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Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 97239 May 12, 1993
INTERNATIONAL RICE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (THIRD DIVISION) AND NESTOR B. MICOSA, respondents.
Jimenez & Associates for petitioner.
Santos & Associates for private respondent.
NOCON, J.:
Posed for determination in this petition for certiorari is the question of whether a conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude is a ground for dismissal from employment and corollarily, whether a conviction of a crime of homicide involves
moral turpitude.
International Rice Research Institute (IRRI) is an international organization recognized by the Philippine government and
accorded privileges, rights and immunities normally granted to organizations of universal character. In !"", it hired private
respondent #estor $. %icosa as laborer, who thereby became bound by IRRI &mployment Policy and Regulations, the
%iscellaneous Provisions of which states viz'
(. (onviction and Previous )eparation
l. . . .
*. +n employer who has been convicted of a (sic) criminal offense involving moral turpitude may be dismissed from the service.
1
,n -ebruary ., !.", %icosa stabbed to death one Reynaldo ,rtega inside a beer house in /os $a0os, /aguna.
,n )eptember 1, !2", %icosa was accused of the crime of homicide. 3uring the pendency of the criminal case, %icosa
voluntarily applied for inclusion in IRRI4s )pecial )eparation Program. 5owever, on 6anuary !, !!7, IRRI4s 3irector
8eneral, 9laus /. /ampe e:pressed deep regret that he had to disapprove %icosa4s application for separation because of
IRRI4s desire to retain the s;ills and talents that persons li;e him possess.
2
,n 6anuary *<, !!7, the trial court rendered a decision fending %icosa guilty of homicide, but appreciating, however, in
his favor the presence of the mitigating circumstances of (a) incomplete self=defense and (b) voluntary surrender, plus the
total absence of any aggravating circumstance.
)ubsequently, %icosa applied for suspension of his sentence under the Probation /aw.
,n -ebruary 2, !!7, IRRI4s 3irector 8eneral personally wrote %icosa that his appointment as laborer was confirmed,
ma;ing him a regular core employee whose appointment was for an indefinite period and who >may not be terminated
e:cept for ?ustifiable causes as defined by the pertinent provisions of the Philippine /abor (ode.
3
,n %arch <7, !!7, IRRI4s 5uman Resource 3evelopment 5ead, 6.9. Pascual wrote %icosa urging him to resign from
employment in view of his conviction in the case for homicide.
,n +pril @, !!7, the /aguna Parole and Probation ,ffice #o. II wrote IRRI informing the latter that said office found
%icosa4s application for probation meritorious as he was evaluated >to possess desirable social antecedents in his life.>
4
,n +pril ., !!7, %icosa informed 6.9. Pascual that he had no intention of resigning from his ?ob at IRRI.
,n +pril **, !!7, 6. 9. Pascual replied to %icosa4s letter insisting that the crime for which he was convicted involves moral
turpitude and informing him that he is thereby charged of violating )ection I=++, Par AII, (=* of the Institute4s Personnel
%anual.
,n +pril *", !!7, %icosa e:plained to 6.9. Pascual that the slaying of Reynaldo ,rtega on -ebruary ., !2" arose out of
his act of defending himself from unlawful aggressionB that his conviction did not involve moral turpitude and that he opted
not to appeal his conviction so that he could avail of the benefits of probation, which the trial court granted to him.
,n %ay ", !!7, %icosa sought the assistance of IRRI4s 8rievance (ommittee who recommended to the 3irector 8eneral,
his continued employment. 5owever, on %ay *, !!7, 6.9. Pascual issued a notice to %icosa that the latter4s employment
was to terminate effective %ay *1, !!7.
,n %ay *!, !!7, %icosa filed a case for illegal dismissal.
