I.

CONCEPTS AND PRINCIPLES OF SPECIAL PENAL LAWS:

RPC. Art. 3. Definitions. Acts and omissions punishable by law are felonies
(delitos).
Felonies are committed not only be means of deceit (dolo) but also by means of
fault (culpa).
There is deceit when the act is performed with deliberate intent and there is fault
when the wrongful act results from imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight, or
lack of skill.

U.S vs. Go Chico
Facts: The defendant, GO Chico is charged in violation of Section 1, Article No. 1696
of the Philippine Commission. He was found guilty by the Court of First Instance
and sentenced to pay the fine of 500 pesos. He appeals that first, before a
conviction under the law cited can be had, a criminal intent upon the part of the
accused must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Second, the prohibition of the
law is directed against the use of identical banners, devices, or emblems actually
used during the Philippine insurrection against the United States in the Philippine
Islands. The defendant claims that he was ignorant of the existence of the law
when he displayed his medallions in his store.
Issue: Whether the two claims of Go Chico that the crime should be proven beyond
a reasonable doubt and the object of the prohibition of the law for his acquittal are
valid.
Held: No. The court ruled an en banc decision affirming the decision of the Court of
First Instance. His first claim, the accused did not consciously intended to commit a
crime; but he intended to commit an act, and the act is, by the very nature of
things, the crime itself intent and all. On his second claim, the court interpreted
that the display of certain banners and emblems that resembles and shows the
significance of the insurrection of the Philippines is a crime and that displaying a
duplicate of such objects is as well considered the same.

Padilla v. Dizon (1988)
Facts: Padilla filed an administrative complaint against RTC Judge Dizon for
rendering a manifestly erroneous decision acquitting Lo Chi Fai of the offense
charged for smuggling foreign currency out of the country in violation of Central
Bank Circular No. 960.
The Circular prohibits transmission of foreign currency out of the Philippines
without authorization from the Central Bank. Penal sanction for such violation is
provided in PD No. 1883. Judge Dizon acquitted accused because of lack of intent
to violate and benefit from the act alone.
Issue: WON it is needed to prove malice in offenses punished by special law
Held: Judge showed gross ignorance of the law. He ought to know that proof of
malice or mens rea is not essential in offense punished by special laws which are
mala prohibita. The judge did not take into consideration the admission of the
accused that he was a carrier of foreign currency for other people but chose to
give credence to the fantastic tale of the accused that he and his alleged business
associate were using the money for a particular investment.


REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7080
AN ACT DEFINING AND PENALIZING THE CRIME OF PLUNDER
SECTION 1.Definition of Terms. As used in this Act, the term
a) Public Officer means any person holding any public office in the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines by virtue of an appointment,
election or contract.
b) Government includes the National Government, and any of its subdivisions,
agencies or instrumentalities, including government-owned or -controlled
corporations and their subsidiaries.
c) Person includes any natural or juridical person, unless the context indicates
otherwise.
d) Ill-gotten wealth means any asset, property, business enterprise or
material possession of any person within the purview of Section Two (2) hereof,
acquired by him directly or indirectly through dummies, nominees, agents,
subordinates and/or business associates by any combination or series of the
following means or similar schemes :
1) Through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of public
funds or raids on the public treasury;
2) By receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share, percentage,
kickbacks or any other form of pecuniary benefit from any person and/or entity in
connection with any government contract or project or by reason of the office or
position of the public officer concerned;
3) By the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets belonging to
the National Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities or
government-owned or -controlled corporations and their subsidiaries;
4) By obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares of
stock, equity or any other form of interest or participation including promise of
future employment in any business enterprise or undertaking;
5) By establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or other
combinations and/or implementation of decrees and orders intended to benefit
particular persons or special interests; or
6) By taking undue advantage of official position, authority, relationship,
connection or influence to unjustly enrich himself or themselves at the expense
and to the damage and prejudice of the Filipino people and the Republic of the
Philippines.
SECTION 2. Definition of the Crime of Plunder; Penalties. Any public officer
who, by himself or in connivance with members of his family, relatives by affinity or
consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons, amasses,
accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth through a combination or series of overt
or criminal acts as described in Section 1(d) hereof, in the aggregate amount or
total value of at least Seventy-five million pesos (P75,000,000.00), shall be guilty of
the crime of plunder and shall be punished by life imprisonment with perpetual
absolute disqualification from holding any public office. Any person who
participated with said public officer in the commission of plunder shall likewise be
punished. In the imposition of penalties, the degree of participation and the
attendance of mitigating and extenuating circumstances shall be considered by the
court. The court shall declare any and all ill-gotten wealth and their interests and
other incomes and assets including the properties and shares of stock derived from
the deposit or investment thereof forfeited in favor of the State.
SECTION 3. Competent Court. Until otherwise provided by law, all
prosecutions under this Act shall be within the original jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan.
SECTION 4. Rule of Evidence. For purposes of establishing the crime of
plunder, it shall not be necessary to prove each and every criminal act done by the
accused in furtherance of the scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or
acquire ill-gotten wealth, it being sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt a
pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or
conspiracy.
SECTION 5. Suspension and Loss of Benefits. Any public officer against
whom any criminal prosecution under a valid information under this Act in
whatever stage of execution and mode of participation, is pending in court, shall be
suspended from office. Should he be convicted by final judgment, he shall lose all
retirement or gratuity benefits under any law, but if he is acquitted, he shall be
entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and other benefits which he failed to
receive during suspension, unless in the meantime, administrative proceedings
have been filed against him.
SECTION 6. Prescription of Crimes. The crime punishable under this Act shall
prescribe in twenty (20) years. However, the right of the State to recover
properties unlawfully acquired by public officers from them or from their nominees
or transferees shall not be barred by prescription, laches, or estoppel.
SECTION 7. Separability of Provisions. If any provisions of this Act or the
application thereof to any person or circumstance is held invalid, the remaining
provisions of this Act and the application of such provisions to other persons or
circumstances shall not be affected thereby.
SECTION 8. Scope. This Act shall not apply to or affect pending prosecutions
or proceedings, or those which may be instituted under Executive Order No. 1,
issued and promulgated on February 28, 1986.
SECTION 9. Effectivity. This Act shall take effect after fifteen (15) days from
its publication in the Official Gazette and in a newspaper of general circulation.
Approved: July 12, 1991

ESTRADA vs. SANDIGANBAYAN
Facts: Estrada was charged of the violation of the Anti-Plunder Law (RA 7080,
amended by RA 7659.) on April 4 2001. Petitioner filed Omnibus Motion initially
alleging the lack of a preliminary investigation, reconsideration/reinvestigation of
offense, and opportunity to prove lack of probable cause, all of which were
quashed. On June 14, petitioner moved to quash the Informations filed against him.
Sandiganbayan denied motion, hence appeal to SC.
Petitioner: 1. Anti-plunder Act is unconstitutional under the void for vagueness
doctrine which states that a statute establishing a criminal offense must define the
offense with sufficient definiteness that persons of ordinary intelligence can
understand what conduct is prohibited by the statute.
2. Anti-Plunder act in unconstitutional for being overbroad, which states that a
government purpose may not be achieved with means which sweep unnecessarily
broadly and thereby invade the area of constitutionally protected freedoms
3. Anti-Plunder act is unconstitutional for it dispenses with due process since the
terms in S1, par. D and S2 (combination, series, pattern) are precisely vague
& overbroad, which denies the petitioner of the right to be informed of the nature
& cause of the accusation against him.
4. Anti-Plunder act is unconstitutional for it dispenses with due process since the S4
thereof sets a lower standard for the modicum of evidence required to convict
person than that which is required for criminal cases, which is proof beyond
reasonable doubt.
Issues: 1. Whether or not the Anti-Plunder Law is unconstitutional for being vague
and overbroad
2. Whether or not the Anti-Plunder Law lowers the threshold for evidence in
violation of due process
3. Whether or not Plunder as defined is malum prohibitum, which means that
criminal intent need not be proved in order to convict person.
Held: 1. NO. There are several levels of reasoning which the SC used.
a. presumption of constitutionality of a statute- basic principle that a legislative
enactment is presumed to be in harmony with the Consti. Every intendment of the
law must be adjudged by the courts in favor of its constitutionality, invalidity being
a measure of last resort.
b. As it is written, the Plunder Law contains ascertainable standards and well-
defined parameters which would enable the accused to determine the nature of his
violation. Section 2 is sufficiently explicit in its description of the acts, conduct and
conditions required or forbidden, and prescribes the elements of the crime with
reasonable certainty and particularity.
1. words of a statute will be interpreted in the natural, plain & ordinary
acceptation, except in cases where it is evident that the legislature intended a
technical & special legal meaning
2. a statute is not rendered uncertain & void merely because general terms are
used, or because it employed terms that were not defined. There is no statutory or
constitutional command that the Congress needs to define every word it uses.
Inability to so define the words employed in a statute will not necessarily result in
the vagueness or ambiguity of the law so long as the legislative will is clear, or at
least, can be gathered from the whole act, which is distinctly expressed in the
Plunder Law.
3. challenge of a statute for being vague can only be applied for those laws which
in the face are utterly vague and cannot be clarified by a saving clause or by
construction.
c. the overbroad and vagueness doctrines, according to the SC, have a special
application for free-speech cases & are inapt for testing the validity of penal
statutes. Therefore, the Anti-Plunder law does not violate due process since it
defines the act which it purports to punish, giving the accused fair warning of the
charges against him, and can effectively interpose a defense on his behalf.
2. NO. In a criminal prosecution for plunder, as in all other crimes, the accused
always has in his favor the presumption of innocence which is guaranteed by the
Bill of Rights. The petitioners contention that the language of the law which states
that not every act of amassing wealth needs to be proven, but only a pattern or
series of acts, dispenses with the requirement of guilt beyond reasonable doubt is
unfounded. The prosecution still has to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the
acts constituting plunder (though not all) occurred, and these predicate acts form a
pattern. Hence it does not lower the level of evidence from beyond reasonable
doubt to mere preponderance. Further, S4 on for the purposes of establishing
the crime of plunder, a procedural & does not define a substantive right in favor of
the accused but only operates in furtherance of a remedy.
3. NO. Plunder is mala in se which requires proof of criminal intent. Mens rea must
be proven. Again, this only means that the Anti-Plunder Law does not establish a
lower level of evidence. Petition dismissed for lack of merit. RA 7080 held to be
constitutional.
J. Mendozas concurring opinion:
Plunder is a malum in se, requiring proof of criminal intent. Precisely because the
constitutive crimes are mala in se the element of mens rea must be proven in a
prosecution for plunder. It is noteworthy that the amended information alleges
that the crime of plunder was committed "willfully, unlawfully and criminally." It
thus alleges guilty knowledge on the part of petitioner.
In support of his contention that the statute eliminates the requirement of mens
rea and that is the reason he claims the statute is void, petitioner cites the
following remarks of Senator Taada made during the deliberation on S. No. 733:
SENATOR TAADA . . . And the evidence that will be required to convict him would
not be evidence for each and every individual criminal act but only evidence
sufficient to establish the conspiracy or scheme to commit this crime of plunder. 39
However, Senator Taada was discussing 4 as shown by the succeeding portion of
the transcript quoted by petitioner: ISDCaT
SENATOR ROMULO: And, Mr. President, the Gentleman feels that it is
contained in Section 4, Rule of Evidence which, in the Gentleman's view, would
provide for a speedier and faster process of attending to this kind of cases?
SENATOR TAADA: Yes, Mr. President . . . 40
Senator Taada was only saying that where the charge is conspiracy to commit
plunder, the prosecution need not prove each and every criminal act done to
further the scheme or conspiracy, it being enough if it proves beyond reasonable
doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts in indicative of the overall unlawful
scheme or conspiracy. As far as the acts constituting the pattern are concerned,
however, the elements of the crime must be proved and the requisite mens rea
must be shown.

PRESIDENTIAL DECREE No. 1613
AMENDING THE LAW ON ARSON
WHEREAS, findings of the police and intelligence agencies of the government
reveal that fires and other crimes involving destruction in Metro Manila and other
urban centers in the country are being perpetrated by criminal syndicates, some of
which have foreign connections;
WHEREAS, the current law on arson suffers from certain inadequacies that impede
the successful enforcement and prosecution of arsonists;
WHEREAS, it is imperative that the high incidence of fires and other crimes
involving destruction be prevented to protect the national economy and preserve
the social, economic and political stability of the country;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by
virtue of the powers vested in me by the Constitution, do hereby order and decree
as part of the law of the land, the following:
Section 1. Arson. Any person who burns or sets fire to the property of another shall
be punished by Prision Mayor.
The same penalty shall be imposed when a person sets fire to his own property
under circumstances which expose to danger the life or property of another.
Section 2. Destructive Arson. The penalty of Reclusion Temporal in its maximum
period to Reclusion Perpetua shall be imposed if the property burned is any of the
following:
1. Any ammunition factory and other establishment where explosives, inflammable
or combustible materials are stored.
2. Any archive, museum, whether public or private, or any edifice devoted to
culture, education or social services.
3. Any church or place of worship or other building where people usually assemble.
4. Any train, airplane or any aircraft, vessel or watercraft, or conveyance for
transportation of persons or property
4. Any building where evidence is kept for use in any legislative, judicial,
administrative or other official proceedings.
5. Any hospital, hotel, dormitory, lodging house, housing tenement, shopping
center, public or private market, theater or movie house or any similar place or
building.
6. Any building, whether used as a dwelling or not, situated in a populated or
congested area.
Section 3. Other Cases of Arson. The penalty of Reclusion Temporal to Reclusion
Perpetua shall be imposed if the property burned is any of the following:
1. Any building used as offices of the government or any of its agencies;
2. Any inhabited house or dwelling;
3. Any industrial establishment, shipyard, oil well or mine shaft, platform or tunnel;
4. Any plantation, farm, pastureland, growing crop, grain field, orchard, bamboo
grove or forest;
4. Any rice mill, sugar mill, cane mill or mill central; and
5. Any railway or bus station, airport, wharf or warehouse.
Section 4. Special Aggravating Circumstances in Arson. The penalty in any case of
arson shall be imposed in its maximum period;
1. If committed with intent to gain;
2. If committed for the benefit of another;
3. If the offender is motivated by spite or hatred towards the owner or occupant of
the property burned;
4. If committed by a syndicate.
The offense is committed by a syndicate if its is planned or carried out by a group
of three (3) or more persons.
Section 5. Where Death Results from Arson. If by reason of or on the occasion of
the arson death results, the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua to death shall be
imposed.
Section 6. Prima Facie evidence of Arson. Any of the following circumstances shall
constitute prima facie evidence of arson:
1. If the fire started simultaneously in more than one part of the building or
establishment.
2. If substantial amount of flammable substances or materials are stored within the
building note necessary in the business of the offender nor for household us.
3. If gasoline, kerosene, petroleum or other flammable or combustible substances
or materials soaked therewith or containers thereof, or any mechanical, electrical,
chemical, or electronic contrivance designed to start a fire, or ashes or traces of any
of the foregoing are found in the ruins or premises of the burned building or
property.
4. If the building or property is insured for substantially more than its actual value
at the time of the issuance of the policy.
4. If during the lifetime of the corresponding fire insurance policy more than two
fires have occurred in the same or other premises owned or under the control of
the offender and/or insured.
5. If shortly before the fire, a substantial portion of the effects insured and stored
in a building or property had been withdrawn from the premises except in the
ordinary course of business.
6. If a demand for money or other valuable consideration was made before the fire
in exchange for the desistance of the offender or for the safety of the person or
property of the victim.
Section 7. Conspiracy to commit Arson. Conspiracy to commit arson shall be
punished by Prision Mayor in its minimum period.
Section 8. Confiscation of Object of Arson. The building which is the object of arson
including the land on which it is situated shall be confiscated and escheated to the
State, unless the owner thereof can prove that he has no participation in nor
knowledge of such arson despite the exercise of due diligence on his part.
Section 9. Repealing Clause. The provisions of Articles 320 to 326-B of the Revised
Penal Code and all laws, executive orders, rules and regulations, or parts thereof,
inconsistent with the provisions of this Decree are hereby repealed or amended
accordingly.
Section 10. Effectivity. This Decree shall take effect immediately upon publication
thereof at least once in a newspaper of general circulation.
Done in the City of Manila, this 7th day of March, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen
hundred and seventy-nine.

REPUBLIC ACT NO. 3019: ANTI-GRAFT AND CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT
SECTION 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to acts or
omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall
constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be
unlawful:
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any
private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge
of his official administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality,
evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to
officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged with the
grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.
(g) Entering, on behalf of the Government, into any contract or transaction
manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the same, whether or not the public
officer profited or will profit thereby.

HENRY T. GO vs., SANDIGANBAYAN
Facts: Vicente C. Rivera, then DOTC Secretary, and petitioner Henry Go, Chairman
and President of PIATCO, were charged with violation of Section 3(g) of RA 3019,
also known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Go, in relation to the
voided 1997 Concession Agreement and the Amended and Restated Concession
Agreement (ARCA) entered into by the government with Philippine International
Air Terminals Co., Inc (PIATCO).
Petitioner Go contended that it was error to charge him with the violation given
that he was not a public officer, a necessary element of the offense under Sec 3(g)
of RA 3019. He further assert that conspiracy by a private party with a public officer
is chargeable only with the offense under Sec3(e).
Issue:Whether or not Petitioner Go, a private person, may be charged with
violation of Sec 3(g) of RA 3019.
Ruling: The application of the anti-graft law extends to both public officers and
private persons.
Private persons, when acting in conspiracy with public officers, may be indicted
and, if found guilty, held liable for the pertinent offenses under Section 3 of RA
3019. This is in consonance with the avowed policy of the anti-graft law to repress
certain acts of public officers and private persons alike constituting graft or corrupt
practices act or which may lead thereto.

Marcos vs. Sandiganbayan is inapplicable to Gos case. In the former, Dans, the
public officer and with whom Marcos had allegedly conspired with in committing
Section 3(g) of RA 3019, had already been acquitted. Marcos could then not be
convicted, on her own as a private person, of the said offense.
The finding of probable cause against petitioner by the Office of the Ombudsman is
a function duly belonging to the latter. The exercise of such function cannot be
meddled with by the courts by virtue of the doctrine of non-interference except for
compelling reasons.

EDGAR Y. TEVES, vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and HERMINIO G. TEVES
Facts: In Oct 2007, petitioner was officially disqualified to run for a congressional
seat in the May 2007 election because of a Sandiganbayan decision rendered
against him in 2005 involving a crime, allegedly, of moral turpitude.
The Comelec likewise rendered the issue raised by petitioner as moot since the
latter lost in the said election.
Issue: Whether or not there WAS ABUSE OF DISCRETION, AMOUNTING TO LACK OR
EXCESS OF JURISDICTION when Comelec disqualified petitioner in view of the
petitioners conviction.
Ruling: The Court ruled that the crime for which petitioner was convicted in
Sandiganbayan in 2005 did not involve moral turpitude.
As found in the Sandiganbayan, petitioner, then Mayor of Valencia, did not use his
influence, authority or power to gain pecuniary or financial interest in the cockpit.
Second, while possession of business and pecuniary interest in a cockpit licensed by
the local government unit is expressly prohibited by the present LGC, however, its
illegality does not mean that violation thereof necessarily involves moral turpitude
or makes such possession of interest inherently immoral
The morality of gambling is not a justiciable issue. Gambling is not illegal per se. It
was held that it was not for the judiciary to settle questions which is for other
branches of the government to deal with.
Being so, the Court reversed the Comelecs decision of disqualifying petitioner. The
case was not moot since the resolution of which would determine petitioners
qualification in future elections.

RPC. Art. 10. Offenses not subject to the provisions of this Code. Offenses which
are or in the future may be punishable under special laws are not subject to the
provisions of this Code. This Code shall be supplementary to such laws, unless the
latter should specially provide the contrary.

RA 8484: AN ACT REGULATING THE ISSUANCE AND USE OF ACCESS DEVICES,
PROHIBITING FRAUDULENT ACTS COMMITTED RELATIVE THERETO, PROVIDING
PENALTIES AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
Section 12. Frustrated and attempted access device fraud. Any person who
performs all the acts of execution which would produce any of the unlawful acts
enumerated in Section 9 of this Act, but which nevertheless does not produce it by
reason of causes independent of the will of said person, shall be punished with
two-thirds (2/3) of the fine and imprisonment provided for the consummated
offenses listed in said section. Any person who commences the commission of any
of the unlawful acts enumerated in Section 9 of this Act directly by overt acts and
does not perform all the acts of execution which would produce the said acts by
reason of some cause or accident other than said person's own spontaneous
desistance, shall be punished with one-half (1/2) of the fine and imprisonment
provided for the consummated offenses listed in the said section.
Section 13. Accessory to access device fraud. Any person who, with intent to gain
for himself or for another, buy, receives, possesses, keeps, acquires, conceals, sells,
or disposes of, shall buy and sell, or in any manner deal in any article, item, object
or anything of value which he knows or should be known to him, to have been
acquired through the use of counterfeit access device or an unauthorized access
device or an access device known to him to have been fraudulently applied for,
shall be considered as an accessory to an access device fraud and shall be punished
with one-half (1/2) of the fine and imprisonment provided for the applicable
consummated offenses listed in Section 9 of this Act. Said person shall be
prosecuted under this Act or under the Anti-Fencing Law of 1979 (Presidential
Decree No. 1612) whichever imposes the longer prison term as penalty for the
consummated offense.

