Peloponnesian War Strategies

Just before the Peloponnesian War began, Pericles of Athens and King Archidamus of Sparta
provided net assessments of the comparative strengths and weaknesses of the two sides.
Evaluate their proections. A stud! of the strategies and proections of King Archidamus of Sparta
as compared to those of Pericles of Athens reveal Archidamus" understanding of the superiorit! of
land power as a basis for success at sea in the ancient #editerranean $ as well as Pericles"
naivet% as to this tenet. &ackground 'he Peloponnesian War between the cit!$states of Athens
and Sparta (and their respective allies) lasted from *+,$*-* &.. .onflicts between the two cites
dated back further, however, with skirmishes from */-$**0 effectivel! ending in a draw. #aor
fighting in the Peloponnesian War occurred from *+,$*1, and ended in Athenian victor!.
2enewed conflict raged from *,+$*-*, ultimatel! concluding in Spartan victor!. An understanding
of these ver! different cultures is illustrative of their leaders" ultimate strategies and proections
before the conflict. At the time of the war, 3reece was divided into two great alliances. Sparta
dominated the Peloponnesian 4eague, an alliance in the Peloponnese region. 'hese allies
included small states close enough to the militant Sparta to be easil! controlled5 stronger (and
more remote) states over which Sparta still had considerable influence5 and the trul! strong,
independent cities of 'hebes and .orinth. Spartan dominance rose from its un6uestionable
position as the preeminent continental arm! of the region. 'he farming and manual labor of the
cit! was provided b! slaves, which freed the male citi7ens to serve in the arm!. Spartan bo!s
were all trained to serve in the militar! as professional soldiers, with individual and famil! needs
subordinated to the needs of the state. 'he Athenian Empire was a more voluntar! alliance of
cit!$states that were impressed b! the Athenian 8av!"s prowess in the Persian War and were
willing to pa! for its protection. Athens used this revenue to further improve its nav!, as well as
improve its own infrastructure and defenses. 9ncluded in these improvements was the
construction of large walls around the cit! and down to the port at Piraeus, home of the Athenian
8av!. 'he open Athenian democrac! stood in stark contrast to the strict oligarch! of Sparta. A
political, philosophical and cultural center, Athens" power and prosperit! depended on its
command of its great maritime empire, which was centered on the Aegean Sea. 9ts nav! grew
along with the alliance. 'here was an increasing concern in the Peloponnesian 4eague that
Athens" rapid growth was an opportunistic e:ploitation of Athenian allies and a direct threat to the
4eague. Well$founded or not, these fears came to a head in *+1, when Spartan allies lobbied
hard for the 4eague to check Athenian growth b! declaring war. At these debates, a Spartan all!
from .orinth chastised the perceived aggressive e:pansion of Athens, stating (Athenians) are b!
nature incapable of either living a 6uiet life themselves or of allowing an!one else to do so.
Spartan Strateg! 9t was at this point in the debates that Sparta"s King Archidamus revealed his
wisdom in both politics and war fighting. 8oting Athens" naval superiorit! and e:pansive financial
resources, he was full! aware that a conflict could not end 6uickl!. 9 fear, he e:plained, that it is
more likel! that we shall be leaving (this war) to our children after us. Archidamus knew well the
tenet proffered b! the great .hinese militar! strategist Sun '7u centuries before, who stated,
;ictor! is the main obect in war. 9f this is long dela!ed, weapons are blunted and morale
depressed. When troops attack cities, their strength will be e:hausted. A protracted campaign
would not be good for Sparta. A dela! in actuall! beginning warfare, however, would aid the
Spartan cause. Archidamus proposed drawing out diplomatic efforts at reconciliation in order to
bu! time for preparations. <e then proposed courting new allies with the specific goal of
increasing naval and financial resources. <e was keenl! aware that the mightiest arm! in the
world could not win without naval support. Archidamus did not suppose that he could match the
Athenian 8av!, however, no matter how man! new allies Sparta courted. <is strateg! instead
was to use his arm! to dominate Athenian allied cities and take all Athenian land outside the
walled cit! of Athens $ in effect, hold it hostage. <e would then use his nav! to block Athens" main
e:ternal source of grain supplies from .rimea. .orinthian allies proposed additional tactics,
including the establishment of fortified camps on sei7ed Athenian lands and fostering revolts
among Athenian all! cities, which would choke off revenue to the war chest. War was still not
Archidamus" hope, and his suggestion for e:tensive diplomatic efforts at resolution was not purel!
