinguished from a mere expectancy or future, contingent, subordinate, or inconsequential interest. In this case,
petitioners seek to enforce a right originally conferred by law on those who were at least 15 but not more than 21 years
old. But with the passage of RA No. 9164, this right is limited to those who on the date of the SK elections are at least 15
but less than 18 years old. The new law restricts membership in the SK to this specific age group. Not falling within this
classification, petitioners have ceased to be members of the SK and are no longer qualified to participate in the July 15,
2002 SK elections. Plainly, petitioners no longer have a personal and substantial interest in the SK elections. The Court
had not seen constitutional issue on this case. At the time petitioners filed their petition, RA No.9164, which reset the SK
elections and reduced the age requirement for SK membership, was not yet enacted into law and even after the passage
of RA No. 9164, they failed to assail any of its provisions that could be unconstitutional. The Court however mentioned the
only semblance of a constitutional issue which is the petitioners claim that SK membership is a "property right within the
meaning of the Constitution. This argument however is bereft of merit. Congress exercises the power to prescribe the
qualifications for SK membership. One who is no longer qualified because of an amendment in the law cannot complain of
being deprived of a proprietary right to SK membership. Only those who qualify as SK members can contest, based on a
statutory right, any act disqualifying them from SK membership or from voting in the SK elections. SK membership is not a
property right protected by the Constitution because it is a mere statutory right conferred by law. Congress may amend at
any time the law to change or even withdraw the statutory right. The Court also gave emphasis that public office is not a
property right. As the Constitution expressly states, a "Public office is a public trust."

No one has a vested right to any public office, much less a vested right to an expectancy of holding a public office. The
petition is dismissed.

7. KILOSBAYAN, et. al. vs. MANUEL L. MORATO, et. al.

FACTS:
This is a petition seeking to declare the ELA invalid on the ground that it is substantially the same as the Contract of
Lease nullified in G. R. No. 113373, 232 SCRA 110.
Petitioners contended that the amended ELA is inconsistent with and violative of PCSO's charter and the decision of
the Supreme Court of 5 May 1995, that it violated the law on public bidding of contracts as well as Section 2(2), Article IX-
D of the 1987 Constitution in relation to the COA Circular No. 85-55-A.
Respondents questioned the petitioners' standing to bring this suit.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners possess the legal standing to file the instant petition.

RULING:
The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. Standing is a special concern in constitutional lawbecause some cases are
brought not by parties who have been personally injured by the operation of the law or by official action taken, but by
concerned citizens, taxpayers or voters who actually sue in the public interest. Petitioners do not in fact show what
particularized interest they have for bringing this suit. And they do not have present substantial interest in the ELA as
would entitle them to bring this suit.
8. People vs. Vera

Facts:
The CFI rendered a judgment of conviction sentencing Cu Unjieng to indeterminate penalty ranging from 4 years and 2
months of prision correccional to 8 years of prision mayor, to pay the costs and with reservation of civil action to the
offended party, HSBC. Upon appeal, the court, on 26 March 1935, modified the sentence to an indeterminate penalty of
from 5 years and 6 months of prision correccional to 7 years, 6 months and 27 days of prision mayor, but affirmed the
judgment in all other respects. Cu Unjieng filed a motion for reconsideration and four successive motions for new trial
which were denied on 17 December 1935, and final judgment was accordingly entered on 18 December 1935. Cu Unjieng
thereupon sought to have the case elevated on certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United States but the latter denied
the petition for certiorari in November, 1936. The Supreme Court, on 24 November 1936, denied the petition subsequently
filed by Cu Unjieng for leave to file a second alternative motion for reconsideration or new trial and thereafter remanded
the case to the court of origin for execution of the judgment.
Cu Unjieng filed an application for probation before the trial court, under the provisions of Act 4221 of the defunct
Philippine Legislature. Cu Unjieng states in his petition, inter alia, that he is innocent of the crime of which he was
convicted, that he has no criminal record and that he would observe good conduct in the future. The CFI of Manila, Judge
Pedro Tuason presiding, referred the application for probation of the Insular Probation Office which recommended denial
of the same. Thereafter, the CFI of Manila, seventh branch, Judge Jose O. Vera presiding, set the petition for hearing on
5 April 1937. The Fiscal of the City of Manila filed an opposition to the granting of probation to Cu Unjieng. The private
prosecution also filed an opposition alleging, among other things, that Act 4221, assuming that it has not been repealed
by section 2 of Article XV of the Constitution, is nevertheless violative of section 1, subsection (1), Article III of the
Constitution guaranteeing equal protection of the laws for the reason that its applicability is not uniform throughout the
Islands and because section 11 of the said Act endows the provincial boards with the power to make said law effective or
otherwise in their respective or otherwise in their respective provinces. The private prosecution also filed a supplementary
opposition elaborating on the alleged unconstitutionality on Act 4221, as an undue delegation of legislative power to the
provincial boards of several provinces (sec. 1, Art. VI, Constitution). The City Fiscal concurred in the opposition of the
private prosecution except with respect to the questions raised concerning the constitutionality of Act 4221. Judge Jose O.
Vera promulgated a resolution, concluding that Cu Unjieng "es inocente por duda racional" of the crime of which he
stands convicted by the Supreme court in GR 41200, but denying the latter's petition for probation. On 3 July 1937,
counsel for Cu Unjieng filed an exception to the resolution denying probation and a notice of intention to file a motion for
reconsideration. An alternative motion for reconsideration or new trial was filed by counsel on 13 July 1937. This was
supplemented by an additional motion for reconsideration submitted on 14 July 1937. The aforesaid motions were set for
hearing but said hearing was postponed at the petition of counsel for Cu Unjieng because a motion for leave to intervene
in the case as amici curiae signed by 33 (34) attorneys had just been filed with the trial court. The Fiscal of the City of
Manila filed a motion with the trial court for the issuance of an order of execution of the judgment of this court in said case
and forthwith to commit Cu Unjieng to jail in obedience to said judgment. Judge Vera issued an order requiring all parties
including the movants for intervention as amici curiae to appear before the court. On the last-mentioned date, the Fiscal of
the City of Manila moved for the hearing of his motion for execution of judgment in preference to the motion for leave to
intervene as amici curiae but, upon objection of counsel for Cu Unjieng, he moved for the postponement of the hearing of
both motions. The judge thereupon set the hearing of the motion for execution on 21 August 1937, but proceeded to
consider the motion for leave to intervene as amici curiae as in order. Evidence as to the circumstances under which said
motion for leave to intervene as amici curiae was signed and submitted to court was to have been heard on 19 August
1937. But at this juncture, HSBC and the People came to the Supreme Court on extraordinary legal process to put an end
to what they alleged was an interminable proceeding in the CFI of Manila which fostered "the campaign of the defendant
Mariano Cu Unjieng for delay in the execution of the sentence imposed by this Honorable Court on him, exposing the
courts to criticism and ridicule because of the apparent inability of the judicial machinery to make effective a final judgment
of this court imposed on the defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng." The scheduled hearing before the trial court was accordingly
suspended upon the issuance of a temporary restraining order by the Supreme Court on 21 August 1937.

Issue:
Whether the People of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General and Fiscal of the City of Manila, is a proper
party in present case.

Held:
YES. The People of the Philippines, represented by the Solicitor-General and the Fiscal of the City of Manila, is a
proper party in the present proceedings. The unchallenged rule is that the person who impugns the validity of a statute
must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustained, direct injury as a
result of its enforcement. It goes without saying that if Act 4221 really violates the constitution, the People of the
Philippines, in whose name the present action is brought, has a substantial interest in having it set aside. Of greater
import than the damage caused by the illegal expenditure of public funds is the mortal wound inflicted upon the
fundamental law by the enforcement of an invalid statute. Hence, the well-settled rule that the state can challenge the
validity of its own laws.

9. IBP vs. Zamora G.R. No.141284, August 15, 2000

Facts: Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Sec. 18, Art. VII of the Constitution, the President directed the
AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate with each other for the proper deployment and utilization of the Marines to
assist the PNP in preventing or suppressing criminal or lawless violence. The President declared that the services of
the Marines in the anti-crime campaign are merely temporary in nature and for a reasonable period only, until such time
when the situation shall have improved. The IBP filed a petition seeking to declare the deployment of
the Philippine Marinesnull and void and unconstitutional.

Issues:

Petitioner failed to sufficiently show that it is in possession of the requisites of standing to raise the issues in the petition.
The IBP has not sufficiently complied with the requisites of standing in this case.
Legal standing or locus standi has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the
party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged.
[13]
The term
interest means a material interest, an interest in issue affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the
question involved, or a mere incidental interest.
[14]
The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges such
personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation
of issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.
[15]

In the case at bar, the IBP primarily anchors its standing on its alleged responsibility to uphold the rule of law and the
Constitution. Apart from this declaration, however, the IBP asserts no other basis in support of its locus standi. The mere
invocation by the IBP of its duty to preserve the rule of law and nothing more, while undoubtedly true, is not sufficient to
clothe it with standing in this case. This is too general an interest which is shared by other groups and the whole
citizenry. Based on the standards above-stated, the IBP has failed to present a specific and substantial interest in the
resolution of the case. Its fundamental purpose which, under Section 2, Rule 139-A of the Rules of Court, is to elevate
the standards of the law profession and to improve the administration of justice is alien to, and cannot be affected by the
deployment of the Marines. It should also be noted that the interest of the National President of the IBP who signed the
petition, is his alone, absent a formal board resolution authorizing him to file the present action. To be sure, members of
the BAR, those in the judiciary included, have varying opinions on the issue. Moreover, the IBP, assuming that it has duly
authorized the National President to file the petition, has not shown any specific injury which it has suffered or may suffer
by virtue of the questioned governmental act. Indeed, none of its members, whom the IBP purportedly represents, has
sustained any form of injury as a result of the operation of the joint visibility patrols. Neither is it alleged that any of its
members has been arrested or that their civil liberties have been violated by the deployment of the Marines. What the IBP
projects as injurious is the supposed militarization of law enforcement which might threaten Philippine democratic
institutions and may cause more harm than good in the long run. Not only is the presumed injury not personal in
character, it is likewise too vague, highly speculative and uncertain to satisfy the requirement of standing. Since petitioner
has not successfully established a direct and personal injury as a consequence of the questioned act, it does not possess
the personality to assail the validity of the deployment of the Marines. This Court, however, does not categorically rule
that the IBP has absolutely no standing to raise constitutional issues now or in the future. The IBP must, by way of
allegations and proof, satisfy this Court that it has sufficient stake to obtain judicial resolution of the controversy.
Having stated the foregoing, it must be emphasized that this Court has the discretion to take cognizance of a suit
which does not satisfy the requirement of legal standing when paramount interest is involved.
[16]
In not a few cases, the
Court has adopted a liberal attitude on the locus standi of a petitioner where the petitioner is able to craft an issue of
transcendental significance to the people.
[17]
Thus, when the issues raised are of paramount importance to the public, the
Court may brush aside technicalities of procedure.
[18]
In this case, a reading of the petition shows that the IBP has
advanced constitutional issues which deserve the attention of this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight
as precedents. Moreover, because peace and order are under constant threat and lawless violence occurs in increasing
tempo, undoubtedly aggravated by the Mindanao insurgency problem, the legal controversy raised in the petition almost
certainly will not go away. It will stare us in the face again. It, therefore, behooves the Court to relax the rules on standing
and to resolve the issue now, rather than later.
10. Prof. Randolf S. David vs. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
G.R. No. 171396, May 3, 2006