,n +ugust *, !!7, /abor +rbiter #umeriano 3. Aillena rendered ?udgment finding the termination of %icosa illegal and
ordering his reinstatement with full bac;wages from the date of his dismissal up to actual reinstatement. Che dispositive
portion of the same is hereunder quoted'
D5&R&-,R&, premises considered, the following orders are hereby entered'
. -inding the termination of complainant4s services illegalB
*. ,rdering respondent International Rice Research Institute to reinstate complainant #estor $. %icosa to his former position without loss of seniority
rights and other privileges appurtenant, thereto immediately upon receipt hereofB
<. ,rdering respondent International Rice Research Institute to pay complainant #estor $. %icosa his full bac;wages computed from the date of his
dismissal on %ay *1, !!7 up to actual reinstatement based on his latest salary rate of P@,7.2.77 per month.
@. ,rdering respondent International Rice Research Institute, to pay complainant4s counsel the amount of -ive Chousand Pesos P1,777.77, representing
his attorney4s feesB and.
1. 3ismissing the claim for damages for lac; of merit.
), ,R3&R&3.

,n appeal, the #ational /abor Relations (ommission was basically in agreement with the findings and conclusions of the
/abor +rbiter. 5ence, in a resolution dated 6anuary <, !!, it affirmed the appealed decision, the dispositive portion of
which states'
D5&R&-,R&, the appealed decision is +--IR%&3 with modification deleting the award of attorney4s fees.
), ,R3&R&3.
!
+ccordingly, petitioner filed this instant petition raising the following issues'
. C5& #+CI,#+/ /+$,R R&/+CI,#) (,%%I))I,# 5+) +(C&3 DIC5 8R+A& +$E)& ,- 3I)(R&CI,# I# -I#3I#8 C5+C IRRI 5+3 #, RI85C
#,R +EC5,RICF C, PR&)(RI$& +#F ,C5&R (+E)&G) -,R 3I)%I))+/ I- C5& )+%& I) #,C +%,#8 C5,)& &#E%&R+C&3 I# +RCI(/& ,-
C5& /+$,R (,3&.
*. C5& #+CI,#+/ /+$,R R&/+CI,#) (,%%I))I,# (,%%ICC&3 8R+A& +$E)& ,- 3I)(R&CI,# I# 5,/3I#8 C5+C >C5&R& I) #, $+)I) C,
+PP/F P&CICI,#&R4) I#)CICEC& P&R),##&/ %+#E+/ I# 3I)%I))I#8 C5& (,%P/+I#+#C ,# C5& ),/& 8R,E#3 C5+C 5I) (,#AI(CI,#
,- 5,%I(I3& (,#)CICEC& %,R+/ CERPICE3&.
7
Che basic premise of petitioner is that %icosa4s conviction of the crime of homicide, which is a crime involving moral
turpitude, is a valid ground for his dismissal under the %iscellaneous Provisions of IRRI4s &mployment Policy Regulations.
In addition to its claim that it has the prerogative to issue rules and regulations including those concerning employee
discipline and that its employees are bound by the aforesaid personnel manual, petitioner ?ustifies its action as a legitimate
act of self=defense. It admits that %icosa4s interests H in his employment and means of livelihood H are adversely
affectedB that a convict should not be discriminated against in society and that he should be given the same opportunities
as those granted to other fellow citizens but claims that at times, one4s right is deemed superior than that of another. In this
case, petitioner believes that it has a superior right to maintain a very high degree or standard not only to forestall any
internal problem hampering operations but also to prevent even the smallest possibility that said problems could occur
considering that it is an international organization with concomitant obligation to the host country to avoid creating
disturbance or give occasion for such disturbance.
It should be recalled, however, that %icosa was issued an appointment with an assurance from the IRRI4s 3irector 8eneral
that as regular core employee he >may not be terminated e:cept for ?ustifiable causes as defined by the pertinent
provisions of the Philippine /abor (ode.>
"
Chus, IRRI could not remove him from his ?ob if there e:isted no ?ustifiable
cause as defined by the /abor (ode.
+rticle *2* of the /abor (ode enumerates the ?ust causes wherein an employer may terminate an employment. Aerily,
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude is not one of these ?ustifiable causes. #either may said ground be ?ustified
under +rticle *2* (c) nor under *2* (d) by analogy. -raud or willful breach by the employees of the trust reposed in him by
his employer or duly authorized representative under +rticle *2* (c) refers to any fault or culpability on the part of the
employee in the discharge of his duty rendering him absolutely unworthy of the trust and confidence demanded by his
position. It cannot be gainsaid that the breach of trust must be related to the performance of the employee4s function.
