State Sovereignty; Effective Occupation;

Terra Nullius (2000)

No XIX - a) What is the basis of the
Philippines' claim to a part of the Spratly
Islands?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The basis of the Philippine claim is effective
occupation of a territory not subject to the
sovereignty of another state. The Japanese
forces occupied the Spratly Island group during
the Second World War. However, under the
San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951 Japan
formally renounced all right and claim to the
Spratlys. The San Francisco Treaty or any
other International agreement however, did not
designate any beneficiary state following the
Japanese renunciation of right. Subsequently,
the Spratlys became terra nullius and was
occupied by the Philippines in the title of
sovereignty. Philippine sovereignty was
displayed by open and public occupation of a
number of islands by stationing of military
forces, by organizing a local government unit,
and by awarding petroleum drilling rights,
among other political and administrative acts. In
1978, it confirmed its sovereign title by the
promulgation of Presidential Decree No. 1596,
which declared the Kalayaan Island Group part
of Philippine territory.
In the case of Bajo de Masinloc, the Philippines has
exercised both effective occupation and effective
jurisdiction over Bajo de Masinloc since its independence.
- Archipelago as defined by Article 46 of UNCLOS:

A group of islands, including parts of the islands,
interconnecting waters and other natural features which
are closely interrelated that such islands, waters, and
other natural resources form an intensive geographical,
economic, political entity or to have historically regarded
as an archipelago.

- Archipelagic State- means a State constituted
wholly by one or more archipelagos and may include other
islands.

- Archipelagic Baselines- basis: UNCLOS: how to
treat Kalayaan Group of Islands (KIG) and Scarborough
shaol: whether to include or to exclude them from the
baselines; and/or consider as part of the regime of
islands.

- Kalayaan Islands (constituted under RA 1596)-
part of Region IV-B, Province of Palawan but under the
custody of DND. Found some 380 miles west of the
southern end of Palawan.

- Scarborough shaol (Bajo de Masinloc)- also
known as scarborough reef, panatag shoal and Huangyan
Dao. Found in the South China Sea, part of the province
of Zambales. A shaol is a traingle shaped chain of reefs
and islands (but mostly rocks. 55 kilometers around with
an area of 150 square kilometer. Its 123 miles west of
Subic Bay. Basis: terra nullius; 200 EEZ

- Spratly Archipelago- international reference to
the entire archipelago wherein the Kalayaan chain of
islands is located. The Philippines essentially claims only
the western section of Spratlys, which is nearest to
Palawan.

- RA 9552 (March 10, 2009)- It defines the general
configuration of the archipelago, including the extended
continental shelf and exclusive economic zone to make it
more compliant with the UNCLOS.

- It redrew the countrys baseline to comply with
the UNCLOS requirements for archipelagic state, in the
process excluding the disputed Kalayaan Island Group
and the Scarborough shoal from the main archipelago and
classifying them instead as regime of islands. They
excluded from the baselines. The national territory
constitutes a roughly triangular delineation which excludes
large areas of waters within 600 miles by 1,200 miles
rectangular enclosing the Philippine archipelago as
defined in the Treaty of Paris.


- Regime of islands (Art. 121 of UNCLOS)
consists of islands or naturally formed areas of land
surrounded by water that remain above water during high
tide. The principle forces claimant states over a certain
territory to maintain peace in the area because no country
can claim exclusive ownership of any of these islands.

- Magalona, et al. vs. Exec. Sec., GR No. 187167,
August 16, 2011- Had Congress in RA 9522 enclosed the
KIG and the Scarborough Shoal as part of the Philippine
archipelago, adverse legal effects would have ensued.
The Philippines would have committed a breach of two
provisions of UNCLOS III. First, Article 47 (3) of UNCLOS
III requires that "[t]he drawing of such baselines shall not
depart to any appreciable extent from the general
configuration of the archipelago." Second, Article 47 (2) of
UNCLOS III requires that "the length of the baselines shall
not exceed 100 nautical miles," save for three per cent
(3%) of the total number of baselines which can reach up
to 125 nautical miles.

Although the Philippines has consistently claimed
sovereignty over the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal for
several decades, these outlying areas are located at an
appreciable distance from the nearest shoreline of the
Philippine archipelago, such that any straight baseline
loped around them from the nearest basepoint will
inevitably "depart to an appreciable extent from the
general configuration of the archipelago.

- Constitutional issues:

Internal waters vs. Archipelagic waters
EEZ; claims over Sabbah and Spratly islands
Delineation of Philippine territory under the Treaty
of
Paris vs. RA 9552

- Right of innocent passage- archipelagic sea lane
passage and right of overflight

- 200-Economic Zone (includes Territorial Seas
and Contiguous Zone) READ: UN Convention on the
Law of the Sea.

- Contiguous Zone (12 nm from the end of
territorials seas)
- Teritorial seas/maritime domain (12 nm from
baseline)
- Internal waters vs. Archipelagic waters

- Reagan vs. CIR, 30 SCRA 968- An exception to
the full and complete power of a nation within its territories
is by virtue of the consent of the nation itself. The
embassy premises of a foreign power are within the
territorial domain of the host State. The ground occupied
as embassy premises is not the territory of the foreign
State to which the premises belong.

- Kalayaan Island Group
a) historic right
b) P.D. No. 1596, dated June 11, 1978
c) effective occupation
d) principle of contiguity because of proximity
e) part of the continental shelf
c) RA 3046 & RA 5446
c) RA 9552

- Freedom islands to which Spratly islands belong-
basis: terra nullius



Sabbah
International law provides for the lease of a territory in
which a state grants another state the right to control at
least part of the lessors territory. Once the territory is
leased the sovereignty remains with the lessor and not
under its jurisdiction which is granted to the lessee. The
lease of the territory is usually given in exchange of an
annual fee.

Section 2- Unreasonable searches & seizures

- The right to security of a person- (Secretary of
National Defense vs. Manalo, GR No. 180908, October 7,
2008)-is a gurarantee of protection of ones rights by the
government. In the context of the writ of amparo, this right
is built into the guarantees of the right to life and liberty
under Art. III, Sec. 1 of the 1987 constitution and the right
to security of person (as freedom from threat and
guarantee of bodily and psychological integrity) under Art.
III, Sec. 2.