FACTS:

These seven (7) consolidated petitions for certiorari and prohibition allege that in issuing Presidential Proclamation No.
1017 (PP 1017) and General Order No. 5 (G.O. No. 5), President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo committed grave abuse of
discretion. Petitioners contend that respondent officials of the Government, in their professed efforts to defend and
preserve democratic institutions, are actually trampling upon the very freedom guaranteed and protected by the
Constitution. Hence, such issuances are void for being unconstitutional.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners have a locus standi.
HELD:

The locus standi of petitioners in G.R. No. 171396, particularly David and Llamas, is beyond doubt. They alleged
"direct injury" resulting from "illegal arrest" and "unlawful search" committed by police operatives pursuant to PP 1017.
Rightly so, the Solicitor General does not question their legal standing.
Locus standi is defined as "a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question."
37
In private suits, standing is
governed by the "real-parties-in interest" rule as contained in Section 2, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended. It provides that "every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest."
Accordingly, the "real-party-in interest" is "the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or the
party entitled to the avails of the suit."
38
Succinctly put, the plaintiffs standing is based on his own right to the relief sought.
The difficulty of determining locus standi arises in public suits. Here, the plaintiff who asserts a "public right" in assailing
an allegedly illegal official action, does so as a representative of the general public. He may be a person who is affected
no differently from any other person. He could be suing as a "stranger," or in the category of a "citizen," or taxpayer." In
either case, he has to adequately show that he is entitled to seek judicial protection. In other words, he has to make out a
sufficient interest in the vindication of the public order and the securing of relief as a "citizen" or "taxpayer.
By way of summary, the following rules may be culled from the cases decided by this Court. Taxpayers, voters, concerned
citizens, and legislators may be accorded standing to sue, provided that the following requirements are met:
(1) the cases involve constitutional issues;
(2) for taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal disbursement of public funds or that the tax measure is
unconstitutional;
(3) for voters, there must be a showing of obvious interest in the validity of the election law in question;
(4) for concerned citizens, there must be a showing that the issues raised are of transcendental importance which
must be settled early; and
(5) for legislators, there must be a claim that the official action complained of infringes upon their prerogatives as
legislators.
Significantly, recent decisions show a certain toughening in the Courts attitude toward legal standing.
11. SANLAKAS VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY [421 SCRA 656; G.R. No. 159085; 3 Feb 2004]

Facts: During the wee hours of July 27, 2003, some three-hundred junior officers and enlisted men of the AFP, acting
upon instigation, command and direction of known and unknown leaders have seized the Oakwood Building in Makati.
Publicly, they complained of the corruption in the AFP and declared their withdrawal of support for thegovernment,
demanding the resignation of the President, Secretary of Defense and the PNP Chief. These acts constitute a violation of
Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code, and by virtue of Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4, the Philippines
was declared under the State of Rebellion. Negotiations took place and the officers went back to their barracks in the
evening of the same day. On August 1, 2003, both the Proclamation and General Orders were lifted, and Proclamation
No. 435, declaring the Cessation of the State of Rebellion was issued.

In the interim, however, the following petitions were filed: (1) SANLAKAS AND PARTIDO NG MANGGAGAWA
VS. EXECUTIVESECRETARY, petitioners contending that Sec. 18 Article VII of the Constitution does not require the
declaration of a state of rebellion to call out the AFP, and that there is no factual basis for such proclamation.
(2)SJS Officers/Members v. Hon. Executive Secretary, et al, petitioners contending that the proclamation is a
circumvention of the report requirement under the same Section 18, Article VII, commanding the President to submit a
report to Congress within 48 hours from the proclamation of martial law. Finally, they contend that the presidential
issuances cannot be construed as an exercise ofemergency powers as Congress has not delegated any such power to
the President. (3) Rep. Suplico et al. v. President Macapagal-Arroyo and Executive Secretary Romulo, petitioners
contending that there was usurpation of the power of Congress granted by Section 23 (2), Article VI of the Constitution.
(4) Pimentel v. Romulo, et al, petitioner fears that the declaration of a state of rebellion "opens the door to the
unconstitutional implementation of warrantless arrests" for the crime of rebellion.

Issues:

Whether or Not the petitioners have a legal standing or locus standi to bring suit.

Held:

Legal standing or locus standi has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has
sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged. The gist of the question
of standing is whether a party alleges "such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete
adverseness which sharpens thepresentation of Issue upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult
constitutional questions. Based on the foregoing, petitioners Sanlakas and PM, and SJS Officers/Members have no legal
standing to sue. Only petitioners Rep. Suplico et al. and Sen. Pimentel, as Members of Congress, have standing to
challenge the subject issuances. It sustained its decision in Philippine Constitution Association v. Enriquez, that the extent
the powers of Congress are impaired, so is the power of each member thereof, since his office confers a right to
participate in the exercise of the powers of that institution.

12. Tatad vs. Secretary of the Department of Energy G.R. No. 124360, November 5, 1997

Facts: The petitions assail the constitutionality of various provisions of RA 8180 entitiled the Downstream Oil Industry
Deregulation Act of 1996. Under the deregulated environment, any person or entity may import or purchase any quantity
of crude oil and petroleum products from a foreign or domestic source, lease or own and operate refineries and other
downstream oil facilities and market such crude oil or use the same for his own requirement, subject only to monitoring by
the Department of Energy.

Issues:

Whether or not the petitioners have the standing to assail the validity of the law

Held:

The effort of respondents to question the legal standing of petitioners also failed. The Court has brightlined its liberal
stance on a petitioners locus standi where the petitioner is able to craft an issue of transcendental significance to the
people. In the case, petitioners pose issues which are significant to the people and which deserve the Courts forthright
resolution. In Kapatiran ng mga Naglilingkod sa Pamahalaan ng Pilipinas, Inc. v. Tan,

we stressed:
Objections to taxpayers' suit for lack of sufficient personality, standing or interest are, however, in the main
procedural matters. Considering the importance to the public of the cases at bar, and in keeping with the Court's
duty, under the 1987 Constitution, to determine whether or not the other branches of government have kept
themselves within the limits of the Constitution and the laws and that they have not abused the discretion given to
them, the Court has brushed aside technicalities of procedure and has taken cognizance of these petitions.
There is not a dot of disagreement between the petitioners and the respondents on the far reaching importance of the
validity of RA No. 8180 deregulating our downstream oil industry. Thus, there is no good sense in being hypertechnical on
the standing of petitioners for they pose issues which are significant to our people and which deserve our forthright
resolution.
13. ESTRADA v SANDIGANBAYAN
Facts:
Petitioner Joseph Estrada prosecuted An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder, wishes to impress
upon the Court that the assailed law is so defectively fashioned that it crosses that thin but distinct line which divides the
valid from the constitutionally infirm. His contentions are mainly based on the effects of the said law that it suffers from the
vice of vagueness; it dispenses with the "reasonable doubt" standard in criminal prosecutions; and it abolishes the
element of mens rea in crimes already punishable under The Revised Penal Code saying that it violates the fundamental
rights of the accused.
The focal point of the case is the alleged vagueness of the law in the terms it uses. Particularly, this terms are:
combination, series and unwarranted. Because of this, the petitioner uses the facial challenge on the validity of the
mentioned law.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner possesses the locus standi to attack the validity of the law using the facial challenge.

Ruling:
On how the law uses the terms combination and series does not constitute vagueness. The petitioners contention
that it would not give a fair warning and sufficient notice of what the law seeks to penalize cannot be plausibly argued.
Void-for-vagueness doctrine is manifestly misplaced under the petitioners reliance since ordinary intelligence can
understand what conduct is prohibited by the statute. It can only be invoked against that specie of legislation that is utterly
vague on its face, wherein clarification by a saving clause or construction cannot be invoked. Said doctrine may not
invoked in this case since the statute is clear and free from ambiguity. Vagueness doctrine merely requires a reasonable
degree of certainty for the statute to be upheld, not absolute precision or mathematical exactitude.
On the other hand, overbreadth doctrine decrees that governmental purpose may not be achieved by means
which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms. Doctrine of strict scrutiny holds
that a facial challenge is allowed to be made to vague statute and to one which is overbroad because of possible chilling
effect upon protected speech. Furthermore, in the area of criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in the area of free
speech. A facial challenge to legislative acts is the most difficult challenge to mount successfully since the challenger
must establish that no set of circumstances exists. Doctrines mentioned are analytical tools developed for facial challenge
of a statute in free speech cases. With respect to such statue, the established rule is that one to who application of a
statute is constitutional will not be heard to attack the statute on the ground that impliedly it might also be taken as
applying to other persons or other situations in which its application might be unconstitutional. On its face invalidation of
statues results in striking them down entirely on the ground that they might be applied to parties not before the Court
whose activities are constitutionally protected. It is evident that the purported ambiguity of the Plunder Law is more
imagined than real.
The crime of plunder as a malum in se is deemed to have been resolve in the Congress decision to include it
among the heinous crime punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. Supreme Court holds the plunder law constitutional
and petition is dismissed for lacking merit.