Sanchez vs. People
FACTS: Appellant was charged with the crime of Other Acts of Child Abuse in an
Information[6] dated August 29, 2001 which reads:
The undersigned, Second Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, hereby accuses Leonilo
Sanchez alias Nilo of Lajog, Clarin, Bohol of the crime of Other Acts of Child Abuse,
committed as follows:
That on or about the 2nd day of September, 2000 in the municipality of Clarin,
province of Bohol, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
acting as a Family Court, the above-named accused, with intent to abuse, exploit
and/or to inflict other conditions prejudicial to the child's development, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously abuse physically one [VVV],[7] a
sixteen (16) year old minor, by hitting her thrice in the upper part of her legs, and
which acts are prejudicial to the child-victim's development which acts are not
covered by the Revised Penal Code, as amended, but the same are covered by Art.
59, par. 8 of P.D. No. 603 as amended; to the damage and prejudice of the
offended party in the amount to be proved during the trial.
The appellant argues that the injuries inflicted by him were minor in nature that it
is not prejudicial to the child-victims development and therefore P.D. No. 603 is
not applicable and he should be charged under the Revised Penal Code for slight
physical injuries.
ISSUE: Whether or not P.D. 603 as amended is applicable to the case at hand.
HELD: In this case, the applicable laws are Article 59 of P.D. No. 603 and Section
10(a) of R.A. No. 7610. Section 10(a) of R.A. No. 7610 provides:
SECTION 10. Other Acts of Neglect, Abuse, Cruelty or Exploitation and Other
Conditions Prejudicial to the Child's Development.
(a) Any person who shall commit any other acts of child abuse, cruelty or
exploitation or be responsible for other conditions prejudicial to the child's
development including those covered by Article 59 of Presidential Decree No. 603,
as amended, but not covered by the Revised Penal Code, as amended, shall suffer
the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period.
As gleaned from the foregoing, the provision punishes not only those enumerated
under Article 59 of Presidential Decree No. 603, but also four distinct acts, i.e., (a)
child abuse, (b) child cruelty, (c) child exploitation and (d) being responsible for
conditions prejudicial to the childs development. The Rules and Regulations of the
questioned statute distinctly and separately defined child abuse, cruelty and
exploitation just to show that these three acts are different from one another and
from the act prejudicial to the childs development. Contrary to petitioners
assertion, an accused can be prosecuted and be convicted under Section 10(a),
Article VI of Republic Act No. 7610 if he commits any of the four acts therein. The
prosecution need not prove that the acts of child abuse, child cruelty and child
exploitation have resulted in the prejudice of the child because an act prejudicial to
the development of the child is different from the former acts.
Moreover, it is a rule in statutory construction that the word or is a disjunctive
term signifying dissociation and independence of one thing from other things
enumerated. It should, as a rule, be construed in the sense which it ordinarily
implies. Hence, the use of or in Section 10(a) of Republic Act No. 7610 before the
phrase be responsible for other conditions prejudicial to the childs development
supposes that there are four punishable acts therein. First, the act of child abuse;
second, child cruelty; third, child exploitation; and fourth, being responsible for
conditions prejudicial to the childs development. The fourth penalized act cannot
be interpreted, as petitioner suggests, as a qualifying condition for the three other
acts, because an analysis of the entire context of the questioned provision does not
warrant such construal.
Appellant contends that, after proof, the act should not be considered as child
abuse but merely as slight physical injuries defined and punishable under Article
266 of the Revised Penal Code. Appellant conveniently forgets that when the
incident happened, VVV was a child entitled to the protection extended by R.A. No.
7610, as mandated by the Constitution. As defined in the law, child abuse includes
physical abuse of the child, whether the same is habitual or not. The act of
appellant falls squarely within this definition. We, therefore, cannot accept
appellant's contention.
Acts committed contrary to the provisions of Section 10(a) in relation to Sections
3(a) and 3(b) No. 1 of Rep. Act No. 7610 and Sec. 59(8) of PD 603, amended.

People v. Saley (1998)
Facts: Saley was convicted of 16 cases of illegal recruitment, one of which was on
the large scale. She was also convicted of 11 counts of estafa. She claims that she
was not engaged in recruitment but is merely acting as an agent. She also claimed
that she was merely aiding the processing of the complainants visas.
Issue: WON the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on the application of the
circumstances that could modify the criminal liability of an accused
Held: NO. Altogether, the evidence against appellant has established beyond any
discernible shadow of doubt that appellant is indeed guilty of illegal recruitment on
various counts. Being neither a licensee nor a holder of authority to recruit,
appellant must suffer under Article 39(c) of the Labor Code the penalty of
imprisonment of not less than four years nor more than eight years or a fine of not
less than P20,000.00 nor more thanP100,000.00 or both such imprisonment and
fine, at the discretion of the court. In imposing the penalty, the provisions of the
Revised Penal Code on the application of the circumstances that could modify the
criminal liability of an accused cannot be considered, these provisions being
inapplicable to special laws
Saley is guilty of illegal recruitment and estafa. She has no valid license or authority
to engage in placement of workers. There is no double jeopardy in this case.
Conviction under the Labor Code for illegal recruitment is malum prohibita while
estafa under the RPC is malum in se.

REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7659: AN ACT TO IMPOSE THE DEATH PENALTY ON CERTAIN
HEINOUS CRIMES, AMENDING FOR THAT PURPOSE THE REVISED PENAL LAWS, AS
AMENDED, OTHER SPECIAL PENAL LAWS, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
WHEREAS, the Constitution, specifically Article III, Section 19 paragraph (1) thereof,
states "Excessive fines shall not be imposed nor cruel, degrading or inhuman
punishment inflicted. Neither shall death penalty be imposed, unless, for
compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, the Congress hereafter provides for
it. . .";
WHEREAS, the crimes punishable by death under this Act are heinous for being
grievous, odious and hateful offenses and which, by reason of their inherent or
manifest wickedness, viciousness, atrocity and perversity are repugnant and
outrageous to the common standards and norms of decency and morality in a just,
civilized and ordered society;
WHEREAS, due to the alarming upsurge of such crimes which has resulted not only
in the loss of human lives and wanton destruction of property but also affected the
nation's efforts towards sustainable economic development and prosperity while at
the same time has undermined the people's faith in the Government and the
latter's ability to maintain peace and order in the country;
WHEREAS, the Congress, in the justice, public order and the rule of law, and the
need to rationalize and harmonize the penal sanctions for heinous crimes, finds
compelling reasons to impose the death penalty for said crimes;
Now, therefore,
Section 1. Declaration of Policy. - It is hereby declared the policy of the State to
foster and ensure not only obedience to its authority, but also to adopt such
measures as would effectively promote the maintenance of peace and order, the
protection of life, liberty and property, and the promotion of the general welfare
which are essential for the enjoyment by all the people of the blessings of
democracy in a just and humane society;
Section 2. Article 114 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, is hereby amended
to read as follows:
"Art. 114. Treason. - Any Filipino citizen who levies war against the Philippines or
adheres to her enemies giving them aid or comfort within the Philippines or
elsewhere, shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death and shall pay a fine
not to exceed 100,000 pesos."
No person shall be convicted of treason unless on the testimony of two witnesses
at least to the same overt act or on confession of the accused in open court.
Likewise, an alien, residing in the Philippines, who commits acts of treason as
defined in paragraph 1 of this Article shall be punished by reclusion temporal to
death and shall pay a fine not to exceed 100,000 pesos."
Section 3. Section Three, Chapter One, Title One of Book Two of the same Code is
hereby amended to read as follows:
"Section Three. - Piracy and mutiny on the high seas or in the Philippine waters
Art. 122. Piracy in general and mutiny on the high seas or in Philippine waters. - The
penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be inflicted upon any person who, on the high
seas, or in Philippine waters, shall attack or seize a vessel or, not being a member
of its complement nor a passenger, shall seize the whole or part of the cargo of said
vessel, its equipment or passengers.
The same penalty shall be inflicted in case of mutiny on the high seas or in
Philippine waters."
Art. 123. Qualified piracy. - The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall be
imposed upon those who commit any of the crimes referred to in the preceding
article, under any of the following circumstances:
1. Whenever they have seized a vessel by boarding or firing upon the same;
2. Whenever the pirates have abandoned their victims without means of saving
themselves or;
3. Whenever the crime is accompanied by murder, homicide, physical injuries or
rape."
Section 4. There shall be incorporated after Article 211 of the same Code a new
article to read as follows:
"Art. 211-A. Qualified Bribery. - If any public officer is entrusted with law
enforcement and he refrains from arresting or prosecuting an offender who has
committed a crime punishable by reclusion perpetua and/or death in consideration
of any offer, promise, gift or present, he shall suffer the penalty for the offense
which was not prosecuted.
If it is the public officer who asks or demands such gift or present, he shall suffer
the penalty of death."
Section 5. The penalty of death for parricide under Article 246 of the same Code is
hereby restored, so that it shall read as follows:
"Art. 246. Parricide. - Any person who shall kill his father, mother, or child, whether
legitimate of illegitimate, or any of his ascendants, or descendants, or his spouse,
shall be guilty of parricide and shall be punished by the penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death."
Section 6. Article 248 of the same Code is hereby amended to read as follows:
"Art. 248. Murder. - Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246
shall kill another, shall be guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusion
perpetua, to death if committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:
1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed
men, or employing means to weaken the defense or of means or persons to insure
or afford impunity.
2. In consideration of a price, reward or promise.
3. By means of inundation, fire, poison, explosion, shipwreck, stranding of a vessel,
derailment or assault upon a railroad, fall of an airship, or by means of motor
vehicles, or with the use of any other means involving great waste and ruin.
4. On occasion of any of the calamities enumerated in the preceding paragraph, or
of an earthquake, eruption of a volcano, destructive cyclone, epidemic or other
public calamity.
5. With evident premeditation.
6. With cruelty, by deliberately and inhumanly augmenting the suffering of the
victim, or outraging or scoffing at his person or corpse."
Section 7. Article 255 of the same Code is hereby amended to read as follows:
"Art. 255. Infanticide. - The penalty provided for parricide in Article 246 and for
murder in Article 248 shall be imposed upon any person who shall kill any child less
than three days of age.
If any crime penalized in this Article be committed by the mother of the child for
the purpose of concealing her dishonor, she shall suffer the penalty of prision
mayor in its medium and maximum periods, and if said crime be committed for the
same purpose by the maternal grandparents or either of them, the penalty shall be
reclusion temporal."
Section 8. Article 267 of the same Code is hereby amended to read as follows:
"Art. 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. - Any private individual who
shall kidnap or detain another, or in any other manner deprive him of his liberty,
shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death:
1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than three days.
2. If it shall have been committed simulating public authority.
3. If any serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted upon the person
kidnapped or detained; or if threats to kill him shall have been made.
4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, except when the accused is
any of the parents, female or a public officer.
The penalty shall be death penalty where the kidnapping or detention was
committed for the purpose of extorting ransom from the victim or any other
person, even if none of the circumstances above-mentioned were present in the
commission of the offense.
When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention or is raped, or is
subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be
imposed."
Section 9. Article 294 of the same Code is hereby amended to read as follows:
"Art. 294. Robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons - Penalties. -
Any person guilty of robbery with the use of violence against or intimidation of any
person shall suffer:
1. The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, when by reason or on occasion of
the robbery, the crime of homicide shall have been committed, or when the
robbery shall have been accompanied by rape or intentional mutilation or arson.
2. The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua,
when or if by reason or on occasion of such robbery, any of the physical injuries
penalized in subdivision I of Article 263 shall have been inflicted.
3. The penalty of reclusion temporal, when by reason or on occasion of the
robbery, any of the physical injuries penalized in subdivision 2 of the article
mentioned in the next preceding paragraph, shall have been inflicted.
4. The penalty of prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in its
medium period, if the violence or intimidation employed in the commission of the
robbery shall have been carried to a degree clearly unnecessary for the commission
of the crime, or when in the course of its execution, the offender shall have
inflicted upon any person not responsible for its commission any of the physical
injuries covered by subdivisions 3 and 4 of said Article 263.
5. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its
medium period in other cases."
Section 10. Article 320 of the same Code is hereby amended to read as follows:
"Art. 320. Destructive Arson. - The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall be
imposed upon any person who shall burn:
1. One (1) or more buildings or edifices, consequent to one single act of burning, or
as a result of simultaneous burnings, committed on several or different occasions.
2. Any building of public or private ownership, devoted to the public in general or
where people usually gather or congregate for a definite purpose such as, but not
limited to, official governmental function or business, private transaction,
commerce, trade, workshop, meetings and conferences, or merely incidental to a
definite purpose such as but not limited to hotels, motels, transient dwellings,
public conveyances or stops or terminals, regardless of whether the offender had
knowledge that there are persons in said building or edifice at the time it is set on
fire and regardless also of whether the building is actually inhabited or not.
3. Any train or locomotive, ship or vessel, airship or airplane, devoted to
transportation or conveyance, or for public use, entertainment or leisure.
4. Any building, factory, warehouse installation and any appurtenances thereto,
which are devoted to the service of public utilities.
5. Any building the burning of which is for the purpose of concealing or destroying
evidence of another violation of law, or for the purpose of concealing bankruptcy
or defrauding creditors or to collect from insurance.
Irrespective of the application of the above enumerated qualifying circumstances,
the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall likewise be imposed when the
arson is perpetrated or committed by two (2) or more persons or by a group of
persons, regardless of whether their purpose is merely to burn or destroy the
building or the burning merely constitutes an overt act in the commission or
another violation of law.
The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall also be imposed upon any person
who shall burn:
1. Any arsenal, shipyard, storehouse or military powder or fireworks factory,
ordnance, storehouse, archives or general museum of the Government.
2. In an inhabited place, any storehouse or factory of inflammable or explosive
materials.
If as a consequence of the commission of any of the acts penalized under this
Article, death results, the mandatory penalty of death shall be imposed."
Section 11. Article 335 of the same Code is hereby amended to read as follows:
"Art. 335. When and how rape is committed. - Rape is committed by having carnal
knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
1. By using force or intimidation;
2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.
The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.
Whenever the crime of rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by
two or more persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.
When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has become insane, the
penalty shall be death.
When the rape is attempted or frustrated and a homicide is committed by reason
or on the occasion thereof, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.
When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, a homicide is committed, the
penalty shall be death.
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any
of the following attendant circumstances:
1. when the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent,
ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the
third civil degree, or the common-law-spouse of the parent of the victim.
2. when the victim is under the custody of the police or military authorities.
3. when the rape is committed in full view of the husband, parent, any of the
children or other relatives within the third degree of consanguinity.
4. when the victim is a religious or a child below seven (7) years old.
5. when the offender knows that he is afflicted with Acquired Immune Deficiency
Syndrome (AIDS) disease.
6. when committed by any member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines or the
Philippine National Police or any law enforcement agency.
7. when by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has suffered
permanent physical mutilation."
Section 12. Section 2 of Republic Act No. 7080 (An Act Defining and Penalizing the
Crime of Plunder) is hereby amended to read as follows:
"Sec. 2. Definition of the Crime of Plunder; Penalties. - Any public officer who, by
himself or in connivance with members of his family, relatives by affinity or
consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons, amasses,
accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth through a combination or series of overt
criminal acts as described in Section 1 (d) hereof in the aggregate amount or total
value of at least Fifty million pesos (P50,000,000.00) shall be guilty of the crime of
plunder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death. Any person who
participated with the said public officer in the commission of an offense
contributing to the crime of plunder shall likewise be punished for such offense. In
the imposition of penalties, the degree of participation and the attendance of
mitigating and extenuating circumstances, as provided by the Revised Penal Code,
shall be considered by the court. The court shall declare any and all ill-gotten
wealth and their interests and other incomes and assets including the properties
and shares of stocks derived from the deposit or investment thereof forfeited in
favor of the State."
Section 13. Sections 3, 4, 5, 7, 8 and 9, of Article II of Republic Act No. 6425, as
amended, known as the Dangerous Drugs Act 1972, are hereby amended to read as
follows:
"Sec. 3. Importation of Prohibited Drugs. - The penalty of reclusion perpetua to
death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos
shall be imposed upon any person who, unless authorized by law, shall import or
bring into the Philippines any prohibited drug.
"Sec. 4. Sale, Administration, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of
Prohibited Drugs. - The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine from five
hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any person
who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, administer, deliver, give away to another,
distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any prohibited drug, or shall act as a
broker in any of such transactions.
Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 20 of this Act to the contrary, if the
victim of the offense is a minor, or should a prohibited drug involved in any offense
under this Section be the proximate cause of the death of a victim thereof, the
maximum penalty herein provided shall be imposed.
"Sec. 5. Maintenance of a Den, Dive or Resort for Prohibited Drug Users. - The
penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred
thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any person or group of
persons who shall maintain a den, dive or resort where any prohibited drug is used
in any form or where such prohibited drugs in quantities specified in Section 20,
Paragraph 1 of this Act are found.
Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 20 of this Act to the contrary, the
maximum of the penalty shall be imposed in every case where a prohibited drug is
administered, delivered or sold to a minor who is allowed to use the same in such
place.
Should a prohibited drug be the proximate cause of the death of a person using the
same in such den, dive or resort, the maximum penalty herein provided shall be
imposed on the maintainer notwithstanding the provisions of Section 20 of this Act
to the contrary.
"Sec. 7. Manufacture of Prohibited Drug. - The penalty of reclusion perpetua to
death and fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall
be imposed upon any person who, unless authorized by law, shall engage in the
manufacture of any prohibited drug.
"Sec. 8. Possession or Use of Prohibited Drugs. - The penalty of reclusion perpetua
to death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos
shall be imposed upon any person who, unless authorized by law, shall possess or
use any prohibited drug subject to the provisions of Section 20 hereof.
"Sec. 9. Cultivation of Plants which are Sources of Prohibited Drugs. - The penalty of
reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos
to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any person who shall plant, cultivate or
culture any medium Indian hemp, opium poppy (papaver somniferum), or any
other plant which is or may hereafter be classified as dangerous drug or from which
any dangerous drug may be manufactured or derived.
The land or portions hereof, and/or greenhouses on which any of said plants is
cultivated or cultured shall be confiscated and escheated to the State, unless the
owner thereof can prove that he did not know such cultivation or culture despite
the exercise of due diligence on his part.
If the land involved in is part of the public domain, the maximum of the penalties
herein provided shall be imposed upon the offender."
Section 14. Sections 14, 14-A, and 15 of Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, as
amended, known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, are hereby amended to read
as follows:
"Sec. 14. Importation of Regulated Drugs. - The penalty of reclusion perpetua to
death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos
shall be imposed upon any person who, unless authorized by law, shall import or
bring any regulated drug in the Philippines.
"Sec. 14-A. Manufacture of Regulated Drugs. - The penalty of reclusion perpetua to
death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos
shall be imposed upon any person who, unless authorized by law, shall engage in
the manufacture of any regulated drug.
"Sec. 15. Sale, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery, Transportation and
Distribution of Regulated Drugs. - The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a
fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be
imposed upon any person who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, dispense,
deliver, transport or distribute any regulated drug.
Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 20 of this Act to the contrary, if the
victim of the offense is a minor, or should a regulated drug involved in any offense
under this Section be the proximate cause of the death of a victim thereof, the
maximum penalty herein provided shall be imposed."
Section 15. There shall be incorporated after Section 15 of Article III of Republic Act
No. 6425, as amended, known as the Dangerous Drug Act of 1972, a new section to
read as follows:
"Sec. 15-a. Maintenance of a den, dive or resort for regulated drug users. - The
penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred
thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any person or group of
persons who shall maintain a den, dive or resort where any regulated drugs is used
in any form, or where such regulated drugs in quantities specified in Section 20,
paragraph 1 of this Act are found.
Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 20 of this Act to the contrary, the
maximum penalty herein provided shall be imposed in every case where a
regulated drug is administered, delivered or sold to a minor who is allowed to use
the same in such place.
Should a regulated drug be the proximate cause of the death of a person using the
same in such den, dive or resort, the maximum penalty herein provided shall be
imposed on the maintainer notwithstanding the provisions of Section 20 of this Act
to the contrary."
Section 16. Section 16 of Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, known as
the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, is amended to read as follows:
"Sec. 16. Possession or Use of Regulated Drugs. - The penalty of reclusion perpetua
to death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos
shall be imposed upon any person who shall possess or use any regulated drug
without the corresponding license or prescription, subject to the provisions of
Section 20 hereof."
Section 17. Section 20, Article IV of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, known as
the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, is hereby amended to read as follows:
Sec. 20. Application of Penalties, Confiscation and Forfeiture of the Proceeds or
Instruments of the Crime. - The penalties for offenses under Section 3, 4, 7, 8 and 9
of Article II and Sections 14, 14-A, 15 and 16 of Article III of this Act shall be applied
if the dangerous drugs involved is in any of the following quantities :
1. 40 grams or more of opium;
2. 40 grams or more of morphine;
3. 200 grams or more of shabu or methylamphetamine hydrochloride;
4. 40 grams or more of heroin;
5. 750 grams or more of indian hemp or marijuana;
6. 50 grams or more of marijuana resin or marijuana resin oil;
7. 40 grams or more of cocaine or cocaine hydrochloride; or
8. In the case of other dangerous drugs, the quantity of which is far beyond
therapeutic requirements, as determined and promulgated by the Dangerous
Drugs Board, after public consultations/hearings conducted for the purpose.
Otherwise, if the quantity involved is less than the foregoing quantities, the penalty
shall range from prision correccional to reclusion perpetua depending upon the
quantity.
Every penalty imposed for the unlawful importation, sale, administration, delivery,
transportation or manufacture of dangerous drugs, the cultivation of plants which
are sources of dangerous drugs and the possession of any opium pipe and other
paraphernalia for dangerous drugs shall carry with it the confiscation and
forfeiture, in favor of the Government, of all the proceeds of the crime including
but not limited to money and other obtained thereby and the instruments or tools
with which it was committed, unless they are the property of a third person not
liable for the offense, but those which are not of lawful commerce shall be ordered
destroyed without delay. Dangerous drugs and plant sources of such drugs as well
as the proceeds or instruments of the crime so confiscated and forfeited in favor of
the Government shall be turned over to the Board for proper disposal without
delay.
Any apprehending or arresting officer who misappropriates or misapplies or fails to
account for seized or confiscated dangerous drugs or plant-sources of dangerous
drugs or proceeds or instruments of the crime as are herein defined shall after
conviction be punished by the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine
ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos."
Section 18. There shall be incorporated after Section 20 of Republic Act No. 6425,
as amended, known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, a new section to read as
follows:
"Sec. 20-A. Plea-bargaining Provisions. - Any person charged under any provision of
this Act where the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua to death shall not be
allowed to avail of the provision on plea bargaining."
Section 19. Section 24 of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, known as the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, is hereby amended to read as follows :
"Sec. 24. Penalties for Government Official and Employees and Officers and
Members of Police Agencies and the Armed Forces, 'Planting' of Evidence. - The
maximum penalties provided for Section 3, 4(1), 5(1), 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12 and 13 of
Article II and Sections 14, 14-A, 15(1), 16 and 19 of Article III shall be imposed, if
those found guilty of any of the said offenses are government officials, employees
or officers, including members of police agencies and the armed forces.
Any such above government official, employee or officer who is found guilty of
"planting" any dangerous drugs punished in Sections 3, 4, 7, 8, 9 and 13 of Article II
and Sections 14, 14-A, 15 and 16 of Article III of this Act in the person or in the
immediate vicinity of another as evidence to implicate the latter, shall suffer the
same penalty as therein provided."
Section 20. Sec. 14 of Republic Act No. 6539, as amended, known as the Anti-
Carnapping Act of 1972, is hereby amended to read as follows:
"Sec. 14. Penalty for Carnapping. - Any person who is found guilty of carnapping, as
this term is defined in Section Two of this Act, shall, irrespective of the value of
motor vehicle taken, be punished by imprisonment for not less than fourteen years
and eight months and not more than seventeen years and four months, when the
carnapping is committed without violence or intimidation of persons, or force upon
things; and by imprisonment for not less than seventeen years and four months
and not more than thirty years, when the carnapping is committed by means of
violence against or intimidation of any person, or force upon things; and the
penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall be imposed when the owner, driver or
occupant of the carnapped motor vehicle is killed or raped in the course of the
commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof."
Section 21. Article 27 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, is hereby amended
to read as follows:
"Art. 27. Reclusion perpetua. - The penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be from
twenty years and one day to forty years.
Reclusion temporal. - The penalty of reclusion temporal shall be from twelve years
and one day to twenty years.
Prision mayor and temporary disqualification. - The duration of the penalties of
prision mayor and temporary disqualification shall be from six years and one day to
twelve years, except when the penalty of disqualification is imposed as an
accessory penalty, in which case, it shall be that of the principal penalty.
Prision correccional, suspension, and destierro. - The duration of the penalties of
prision correccional, suspension, and destierro shall be from six months and one
day to six years, except when the suspension is imposed as an accessory penalty, in
which case, its duration shall be that of the principal penalty.
Arresto mayor. - The duration of the penalty of arresto mayor shall be from one
month and one day to six months.
Arresto menor. - The duration of the penalty of arresto menor shall be from one
day to thirty days.
Bond to keep the peace. - The bond to keep the peace shall be required to cover
such period of time as the court may determine."
Section 22. Article 47 of the same Code is hereby amended to read as follows:
Art. 47. In what cases the death penalty shall not be imposed; Automatic review of
the Death Penalty Cases. - The death penalty shall be imposed in all cases in which
it must be imposed under existing laws, except when the guilty person is below
eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the commission of the crime or is more
than seventy years of age or when upon appeal or automatic review of the case by
the Supreme Court, the required majority vote is not obtained for the imposition of
the death penalty, in which cases the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua.
In all cases where the death penalty is imposed by the trial court, the records shall
be forwarded to the Supreme Court for automatic review and judgment by the
Court en banc, within twenty (20) days but not earlier than fifteen (15) days after
promulgation of the judgment or notice of denial of any motion for new trial or
reconsideration. The transcript shall also be forwarded within ten (10) days from
the filing thereof by the stenographic reporter."
Section 23. Article 62 of the same Code, as amended, is hereby amended to read as
follows :
"Art. 62. Effects of the attendance of mitigating or aggravating circumstances and
of habitual delinquency. - Mitigating or aggravating circumstances and habitual
delinquency shall be taken into account for the purpose of diminishing or
increasing the penalty in conformity with the following rules:
1. Aggravating circumstances which in themselves constitute a crime specially
punishable by law or which are included by the law in defining a crime and
prescribing the penalty therefor shall not be taken into account for the purpose of
increasing the penalty.
1(a). When in the commission of the crime, advantage was taken by the offender of
his public position, the penalty to be imposed shall be in its maximum regardless of
mitigating circumstances.
The maximum penalty shall be imposed if the offense was committed by any group
who belongs to an organized/syndicated crime group.
An organized/syndicated crime group means a group of two or more persons
collaborating, confederating or mutually helping one another for purposes of gain
in the commission of any crime.
2. The same rule shall apply with respect to any aggravating circumstances inherent
in the crime to such a degree that it must of necessity accompany the commission
thereof.
3. Aggravating or mitigating circumstances which arise from the moral attributes of
the offender, or from his private relations with the offended party, or from any
other personal cause, shall only serve to aggravate or mitigate the liability of the
principals, accomplices and accessories as to whom such circumstances are
attendant.
4. The circumstances which consist in the material execution of the act, or in the
means employed to accomplish it, shall serve to aggravate or mitigate the liability
of those persons only who had knowledge of them at the time of the execution of
the act or their cooperation therein.
5. Habitual delinquency shall have the following effects :
(a) Upon a third conviction the culprit shall be sentenced to the penalty provided
by law for the last crime of which he be found guilty and to the additional penalty
of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods;
(b) Upon a fourth conviction, the culprit shall be sentenced to the penalty provided
for the last crime of which he be found guilty and to the additional penalty of
prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods; and
(c) Upon a fifth or additional conviction, the culprit shall be sentenced to the
penalty provided for the last crime of which he be found guilty and to the
additional penalty of prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in
its minimum period.
Notwithstanding the provisions of this article, the total of the two penalties to be
imposed upon the offender, in conformity herewith, shall in no case exceed 30
years.
For purposes of this article, a person shall be deemed to be a habitual delinquent, if
within a period of ten years from the date of his release or last conviction of the
crimes of serious or less serious physical injuries, robo, hurto, estafa or falsification,
he is found guilty of any of said crimes a third time or oftener.
Section 24. Article 81 of the same Code, as amended, is hereby amended to read as
follows :
"Art. 81. When and how the death penalty is to be executed. - The death sentence
shall be executed with preference to any other and shall consist in putting the
person under sentence to death by electrocution. The death sentence shall be
executed under the authority of the Director of Prisons, endeavoring so far as
possible to mitigate the sufferings of the person under the sentence during
electrocution as well as during the proceedings prior to the execution.
If the person under sentence so desires, he shall be anaesthetized at the moment
of the execution.
As soon as facilities are provided by the Bureau of Prisons, the method of carrying
out the sentence shall be changed to gas poisoning.
The death sentence shall be carried out not later than one (1) year after the
judgment has become final."
Section 25. Article 83 of the same Code is hereby amended to read as follows:
"Art. 83. Suspension of the execution of the death sentence. - The death sentence
shall not be inflicted upon a woman while she is pregnant or within one (1) year
after delivery, nor upon any person over seventy years of age. In this last case, the
death sentence shall be commuted to the penalty of reclusion perpetua with the
accessory penalties provided in Article 40.
In all cases where the death sentence has become final, the records of the case
shall be forwarded immediately by the Supreme Court to the Office of the
President for possible exercise of the pardoning power."
Section 26.
Section 27. If, for any reason or reasons, any part of the provision of this Act shall
be held to be unconstitutional or invalid, other parts or provisions hereof which are
not affected thereby shall continue to be in full force and effect.
Section 28. This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days after its publication in two (2)
national newspapers of general circulation. The publication shall not be later than
seven (7) days after the approval hereof.
Approved: December 13, 1993

