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Case Digests: Wills & Succession

GR No.L-8018, October 26, 1955
87 PHIL 762

FACTS: Estefania Atun died without any issue leaving in the possession of the plaintiffs, her neices and nephews, a parcel of
land. Such land was delivered by plaintiff Gil Atun to Silvestra Nuez (sister of defendant-appellee Eusebio Nuez) for
cultivation, for which Silvestra paid the Atuns a part of the harvest as rental. In 1940, Silvestra turned over the land to
defendant Eusebio Nuez, who thereafter refused to recognize plaintiffs' ownership or to deliver their share of the produce.
The defendant turn sold the land to his co-defendant Diego Belga, who took the property with the knowledge that it belonged,
not to Nuez, but to plaintiffs. There was no prior judicial declaration, however, that the plaintiffs were the legal heirs of the

ISSUE: Has plaintiffs the right to recover the property as a successor of the decedent?

HELD: Yes. In the instant case, as the land in question still stands registered in the name of Estefania Atun, now deceased, the
present owners thereof would be her legal heirs. It is of record that Estefania Atun died without any issue or ascendants and
left as her only surviving heirs the children of her brother Nicolas, plaintiffs herein; and the rule is settled that the legal heirs of
a deceased may file an action arising out of a right belonging to their ancestor, without a separate judicial declaration of their
status as such, provided there is no pending special proceeding for the settlement of the decedent's estate.

GR No.L-44837, November 23, 1938
66 PHIL 547

FACTS: Lorenzo Quitco, died in 1930, leaving defendant Mclachlin and her children as heirs. Plaintiff Ana Ledesma,
spurious/illegitimate child of Lorenzo Quitco, and her mother, sued to declare her as compulsory heir which the court however
denied. Two years later, Lorenzo's father Eusebio died, and because he left some personal and real properties without a will, an
intestate proceeding was instituted and a court order declaring his compulsory heirs did not of course include Ana as one.
Following such court action, the plaintiff proceeded to collect the sum payable on a promissory note then issued in favor of her
by Lorenzo by filing a claim in the intestate proceedings of Eusebio's Estate claiming that the sum be paid out of the properties
inherited by the defendants represents that of the successional rights of Lorenzo as a compulsory heir of his father Eusebio.

ISSUE: Has plaintiff the right collect the sum promised by her father from her grandfather's estate?

HELD: No. The properties inherited by the defendants from their deceased grandfather by representation are not subject to the
payment of debts and obligations of their deceased father, who died without leaving any property. While it is true that under
the provisions of Articles 924 to 927 of the Civil Code, a child presents his father or mother who died before him in the
properties of his grandfather or grandmother, this right of representation does not make the said child answerable for the
obligations contracted by his deceased father or mother, because, as may be seen from the provisions of the Code of Civil
Procedure referring to partition of inheritances, the inheritance is received with the benefit of inventory, that is to say, the heirs
only answer with the properties received from their predecessor. The herein defendants, as heirs of Eusebio Quitco, in
representation of their father Lorenzo M. Quitco, are not bound to pay the indebtedness of their father from whom they did
not inherit anything.

GR No.L-770, April 27, 1948
80 PHIL 776

FACTS: Petitioner opposed the issuance by the Public Service Commission of a certificate of public convenience to install,
maintain and operate an ice plant in San Juan to the respondent despite his demise, contending that the Commission erred in
allowing the substitution of the legal representative of the estate of Pedro O. Fragante for the latter as party applicant in the
case then pending before the commission, and in subsequently granting to said estate the certificate applied for, which is said
to be in contravention of law.

ISSUE: Is the decision of the Commission correct and with basis?

HELD: Yes. If the respondent had not died, there can be no question that he would have had the right to prosecute his
application before the commission to its final conclusion. No one would have denied him that right... The aforesaid right of
respondent to prosecute said application to its conclusion was one which by its nature did not lapse through his death. Hence,
it constitutes a part of the assets of his estate, for which right was a property despite the possibility that in the end the
commission might have denied his application, although under the facts of the case, the commission granted the application in
view of the financial ability of the estate to maintain and operate the ice plant.

GR No.L-4963, January 29, 1953
92 PHIL 530

FACTS: Faustino Nebreda died in 1945 leaving as an only heir his estranged wife Maria Uson, the petitioner. The latter sued to
recover the ownership and possession of five parcels of land occupied by defendant Maria del Rosario, decedent's common-
law-spouse and her children. As a defense, defendant presented a deed of separation agreed upon and signed Faustino and
Uson containing among others an statement giving a parcel of land to Uson as an alimony and the latter renouncing her rights
to any inheritance from Faustino.
The defendant also contends that while it is true that the four minor defendants are illegitimate children of the decedent and
under the old Civil Code are not entitled to any successional rights, however, under the new Civil Code they are given the status
and rights of natural children and are entitled to the successional rights which the law accords to the latter (article 2264 and
article 287, new Civil Code), and because these successional rights were declared for the first time in the new code, they shall
be given retroactive effect even though the event which gave rise to them may have occurred under the prior legislation
(Article 2253, new Civil Code).

ISSUE: Are the contentions of the defendants correct?

HELD: No. It is evident that when the decedent died in 1945 the five parcels of land he was seized of at the time passed from
the moment of his death to his only heir, his widow Maria Uson (Article 657, old Civil Code). As this Court aptly said, "The
property belongs to the heirs at the moment of the death of the ancestor as completely as if the ancestor had executed and
delivered to them a deed for the same before his death" (Ilustre vs. Alaras Frondosa, 17 Phil., 321). From that moment,
therefore, the rights of inheritance of Maria Uson over the lands in question became vested.
The claim of the defendants that Uson had relinquished her right over the lands in question in view of her expressed
renunciation to inherit any future property that her husband may acquire and leave upon his death in the deed of separation
they had entered into cannot be entertained for the simple reason that future inheritance cannot be the subject of a contract
nor can it be renounced.
Nor does the contention that the provisions of the New Civil Code shall apply and be given retroactive effect. Article 2253
above referred to provides indeed that rights which are declared for the first time shall have retroactive effect even though the
event which gave rise to them may have occurred under the former legislation, but this is so only when the new rights do not
prejudice any vested or acquired right of the same origin... As already stated in the early part of this decision, the right of
ownership of Maria Uson over the lands in question became vested in 1945 upon the death of her late husband and this is so
because of the imperative provision of the law which commands that the rights to succession are transmitted from the moment
of death (Article 657, old Civil Code). The new right recognized by the new Civil Code in favor of the illegitimate children of the
deceased cannot, therefore, be asserted to the impairment of the vested right of Maria Uson over the lands in dispute.

GR No.L-4170, January 31, 1952, 90PHIL757
90 PHIL 757

FACTS: Pedro Litonjua obtained a judgment against Claudio Montilla for the payment of a sum of P4,039. Failing to find or
identify a property of Claudio to be levied, petitioner then proceeded to file a claim in the intestate proceeding of the estate of
Agustin Montilla Sr, father of the deceased. The estate has not yet been properly probated.