*Facial Challenge; Overbreadth Doctrine; Void-For-Vagueness Rule
Romualdez vs. COMELEC
Facts:
Petitioners are of legal ages and residents of 113 Mariposa Loop, Mariposa Street, Bagong Lipunan ng Crame, Quezon
City. Carlos S. Romualdez and Erlinda R. Romualdez, applied for registration as new voters with the Office of the Election
Officer of Burauen, Leyte, in their sworn applications, petitioners made false and untruthful representations in violation of
Section 10 of Republic Act Nos. 8189, by indicating therein that they are residents of 935 San Jose Street, Burauen,
Leyte, when in truth and in fact, they were and still are residents of 113 Mariposa Loop, Mariposa Street, Bagong Lipunan
ng Crame, Quezon City, and registered voters of Barangay Bagong Lipunan ng Crame, District IV, Quezon City, Precinct
No. 4419-A and that petitioners intentionally and willfully, did not fill the blank spaces in said applications corresponding to
the length of time which they have resided in Burauen, Leyte. Due to the complaint of Dennis Garay, respondent-spouses,
Carlos Sison Romualdez and Erlinda Reyes Romualdez committed and consummated election offenses in violation of our
election laws, specifically, Sec. 261, paragraph (y), subparagraph (2), for knowingly making any false or untruthful
statements relative to any data or information required in the application for registration, and of Sec. 261, paragraph (y),
subparagraph (5), committed by any person who, being a registered voter, registers anew without filing an application for
cancellation of his previous registration, both of the Omnibus Election Code (BP Blg. 881), and of Sec. 12, RA 8189 (Voter
Registration Act) for failure to apply for transfer of registration records due to change of residence to another city or
municipality."
Issue: Whether or not the petitioners allegation for vagueness of Section 45(j) of Republic Act No. 8189 on the ground
that it contravenes 1987 Constitution will prosper
Rulings:
The petitioners allegation will not prosper. The void-for-vagueness doctrine holds that a law is facially invalid if men of
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. A facial challenge using the
overbreadth doctrine will require the Court to examine and pinpoint its flaws and defects, not on the basis of its actual
operation to petitioners, but on the assumption or prediction that its very existence may cause others not before the Court
to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or expression. A facial challenge on the ground of overbreadth is the most
difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger must establish that there can be no instance when the
assailed law may be valid. Here, petitioners did not even attempt to show whether this situation exists, the petitioners do
not cite a word in the challenged provision, the import or meaning of which they do not understand which proved that their
allegations cannot prosper for lack of merit. It is clear that the law provides for the procedure and proper qualifications in
registration in the COMELEC but still, they violated the law. The court ruled that petitioners must be charged to have been
violated Section 10(g) and (j), in relation to Section 45(j) of Republic Act No. 8189 and must be filed with the RTC. The
case must, thus, be allowed to take its due course.
*Earliest Possible Opportunity
People of the Philippines and HSBC vs. Jose Vera
Facts:
Cu Unjieng was convicted by the trial court in Manila. He filed for reconsideration which was elevated to the SC and the
SC remanded the appeal to the lower court for a new trial. While awaiting new trial, he appealed for probation alleging that
the he is innocent of the crime he was convicted of. Judge Tuason of the Manila CFI directed the appeal to the Insular
Probation Office. The IPO denied the application. However, Judge Vera upon another request by petitioner allowed the
petition to be set for hearing. The City Prosecutor countered alleging that Vera has no power to place Cu Unjieng under
probation because it is in violation of Sec. 11 Act No. 4221 which provides that the act of Legislature granting provincial
boards the power to provide a system of probation to convicted person. Nowhere in the law is stated that the law is
applicable to a city like Manila because it is only indicated therein that only provinces are covered. And even if Manila is
covered by the law it is unconstitutional because Sec 1 Art 3 of the Constitution provides equal protection of laws. The
said law provides absolute discretion to provincial boards and this also constitutes undue delegation of power. Further, the
said probation law may be an encroachment of the power of the executive to provide pardon because providing probation,
in effect, is granting freedom, as in pardon.
Issue: (1) Whether or not the constitutionality of Act No. 4221 has been properly raised in these proceedings; and (2)
whether or not said Act is constitutional
Rulings:
In the case at bar, it is unquestionable that the constitutional issue has been squarely presented not only before this court
by the petitioners but also before the trial court by the private prosecution. The respondent, Hon. Jose O Vera, however,
acting as judge of the court, declined to pass upon the question on the ground that the private prosecutor, not being a
party whose rights are affected by the statute, may not raise said question. While therefore, the court a quo admits that
the constitutional question was raised before it, it refused to consider the question solely because it was not raised by a
proper party. as a general rule, the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity, so that if not
raised by the pleadings, ordinarily it may not be raised at the trial, and if not raised in the trial court, it will not considered
on appeal. Thus, in criminal cases, although there is a very sharp conflict of authorities, it is said that the question may be
raised for the first time at any stage of the proceedings, either in the trial court or on appeal. Even in civil cases, it has
been held that it is the duty of a court to pass on the constitutional question, though raised for the first time on appeal, if it
appears that a determination of the question is necessary to a decision of the case.
The act of granting probation is not the same as pardon. In fact it is limited and is in a way an imposition of penalty. There
is undue delegation of power because there is no set standard provided by Congress on how provincial boards must act
in carrying out a system of probation. The provincial boards are given absolute discretion which is violative of the
constitution and the doctrine of the non delegability of power. Further, it is a violation of equity so protected by the
constitution. The challenged section of Act No. 4221 in section 11 which reads as follows: This Act shall apply only in
those provinces in which the respective provincial boards have provided for the salary of a probation officer at rates not
lower than those now provided for provincial fiscals. Said probation officer shall be appointed by
the Secretary of Justice and shall be subject to the direction of the Probation Office. This only means that only provinces
that can provide appropriation for a probation officer may have a system of probation within their locality. This would mean
to say that convicts in provinces where no probation officer is instituted may not avail of their right to probation. The SC
declared the old probation law as unconstitutional.
*Constitutionality is the lismota of the case
Vicente Sotto vs. COMELEC
Facts:
Respondent Emilio M. Javier was designated in November, 1941, by the late Juan Sumulong, President of the Popular
Front (Sumulong) Party as his substitute or acting President of the Party during his illness, under section 13 of the "Rules
and Regulations of the Party." After the death of Juan Sumulong on January 9, 1942, not only the members of the
Directorate, but also the members of the Party in the convention of January 27, 1946, considered and recognized Emilio
M. Javier as Acting President of the Party. The right of said respondent to act as such President was only questioned after
the meeting of four members of the Directorate in which the said four members adopted a resolution accepting the alleged
resignation of respondent Javier tendered in his letter and designating petitioner Sotto as Acting President.
Vicente Sotto petition for review of the decision of the Commission on Elections which declared respondent Emilio M.
Javier as the true and legitimate President of the Popular Front (Sumulong) Party. The petitioner Vicente Sotto contends
in his petition that he is the President of said Party, and prays that said decision be reviewed and reversed and that
petitioner be declared the legitimate President of the Party.
Issue: (1) Whether or not section 9 of Commonwealth Act No. 657 is constitutional; (2) whether or not the action or
resolution of the four members of the Directorate accepting the said resignation of respondent Javier and designating or
appointing Vicente Sotto as Acting President of the Party, was valid
Rulings:
It is true that Article X, section 2, of the Constitution of the Philippines provides that "decisions, orders and rulings of the
Commission shall be subject to review by the Supreme Court." The Philippine Congress has provided in section 9,
Commonwealth Act No. 657, that decisions, orders and rulings of the Commission on Elections may be reviewed by this
Court by writ of certiorari in accordance with the Rules of Court, we have to apply said provision of Act No. 657, since its
constitutionality is not assailed by the parties in this case, and the presumption is that it is constitutional. It is a well-
established rule that a court should not pass upon a constitutional question and decide a law to be unconstitutional or
invalid, unless such question is raised by the parties, and that when it is raised, if the record also presents some other
ground upon which the court may rest its judgment, that course will be adopted and the constitutional will be left for
consideration until a case arises in which a decision upon such question will be unavoidable.
Commission on Elections' conclusion to the effect that it is not valid, and that respondent Emilio M. Javier continues to be
up to now the acting President of the Popular Front Party (Sumulong), is in conformity with the facts and the law of the
case for the following reasons: He tendered his resignation as acting President of the Party, was not a real resignation.
According to him, he was compelled to write said letter not because he really wanted to resign, but in order to avoid being
molested by the Japanese who wanted to appoint him to some government position. The said meeting of February 1,
1946, was called by the Secretary on January 30, of the same year, without the knowledge and consent of the President
Emilio Javier. The meeting was called without previous notice to all the members of the Directorate, at least to President
Javier. Therefore, Emilio Javier is the legitimate President of Popular Front (Sumulong) Party.
*Constitutionality is the lismota of the case
Arceta vs. Judge Mangrobang
Facts:
Petitioner Ofelia V. Arceta issued checks to Oscar Castro where the petitioner did not have sufficient funds or credit with
the drawee bank for the payment, which check when presented for payment within ninety (90) days from the date thereof
was subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for reason "DRAWN AGAINST INSUFFICIENT FUNDS," and despite
receipt of notice of such dishonor, the accused failed to pay said payee with the face amount of said check or to make
arrangement for full payment thereof within five (5) banking days after receiving notice.
Petitioner Gloria S. Dy did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously make an issue check drawn against
PRUDENTIAL BANK in the amount of P2,500,000.00 to pay Anita Chua well knowing at the time of issue that she has no
sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment which check
was subsequently dishonored for the reason "ACCOUNT CLOSED" and with intent to defraud failed and still fails to pay
the said complainant the amount of P2,500,000.00 despite receipt of notice from the drawee bank that said check has
been dishonored and had not been paid.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioners allegation of the constitutionality of B.P 22 is tenable
Rulings:
When the issue of unconstitutionality of a legislative act is raised, it is the established doctrine that the Court may exercise
its power of judicial review only if the following requisites are present: (1) an actual and appropriate case and controversy
exists; (2) a personal and substantial interest of the party raising the constitutional question; (3) the exercise of judicial
review is pleaded at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the constitutional question raised is the very lis mota of the case.
Thus, the petitioners should have moved to quash the separate indictments or moved to dismiss the cases in the
proceedings in the trial courts on the ground of unconstitutionality of B.P. Blg. 22. But the records show that petitioners
failed to initiate such moves in the proceedings. This Court could not entertain questions on the invalidity of a statute
where that issue was not specifically raised, insisted upon, and adequately argued.