- PROBABLE CAUSE- Read: Stone Hill vs.
Diokno; Lim vs. Felix; Webb vs. de Leon; Roan vs.
Gonzales; Papa vs. Mago; Aniag vs. COMELEC.

- Del Rosario vs. People, May 31, 2001- Seizure
of evidence in plain view is justified only when:
1. there is prior valid intrusion based on a valid
warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present
in the pursuit of their official duties;
2. the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the
police who had the right to be there where they are;
3. the evidence must be immediately apparent; and
4. plain view justified the seizure without further
search conducted.

- Manalili vs. CA, 280 SCRA 400- The following
are valid warrantless searches and seizures:

1. Search incidental to lawful arrest (PP vs. Tiu
Won Chua, 405 SCRA 280; PP vs. Estella, 395 SCRA
553);
2. search of a moving vehicle (PP vs. Tampis, 407
SCRA 582);
3. seizure in plain view (PP vs. Go, 411 SCRA 81,
The counterfeit nature of the seals and stamps was not
apparent and established until after they have been
turned over to the Chinese embassy and the Bureau of
Immigration for verification. Hence, not considered as
evidence in plain view);
4. customs search (Salvador vs. PP, July 15, 2005);
5. waiver by the accused( 1. right to be waived
exists; 2. person waiving has knowledge of such right,
actually or constructively; and 3. he/she has actual
intention to relinquish the right.) Silahis Intl Hotel vs.
Soluta, Feb. 20, 2006; Valdez vs. People, 538 SCRA
611)- It is the State which has the burden of proving, by
clear and positive testimony, that the necessary consent
was obtained and that it was freely and voluntarily given.
6. stop & frisk (limited protective search); Terry
Search (Terry vs, Ohio, 1968; Malacat vs CA, Dec. 1,
1997) it is a stop of a person by law enforcement officer
based upon reasonable suspicion that a person may
have been engaged in criminal activity, whereas an arrest
requires probable cause that a suspect committed a
criminal offense.
7. Armed conflict (war time)
8. Check points (limited to visual search; PP vs.
Escao, GR No. 129756-58, January 28, 2000);
9. Exigent and emergency circumstances (PP vs.
De Gracia, 233 SCRA 716), where a warrantless search
was allowed where there was a prevailing general chaos
and disorder because of an ongoing coup;
10. Conduct of Area Target Zone and Saturation
Drives in the exercise of military powers of the President
(Guanzon vs. Villa, 181 SCRA 623);
11. Routine Airport Security Procedure (PP vs.
Suzuki, October 23, 2003; PP vs. Johnson, GR No.
138881, December 18, 2000).

WARRANTLESS ARREST

HOT PURSUIT- Requisites:

1. The pursuit of the offender by the arresting
officer must be continuous from the time of the
commission of the offense to the time of the arrest.
2. There must be no supervening event which
breaks the continuity of the chase.

- Ladlad/Beltran, et al. vs. Gonzales/Velasco, June
1, 2007- Inquest proceedings are proper only when the
accused has been lawfully arrested without warrant.

- PP vs. dela Cruz, 571 SCRA 469- arrest in
flagrante delicto to be availed, the following requisites
must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute
an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is
actually committing or is attempting to commit a crime. (2)
such commission of a crime must be done in the presence
and within the view of the arresting officer.

- PP vs. Del Rosario, 305 SCRA 740, There must
be a large measure of immediacy between the time of the
offense was committed and the time of the warrantless
arrest. If there was an appreaciable lapse of time between
the arrest and the commission of the crime, a warrant of
arrest must be secured.

- Padilla vs. CA, 269 SCRA 402, When the law
speaks of a crime committed in the presence of an
arresting officer, it is not limited to actually seeing the
commission of the crime. The requirement of the law is
complied where the arresting officer was within an earshot
from the scene although he did not personally witness the
commission of the crime.

- PP vs. Martin, 193 SCRA 57, The Bill of Rights is
protection against the State. The protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be extended
to acts committed by private individuals so as to bring it
within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the
government. Right applies only against the government
and agencies tasked with the enforcement of the law.

- Only a judge may validly issue a warrant-
EXCEPT: By administrative authorities (CID; BOC) only
for the purpose of carrying out a final finding of violation of
law.

- Jackson vs. Macalino, November 24, 2003- the
Commissioner of the Immigration can issue a warrant of
arrest against a foreigner who has been ordered to be
deported.

- SCATTER SHOT WARRANT- is a warrant
having been issued to more than one offense.

- PRECISE AND MINUTE DETAIL AS TO THE
PLACE TO BE SEARCHED AND THINGS OR PERSONS
TO BE SEIZED NOT REQUIRED- the constitution does
not require that the things to be seized must be described
in precise and minute detail as to no room for doubt on the
part of the searching authorities; TECHNICAL
DESCRIPTION IS NOT REQUIRED- It is only necessary
that there be reasonable certainty or particularity as to the
identity of the property to be searched for and seized so
that the warrant shall not be a mere roving commission.
THE TEST as would be as to what is to be taken, nothing
is left to the discretion of the officer executing the warrant.
VALLEJO VS. CA, 427 SCRA 658, April 14, 2004.

- Local Autonomy ( Basco vs. Pagcor)- the power
of local government to impose taxes and fees is always
subject to limitations which Congress may provide by law.
The principle of local autonomy under the 1987
constitution simply means decentralization. It does not
make local governments sovereign within the state of an
imperium in imperio (unlike in a Federal System). The
matter of regulating, taxing or otherwise dealing with
gambling is a State concern and hence, it is the sole
prerogative of the State to retain it or delegate it to local
governments.

- Province of North Cotabato vs. GRP Peace
Panel, (GR No. 183591, Oct. 14, 2008)- The Constitution
does not contemplate any state in this jurisdiction other
than the Philippine State much less does it provide for a
transitory status that aims to prepare any part of the
Philippine territory for independence.