9
,n
the other hand, the commission of a crime by the employee under +rticle *2* (d) refer to an offense against the person of
his employer or any immediate member of his family or his duly authorized representative. +nalogous causes must have
an element similar to those found in the specific ?ust cause enumerated under +rticle *2*. (learly lac;ing in the ground
invo;ed by petitioner is its relation to his wor; or to his employer.
In the case at bar, the commission of the crime of homicide was outside the perimeter of the IRRI comple:, having been
committed in a restaurant after office hours and against a non=IRRI employee. Chus, the conviction of %icosa for homicide
was not wor;=related, his misdeed having no relation to his position as laborer and was not directed or committed against
IRRI or its authorized agent.
$esides, IRRI failed to show how the dismissal of %icosa would be in consideration of the safety and welfare of its
employees, its reputation and standing in the community and its special obligations to its host country. It did not present
evidence to show that %icosa possessed a tendency to ;ill without provocation or that he posed a clear and present
danger to the company and its personnel. ,n the contrary, the records reveal that %icosa4s service record is unblemished.
Chere is no record whatsoever that he was involved in any incident similar to that which transpired on that fateful night of
-ebruary ., !2". In fact, even after his conviction, the IRRI4s 3irector 8eneral e:pressed his confidence in him when he
disapproved his application for special separation in a letter dated 6anuary 2, !!7 and when he conveyed to him IRRI4s
decision to promote him to the status of a regular core employee, with the commensurate increases in benefits in a letter
dated -ebruary !!7. Respondent IRRI derogates the letters4 significance saying that they were mere pro-forma
communications which it had given to numerous other wor;ers. $ut whether or not such letters were >form letters, they
e:pressed the message that were meant to be conveyed, i.e., that %icosa is fit for continued employment. In addition, the
employees at IRRI4s 8rievance (ommittee interceded favorably in behalf of %icosa when they recommended his retention
despite his conviction showing that the very employees which IRRI sought to protect did not believe that they were placing
their very own lives in danger with %icosa4s retention.
/i;ewise, noteworthy is the fact that %icosa, although found guilty as charged, was also found worthy of probation. Chis
means that all the information regarding his character, antecedents, environment, as well as his mental and physical
condition were evaluated as required under )ection 2 of the Probation /aw and it was found that there e:isted no undue
ris; that %icosa will commit another crime during his period of probation and that his being placed on probation would be
to the benefit of society as a whole.
In the face of all these, IRRI remained adamant and insisted on %icosa4s termination. (ertainly, said termination cannot be
upheld for it lac;ed not only a legal basis but factual basis as well.
&ven under IRRI4s &mployment Policy and Regulations, the dismissal of %icosa4s on the ground of his conviction for
homicide cannot be sustained. Che miscellaneous provisions of said personnel manual mentions of conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude as a ground for dismissal. IRRI simply assumed that conviction of the crime of homicide is
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude. De do not subscribe to this view.
%oral turpitude has been defined in Can v. Galing
1#
citing In Re Basa
11
and Tak g v. Rep!"lic
12
as everything which is
done contrary to ?ustice, modesty, or good moralsB an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and social duties
which a man owes his fellowmen, or to society in general, contrary to ?ustice, honesty, modesty or good morals.
+s to what crime involves moral turpitude, is for the )upreme (ourt to
determine.
13
Chus, the precipitate conclusion of IRRI that conviction of the crime of homicide involves moral turpitude is
unwarranted considering that the said crime which resulted from an act of incomplete self=defense from an unlawful
aggression by the victim has not been so classified as involving moral turpitude.
IRRI argues that the crime of homicide committed by %icosa involves moral turpitude as the ;illing of a man is conclusively
an act against ?ustice and is immoral in itself not merely prohibited by law. It added that %icosa stabbed the victim more
than what was necessary to repel the attac;.