Taking into account the early stage of
the trial proceedings below, the instant petitions are patently premature. Nor do we find the constitutional question herein
raised to be the very lis mota presented in the controversy below. Every law has in its favor the presumption of
constitutionality, and to justify its nullification, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution and not
one that is doubtful, speculative or argumentative. Therefore, the petitioners allegation is untenable.
*D. Effects of Declaration of Unconstitutionality
Concurring Opinion of Justice Fernando in Federico Fernandez vs. P. Cuerva & Co.
Facts:
Plaintiff Federico Fernandez was employed as salesman by defendant P. Cuerva & Co. After his separation from the
service, plaintiff filed a claim to recover unpaid salaries and commissions, and separation pay, defendant filed a motion to
dismiss the complaint upon the grounds that the actions had prescribed and that the court had no jurisdiction over the
case. The court below, after allowing the parties to submit their respective memorandum on the questions of prescription
and jurisdiction, dismissed the case. The action to recover the same was already barred under Section 17 of said Act
inasmuch as it was not brought within three years from the time the right of action accrued; and that because the
remaining claim of plaintiff was limited to his separation pay the action to collect the same was not within the original
jurisdiction of the court. plaintiff's action to recover the amount held by defendant as bond is already barred because more
than three years had elapsed by the time plaintiff instituted the present case.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioner is still entitled for the benefits of Reorganization Plan No. 20-A after its declaration of
unconstitutionality
Rulings:
Reorganization Plan No. 20-A was promulgated pursuant to Republic Act 997, and under Section 25 of said
reorganization plan each regional office of the Department of Labor was vested with original and exclusive jurisdiction
over all cases affecting all money claims arising from violations of labor standards on working conditions such as unpaid
wages, underpayment, overtime and separation pay, etc., to the exclusion of courts. We have taken note of the fact that
on June 30, 1961, Section 25 of Reorganization Plan No. 20-A had been declared unconstitutional by this Court. It
appears, however, that the plaintiff had filed his claim before Regional Office No. 4 of the Department of Labor on July 26,
1960, or about one year before said Section 25 had been declared unconstitutional. The circumstance that Section 25 of
Reorganization Plan No. 20-A had been declared unconstitutional should not be counted against the defendant in the
present case.
The Court believes that it is only fair and just that the foregoing doctrine should be applied in favor of the plaintiff in the
present case. As shown in the record that it was precisely because Section 25 of Reorganization Plan No. 20-A was
declared unconstitutional by this Court on June 30, 1961 that the plaintiff, without awaiting the action of Regional Office
No. 4 of the Department of Labor on the claim that he filed on July 26, 1960, instituted his action in the present case in the
court below on December 17, 1962. The move of plaintiff was precisely intended to protect his right of action from the
adverse effect of the decision of this Court.
*D. Effects of Declaration of Unconstitutionality
Republic of the Philippines vs. Julio Herida
Facts:
Defendant Julio Herida issued a promissory note in favor of the Bank of Taiwan, Ltd. All the promissory notes bear
interest at the rate of 6% per annum compounded quarterly. To secure the prompt and full payment of the loans,
defendant Julio Herida executed two real estate mortgages affecting six parcels of land. The contract further provides that
upon failure of the mortgagor to comply with the terms and conditions stipulated in the contract, defendant win pay 10% of
the total indebtedness but not less than P200.00 as attorneys's fees and to pay the costs.
Issue: Whether or not the moratorium laws: Executive Order No. 25 of November 10, 1944; Executive Order No. 32 of
1945, amending the former; and, Act No. 342 are applicable to the loans at bar
Rulings:
Since the moratorium laws were declared unconstitutional only on May 18, 1953, the ten-year period within which to bring
the action against the appellant began the next day or, to be precise, on May 19, 1953. Appellee's cause of action will,
therefore, prescribe only on May 19, 1963. The complaint in this case was filed on November 27, 1961. Consequently, the
ten-year period within which to bring the action has not yet prescribed. The appeal must be dismissed. The promissory
notes executed by the appellant in favor of the Bank of Taiwan, Ltd. were due for payment on May 10, 1944, June 8, 1944
and June 10, 1944, respectively. Ordinarily, the counting of the prescriptive period should be reckoned from said dates
when appellant's debts became due and demandable. said laws were in effect from the time of their respective
promulgations until May 18, 1953. As a consequence, before they were declared unconstitutional, they suspended the
running of the prescriptive period during their effectivity. Thus, the 10-year period within which to institute the action
against herein appellant began the day after the moratorium laws were declared unconstitutional or, to be precise, on May
19, 1953. Appellee's cause of action will therefore prescribe only on May 19, 1963. The complaint in this case was filed in
November 1961, which is within the 10 year period and, therefore, the action has not yet prescribed.
*Partial Constitutionality
(E. Doctrine of Operative Fact)
Planters Products, Inc. vs. Fertiphil Corporation
Facts:

Petitioner PPI and respondent Fertiphil are private corporations incorporated under Philippine laws, both engaged in the
importation and distribution of fertilizers, pesticides and agricultural chemicals. Marcos issued Letter of Instruction (LOI)
1465, imposing a capital recovery component of Php10.00 per bag of fertilizer. The levy was to continue until adequate
capital was raised to make PPI financially viable. Fertiphil remitted to the Fertilizer and Pesticide Authority (FPA), which
was then remitted the depository bank of PPI. Fertiphil paid P6,689,144 to FPA from 1985 to 1986. After the 1986 Edsa
Revolution, FPA voluntarily stopped the imposition of the P10 levy. Fertiphil demanded from PPI a refund of the amount it
remitted, however PPI refused. Fertiphil filed a complaint for collection and damages, questioning the constitutionality of
LOI 1465, claiming that it was unjust, unreasonable, oppressive, invalid and an unlawful imposition that amounted to a
denial of due process. PPI argues that Fertiphil has no locus standi to question the constitutionality of LOI No. 1465
because it does not have a "personal and substantial interest in the case or will sustain direct injury as a result of its
enforcement." It asserts that Fertiphil did not suffer any damage from the imposition because "incidence of the levy fell on
the ultimate consumer or the farmers themselves, not on the seller fertilizer company.
Issue: (1) Whether or not Fertiphil has locus standi to question the constitutionality of LOI No. 1465. (2) whether or not the
doctrine of operative fact is applicable in this case
Rulings:
The doctrine of locus standi or the right of appearance in a court of justice has been adequately discussed by this Court in
a catena of cases. Succinctly put, the doctrine requires a litigant to have a material interest in the outcome of a case. In
private suits, locus standi requires a litigant to be a "real party in interest," which is defined as "the party who stands to be
benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the avails of the suit." Therefore, Fertiphil has locus
standi because it suffered direct injury; doctrine of standing is a mere procedural technicality which may be waived.
The refund is a mere consequence of the law being declared unconstitutional. The RTC surely cannot order PPI to refund
Fertiphil if it does not declare the LOI unconstitutional. It is the unconstitutionality of the LOI which triggers the refund. The
doctrine of operative fact, as an exception to the general rule, only applies as a matter of equity and fair play. It nullifi es
the effects of an unconstitutional law by recognizing that the existence of a statute prior to a determination of
unconstitutionality is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot always be ignored. The past cannot
always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The doctrine is applicable when a declaration of unconstitutionality will
impose an undue burden on those who have relied on the invalid law. Thus, it was applied to a criminal case when a
declaration of unconstitutionality would put the accused in double jeopardy or would put in limbo the acts done by a
municipality in reliance upon a law creating it.
Here, the Court does not find anything iniquitous in ordering PPI to refund the amounts paid by Fertiphil under LOI No.
1465. It unduly benefited from the levy. It was proven during the trial that the levies paid were remitted and deposited to its
bank account. Quite the reverse, it would be inequitable and unjust not to order a refund. To do so would unjustly enrich
PPI at the expense of Fertiphil. Article 22 of the Civil Code explicitly provides that "every person who, through an act of
performance by another comes into possession of something at the expense of the latter without just or legal ground shall
return the same to him." The Court cannot allow PPI to profit from an unconstitutional law. Justice and equity dictate that
PPI must refund the amounts paid by Fertiphil.
*Partial Constitutionality
(E. Doctrine of Operative Fact)
Union of Filipino Employees vs. Benigno Vivar, Jr., et al.
Facts:
This labor dispute stems from the exclusion of sales personnel from the holiday pay award and the change of the divisor
in the computation of benefits from 251 to 261 days. On November 8, 1985, respondent Filipro, Inc. (now Nestle
Philippines, Inc.) filed with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) a petition for declaratory relief seeking a
ruling on its rights and obligations respecting claims of its monthly paid employees for holiday pay.
Both Filipro and the Union of Filipino Employees (UFE) agreed to submit the case for voluntary arbitration and appointed
respondent Benigno Vivar, Jr. as voluntary arbitrator.

Filipro filed a motion for clarification seeking (1) the limitation of the award to three years, (2) the exclusion of salesmen,
sales representatives, truck drivers, merchandisers and medical representatives (hereinafter referred to as sales
personnel) from the award of the holiday pay, and (3) deduction from the holiday pay award of overpayment for overtime,
night differential, vacation and sick leave benefits due to the use of 251 divisor. (Rollo, pp. 138-145)

Petitioner UFE answered that the award should be made effective from the date of effectivity of the Labor Code, that their
sales personnel are not field personnel and are therefore entitled to holiday pay, and that the use of 251 as divisor is an
established employee benefit which cannot be diminished.
Issue: Whether or not the non-payment of the holiday benefit of Nestle is valid
Rulings:
Nestle's non-payment of the holiday benefit up to the promulgation of the IBAA case on October 23, 1984 was in
compliance with these presumably valid rule and policy instruction.
The "operative fact" doctrine realizes that in declaring a law or rule null and void, undue harshness and resulting
unfairness must be avoided. Applying the aforementioned doctrine to the case at bar, it is not far-fetched that Nestle,
relying on the implicit validity of the implementing rule and policy instruction before this Court nullified them, and thinking
that it was not obliged to give holiday pay benefits to its monthly paid employees, may have been moved to grant other
concessions to its employees, especially in the collective bargaining agreement. This possibility is bolstered by the fact
that respondent Nestle's employees are among the highest paid in the industry. With this consideration, it would be unfair
to impose additional burdens on Nestle when the non-payment of the holiday benefits up to 1984 was not in any way
attributed to Nestle's fault. The Court thereby resolves that the grant of holiday pay be effective, not from the date of
promulgation of the Chartered Bank case nor from the date of effectivity of the Labor Code, but from October 23, 1984,
the date of promulgation of the IBAA case.