People vs. Simon
Facts: The accused was arrested after a buybust operation conducted by the police
wherein the accused sold 2 tea-bags of marijuana to a poseur buyer for P40. He
was sentenced to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment.
Issue: Whether or not the correct sentence was applied
Held: NO. To sustain a conviction for selling prohibited drugs under the Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972, the sale must be clearly established. The commission of the
offense of illegal sale of prohibited drugs requires merely the consummation of the
selling transaction. The court held that in the instant case the imposable penalty
under RA 6425 as amended by RA 7659 is prison correccional to be taken from the
medium period thereof pursuant to Art. 64 of the RPC, there being no aggravating
and mitigating circumstance.
Dissent: It is thus clear that an offense is punished by the RPC if both its definition
and the penalty therefore are found in the special law. That the latter imports or
borrows from the RPC its nomenclature of penalties. In short, the mere use by a
special law of a penalty found in the RPC can by no means make an offense
thereunder an offense punished or punishable by the RPC.

Ladonga v People
Facts: Spouses Ladonga were convicted by the RTC for violation of B.P Blg 22 (The
Bouncing Checks Law). The husband filed for probation, which was granted while
the wife appealed arguing that the RTC erred in finding her criminally liable for
conspiring with her husband as the principle of conspiracy, is inapplicable to BP Blg
22, which is a special law.
Issue: Whether or not conspiracy is applicable in violations of BP Blg 22 by invoking
the suppletory character of the RPC
Held: Yes BP Blg 22 does not expressly prescribe the suppletory application of the
provisions of the RPC. Thus in the absence of contrary provision in BP Blg 22, the
general provisions of the RPC are necessarily applicable and may be applied
suppletorily in this case.

People v. Bustinera (2004)
Facts: Bustinera was convicted by the trial Court for qualified theft under Article
310 of the Revised Penal Code for the unlawful taking of the taxi cab driven by him
which is owned and operated by Cipriano and was sentenced to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua.
Issue: WON carnapping is essentially the robbery or theft of a motorized vehicle,
the concept of unlawful taking in theft, robbery and carnapping being the same.
Held:YES. The unlawful taking of motor vehicles is now covered by the anti-
carnapping law (RA No. 6539) and not by the provisions on qualified theft or
robbery. The trial court having convicted Bustinera of qualified theft instead of
carnapping, erred in the imposition of the penalty. While the information alleges
that the crime was attended with grave abuse of confidence, the same cannot be
appreciated as the suppletory effect of the Revised Penal Code to special laws, as
provided in Article 10 of said Code, cannot be invoked when there is a legal
impossibility of application, either by express provision or by necessary implication.
Moreover, when the penalties under the special law are different from and are
without reference or relation to those under the Revised Penal Code, there can be
no suppletory effect of the rules, for the application of penalties under the said
Code or by other relevant statutory provisions are based on or applicable only to
said rules for felonies under the Code.
Section 2 of Republic Act No.6539, as amended defines carnapping as the
taking, with intent to gain, of a motor vehicle belonging to another without the
latters consent, or by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by
using force upon things. The elements of carnapping are thus: (1) the taking of a
motor vehicle which belongs to another; (2)the taking is without the consent of the
owner or by means of violence against or intimidation of persons or by using force
uponthings; and (3) the taking is done with intent to gain.
The court cited the case of People v. Panida which involved the crime of carnapping
and the penalty


Go-Tan vs. Tan
Facts: On April 18, 1999, Sharica Mari L. Go-Tan (petitioner) and Steven L. Tan were
married. Out of this union, two female children were born, Kyra Danielle and
Kristen Denise. On January 12, 2005, barely six years into the marriage, petitioner
Go-Tan filed a Petition with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Protective
Order (TPO) against Steven and her parents-in-law, Spouses Perfecto C. Tan and
Juanita L. Tan (respondents) before the RTC. She alleged that Steven, in conspiracy
with respondents, were causing verbal, psychological and economic abuses upon
her in violation of Section 5, paragraphs (e)(2)(3)(4), (h)(5), and (i) of Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 9262, otherwise known as the "Anti-Violence Against Women and Their
Children Act of 2004."
Petitioners Contention: Petitioner Go-Tan contends that R.A. No. 9262 must be
understood in the light of the provisions of Section 47 of R.A. No. 9262 which
explicitly provides for the suppletory application of the Revised Penal Code (RPC)
and, accordingly, the provision on "conspiracy" under Article 8 of the RPC can be
suppletorily applied to R.A. No. 9262; that Steven and respondents had community
of design and purpose in tormenting her by giving her insufficient financial support;
harassing and pressuring her to be ejected from the family home; and in repeatedly
abusing her verbally, emotionally, mentally and physically.
Respondents Contention: Spouses Tans were contending that the RTC lacked
jurisdiction over their persons since, as parents-in-law of the petitioner, they were
not covered by R.A. No. 9262. They submit that they are not covered by R.A. No.
9262 since Section 3 thereof explicitly provides that the offender should be related
to the victim only by marriage, a former marriage, or a dating or sexual
relationship; that allegations on the conspiracy of respondents require a factual
determination which cannot be done by this Court in a petition for review.

TC- Granted Motion To Dismiss on the ground that, being the parents-in-law of the
petitioner, they were not included/covered as respondents under R.A. No. 9262
under the well-known rule of law "expressio unius est exclusio alterius."
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENTS-SPOUSES PERFECTO & JUANITA,
PARENTS-IN-LAW OF SHARICA, MAY BE INCLUDED IN THE PETITION FOR THE
ISSUANCE OF A PROTECTIVE ORDER, IN ACCORDANCE WITH REPUBLIC ACT NO.
9262, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE "ANTI-VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND THEIR
CHILDREN ACT OF 2004".
HELD: YES.
RATIO: The ratio of the SC is anchored on the 4 points below:
(1) Section 3 of R.A. No. 9262 defines ''[v]iolence against women and their
children'' as
"any act or a series of acts committed by any person against a woman who is his
wife, former wife, or against a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or
dating relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or against her child
whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which result
in or is likely to result in physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or
economic abuse including threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion,
harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty."
While the said provision provides that the offender be related or connected to the
victim by marriage, former marriage, or a sexual or dating relationship, it does not
preclude the application of the principle of conspiracy under the RPC.
Indeed, Section 47 of R.A. No. 9262 expressly provides for the suppletory
application of the RPC, thus:
SEC. 47. Suppletory Application. - For purposes of this Act, the Revised Penal
Code and other applicable laws, shall have suppletory application.
(2) Section 5 of R.A. No. 9262 expressly recognizes that the acts of violence against
women and their children may be committed by an offender through another.
(h) Engaging in purposeful, knowing, or reckless conduct, personally or through
another, that alarms or causes substantial emotional or psychological distress to
the woman or her child. This shall include, but not be limited to, the following acts:
(1) Stalking or following the woman or her child in public or private places;
(2) Peering in the window or lingering outside the residence of the woman or her
child;
(3) Entering or remaining in the dwelling or on the property of the woman or her
child against her/his will;
(4) Destroying the property and personal belongings or inflicting harm to animals or
pets of the woman or her child; and
(5) Engaging in any form of harassment or violence; x x x
(3) In addition, the protection order that may be issued for the purpose of
preventing further acts of violence against the woman or her child may include
individuals other than the offending husband, thus:
SEC. 8. Protection Orders. x x x The protection orders that may be issued under
this Act shall include any, some or all of the following reliefs:
(a) Prohibition of the respondent from threatening to commit or committing,
personally or through another, any of the acts mentioned in Section 5 of this
Act; 1avvphi1.net
(b) Prohibition of the respondent from harassing, annoying, telephoning,
contacting or otherwise communicating with the petitioner, directly or indirectly; x
x x
(4) Finally, Section 4 of R.A. No. 9262 calls for a liberal construction of the law, thus:
SEC. 4. Construction. - This Act shall be liberally construed to promote the
protection and safety of victims of violence against women and their children.
Thus, contrary to the RTC's pronouncement, the maxim "expressio unios est
exclusio alterius" finds no application here.



II. SPECIAL PENAL LAW AFFECTING CRIMINAL LIABILITY:
ACT NO. 3326 - AN ACT TO ESTABLISH PERIODS OF PRESCRIPTION FOR VIOLATIONS
PENALIZED BY SPECIAL ACTS AND MUNICIPAL ORDINANCES AND TO PROVIDE
WHEN PRESCRIPTION SHALL BEGIN TO RUN
Section 1. Violations penalized by special acts shall, unless otherwise provided in
such acts, prescribe in accordance with the following rules: (a) after a year for
offenses punished only by a fine or by imprisonment for not more than one month,
or both; (b) after four years for those punished by imprisonment for more than one
month, but less than two years; (c) after eight years for those punished by
imprisonment for two years or more, but less than six years; and (d) after twelve
years for any other offense punished by imprisonment for six years or more, except
the crime of treason, which shall prescribe after twenty years. Violations penalized
by municipal ordinances shall prescribe after two months.

Sec. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the
violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery
thereof and the institution of judicial proceeding for its investigation and
punishment.
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the
guilty person, and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for
reasons not constituting jeopardy.

Sec. 3. For the purposes of this Act, special acts shall be acts defining and penalizing
violations of the law not included in the Penal Code.
Sec. 4. This Act shall take effect on its approval.


Citibank vs. Tanco-Gabaldon
Facts: Ester H. Tanco-Gabaldon (Gabaldon), Arsenio Tanco (Tanco) and the Heirs of
Ku Tiong Lam (Lam) (respondents) filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commissions Enforcement and Prosecution Department (SEC-EPD) a complaint for
violation of the Revised Securities Act (RSA) and the Securities Regulation Code
(SRC) against petitioners Citibank N.A. (Citibank) and its officials. In their
Complaint, the respondents alleged that Gabaldon, Tanco and Lam were joint
account holders of petitioner Citigroup. The respondents met with petitioner Lim,
who induced them into signing a subscription agreement for the purchase of
Ceres II Finance Ltd. Income Notes. In September of the same year, they met again
with Lim for another investment proposal. In a January 2003 statement issued by
the Citigroup, the respondents learned that their investments declined, until their
account was totally wiped out. Upon verification with the SEC, they learned that
the Ceres II Finance Ltd. Notes and the Aeries Finance II Ltd. Notes were not duly
registered securities. They also learned that Ceres II Finance Ltd., Aeries Finance II
Ltd. and the petitioners, among others, are not duly-registered security issuers,
brokers, dealers or agents.
Thereafter, in an order dated December 8, 2008, the SEC-EPD terminated its
investigation on the ground that the respondents action has already prescribed.
Seven (7) years had lapsed before the filing of the action before the SEC while the
complaint instituted before the DOJ was filed one month after the expiration of the
allowable period.
On November 6, 2009, petitioners Citibank and Citigroup received the SEC en
banc Decision dated October 15, 2009 reinstating the complaint and ordering the
immediate investigation of the case.
The Securities and Exchange Commission-Enforcement and Prosecution
Department is ordered to proceed with its investigation with dispatch and with due
regard to the parties right to notice and hearing.
The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied by the CA.
Issue: whether the criminal action for offenses punished under the SRC filed by the
respondents against the petitioners has already prescribed
Held: It was the CAs view that since the SRC has no specific provision on
prescription of criminal offenses, the applicable law is Act No. 3326. Under the SRC,
imprisonment of more than six (6) years is the imposable penalty for the offenses
with which the petitioners were charged, and applying Act No. 3326, the
prescriptive period for the filing of an action is twelve (12) years, reckoned from
the time of commission or discovery of the offense. The respondents filing of the
complaint with the SEC, therefore, was within the prescriptive period.

In G.R. Nos. 198469-70, petitioner Lim share the view of petitioners Citibank and
Citigroup that Act No. 3326 is not applicable and the SRC provides for its own
prescriptive period.Meanwhile, in G.R. No. 198444, petitioners Citibank and
Citigroup maintain that the CA committed an error in applying Act No. 3326.
According to the petitioners, Section 62.2 of the SRC applies to both civil and
criminal liability. The petitioners also insist that laches bar the investigation of the
respondents complaint against the petitioners. On the other hand, the
respondents assert, among others, the applicability of Act No. 3326.

The CA did not commit any error when it ruled that the phrase any liability in
subsection 62.2 can only refer to other liabilities that are also civil in nature. The
phrase could not have suddenly intended to mean criminal liability for this would
go beyond the context of the other provisions among which it is found.


Given the absence of a prescriptive period for the enforcement of the criminal
liability in violations of the SRC, Act No. 3326 now comes into play. Panaguiton, Jr.
v. Department of Justice expressly ruled that Act No. 3326 is the law applicable to
offenses under special laws which do not provide their own prescriptive periods.

Under Section 73 of the SRC, violation of its provisions or the rules and regulations
is punishable with imprisonment of not less than seven (7) years nor more than
twenty-one (21) years. Applying Section 1 of Act No. 3326, a criminal prosecution
for violations of the SRC shall, therefore, prescribe in twelve (12) years.

In Republic v. Cojuangco, Jr. the Court ruled that Section 2 provides two rules for
determining when the prescriptive period shall begin to run: first, from the day of
the commission of the violation of the law, if such commission is known;
and second, from its discovery, if not then known, and the institution of judicial
proceedings for its investigation and punishment.
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cralaw virtualaw library

The respondents alleged in their complaint that the transactions occurred between
September 2000 and July 31, 2003. Nevertheless, it was only sometime in
November 2004 that the respondents discovered that the securities they
purchased were actually worthless. Finally, the respondents filed the complaint
with the SEC on September 21, 2007. Based on the foregoing antecedents, only
seven (7) years lapsed since the respondents invested their funds with the
petitioners, and three (3) years since the respondents discovery of the alleged
offenses, that the complaint was correctly filed with the SEC for investigation.
Hence, the respondents complaint was filed well within the twelve (12)-year
prescriptive period provided by Section 1 of Act No. 3326.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are DENIED for lack of merit.

People vs. Pangilinan
FACTS: On 16 September 1997, Virginia C. Malolos filed an affidavit-complaint for
estafa and violation of Batas Pambansa (BP) Blg. 22 against Ma. Theresa Pangilinan
(respondent) with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City. The complaint
alleges that respondent issued nine (9) checks with an aggregate amount of Nine
Million Six Hundred Fifty-Eight Thousand Five Hundred Ninety-Two Pesos
(P9,658,592.00) in favor of private complainant which were dishonored upon
presentment for payment.
Consequently the case was modified, and only on February 3, 2000 that two counts
for violation of BP Blg. 22 were filed against respondent Ma.Theresa Pangilinan in
the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City. On 17 June 2000, respondent filed an
Omnibus Motion to Quash the Information and to Defer the Issuance of Warrant
of Arrest before MeTC, Branch 31, Quezon City. She alleged that her criminal
liability has been extinguished by reason of prescription.

In defense of her claim, Pangilinan said that the prevailing law that governs the
prescription of special penal law, B.P. 22, is Section 2 of Act No. 3326 (An Act To
Establish Periods Of Prescription For Violations Penalized By Special Acts) where the
right to file an action to a proper court and not to merely to prosecution office
for B.P. 22, prescribes four (4) years from the commission of the crime. The
imputed violation occurred sometime in 1995, and only on February 3, 2000 that a
case was formally filed in the Metropolitan Trial Court, therefore the action already
prescribes. RTC granted the motion.
On the other hand, the complainant argued that the filing with the office of city
prosecutor constitutes an interruption to the prescription.

ISSUE: WON filing a complaint to city prosecutor office considered a judicial
proceeding that can interrupt prescription of crime under B.P. 22?