ISSUE: Could the petitioner succeed in collecting the debt as against the estate of the debtor's deceased parent?

HELD: No. In the case of Ortiga Brothers and Co. vs. Enage and Yap Tico, 18 Phil. 345, it was held that the creditor of the heirs
of a deceased person is entitled to collect his claim out of the property which pertains by inheritance to said heirs, only after
the debts of the testate or intestate have been paid and when the net assets that are divisible among the heirs are known,
because the debts of the deceased must first be paid before his heirs can inherit. It was therein also held that a person who is
not a creditor of a deceased, testate or intestate, has no right to intervene either in the proceedings brought in connection with
the estate or in the settlement of the succession. The foregoing pronouncements are perfectly applicable to the case at bar,
because the appellant is not a creditor of the deceased Agustin Montilla, Sr. and he seeks to collect his claim out of the
inheritance of Claudio Montilla, an heir, before the net assets of the intestate estate have been determined.

GR No.L-4133, May 13, 1952
91 PHIL 265

FACTS: A lot had been mortgaged by spouses Severino Salak and Petra Garcia to Pedro Magat; the latter then assigned the
mortgage to Honoria Salak. After the death Petra, Severino transferred 1/2 of his rights to the property to Honoria for the sum
representing 1/2 of the consideratioin paid by her to the mortgagees Magat. Severino later died leaving the defendants as
heirs. Honoria also died, with the plaintiff as heir. Intestate proceedings were instituted for the settlement and distribution of
the estate of the deceased Severino and Petra, including the lot in question which was adjudicated, after proper proceedings in
favor of the defendants. Plaintiff sued for reconveyance of the 1/2 of the portion of the lot in her favor as heir of Honoria.

ISSUE: May the petition prosper?

HELD: No. The property now sought to be recovered from the defendants was adjudicated in their favor after all claims,
indebtedness and obligations chargeable against the intestate estate of the deceased Severino Salak and Petra Garcia had been
all paid and accounted for out of the estate of the deceased; so that, in the eyes of the law, the properties now in the hands of
the defendants are presumed to be free from all claims whatsoever. The claim of the plaintiff set up in the complaint should
have been interposed during the pendency and progress of Special Proceeding No. 3; but plaintiff not having done so, she
cannot now bring this action against the defendants, for it is clear that there exists no privity of contract between plaintiff and
defendants upon which plaintiff can predicate her action against the present defendants.

GR No.L-5064, February 27, 1953
92 PHIL 721

FACTS: Leonardo Winstanley died leaving a parcel of land to his surviving spouse Catalina Navarro and some minor children.
Catalina sold the entire parcel of land to Maria Canoy who later sold the same land to the plaintiff Bienvenido Ibarle. After
some time, after her appointment as guardian of her minor children, Catalina again sold 1/2 of the land in question, which
portion now belonged to the children as heirs, to herein defendant Esperanza Po.

ISSUE: Which sale was valid, and who has the rightful claim to the property?

HELD: The sale to defendant is valid. Article 657 of the old Civil Code provides: "The rights to the succession of a person are
transmitted from the moment of his death." in a slightly different language, this article is incorporated in the new Civil Code as
article 777.
The above provision and comment make it clear that when Catalina Navarro Vda. de Winstanley sold the entire parcel to the
Canoy spouses, one-half of it already belonged to the seller's children. No formal or judicial declaration being needed to
confirm the children's title, it follows that the first sale was null and void in so far as it included the children's share.
On the other hand, the sale to the defendant having been made by authority of the competent court was undeniably legal and
effective. The fact that it has not been recorded is of no consequence. If registration were necessary, still the non-registration
would not avail the plaintiff because it was due to no other cause than his own opposition.

GR No.L-10474, March 29, 1916
41 PHIL 531

FACTS: Francisco Osorio y Garcia filed a written complaint alleging that he is a natural son of one Francisco Osorio y Reyes who
died in 1896; and that he had been in continuous possession of the status of natural son of said Osorio y Reyes, as proven by
direct acts of the latter and of his family; that the defendant Soledad Osorio, lawful daughter and lawful heir of said Osorio y
Reyes, be ordered to recognize the plaintiff as a natural son of said Osorio y Reyes, and is entitled to share in his father's estate;
and, furthermore, that said defendant be ordered to furnish subsistence to plaintiff in such amount as the court might deem
proper to fix. The evidence offered relating to the fact of filiation of Osorio y Garcia to Osorio Reyes is strong and
unimpeachable, so that the court found the legitimacy of claim of Osorio y Garcia to be properly established.

ISSUE: Has plaintiff the right to be recognized as co-heir and be entitled to the rights appertaining to his deceased father's

HELD: Yes. Recognition of the child as a natural child must be made if he has been in continuous possession of his filiation,
proven by the attendance of his father at his baptism, in the certificate in which his name and that of his mother appear,
though the document contains errors, and by his father's statement to various friends that the boy was his natural son, and by
his father's always having attended to the care, education and support of his son.
So that the plaintiff, Francisco Osorio y Garcia, according to the facts proven in this case and the law on the subject, is entitled
to have his half sister Soledad Osorio, a legitimate daughter of the father of both of them, recognize him as being the natural,
recognized son of Francisco Osorio y Reyes and as entitled to the rights granted him by law in respect to his deceased father's
estate, all of which is in possession of the defendant spouses.

GR No.L-25049, August 30, 1968
22 SCRA 918

FACTS: Victoriana Eguaras, single, mortgaged a real estate to spouses Baltazar, defendants in this case. Upon demise of
Victoriana, the mortgagees, as creditors of the deceased, filed a petition for the intestate proceedings of Victoriana's estate,
alleging further that plaintiffs Felimon and Monica Ramirez are heirs of the deceased. Felimon was later appointed as
adminstrator but did not qualify so that Artemio Diawan was appointed as judicial administrator of the estate. The mortgagees
then filed a foreclosure of the property in question and succeeded, after Diawan failed to file an answer against the petition.
The foreclosure sale ensued, the property was bought by the mortgagees themselves and the sale was confirmed by the court.
Felimon sued for the annulment of the entire foreclosure proceedings, alleging among others the failure of the judicial
administrator to protect their interests. Defendants contended that plaintiffs have no legal capacity to sue and hava no cause of

ISSUE: Have plaintiffs the cause of action against the defendant?

HELD: Yes. There is no question that the rights to succession are automatically transmitted to the heirs from the moment of the
death of the decedent. While, as a rule, the formal declaration or recognition to such successional rights needs judicial
confirmation, this Court has, under special circumstances, protected these rights from encroachments made or attempted
before the judicial declaration. In Pascual vs. Pascual, it was ruled that although heirs have no legal standing in court upon the
commencement of testate or intestate proceedings, this rule admits of an exception as "when the administrator fails or refuses
to act in which event the heirs may act in his place."