*Police Power
(A. Definition)
Churchill vs. Rafferty
Facts:
The case arises from the fact that defendant, Collector of Internal Revenue, would like to destroy or remove any sign,
signboard, or billboard, the property of the plaintiffs, for the sole reason that such sign, signboard, or billboard is, or may
be offensive to the sight. The plaintiffs allege otherwise.
Issue: Was there valid exercise of police power in this case?
Rulings:
Yes. There can be no doubt that the exercise of the police power of the Philippine Government belongs to the Legislature
and that this power is limited only by the Acts of Congress and those fundamentals principles which lie at the foundation
of all republican forms of government. An Act of the Legislature which is obviously and undoubtedly foreign to any of the
purposes of the police power and interferes with the ordinary enjoyment of property would, without doubt, be held to be
invalid. But where the Act is reasonably within a proper consideration of and care for the public health, safety, or comfort,
it should not be disturbed by the courts.
The power vested in the legislature by the constitution to make, ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome and
reasonable laws, statutes, and ordinances, either with penalties or without, not repugnant to the constitution, as they shall
judge to be for the good and welfare of the commonwealth, and of the subjects of the same. The police power of the
State, so far, has not received a full and complete definition. It may be said, however, to be the right of the State, or state
functionary, to prescribe regulations for the good order, peace, health, protection, comfort, convenience and morals of the
community, which do not violate any of the provisions of the organic law.
(B. Characteristics & Foundation)
Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc. vs. Mayor of Manila
Facts:
The Manila Municipal Board enacted Ordinance 4760 and the same was approved by then acting mayor Astorga.
Ordinance 4760 sought to regulate hotels and motels. It classified them into 1
st
class and 2
nd
class. It also compelled
hotels/motels to get the demographics of anyone who checks into their rooms to compelled hotels/motels to have open
spaces so as not to conceal the identity of their patrons. Ermita-Malate impugned the validity of the law averring such
oppressive, arbitrary and against due process. The lower court as well as the appellate court ruled in favor of Ermita-
Malate.
Issue: Whether or not Ordinance 4760 is valid
Rulings:
The SC ruled in favor of Astorga. There is a presumption that the law enacted by Congress is valid. Without showing a
strong foundation of invalidity, the presumption stays. As in this case, there was only a stipulation of facts and such
cannot prevail over the presumption. Further, the ordinance is a valid exercise of Police Power. There is no question but
that the challenge ordinance was precisely enacted to minimize certain practices hurtful to public morals. This is to
minimize prostitution. The increase in taxes not only discourages the hotels/motels in doing any business other than legal
but also increases the revenue of LGU concerned. And taxation is a valid exercise of police power as well. The due
process contention is likewise untenable; due process has no exact definition but has reason as a standard. In this case,
the precise reason why the ordinance was enacted was to curb down prostitution in the city which is enough reason and
cannot be defeated by mere singling out of the provisions of the said ordinance alleged to be vague.
The mere fact, that some individuals in the community may be deprived of their present business or a particular mode of
earning a living cannot prevent the exercise of the police power. As was said in a case, persons licensed to pursue
occupations which may in the public need and interest be affected by the exercise of the police power embark in these
occupations subject to the disadvantages which may result from the legal exercise of that power. With all due allowance
for the arguments pressed with such vigor and determination, the attack against the validity of the challenged ordinance
cannot be considered a success. Respect for constitutional law principles so uniformly held and so uninterruptedly
adhered to by this Court compels a reversal of the appealed decision.
(B. Characteristics & Foundation)
U.S. vs. Toribio
Facts:
In the town of Carmen, in the Province of Bohol, Toribio applied for a license to have his carabao be slaughtered. His
request was denied because his carabao is found not to be unfit for work. He nevertheless slaughtered his carabao
without the necessary license. He was eventually sued and was sentenced by the trial court. His counsel in one way or
the other argued that the law mandating that one should acquire a permit to slaughter his carabao is not a valid exercise
of police power.
Issue: Whether or not sections 30 and 33 of Act No. 1147 is valid
Rulings:
The SC ruled against Toribio. From what has been said, we think it is clear that the enactment of the provisions of the
statute under consideration was required by "the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a
particular class;" and that the prohibition of the slaughter of carabaos for human consumption, so long as these animals
are fit for agricultural work or draft purposes was a "reasonably necessary" limitation on private ownership, to protect the
community from the loss of the services of such animals by their slaughter by improvident owners, tempted either by
greed of momentary gain, or by a desire to enjoy the luxury of animal food, even when by so doing the productive power
of the community may be measurably and dangerously affected. The SC explained that it is not a taking of the property
for public use, within the meaning of the constitution, but is a just and legitimate exercise of the power of the legislature to
regulate and restrain such particular use of the property as would be inconsistent with or injurious to the rights of the
public. All property is acquired and held under the tacit condition that it shall not be so used as to injure the equal rights of
others or greatly impair the public rights and interests of the community.
(C. Nature & Extent)
Lim vs. Pacquing
Facts:
Manila mayor Alfredo S. Lim is directed to issue the permit/license to operate the jai-alai in favor of Associated
Development Corporation (ADC). In the present case, the resulting injustice and injury, should the national government's
allegations be proven correct, are manifest, since the latter has squarely questioned the very existence of a valid
franchise to maintain and operate the jai-alai (which is a gambling operation) in favor of ADC. Since ADC has no franchise
from Congress to operate the jai-alai, it may not so operate even if it has a license or permit from the City Mayor to
operate the jai-alai in the City of Manila. While jai-alai as a sport is not illegal per se, the accepting of bets or wagers on
the results of jai-alai games is undoubtedly gambling and, therefore, a criminal offense.
Issue: Whether or not PD No. 771 is constitutional
Rulings:
ADC argues that PD No. 771 is unconstitutional for being violative of the equal protection and non-impairment provisions
of the Constitution. It cannot be argued that the control and regulation of gambling do not promote public morals and
welfare. Gambling is essentially antagonistic and self-reliance. It breeds indolence and erodes the value of good, honest
and hard work. It is, as very aptly stated by PD No. 771, a vice and a social ill which government must minimize (if not
eradicate) in pursuit of social and economic development. It should also be remembered that PD No. 771 provides that
the national government can subsequently grant franchises "upon proper application and verification of the qualifications
of the applicant." ADC has not alleged that it filed an application for a franchise with the national government subsequent
to the enactment of PD No. 771; thus, the allegations abovementioned (of preference to a select group) are based on
conjectures, speculations and imagined biases which do not warrant the consideration of this Court.
On the other hand, the government contends that PD No. 771 is a valid exercise of the inherent police power of the State.
The police power has been described as the least limitable of the inherent powers of the State. It is based on the ancient
doctrine salus populi est suprema lex (the welfare of the people is the supreme law.) The police power of the State is a
power co-extensive with self-protection, and is not inaptly termed the "law of overruling necessity." It may be said to be
that inherent and plenary power in the State which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare
of society. Carried onward by the current of legislation, the judiciary rarely attempts to dam the onrushing power of
legislative discretion, provided the purposes of the law do not go beyond the great principles that mean security for the
public welfare or do not arbitrarily interfere with the right of the individual. Therefore, PD No. 771 is presumed valid and
constitutional.
(D. Who may exercise the power?)
Metro Manila Development Authority vs. Bel-Air Village Association
Facts:
Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA), petitioner herein, is a Government Agency tasked with the delivery
of basic services in Metro Manila. Bel-Air Village Association (BAVA), respondent herein, received a letter of request from
the petitioner to open Neptune Street of Bel-Air Village for the use of the public. The said opening of Neptune Street will
be for the safe and convenient movement of persons and to regulate the flow of traffic in Makati City. This was pursuant to
MMDA law or Republic Act No. 7924. On the same day, the respondent was appraised that the perimeter wall separating
the subdivision and Kalayaan Avenue would be demolished.

The respondent, to stop the opening of the said street and demolition of the wall, filed a preliminary injunction and a
temporary restraining order. Respondent claimed that the MMDA had no authority to do so and the lower court decided in
favor of the respondent. Petitioner appealed the decision of the lower courts and claimed that it has the authority to open
Neptune Street to public traffic because it is an agent of the State that can practice police power in the delivery of basic
services in Metro Manila.
Issue: Whether or not the MMDA has the mandate to open Neptune Street to public traffic pursuant to its regulatory and
police powers.
Rulings:
The Court held that the MMDA does not have the capacity to exercise police power. Police power is primarily lodged in
the National Legislature. However, police power may be delegated to government units. Petitioner herein is a
development authority and not a political government unit. Therefore, the MMDA cannot exercise police power because it
cannot be delegated to them. It is not a legislative unit of the government. Republic Act No. 7924 does not empower the
MMDA to enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the inhabitants of
Manila. There is no syllable in the said act that grants MMDA police power.

It is an agency created for the purpose of laying down policies and coordinating with various national government
agencies, peoples organizations, non-governmental organizations and the private sector for the efficient and expeditious
delivery of basic services in the vast metropolitan area.
(D. Who may exercise the power?)
Metro Manila Development Authority vs. Garin
Facts:
Dante O. Garin, a lawyer, who was issued a traffic violation receipt (TVR) and his driver's license confiscated for parking
illegally along Gandara Street, Binondo, Manila. The respondent further contended that the provision violates the
constitutional prohibition against undue delegation of legislative authority, allowing as it does the MMDA to fix and impose
unspecified and therefore unlimited - fines and other penalties on erring motorists. In support of his application for a writ
of preliminary injunction, Garin alleged that he suffered and continues to suffer great and irreparable damage because of
the deprivation of his license and that, absent any implementing rules from the Metro Manila Council, the TVR and the
confiscation of his license have no legal basis. The petitioner further argues that revocation or suspension of this privilege
does not constitute a taking without due process as long as the licensee is given the right to appeal the revocation.
Issue: Whether or not the confiscation, suspension or revocation of the license of motorists are within the scope of the
powers of MMDA
Rulings:
Republic Act No. 7924 does not grant the MMDA with police power, let alone legislative power, and that all its functions
are administrative in nature. Tracing the legislative history of Rep. Act No. 7924 creating the MMDA, we concluded that
the MMDA is not a local government unit or a public corporation endowed with legislative power, and, unlike its
predecessor, the Metro Manila Commission, it has no power to enact ordinances for the welfare of the community.
We restate here the doctrine in the said decision as it applies to the case at bar: police power, as an inherent attribute of
sovereignty, is the power vested by the Constitution in the legislature to make, ordain, and establish all manner of
wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes and ordinances, either with penalties or without, not repugnant to the
Constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the commonwealth, and for the subjects of the same.
The MMDA was intended to coordinate services with metro-wide impact that transcend local political boundaries or would
entail huge expenditures if provided by the individual LGUs, especially with regard to transport and traffic management,
and we are aware of the valiant efforts of the petitioner to untangle the increasingly traffic-snarled roads of Metro Manila.
But these laudable intentions are limited by the MMDA's enabling law, which we can but interpret, and petitioner must be
reminded that its efforts in this respect must be authorized by a valid law, or ordinance, or regulation arising from a
legitimate source.
Lucena Grand Central Terminal, Inc., vs JAC Liner
Facts:

Respondent, JAC Liner, Inc., a common carrier operating buses assailed via a petition for prohibition and injunction
against the City of Lucena, its Mayor, and the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Lucena City, City Ordinance Nos. 1631 and
1778 as unconstitutional on the ground that the same constituted an invalid exercise of police power, an undue taking of
private property. The provisions of the ordinances are to wit:

Ordinance No. 1631 AN ORDINANCE GRANTING THE LUCENA GRAND CENTRAL TERMINAL, INC., A FRANCHISE
TO CONSTRUCT, FINANCE, ESTABLISH, OPERATE AND MAINTAIN A COMMON BUS-JEEPNEY TERMINAL
FACULTY IN THE CITY OF LUCENA.