LIMBONA VS MANGELIN
[170 SCRA 786]
Autonomy is either decentralization of administration or
decentralization of power. The second is abdication by the
national government of political power in favor of the local
government (essence in a federal set-up); the first
consists merely in the delegation of administrative powers
to broaden the base of governmental power (essence in a
unitary set-up). Against the first, there can be no valid
constitutional challenge.

Local autonomy is the degree of self-determination
exercised by lgus vis--vis the central government. The
system of achieving local autonomy is known as
decentralization and this system is realized through the
process called devolution.

Decentralization is a system whereby lgus shall be given
more powers, authority and responsibilities and resources
and a direction by which this is done is from the national
government to the local government

Devolution refers to the act by which the national
government confers power and authority upon the various
local government units to perform specific functions and
responsibilities.

This includes the transfer to local government units of the
records, equipment, and other assets and personnel of
national agencies and offices corresponding to the
devolved powers, functions, and responsibilities.

Distinguish devolution from deconcentration:

Deconcentration is different. If devolution involves the
transfer of resources, powers from national government to
lgus, deconcentration is from national office to a local
office.

Deconcentration is the transfer of authority and power to
the appropriate regional offices or field offices of national
agencies or offices whose major functions are not
devolved to local government units.


Devolution of Power (1999)
Define devolution with respect to local
government units.

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Section 17(e) of the Local Government Code
defines devolution as the act by which the
National Government confers power and
authority upon the various local government
units to perform specific functions and
responsibilities.

Searches and Seizures; Aliens (2001)
No IV - A is an alien. State whether, in the
Philippines, he: Is entitled to the right against illegal
searches and seizures and against illegal arrests. (2%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Aliens are entitled to the right against illegal
searches and seizures and illegal arrests. As
applied in People v. Chua Ho San, 307 SCRA
432 (1999), these rights are available to all
persons, including aliens.

Searches and Seizures; Incidental to Valid
Search (1990)
No. 9; Some police operatives, acting under a
lawfully issued warrant for the purpose of
searching for firearms in the House of X located
at No. 10 Shaw Boulevard, Pasig, Metro
Manila, found, instead of firearms, ten
kilograms of cocaine.
(1) May the said police operatives lawfully
seize the cocaine? Explain your answer.
(2) May X successfully challenge the legality
of the search on the ground that the
peace officers did not inform him about
his right to remain silent and his right to
counsel? Explain your answer.
(3) Suppose the peace officers were able to
find unlicensed firearms in the house in
an adjacent lot, that is. No, 12 Shaw
Boulevard, which is also owned by X.
May they lawfully seize the said
unlicensed firearms? Explain your
answer.

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(1) Yes, the police operatives may lawfully
seize the cocaine, because it is an item whose
possession is prohibited by law, it was in plain
view and it was only inadvertently discovered in
the course of a lawful search. The possession
of cocaine is prohibited by Section 8 of the
Dangerous Drugs Act. As held in Magoncia v.
Palacio, 80 Phil. 770, an article whose
possession is prohibited by law may be seized
without the need of any search warrant if it was
discovered during a lawful search. The
additional requirement laid down in Roan v.
Gonzales, 145 SCRA 687 that the discovery of
the article must have been made inadvertently
was also satisfied in this case.

(2) No, X cannot successfully challenge the
legality of the search simply because the peace
officers did not inform him about his right to
remain silent and his right to counsel. Section
12(1), Article III of the 1987 Constitution
provides: "Any person under investigation for
the commission of an offense shall have the
right to be informed of his right to remain silent
and to have competent and independent
counsel preferably of his own choice."
As held in People v. Dy, 158 SCRA 111. for
this provision to apply, a suspect must be
under investigation. There was no
investigation involved in this case.

(3) The unlicensed firearms stored at 12 Shaw
Boulevard may lawfully be seized since their
possession is illegal. As held in Magoncia a
Palacio, 80 Phil. 770, when an individual
possesses contraband (unlicensed firearms
belong to this category), he is committing a
crime and he can be arrested without a warrant
and the contraband can be seized.

ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
In accordance with the rulings in Uy Keytin v,
Villareal, 42 Phil. 886 and People v. Sy Juco,
64 Phil. 667, the unlicensed firearms found in
the house at 12 Shaw Boulevard may not be
lawfully seized, since they were not included in
the description of the articles to be seized by
virtue of the search warrant. The search
warrant described the articles to be seized as
firearms in the house of X located at 10 Shaw
Boulevard.

Searches and Seizures; Valid Warrantless
Search (2000)
a) Crack officers of the Anti-Narcotics Unit
were assigned on surveillance of the environs
of a cemetery where the sale and use of
dangerous drugs are rampant. A man with
reddish and glassy eyes was walking unsteadily
moving towards them but veered away when he
sensed the presence of policemen. They
approached him, introduced themselves as
police officers and asked him what he had
clenched in his hand. As he kept mum, the
policemen pried his hand open and found a
sachet of shabu, a dangerous drug. Accordingly
charged in court, the accused objected to the
admission in evidence of the dangerous drug
because it was the result of an illegal search
and seizure. Rule on the objection. (3%)
b) What are the instances when warrantless
searches may be effected? (2%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
a) The objection is not tenable. In
accordance with Manalili v. Court of Appeals,
280 SCRA 400 (1997). since the accused had
red eyes and was walking unsteadily and the
place is a known hang-out of drug addicts, the
police officers had sufficient reason to stop the
accused and to frisk him. Since shabu was
actually found during the investigation, it could
be seized without the need for a search
warrant.
b) A warrantless search may be effected in
the following cases:
a) Searches incidental to a lawful arrest:
b) Searches of moving vehicles;
c) Searches of prohibited articles in plain view:
d) Enforcement of customs law;
e) Consented searches;
f) Stop and frisk (People v. Monaco, 285
SCRA 703 [1998]);
g) Routine searches at borders and ports of
entry (United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S.
606 [1977]); and
h) Searches of businesses in the exercise of
visitorial powers to enforce police
regulations (New York v. Burger, 482 U.S.
691 (1987]).