GR No.L-20609, September 29, 1966
21 SCRA 1133

FACTS: Petitioners Juan De Borja et al. petitioned for the reversal of the order of Judge Mencias, denying their petition cause
the sale of the properties levied upon to satisfy the money judgment in a civil case rendered in favor of petitioners against
respondent Crisanto de Borja. Petitioners levied aganst the rights, interest and
participation which Crisanto de Borja had in certain real properties, as an heir of the decedents Josefa Tangco and Francisco de
Borja, whose estates were then pending settlement in Special Proceedings Nos. F-7866 and 1955 of the aforementioned court,
this Court hereby holds that whatever interest, claim or right which Crisanto de Borja may have in the testate estate of Josefa
Tangco and in the intestate estate of Francisco de Borja are subject to attachment and execution for the purpose of satisfying
the money judgment rendered against the said heir
ISSUE: May the sale of the property levied for execution proceed?

HELD: The above question must be answered in the affirmative, provided it is understood that the sale shall be only of
whatever rights, interest and participation may be adjudicated to said heir as a result of the final settlement of the estates, and
that delivery thereof to the judgment creditor or to the purchaser at the public sale thereof shall be made only after the fi nal
settlement of the estates and in the manner provided by the legal provision mentioned above.

GR No.L-21993, June 21, 1966
17 SCRA 418

FACTS: Private respondents Apolonia Pangilinan and Adelaida Jacalan delivered to the Clerk of Court of Bulacan a purported last
will and testament of Fr. Rodriguez, meanwhile the petitioners filed a petition before the court to examine the purported will
but which was later withdrawn, and a petition for the settlement of the intestate estate of Fr. Rodriguez was subsequently field
in a another court in Rizal. The petitioners now sought the dismissal of the special proceeding on the settlement of the
decedent's estate based on the purported will, questioning therefore the jurisdiction of CFI Bulacan.

ISSUE: Does CFI Bulacan have jurisdiction to proceed with the testate proceedings?

HELD: Yes. The jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan became vested upon the delivery thereto of the will of the
late Father Rodriguez, even if no petition for its allowance was filed until later, because upon the will being deposited the court
could, motu proprio, have taken steps to fix the time and place for proving the will, and issued the corresponding notices
conformably to what is prescribed by section 3, Rule 76, of the Revised Rules of Court. Moreover, aside from the rule that the
Court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other
courts, intestate succession is only subsidiary or subordinate to the testate, since intestacy only takes place in the absence of a
valid operative will.

GR No. L-68282, November 8, 1990

FACTS: Manuela Buenavista assigned her paraphernal property in equal pro-diviso among her 6 children, while possession of
such property still remains with her. Three of her children sold each their share to private respondent Concepcion,
consolidating 4/6 portion thereof. Deeds of sale were therefor executed with the conformity of Manuela. Despite such
transfers, the latter sold the entire property to one of the siblings, herein petitioner Raquel Chavez. Respondent sued for the
annulment of the later sale to Raquel which was denied by the trail court but which later decision overturned by the Court of
Appeals. On appeal, petitioner also contends that their mother has left a last will and this will supercedes the earlier transfers.

ISSUE: Is partition inter-vivos, and sale based on such partition valid? Does a last will supercede that of the partition inter-vivos?

HELD: Yes. When a person makes a partition by will, it is imperative that such partition must be executed in accordance with
the provisions of the law on wills; however, when a person makes the partition of his estate by an act inter vivos, such partition
may even be oral or written, and need not be in the form of a will, provided that the partition does not prejudice the legitime of
compulsory heirs. xxx The Deeds of Sale are not contracts entered into with respect to future inheritance but a contract
perfected and consummated during the lifetime of Manuela Buenavista who signed the same and gave her consent thereto.
Such partition inter vivos, executed by the property owner herself, is valid.
It would be unjust and inequitable to allow Manuela Buenavista Vda. de Chavez to revoke the sales she herself authorized as
well as the sale she herself executed in favor of her son only to execute a simulated sale in favor of her daughter Raquel who
had already profited from the sale she made of the property she had received in the partition inter vivos.

GR No.L-47799, May 21, 1943
74 PHIL 185

FACTS: This is a case where the testator Agripino Neri in his will left all his property by universal title to the children by his
second marriage, the herein respondents, with omission of the children by his first marriage, the herein petitioner. The
omission of the heirs in the will was contemplated by the testator with the belief that he had already given each of the children
portion of the inheritance, particularly a land he had abandoned was occupied by the respondents over which registration was
denied for it turned out to be a public land, and an aggregate amount of money which the respondents were indebted to their

ISSUE: Should there be cancellation of the will, in view of the omission of heirs? Is there disinheritance in this case?

HELD: Yes. The Court annulled the institution of heirs and declared a total intestacy on the ground that testator left all his
property by universal title to the children by his second marriage, without expressly disinheriting the children by his first
marriage but upon the erroneous belief that he had given them already more shares in his property than those given to the
children by his second marriage. Disinheritance made without a statement of the cause, if contested, shall annul the institution
of heirs in so far as it is prejudicial to the disinherited person. This is but a case of preterition which annuls the institution of

GR No.73275 May 20, 1987

FACTS: Paulina Baranda died without issue, but before her demise, two of her supposed heirs, the herein respondents
Evangelina and Elisa Baranda, have already taken possession of 6 parcels of land and caused the transfer of such by virtue of
questionable sales which the late widow had also sought the reconveyance which did not however materialized. The
petitioners, siblings of the decedent, now sought the annulment of the supposed sale or transfers. Respondents question the
petitioners legal standing, them being not a party-in-interest in the deed of sale.

ISSUE: Can the petitioners impugn the validity of the sales?

HELD: This Court has repeatedly held that "the legal heirs of a decedent are the parties in interest to commence ordinary
actions arising out of the rights belonging to the deceased, without separate judicial declaration as to their being heirs of said
decedent, provided that there is no pending special proceeding for the settlement of the decedent's estate.
There being no pending special proceeding for the settlement of Paulina Baranda's estate, the petitioners, as her intestate
heirs, had the right to sue for the reconveyance of the disputed properties, not to them, but to the estate itself of the decedent,
for distribution later in accordance with law. Otherwise, no one else could question the simulated sales and the subjects
thereof would remain in the name of the alleged vendees, who would thus have been permitted to benefit from their
deception, In fact, even if it were assumed that those suing through attorneys-in-fact were not properly represented, the
remaining petitioners would still have sufficed to impugn the validity of the deeds of sale.

GR No.L-33924, March 18, 1988
159 SCRA 47

FACTS: On an action for recovery of real property filed by the respondents, spurious children of the late Escolastico Balais who
died in 1948, against the petitioners, legitimate children of the deceased, the trial court decreed reconveyance of the portion of
the property belonging to the legitime and further declaring partition that sent 1/4 portion of the legitime to the respondents.
Petitioners come now questioning the partition and seeking the reconveyance of the 1/4 share that went to the spurious
children, relying on the provisions of the old civil code, and thereby questioning the competence and jurisdiction of the trial

ISSUE: Is the court competent to decree the partition, without it being asked in the complaint? Could the provisions of the new
civil code be applied over a case which occurs prior to its effectivity?