HELD: YES. Following a catena of cases, the court held that, there is no more
distinction between cases under the Revised Penal Code (RPC) and those covered
by special laws with respect to the interruption of the period of prescription; that
the institution of proceedings for preliminary investigation in the office of
prosecutor against accused interrupts the period of prescription.

Following the factual finding the crime was committed sometime in 1995, the filing
of complaint on September 1997, two (2) years from the commission of the crime
validly interrupts the running of prescription. Therefore the action against the
respondent Pangilinan did not prescribe.

REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9262: AN ACT DEFINING VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND
THEIR CHILDREN, PROVIDING FOR PROTECTIVE MEASURES FOR VICTIMS,
PRESCRIBING PENALTIES THEREFORE, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
Sec. 26. Battered Woman Syndrome as a Defense. Victim-survivors who are found
by the courts to be suffering from battered woman syndrome do not incur any
criminal and civil liability notwithstanding the absence of any of the elements for
justifying circumstances of self-defense under the Revised Penal Code.
In the determination of the state of mind of the woman who was suffering from
battered woman syndrome at the time of the commission of the crime, the courts
shall be assisted by expert psychiatrists/ psychologists.

People vs. Genosa
FACTS: This case stemmed from the killing of Ben Genosa, by his wife Marivic
Genosa, appellant herein. During their first year of marriage, Marivic and Ben lived
happily but apparently thereafter, Ben changed and the couple would always
quarrel and sometimes their quarrels became violent. Appellant testified that every
time her husband came home drunk, he would provoke her and sometimes beat
her. Whenever beaten by her husband, she consulted medical doctors who
testified during the trial. On the night of the killing, appellant and the victim were
quarreled and the victim beat the appellant. However, appellant was able to run to
another room. Appellant admitted having killed the victim with the use of a gun.
The information for parricide against appellant, however, alleged that the cause of
death of the victim was by beating through the use of a lead pipe. Appellant
invoked self defense and defense of her unborn child. After trial, the Regional Trial
Court found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of parricide
with an aggravating circumstance of treachery and imposed the penalty of death.

On automatic review before the Supreme Court, appellant filed an URGENT
OMNIBUS MOTION praying that the Honorable Court allow (1) the exhumation of
Ben Genosa and the re-examination of the cause of his death; (2) the examination
of Marivic Genosa by qualified psychologists and psychiatrists to determine her
state of mind at the time she killed her husband; and finally, (3) the inclusion of the
said experts reports in the records of the case for purposes of the automatic
review or, in the alternative, a partial re-opening of the case a quo to take the
testimony of said psychologists and psychiatrists. The Supreme Court partly
granted the URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION of the appellant. It remanded the case to
the trial court for reception of expert psychological and/or psychiatric opinion on
the battered woman syndrome plea. Testimonies of two expert witnesses on the
battered woman syndrome, Dra. Dayan and Dr. Pajarillo, were presented and
admitted by the trial court and subsequently submitted to the Supreme Court as
part of the records.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not appellant herein can validly invoke the battered woman
syndrome as constituting self defense.
2. Whether or not treachery attended the killing of Ben Genosa.

Ruling: 1. The Court ruled in the negative as appellant failed to prove that she is
afflicted with the battered woman syndrome.

A battered woman has been defined as a woman who is repeatedly subjected to
any forceful physical or psychological behavior by a man in order to coerce her to
do something he wants her to do without concern for her rights. Battered women
include wives or women in any form of intimate relationship with men.
Furthermore, in order to be classified as a battered woman, the couple must go
through the battering cycle at least twice. Any woman may find herself in an
abusive relationship with a man once. If it occurs a second time, and she remains in
the situation, she is defined as a battered woman.

More graphically, the battered woman syndrome is characterized by the so-called
cycle of violence, which has three phases: (1) the tension-building phase; (2) the
acute battering incident; and (3) the tranquil, loving (or, at least, nonviolent) phase.

The Court, however, is not discounting the possibility of self-defense arising from
the battered woman syndrome. First, each of the phases of the cycle of violence
must be proven to have characterized at least two battering episodes between the
appellant and her intimate partner. Second, the final acute battering episode
preceding the killing of the batterer must have produced in the battered persons
mind an actual fear of an imminent harm from her batterer and an honest belief
that she needed to use force in order to save her life. Third, at the time of the
killing, the batterer must have posed probable -- not necessarily immediate and
actual -- grave harm to the accused, based on the history of violence perpetrated
by the former against the latter. Taken altogether, these circumstances could
satisfy the requisites of self-defense. Under the existing facts of the present case,
however, not all of these elements were duly established.

The defense fell short of proving all three phases of the cycle of violence
supposedly characterizing the relationship of Ben and Marivic Genosa. No doubt
there were acute battering incidents but appellant failed to prove that in at least
another battering episode in the past, she had gone through a similar pattern.
Neither did appellant proffer sufficient evidence in regard to the third phase of the
cycle.

In any event, the existence of the syndrome in a relationship does not in itself
establish the legal right of the woman to kill her abusive partner. Evidence must
still be considered in the context of self-defense. Settled in our jurisprudence, is the
rule that the one who resorts to self-defense must face a real threat on ones life;
and the peril sought to be avoided must be imminent and actual, not merely
imaginary. Thus, the Revised Penal Code provides that the following requisites of
self-defense must concur: (1) Unlawful aggression; (2) Reasonable necessity of the
means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) Lack of sufficient provocation on
the part of the person defending himself.

Unlawful aggression is the most essential element of self-defense. It presupposes
actual, sudden and unexpected attack -- or an imminent danger thereof -- on the
life or safety of a person. In the present case, however, according to the testimony
of Marivic herself, there was a sufficient time interval between the unlawful
aggression of Ben and her fatal attack upon him. She had already been able to
withdraw from his violent behavior and escape to their childrens bedroom. During
that time, he apparently ceased his attack and went to bed. The reality or even the
imminence of the danger he posed had ended altogether. He was no longer in a
position that presented an actual threat on her life or safety.

The mitigating factors of psychological paralysis and passion and obfuscation were,
however, taken in favor of appellant. It should be clarified that these two
circumstances -- psychological paralysis as well as passion and obfuscation -- did
not arise from the same set of facts.

The first circumstance arose from the cyclical nature and the severity of the battery
inflicted by the batterer-spouse upon appellant. That is, the repeated beatings over
a period of time resulted in her psychological paralysis, which was analogous to an
illness diminishing the exercise of her will power without depriving her of
consciousness of her acts.

As to the extenuating circumstance of having acted upon an impulse so powerful as
to have naturally produced passion and obfuscation, it has been held that this state
of mind is present when a crime is committed as a result of an uncontrollable burst
of passion provoked by prior unjust or improper acts or by a legitimate stimulus so
powerful as to overcome reason. To appreciate this circumstance, the following
requisites should concur: (1) there is an act, both unlawful and sufficient to
produce such a condition of mind; and (2) this act is not far removed from the
commission of the crime by a considerable length of time, during which the
accused might recover her normal equanimity.

2. NO. Because of the gravity of the resulting offense, treachery must be proved as
conclusively as the killing itself. Besides, equally axiomatic is the rule that when a
killing is preceded by an argument or a quarrel, treachery cannot be appreciated as
a qualifying circumstance, because the deceased may be said to have been
forewarned and to have anticipated aggression from the assailant. Moreover, in
order to appreciate alevosia, the method of assault adopted by the aggressor must
have been consciously and deliberately chosen for the specific purpose of
accomplishing the unlawful act without risk from any defense that might be put up
by the party attacked.

The appellant acted upon an impulse so powerful as to have naturally produced
passion or obfuscation. The acute battering she suffered that fatal night in the
hands of her batterer-spouse, in spite of the fact that she was eight (8) months
pregnant with their child, overwhelmed her and put her in the aforesaid emotional
and mental state, which overcame her reason and impelled her to vindicate her life
and that of her unborn child.

The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of appellant for parricide. However,
considering the presence of two (2) mitigating circumstances and without any
aggravating circumstance, the penalty is reduced to six (6) years and one (1) day of
prision mayor as minimum; to 14 years 8 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal
as maximum. Inasmuch as appellant has been detained for more than the
minimum penalty hereby imposed upon her, the director of the Bureau of
Corrections may immediately RELEASE her from custody upon due determination
that she is eligible for parole, unless she is being held for some other lawful cause.

RA 9344: AN ACT ESTABLISHING A COMPREHENSIVE JUVENILE JUSTICE AND
WELFARE SYSTEM, CREATING THE JUVENILE JUSTICE AND WELFARE COUNCIL
UNDER THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR AND
FOR OTHER PURPOSES
SEC. 4. Definition of Terms. - The following terms as used in this Act shall be
defined as follows:
(d) "Child at Risk" refers to a child who is vulnerable to and at the risk of
committing criminal offenses because of personal, family and social circumstances,
such as, but not limited to, the following:
(1) being abused by any person through sexual, physical, psychological, mental,
economic or any other means and the parents or guardian refuse, are unwilling, or
unable to provide protection for the child;
(2) being exploited including sexually or economically;
(3) being abandoned or neglected, and after diligent search and inquiry, the parent
or guardian cannot be found;
(4) coming from a dysfunctional or broken family or without a parent or guardian;
(5) being out of school;
(6) being a streetchild;
(7) being a member of a gang;
(8) living in a community with a high level of criminality or drug abuse; and
(9) living in situations of armed conflict.

(e) "Child in Conflict with the Law" refers to a child who is alleged as, accused of, or
adjudged as, having committed an offense under Philippine laws.

RA 10630: SEC. 3. Section 6 of Republic Act No. 9344 is hereby amended to read as
follows:
SEC. 6. Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility. A child fifteen (15) years of
age or under at the time of the commission of the offense shall be exempt from
criminal liability. However, the child shall be subjected to an intervention
program pursuant to Section 20 of this Act.
A child is deemed to be fifteen (15) years of age on the day of the fifteenth
anniversary of his/her birthdate.
A child above fifteen (15) years but below eighteen (18) years of age shall
likewise be exempt from criminal liability and be subjected to an intervention
program, unless he/she has acted with discernment, in which case, such child
shall be subjected to the appropriate proceedings in accordance with this Act.
The exemption from criminal liability herein established does not include
exemption from civil liability, which shall be enforced in accordance with
existing laws.

Ortega vs. People
FACTS: The petitioner, Joemar Ortega, who was then 14 years old, was charged
with the crime of rape for allegedly raping AAA, who was about 8 years old. That
the rape happened in 3 occasions, the first one happened sometime August 1999,
when AAAs mother left her in the care of the petitioners mother, Luzviminda.
That the petitioner woke up AAA and led her in the sala and raped her. The second
occasion happened the next day when the petitioner led AAA into the bathroom
and raped her there. In all the instances, petitioner warned AAA to not tell her
parents or he will spank her. The third and last time happened in the house of AAA,
where her brother caught her and the petitioner naked waist down and having
intercourse. The brother then told the incident to his mother. MMM testified that
when she asked AAA what happened, AAA told her that petitioner inserted his
fingers and penis into her vagina. And when MMM examined the private part of
her daughter, she noticed that it was reddish and white fluid was coming out of it.
MMM called Luzviminda and confronted her about what happened. Luzviminda
then demanded that AAA should be brought to a doctor for examination. The Rural
Health Officer, however, did not find any indication that AAA was molested.
Subsequently, the two families reached an amicable settlement that requires the
petitioner to depart from their house and stay with a certain priest. However, a
year later, the family of AAA charged the petitioner with 3 counts of rape, in which
the petitioner plead not guilty.
The RTC ruled that the petitioner is guilty beyond reasonable doubt in the
crime of rape and is sentenced to reclusion temporal. The CA affirmed the ruling of
the trial court. During the pendency of the case in the SC, RA 9344 Juvenile Justice
and Welfare Act was enacted that establishes a comprehensive system to manage
children in conflict with the law. At the case at bar, because the petitioner was a
minor under 15 years of age at the commission of the crime, he can be relieved
from criminal liability.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner can avail exempting circumstance provided by
the newly enacted law on minors in conflict with law.
HELD: Yes
RATIO: The petitioner can avail the exempting circumstance that will relieve him
from criminal liability because the law enacted was favorable to the accused, and is
therefore retroactive in application. Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act provides that
a child under 15 years of age in the commission of the offense shall be exempt
from criminal liability, but is subject to an intervention program. Exemption from
criminal liability, however, does not include exemption from civil liability. Section
64 of the newly enacted law also provides that cases of children under 15 years of
age at the commission of the crime, shall immediately be dismissed and the child
shall be referred to the appropriate local social welfare and development officer.
The Court therefore held that the case against Joemar Ortega is hereby
DISMISSED. Petitioner is hereby referred to the local social welfare and
development officer of the locality for the appropriate intervention program.

RA 9344: SEC. 7. Determination ofAge. - The child in conflict with the law shall
enjoy the presumption of minority. He/She shall enjoy all the rights of a child in
conflict with the law until he/she is proven to be eighteen (18) years old or older.
The age of a child may be determined from the child's birth certificate, baptismal
certificate or any other pertinent documents. In the absence of these documents,
age may be based on information from the child himself/herself, testimonies of
other persons, the physical appearance of the child and other relevant evidence. In
case of doubt as to the age of the child, it shall be resolved in his/her favor.
Any person contesting the age of the child in conflict with the law prior to the filing
of the information in any appropriate court may file a case in a summary
proceeding for the determination of age before the Family Court which shall decide
the case within twenty-four (24) hours from receipt of the appropriate pleadings of
all interested parties.
If a case has been fiied against the child in conflict with the law and is pending in
the appropriate court, the person shall file a motion to determine the age of the
child in the same court where the case is pending. Pending hearing on the said
motion, proceedings on the main case shall be suspended.
In all proceedings, law enforcement officers, prosecutors, judges and other
government officials concerned shall exert all efforts at determining the age of the
child in conflict with the law.

Rule on Commitment of Children A.M NO. 02-1-19-SC
SECTION 1. Objective, -The objective of this Rule is to ensure that every effort
is exerted to promote the child's welfare and enhance his opportunities for a
useful and happy life, Toward this end, this Rule seeks to protect the child from
all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation and other conditions
prejudicial to his development.

SEC. 2. Interpretation. -The best interests of the child shall be the paramount
consideration in all actions concerning him, whether undertaken by public or
private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities and
legislative bodies consistent with the United Nations Convention on the Rights
of the Child,

SEC. 3. Definition of Terms. -
(a) "Child" is a person below eighteen years of age.

(b) "Department" refers to the Department of Social Welfare and
Development,

(c) "Dependent child" is one who is without a parent, guardian or custodian, or
one whose parents, guardian or other custodian for good cause desires to be
relieved of his care and custody, and is dependent upon the public for support.

(d) "Abandoned child" is one who has no proper parental care or guardianship,
or whose parents or guardian has deserted him for a period of at least six (5)
continuous months.

(e) "Neglected child" is one whose basic needs have been deliberately
unattended to or inadequately attended to, physically or emotionally, by his
parents or guardian.

(f) "Physical neglect" occurs when the child is malnourished, ill-clad and
without proper shelter.

(g) "Emotional neglect" occurs when a child is raped, seduced, mal-treated,
exploited, overworked or made to work under conditions not conducive to
good health; made to beg in the streets or public places, or when placed in
moral danger, or exposed to drugs, alcohol, gambling, prostitution and other
vices.

(h) "Disabled child" includes mentally retarded, physically handicapped,
emotionally disturbed and mentally ill children, children with cerebral palsy and
those with similar afflictions.

(i) "Mentally retarded child" is one who is (1) socially incompetent, that is,
socially inadequate, occupational^ incompetent and unable to manage his own
affairs; (2) mentally subnormal; (3) intellectually retarded from birth or early
age; (4) retarded at maturity; (5) mentally deficient as a result of constitutional
origin through heredity or diseases or (6) essentially incurable.

(j) "Physically handicapped child" is one who is crippled, deaf-mute, blind, or
otherwise suffers from a defect which restricts his means of action or
communication with others.

(k) "Emotionally disturbed child" is one who, although not afflicted with
insanity or mental defect, is unable to maintain normal social relations with
others and the community in general due to emotional problems or complexes.

(I) "Mentally ill child" is one with any behavioral disorder, whether functional
or organic, which is of such a degree of severity as to require professional help
or hospitalization.

(m) "Commitment" or "surrender of a child" is the legal act of entrusting a child
to the care of the Department or any duly licensed child- placement or child-
caring agency or individual by the court, parent or guardian or any interested
party.

(n) "Involuntarily committed child" is one whose parents have been
permanently and judicially deprived of parental authority due to abandonment;
substantial, continuous, or repeated neglect; abuse; or incompetence to
discharge parental responsibilities in accordance with Section 4 herein.

(o) "Voluntarily committed child" is one whose parents knowingly and willingly
relinquished parental authority to the Department or any duly licensed child-
placement or child-caring agency or individual in accordance with Section 3
herein.

(p) "Child-placing or child-placement agency" refers to a private non-profit or
charitable institution or government agency duly licensed and accredited by
(he Department to provide comprehensive child welfare services, including but
not limited to, receiving applications for adoption or foster care, evaluating the
prospective adoptive or foster parents and preparing the home study report.

(q) "Child-caring agency" refers to a private non-profit or charitable institution
or government agency duly licensed and accredited by the Department that
provides twenty-four hour residential care services for abandoned, orphaned,
neglected, involuntarily or voluntarily committed children.

(r) "Guardian ad litem is a person appointed by the court where the case is
pending for a child sought to be committed to protect his best interests.

(s) "Case Study Report" is a written report of the result of an investigation
conducted by a social worker as to the socio-cultural, economic and legal status
or condition of the child sought to be committed. It shall include among others
his developmental age, educational attainment, family and social relationships,
the quality of his peer group, his family's strengths and weaknesses and
parental control over him. The report is submitted to the Family Court to aid it
in its evaluation of whether the child ought to be committed to the care of the
Department or any duly licensed child-placement or child-caring agency or
individual.
SEC. 4.
(a) Who may file. - The Secretary of the Department or his authorized
representative or any duly licensed child-placement or child-caring agency
having knowledge of a child who appears to be dependent, abandoned or
neglected, may file a verified petition for involuntary commitment of said child
to the care of any duly licensed child-placement or child-caring agency or
individual.

(b) Venue. - The petition shall be filed with the Family Court of the province or
city in which the parent or guardian resides or where the child is found.

(c) Contents of Verified Petition. -The petition must state:
The names of the parents or guardian and their place of residence. If the child's
parents are unknown, petitioner must allege that diligent efforts have been
exerted to locate them. It said parents are deceased, petitioner shall attach a
certified true copy of their death certificate;

2. The facts showing that the child is dependent, abandoned, or neglected;

3. The facts showing who has custody of the child at the time of the filing of the
petition; and

4. The name, address and written consent of the Department or duly licensed
child-placement or child-caring agency or individual to whose care the
commitment of the child is sought to be entrusted.
(d) Summons; Court to Set Time for Hearing. - If the court is satisfied that the
petition is sufficient in form and substance, it snail direct the clerk of court to
immediately issue summons which shall be served together with a copy of the
petition and a notice of hearing, upon the parents or guardian of the child and
the office of the public prosecutor not less than five (5) days before the date of
the hearing. The office of the public prosecutor shall be directed to
immediately transmit the summons to the prosecutor assigned to the Family
Court concerned.

If it appears from the petition that both parents of the child are dead or that
neither parent can be found in the province or city where the court is located
and the child has no guardian residing therein, summons may not be issued
and the court shall thereupon appoint a guardian ad litem pursuant to Sub-
section (f) below and proceed with the hearing of the case with due notice to
the provincial or city prosecutor.

(e) Social Worker. - After the court sets the petition for hearing in accordance
with Sub-section (d) above, it shall direct the social worker to submit, before
the hearing, a case study report of the child to aid it in evaluating whether said
child should be committed to the care of the Department or any duly licensed
child-placement or child-caring agency or individual. The report shall bear the
signature of the social worker on every page.

(f) Guardian Ad Litem of Child. - If neither of the parents nor the guardian of
the child can be located or does not appear in court despite due notice, or if
the court finds them incompetent to protect the best interests of the child, it
shall be the duty of the court to appoint a suitable person as guardian ad litem
to represent the child. In making the appointment, the court shall consider the
background of the guardian ad litem and his familiarity with the judicial
process, social service programs and child development. A member of the
Philippine Bar may be appointed guardian ad litem.

(g) Child's Right to Counsel. - The court, upon request of the child capable of
forming his own views or upon request of his guardian ad litem, shall appoint a
lawyer to represent him in the proceedings.

(h) Duty of Public Prosecutor. - The provincial or "city prosecutor shall appear
for the State and ascertain if there has been due notice to all parties concerned
and that there is justification for the declaration of dependency, abandonment
or neglect.

(i) Hearing. - The court shall direct the person or agency which has custody of
the child to bring the latter to the court on the date of the hearing of the
petition and shall ascertain the facts and determine whether the child is
dependent, abandoned, or neglected, and if so, the-cause and circumstances of
such condition.

(j) Judgment. - If, after the hearing, the court shall find the child to be
dependent, abandoned, or neglected, it shall render judgment committing him
to the care and custody of the Department or any duly licensed child-
placement or child-caring agency or individual until he reaches the age of
eighteen (18), The judgment shall likewise make proper provisions for the
custody of the property or money belonging to the committed child.

If the child is committed to the Department, it shall notify the court within
thirty (30) days from the order of commitment, the name and address of the
duly licensed and accredited child-placement or child-caring agency or
individual where the child shall be placed.

However, if the court finds that the abandonment or neglect of the child may
be remedied, the child may be allowed to stay in his own home under the care
and control of his parents or guardian, subject to supervision and direction of
the Department.

(k) Visitation or Inspection. - Any duly licensed child-placement or child-caring
agency or individual to whom a child has been committed by the court shall be
subject to visitation or inspection by a representative of the court or of the
Department, as the case may be or of both, to determine whether the welfare
and interests of the child are being served,

(I) Report of Person or Institution. - Any duly licensed child-placement or child-
caring agency or individual to whom a child has been committed by judicial
order may at any time be required by the court to submit a report, containing
all necessary information for determining whether the welfare of the child is
being served.