SECTION 1. There is herby grabted to the Lucena Grand Central Terminal, Inc., its successors or assigns, hereinafter
referred to as the grantee, a franchise to construct, finance, establish, operate, and maintain a common bus-jeepney
terminal facility in the City of Lucena.

SECTION 2 This franchise shall continue for a period of 25 years, counted from the approval of this ordinance, and
renewable at the option of the grantee for another period of 25 years upon such expiration.
SECTION 4. Responsibilities and Obligations of the City Government of Lucena. During the existence of the franchise,
the City Government of Lucena shall have the following responsibilities and obligations:
(c) It shall not grant any third party any privilege and/or concession to operate a bus, mini-bus and/or jeepney terminal.
Ordinance No. 1778 - AN ORDINANCE REGULATING THE ENTRANCE TO THE CITY OF LUCENA OF ALL BUSES,
MINI-BUSES AND OUT-OF-TOWN PASSENGER JEEPNEYS AND FOR THIS PURPOSE, AMENDING ORDINACE NO.
1420, SERIES OF 1993, AND ORDINANCE NO. 1557, SERIES OF 1995
SECTION 1. The entrance to the City of Lucena of all buses, mini-buses and out-of-town passenger jeepneys is hereby
regulated as follows:
(a) All buses, mini-buses and out-of-town passenger jeepneys shall be prohibited from entering the cityand are
hereby directed to proceed to the common terminal, for picking-up and/or dropping of their passengers.
(b) All temporary terminals in the City of Lucena are hereby declared inoperable starting from the effectivity of
this ordinance.
SECTION 3. a) Section 1 of Ordinance No. 1557, Series of 1995, is hereby amended to read as follows:
Buses, mini-buses, and jeepney type mini-buses from other municipalities and/or local government units going to Lucena
City are directed to proceed to the Common Terminal located at Diversion Road, Brgy. Ilayang Dupay, to unload and load
passengers.
c) Section 3 of Ordinance No. 1557, Series of 1995, is hereby amended to read as follows:
Passenger buses, mini-buses, and jeepney type mini-buses coming from other municipalities and/or local
government units shall utilize the facilities of the Lucena Grand Central Terminal at Diversion Road, Brgy. Ilayang
Dupay, this City, and no other terminals shall be situated inside or within the City of Lucena;
d) Section 4 of Ordinance No. 1557, Series of 1995, is hereby amended to read as follows:
Passenger buses, mini-buses, and jeepney type mini-buses coming from other municipalities and/or local
government units shall avail of the facilities of the Lucena Grand Central Terminal which is hereby designated as
the officially sanctioned common terminal for the City of Lucena;
e) Section 5 of Ordinance No. 1557, Series of 1995, is hereby amended to read as follows:
The Lucena Grand Central Terminal is the permanent common terminal as this is the entity which was
given the exclusive franchise by the Sangguniang Panglungsod under Ordinance No. 1631;

These ordinances were professedly aimed towards alleviating the traffic congestion alleged to have been caused by the
existence of various bus and jeepney terminals within the City as stated in the WHEREAS CLAUSE

Trail Court declared Ordinance 1631 as valid, having been issued in the exercise of the police power of the City Govt of
Lucena insofar as the grant of franchise to the Lucena Grand Central Terminal, Inc. to construct, finance, establish,
operate and maintain common bus-jeepney terminal facility in the City of Lucena. However Section 4 was illegal for it
contravenes RA 7160, The Local Govt Code. Ordinance 1778 was declared null and void for it is oppressive and
unreasonable exercise of police power. Thus, ordered the prohibition and injunction for its implementation.

Issue: Whether or not the Lucena City properly exercised its police power when it enacted the subject ordinance.

Ruling:

As with the State, the local government maybe considered as having properly exercised its police power only if the
following requisites are met: (1) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class,
require the interference of the state; (2) the means employed are reasonably necessary for the attainment of the object
sough to be accomplished and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. Otherwise stated, there must be a concurrence of
a lawful subject and lawful method.

The traffic congestion is a public, not merely a private, concern, cannot be gainsaid. The questioned ordinances having
been enacted with the objective of relieving traffic congestion in the City of Lucena, they involve public interest warranting
the interference of the State. The first requisite for the proper exercise of police power is thus present.

With the aim of localizing the source of traffic congestion in the city to a single location, the subject ordinances prohibit the
operation of all bus and jeepney terminals within Lucena City, including those already existing and allow the operation of
only one common terminal located outside the city proper, the franchise for which granted to petitioner. The common
carriers plying routes to and from Lucena City are thus compelled to close down their existing terminals and use the
facilities of petitioner. Through this means, the second requisite fails. Bus terminals per se do not, however, impede or
help impede the flow of traffic. The scope of the proscription against the maintenance of terminals is so broad that even
entities which might be able to provide facilities better than the franchised terminal are barred from operating at all. The
grant of an exclusive franchise to petitioner has not been shown to be the only solution to the problem. As for petitioners
claim that the challenged ordinances have actually been proven effective in easing traffic congestion; Whether an
ordinance is effective is an issue different from whether it is reasonably necessary. It is its reasonableness, not its
effectiveness, which bears upon its constitutionality. If the constitutionality of a law were measured by its effectiveness,
then even tyrannical laws may be justified whenever they happen to be effective.

Taxicab Operators of Manila,Inc., Felicisimo Cabigao and Ace Transportation Corp vs The Board of
Transportation and the Director of the Bureau of Land Transportation
Facts:

Petitioners Taxicab Operators of Manila, Inc. (TOMMI), a domestic corporation composed of taxicab operators and
grantee of Certificates of Public Convenience to operate taxicabs within Metro Manila and to any other parts of Luzon,
Felicisimo Cabigao and Ace Transportation Corp, two of the members of TOMMI, seek to declare the nullity of
Memorandum Circular No. 77-42 of the Board of Transportation (BOT) and Memorandum Circular No.52 of the Bureau of
Land Transportation. The assailed memoranda are to wit:

Memorandum Circular No. 77-42 (issued by BOT)
SUBJECT: Phasing out and Replacement of Old and Dilapidated Taxis
WHEREAS, it is the policy of the government to insure that only safe and comfortable units are used as public
conveyances;
WHEREAS, the riding public, particularly in Metro-Manila, has, time and again, complained against, and
condemned, the continued operation of old and dilapidated taxis;
WHEREAS, in order that the commuting public may be assured of comfort, convenience, and safety, a program of
phasing out of old and dilapidated taxis should be adopted;
WHEREAS, after studies and inquiries made by the Board of Transportation, the latter believes that in six years of
operation, a taxi operator has not only covered the cost of his taxis, but has made reasonable profit for his
investments;
NOW, THEREFORE, pursuant to this policy, the Board hereby declares that no car beyond six years shall be
operated as taxi, and in implementation of the same hereby promulgates the following rules and regulations:
1. As of December 31, 1977, all taxis of Model 1971 and earlier are ordered withdrawn from public service and
thereafter may no longer be registered and operated as taxis. In the registration of cards for 1978, only taxis of
Model 1972 and later shall be accepted for registration and allowed for operation;
2. As of December 31, 1978, all taxis of Model 1972 are ordered withdrawn from public service and
thereafter may no longer be registered and operated as taxis. In the registration of cars for 1979, only
taxis of Model 1973 and later shall be accepted for registration and allowed for operation; and every year
thereafter, there shall be a six-year lifetime of taxi, to wit:
1980 Model 1974
1981 Model 1975, etc.
All taxis of earlier models than those provided above are hereby ordered withdrawn from public service as
of the last day of registration of each particular year and their respective plates shall be surrendered
directly to the Board of Transportation for subsequent turnover to the Land Transportation Commission.
For an orderly implementation of this Memorandum Circular, the rules herein shall immediately be effective in Metro-
Manila. Its implementation outside Metro- Manila shall be carried out only after the project has been implemented in
Metro-Manila and only after the date has been determined by the Board.

Memorandum Circular No. 52 (issued by BLT)

Pursuant to BOT Memo-Circular No. 77-42, taxi units with year models over six (6) years old are now banned from
operating as public utilities in Metro Manila. As such the units involved should be considered as automatically dropped as
public utilities and, therefore, do not require any further dropping order from the BOT.
Henceforth, taxi units within the National Capitol Region having year models over 6 years old shall be refused registration.
The following schedule of phase-out is herewith prescribed for the guidance of all concerned:
Year Model Automatic
Phase-Out
Year
1980
1974 1981
1975 1982
1976 1983
1977
etc. etc.
Petitioners contend that they were denied procedural due process for they were not caged upon to submit their position
papers, nor were they ever summoned to attend any conference prior to the issuance of the questioned BOT circular and
that their rights to equal protection of the law because the same is being enforced in Metro Manila only and is directed
solely towards the taxi industry.
.
Issue: Whether or not the contention of the petitioners is tenable.

Ruling:

On Procedural and Substantive Due Process:
Presidential Decree No. 101 grants to the Board of Transportation the power
4. To fix just and reasonable standards, classification, regulations, practices, measurements, or service to
be furnished, imposed, observed, and followed by operators of public utility motor vehicles.
Section 2 of said Decree provides procedural guidelines for said agency to follow in the exercise of its powers:
Sec. 2. Exercise of powers. In the exercise of the powers granted in the preceding section, the Board
shag proceed promptly along the method of legislative inquiry.
Apart from its own investigation and studies, the Board, in its discretion, may require the cooperation and
assistance of the Bureau of Transportation, the Philippine Constabulary, particularly the Highway Patrol
Group, the support agencies within the Department of Public Works, Transportation and
Communications, or any other government office or agency that may be able to furnish useful information
or data in the formulation of the Board of any policy, plan or program in the implementation of this Decree.
The Board may also can conferences, require the submission of position papers or other documents, information, or data
by operators or other persons that may be affected by the implementation of this Decree, or employ any other suitable
means of inquiry.