HELD: 1. Yes. The court acquired jurisdiction by estoppel. It must be noted that, in spite of the broad challenge the appellants
present against the jurisdiction of the trial court to order the distribution of the property, they, in reality, question only that
part of the decision awarding a one-fourth part of the property to the illegitimate children of the deceased, upon the ground
that under the old Civil Code illegitimate children other than natural enjoyed no successionary rights. They do not contest the
delivery of the estate to the deceased's widow or to themselves in the proportions decreed by the court.
2. No. The court erred in applying the provisions of the new code. But as stated, the error of the court notwithstanding, the
case is a closed chapter, the decision having been rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction, have become final and
executory. A decision, no matter how erroneous, becomes the law of the case between the parties upon attaining finality.

GR No.L-4275, March 23, 1909
13 PHIL 249

FACTS: Casiano Abaya died unmarried however leaving two unaknowledged children by herein plaintiff-appellee Paula Conde.
The latter, as a ascendant heir of her children, sued for the settlement of the intestate estate of Casiano along with the
acknowledgment of the two as natural children of the deceased. The trial court, with the opposition of the defendant-appellant
Roman Abaya, brother of the deceased, rendered judgment bestowing the estate of Casiano to Conde as legitimate heir of the
decedent's natural children.

ISSUE: May the mother of a natural child now deceased, bring an action for the acknowledgment of the natural filiation in favor
of such child in order to appear in his behalf to receive the inheritance from the deceased natural father.

HELD: The right of action that devolves upon the child to claim his legitimacy lasts during his whole life, while the right to claim
the acknowledgment of a natural child lasts only during the life of his presumed parents. An action for the acknowledgment of
a natural child may, as an exception, be exercised against the heirs of the presumed parents in two cases: first, in the event of
the death of the latter during the minority of the child, and second, upon the discovery of some instrument of express
acknowledgment of the child, executed by the father or mother, the existence of which was unknown during the life of the
But such action for the acknowledgment of a natural child can only be exercised by him. It cannot be transmitted to his
descendants, or his ascendants.

GR No.14851, September 13, 1919
40 PHIL 105

FACTS: Antonia Reira, widow of Juan Pons who was at the time of the latter's death residing at Palma de Mallorca, sought the
annulment of the order of the trial court admitting the probate of a purported will of her husband. The purported will was
submitted to be admitted to probate by respondent Consul General Palmaroli. The petitioner contends that the probate of the
will, in view of her absence, deprived her of her right to contest the original application.

ISSUE: Should the probated will yield to the rights of the decedent's heir?

HELD: Yes. A will is nothing more than a species of conveyance whereby a person is permitted, with the formalities prescribed
by law, to control in a certain degree the disposition of his property after his death. Out of consideration for the important
interests involved the execution and proof of wills has been surrounded by numerous safeguards, among which is the provision
that after death of the testator his will may be judicially established in court. xxx The probate of a will, while conclusive as to its
due execution, in no wise involves the intrinsic validity of its provisions. If, therefore, upon the distribution of the estate of the
decedent, it should appear that any provision of his will is contrary to the law applicable to his case, the will must necessarily
yield upon that point and the disposition made by law must prevail.


FACTS: Montinola filed an action against the heirs of Dr. Jose Rizal for recovery of possession of personal property (the RIZAL
RELICS) allegedly sold to him by Doa Trinidad Rizal. The trial court held that neither party is entitled to the possession of such
property, relying principally on the fact that in Rizal's Mi Ultimo Adios, there is a line where Rizal bequeathed all his property to
the Filipino people. The court argued that the handwritten work of Rizal constitutes a holographic will giving the State all his

ISSUE: Does Mi Ultimo Adios constitute a last will?

HELD: No. An instrument which merely expresses a last wish as a thought or advice but does not contain a disposition of
property, and executed without Animus Standi cannot be legally considered a will. Rizal's Mi Ultimo Adios is but a literary piece
of work, and was so intended. It may be considered a will in a grammatical sense but not in a legal or juridical sense. Moreover,
it also lacks the requirements of a holographic will such as a statement of the year month and day of its execution and his

GR No.L-4888, May 25, 1953
93 PHIL 142

FACTS: Pilar Montealegre died leaving a will (Exhibit A) and a so-called codicil (Exhibit B), disinheriting her husband Pedro Porras
and some of her relatives. The two documents were submitted to probate but were denied by the trial court, upon the grounds
such as the defect of the attestation clause on Exh. A and that Exh. cannot be considered a codicil for it was executed by the
testator a day before Exhibit A, thus it cannot be included in the probate proceedings.

ISSUE: Should a document, expressly disinheriting certain heirs, executed by the testator prior to a supposed last will, be

HELD: Yes. The trial court and the CA is correct that Exhibit B having been executed one day before Exhibit A could not be
considered as a codicil "because a codicil, as the word implies, is only an addition to, or modification of, the will." The Court of
Appeals added that "the contents of Exhibit B are couched in the language ordinarily used in a simple affidavit and as such, may
not have the legal effect and force to a testamentary disposition."
However, Exhibit B does partake of the nature of a will. A will is defined in article 667 of the Civil code of Spain as "the act by
which a person dispose of all his property or a portion of it," and in article 783 of the new Civil Code as "an act whereby a
person is permitted, with the formalities prescribed by law, to control to a certain degree the disposition of his estate, to take
effect after his death. Exhibit B comes within this definition.

GR No.1439, March 19, 1904
3 PHIL 426

FACTS: Appellant constested the validity of the will of Doa Juana Moreno upon the ground that although the attestation clause
in the will states that the testator signed the will in the presence of three witnesses who also each signed in each presence, the
will was not actually written by the testator.

ISSUE: Is it necessary that a will be written by the testator herself?

HELD: No. Section 618 of the Civil Code requires (1) that the will be in writing and (2) either that the testator sign it himself or, if
he does not sign it, that it be signed by some one in his presence and by his express direction. Who does the mechanical work
of writing the will is a matter of indifference. The fact, therefore, that in this case the will was typewritten in the office of the
lawyer for the testratrix is of no consequence.

GR No.L-22595, November 1, 1927
50 PHIL 867

FACTS: Joseph Brimo, a Turkish national, died leaving a will which one of the clauses states that the law of the Philippines shall
govern the partition and not the law of his nationality, and that legatees have to respect the will, otherwise the dispositions
accruing to them shall be annulled. By virtue of such condition, his brother, Andre Brimo, an instituted heir was thus excluded
because, by his action of having opposed the partition scheme, he did not respect the will. Andre sued contending that the
conditions are void being contrary to law which provides that the will shall be probated according to the laws of the nationality
of the decedent.

ISSUE: Is the condition as set by the testator valid?