Searches and Seizures; Visual Search (1992)
No. 5: During the recent elections, checkpoints
were set up to enforce the election period ban
on firearms.
During one such routine search one night, while
looking through an open window with a
flashlight, the police saw firearms at the
backseat of a car partially covered by papers
and clothes.
Antonio, owner and driver of the car in question,
was charged for violation of the firearms
ban. Are the firearms admissible in
evidence against him? Explain.
If, upon further inspection by the police,
prohibited drugs were found inside the
various compartments of Antonio's car,
can the drugs be used in evidence
against Antonio if he is prosecuted for
possession of prohibited drugs? Explain.

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
a) Yes, the firearms are admissible in
evidence, because they were validly seized. In
Valmonte vs. De Villa, 178 SCRA 211 and 185
SCRA 665, the Supreme Court held that
checkpoints may be set up to maintain peace
and order for the benefit of the public and
checkpoints are a security measure against
unauthorized firearms. Since the search which
resulted in the discovery of the firearms was
limited to a visual search of the car, it was
reasonable. Because of the ban on firearms,
the possession of the firearms was prohibited.
Since they were found in plain view in the
course of a lawful search, in accordance with
the decision in Magancia vs. Palacio, 80 Phil.
770, they are admissible in evidence.
b) No, the drugs cannot be used in evidence
against Antonio if he is prosecuted for
possession of prohibited drugs. The drugs
were found after a more extensive search of the
various compartments of the car. As held in
Valmonte vs. De Villa, 185 SCRA 665, for such
a search to be valid, there must be a probable
cause. In this case, there was no probable
cause, as there was nothing to indicate that
Antonio had prohibited drugs inside the
compartments of his car.

Searches and Seizures; Warrantless Arrests
(1993)
No. 9: Johann learned that the police were
looking for him in connection with the rape of an
18-year old girl, a neighbor. He went to the
police station a week later and presented
himself to the desk sergeant. Coincidentally. the
rape victim was in the premises executing an
extrajudicial statement. Johann, along with six
(6) other suspects, were placed in a police lineup
and the girl pointed to him as the rapist.
Johann was arrested and locked up in a cell.
Johann was charged with rape in court but prior
to arraignment invoked his right to preliminary
investigation. This was denied by the judge,
and thus, trial proceeded. After the prosecution
presented several witnesses, Johann through
counsel, invoked the right to bail and filed a
motion therefor, which was denied outright by
the Judge. Johann now files a petition for
certiorari before the Court of Appeals arguing
that: His arrest was not in accordance with law.
Decide.

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, the warrantless arrest of Johann was not
in accordance with law. As held in Go v. Court
of Appeals, 206 SCRA 138, his case does not
fall under the Instances in Rule 113, sec. 5 (a)
of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure
authorizing warrantless arrests. It cannot be
considered a valid warrantless arrest because
Johann did not commit a crime in the presence
of the police officers, since they were not
present when Johann had allegedly raped his
neighbor. Neither can It be considered an arrest
under Rule 113 sec. 5 (b) which allows an
arrest without a warrant to be made when a
crime has in fact just been committed and the
person making the arrest has personal
knowledge offsets indicating that the person to
be arrested committed it. Since Johann was
arrested a week after the alleged rape, it cannot
be deemed to be a crime which "has just been
committed". Nor did the police officers who
arrested him have personal knowledge of facts
indicating that Johann raped his neighbor.

Searches and Seizures; Warrants of Arrest
(1991)
No. 8: On the basis of a verified report and
confidential information that various electronic
equipment, which were illegally imported into
the Philippines, were found in the bodega of the
Tikasan Corporation located at 1002 Binakayan
St., Cebu City, the Collector of Customs of
Cebu issued, in the morning of 2 January 1988,
a Warrant of Seizure and Detention against the
corporation for the seizure of the electronic
equipment. The warrant particularly describes
the electronic equipment and specifies the
provisions of the Tariff and Customs Code
which were violated by the importation.
The warrant was served and implemented in
the afternoon of 2 January 1988 by Customs
policemen who then seized the described
equipment. The inventory of the seized articles
was signed by the Secretary of the Tikasan
Corporation. The following day, a hearing
officer in the Office of the Collector of Customs
conducted a hearing on the confiscation of the
equipment.
Two days thereafter, the corporation filed with
the Supreme Court a petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus to set aside the
warrant, enjoin the Collector and his agents
from further proceeding with the forfeiture
hearing and to secure the return of the
confiscated equipment, alleging therein that the
warrant issued is null and void for the reason
that, pursuant to Section 2 of Article III of the
1987 Constitution, only a judge may issue a
search warrant. In his comment to the petition,
the Collector of Customs, through the Office of
the Solicitor General, contends that he is
authorized under the Tariff and Custom Code to
order the seizure of the equipment whose
duties and taxes were not paid and that the
corporation did not exhaust administrative
remedies. Should the petition be granted?
Decide.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The petition should not be granted. Under Secs.
2205 and 2208 of the Tariff and Customs Code,
customs officials are authorized to enter any
warehouse, not used as dwelling, for the
purpose of seizing any article which is subject
to forfeiture. For this purpose they need no
warrant issued by a court. As stated in Viduya
vs. Berdiago, 73 SCRA 553. for centuries the
seizure of goods by customs officials to enforce
the customs laws without need of a search
warrant has been recognized.

CITIZENSHIP

- Valles vs. COMELEC, 337 SCRA 543- Having a
Filipino father at the time of birth makes one a Filipino.
Having an Australian passport and an alien certificate of
registration does not constitute an effective renunciation of
citizenship and does not militate against the claim of
Filipino citizenship.

- Co vs. HRET, 199 SCRA 692- An attack on a
persons citizenship may be done through a direct action
for its nullity.