(m) Temporary Custody of Child. - The duly licensed child-placement or child-
caring agency or individual to whom a child has been committed may file a
verified motion with the court which granted the petition for involuntary
commitment of a child to place him in the care of any suitable person, upon the
latter's request, for a period not exceeding one month at a time. The court may
order the social worker to submit a case study report to aid it in evaluating
whether such temporary custody shall be for the best interests of the child. The
period of temporary custody of the child may be extended by the court for a
period not exceeding one month at a time upon motion of the duly licensed
child-placement or child-caring agency or individual to which the child has been
committed.

The court, motu proprio, or upon request of the child assisted by his guardian
ad litem, or at the instance of the agency or person to whom the child was
committed, after due notice and hearing, shall discontinue the temporary
custody of the child if it appears that he is not being given proper care.

After one month from the date temporary custody of the child was given to
another suitable person, the agency or individual shall submit to the court a
verified report on whether the temporary custody of the child has promoted
his best interests.

(n) Change of Custody. - If the child is committed to the Department, it shall
have the authority to change the custody o! a child it had placed with any duly
licensed child-placement or child-caring agency or individual if it appears that
such change is for the best interests of the child. The Department shall notify
the court of any change in custody of the child,

When conflicting interests arise among child-placement or child-caring
agencies, the court which granted the involuntary commitment of the child,
upon motion of the Department or any of the agencies concerned, shall order
the change of commitment of the child.

(o) Removal of Custody. - A motion to remove custody of a child may be filed
by an authorized representative of the Department with knowledge of the facts
against a child-placement or child-caring agency or individual to whose custody
a child has been committed by the court on the ground of neglect of such child
as defined in Section 3 (e) of this Rule. The court shall set the motion for
hearing with notice to the public prosecutor and the court-designated social
worker. If the court finds after hearing that the allegations of the motion have
been established and that it is for the best interests and welfare of the child,
the court shall issue an order removing him from the custody of the person or
agency, as the case may be, and committing him to the custody of another duly
licensed child-placement or child-caring agency or individual.

In the same proceeding, the court may suspend or revoke the license of the
agency or individual found guilty of such neglect depending upon the gravity or
frequency of the offense.
(p) Restoration of Parental Authority After Involuntary Commitment. -
Who may file; Ground. - The parents or guardian of a child committed
to the care of a person, agency or institution by judicial order may file a
verified motion for the restoration of his rights over the child with the
court which granted the involuntary commitment on the ground that
he is now able to take proper care and custody of said child, provided,
however, that the child has not yet been adopted.

(ii) Notice of Hearing. - The court shall fix the time and date for the
hearing of the motion, which shall not be earlier than thirty (30) days
nor later than sixty (60) days from the date of the filing of said motion
and cause notice of the hearing to be sent to the person, agency or
institution to which the child has been committed, the public
prosecutor and the court-designated social worker, at least five (5)
days before the date of hearing.

(iii) Hearing. - At the hearing, any person may be allowed to intervene
at the discretion of the court to contest the right to the relief
demanded. Witnesses may be called and examined by the parties or by
the court motu proprio.

(iv) Resolution. - If it is found that the cause for the commitment of the
child no longer exists and that the movant is already able to take
proper care and custody of the child, the court, after taking into
consideration the best interests and the welfare of the child, shall issue
a resolution terminating the parental authority of the person, agency
or institution to whom the child was committed by judicial order and
restoring parental authority to the movant.
q) Jurisdiction for Prosecution of Punishable Acts. - The Family Court which
granted the involuntary commitment shall have jurisdiction over the
prosecution of a child who left without prior permission from the person or
institution to which he has been judicially committed or the person under
whose custody he has been judicially committed in accordance with Sub-
section (m) of Section 4 of this Rule. It shall likewise have jurisdiction over the
person who induced the child to leave such person or institution, except in case
of actual or imminent grave physical or moral danger to the child. The Family
Court which granted the involuntary commitment shall also have jurisdiction
over the prosecution of parents or guardians of the child who may be held
liable under Articles 59 and 60 of P.D. No. 603 and Sections 9, 10 and 31 of R.A.
No. 7610.
SEC. 5. Voluntary Commitment of a Child to an Institution or Individual. - The
parent or guardian of a dependent, abandoned or neglected child may
voluntarily commit him to the Department or any duly licensed child-
placement or child-caring agency or individual subject to the rules of the
Department. However, no child shall be committed unless he is surrendered in
writing by his parents or guardian stating such voluntary commitment and
specifically naming the office, agency, or individual to whose custody the child
is to be committed. Such written instrument should be notarized and signed in
the presence of an authorized representative of the Department after
counseling and other services have been made available to encourage the
child's parents to keep the child.

(a) Petition for Removal of Custody. -
Who may file; Ground. - The parents or guardian who voluntarily committed
the child, or in their absence or failure, any person with knowledge of the facts,
may file a verified petition to remove custody of the child against the child-
placement or child-caring agency or individual to whose custody the child has
been voluntarily committed on the ground of neglect of such child as defined in
Section 3 (e) of this Rule. A child may also be removed from the custody of the
child-placement or child-caring agency or individual on the ground that the
voluntary commitment of the child was unjustified.

(ii) Venue. - The petition shall be filed with the Family Court of the province or
city where the child-placement or child-caring agency to which the child has
been voluntarily committed is located or where the child may be found.

(iii) Contents of Verified Petition. - The petition must state:

The name and address of the child-placement or child-caring agency or
individual to whose custody the child has been voluntarily committed;

The facts showing that the child has been neglected by the agency or in cases
where the voluntary commitment was unjustified, that the parents of the child
are actually capable of taking care and custody of the child;

The name, address and written consent of the duly licensed child-placement or
child-caring agency or individual to whose care the child may be transferred.

The facts showing that petitioner has exhausted the administrative remedies
available to him,

(iv) Notice of Hearing. - If the petition is sufficient in form and substance, the
court shall set the same for hearing with notice to the Department, the public
prosecutor, the court-designated social worker, the agency or individual to
whom the child has been committed and in appropriate cases, the parents of
the child.

(v) Judgment. - If after hearing the court finds that the allegations of the
petition have been established and that it is for the best interests and welfare
of the child, it shall issue an order removing the child from the custody of the
person or agency concerned, and committing him to the custody of another
duly licensed child-placement or child-caring agency or individual.

The court, in the same proceeding may, after hearing the comment or
recommendation of the Department, suspend or revoke the license of the
agency or individual found guilty of such neglect depending upon the gravity or
frequency of the offense.
(b) Restoration of Parental Authority After Voluntary Commitment. - The
restoration of rights of the parent or guardian over the child who has been
voluntarily committed shall be governed by the rules of the Department,
provided, however, that the petition for restoration is filed within six (6)
months from the date of voluntary commitment. In case the Department
refuses to grant legal custody and parental authority to the parent or guardian
over the child who has been voluntarily committed to an agency or individual,
the parent or guardian may file a petition in court for restoration of parental
authority in accordance with Section 4 (p) of this Rule.

(c) Jurisdiction for Prosecution of Punishable Acts. - The Family Court of the
place where the child may be found or where the duly licensed child-placement
or child-caring agency or individual is located shall have jurisdiction over the
prosecution of a child who left without prior permission from the person or
institution to which he has been voluntarily committed. It shall likewise have
jurisdiction over the person who induced the child to leave such person or
institution, except in case of grave actual or imminent physical or moral danger,
to the child. The same Family Court shall also have jurisdiction over the
prosecution of parents or guardians of the child who may be held liable under
Articles 59 and 60 of P.O. No, 603 and Sections 9, 10 and 31 of R.A. No. 7610.

SEC. 6. Petition for Commitment of a Disabled Child. -
(a) Who may file. - Where a child appears to be mentally retarded physically
handicapped, emotionally disturbed, mentally ill, with cerebral palsy or with
similar afflictions and needs institutional care but his parents or guardians are
opposed thereto, the Department, or any duly licensed child-placement or
child-caring agency or individual may file a verified petition for commitment of
the said child to any reputable institution providing care, training and
rehabilitation for disabled children.

The parents or guardian of the child may file a similar petition in case no
immediate placement can be arranged for the disabled child when his welfare
and interests are at stake,

(b) Venue. - The petition for commitment of a disabled child shall be filed with
the Family Court of the place where the parent or guardian resides or where
the child is found.

(c) Contents of Verified Petition. - The petition for commitment must stale the
following:
The facts showing that the child appears to be mentally retarded,
physically handicapped, emotionally disturbed, mentally ill, with
cerebral 'palsy or with similar afflictions and needs institutional care;

(2) The name of the parents and their residence, if known, or if the
child has no living parent, the name and residence of the guardian, if
any; and

(3) The fact that the parents or guardian or any duty licensed disabled
child-placement or child-caring agency, as the case may be, has
opposed the commitment of such child;

(4) The name and written conformity of the institution where the child
is to be committed.

(5) An estimate of the costs and other expenses of maintaining the
child in the institution.
The verified petition shall be sufficient if based upon the personal knowledge of
the petitioner.

(d) Order of Hearing; Notice. - If the petition filed is sufficient in form and
substance, the court, by an order reciting the purpose of the petition, shall fix
the date of the hearing thereof, and a copy of such order shall be served on the
child alleged to be mentally retarded, physically handicapped, emotionally
disturbed, mentally ill, with cerebral palsy or with similar afflictions and on the
person having charge of him or any of his relatives residing in the province or
city as the court may deem proper.

The order shall also direct the sheriff or any other officer of the court to
produce, if necessary, the alleged disabled child on the date of the hearing.

(e) Hearing and Judgment. - If the court finds that the allegations of the
petition have been established and that institutional care of the child is for his
best interests or the public welfare and that his parents, or guardian or
relatives are unable for any reason whatsoever to take proper care of him, the
court shall order his commitment to the proper institution for disabled
children. The court shall likewise make proper provisions for the custody of the
property or money belonging to the committed child.

The expense of maintaining a disabled child in the institution to which he has
been committed shall be borne primarily by the parents or guardian and
secondarily, by such disabled child, if he has property of his own.

In all cases where the expenses for the maintenance of the disabled child
cannot be paid in accordance with the immediately preceding paragraph, the
Department shall bear the expenses, or such part thereof as may remain
unpaid.

The court shall furnish the institution to which the child has been committed
with a copy of its judgment, together with ail the reports and other data
pertinent to the case.

(f) Discharge of Judicially Committed Disabled Child. - Upon motion of the
parent, guardian or institution to which the child has been judicially committed
under this Rule, the court, after hearing, shall order the discharge of such child
if it is established and certified by the Department that:
He is no longer a danger to himself and the community;

(2) He has been sufficiently rehabilitated from his physical
handicap or if of working age, is already fit to engage in gainful
occupation; or

(3) He has been sufficiently relieved of his psychological,
mental and emotional problems and is ready to assume normal
social relations.
SEC. 7. Effectivity. - This rule shall take effect on April 15, 2002 after its
publication in a newspaper of general circulation not later than March 15,
2002.

Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with Law (A.M No. 02-1-18-SC)
Section 1. Applicability of the Rule. - This Rule shall apply to all criminal cases
involving children in conflict with law.
A child in conflict with the law is a person who at the time of the commission of the
offense is below eighteen (18) years old but not less than fifteen (15) years and one
(1) day old.
This Rule shall not apply to a person who at the time of the initial contact as
defined in Sec. 4 (q) of this Rule shall have reached the age of eighteen (18) in
which case, the regular rules on criminal procedure shall apply without prejudice to
the rights granted under Secs. 53,54,55 and 56 of this Rule.
Section 2. Objective. - The objective of this Rule is to ensure that the justice system
treats every child in conflict with the law in a manner that recognizes and upholds
human dignity and worth, and instills in the child respect for the fundamental rights
ad freedom of others. The Rule considers the developmental age of the child and
the desirability of the child's reintegration in the assumption of a constructive role
in society in accordance with the principles of balanced and restorative justice.
To attain this objective, the Rule seeks:
(a) To provide child-appropriate proceedings, including programs and services for
crime prevention, diversion, rehabilitation, re-integration and aftercare to ensure
the normal growth and development of the child in conflict with the law;
(b) To provide procedural rules dealing with children in conflict with the law that
take into account their distinct circumstances, assure all parties of a fair hearing
with each party's constitutional and statutory rights recognized and respected, and
ensure that appropriate disposition measures are implemented by law enforcers
social services and the courts;
(c) To divert from the formal justice system children in conflict with the law who
can be cared for or placed under community continuum alternative programs of
treatment, training and rehabilitation in conformity with the principles of balanced
and restorative justice;
(d) To deal with the child in a family environment whenever possible, and to
separate the child from the parents only when necessary for the child's welfare or
in the interest of public safety.
(e) To remove from children in conflict with the law the stigma of criminality and
criminal behavior;
(f) to promote, facilitate and implement in administrative and judicial proceedings
respect for the view of the child;
(g) To provide for the care, protection and wholesome moral, mental, and physical
development of children in conflict with the law; and
(h) To promote and protect the rights and interest of children as zones of peace in
situations of armed conflict, but who are alleged to be in conflict with the law. (a)
Section 3. Interpretation. - This Rule shall be interpreted liberally to promote the
best interest of the child in conformity with Philippine laws, the United Nations'
Convention on the Rights of the Child and relevant international treaties and
protocols.
Section 4. Definitions. - As used in this Rule,
(a) Age of criminal responsibility is the age when a child, fifteen (15) years and one
(1) day old or above but below eighteen (18) years of age, commits an offense with
discernment.
(b) Bail refers to the security given for the release of the child in custody of the law,
furnished by the child, the child's parent, guardian, or a bondsman, to guarantee
the child's appearance before the court. Bail may be posted in a form such as
corporate security, property bond or cash deposit.
(c) Balanced and Restorative Justice is a principle in juvenile justice that requires a
process of resolving conflicts with the participation of the victim, the child in
conflict with the law, and the community. It seeks to obtain reparation for the
victim; reconciliation to the victim, the child in conflict with the law, and the
community, and the reassurance that the child in conflict with the law can be
reintegrated into society. It also enhances public safety by involving the victim, the
child in conflict with the law, and the community in prevention strategies. (a)
(d) Best interest of the child refers to the totality of congenial to the survival,
protection and feelings of security of the child and most encouraging to the child's
physical, psychological and emotional development. It also means the least
detrimental available alternative for safeguarding the growth and development.
(e) Case study report is a written report on the social case inquiry conducted by the
social worker of the local government unit or the Department of Social Welfare and
Development or by the social worker designated by the court on the social,
cultural, economic and legal status or condition of the child in conflict in the law. It
shall include, among other matters, the child's development age; educational
attainment; family and social relationships; the quality of the child's peer group;
the strengths and weaknesses of the family; parental control; the child's attitude
towards the offense ; the harm or damage done to others resulting from the
offenses, if any; and the attitude of the parents towards the child's responsibility
for the offense. The social worker shall also include an initial determination of the
child's discernment in the commission of the offense. (a)
(f) Community continuum refers to the aftercare of a child in conflict with the law
and is a provides continuous guidance and support to the child in conflict with the
law upon release from rehabilitation and subsequent reintegration into society.
Community continuum for the child includes timely release, suitable residence,
food, clothing, available employment and sufficient means to facilitate successful
reintegration in local government unit and other appropriate agencies. (n)
(g) Corporal punishment is any kind of physical punishment inflicted on the body as
distinguished from pecuniary punishment or fine.
(h) Court refers to a designated family court or in places where there are no
designated family courts, any regional trial court hearing family and youth
cases. (a)
(i) Deprivation of Liberty refers to any form of detention or imprisonment, or to the
placement of a child in conflict with the law in a public or private custodial setting,
from which the child in conflict with the law is not permitted to leave at will except
by order of any judicial or administrative authority. (a)
(j) Discernment means the capacity of the child at the time of the commission of
the offense to understand the differences between right and wrong and the
consequences of the wrongful act.
(k) Disposition conference is a meeting held by the court with the social worker who
prepared the case study report, together with the child in conflict with the law and
the parents or guardian ad litem, and the child's counsel for the purpose of
determining the disposition measures appropriate to the personal and special
circumstances of the child.
(l) Diversion refers to an alternative child-appropriate process of determining the
responsibility and treatment of a child in conflict with the law on the basis of the
child's social, cultural, economic psychological or educational background without
resorting to formal court adjudication.
(m) Diversion programs refer to programs the child in conflict the law is required to
undergo in lieu of formal court proceedings.
(n) Expedited Transfer of a Child is a process where a child who commits an offense
is immediately brought by the apprehending officer or private individual to a social
worker for preliminary determination of discernment. (n)
(o) Guardian Ad Litem is a person appointed by the court to protect the best
interest of the child. (a)
(p) In conflict with the law means take into custody, detained, or charged with the
commission of an act defined and punished as a crime or offense under the law,
including violations of traffic laws, rules and regulations, and ordinances of local
government units. (a)
(q) Initial contact refers to apprehension or taking into custody of a child in conflict
with the law by law enforcement officers or private citizens. It includes the time the
child alleged to be in conflict with the law receives a subpoena under Section 3 (b)
of Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure or summons under Section
6 (a) or Section 9(b) of the same Rule in cases that do not require preliminary
investigation, or where there is no necessity to place the child alleged to be in
conflict with the law under immediate custody. (n)
(r) Intake report is the initial written report containing the personal and other
circumstances of the child in conflict with the law prepared by the social worker
assigned to assist the child entering the justice system.
(s) Intervention programs refer to a series of individualized treatment activities or
programs designed to address issues that caused the child to commit an offense .
These may include counseling, skills, training, education, and other activities that
are aimed to improve and enhance the child's psychological, emotional and
psychosocial well being. (n)
(t) Law Enforcement Officer refers to the person in authority or an agent as defined
in Article 152 of the Revised Penal Code, including a barangay tanod. (n)
(u) Non-Serious Offense refers to an offense where the imposable penalty for the
crime committed is not more than six (6) years imprisonment. (n)
(v) Probation is an alternative disposition, ordered by the court, under which a child
in conflict with the law is released after conviction and sentence and permitted to
remain at home or with an appropriate custodian, subject to certain terms and
conditions imposed by the court.
(w) Recognizance is an undertaking in lieu of a bond, assumed by a mother or
father, or appropriate guardian or custodian, or in their absence, the nearest
relative, or any responsible member of the community to assume custody of a child
in conflict with the law and be responsible for the appearance of the child in court
whenever required during the pendency of the case. (a)
(x) Segregation refers to the procedure where, upon initial contact with a child
alleged to have committed an offense, the law enforcer places the child in a
separate and different area from adult detention prisoners, and ensures that
female children are separated from male children. (n)
(y) Serious offense refers to an offense where the imposable penalty for the offense
committed exceeds six (6) years imprisonment. (a)
(z) Status offenses refers to offenses that discriminate only against a child, such as
curfew violations, truancy, parental disobedience and the like. (n)
(aa) Suspended sentence is the holding in abeyance of the service of the sentence
imposed by the court upon a finding of guilt of the child in conflict with the law,
whereby the child undergoes rehabilitation within a fixed period under such terms
and conditions as may be ordered by the court. (n)
(bb) Victimless Crimes refer to offenses where there are no private offended
parties. (n)
(cc) Youth detention home refers to a 24-hour child-caring institution managed by
accredited local government units and licensed and/or accredited non-government
organizations providing short-term residential care for children in conflict with the
law and where the child may be physically restricted by order of any judicial,
administrative or other public authority, and from which the child is not permitted
to leave at will, pending court disposition of the charge or transfer to other
agencies or jurisdiction. (a)
(dd) Youth rehabilitation center refers to a 24-hour residential care facility
managed by the Department of Social Welfare and Development, local government
units, licensed and/or accredited non-government organizations monitored by the
Department of Social Welfare and Development. The Center provides care,
treatment and rehabilitation services for children in conflict with the law under a
structured therapeutic environment through the guidance of a trained staff, where
the physical mobility of the children may be restricted pending court disposition of
their cases. (a)
Section 5. Determination of Age. - The child in conflict with the law shall enjoy the
presumption of minority and shall enjoy all the rights of a child in conflict with the
law until proven to be eighteen years old or older at the time of the commission of
the offense. The age of the child shall be determined according to the following
rules:
(1) The best evidence to prove the age of a child is an original or certified true copy
of the certificate of live birth;
(2) In the absence of a certificate of live birth, similar authentic documents such as
baptismal certificates and school records or any pertinent document that shows
the date of birth of the child;
(3) In the absence of the documents under paragraphs 1 and 2 of this section due
to loss, destruction or unavailability, the testimony of the child, the testimony of a
member of the family related to the child by affinity or consanguinity who is
qualified to testify on matters respecting pedigree such as the exact age or date of
birth of the child pursuant to Sec.40, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence, the
testimonies of the other persons, the physical appearance of the child and other
relevant evidence, shall suffice.
Section 6. Burden of Proof of Age. - Any person alleging the age of the child in
conflict with the law has the burden of proving the age of such child.
If the age of the child is contested prior to the filing of the information in court, a
case for determination of age under summary proceeding may be filed before a
court which shall render its decision within 24 hours from receipt of the
appropriate pleadings of all the parties. (n)
In all cases involving a child, the court shall make a categorical finding as to the age
of the child.
Section 7. Exemption from Criminal Liability. - A child fifteen years of age or under
at the time of the commission of the offense shall be exempt from criminal liability.
However, the child shall be subjected to an intervention program as provided for in
Republic Act No. 9344 when consented to by the child and the parents. (a)
Exemption from criminal liability does not include exemption from civil liability
which shall be enforced in accordance with the provisions of Article 221 of the
Family Code in relation to Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code and Rule 111 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. If the act or omission of the child involves a
quasi-delict, Article 2180 of the Civil Code shall apply.
Section 8. Procedure for Handling Children Exempted from Criminal Liability. - If it is
determined at the initial contact that the child is 15 years of age or below, the
procedure provided in Section 20, Republic Act No. 9344 shall be observed as
follows:
(a) The authority who had the initial contact with the child shall immediately
release the child to the custody of the mother or father, or the appropriate
guardian or custodian, or in their absence, the nearest relative.
(b) The authority shall immediately notify the local social welfare and development
officer of the taking of the child into custody.
(c) The local social welfare and development officer shall, with the consent of the
child and the person having custody over the child, determine the appropriate
intervention programs for the child.
(d) If the child's parents, guardians or nearest relatives cannot be located, or if they
refuse to take custody, the child may be released to any of the following: a duly
registered nongovernmental or religious organization; a barangay official or a
member of the Barangay Council for the Protection of Children; a local social
welfare and development officer; or, when and where appropriate, the
Department of Social Welfare and Development.
(e) If the child has been found by the local social welfare and development office to
be abandoned, neglected or abused by the parents, or if the parents and the child
do not consent to or do not comply with the prevention program, the Department
of Social Welfare and Development or the Local Social Welfare and Development
Office shall file before the court a petition for involuntary commitment pursuant to
Presidential Decree No. 603, otherwise known as "The Child and Youth Welfare
Code." (a)
Section 9. Procedure for Children Not Exempted from Criminal Liability. - A child
fifteen (15) years and one (1) day old or above but below eighteen (18) years of age
at the time of the commission of the offense shall, at the sound discretion of the
court and subject to its supervision, be released on recognizance to the care of the
willing and responsible mother or father, or appropriate guardian or custodian, or,
in their absence, the nearest relative. However, if the prosecution determines that
the child acted with discernment, the child shall be proceeded against in
accordance with Secs. 25 to 29 or, in case of diversion, Secs. 31 to 38 of this Rule.
Section 10. Determination of Discernment. - Discernment is preliminarily
determined by a social worker and finally by the court in the case of a child charged
with a non-serious offense. In all other cases, discernment is determined by the
court.
The determination of discernment shall take into account the ability of a child to
understand the moral and psychological components of criminal responsibility and
the consequences of the wrongful act; and whether a child can be held responsible
for essentially antisocial behavior.
Section 11. Duties of a Person in Authority Taking a Child into Custody. - Any person
taking into custody a child in conflict with the law shall:
(a) Assign an alias to the child;
(b) Ensure that the blotter details containing the true name of the child, if any, are
modified, to reflect the alias by which the child shall be known throughout the
proceedings;
(c) Explain to the child in simple language and in a dialect that can be understood
the reason for placing the child under custody, and the offense allegedly
committed;
(d) Advise the child of his/her constitutional rights in a language or dialect
understandable to the child;
(e) Present proper identification to the child;
(f) Refrain from using vulgar or profane words and from sexually harassing or
abusing, or making sexual advances on the child;
(g) Avoid displaying or using any firearm, weapon, handcuffs or other instrument of
force or restraint, unless absolutely necessary and only after all methods of control
have been exhausted and have failed;
(h) Avoid violence or unnecessary force and refrain from subjecting the child to
greater restraint than is necessary for apprehension and custody;
(i) Ensure that a body search of the child is done only by a law enforcement officer
of the same gender as that of the child;
(j) Ensure expedited transfer of the child by immediately, or not later than eight (8)
hours after apprehension, turning over custody of the child to the local social
welfare and development office or other accredited non-government
organizations;
(k) Notify the child's parents, guardians or custodians or in their absence, the child's
nearest relative and the Public Attorney's Office of the child's apprehension;
(l) Ensure that the child is not locked up in a jail or detention cell during the
investigation;
(m) Bring the child immediately to an available government medical or health
officer for a thorough physical and mental examination;
(n) Ensure that should detention of the child in conflict with the law be necessary,
the segregation of the child be secured in quarters separate from that of the
opposite sex and adult offenders, except where a child is taken into custody for
reasons related to armed conflict, either as combatant, courier, guide or spy, and
families are accommodated as family units in which case, the child shall not be
separated from the family;
(o) Record all the procedures undertaken in the initial investigation including the
following: whether handcuffs or other instruments of restraint were used, and if so,
the reason for such use; that the parents or guardian of the child, the Department
of Social Welfare and Development, and the Public Attorney's Office were informed
of the taking into custody of the child and the details thereof; the measures that
were undertaken to determine the age of child, and the precise details of the
physical and medical examination or in case of failure to submit a child to such
examination, the reason therefore; and
(p) Ensure that all statements signed by the child during the investigation are
witnessed and signed by the child's parents or guardian, social worker or legal
counsel in attendance. (n)
Section 12. Rights of a Child Under Custody. - At the custodial investigation, a child
who has been taken into custody shall have the following rights:
(a) At the police station, to be immediately assisted by a lawyer and a social worker
who shall make sure that the child is effectively informed of his/her rights, as far as
the child's maturity and discernment allow;
(b) To demand that the questioning or interrogation take place in conditions that
respect the rights of the child and are complaint with child-sensitive procedural
rules;
(c) To have the child's family located and notified with dispatch;
(d) To be informed, together with the parents, guardians or custodians or nearest
relatives, by the social welfare and development officer of the local government
unit or of the Department of Social Welfare and Development of the consequences
of the offense alleged to have been committed with a view towards counseling and
rehabilitation, diversion from criminal justice system and reparation if appropriate;
(e) To have the results of the child's medical and dental examination kept
confidential unless otherwise ordered by the court. Whenever medical treatment
for any physical or mental defect is necessary, to demand that steps must be
immediately taken by the medical officer to provide the child with the necessary
and proper treatment;
(f) To have the right of privacy respected and protected at all times, including the
utilization of all measures necessary to promote this right, including the exclusion
of the media; and
(g) While under investigation, not to be fingerprinted or photographed in a
humiliating and degrading manner.
Section 13. Taking Custody of a Child Without a Warrant. - The law enforcement
officer or a private person taking into custody a child in conflict with the law
without a warrant shall observe the provisions in Sections 5, 8 and 9 of Rule 113 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure and shall forthwith deliver the child to the
nearest police station. The child shall be proceeded against in accordance with
Section 7 of Rule 112 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Section 14. Conduct of Initial Investigation by the Police. - The police officer
conducting the initial investigation of a child conflict with the law shall do so in the
presence of either or both of the parents, guardian or custodian, or in their
absence, the nearest relative of the child, the child's counsel of choice, or a lawyer
from the Public Attorney's Office, and the local social welfare officer. A
representative of a non-government organization, religious group, or member of
the Barangay Council for the Protection of Children shall be allowed to be present
at the investigation in the absence of the parents, guardian, relative, or social
welfare officer. (a)
Section 15. Guidelines for Fingerprinting and Photographing of the Child. - The
following guidelines shall be observed when fingerprinting or photographing the
child:
(a) The child's fingerprint and photograph files shall be kept separate from those of
adults and shall be kept confidential. They may be inspected by law enforcement
officers only when necessary for the effective discharge of their duties and upon
prior authority of the court; and
(b) The fingerprint and photograph shall be removed from the files and destroyed:
(1) if the case against the child is not filed, or is dismissed; or (2) when the child
reaches twenty-one (21) years of age and there is no record that the child
committed an offense after reaching eighteen (18) years of age.
Section 16. Intake Report by the Social Welfare Officer. - Upon the taking into
custody of a child in conflict with the law, the social welfare officer assigned to the
child shall immediately undertake a preliminary background investigation of the
child and, should a case be filed in court, submit to the court the corresponding
intake report prior to the arraignment.
Section 17. Filing of Criminal Action. - A criminal action may be instituted against a
child in conflict with the law by filing a complaint with the prosecutor.
All criminal actions commenced by complaint or information shall be prosecuted
under the direction and control of the public prosecutor assigned to the court.
Petitions for confinement of a child drug dependent shall be filed under Section 21
of the Rule on Children Charged under Republic Act No. 9165. (n)
Section 18. Prosecution of Civil Action. - When a criminal action is instituted against
a child in conflict with the law, the action for recovery of civil liability arising from
the offense charged shall be governed by Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure.
Section 19. Preliminary Investigation. - As far as consistent with this Rule, the
preliminary investigation of a child conflict with the law shall be governed by
Section 3 of Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. A specially trained
prosecutor shall be assigned to conduct the inquest, preliminary investigation and
prosecution of the case involving a child in conflict with the law. The child, on the
other hand, shall be assisted by a private lawyer or if none, a lawyer from the
Public Attorney's Office. If there is an allegation or evidence of torture or ill-
treatment of a child in conflict with the law during custody or detention, it shall be
the duty of the prosecutor to investigate the same. (n)
Section 20. Conduct of Preliminary Investigation. - Preliminary investigation shall be
conducted in the following instances: (a) when the child in conflict with the law
does not qualify for diversion; (b) when the child, the parents or guardian do not
agree to diversion as provided in Sections 27 and 28 of Republic Act No. 9344; or (c)
when, after considering the assessment and recommendation of the social worker,
the prosecutor determines that diversion is not appropriate for the child in conflict
with the law. (n)
At the preliminary investigation, should there arise a need for clarificatory
questions to be propounded on the child, the Rule on Examination of a Child
Witness shall apply.
Section 21. Filing of Information. - If the investigating prosecutor finds probable
cause to hold the child in conflict with the law for trial, there being discernment,
the corresponding Resolution and Information shall be prepared for the approval
by the provincial or city prosecutor, a s the case may be. The child and the mother
or father, or appropriate guardian or custodian, or in the absence thereof, the
nearest relative, and the child's private counsel or lawyer from the Public
Attorney's Office shall be furnished forthwith a copy of the approved resolution
and the Information.
The Information shall be filed with the court within forty-five (45) days from the
start of the preliminary investigation.(n)
No Information shall be filed against a child for the commission of the following:
(a) status offences;
(b) vagrancy and prostitution under Section 202 of the Revised Penal Code;
(c) mendicancy under Presidential Decree No. 1563; and
(d) sniffing of rugby under Presidential Decree No. 1619.
Children taken into custody for the foregoing shall, with their consent and that of
their parents, guardian or custodian, instead undergo appropriate counseling and
treatment program. (n)
Section 22. Duties of the Clerk of Court Upon Receipt of information. - The Clerk of
Court, upon receipt of the Information, shall:
(1) Maintain a separate case docket or logbook for cases involving children in
conflict with the law. Whenever possible, the Clerk of Court shall use color coding
or other method to easily distinguish the records of children in conflict with the law
from the other case records;
(2) Determine whether the offense charged qualifies for diversion, that is it
punishable by imprisonment of not more than twelve (12) years, regardless of fine,
or fine alone regardless of the amount;
(3) If the crime charged is punishable by such imprisonment, immediately assign a
temporary case number in accordance with Sec. 23 of this Rule and raffle off the
case to a court so that its Diversion Committee can immediately undertake the
appropriate action under Section 33 of this Rule; and
(4) If the crime charged does not quality for diversion because it is punishable by
imprisonment of more than twelve (12) years, the case shall be assigned a regular
criminal case docket number raffled off to a court for formal proceedings. (n)
Section 23. Docketing of the Case - a case that qualifies for diversion under
paragraph 3 of the preceding Section shall not be docketed as a regular criminal
case but instead shall be assigned a temporary case number as follows: CICL-(no.)
___- (year) ___ -D (which means diversion), before the same is raffled off to the
appropriate court.
Section 24. Venue - Subject to the provisions of Section 15, Rule 110 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure, any criminal or civil action involving a child in conflict
with the law shall be instituted and tried in the appropriate court nearest the place
where the offense was committed or where any of its essential elements occurred.
Section 25. Released of Children on Recognizance to the Parents, Guardian,
Custodian or Nearest Relative. - The release of a child from a custody during the
pendency of the case involving a non-serious offense as defined in Sec. 4 (u) of this
rule may be ordered by the court only after a hearing for that purpose, and upon
favorable recommendation of the social worker assigned to the child, with the
conformity of the public prosecutor and the private complainant. The child shall be
released to the custody of a willing and responsible mother or father, or
appropriate guardian or custodian or in their absence, the nearest relative, who
shall be responsible for the child's good behavior and appearance in court
whenever required.
No child shall be ordered detained in jail pending trial or hearing of the child's case,
subject to the provisions of this Rule. (n)
Section 26. Commitment and transfer to a youth Rehabilitation Center. - A child
charged with non-serious offense as defined in Section 4 (u) of this Rule, unless
released on bail or recognizance, may be transferred to a youth detention home
rehabilitation center or other appropriate facility such as the Department of Social
Welfare and Development which shall ensure the appearance of the child in court.
In the absence of a youth detention home established by the local government
pursuant to Section 8 of the Family Courts Acts, in the city or municipality where
the child resides or, a local rehabilitation center recognized by the government in
the province, city or municipality within the jurisdiction of the court, or the
Department of Social Welfare and Development or other appropriate local
rehabilitation center, the youth shall be placed under the care of a provincial, city
or municipality jail which shall ensure the appearance of the child in court when so
required. (a)
Section 27. Bail as a Matter of right. - All children in conflict with the law shall be
admitted to bail as a matter of right before final conviction of an offense not
punishable by reclusion perpetua life imprisonment.
Section 28. When Bail Not a Matter of Right. - No child charged with an offense
punishable by reclusion perpetuaor life imprisonment shall be admitted to bail
when evidence of guilt is strong. In this case, the court shall commit the to a youth
detention home or youth rehabilitation center, or in the absence thereof, to the
care of a provincial, city or municipal jail as provided for in Section 27 of this Rule,
which shall be responsible for the appearance of the child in court whenever
required.
Section 29. Care of Child in Youth Detention Homes or Rehabilitation Centers. - The
child in conflict with the law who has been transferred to a youth rehabilitation
center or youth detention home shall be provided with a healthy environment. If
the child is placed under the care of the provincial, city or municipal jail, the child
shall be provided with adequate quarters separate from adults and prisoners of the
opposite sex depending on the age, sex, sexual lifestyle, and such other
circumstances and needs of the child.
Section 30. Case Study Report. - After the institution of the criminal action, the
social worker assigned to the child shall immediately undertake a social case
inquiry of the child and the child's family, the child's environment and such other
matters relevant to aid the court in the proper disposition of the case. The report
shall be submitted to the court preferably before arraignment. If not available at
that time, the Report must be submitted to the court as soon as possible.
Section 31. Diversion Committee - In each court, there shall be organized a
Diversion Committee composed of its Branch Clerk of Court as chairperson; the
prosecutor, a lawyer of the Public Attorney's Office assigned to the court, and the
social worker assigned by the court to the child, as members.
Section 32. Proceedings Before Arraignment - The Diversion Committee shall
determine if the child can be diverted and referred to alternative measures or
services. Subject to pertinent provisions of this Rule and pending determination of
diversion by the Committee, the court shall release the child on recognizance to the
parents, guardian or custodian, or nearest relative; or if this is not advisable,
commit the child to an appropriate youth detention home or youth rehabilitation
center which shall be responsible for the presence of the child during the diversion
proceedings.
If the Diversion Committee determines that diversion is not proper, or when the
child or the private complainant object to the diversion, or when there is failure if
the diversion program if undertaken by the child, it shall submit a report to the
court recommending that the case be subjected to formal criminal proceedings.
The court in turn shall direct the transmittal of the records of the case to the Office
of the Clerk of Court for the assignment of a regular criminal docket number to the
case as follows: CICL Crim. Case No.___-___( year). The Office of the Clerk of Court
shall thereafter return the case to the court for arraignment and formal
proceedings.
Section 33. Proceeding Before the Diversion Committee. - Upon receipt by the
Committee of a case for diversion from the Office of the Clerk of Court, the
chairperson shall call for a conference with notice to the child, the mother or
father, or appropriate guardian or custodian, or in their absence, the nearest
relative, the child's counsel, and the private complainant and counsel to determine
if the child can be diverted to the community continuum instead of formal court
proceedings.
In determining whether diversion is appropriate for the child, the Committee shall
consider the following factors:
(a) The past records, if any, involving the child in conflict with the law;
(b) The likelihood that the child will be an obvious threat to himself/herself and the
community;
(c) Whether the child has feeling of remorse for the offense committed;
(d) If the child or the parent are indifferent or hostile; and whether this will
increase the possibility of delinquent behavior; and
(f) If community-based programs for the rehabilitation and reintegration of the
child are available.
If the Committee finds that diversion is appropriate, it shall design a diversion
program in accordance with Section 34 of this Rule for the consideration and
approval of the court.
Should the Committee determine that diversion is not appropriate, it shall make
the corresponding report and recommendation in accordance with Section 31 of
this Rule.
The Committee cannot recommend diversion in case the child or the private
complainant objects.
Section 34. Diversion programs. -The Committee shall design a diversion program
talking into consideration the individual characteristics and peculiar circumstances
of the child in conflict with the law. The program shall be for a specific and definite
period and may include any or a combination of the following:
(a) Written or oral reprimand or citation;
(b) Written or oral apology;
(c) Payment of the damage caused;
(e) Payment of the cost of the proceedings;
(f) Return of the property;
(g) Guidance and supervision orders;
(h) Counseling for the child and his family;
(i) Training, seminar and lectures on (i) anger management skills; (ii) problem-
solving and/or conflict resolution skills; (iii) values formation; and (iv) other skills
that will aid the child to properly deal with situations that can lead to a repetition
of the offense;
(j) Participation in available community-based programs;
(k) Work-detail program in the community; or
(l) Institutional care and custody.
The Committee shall also include in the program a plan that will secure satisfaction
of the civil liability of the child in accordance with Sec. 2180 of the Civil Code.
Inability to satisfy the civil the liability shall not by itself be a ground to discontinue
the diversion program of a child. On the other hand, consent to diversion by the
child or payment of civil indemnity shall not in any way be construed as admission
of guilt and used as evidence against the child in the event that the case is later on
returned to the court for arraignment and conduct of formal proceedings.
The court shall act on the recommendation within five (5) days from the
termination of the hearing.
Section 36. Undertaking. - In all cases where a child in conflict with the law is
granted diversion by the court, the child, together with the mother or father, or
appropriate guardian or custodian, or in their absence, the nearest relative, and the
child's counsel shall sign an undertaking to comply with their respective duties and
obligation under the terms and conditions of the express agreement by
complainant assisted by counsel to the diversion of the child, shall be approved by
and enforced under the supervision and control of the court. It shall contain the
following minimum principal terms and conditions:
(a) The child shall appear before the social worker assigned to the child by the
Court that approved the diversion program at least once a month for evaluation of
its effectiveness.
(b) The child shall faithfully comply with the term and conditions of the program.
Should the child fail to do so, the Committee shall report such failure to the court
which shall set a show- cause hearing with notice to the child and private
complainant. The court shall thereafter determine whether to allow the child to
continue with the diversion program, or to end the same and direct that the case
now undergo a formal proceeding.
Should the child be permitted by the court to reside in a place under the
jurisdiction of another court, control and supervision over such child shall be
transferred to the appropriate court of that place. The diversion records of the case
such as the minutes of the diversion proceedings, copy of the undertaking, the
intake and case study reports and all other pertinent documents shall be
transmitted to the court to which jurisdiction over the diverted child has been
transferred.
Section 37. Report of Social Worker. - The court social worker shall conduct regular
monthly visit to the child undergoing diversion proceedings and shall submit the
corresponding reports about the status of the diverted child to the committee. At
any time before or at the end diversion period, the committee shall file with trhe
court of the report recommending termination or extension of diveertion, as the
case may be. The report and recommendation shall be heard by the court within
fifteen (15) dyas form receipt, with notice to the members of the Committee, the
child, the mother or father, or the appropriate guardian or custodian, or in the
absensce thereof, the nearest relative, the child's councel, and the complainant
and counsel.
The court shall thereafter determine whether the diversion program has been full
and satisfactorily complied with
Section 38. Closure Order. - On the basis of the report and recommendation of the
Committee, the court may:
(a) Issue a closure order terminating the case if it is convinced that the child has
complied satisfactorily with the diversion program; or
(b) Extend the period of diversion if it is convinced that the child may still be
rehabilitated; or
(c) Order the case to undergo formal court proceedings if it finds that the child has
not complied with the diversion program, is incorrigible, or that the program is not
serving its purpose.
In case of the judicially-approved transfer of residence of the child in conflict with
the law, the court to which supervision of the diversion program was transferred
shall make the proper finding. IF it finds that diversion has been successful. It shall
order the closure of the case. However, if it determines that diversion has failed it
shall return the case to the original court for formal criminal proceedings.
Section 39. Rights of the Child in Conflict with the Law. - In all criminal proceedings,
the child in conflict with the law shall have the following rights which shall be
respected and protected by the court:
(a) To be presumed innocent until guilt is proved beyond reasonable doubt;
(b) To be informed promptly and directly of the nature and cause of the charge and
if appropriate, through the child's mother, father, legal guardian, or appropriate
custodian;
(c) To be present at every stage of the proceedings, from arraignment to
promulgation of judgement. The child may, however, waive presence at the rial
pursuant to the stipulations set forth in the bail bond, unless presence at the trial is
specifically ordered by the court for purposes of identification. The absence of the
child without justifiable cause at the trial of which there was due notice shall be
considered a waiver of the right of the child to be present. Escape by the child
under custody shall be deemed a waiver of the right to be present in all subsequent
hearings until custody over such child is gained;
(d) To have legal and other appropriate assistance in the preparation and
presentation of the child's defense; in case of a child arrested for reasons related to
armed conflict, to have immediate free legal assistance;
(e) If detained, to be released (I) on recognizance to the willing and responsible
mother or father or appropriate guardian or custodian, or in the absence thereof,
the nearest relative; (ii) on bail; or (iii) by commitment to a youth detention home
or youth rehabilitation center, 1avvphi1
(f) Not to be detained in a jail or transferred to an adult facility pending trial or
hearing of the case, unless detention is used as a last resort which must be done for
the shortest time possible, and only upon order by the court;
(g) In the case the child has been arrested for reasons related to armed conflict,
either as combatant, courier, guide or spy:
(i) To be segregated and have separate detention quarters from adults except
where families ate accommodated as family un its;
(ii) To immediate free legal assistance in the absence of private counsel;
(iii) To immediate notice of such arrest to the parents, guardians or custodians or
nearest relatives of the child; and;
(iv) To be released on recognizance within twenty-four (24) hours to the custody of
the Department of Social Welfare and Development or any responsible member of
the community as determined by the court.
(h) To testify as a witness in his/her own behalf; and subject to cross-examination
only on matters covered by direct examination. The child shall not be compelled to
be a witness against himself/herself and the child's silence shall not in any manner
prejudice him/her;
(i) To confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him/her;
(j) To have compulsory process issued to secure the attendance of witnesses and
production of other evidence in the child's behalf
(k) To have speedy and imparial trial, with legal or other appropriate assistance and
preferable in the presence of the child's parents or legal guardian or custodian,
unless such presence is considred not to be in the best interest of the child taking
into account the latter's age or other peculiar circumstances;
(l) To be accorded all the rights un der the Rule on Examination of a Child Witness;
(m) To have the child's privacy fully protected in all stages of the proceedings; and
(n) To appeal in all cases allowed and in the manner prescribed by law.
Section 40. Rights if Victims of Offences Committed by Children in Conflict with the
Law. - In any case involving a child in conflict with the law, the victim has the
following rights:
(1) To be reasonably protected from the child in conflict with the law;
(2) To timely notice of any public proceedings, or any parole proceedings involving
the crime or of any release or escape of the child in conflict with the law;
(3) Not to be excluded from any public proceeding, unless the court, after receiving
any clear and convincing evidence, determines that the testimony by the victim
would be materially altered if the victim heard other testimony in that proceeding.
(4) To be reasonably heard at any administrative or public proceeding involving
diversion, release, plea, suspension of sentence and determination of disposition
measures, or any parole proceeding;
(5) To confer with the prosecutor in the case;
(6) To avail of legal assistance from the Public Attorney's Office, Integrated Bar of
the Philippines. any other legal aid office or any law practitioner.1avvphi1
(7) To be informed of the availability of compensation from the Department of
Justice Board of Claims in accordance with the provisions of Rep Act. No.7309.
(8) To be entitled to support services from the Department of Social Welfare and
Development and local government units;
(9) To be entitled to all legal remedies and support as provided for under the
Family Code;
(10) To be informed of the rights and the services available to victims of offenses
including the right to apply for a protection order;
(11) To full and timely restitution as provided in law;
(12) To proceedings that are free from unreasonable delay; and
(13) To be treated with fairness and with respect for the victim's dignity and
privacy.
Section 41. Responsibilities of the Court. - For the protection of the rights of the
child in the conflict with the law, the court shall have the following responsibilities:
(1) To monitor the status of a child whose case is pending in its court placed in a
youth detention center or other institution during the pendency of the child's case;
(2) To receive and investigate complaints concerning violations of the rights of the
child whose case is pending on its court;
(3) To require all professionals working for the welfare of the child, such as
barangay captains, teachers, social workers, medical professionals, and law
enforcers, to render regular monthly reports to the court.
(4) To order access to adequate services for rehabilitation, counseling and other
forms of reintegration for the child;
(5) To ensure that the child who is capable of forming his or her own views has the
right to express those views freely in all matters affecting the child, and that such
views be accorded due weight in accordance with the developmental age and
maturity of the child;
(6) To ensure that the child, either directly or through a representative , is provided
the opportunity to be heard in all proceedings affecting such child;
(7) To ensure communication at all times between the judge and the child;
(8) To ensure that the child sits with close family members of the child's choice
during the court proceedings;
(9) To ensure that the child can communicate freely with counsel at all times;
(10) To ensure that the child is informed in age-appropriate language of all stages
of the judicial proceeding affecting such child;
(11) To ensure that a child placed in a Youth Detention Home or Youth
Rehabilitation Center or in any child facility be given appropriate medical
examination in order to determine and put on record any evidence of ill-treatment;
to identify any physical or mental condition requiring medical attention; and
thereafter make sure that child is provided by adequate treatment and medical
attention;
(12) To insure that a child is informed as soon as possible of the death, serious
illness or injury of any immediate family member and be allowed to visit the ill
family member or attend the funeral, when appropriate and advisable;
(13) To ensure if a child dies during the pendency of the case or within six (6)
months of release, an independent inquiry is conducted on the circumstances of
the death and a report thereof, including the child's death certificate, be made
available to the child's mother or father , guardian, custodian or nearest relative;
(14) When appropriate and advisable, to allow the child temporarily leave the
detention home or rehabilitation center by means of an "out-on-pass" order to
attend special family occasions such as Christmas and New Year celebrations. The
"out-on-pass" order shall contain reasonable restrictions to ensure safety, security
and timely return to detention as may be determined by the court;
(15) To allow at all times, and from the moment of initial contact, any member of
the family or the guardian of the child to visit the child, unless prejudicial to the
latter's best interest;
(16) To allow the appointment of a Guardian Ad Litem if available and advisable, to
enable the child to raise concerns and complaints without fear or retribution; and
(17) To undertake all other appropriate measures to ensure the promotion of the
best interest of the child and the child's eventual reintegration in society.
Section 42. Determination of the Bests Interests of the Child. - The following factors
may be considered in determining the best interests of a child in conflict with the
law: the child's age and sex, the child's mental and physical health, the mental and
physical health of the parents, their lifestyle and other social factors; the emotional
ties between the parents and the child, the ability of the parents to provide the
child with food, shelter, clothing and medical care; the established living pattern for
the child concerning school, home, community and religious institution, quality of
schooling, the existence of other relatives who may be in a better position to be
with the child and the child's relationship with these relatives; the child's
background, maturity and level of understanding, sexual lifestyle and any other
characteristics and needs of the child that the court may deem relevant.
Section 43. Arraignment and Plea. - The provisions of Rules 116 and 117 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure shall apply to the arraignment of the child in
the conflict with the law. The arraignment shall be scheduled within three (3) days
from the date of receipt of the complaint or information by the court, unless a
shorter period is provided for by law.
In case the child is not assisted by a private counsel, the court shall immediately
appoint its Public Attorney as the child's counsel de oficio.
Arraignment shall be held in chambers and conducted by the judge by furnishing
the child and counsel a copy of the complaint or information, reading the same in a
language or dialect known to and understand by the child, explaining the nature
and consequences of a plea of guilty or not guilty and asking the child's plea.
Section 44. Pre-trial. - The provisions of Rule 118 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure shall govern the pre-trial of the child in conflict with the law.
Agreements or admissions made during the pre-trial conference shall be in writing
and signed by the child, the mother, the father or duly appointed guardian, and
counsel; otherwise, the agreements or admissions shall not be admissible against
the child.
Whenever possible and practicable, the court shall explore all possibilities of
settlement of the case, except its criminal aspects. Plea bargaining shall be resorted
to only as a last measure when it shall serve the best interest of the child and the
demands of truth and restorative justice.
Section 45. Trial. - All hearings shall be conducted in am manner conductive to the
best interest of the child and in an environment that will allow the child to
participate fully and freely in accordance with the Rule on Examination of a Child
Witness.
Section 46. Guiding Principles in Judging the Child. - Subject to the provisions of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, and other special laws, the judgment against a
child in conflict with the law shall be guided by the following principles:
(1) The judgment shall be in proportion to the gravity of the offense, and shall
consider the circumstances and the best interest of the child, the rights of the
victim, and the needs of society in line with the demands of balanced and
restorative justice.
(2) Restrictions on the personal liberty of the child shall be limited to the minimum.
Where discretion is given by the law to the judge whether the penalty to be
imposed is fine or imprisonment, the imposition of fine should be proffered as the
more appropriate penalty.
(3) No corporal punishment shall be imposed.
(4) In case of the presence of any exculpatory evidence or doubt in the
prosecution's evidence, the doubt shall be resolved In favor of the child.
Section 47. Promulgation of Sentence. - If. After the trial, the court should find the
child in conflict with the law guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense
charged, it shall impose the proper penalty, including any civil liability which the
child may have incurred, and promulgate the sentence in accordance with Section
6, Rule 120 of the Revised Rules if Criminal Procedure.
Section 48. Automatic Suspension of Sentence and Disposition Orders. - If the child
is found guilty of the offense charged, the court, instead of executing the
judgments of conviction, shall palce the child in conflict with the law under
suspended sentence, without need of application. Suspension of sentence can be
availed of even if the child is already eighteen years (18) of age or more but not
above twenty-one (21) years old, at the time of the pronouncement of guilt,
without prejudice to the child's availing of other benefits such as probation, if
qualified, or adjustment of penalty, in interest of justice.
The benefits of the suspended sentence shall not apply to a child in conflict with
the law who has once enjoyed suspension of sentence, but shall nonetheless apply
to one who is convicted of an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment pursuant to the provisions of Rep. Act No. 9346 prohibiting the
imposition of the death penalty and in lieu thereof, reclusion perpetua, and after
application of the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority.
If the child in conflict with the law reaches eighteen (18) years of age while under
suspended sentence, the court shall determine whether to discharge the child in
accordance with the provisions of Republic Act 9344, or to extend the suspended
sentence for a maximum period of up to the time the child reaches twenty-one (21)
years of age, or to order service of sentence.
Section 49. Disposition Conference. -In case of suspended sentence, the court shall
set the case for disposition conference within fifteen (15) days from the
promulgation of sentence with notice to the social worker of the court, the child
and the parents or guardian ad litem of the child and the child's counsel , the victim
and counsel. At the conference, the court shall proceed to determine and issue any
or a combination of the following disposition measures best suited to the
rehabilitation and welfare of the child:
(1) Care, guidance, and supervision of orders;
(2) Community service orders;
(3) Drug and alcohol treatment
(4) Participation in group counseling and similar activities; and
(5) Commitment to the Youth Rehabilitation Center of the Department of Social
Welfare and Development or other centers for children in conflict with the law
authorized by the Secretary of the Department of Social Welfare and Development.
Section 50. Compliance with the Disposition Measures. - The social worker assigned
to the child shall monitor the compliance by the child in conflict with the law with
the disposition measures and shall submit regularly to the court a status and
progress report on the matter. The court may set a conference for the evaluation
of such report in the presence, if practicable, of the child, the parents or guardian,
counsel and other persons whose presence may be deemed necessary.
Section 51. Discharge of Child Subject of Disposition Measure. - Upon the
recommendation of the social worker assigned to the child, the court shall, after
due notice to all parties and hearing, dismiss the case against the child who has
been issued disposition measures, even before reaching eighteen(18) years of age,
and order a final discharge if it finds that the child has been rehabilitated and has
shown the capability to be a useful member of the community.
If the court finds that the child (a) is incorrigible; or (b) has not shown the capability
of becoming a useful member of society; or (c) has willfully failed to comply with
the conditions of the disposition or rehabilitation program; (d) or the child's
continued stay in the training institution is not in the child's best interest, the child
shall be brought before the court for execution of the judgment.
The final release of the child shall not extinguish the civil liability. The parents and
other persons exercising parental authority over the child shall be civilly liable for
the injuries and damages caused by the acts or omissions of the child living in their
company and under the parental authority subject to the appropriate defenses
provided by law.
Section 52. Probation as an Alternative to Imprisonment. - The court may, after it
shall have convicted and sentenced a child in conflict with the law and upon
application at any time, place the child on probation if qualified, in lieu of service of
sentence taking into account the best interest of the child.
Section 53. Credit in Service of Sentence. - The child in conflict with the law who has
undergone preventive imprisonment shall be credited in the service of the
sentence consisting of deprivation of liberty, with the full time during which the
child has undergone preventive imprisonment, if the child agrees voluntarily in
writing to abide by the same or similar disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted
prisoners, except in any of the following cases:
(1) When the child is a recidivist or has been convicted twice or more times of any
crime; or
(2) When upon being summoned for execution of sentence, the child failed to
surrender voluntarily.
A child who does not agree to the same disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted
prisoners shall be credited in the service of the sentence with four-fifths of the time
during which the child has undergone preventive imprisonment.
Whenever the child has undergone preventive imprisonment for a period equal to
or more than the possible maximum imprisonment of the offense charged to which
the child may be sentenced and the case is not yet terminated, the child shall be
released immediately without prejudice to the continuation of any on-going
intervention program, and the trial thereof or the proceeding on appeal, if the
same is under review. In case the maximum penalty to which the child may be
sentenced is destierro, the child shall be released after thirty (30) days of
preventive imprisonment.
Any form of physical restraint imposed on the child in conflict with the law,
including community service and commitment to a rehabilitation center, shall be
considered preventive imprisonment.
Section 54. Confidentiality of Proceedings and Record. - All proceedings and records
involving children in conflict with the law from initial contact until final disposition
of the case by the court shall be considered privileged and confidential. The public
may be excluded from the proceedings and pursuant to the provisions of Section
31 of the Rule on Examination of a Child Witness, the records shall not be disclosed
directly or indirectly to anyone by any of the parties or the participants in the
proceeding for any purpose whatsoever, except to determine if the child may have
the sentence suspended under Section 38 of this Rule or if the child may be granted
probation under the Probation Law, or to enforce the civil liability imposed in the
criminal action.
The court shall employ other measures to protect confidentiality of proceedings
including non-disclosure of records to the media, the maintenance of a separate
police blotter for cases involving children in conflict with the law and the adoption
of a system of coding to conceal material information, which lead to the child's
identity. The records of children in conflict with the law shall not be used in
subsequent proceedings or cases involving the same offender as an adult.
Section 55. Non-liability for Perjury or Concealment or Misrepresentation. - Any
person who has been in conflict with the law as a child shall not be held guilty of
perjury or of concealment or misrepresentation by reason of failure to
acknowledge the case or recite any fact related thereto in response to any inquiry.
Section 56. Sealing of Records. - The court, motu proprio or on application of a
person who has been adjudge a child in conflict with the law, or if still a minor, on
motion of the parents or legal guardian, shall, upon notice to the prosecution and
after hearing, order the sealing of the records of the case if it finds that two (2)
years have elapsed since the final discharged of the child after suspension of
sentence or probation, or from the date of the closure order and the child has no
pending case of an offense or a crime involving moral turpitude.
Upon entry of the order, the case shall be treated as if it never occurred. All index
references shall be deleted and in case of inquiry, the court, prosecution, law
enforcement officers and all other offices and agencies that dealt with the case
shall reply that no record exist with respect to the child concerned. Copies of the
order shall be sent to these officials and agencies named in the order. Inspection of
the sealed records thereafter may be permitted only by order of the court upon
petition of the child who is the subject of the records or of other proper parties.
This procedure shall be without prejudice to the rule on destruction of video or
audio tapes under Section 31 of the Rule on the Examination of Child Witness.
Section 57. Prohibition of Labeling. - In the conduct of proceedings from initial
contact with the child in conflict with the law to the final disposition of the case,
there shall be no branding or labeling of the child as a young criminal, juvenile
delinquent, prostitute, vagrant, or attaching to the child in any manner any
derogatory description or name. Likewise, no discriminatory statements, conduct
and practices shall be allowed, particularly with respect to the child's social or
economic status, physical or mental disability or ethnic origin.
Section 58. Contempt Powers. - A person who directly or indirectly disobeys any
order of the court or obstruct or interferes with its proceedings or the enforcement
of its orders issued under this Rule shall be liable for contempt of court.
Section 59. Effectivity. - This Rule as revised shall take effect on December 1, 2009
after its publication in two (2) newspapers of general circulation not later than
November 27, 2009.