HELD: No. A foreigner's will to the effect that his properties shall be distributed in accordance with Philippine law and not with
his national law, is illegal and void, for his national law cannot be ignored in regard to those matters that Article 10 of the Civil
Code states said national law should govern. Said condition then, in the light of the legal provisions above cited, is considered
unwritten, and the institution of legatees in said will is unconditional and consequently valid and effective even as to the herein
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Mambulao vs. Republic
Cabrera vs. The Provincial Treasurer of Tayabas
CIR vs. Vda. de Codiera
Republic vs CA and Nielson & Co.
CIR vs. CA, Atlas Consolidated
Abaya vs. Ebdane Jr.
Gonzales vs. Marcos
Maceda vs. Macaraig Jr.
CIR vs Pascor
CIR vs. CA
Punsalan vs. Mun. Board of City of Manila
Lutz vs. Araneta
Gomez vs. Palomar
North Camarines vs. CIR
Philex Mining vs CIR
Philippiine Guaranty Inc. vs. CIR
Phil. Bank of Communications vs. CIR
Reyes vs. Almanzor
Marcos II vs. CA
Davao Gulf Lumber vs. CIR
Commissioner vs. Algue, Inc.
CIR vs. CA, Citytrust Banking Corp.
Vera vs. Fernandez
CIR vs. Pineda
ESSO Standard vs. Acting Commissioner of Customs
Villegas vs. Hiu Chiong
Osmea vs. Orbos
Pepsi-Cola vs. Municipality of Tanauan
Pepsi-Cola vs. City of Butuan
Board of Assessment Appeals vs. CTA
Atlas Consolidated vs. CIR
Commissioner vs. BOAC
Pascual vs. Secretary of Public Works
Bagatsing vs. Ramirez
City of Baguio vs. De Leon
Tio vs. VRB

Case Digests: Taxation I (add'l)

Case Digests: Wills & Succession

Case Digests: Taxation i

digests: credit transactions

memoirs of the colony
Case Digests: Labor Law
CALALANG v. WILLIAMS, 70 PHIL 726, GR No. 47800, December 2, 1940

FACTS: The National Traffic Commission resolved that animal-drawn vehicles be prohibited from passing along some major
streets such a Rizal Ave. in Manila for a period of one year from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic. The
Secretary of Public Works approved the resolution on August 10,1940. The Mayor of Manila and the Acting Chief of Police of
Manila have enforced the rules and regulation. As a consequence, all animal-drawn vehicles are not allowed to pass and pick up
passengers in the places above mentioned to the detriment not only of their owners but of the riding public as well.

ISSUE: Does the rule infringe upon the constitutional precept regarding the promotion of social justice? What is Social Justice?

HELD: No. The regulation aims to promote safe transit and avoid obstructions on national roads in the interest and
convenience of the public. Persons and property may be subject to all kinds of restraints and burdens in order to secure the
general comfort, health, and prosperity of the State. To this fundamental aims of the government, the rights of the individual
are subordinated.
Social justice is neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy, but the humanization of laws and the
equalization of social and economic forces by the State so that justice in its rational and objectively secular conception may at
least be approximated. Social justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the people, the adoption by the Government of
measures calculated to insure economic stability of all the competent elements of society, through the maintenance of a
proper economic and social equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of the community, constitutionally, through the
adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extra-constitutionally, through the exercise of powers underlying the existence of all
governments on the time-honored principles of Salus Populi est Suprema Lex.(Justice Laurel)


FACTS: Petitioner is resident physician in a hospital in Negros Oriental, who was diagnosed of a kidney disease. After having her
kidney transplant, she filed a work-related sickness compensation claim with the respondent ECC through the GSIS, which
denied the same, arguing that the disease she contracted is not listed among the occupational diseases determined by them to
be compensable as work-related sickness. Petitioner appealed contending that the bacteria causing the disease was contracted
while being employed in the hospital since symptoms have already manifested since 1994, and relying upon the theory that her
employment poses an increased risk in contracting the diseases.

ISSUE: Is the contention of the petitioner correct?

HELD: Yes. In determining whether an injury or sickness is work-related or not, what the law requires is reasonable work
connection, not a direct causal connection. It is observed that the WCL has not ceased to be a social legislation, hence liberality
of the law in the form of the workingman or woman still prevails.


FACTS: While being an employee of the Philippine Ports Authority, respondent was inflicted with tuberculosis, hypertension
and diabetes. He then filed with the petitioner Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) a claim for compensation benefits
under PD No. 626. However, petitioner denied the respondents claim on the ground that the ailments are not considered
occupational diseases, and there is no clear evidence, such as medical records, showing that he contracted the diseases during
his work or his duties have increased the risk of contracting said ailments. Petitioner rejected respondent's contention that
there is probability of contracting TB with the kind of job the respondent has.

ISSUE: How should PD 626 be applied with respect to determining compensability of work-related diseases?

HELD: A social legislation should interpreted liberally. In applying liberality in the interpretation of Workmen's Compensation
Law, the degree of proof required by the law is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind may accept to support a
conclusion. Probability, not certainty, is the touchstone. Any doubt on this matter has to be interpreted in favor of the
employees considering that PD 626 is a social legislation.


FACTS: Mayor Fuguso refused to grant the petitioner and his party a permit to hold a public meeting at Plaza Miranda, based on
a city ordinance which grants the mayor the discretion to regulate such conduct of public assemblies, as a lawful exercise of
police power.

ISSUE: What is police power? How was it supposed to be exercised by the Manila City Officials?

HELD: Police Power is the power of the State to enact laws and prescribe regulations that will promote the health, morals,
education, good order, safety, and general welfare of the People. However, in the exercise of police power the council may, in
its discretion, regulate the exercise of such rights in a reasonable manner, but cannot suppress them, directly or indirectly, by
attempting to commit the power of doing so to the mayor or any other officer. The ordinance grants the mayor the power to
regulate as to how, when and where a public assembly should be held, but not the discretion to refuse the grant of such permit
to derogate the right of the petitioner to peaceably assemble and seek redress against the government.


FACTS: The Department of Labor and Employment issued an order suspending the deployment of Filipino domestic and
household workers, in view of the heightened abuses committed against OFWs abroad. The petitioner, a local recruitment
agency, petitioned for the invalidation of such order for alleged violation of equal protection clause.

ISSUE: Is the deployment ban a valid exercise of police power? What is police power?

HELD: Yes, the deployment ban of domestic helpers is a valid exercise of police power. Police Power is the inherent power of
the State to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty and property in order to promote the general welfare.


FACTS: Petitioner closed its industrial service unit due to alleged loss and extinct demand resulting to the termination of the
employment of the respondent. The latter filed an illegal dismissal case but the same was denied by the labor arbiter, and
subsequently by the NLRC contending that the same is part of the management prerogative.

ISSUE: Has employer the right to close its business even without basis resulting to the displacement of the worker?

HELD: No. Employers are also accorded with rights and privileges to assure their self-determination and independence and
reasonable return of capital. This mass of privileges is called management prerogatives. Although they may be broad and
unlimited in scope, the State has the right to determine whether an employer's privilege is exercised in a manner that complies
with the legal requirements and does not offend the protected rights of labor.