IRRI failed to comprehend the significance of the facts in their totality. Che facts on record show that %icosa was then
urinating and had his bac; turned when the victim drove his fist unto %icosa4s faceB that the victim then forcibly rubbed
%icosa4s face into the filthy urinalB that %icosa pleaded to the victim to stop the attac; but was ignored and that it was while
%icosa was in that position that he drew a fan ;nife from the left poc;et of his shirt and desperately swung it at the victim
who released his hold on %icosa only after the latter had stabbed him several times. Chese facts show that %icosa4s
intention was not to slay the victim but only to defend his person. Che appreciation in his favor of the mitigating
circumstances of self= defense and voluntary surrender, plus the total absence of any aggravating circumstance
demonstrate that %icosa4s character and intentions were not inherently vile, immoral or un?ust.
Chis is not to say that all convictions of the crime of homicide do not involve moral turpitude. 5omicide may or may not
involve moral turpitude depending on the degree of the crime.
14
%oral turpitude is not involved in every criminal act and is
not shown by every ;nown and intentional violation of statute, but whether any particular conviction involves moral
turpitude may be a question of fact and frequently depends on all the surrounding circumstances.
1
Dhile . . . generally
but not always, crimes mala in se involve moral turpitude, while crimes mala pro#i"ita do not, it, cannot always be
ascertained whether moral turpitude does or does not e:ist by classifying a crime as mal!m in se or as mal!m pro#i"it!m,
since there are crimes which are mala in se and yet but rarely involve moral turpitude and there are crimes which involve
moral turpitude and are mala pro#i"ita only.
1!
It follows therefore, that moral turpitude is somewhat a vague and indefinite
term, the meaning of which must be left to the process of ?udicial inclusion or e:clusion as the cases are reached.
In fine, there is nothing in this case to show any abuse of discretion by the #ational /abor Relations (ommission in
affirming the decision of the /abor +rbiter finding that %icosa was illegally dismissed. -or certiorari to lie, there must be
capricious, arbitrary and whimsical e:ercise of power, the very antithesis of the ?udicial prerogative in accordance with
centuries of both civil and common traditions.
17
Che abuse of discretion must be grave and patent, and it must be shown
that the discretion was e:ercised arbitrarily or despotically.
1"
D5&R&-,R&, the petition, is hereby 3I)%I))&3 for lac; of merit.
), ,R3&R&3.
arvasa$ C.J.$ %adilla and Regalado$ JJ.$ conc!r.
$ %oo&'o&()
Rollo, p. <.
* Records, p. 1..
< Id., p. 1".
@ Id., p. .7.
1 Rollo, pp. *. and *".
. Id., p. <*.
" Id$ p. *.
2 S!pra.
! Iuezon &lectric (ooperative v. #/R(, et al., 8.R. #os. "!"2=**, "* )(R+ 22 (!2!).
7 8.R. #o. 1@*12, )(R+ ..< (!2").
@ Phil. *"1.
* 7. Phil. "*".
< Re' Aictorio /anuevo, +dministrative (ase #o. .*, .. )(R+ *@1 (!"1).
@ 5artman v. $oard of (hiropractic &:aminers, ..P. *d "71, "7., *7 (al. +pp. *d ".B E.). e: rel. %ongiovi v. 9arnuth, 3.(.#.F., <7 -. *d 2*1, 2*.,
cited in 12 (6), %oral Curpitude, p. *7..
1 (al. H $rainard v. $oard of %edical &:aminers of (alifornia, 1" P. *d ", 2, .2 (al +pp. *d 1! cited in 12 (6), %oral Curpitude, p. *7@.
. +riz. H 3u Aal v. $oard of %edical &:aminers of +rizona, .. P. *d 7*., 7<7,@! +riz. <*!, cited in 12 (6), %oral Curpitude, p. *71.
" Panaligan v. +dolfo, 8.R. #o. /=*@77, ." )(R+ ". (!"1).
2 Philippine Airginia Cobacco +dministration v. /ucero, 8.R. #o. /=<*117, *1 )(R+ <<" (!2<).

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