- Re: Vicente Ching, 316 SCRA 1- There are two
conditions in order that the election of Philippine
citizenship is effective:
1. the mother of the person making the election
must be citizen of the Philippines; and
2. said election must be made upon reaching the
age of majority.
- Ma v. Fernandez, July 26, 2010, GR No. 183133
- the evolvement from election of Philippine citizenship
upon reaching the age of majority under the 1935
Philippine Constitution to dispensing with the election
requirement under the 1973 Philippine Constitution to
express classification of these children as natural-born
citizens under the 1987 Constitution towards the
conclusion that the omission of the 1941 statutory
requirement of registration of the documents of election
should not result in the obliteration of the right to
Philippine citizenship.
- The Court concluded that, having a Filipino
mother is permanent. It is the basis of the right of the
petitioners to elect Philippine citizenship. Petitioners
elected Philippine citizenship in form and substance. The
failure to register the election in the civil registry should
not defeat the election and negate the permanent fact that
they have a Filipino mother. The lacking requirements
may still be complied with subject to the imposition of
appropriate administrative penalties, if any.
- Bengson vs. HRET, May 7, 2001- Repatriation
may be had under various statutes by those who lost their
citizenship due to: 1) desertion of the AFP; 2) served in
the armed forces of the allied forces in WWII; 3) service in
the AF of the US at any other time; 4) marriage of a
Filipino woman to an alien; 5) political and economic
necessity.

- R.A. No. 8171, which has lapsed into law on 23
October 1995, is an act providing for the repatriation (a) of
Filipino women who have lost their Philippine citizenship
by marriage to aliens and (b) of natural-born Filipinos who
have lost their Philippine citizenship on account of political
or economic necessity. To claim the benefit of RA 8171,
the children must be of minor age at the time of the
petititon for repatriation was filed by the parent [Angat vs.
RP, September 14, 1999; Tabasa vs. CA, GR. No.
125793, August 29, 2006- no showing that Tabasas
parents lost their Philippine citizenship on account of
political or economic necessity].

- Repatriation simply consists of the taking of an
oath of allegiance to the RP and registering said oath in
the Local Civil Registry of the place where the person
concerned resides or last resided.

- Altarejos vs. COMELEC, 441 SCRA 655- In
addition to the taking the oath of allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines, the registration of the
Certificate of Repatriation in the proper civil registry and
the Bureau of Immigration is a prerequisite in effecting the
repatriation of a citizen.

- Repatriation retroacts to the date of the filing of
ones application for repatriation. Supra.

- Repatriation results in the recovery of the original
nationality. If he was originally a natural born citizen
before he lost his citizenship, he will be restored to his
former status as natural born Filipino.

- NATURAL BORN- Read Sections 2 and 4 of RA
9225, amending CA 63, otherwise known as Citizenship
Retention and Reacquisition Act (August 29, 2003)-
including citizens repatriated and unmarried children,
whether legitimate or illegitimate or adopted, below 18
years of age of those repatriated.


- DUAL CITIZENSHIP- Read: Mercado vs.
Manzano, 307 SCRA 630- The phrase dual citizenship in
RA 7160 must be understood as referring to dual
allegiance (especially for naturalized citizens). In filing a
certificate of candidacy, the person with dual citizenship
effectively renounces his foreign citizenship. The oath of
allegiance contained in the certificate of candidacy
constitutes sufficient renunciation of his foreign
citizenship.

- Corodora v. COMELEC, GR No. 176947,
February 19, 2009- The Supreme Court recently ruled that
a natural-born Filipino, who also possesses American
citizenship having been born of an American father and a
Filipino mother, is exempt from the twin requirements of
swearing to an Oath of Allegiance and executing a
Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship under the Citizenship
Retention and Reacquisition Act (RA 9225) before running
for public office. The Supreme Court En Banc held that
that it has applied the twin requirements to cases which
involve natural-born Filipinos who later became
naturalized citizens of another country and thereafter ran
for elective office in the Philippines. In the present case,
[private respondent Gustavo S.] Tambunting, a natural-
born Filipino, did not subsequently become a naturalized
citizen of another country. Hence, the twin requirements in
RA No. 9225 do not apply to him.

- LOPEZ VS. COMELEC, G.R. No. 182701, July
23, 2008 Valles and Mercado Doctrines do not apply is
one reacquires his citizenship under RA 9225 and runs for
public office. To comply with the provisions of Section 5
(2) of RA 9225, it is necessary that the candidate for
public office must state in clear and unequivocal terms
that he is renouncing all foreign citizenship.

- Jacot vs. COMELEC, G. R. No. 179848,
November 27, 2008 Mercado case was decided under
Section 40 of LGC re dual allegiance, and that time RA
9225 was not yet enacted.

- Manuel B. Japzon vs. COMELEC, GR No.
180088, January 19, 2009- It bears to point out that
Republic Act No. 9225 governs the manner in which a
natural-born Filipino may reacquire or retain his Philippine
citizenship despite acquiring a foreign citizenship, and
provides for his rights and liabilities under such
circumstances. A close scrutiny of said statute would
reveal that it does not at all touch on the matter of
residence of the natural-born Filipino taking advantage of
its provisions. Republic Act No. 9225 imposes no
residency requirement for the reacquisition or retention of
Philippine citizenship; nor does it mention any effect of
such reacquisition or retention of Philippine citizenship on
the current residence of the concerned natural-born
Filipino. Clearly, Republic Act No. 9225 treats citizenship
independently of residence. This is only logical and
consistent with the general intent of the law to allow for
dual citizenship. Since a natural-born Filipino may hold, at
the same time, both Philippine and foreign citizenships, he
may establish residence either in the Philippines or in the
foreign country of which he is also a citizen. Residency in
the Philippines only becomes relevant when the natural-
born Filipino with dual citizenship decides to run for public
office. Under Republic Act No. 9225, to run for public
office, he must: (1) meet the qualifications for holding such
public office as required by the Constitution and existing
laws; and (2) make a personal and sworn renunciation of
any and all foreign citizenships before any public officer
authorized to administer an oath.