Guevarra vs. Almodovar
Facts: The Petitioner John Philip Guevarra, petitioned the court for a special civil
action for certiorari against the Hon. Judge Ignacio Almodovar of the city court of
Legaspi. The petitioner, then 11 years old was target shooting with his best friend
Teodoro Amine, Jr. and three other children in the backyard in the morning of
29October1984. Unfortunately, Teodoro was hit by a pellet on the left collar bone,
w/c then caused his death.
Issue: Can an 11- year old boy be charged w/ the crime of homicide thru reckless
imprudence?
HELD:- Intent and discernment are two different concepts. Intent means: a
determination to do certain things; an aim; the purpose of the mind, including such
knowledge as is essential to such intent. Discernment means: the mental capacity
to understand the difference between right and wrong
- While they (intent and discernment) are products of mental processes w/in a
person; intent refers to the desired of ones act (active) while discernment refers to
the moral significance that a person ascribes to an act (passive)
- Minors 9yrs to 15yrs are presumed to be without criminal capacity; but this
presumption may be rebutted if it could be proven that they were capable of
appreciating the nature and criminality of the act, that is, that (they) acted w/
discernment
- Discernment is embraced w/in the concept of intelligence w/c is one of the
elements of a culpable felony, thus it is important that a minor 9yrs to below 15 yrs
of age to have acted w/ discernment to show that he acted w/ intelligence thus
being liable for the offense under Art 365 of the R.PC
PETITION DISMISSED FOR LACK OF MERIT AND THE TRO EFFECTIVE
17SEPTEMBER1986 IS LIFTED. LET IT BE REMANDED TO THE LOWER COURT FOR
TRIAL ON THE MERITS. NO COSTS.

People vs. Doquena
Facts: Between 1-2 pm of Nov. 19, 1938, Juan Ragojos and Epifanio Rarang were
playing volleyball in the yard of their school in Sual, Pangasinan. Valentin Doquena,
the accused, intercepted the ball, and threw it a Ragojos, who was hit in the
stomach. Miffed, Ragojos chased Doquena, and upon catching him, slapped
Doquena on the nape, and punched him in the face. After doing this, Ragojos went
back to Rarang to resume playing volleyball. Insulted, Doquena looked for
something to throw at Ragojos, finding none, he got his cousin's (Romualdo Cocal)
knife, and confronted Ragojos. Ragojo's denied Doquena's request for a fight and
resumed playing. Doquena stabbed the unaware Ragojos in the chest, thereby
killing the latter. The court held that in committing the act, the accused acted with
discernment and was conscious of the nature and consequences of his acts,
therefore his defense that he was a minor was untenable (given that the Doquena
was a 7th grade pupil, one of the brightest in his class, and was an officer in the
CAT program), and thus convicted him of the crime of homicide. The court ordered
him to be sent to the Training School for Boys until he reaches the age of majority.
Thus, the appeal by the accused, stating that to determine whether or not there
was discernment on the part of the minor, the following must be taken into
consideration:
1. The facts and circumstances which gave rise to the act committed.
2. The state of mind at the time the crime was committed
3. The time he had at his disposal
4. The degree of reasoning of the minor
Issue: WON the accused acted with discernment
Held: Decision affirmed. Yes, the accused acted with discernment. Accused
mistakes the discernment for premeditation, or at least for lack of intention, as a
mitigating circumstance. However, the DISCERNMENT that constitutes an
exception to the exemption from criminal liability of a minor under 15 years but
over nine, who commits an act prohibited by law, is his MENTAL CAPACITY to
understand the difference between right and wrong, and such capacity may be
known and should be determined by taking into consideration all the facts and
circumstances afforded by the records in each case, the very appearance, the very
attitude, the very comportment and behavior of said minor, not only before and
during the commission of the act, but also after and even during the trial.

People vs. Arpon
Facts: On December 29, 1999, the accused-appellant was charge with eight (8)
counts of rape in separate informations.
The prosecution presented the lone testimony of AAA to prove the charges against
the accused-appellant. AAA testified that she was born on November 1, 1987. In
one afternoon when she was only eight years old, she stated that the accused-
appellant raped her inside their house. AAA also testified that the accused-
appellant raped her again in July 1999 for five times on different nights.

Upon the other hand, the defense called the accused-appellant to the witness
stand to deny the informations filed against him and to refute the testimony of
AAA. He testified that when the first incident of rape allegedly happened in 1995,
he was only 13 years old as he was born on February 23, 1982. In 1995, he worked
in Sagkahan, Tacloban City as a houseboy for a certain Gloria Salazar and he stayed
there up to 1996. He further recounted that in July 1999, he was also living
in Tacloban City and worked there as a dishwasher at a restaurant. He worked
there from 1998 up to September 1999. The accused-appellant likewise stated that
in August 1999, he was still working at the same restaurant in Tacloban City. He
denied that he would have drinking sprees with AAAs stepfather, BBB, because
they were enemies.
On September 9, 2002, the RTC rendered a Decision convicting the accused-
appellant.The accused-appellant filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the RTC
Decision, asserting that the trial court failed to consider his minority as a privileged
mitigating circumstance.The cases were elevated to the Court of Appeals on
automatic review and was affirmed.
Issue: WON the RTC and the Court of Appeals should have appreciated the
accused-appellants minority in ascertaining the appropriate penalty.
Held: YES. Although the acts of rape in this case were committed before Republic
Act No. 9344 took effect on May 20, 2006, the said law is still applicable given that
Section 68 provides for such.
Thus, in the matter of assigning criminal responsibility, Section 6 of Republic Act
No. 9344 is explicit in providing that:
SEC. 6. Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility. A child fifteen (15) years of age
or under at the time of the commission of the offense shall be exempt from
criminal liability. However, the child shall be subjected to an intervention program
pursuant to Section 20 of the Act.
A child above fifteen (15) years but below eighteen (18) years of age shall likewise
be exempt from criminal liability and be subjected to an intervention program,
unless he/she has acted with discernment, in which case, such child shall be
subjected to the appropriate proceedings in accordance with this Act.
The exemption from criminal liability herein established does not include
exemption from civil liability, which shall be enforced in accordance with existing
laws. (Emphases ours.)
Accordingly, for the first count of rape, which in the information in Criminal Case
No. 2000-01-46 was allegedly committed in 1995, the testimony of the accused-
appellant sufficiently established that he was only 13 years old at that time. Any
doubt therein should be resolved in favor of the accused, it being more beneficial
to the latter. The Court, thus, exempts the accused-appellant from criminal
liability for the first count of rape pursuant to the first paragraph of Section 6 of
Republic Act No. 9344. The accused-appellant, nevertheless, remains civilly liable
therefor.
For the second and third counts of rape that were committed in the year 1999, the
accused-appellant was already 17 years old. We likewise find that in the said
instances, the accused-appellant acted with discernment. In this case, the fact that
the accused-appellant acted with discernment was satisfactorily established by the
testimony of AAA, which we had already found to be credible.
Had the trial court correctly appreciated in favor of the accused-appellant the
circumstance of his minority, the latter would have been entitled to a suspension of
sentence for the second and third counts of rape under Section 38 of Republic Act
No. 9344.
Be that as it may, the suspension of sentence may no longer be applied in the
instant case given that the accused-appellant is now about 29 years of age and
Section 40 of Republic Act No. 9344 puts a limit to the application of a suspended
sentence, namely, when the child reaches a maximum age of 21.
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision of
the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS: For the first count of rape
herein established, the accused-appellant Henry Arpon y Juntilla is
hereby EXEMPTED from criminal liability.
For the second and third counts of rape, the accused-appellant is
found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of QUALIFIED RAPE and
is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count.The
case is hereby REMANDED to the court of origin for its appropriate action in
accordance with Section 51 of RepublicAct No. 9344.

Madali vs. People
Facts: Petitioners inflicted physical injuries to the victim which caused the latters
death. At the time of the crime, Raymund and Rodel were minors 14 years old
and 16 years old respectively. The lower court found them guilty of homicide.
Petitioners elevated the case to the CA and during the pendency of the appeal, RA
9344 took effect.
ISSUE: Whether petitioners should be exempted from criminal liability.
HELD: Yes. At the time of the commission of the crime, petitioners were minors. By
provisions of RA 9344, they are exempted from liability but not from criminal
liability. Their exemption however differs. In the case of Raymund, the case is
dismissed as to him since he was below 15 years old. He is to be released and
custody is given to the parents by virtue of RA 9344 Secs. 6 and 20 setting the
minimum age of criminal responsibility and who will have custody respectively. In
the case of Rodel, who was 16 years old at that time, It is necessary to determine
whether he acted with discernment or not. Sec 6 provides that children above 15
but below 18 will be exempt from criminal liability unless he acted with
discernment. He, however, should be subjected to an intervention program. Sec 38
provides for the automatic suspension of sentence.