FACTS: Private respondent Estrada is a member of the respondent labor union. He did not report for work for 1 month due to a
grave family problem as his wife deserted him and nobody was there to look after his children. He was required to explain.
Finding his reasons to be unjustified, the petitioner terminated him, since according to company rules, absence for 6
consecutive days is considered abandonment of work.

ISSUE: Should a worker be summarily dismissed relying on some company rules?

HELD: No. While the employer is not precluded from prescribing rules and regulations to govern the conduct of his employees,
these rules and their implementation must be fair, just and reasonable. No less than the Constitution looks with compassion on
the workingman and protects his rights not only under a general statement of a state policy but under the Article on Social
Justice and Human Rights, thus placing labor contracts on a higher plane and with greater safeguards. Verily, relations between
labor and capital are not merely contractual. They are impressed with public interest and labor contracts must, perforce, yield
to the common good.


FACTS: Petitioners are cashiers of Isetann Department Store who were dismissed for having accumulated shortages. Petitioners
admitted this in their affidavits. The labor arbiter ruled them having been illegally dismissed. The NLRC reversed the ruling.

ISSUE: Were the petitioners validly dismissed?

HELD: Yes. The failure of the petitioners to report to the management the irregularities constitute "fraud or willful breach of
the trust reposed in them by their employer or duly authorized representative"--one of the just causes of valid termination of
employment. The employer cannot be compelled to retain employees who were guilty of malfeasance as their continued
employment will be prejudicial to the former's best interest. The law, in protecting the rights of the employees, authorizes
neither oppression nor self-destruction of the employer.


FACTS: Private respondent Silvestre Germane did not report for work because his wife delivered their first child. He did not
however notify his employer, causing a disruption in the business of the latter. When the respondent returned to work he was
surprised upon knowing that someone has been hired to take his place.

ISSUE: Was there a case of illegal dismissal?

HELD: Yes. It appeared that the respondent was illegally dismissed. While a prolonged absence without leave may constitute as
a just cause for dismissal, its illegality stems from the non-observance of due process. Applying the WenPhil Doctrine by
analogy, where dismissal was not preceded by the twin requirement of notice and hearing, the illegality of the dismissal in
question, is under heavy clouds and therefore illegal.


FACTS: Respondent filed 2 petitions with the CIR: 1.) to lay off its 44 employees on the ground that the company is losing its
operations, and 2.) to lease its equipment to certain individuals. Judge Roldan of the CIR, after ocular inspection, approved the
petitions, thereby leaving the petitioners, if not unemployed, having nothing to do because of absence of equipment in the
studios. Petitioner assailed the ruling of the judge, and appealed to the CIR en banc.

ISSUE: Should the court grant a petition for mass dismissal without hearing the side of the employees concerned?

HELD: No. A worker cannot be deprived of his job or his wages without due process of law. The case was then remanded to CIR
for proper hearing.

CALLANTA v. CARNATION PHILS., 145 SCRA 268, G.R. No. 70615 October 28, 1986

FACTS: Upon clearance approved by the MOLE Regional Office, respondent dismissed the petitioner in June 1979. On July 1982,
petitioner filed an illegal dismissal case with claim for reinstatement with the Labor Arbiter, who granted it. On appeal, the
NLRC reversed the judgment based on the contention that the action by the petitioner has already prescribed, since Art. 291 &
292 of the Labor Code is expressed that offenses penalized under the Code and all money claims arising from employer-
employee relationships shall be filed within 3 years from when such cause of action arises, otherwise it will be barred.

ISSUE: Is ruling of the NLRC correct?

HELD: No. It is a principle well recognized in this jurisdiction, that one's employment, profession, trade or calling is a property
right, and the wrongful interference therewith is an actionable wrong. The right is considered to be property within the
protection of the Constitutional guarantee of due process of law.

Verily, the dismissal without just cause of an employee from his employment constitutes a violation of the Labor Code and its
implementing rules and regulations. Such violation, however, does not amount to an "offense" as understood under Article 291
of the Labor Code. In its broad sense, an offense is an illegal act which does not amount to a crime as defined in the penal law,
but which by statute carries with it a penalty similar to those imposed by law for the punishment of a crime. The confusion
arises over the use of the term "illegal dismissal" which creates the impression that termination of an employment without just
cause constitutes an offense. It must be noted, however that unlike in cases of commission of any of the prohibited activities
during strikes or lockouts under Article 265, unfair labor practices under Article 248, 249 and 250 and illegal recruitment
activities under Article 38, among others, which the Code itself declares to be unlawful, termination of an employment without
just or valid cause is not categorized as an unlawful practice.

DE LEON v. NLU, 100 PHIL 789

FACTS: The defendant-appellees had been picketing the Dalisay Theater owned by the plaintiff for the purpose of securing
reinstatement to their respective jobs in the theater when it was run and operated by the Filipino Theatrical Enterprises (FTE),
then a lessee of the parcel of land owned by plaintiff on which the theater was erected. The defendant-appellees lost their jobs
upon termination of the lease contract between De Leon and the FTE, which turned over the rights to the theater back to De
Leon, the owner of the lot.

ISSUE: Has terminated employees the right to strike in this case?

HELD: Yes. Although the employees has no business with the owner of the establishment, they have nevertheless the right to
peaceful picketing which applies also to cases where employer-employee relationship is absent. The picketing, a form of
freedom of expression, is conducted not to disrupt the business of the owner but to appeal for a humanitarian consideration,
after having been laid off due to the termination of the business of their previous employer.


FACTS: Petitioner labor union picketed against Metrobank, which is occupying an office space in the Wellington building.
Wellington complained that the picketers were annoyingly blocking the common passageway of the building, the only ingress
and egress being used by the occupants of the second to the sixth floors thereof as well as by their respective employees,
clients and customers, so that the picket has caused a disruption of the business of Wellington as well as the other lessors in the

ISSUE: Does the court have the power to enjoin the picket, despite being peaceful?

HELD: Yes. The courts are vested with the power to limit the exercise of the right of peaceful picketing to parties involved in the
labor dispute, or having a direct interest to the context of this issue. Wellington is a mere "innocent bystander" who is not
involved in the labor dispute. Thus, they are entitled to seek protection of their rights from the courts and the courts may,
accordingly, legally extend the same.


FACTS: The picket held by defendant-appellant union against their employer prevented herein plaintiff-appellee's truck from
loading and unloading of its products inside the premises of Permanent Concrete Products, where the plaintiff-appellee was
occupying as a sub-lessee. Hence, the latter sought to enjoin the picket.

ISSUE: May a picket be enjoined at the instance of a third party?

HELD: Yes. Peaceful picketing, while being allowed as a phase of freedom of expression guaranteed by the Constitution and
could not be curtailed even in the absence of employer-employee relationship, is not an absolute right. The courts are not
without power to localize the sphere of demonstration, whose interest are foreign to the context of the dispute. Thus the right
may be recognized at the instance of an "innocent bystander" who is not involved in the labor dispute if it appears that the
result of the picketing is create an impression that a labor dispute exists between him and the picketing union.