- Roseller de Guzman vs. COMELEC, GR No.
180048, June 19, 2009- R.A. No. 9225 was enacted to
allow re-acquisition and retention of Philippine citizenship
for: 1) natural-born citizens who have lost their Philippine
citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a
foreign country; and 2) natural-born citizens of the
Philippines who, after the effectivity of the law, become
citizens of a foreign country. The law provides that they
are deemed to have re-acquired or retained their
Philippine citizenship upon taking the oath of allegiance.
However, it must be emphasized that R.A. No. 9225
imposes an additional requirement on those who wish to
seek elective public office, as follows: Section 5. Civil and
Political Rights and Liabilities. Those who retain or re-
acquire Philippine Citizenship under this Act shall enjoy
full civil and political rights and be subject to all attendant
liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the
Philippines and the following conditions:

- x x x x (2)Those seeking elective public office in
the Philippines shall meet the qualifications for holding
such public office as required by the Constitution and
existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate
of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of
any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer
authorized to administer an oath. The filing of a certificate
of candidacy does not ipso facto amount to a renunciation
of his foreign citizenship under R.A. No. 9225. The rulings
in the cases of Frivaldo and Mercado are not applicable
because R.A. No. 9225 provides for more requirements.


- BM No. 1678, Petition for Leave to Resume the
Practice of Law, Benjamin M. Dacanay, December 17,
2007- Dual citizens may practice law in the Philippines by
leave of the Supreme Court and upon compliance with the
requirements, which will restore their good standing as
members of the Philippine Bar.


- Effective nationality principle (Nottebohm case)-
The Nottebohm case cited by the petitioner invoked the
international law principle of effective nationality which is
clearly not applicable to the case at bar. This principle is
expressed in Article 5 of the Hague Convention of 1930
on the Conflict of Nationality Laws as follows: Art. 5.
Within a third State a person having more than one
nationality shall be treated as if he had only one. Without
prejudice to the application of its law in matters of
personal status and of any convention in force, a third
State shall, of the nationalities which any such person
possesses, recognize exclusively in its territory either the
nationality of the country in which he is habitually and
principally resident or the nationality of the country with
which in the circumstances he appears to be in fact most
closely connected. Nottebohm was a German by birth but
a resident of Guatemala for 34 years when he applied for
and acquired naturalization in Liechtenstein one month
before the outbreak of World War II. Many members of
his family and his business interests were in Germany. In
1943, Guatemala, which had declared war on Germany,
arrested Nottebohm and confiscated all his properties on
the ground that he was a German national. Liechtenstein
thereupon filed suit on his behalf, as its citizen, against
Guatemala. The International Court of Justice held
Nottebohm to be still a national of Germany, with which he
was more closely connected than with Liechtenstein.

*Read: Frivaldo vs. COMELEC, GR No. 87193, June 23,
1989
- AASJS, Calilung vs. Datumanong, GR No.
160869, May 11, 2007- It is clear that the intent of the
legislature in drafting Rep. Act No. 9225 is to do away with
the provision in Commonwealth Act No. 63 which takes
away Philippine citizenship from natural-born Filipinos
who become naturalized citizens of other countries. What
Rep. Act No. 9225 does is allow dual citizenship to
natural-born Filipino citizens who have lost Philippine
citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a
foreign country. On its face, it does not recognize dual
allegiance. By swearing to the supreme authority of the
Republic, the person implicitly renounces his foreign
citizenship. Plainly, from Section 3, Rep. Act No. 9225
stayed clear out of the problem of dual allegiance and
shifted the burden of confronting the issue of whether or
not there is dual allegiance to the concerned foreign
country. What happens to the other citizenship was not
made a concern of Rep. Act No. 9225. xxx To begin with,
Section 5, Article IV of the Constitution is a declaration of
a policy and it is not a self-executing provision. The
legislature still has to enact the law on dual allegiance. In
Sections 2 and 3 of Rep. Act No. 9225, the framers were
not concerned with dual citizenship per se, but with the
status of naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance
to their countries of origin even after their naturalization.
Congress was given a mandate to draft a law that would
set specific parameters of what really constitutes dual
allegiance. Until this is done, it would be premature for the
judicial department, including the Supreme Court, to rule
on issues pertaining to dual allegiance.

- Tecson vs. COMELEC, 424 SCRA 148; Velez
vs. Poe and Fornier vs. COMELEC, March 3, 2004-
Under the Philippine Bill of 1902, a citizen of the
Philippines was one who was an inhabitant of the
Philippines, and a Spanish subject on the 11th day of April
1899. The term inhabitant was taken to include 1) a
native-born inhabitant, 2) an inhabitant who was a native
of Peninsular Spain, and 3) an inhabitant who obtained
Spanish papers on or before 11 April 1899. Whether or
not respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen, which, in
turn, depended on whether or not the father of
respondent, Allan F. Poe, would have himself been a
Filipino citizen and, in the affirmative, whether or not the
alleged illegitimacy of respondent prevents him from
taking after the Filipino citizenship of his putative father.
Any conclusion on the Filipino citizenship of Lorenzo Pou
could only be drawn from the presumption that having
died in 1954 at 84 years old, Lorenzo would have been
born sometime in the year 1870, when the Philippines was
under Spanish rule, and that San Carlos, Pangasinan, his
place of residence upon his death in 1954, in the absence
of any other evidence, could have well been his place of
residence before death, such that Lorenzo Pou would
have benefited from the en masse Filipinization that the
Philippine Bill had effected in 1902. That citizenship (of
Lorenzo Pou), if acquired, would thereby extend to his
son, Allan F. Poe, father of respondent FPJ. The 1935
Constitution, during which regime respondent FPJ has
seen first light, confers citizenship to all persons whose
fathers are Filipino citizens regardless of whether such
children are legitimate or illegitimate.

- As Section 3, Article IV of the 1935 Constitution
does not distinguish between legitimate child and
illegitimate child of a Filipino father, we should not make a
distinction. The civil status of legitimacy or illegitimacy, by
itself, is not determinative of the Philippine citizenship.

- Moy Ya Lim Yao vs. Commissioner Immigration,
41 SCRA 292- When citizenship is raised as an issue in
judicial or administrative proceedings, the resolution or
decision thereon is generally not considered as res
judicata in any subsequent proceeding challenging the
same.

- Burca vs. Republic, 51 SCRA 248-
EXCEPTIONS (to res judicata principle) 1.) a persons
citizenship be raised as a material issue in a controversy
where the person is a party; 2.) the Solicitor General or his
authorized representative took active part in the resolution
thereof; and 3.) the finding on citizenship is affirmed by
the Supreme Court.