tactical stalling. 9ndeed, envo! after envo! was sent to Athens proposing various terms of
compromise, but Athens, and in particular Pericles, was unwilling to make concessions. Athenian
Strateg! #uch of Athens" unwillingness to compromise stemmed from the supreme confidence
Pericles had in both his nav! and his overall strateg!. <e knew the Spartan Arm! was without
peer and anticipated the sei7ure of Athenian lands outside the cit! walls. 9n fact, he even
proposed that Athenians la! waste to their own lands to den! the Spartan arm! resources and the
opportunit! to do so itself5 but he knew this was an unrealistic re6uest of the people. Pericles
intended to draw citi7ens inside the protective walls to wait out the Spartan advance. At the same
time, the might! Athenian 8av! would both conduct offensive raids on Spartan coastal assets and
bring in supplies at the port at Piraeus. Pericles e:plained that if the Athenians would remain
6uiet, take care of their fleet, refrain from tr!ing to e:tend their empire in wartime and thus putting
their cit! in danger, the! would prevail. 9n other words, the best offense is a good defense. 'his
conservative strateg!, too, has support from Sun '7u, who noted that invincibilit! lies in the
defense5 the possibilit! of victor! in the attack. .omparison =f Strategies 2eviewing King
Archidamus" proections, from both his perspective and with the benefit of hindsight, reveal his
sagacit!. Archidamus was keenl! aware of Sparta"s main weakness $ its nav! $ and took
affirmative steps before engaging in battle to address the problem. <e dela!ed engagement for
this purpose, but also to allow cooler heads to prevail after the heated debates demanding a swift
attack on Athens. Archidamus knew that a victorious arm! wins its victories before seeking battle5
an arm! destined to defeat fights in the hope of winning. 'his tactic makes sense from a practical
standpoint as well. 9n comparison, it would be easier for a nation to ac6uire or all! with a nav! in
some form than to ac6uire an arm!. &u!ing ships is easier than bu!ing soldiers. Archidamus
could not hope to ac6uire a nav! e6ual to Athens", but he did not need such a fleet. <e did not
need to defeat the entire Athenian 8av!5 he onl! needed to complete the choke$hold on Athens
begun b! his arm! outside the cit! walls. Pericles" strateg!, on the other hand, had problems from
the onset. While Archidamus sought to shore up his weak nav!, Pericles made no attempt to
shore up his weak arm!5 and as strong as the Athenian 8av! was, it did not pose a maor threat
to the cit! of Sparta. 'he ancient ships of the era did not pose a threat of shore bombardment or
maor amphibious landings. While Athenian forces made raids and even established small coastal
bases in Spartan territor!, these fora!s were unable to inflict sufficient damage to aid the Athenian
fight. 9n addition, crowding the Athenian populace into the walled cit! created a great risk of
infectious disease. 9ndeed, a terrible plague wrought havoc on the besieged cit! from *+-$*1>
and again in *1?. Pericles himself fell to the plague in *1>. 'he e:tent to which this amounts to
#onda! morning 6uarterbacking is uncertain5 but at the bare minimum, Pericles seems to have
underestimated the e:tent of the hardships his strateg! would bring on the people. 'he author
and historian @onald Kagan e:panded on this point. Airst, he noted that the plan lacked
credibilit!. Pericles asked Athenians to passivel! hide behind the walls and watch the Spartan
Arm! level their farms and homes. <e asked them to tolerate the insults and accusations of
cowardice the enem! would hurl at them from beneath their walls. Secondl!, in a related theor!,
Kagan noted that this strateg! flew in the face of 3reek habit and culture. 9ndeed, Athens
abandoned this strateg! after Pericles died in *1>. 'his is not to sa! that the plan was
unsuccessful to that point $ but it was un$Athenian to ust do nothing and wait. Alternative Anal!sis
Athenian tactics in the !ears following Pericles" death resulted in the near$total loss of the fleet
and eventual victor! for Sparta. 'hese facts certainl! lend credibilit! to Pericles" defense$based
strategic principles, which were b! no means foolhard!. <e correctl! observed that a power
dominant b! sea can do certain things which a land power is debarred from doing5 as, for
instance, ravage the territor! of a superior, since it is alwa!s possible to coast along to some
point, where either there is no hostile force to deal with or merel! a small bod!. 9n addition,
Pericles knew the Spartan culture. <e knew that it was a tumultuous cit!$state where the risk of
rebellion b! the slave population was alwa!s a real threat. When a great armed force marched
out of the cit!, the risk of rebellion grew e:ponentiall!. 9f enough Spartan forces were bus!
pounding their fists against the thick walls of Athens, it is not inconceivable that Athens could set
up camp on the Spartan coast and launch a successful offensive campaign from there $
particularl! if Spartan slaves could be turned against their masters. .onclusion Pericles"
proections and strategies were sound in principle, but as Kagan e:plained, the! were too difficult
in practice because the! flew against human nature. Aurther, Pericles did not seem to share King
Archidamus awareness of the war"s inevitable duration. 'he negative impact on Athenian morale
must have been profound as their homes and farms were destro!ed, their friends and famil! fell
to the plague, and the war dragged on for !et another generation. King Archidamus, on the other
hand, reali7ed the protracted nature of the engagement. <e worked hard to avoid it and harder to
prepare for it. &! reali7ing Sparta"s own weaknesses earl! and aggressivel! seeking wa!s to
ameliorate them, he showed sound leadership and tactical prowess. Sun '7u would have
approved.
&ibliograph!
3ra!, .olin S. 'he 4everage of Sea Power. 'he Aree PressB 8ew Cork, 8C. ,>>1. Kagan, @onald.
=n 'he =rigins of War. @oubleda!B 8ew Cork, 8C. ,>>0. Sun '7u (translated b! Samuel &.
3riffith). 'he Art =f War. =:ford Dniversit! PressB 8ew Cork, 8C. ,>?,. 'huc!dides (translated b!
2e: Warner). <istor! of the Peloponnesian War. Penguin &ooksB 8ew Cork, 8C. ,>?1.