PD No. 101 accorded the BOT a wide range of choice in gathering necessary information or data in the formulation of any
policy, plan or program. It is not mandatory that it should first call a conference or require a submission of position papers
or other documents from operators or persons who maybe affected, this being only one of the options open to the Board,
which is given wide range of discretionary authority. Petitioners cannot justifiably claim, therefore, that they were deprived
of procedural due process.

The contention that fixing the ceiling at six(6) years is arbitrary and oppressive because the roadworthiness of taxicabs
depends upon their kind of maintenance and the use to which they are subjected, and, therefore, their actual physical
condition should be taken into consideration at the time of registration. A reasonable standard must be adopted to apply to
any vehicles affected uniformly, fairly and justly. The span of six years supplies that reasonable standard. The product of
experience shows that by that time taxis have fully depreciated, their cost recovered, and a fair return on investment
obtained. With that standard of reasonableness and absence of arbitrariness, the requirement of due process has been
met.

On Equal Protection Clause:
The Boards reason for enforcing the Circular initially in Metro Manila is that taxicabs in this city, compared to other
places, are subjected to heavier traffic pressure and more constant use. Considering that traffic conditions are not the
same in every city, a substantial distinction exists so that infringement of the equal protection clause can hardly be
successfully claimed.

The State, in the exercise of its police power, can prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, good order,
safety and general welfare of the people. It can prohibit all things hurtful to comfort, safety and welfare of society.

Equal protection clause does not imply that the same treatment be accorded all and sundry. It applies to things or persons
identically or similarly situated. It permits of classifications of the object or subject of the law provided classification is
reasonable or based on substantial distinction which make for real differences, and that it must apply equally to each
member of the class. What is required under the equal protection clause is the uniform operation by legal means so that
all persons under identical or similar circumstance would be accorded the same treatment both in privilege conferred and
the liabilities imposed.

Petition is dismissed.

Sangalang vs Intermediate Appellate Court, and AYALA Corporation
Facts:

Bel-Air Village was owned and developed into a residential subdivision by Makati Devt Corp which later merged with
Ayala Corp. Owners of lot/s is required to be and is automatically a member of the Bel-Air Village Association (BAVA) and
must abide to such rules and regulations laid down therein including the deed of restriction which states that lots therein
shall not serve for commercial purposes but only for residential purposes. Makati City council enacted Ordinance 81
providing for the zonification of Makati in which Bel-air Village was classified as class A Residential Zone with its boundary
in the south extending to the center line of Jupiter Street which is a commercial zone. BAVA installed gates at strategic
locations across Jupiter Street manned by its own security guards for the maintenance, supervision and enforcement of
traffic regulations in the roads and streets of the village.

Office of the Makati City Mayor then ordered for the opening the Jupiter Street from Makati Ave to Reposo Street for
public use and opened a vehicular and pedestrian traffic the entire portion of Jupiter Street. Finally, municipal officials
opened, destroyed and removed the gates constructed at Jupiter Street and Makati Ave forcibly and then opened the
entire length of Jupiter Street to public traffic. Petitioners then filed for specific performance and damages against Ayala
Corp.

Issue: Whether or not the opening of Jupiter Street for public traffic is a lawful subject in the exercise of police power

Ruling:

Ayala Corp was not liable for the opening of Jupiter Street to the general public for said street is not covered by the
restrictive easements based on the dded restrictions but chiefly because the National Govt itself, thru the Metro Manila
Commission(MMC) had reclassified Jupiter Street into high density commercial zone.

It is not that restrictive easements, especially easements herein question, are invalid or ineffective. As far as the Bel-air
subdivision itself is concerned, certainly, they are valid and enforceable. But they are, like all contracts, subject to the
overriding demands, needs and interests of the greater number as the State may determine in the legitimate exercise of
police power. Our jurisdiction guarantees sanctity of contract and is said to be the law between the contracting parties,
but while it is so, it cannot contravene law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy. Above all it cannot be a
deterrent to police power, designed precisely to promote health, safety, peace, and enhance the common good, at the
expense of contractual rights whenever necessary. Petitions denied.

Miners Association of the Philippines
vs Hon. Fulgencio Factoran, DENR Secretary and Joel Muyco, Director of Mines and Gesciences
Facts:

Petitioner Miners Association of the Philippines assailed the constitutionality of the DENRs Administrative Order Nos 57
and 82.

AO No.57 - Guidelines of Mineral Production Sharing Agreement under EO No. 279 in which embodied in its Article 9
that all existing mining leases or agreements which were granted after the effectivity of 1987 Constitution pursuant to EO
No. 211, except small scale mining leases and those pertaining to sand and gravel and quarry resources covering an area
of 20 hectares or less, shall be converted into production-sharing agreements within one year from the effectivity of these
guidelines

AO No. 82 Procedural Guidelines on the Award of Mineral Production Sharing Agreement (MPSA) through
Negotiation. Section 3 enumerates the persons or entities required to submit Letter of Intent (LOI) and Mineral Production
Sharing Agreement (MPSA) within 2 years from the effectivity of DENR AO No. 57. Failure to do so within the prescribed
period shall cause the abandonment of mining, quarry and sand and gravel claims.

Petitioner contends that respondent Secretary of DENR issued both AO in excess of his rule-making power under Section
6 of EO 279 and the same violate the non-impairment of contract provision under Art 3 Section 10 of the 1987
Constitution.

Issue: Whether or not the contention is tenable

Ruling:

The power of administrative officials to promulgate rules and regulations in the implementation of a statute is necessarily
limited to carrying into effect what is provided in the legislative enactment. There is no clear showing that respondent
DENR Secretary has transcended the bounds demarcated by EO No. 279 for the exercise of his rule-making power
tantamount to grave abuse of discretion. Section 6 of EO 279 specifically authorizes said official to promulgate such
supplementary rules and regulations as may be necessary to effectively implement the provisions thereof. Moreover the
subject sought to be governed and regulated by the questioned orders is germane to the objects and purposes of EO 279
specifically issued to carry out the mandate of Article 12, Section 2 of 1987 Constitution.

Petition is dismissed.

Pollution Adjudication Board vs CA and Solar Textile Finishing Corp
Facts:

Petitioner Pollution Adjudication Board (Board) issued an ex parte Order directing respondent Solar Textile Finishing
Corp. immediately to cease and desist from utilizing its wastewater pollution source installations which were discharging
untreated wastewater directly into a canal leading to Tullahan-Tinejeros River. Solar is involved in bleaching, rinsing and
dyeing textiles with wastewater of about 30gpm being directly discharged untreated into the sewer. Solar then filed for a
motion for reconsideration with prayer to stay the execution which was granted by the Board allowing Solar to operate
temporarily, to enable the Board to conduct another inspection and evaluation of Solars wastewater treatment. However,
Solar filed a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction against the Board which was dismissed by the trial court on
the ground that the proper remedy is on appeal and not certiorari and it was already rendered moot and academic. On
appeal to CA, it reversed the order of dismissal of the trial court.

Issue: Whether or not CA erred in reversing the trial court on the ground that Solar had been denied due process by the
Board

Ruling:

The ex parte cease and desist Order was issued not by a local Govt official but by the Pollution Adjudication Board, the
very agency of the Govt charged with the task of determination whether the effluents of a particular industrial
establishment comply with or violate applicable anti-pollution statutory and regulatory provisions. The relevant pollution
control statute and implementing regulations were enacted and promulgated in the exercise of that pervasive , sovereign
power to protect the safety, health and general welfare and comfort of the public, as well as the protection of plant and
animal life commonly designated as the police power. It is a constitutional common place that the ordinary requirements of
procedural due process yield to the necessities of protecting vital public interests like those here involved, through the
exercise of police power.

Restituto Ynot vs Intermediate Appellate Court

Facts:

Petitioner Ynot transported 6 carabaos in a pump boat which were confiscated by the police station commander for
violation of EO 626-A which prohibits the transport carabaos or carabao meat across provincial boundaries without
government clearance, for the purpose of preventing the indiscriminate slaughter of these animals. Petitioner then sought
for recovery but the trial court sustained the confiscation of the carabaos. Petitioner questions the constitutionality of the
said executive order.

Issue: Whether or not EO 626-A employed lawful means to be rendered constitutional

Ruling:
We do not see how the prohibition of the inter-provincial transport of carabaos can prevent their indiscriminate slaughter,
considering that they can be killed anywhere, with no less difficulty in one province than in another. Obviously retaining
the carabaos in one province will not prevent their slaughter there, any more than moving them to another province will
make it easier to kill them there. As for the carabeef, the prohibition is made to apply to it as otherwise, so says executive
order, it could be easily circumvented by simply killing the animal. Perhaps so. However, if the movement of the live
animals for the purpose of preventing their slaughter cannot be prohibited, it should follow that there is a reason either to
prohibit their transfer as, not to be flippant dead meat.

In the instant case, the carabaos were arbitrarily confiscated by the police station commander, were returned to the
petitioner only after he had filed a complaint for recovery and given a supersedeas bond of P12,000, which was ordered
confiscated upon his failure to produce the carabaos when ordered by the trial court. The executive order defined the
probation, convicted the petitioner and immediately imposed punishment, which was carried out forthright. The measure
struck at once and pounced upon the petitioner without giving him a chance to be heard, thus denying him the centuries-
old guaranty of elementary fair play.

EO 626-A is unconstitutional.