FACTS: Petitioner Ramos was suspended for writing the phrase "under protest" in the company payroll to object to the P1.0
deduction made by the respondent for allegedly getting P500 worth of lumber in 1964. The deduction started only in 1969, at
the peak of union activities of the petitioner when several complaints of unfair labor practices were filed by the union against
the respondent.

ISSUE: Is the action of the petitioner a lawful exercise of freedom of expression?

HELD: Yes. The freedom of expression is available to individual workers subject to legal limitation of industrial peace to air valid
grievances. It is thus too clear from the foregoing that petitioner Ramos was justified in airing his grievances against the
unauthorized and illegal deductions made by respondent company. By writing "under protest" on the company payroll,
petitioner Ramos was well within the ambit of his constitutional freedom of expression as well as the right to petition against
what was obviously a calculated undue harassment amounting to unfair labor practice perpetuated by respondent employer


FACTS: Stepping on the provisions of RA 3350 exempting members of religious sects which prohibit its members from joining
associations, plaintiff-appellee, being of a faithful of Iglesia ni Cristo, withdrew his membership from the appellant union. The
latter, who have pact a closed-shop provision in their collective bargaining agreement with respondent company sought the
separation of the plaintiff-appellee. The trial court enjoined the supposed dismissal, prompting the union to assail the validity
of RA 3350 particularly the provision granting exemption to members of above-mentioned sects.

ISSUE: Does the law infringe the right or freedom of labor to associate?

HELD: No. Freedom of association implies not only the right to join a labor union, but also the privilege of not joining one, of
selecting which union to join, and of disaffiliating from a union. It is clear that the assailed Act, far from infringing the
constitutional provision on freedom of association, upholds and reinforces it. It does not prohibit the members of said religious
sects from affiliating with labor unions. It still leaves to said members the liberty and the power to affiliate, or not to affiliate,
with labor unions. If, notwithstanding their religious beliefs, the members of said religious sects prefer to sign up with the labor
union, they can do so. If in deference and fealty to their religious faith, they refuse to sign up, they can do so; the law does not
coerce them to join; neither does the law prohibit them from joining; and neither may the employer or labor union compel
them to join.


FACTS: Petitioner bank terminated private respondents for having written and published a "patently libelous letter tending to
cause dishonor, discredit or contempt not only the officers and employees of the bank, but also their employer" by demanding
the resignation of the bank president on grounds of immorality, nepotism and favoritism. CIR ruled that the petitioner's act
constitutes an unfair labor practice.

ISSUE: Does the dismissal of employees airing their grievance against their employer constitute unfair labor practice?

HELD: Yes. Even assuming that respondents acted in their individual capacities when they wrote the letter, they were
nonetheless protected for they were engaged in concerted activity, in the exercise of their right to self-organization that
includes concerted activity for mutual aid and protection, interference with which constitutes unfair labor practice.

The petitioner should have allowed the respondents to air their grievances as a mechanism in a collective bargaining
agreement. Collective bargaining... normally takes the form of negotiation when major conditions of employment to be written
into an agreement are under consideration, and of grievance committee meetings and arbitration when questions arising from
the administration of an agreement are at stake.


FACTS: Petitioners went on strike after their employer SSS failed to act upon the union's demands concerning the
implementation of their CBA. SSS filed an injunction contending that the petitioners are covered by Civil Service laws which
prohibits employees of the government from staging a strike. SSSEA on the other hand, argued that the NLRC has the
jurisdiction of the case by virtue of the provisions of the Labor Code.

ISSUE: Does the court have jurisdiction? Do employees covered by the Civil Service have the right to strike?

HELD: On question of jurisdiction, yes. The RTC, in the exercise of its general jurisdiction under BP 129, has jurisdiction over
petitioner's claim for damages and for the issuance of a writ of injunction to stop the strike, since the Labor Code do not apply
to government employees.

On the right to strike of government workers, No. The Constitution provides guarantee among workers with the right to
organize and conduct peaceful concerted activities. On the other hand, EO 180 provides that the Civil Service law and rules
governing concerted activities in government service shall be observed subject to any legislation that may be enacted by
Congress. Referring to Memo Circular No.6, s. 1987 of the CSC which states that prior to the enactment by Congress of
applicable laws concerning strike by government employees, enjoins under pain of administrative sanctions, all government
officials and employees from staging a strike, demonstrations, mass leaves, walk-outs and other forms of mass action which will
result in temporary stoppage or disruption of public service, the court ruled that in the absence of any legislation allowing
government employees to strike, they are therefore prohibited from doing so.

GARCIA v. PAL, GR 164856, Jan. 20, 2009

FACTS: PAL filed an administrative case against Garcia and Dumago after they were allegedly caught sniffing shabu at the PAL
Tool Room. After due notice, they were dismissed for transgressing the PAL Code of Discipline. The petitioners filed a complaint
for illegal dismissal. The Labor Arbiter decided in favor of petitioners with an immediate reinstatement. A writ was issued to
such effect pending appeal with the NLRC.

ISSUE: Can the petitioners collect wages on the period of appeal from the Labor Arbiters order up to the final decision of the
higher court?

HELD: Yes. The State forcefully and meaningfully underscore labor as a primary social and economic force. In short, with respect
to decisions reinstating employees, the law itself has determined a sufficiently overwhelming reason for its execution pending
appeal. Therefore, the petitioners can collect wages from the period of the execution of the decision of the labor arbiter to the
time of the final decision of the higher court.

MORTERA v. CIR, GR L-1340, Oct. 13, 1947
FACTS: All laborers of Canlubang Sugar Estate were ordered to return to work immediately and stop the strike with the
admonition that those who will fail to report will not only lose any concession but the company was authorized by the public
respondent herein to employ new employees or laborers to take the places or positions of those who fail to report. The public
respondent ordered that picketing under any guise or form, is entirely prohibited considering that the industry was into sugar, a
very important and essential food, lack of supply would mean destruction of sugar centrals of many provinces.

ISSUE: Was there a denial of the right to strike?
HELD: Yes. The order on prohibition to strike should be understood to cover only illegal picketing, that is, picketing through the
use of illegal means. Peaceful picketing cannot be prohibited. It is part of the freedom of speech guaranteed by the
Constitution. Petitioners have not shown reasons to annul the order. Petition dismissed.

FELIX UY v. COA, GR 130685, March 21, 2000

FACTS: Petitioners were among the more than 60 dismissed permanent employees of the Capitol of Agusan del Sur by the
newly incumbent Governor Paredes. They contended that the dismissal was a political vengeance because he hired new
employees. The Governor averred that the dismissal was not illegal because it was due to the reduction in work force due to
lack of funds and it is a valid ground of terminating the services of the employees. The Merit System Protection Board held the
dismissal illegal and ordered their reinstatement but Governor Paredes refused to abide from the order. The COA on the other
hand affirmed the decision of the MSPB but denied the motion of the petitioners stating that it is the personal liability of
Governor Paredes and not the Provincial Government of Agusan del Sur.

ISSUE: Can government employees receive backwages and other monetary benefits from the government?