- Administrative Naturalization (R.A. No. 9139)
grants Philippine citizenship by administrative
proceedings to aliens born and residing in the
Philippines. They have the choice to apply for judicial or
administrative naturalization, subject to the prescribed
qualifications and disqualifications.


- Kilosbayan vs. Ermita, GR No. 177721, July 3,
2007 . The alleged subsequent recognition of his natural-
born status by the Bureau of Immigration and the DOJ
cannot amend the final decision of the trial court stating
that respondent Ong and his mother were naturalized
along with his father.

- JOCELYN SY LIMKAICHONG VS. COMELEC,
G.R. No. 179120, April 1, 2009- Clearly, under the law
and jurisprudence, it is the - State, through its
representatives designated by statute, that may question
the illegally or invalidly procured certificate of
naturalization proceedings. It is not a matter that maybe
raised by private persons in an election case involving the
naturalized citizens descendant.

- Ugdoracion, Jr. vs. COMELEC, 552 SCRA 231-
A Filipino citizens acquisition of permanent resident
status abroad constitutes an abandonment of his domicile
and residence in the Philippines. The green card status
in the USA is a renunciation on ones status as a resident
of the Philippines.


Dual Allegiance vs. Dual Citizenship (1988)
No. 13: Robert Brown was born in Hawaii on
May 15, 1962, of an American father and a
Filipina mother. On May 16, 1983 while holding
an American passport, he registered as a
Filipino with the Philippine Consulate at
Honolulu, Hawaii. In September, 1983 he
returned to the Philippines, and took up
residence at Boac, Marinduque, hometown of
his mother. He registered as a voter, voted, and
even participated as a leader of one of the
candidates in that district in the 1984 Batasan
elections. In the elections of 1987, he ran for
Congressman, and won. His sole opponent is
now questioning his qualifications and is trying
to oust him on two basic claims:
(1) He is not a natural born Filipino citizen, but
is in fact, an American, born in Hawaii, an
integral portion of the U.S.A., who holds an
American passport;
(2) He did not meet the age requirement; and
(3) He has a "green card" from the U.S.
Government.
Assume that you are a member of the House
Electoral Tribunal where the petition for Brown's
ouster is pending. How would you decide the
three issues raised against him?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The first and third grounds have no merit. But
the second is well taken and, therefore, Brown
should be disqualified.
1. Robert Brown is a natural born citizen of the
Philippines. A person born of a Filipino mother
and an alien father before January 17, 1973,
who thereafter upon reaching the age of
majority elect Philippine citizenship, is a citizen
of the Philippines (Art. IV, sec. 1(3)). Under Art.
IV, sec, 2 he is also deemed a natural-born
citizen.

2. The Constitution requires, among other
things, that a candidate for member of the
House of Representatives must be at least 25
years of age "on the day of the election." (Art.
VI, sec. 6). As Brown was born on May 15,
1962, he did not become 25 years old until May
15, 1987. Hence on May 11, 1987, when the
election was held, he was 4 days short of the
required age.

3. The Constitution provides that those who
seek either to change their citizenship or to
acquire the status of an immigrant of another
country "during their tenure" shall be dealt with
by law (Art. XI, sec. 17). The provision cannot
apply to Brown for the following reasons: First,
Brown is in addition an American citizen and
thus has a dual citizenship which is allowed by
the Constitution. (Cf. Art. IV, sec. 4), Second,
Brown did not seek to acquire the status of an
immigrant, but is an American by birth under
the principle of jus soli obtaining in the United
States. Third, he did not seek to change his
status during his tenure as a public officer.
Fourth, the provision of Art. XI, sec. 17 is not
self-executing but requires an implementing
law. Fifth, but above all, the House Electoral
Tribunal has no jurisdiction to decide this
question since it does not concern the
qualification of a member-elect.

Ways of Reacquiring Citizenship (2000)
No XVIII. - Cruz, a Filipino by birth, became an
American citizen. In his old age he has returned
to the country and wants to become a Filipino
again. As his lawyer, enumerate the ways by
which citizenship may be reacquired. (2%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Cruz may reacquire Philippine citizenship in the
following ways:
1. By naturalization;
2. By repatriation pursuant to Republic Act No.
8171; and
3. By direct act of Congress (Section 2 of
Commonwealth Act No. 63).


- EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE- is the implied
constitutional power of the President to withhold
information requested by other branches of the
government. The Constitution does not expressly grant
this power to the President but courts have long
recognized implied Presidential powers if necessary and
proper in carrying out powers and functions expressly
granted to the Executive under the Constitution. xxx In
this jurisdiction, several decisions have recognized
executive privilege starting with the 1995 case of Almonte
v. Vasquez, and the most recent being the 2002 case of
Chavez v. Public Estates Authority and the 2006 case of
Senate v. Ermita.

As Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and as
Chief Executive, the President is ultimately responsible for
military and national security matters affecting the nation.
In the discharge of this responsibility, the President may
find it necessary to withhold sensitive military and national
security secrets from the Legislature or the public.
As the official in control of the nations foreign service by
virtue of the Presidents control of all executive
departments, bureaus and offices, the President is the
chief implementer of the foreign policy relations of the
State. The Presidents role as chief implementer of the
States foreign policy is reinforced by the Presidents
constitutional power to negotiate and enter into treaties
and international agreements. In the discharge of this
responsibility, the President may find it necessary to
refuse disclosure of sensitive diplomatic secrets to the
Legislature or the public. Traditionally, states have
conducted diplomacy with considerable secrecy. There is
every expectation that a state will not imprudently reveal
secrets that its allies have shared with it.
There is also the need to protect the confidentiality of
the internal deliberations of the President with his Cabinet
and advisers. To encourage candid discussions and
thorough exchange of views, the Presidents
communications with his Cabinet and advisers need to be
shielded from the glare of publicity. Otherwise, the
Cabinet and other presidential advisers may be reluctant
to discuss freely with the President policy issues and
executive matters knowing that their discussions will be
publicly disclosed, thus depriving the President of candid
advice.