Carlos Balacuit vs CFI Agusan del Norte
Facts:

Petitioners Carlos Balacuit, Lamberto Tan and Sergio Yu, managers of theaters filed a complaint praying that Municipal
Ordinance No. 640 passed by the Municipal Board of the City of Butuan be declared unconstitutional and contend that it is
an invalid exercise of police power.
ORDINANCE-640
ORDINANCE PENALIZING ANY PERSON, GROUP OF PERSONS, ENTITY OR CORPORATION ENGAGED IN THE
BUSINESS OF SELLING ADMISSION TICKETS TO ANY MOVIE OR OTHER PUBLIC EXHIBITIONS, GAMES,
CONTESTS OR OTHER PERFORMANCES TO REQUIRE CHILDREN BETWEEN SEVEN (7) AND TWELVE (12)
YEARS OF AGE TO PAY FULL PAYMENT FOR TICKETS INTENDED FOR ADULTS BUT SHOULD CHARGE ONLY
ONE-HALF OF THE SAID TICKET
Issue: Whether or not said ordinance exercises a valid police power
Ruling:
We agree with petitioners that the ordinance is not justified by any necessity for the public interest. The police power
legislation must be firmly grounded on public interest and welfare, and a reasonable relation must exist between purposes
and means.
22
The evident purpose of the ordinance is to help ease the burden of cost on the part of parents who have to
shell out the same amount of money for the admission of their children, as they would for themselves, A reduction in the
price of admission would mean corresponding savings for the parents; however, the petitioners are the ones made to bear
the cost of these savings. The ordinance does not only make the petitioners suffer the loss of earnings but it likewise
penalizes them for failure to comply with it. Furthermore, as petitioners point out, there will be difficulty in its
implementation because as already experienced by petitioners since the effectivity of the ordinance, children over 12
years of age tried to pass off their age as below 12 years in order to avail of the benefit of the ordinance. The ordinance
does not provide a safeguard against this undesirable practice and as such, the respondent City of Butuan now suggests
that birth certificates be exhibited by movie house patrons to prove the age of children. This is, however, not at all
practicable. We can see that the ordinance is clearly unreasonable if not unduly oppressive upon the business of
petitioners. Moreover, there is no discernible relation between the ordinance and the promotion of public health, safety,
morals and the general welfare.
Ordinance 640 is unconstitutional.
City Govt of Quezon City vs Judge Ericta and Himlayang Pilipino
Facts:
Herein respondent questions the validity and constitutionality of petitioner City Govt of Quezons Section 9 of Ordinance
No. 6118,S-64 which reads:
Sec. 9. At least six (6) percent of the total area of the memorial park cemetery shall be set aside for charity burial of
deceased persons who are paupers and have been residents of Quezon City for at least 5 years prior to their death, to be
determined by competent City Authorities. The area so designated shall immediately be developed and should be open
for operation not later than six months from the date of approval of the application.
The trial court declared it as null and void thus, petitioner seeks for its reversal.
Issue: Whether or not Section 9 of the ordinance is a valid exercise of police power.
Ruling:
It will be seen from the foregoing authorities that police power is usually exercised in the form of mere regulation or
restriction in the use of liberty or property for the promotion of the general welfare. It does not involve the taking or
confiscation of property with the exception of a few cases where there is a necessity to confiscate private property in order
to destroy it for the purpose of protecting the peace and order and of promoting the general welfare as for instance, the
confiscation of an illegally possessed article, such as opium and firearms.
It seems to the court that Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, Series of 1964 of Quezon City is not a mere police regulation
but an outright confiscation. It deprives a person of his private property without due process of law, nay, even without
compensation.
There is no reasonable relation between the setting aside of at least six (6) percent of the total area of an private
cemeteries for charity burial grounds of deceased paupers and the promotion of health, morals, good order, safety, or the
general welfare of the people. The ordinance is actually a taking without compensation of a certain area from a private
cemetery to benefit paupers who are charges of the municipal corporation. Instead of building or maintaining a public
cemetery for this purpose, the city passes the burden to private cemeteries.
Petition is dismissed. Section of said ordinance is unconstitutional.
Pasong Bayabas Farmers Association vs CA, Credito Asiatic, Inc.
Facts:

Lakeview Devt Corp (LDC) bought a parcel of land and the title of which was in the name of Credito Asiatic, Inc. it
undertook to develop the land into residential and industrial sites. The plan of converting the land into residential area was
approved by the Municipal Council of Carmona. To this effect, it proceeded in bulldozing said land area. Petitioner Pasong
Bayabas Farmers Association alleging they have been occupying a parcel of land filed a complaint for Maintenance of
Peaceful Possession and Cultivation with Damages with Prayer for the Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and
Preliminary Injunction before the DARAB.

Issue: Whether or not municipality of Carmona exercised a valid police power when it issued the zoning classification of
said land into a residential area.

Ruling:
The authority of the municipality of Carmona to issue zoning classification is an exercise of its police power, not the power
of eminent domain. "A zoning ordinance is defined as a local city or municipal legislation which logically arranges,
prescribed, defines and apportions a given political subdivision into specific land uses as present and future projection of
needs.
Section 3 of Rep. Act No. 2264,
77
amending the Local Government Code, specifically empowers municipal and/or city
councils to adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances or regulations in consultation with the National Planning Commission.
A zoning ordinance prescribes, defines, and apportions a given political subdivision into specific land uses as present and
future projection of needs.
78
The power of the local government to convert or reclassify lands to residential lands to non-
agricultural lands reclassified is not subject to the approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform.
79
Section 65 of Rep.
Act No. 6657 relied upon by the petitioner applies only to applications by the landlord or the beneficiary for the conversion
of lands previously placed under the agrarian reform law after the lapse of five years from its award. It does not apply to
agricultural lands already converted as residential lands prior to the passage of Rep. Act No. 6657.
80

When Agrarian Reform Minister Conrado F. Estrella confirmed the reclassification of the property by the Municipal Council
of Carmona to non-agricultural land when he approved, on July 3, 1979, the application of the private respondent/LDC for
the conversion of 35.80 hectares of the property covered by TCT No. 62972 into non-agricultural land, he did so pursuant
to his authority under Rep. Act No. 3844, as amended, by P.D. No. 815 and P.D. No. 946.
81

It bears stressing that in his Order, the Agrarian Reform Minister declared that the property was not tenanted and not
devoted to the production of palay and/or corn, and that the land was suitable for conversion to a residential subdivision.
The order of the Minister was not reversed by the Office of the President; as such, it became final and executory. By
declaring, in its Decision of September 2, 1997, that the property subject of the suit, was agricultural land, the petitioner
DARAB thereby reversed the Order of Agrarian Reform Minister Estrella, issued almost eighteen (18) years before, and
nullified Resolution No. 30 of the Municipal Council of Carmona, approved twenty-one (21) years earlier, on May 30,
1976, as well as the issuances of the NHA, the HSRC, the HLURB, the Ministry of Local Government and the National
Planning Commission. Thus, the petitioner DARAB acted with grave abuse of its discretion amounting to excess or lack of
jurisdiction.

Walter Lutz vs Antonio Araneta
Facts:

Petitioner Walter Lutz, in his capacity as Judicial Admininistrator of the Estate of Antonio Jayme Ledesma seeks to
recover from the Collector of Internal Revenue the sum of P14, 666.40, under Commonwealth Act Section3 alleging that
such tax is unconstitutional and void., being levied for the aid and support of the sugar industry exclusively, and that i s not
a public purpose for which a tax maybe constitutionally levied. The trial court dismissed the complaint.

Issue: Whether or not CA 567 is an exercise of police power.

Ruling:

The tax levied by the challenged statute is for a regulatory purpose namely,, to provide ways and means for the
rehabilitation and stabilization of the sugar industry. Sugar production is one of the great industries of the country and
imbued with public interest, and, hence, Congress was empowered to find that the general welfare demanded that the
sugar industry be stabilized. The law is thus primarily an exercise of the police power of the state and taxation was merely
used to implement the states power.

Association of Small Landowners vs Secretary of Agrarian Reform

Facts:

This a consolidated complaint which petitioners question the constitutionality of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program (CARP) alleging that it was issued by then President Corazon Aquino invalidly.

Issue: Whether or not CARP is a valid exercise of police power

Ruling:

Like taxation, the power of eminent domain could be used as an implement of the police power. The expressed objective
of the law was the promotion of the welfare of the farmers, which came clearly under the police power of the State. To
achieve this purpose, the law provided for the expropriation of agricultural lands subject to minimum retention limits for the
landowner to be distributed among the landless peasantry. As to the extent that the measures under challenge merely
prescribe retention limits for landowners, there is an exercise of police power for the regulation of private property in
accordance with the Constitution. Bu, where to carry out such regulation, it becomes necessary to deprive such owners of
whatever lands they may own in excess of the maximum area allowed, there is definitely a taking under the power of
eminent domain for which payment of just compensation is imperative.

Ortigas and Co., vs CA and Ismael Mathay III
Facts:

Petitioner Ortigas and Co. sold to Emilia Hermoso a parcel of land with a contract of sale which states the conditions that:
1. Be used exclusivelyfor residential purposes only, and not more than one single-family residential building
will be constructed thereon,
2. The BUYER shall not erectany sign or billboard on the rooffor advertising purposes
3. No single-family residential building shall be erecteduntil the building plans, specificationhave been
approved by the SELLER
Respondent Ismael Mathay then leased the lot from Emilia in which lease contract did not state the purpose of the
lease. Thereupon, respondent constructed a single story commercial building. Petitioner then filed a complaint
against Emilia Hermoso which seeks for the demolition of the said commercial structure for having violated the terms
and conditions of the Deed of Sale. Complainant also prayed for the issuance of temporary restraining order and a
writ of preliminary injunction to prohibit petitioner from constructing the building which the trial court had issued.
Respondent, on appeal contends that MMC Ordinance No. 81-01 classified the area where the lot was located as
commercial area and said ordinance must be read into the Deed of sale as a concrete exercise of police power.

Issue: Whether or not in exercising the police power in said ordinance, it impairs the non-impairment clause
Ruling:
In general, we agree that laws are to be construed as having only prospective operation. Lex prospicit, non
respicit. Equally settled, only laws existing at the time of the execution of a contract are applicable thereto and not later
statutes, unless the latter are specifically intended to have retroactive effect.
[7]
A later law which enlarges, abridges, or in
any manner changes the intent of the parties to the contract necessarily impairs the contract itself
[8]
and cannot be given
retroactive effect without violating the constitutional prohibition against impairment of contracts.
[9]

But, the foregoing principles do admit of certain exceptions. One involves police power. A law enacted in the
exercise of police power to regulate or govern certain activities or transactions could be given retroactive effect and may
reasonably impair vested rights or contracts. Police power legislation is applicable not only to future contracts, but equally
to those already in existence. Nonimpairment of contracts or vested rights clauses will have to yield to the superior and
legitimate exercise by the State of police power to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order, safety, and
general welfare of the people. Moreover, statutes in exercise of valid police power must be read into every contract.
Noteworthy, in Sangalang vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, we already upheld MMC Ordinance No. 81-01 as a legitimate
police power measure.