HELD: Yes. If the MSPB found bad faith on the part of Governor Paredes, it would have categorically decreed his personal
liability for the illegal dismissal of the petitioners. To be sure, even the petitioners did not proceed from the theory that their
dismissal is the personal liability of Governor Paredes. Familiar learning is our ruling that bad faith cannot be presumed and he
who alleges bad faith has the onus of proving it. In the case at bar, the decision of the MSPB by itself does not meet the
quantum of proof necessary to overcome the presumption of good faith.

FACTS: The petitioner, a managerial employee who was holding a position of trust and confidence, was admonished by the
latter of her improper handling of a situation involving a rank-and-file employee. She admitted having read a supposed
confidential letter for the PET directors containing a legal opinion of the respondent's counsel regarding the status of her
employment. As a consequence, she was terminated for willful breach of trust reposed upon by her employer. She claimed
having been denied of due process.

ISSUE: Was her dismissal justified?

HELD: Yes. The petitioner has given the respondent more than enough reasons to distrust her. The arrogance and hostility she
has shown towards the company her stubborn uncompromising stance in almost all instances justify the company's
termination of her employment.

PANTRANCO v. PSC, GR 47065, June 26, 1940

FACTS: Petitioner wanted to have Sec. 1 of CA 454 be declared unconstitutional or that if constitutional be declared inapplicable
to valid and subsisting certificates issued prior to its enactment. This arose from the time petitioner applied for ten additional
trucks to comply with his existing certificates of public convenience issued before the enactment of the CA 454 because he was
not agreeable with the conditions set forth by PSC. He contended that this Act violates the constitutional guarantee of non-
impairment of contracts.

ISSUE: Was the constitutional guarantee of non-impairment of obligations and contracts violated?

HELD: No. Statutes for the regulation of public utilities are a proper exercise by the state of its police power for the control and
regulation of public utilities in order to protect the public. If one voluntarily placed his property in public service, he cannot
complain of the regulation of the State through its police power. A regulation of public utilities applies not only to future but
also to present contracts in operation. Such statutes are, therefore, not unconstitutional, either impairing the obligation of
contracts, taking property without due process, or denying the equal protection of the laws, especially inasmuch as the
question whether or not private property shall be devoted to a public and the consequent burdens assumed is ordinarily for the
owner to decide.


FACTS: Palmeria was employed by private respondent Coca-cola, which later entered into a contract of service with Lipercon
Services. It was made to appear that the petitioner was an employee of Lipercon, before being dismissed by Coca-cola.
Petitioner was able to prove his employment with Coca-cola, hence sought for reinstatement. The labor arbiter and NLRC ruled
that reinstatement could not be availed of because of the vehement refusal of the respondent to accept back the petitioner.

ISSUE: Should the petition for reinstatement be granted despite the strained relations between employee and employer?

HELD: Yes. The importance of the remedy of reinstatement to an unjustly dismissed employee cannot be overstated. It is the
remedy that most effectively restores the right of an employee to his employment and all its benefits before its violation by his
employer. Yet despite all its virtues, reinstatement does not and cannot fully vindicate all of an employees injuries for
reinstatement no more than compensates for his financial damages. It cannot make up for his other sufferings, intangible yet
valuable xxx It is a right which cannot be allowed to be devalued by the purchasing power of employers who are only too
willing to bankroll the separation pay of their illegally dismissed employees to get rid of them.


FACTS: Petitioners were among the 800 public school teachers who staged mass actions on September 17 to 19, 1990 to
dramatize their grievances against the alleged failure of the government to implement measures intended for their material
benefit. The Education Secretary issued a Return-to-Work Order but the petitioners failed to comply. Hence they were charged
by the Secretary with several administrative cases leading to their dismissal from service.

ISSUE: Can government employees engage in a strike?

HELD: No. As a general rule, even in the absence of express statutory prohibition like Memo Circ. No.6 public employees are
denied the right to strike or engage in work stoppage against a public employer. The right of the sovereign to prohibit strikes or
work stoppages public employees was clearly recognized at common law. To grant employees of the public sector the right to
strike there must be a clear and direct legislative authority therefor. In the absence of any express legislation allowing
government employees to strike, recognizing their right to do so, or regulating the exercise of the right, employees in the public
service may not engage in strike, walk-outs and temporary work stoppage like workers in the private sector.


FACTS: During the pendency of the labor dispute between the petitioners and the respondents, the CIR managed to forge a
voluntary agreement which results into a return-to-work order, and the respondents was prohibited to, among others, lay-off
any of the petitioners. Barely 4 months the contract, petitioners again staged a strike, violating the condition of the agreement.
The latter countered by assailing the Sec 19 of CA 103, the law upon which the voluntary agreement was based, arguing that
the same results to involuntary servitude.

ISSUE: Should a voluntary agreement with a condition that workers must return to work be voided upon a ground of
involuntary servitude?

HELD: No. An employee entering into a contract of employment voluntarily accepts, among other conditions, those prescribed
in Section 19 of CA 103. The voluntariness of the employee's entering into it or not--with such implied condition, negatives the
possibility of involuntary servitude ensuing.

MABEZA v. NLRC, G.R. No. 118506 April 18, 1997

FACTS: The petitioner and her co-employees were asked by their employer to sign an instrument attesting to the latters
compliance with minimum wage and other labor standard provision, and that they have no complaints against the
management. The petitioner signed the affidavit but refused to go to the Citys Prosecutors Office to confirm the veracity and
contents of the affidavit as instructed by management. That same day she was ordered by the hotel management to turn over
the keys to her living quarters and to remove her belongings in the hotels premises. She then filed a leave of absence which
was denied by her employer. She attempted to return to work but the hotels cashier told her that she should not report to
work and instead continue with her unofficial leave of absence. The management defended upon a ground of loss of

ISSUE: Was the dismissal of the petitioner valid?

HELD: No. The pivotal question in any case where unfair labor practice on the part of the employer is alleged is whether or not
the employer has exerted pressure, in the form of restraint, interference or coercion, against his employees right to institute
concerted action for better terms and conditions of employment. Without doubt, the act of compelling employees to sign an
instrument indicating that the employer observed labor standard provisions of the law when he might not have, together with
the act of terminating or coercing those who refuse to cooperate with the employers scheme constitutes unfair labor practice.


FACTS: Supervisors and managers in petitioner company formed a union separate from that of the rank-and-file union,
petitioned for certification election, and staged a strike against the petitioner, prompting the latter to seek a permanent

ISSUE: Are supervisors or managers allowed by law to form a union?

HELD: No. The supervisory employees of petitioner firm may not, under the law, form a supervisors union, separate and
distinct from the existing bargaining unit (BEU), composed of the rank-and-file employees of the Bulletin Publishing
Corporation. It is evident that most of the private respondents are considered managerial employees. xxx The rationale for this
inhibition has been stated to be, because if these managerial employees would belong to or be affiliated with a Union, the
latter might not be assured of their loyalty to the Union in view of evident conflict of interests. The Union can also become
company- dominated with the presence of managerial employees in Union membership.
Posted 9th July 2013 by cLutz