Executive privilege, however, is not absolute. The interest
of protecting military, national security and diplomatic
secrets, as well as Presidential communications, must be
weighed against other constitutionally recognized
interests. There is the declared state policy of full public
disclosure of all transactions involving public interest, the
right of the people to information on matters of public
concern, the accountability of public officers, the power
of legislative inquiry, and the judicial power to secure
testimonial and documentary evidence in deciding cases.
The balancing of interests between executive privilege
on one hand and the other competing constitutionally
recognized interests on the other hand - is a function of
the courts. The courts will have to decide the issue based
on the factual circumstances of each case. This is how
conflicts on executive privilege between the Executive and
the Legislature, and between the Executive and the
Judiciary, have been decided by the courts.

Akbayan vs. Aquino, G.R. No. 170516, July 16, 2008 -
Applying the principles adopted in PMPF v. Manglapus, it
is clear that while the final text of the JPEPA may not be
kept perpetually confidential since there should be
ample opportunity for discussion before [a treaty] is
approved the offers exchanged by the parties during
the negotiations continue to be privileged even after the
JPEPA is published. It is reasonable to conclude that the
Japanese representatives submitted their offers with the
understanding that historic confidentiality would govern
the same. Disclosing these offers could impair the ability
of the Philippines to deal not only with Japan but with
other foreign governments in future negotiations. xxx
Diplomatic negotiations, therefore, are recognized as
privileged in this jurisdiction, the JPEPA negotiations
constituting no exception. It bears emphasis, however,
that such privilege is only presumptive. For as Senate v.
Ermita holds, recognizing a type of information as
privileged does not mean that it will be considered
privileged in all instances. Only after a consideration of
the context in which the claim is made may it be
determined if there is a public interest that calls for the
disclosure of the desired information, strong enough to
overcome its traditionally privileged status.

- Operational Proximity Test (Neri vs. Senate
Committee, G.R. No. 180643, March 25, 2008)- The
communications elicited by the three (3) questions [a)
Whether the President followed up the (NBN) project? b)
Were you dictated to prioritize the ZTE? c) Whether the
President said to go ahead and approve the project after
being told about the alleged bribe?] are covered by the
presidential communications privilege. First, the
communications relate to a quintessential and non-
delegable power of the President, i.e. the power to enter
into an executive agreement with other countries. This
authority of the President to enter into executive
agreements without the concurrence of the Legislature
has traditionally been recognized in Philippine
jurisprudence. Second, the communications are
received by a close advisor of the President. Under the
operational proximity test, petitioner can be considered a
close advisor, being a member of President Arroyos
cabinet. And third, there is no adequate showing of a
compelling need that would justify the limitation of the
privilege and of the unavailability of the information
elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.



Under the operative fact doctrine, the law is recognized
as unconstitutional but the effects of the unconstitutional
law, prior to its declaration of nullity, may be left
undisturbed as a matter of equity and fair play. In fact, the
invocation of the operative fact doctrine is an admission
that the law is unconstitutional.

The reason is the operation of what is called the
operative fact doctrine. What is this? The doctrine of
operative fact recognizes that a law or executive act,
before it is declared unconstitutional, is an operative fact
which produces consequences that cannot always be
erased, ignored or disregarded. The law is nullified, but its
effect is sustained. Unless the doctrine is held to apply,
the Executive as the disburser and the offices under it and
elsewhere as the recipients could be required to undo
everything that they had implemented in good faith under
the DAP. That scenario would be enormously
burdensome for the Government. Equity alleviates such
burden.

However, as Justice Arturo Brion has clarified, the
doctrine of operative fact cannot apply to the authors and
implementors of the DAP, unless there are concrete
findings of good faith in their favor by the proper tribunals
determining their criminal, civil, administrative and other
liabilities. The Supreme Court is not the proper tribunal to
determine that.
Necessarily, therefore, the question must be asked about
the good faith of the author of the law that has been
declared unconstitutional. But what is good faith?
Good faith is an abstract term which includes a sincere
belief without any malice or intent to defraud.

RH LAW


These were the provisions that the high court declared as
unconstitutional:

Section 7 and the corresponding provisions in the
Implementing Rules and Regulations, insofar as (a) they
require private health facilities and non-maternity hospitals
owned and operated by a religious group to refer patients,
not in an emergency of life-threatening cases, as defined
under RA 8544, to another health facility which is
conveniently accessible, and (b) allow minor patients or
minors who have suffered miscarriage access to modern
methods of family planning without written consent from
their parents or guardian;

Section 23 (a)(1) and the corresponding provision in the
IRR, particularly Section 5.24 insofar as it punishes a
health provider who fails or refuses to disseminate
information regarding programs and services on
reproductive health, regardless of his or her religious
beliefs;

Section 23(a)(2)(1) insofar as they allow a married
individual not in an emergency or life-threatening
situation, as defined under RA 8544, to undergo
reproductive health procedures without the consent of the
spouse;

Section 23(a)(3) and the corresponding provisions in the
IRR, particularly Section 5.24 insofar as they punish any
health care provider who fails and or refuses to refer a
patient not in an emergency or life-threatening case as
defined under RA 8544 to another health care service
provider within the same facility or one which is
conveniently accessible, regardless of his or her belief;

Section 23 (b) and the corresponding provision in the IRR,
particularly Section 5.24 insofar as they punish any public
officer who refuses to support reproductive health
programs or shall do any act that hinders the full
implementation of a reproductive health program,
regardless of his or her religious beliefs;

Section 17 and the corresponding provision in the IRR
regarding the rendering pro bono reproductive health
service insofar as they affect the conscientious objector in
securing Philhealth accreditation;

Section3.01(a) and (11) insofar as it penalizes a health
service provider who will require parental consent from the
minor in not emergency or serious situations.


Section 5 Freedom of Religion

Conscientious Objector Test
A person who, because of principles of religious training
and moral belief, is opposed to all war regardless of its
cause.

A conscientious objector may be release from the
obligation to serve in the armed forces or to participate in
selective service registration. A conscientious objector
must oppose war in any form, and not just a particular
war, in order to avoid military service. He does not have
to be a member of a religious congregation that forbids
participation in war.