Jose vs. People
Facts: On November 14, 1995, P/Supt Joseph Castro received an information from
an unnamed informant that a big time group of drug pushers from Greenhills will
deliver 100 grams of shabu at Chowking. Acting on such report, SPO1 Bonifacio
Gueverra was assigned to act as a poseur buyer.
They positioned their cars at the parking area where they had a
commanding view of people going in and out. In the afternoon a Toyota Corolla
arrived, Sonny Zarraga was the driver with Alvin Jose. The unnamed informant
approached and talked to Sonny Zarraga. Then, the informant called SPO1
Bonifacio Guevarra and informed the latter that Sonny Zarraga had with him 100
grams of shabu. SPO1 Guevarra offered to buy the shabu. Sonny Zarraga asked
SPO1 Bonifacio Guevarra if he had the money. Guevarra said yes. He showed the
aforecited bundle of "money bills." Sonny Zarraga then asked Alvin Jose to bring
out the shabu and handover to Guevarra. SPO1 Guevarra, in turn, handed the
bundle of "money bills. Then the other police approached and introduced
themselves as Narcom Operatives. They arrested Sonny Zarraga and Alvin Jose.
The RTC finds both the accused Sonny Zarraga and Alvin Jose guilty beyond
reasonable doubt, for violation of R.A. 6425.
On appeal to the CA, the CA rendered judgment affirming the decision
appealed from with modification. The appellate court reduced the penalty imposed
on appellant Alvin Jose, on its finding that he was only thirteen (13) years old when
he committed the crime.
Appellant Jose, now the petitioner, filed his petition for review on
certiorari, alleging that under paragraph 3, Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code, a
minor over nine (9) and under fifteen (15) years of age at the time of the
commission of the crime is exempt from criminal liability.
Issue: Whether or not Alvin Jose can be exempt from criminal liability under the
mitigating circumstances of minority.
Ruling: Yes. Under Article 12(3) of the Revised Penal Code, a minor over nine years
of age and under fifteen is exempt from criminal liability if charged with a felony.
The law applies even if such minor is charged with a crime defined and penalized by
a special penal law. In such case, it is the burden of the minor to prove his age in
order for him to be exempt from criminal liability. The reason for the exemption is
that a minor of such age is presumed lacking the mental element of a crime.
In the present case, the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable
doubt that the petitioner, who was thirteen (13) years of age when the crime
charged was committed, acted with discernment relative to the sale of shabu to
the poseur-buyer.
Aside from bringing out and handing over the plastic bag to accused
Zarraga, the petitioner merely sat inside the car and had no other participation
whatsoever in the transaction between the accused Zarraga and the poseur-buyer.
There is no evidence that the petitioner knew what was inside the plastic and soft
white paper before and at the time he handed over the same to his cousin. Indeed,
the poseur-buyer did not bother to ask the petitioner his age because he knew that
pushers used young boys in their transactions for illegal drugs.

Llave vs. People
Facts: On Sept. 24, 2002, on an errand from her mother, the victim, who was only 7
years old at that time, proceeded to their house, where the accused waited for her,
and accosted her; he proceeded to sexually abuse her, while the victim cried for
help.
A barbecue vendor nearby heard her cries and came to the scene; the accused fled,
and the vendor told the victim to tell her parents what happened.
Together with her parents, the victim went to the police and reported the incident;
the vendor also testified to what he saw during that time.
The medical examiner found no injury on the hymen and perineum, but found
scanty yellowish discharge between the labia minora; there was also fresh abrasion
of the perennial skin at 1 oclock position near the anal opening.
The trial court found the victim guilty, declaring that he acted with discernment,
but crediting him with the special mitigating circumstance of minority.
Issue: W/N accused had carnal knowledge of the victim, and if yes, whether he
acted with discernment, being a minor of age more than 9 years old but less than
15?
Decision: YES. Penetration, no matter how slight, or the mere introduction of the
male organ into the labia of the pudendum, constitutes carnal knowledge. Hence,
even if the penetration is only slight, the fact that the private complainant felt
pains, points to the conclusion that the rape was consummated.
While it is true that medical examiner did not find any abrasion or laceration in the
private complainants genitalia, such fact does not negate the latters testimony the
petitioner had carnal knowledge of her. The absence of abrasions and lacerations
does not disprove sexual abuses, especially when the victim is a young girl as in this
case.
The court have held that when the offended party is young and immature, from the
age of thirteen to sixteen, courts are inclined to give credence to their account of
what transpired, considering not only their relative vulnerability but also the shame
and embarrassment to which they would be exposed if the matter to which they
testified is not true.
Discernment is the mental capacity to understand the difference between right and
wrong.
The accused, with methodical fashion, dragged the resisting victim behind the pile
of hollow blocks near the vacant house to insure that passers-by would not be able
to discover his dastardly acts.

PD 1866 as amended by RA 8294: Decree Codifying the Laws on Illegal/Unlawful
Possession, Manufacture, Dealing in, Acquisition or Disposition, of Firearms,
Ammunition or Explosives
RA 8294: SECTION 1. Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1866, as amended, is
hereby further amended to read as follows:
"SECTION 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or Possession
of Firearms or Ammunition or Instruments Used or Intended to be Used in the
Manufacture of Firearms or Ammunition. The penalty of prision correccional in
its maximum period and a fine of not less than Fifteen thousand pesos (P15,000)
shall be imposed upon any person who shall unlawfully manufacture, deal in,
acquire, dispose, or possess any low powered firearm, such as rimfire handgun,
.380 or .32 and other firearm of similar firepower, part of firearm, ammunition, or
machinery, tool or instrument used or intended to be used in the manufacture of
any firearm or ammunition: Provided, That no other crime was committed.
"The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period and a fine of Thirty thousand
pesos (P30,000) shall be imposed if the firearm is classified as high powered
firearm which includes those with bores bigger in diameter than .38 caliber and 9
millimeter such as caliber .40, .41, .44, .45 and also lesser calibered firearms but
considered powerful such as caliber .357 and caliber .22 center-fire magnum and
other firearms with firing capability of full automatic and by burst of two or three:
Provided, however, That no other crime was committed by the person arrested.
"If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such
use of an unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance.
"If the violation of this Section is in furtherance of or incident to, or in connection
with the crime of rebellion or insurrection, sedition, or attempted coup d'tat, such
violation shall be absorbed as an element of the crime of rebellion, or insurrection,
sedition, or attempted coup d'tat.
"The same penalty shall be imposed upon the owner, president, manager, director
or other responsible officer of any public or private firm, company, corporation or
entity, who shall willfully or knowingly allow any of the firearms owned by such
firm, company, corporation or entity to be used by any person or persons found
guilty of violating the provisions of the preceding paragraphs or willfully or
knowingly allow any of them to use unlicensed firearms or firearms without any
legal authority to be carried outside of their residence in the course of their
employment.
"The penalty of arresto mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall carry
any licensed firearm outside his residence without legal authority therefor."

People vs. Ladjaalam
FACTS: Four Informations were filed against appellant Walpan Ladjaalam in the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Zamboanga City (Branch 16), three of which he was
found guilty, to wit: 1) maintaining a drug den in violation of Section 15-A, Article
III, of Republic Act No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972); 2) illegal possession of
firearm and ammunition in violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866 as amended
by Republic Act. No. 8294; and 3) direct assault with multiple attempted
homicide. The following information was provided by the prosecution:
1) In the afternoon of September 24, 1997, more than thirty (30) policemen
proceeded to the house of appellant and his wife to serve the search warrant
when they were met by a volley of gunfire coming from the second floor of the
said house. They saw that it was the appellant who fired the M14 rifle towards
them.
2) After gaining entrance, two of the police officers proceeded to the second
floor where they earlier saw appellant firing the rifle. As he noticed their
presence, the appellant jumped from the window to the roof of a neighboring
house. He was subsequently arrested at the back of his house after a brief
chase.
3) Several firearms and ammunitions were recovered from appellants house.
Also found was a pencil case with fifty (50) folded aluminum foils inside, each
containing methamphetamine hydrochloride.
4) A paraffin test was conducted and the casts taken both hands of the
appellant yielded positive for gunpowder nitrates.
5) Records show that appellant had not filed any application for license to
possess firearm and ammunition, nor has he been given authority to carry
firearms.
ISSUE: Whether or not such use of an unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an
aggravating circumstance.
HELD: No. Section 1 of RA 8294 substantially provides that any person who shall
unlawfully possess any firearm or ammunition shall be penalized, unless no other
crime was committed. Furthermore, if homicide or murder is committed with the
use of an unlicensed firearm, such use of an unlicensed firearm shall be considered
as an aggravating circumstance. Since the crime committed was direct assault and
not homicide or murder, illegal possession of firearms cannot be deemed an
aggravating circumstance.

People vs. Castillo
Facts: With the passage of Republic Act No. 8294 on June 6, 1997, the use of an
unlicensed firearm in murder or homicide is now considered, not as a separate
crime, but merely a special aggravating circumstance.
In the case at bar, appellant JULIAN CASTILLO y LUMAYRO was charged
with Murder and Illegal Possession of Firearms in two (2) separate Informations.
The scene of the crime was the then on-going construction site of Gaisano Building
in Lapaz, Iloilo City. ROBERTO LUSTICA, a construction worker, was on the last rung
of the stairs on the third floor of the Gaisano building when he saw his co-
worker ROGELIO ABAWAG being closely pursued by accused JULIAN CASTILLO, a
lead man in the same construction site. During the chase, the accused pointed a
gun at Abawag and shot him. Abawag, then about a half meter away from the
accused, fell on his knees beside a pile of hollow blocks.
Abawag was then leaning on a pile of hollow blocks, pleading for mercy. The
accused shot Abawag a third time despite the latter's imploration. The accused
then fled, leaving Abawag lifeless.
The management of Gaisano reported the shooting incident to the police
authorities who immediately rushed to the scene of the crime. JUN LIM,
alias "Akoy," brother-in-law of the victim and also a construction worker at the
Gaisano, volunteered to go with the police and assist them in locating the accused.
The police found the accused in possession of a .38 caliber handmade revolver,
three (3) empty shells and three (3) live ammunitions. Further inquiry revealed that
the accused owned the gun but had no license to possess it. The police then took
the accused into custody and charged him for the murder of Abawag and for illegal
possession of firearm.
He was convicted of Homicide, as the prosecution failed to prove the alleged
qualifying circumstances of evident premeditation and treachery, and of Illegal
Possession of Firearm, aggravated by homicide.
On automatic review by this Court, appellant impugns solely his conviction for
illegal possession of firearm for which he was sentenced to the supreme penalty of
death.
Issue: WON the use of a illegal firearm in homicide is a special aggravating
circumstance
Held: YES. P.D. 1866, which codified the laws on illegal possession of firearms, was
amended on June 6, 1997 by Republic Act 8294. Aside from lowering the penalty
for said crime, R.A. 8294 also provided that if homicide or murder is committed
with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such use shall be considered as a special
aggravating circumstance. This amendment has two (2) implications: first, the use
of an unlicensed firearm in the commission of homicide or murder shall not be
treated as a separate offense, but merely as a special aggravating circumstance;
second, as only a single crime (homicide or murder with the aggravating
circumstance of illegal possession of firearm) is committed under the law, only one
penalty shall be imposed on the accused.
Prescinding therefrom, and considering that the provisions of the amendatory law
are favorable to herein appellant, the new law should be retroactively applied in
the case at bar. It was thus error for the trial court to convict the appellant of two
(2) separate offenses, i.e., Homicide and Illegal Possession of Firearms, and punish
him separately for each crime. Based on the facts of the case, the crime for which
the appellant may be charged is homicide, aggravated by illegal possession of
firearm, the correct denomination for the crime, and not illegal possession of
firearm, aggravated by homicide as ruled by the trial court, as it is the former
offense which aggravates the crime of homicide under the amendatory law.
Two (2) requisites are necessary to establish illegal possession of firearms: first, the
existence of the subject firearm, and second, the fact that the accused who owned
or possessed the gun did not have the corresponding license or permit to carry it
outside his residence. The onus probandi of establishing these elements as alleged
in the Information lies with the prosecution.
The first element -- the existence of the firearm -- was indubitably established by
the prosecution. Prosecution eyewitness Acaso saw appellant shoot the victim
thrice with a .38 caliber revolver.. However, no proof was adduced by the
prosecution to establish the second element of the crime, i.e., that the appellant
was not licensed to possess the firearm. This negative fact constitutes an essential
element of the crime as mere possession, by itself, is not an offense. The lack of a
license or permit should have been proved either by the testimony or certification
of a representative of the PNP Firearms and Explosives Unit that the accused was
not a licensee of the subject firearm or that the type of firearm involved can be
lawfully possessed only by certain military personnel. IN VIEW OF THE
FOREGOING, the assailed Decision is MODIFIED. Appellant Julian Castillo y Lumayro
is found guilty of Homicide.

Sison vs. People
Facts: On April 21, 2003, two (2) separate Informations were filed with the RTC
against petitioner for Kidnapping with Rape and violation of P.D. 1866, as amended
by R.A. 8294 (Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunitions). Petitioner pleaded
not guilty to both charges.
The RTC found AAA's testimony, narrating how petitioner raped her, to be candid
and straightforward, thus reflective of her honesty and credibility. It found nothing
on record that would show that AAA was actuated by ill motive in filing the charges
against petitioner. The RTC also noted that AAA even cried when she testified in
court. It did not believe petitioner's claim that AAA was a small time prostitute,
considering that she was a college graduate who was already working at the time
of the incident and the fact that she immediately reported the rape incident to the
police despite threat to her life.
As to the charge of illegal possession of firearm and ammunitions, the RTC
found the elements of the crime to be duly proven. AAA testified that petitioner
pointed a gun at her and because of such threat submitted herself to his bestial
desire; the gun, as well as the ammunitions, was offered in evidence and even the
accused admitted that he had a gun at the time of the incident. It was established
through the testimony of police investigator Regundina Sosa that based on
petitioner's permit to carry firearm outside residence, the same had already
expired on January 11, 2003, few months before his apprehension.

Petitioner filed his appeal with the CA. The Office of the Solicitor General filed its
Comment and petitioner his Reply thereto. CA issued its assailed Decision affirming
petitioner's conviction

In so ruling, the CA pointed out that the crime committed was not kidnapping with
rape, but only rape qualified with the use of a deadly weapon. Applying
jurisprudence, it said that if the offender is only to rape the victim and in the
process, the latter had to be illegally detained, only the crime of rape is committed
since illegal detention is deemed absorbed in rape. The CA upheld the RTC's
assessment of AAA's credibility, because of its unique position to observe the
deportment of the witness while testifying. It also found that while the
prosecution was able to prove that petitioner's license to carry said firearm outside
residence already expired at the time he was apprehended with it, however, there
was no showing that the firearm he carried on April 17, 2003 was not licensed or its
license had expired, thus petitioner could only be liable for carrying a licensed
firearm outside his residence under the last paragraph of Section 1, P.D. 1866, as
amended.

Issue: WON illegal possession of firearms herein is a separate crime

Held: No. As to petitioner's conviction for illegal possession of firearms, such
judgment must be set aside. We find that he can no longer be held liable for such
offense since another crime was committed, i.e., rape.
In People v. Ladjaalam, we laid down the correct interpretation of the law and
ruled:
x x x A simple reading thereof shows that if an unlicensed firearm is
used in the commission of any crime, there can be no separate
offense of simple illegal possession of firearms. Hence, if the other
crime is murder or homicide, illegal possession of firearms
becomes merely an aggravating circumstance, not a separate
offense. Since direct assault with multiple attempted homicide was
committed in this case, appellant can no longer be held liable for
illegal possession of firearms.
Moreover, penal laws are construed liberally in favor of the
accused. In this case, the plain meaning of RA 8294s simple
language is most favorable to herein appellant. Verily, no other
interpretation is justified, for the language of the new law
demonstrates the legislative intent to favor the
accused. Accordingly, appellant cannot be convicted of two
separate offenses of illegal possession of firearms and direct assault
with attempted homicide. Moreover, since the crime committed
was direct assault and not homicide or murder, illegal possession of
firearms cannot be deemed an aggravating circumstance.

x x x The law is clear: the accused can be convicted of simple illegal
possession of firearms, provided that no other crime was
committed by the person arrested. If the intention of the law in
the second paragraph were to refer only to homicide and murder, it
should have expressly said so, as it did in the third paragraph.
Verily, where the law does not distinguish, neither should we.

All told, we affirm petitioner's conviction for the crime of rape. However,
petitioner's conviction of illegal possession of firearms is set aside.

RA 9165: The Comprehensive Dangerous Act of 2002
Section 25. Qualifying Aggravating Circumstances in the Commission of a Crime
by an Offender Under the Influence of Dangerous Drugs. Notwithstanding the
provisions of any law to the contrary, a positive finding for the use of
dangerous drugs shall be a qualifying aggravating circumstance in the
commission of a crime by an offender, and the application of the penalty
provided for in the Revised Penal Code shall be applicable.
RPC Art. 8. Conspiracy and proposal to commit felony. Conspiracy and proposal
to commit felony are punishable only in the cases in which the law specially
provides a penalty therefor.
A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning
the commission of a felony and decide to commit it.
There is proposal when the person who has decided to commit a felony proposes
its execution to some other person or persons.
RA 9165 Section 26. Attempt or Conspiracy. Any attempt or conspiracy to commit
the following unlawful acts shall be penalized by the same penalty prescribed for
the commission of the same as provided under this Act:
(a) Importation of any dangerous drug and/or controlled precursor and essential
chemical;
(b) Sale, trading, administration, dispensation, delivery, distribution and
transportation of any dangerous drug and/or controlled precursor and essential
chemical;
(c) Maintenance of a den, dive or resort where any dangerous drug is used in any
form;
(d) Manufacture of any dangerous drug and/or controlled precursor and essential
chemical; and
(e) Cultivation or culture of plants which are sources of dangerous drugs.
Section 33. Immunity from Prosecution and Punishment. Notwithstanding the
provisions of Section 17, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure and
the provisions of Republic Act No. 6981 or the Witness Protection, Security and
Benefit Act of 1991, any person who has violated Sections 7, 11, 12, 14, 15, and 19,
Article II of this Act, who voluntarily gives information about any violation of
Sections 4, 5, 6, 8, 10, 13, and 16, Article II of this Act as well as any violation of the
offenses mentioned if committed by a drug syndicate, or any information leading
to the whereabouts, identities and arrest of all or any of the members thereof; and
who willingly testifies against such persons as described above, shall be exempted
from prosecution or punishment for the offense with reference to which his/her
information of testimony were given, and may plead or prove the giving of such
information and testimony in bar of such prosecution: Provided, That the following
conditions concur:
(1) The information and testimony are necessary for the conviction of the persons
described above;
(2) Such information and testimony are not yet in the possession of the State;
(3) Such information and testimony can be corroborated on its material points;
(4) the informant or witness has not been previously convicted of a crime involving
moral turpitude, except when there is no other direct evidence available for the
State other than the information and testimony of said informant or witness; and
(5) The informant or witness shall strictly and faithfully comply without delay, any
condition or undertaking, reduced into writing, lawfully imposed by the State as
further consideration for the grant of immunity from prosecution and punishment.
Provided, further, That this immunity may be enjoyed by such informant or witness
who does not appear to be most guilty for the offense with reference to which
his/her information or testimony were given: Provided, finally, That there is no
direct evidence available for the State except for the information and testimony of
the said informant or witness.

Section 66. Suspension of Sentence of a First-Time Minor Offender. An accused
who is over fifteen (15) years of age at the time of the commission of the offense
mentioned in Section 11 of this Act, but not more than eighteen (18) years of age at
the time when judgment should have been promulgated after having been found
guilty of said offense, may be given the benefits of a suspended sentence, subject
to the following conditions:
(a) He/she has not been previously convicted of violating any provision of this Act,
or of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended; or of the Revised Penal Code;
or of any special penal laws;
(b) He/she has not been previously committed to a Center or to the care of a DOH-
accredited physician; and
(c) The Board favorably recommends that his/her sentence be suspended.
While under suspended sentence, he/she shall be under the supervision and
rehabilitative surveillance of the Board, under such conditions that the court may
impose for a period ranging from six (6) months to eighteen (18) months.
Upon recommendation of the Board, the court may commit the accused under
suspended sentence to a Center, or to the care of a DOH-accredited physician for at
least six (6) months, with after-care and follow-up program for not more than
eighteen (18) months.
In the case of minors under fifteen (15) years of age at the time of the commission
of any offense penalized under this Act, Article 192 of Presidential Decree No. 603,
otherwise known as the Child and Youth Welfare Code, as amended by Presidential
Decree No. 1179 shall apply, without prejudice to the application of the provisions
of this Section.
Section 67. Discharge After Compliance with Conditions of Suspended Sentence of a
First-Time Minor Offender. If the accused first time minor offender under
suspended sentence complies with the applicable rules and regulations of the
Board, including confinement in a Center, the court, upon a favorable
recommendation of the Board for the final discharge of the accused, shall discharge
the accused and dismiss all proceedings.
Upon the dismissal of the proceedings against the accused, the court shall enter an
order to expunge all official records, other than the confidential record to be
retained by the DOJ relating to the case. Such an order, which shall be kept
confidential, shall restore the accused to his/her status prior to the case. He/she
shall not be held thereafter to be guilty of perjury or of concealment or
misrepresentation by reason of his/her failure to acknowledge the case or recite
any fact related thereto in response to any inquiry made of him for any purpose.
Section 68. Privilege of Suspended Sentence to be Availed of Only Once by a First-
Time Minor Offender. The privilege of suspended sentence shall be availed of only
once by an accused drug dependent who is a first-time offender over fifteen (15)
years of age at the time of the commission of the violation of Section 15 of this Act
but not more than eighteen (18) years of age at the time when judgment should
have been promulgated.
Section 69. Promulgation of Sentence for First-Time Minor Offender. If the
accused first-time minor offender violates any of the conditions of his/her
suspended sentence, the applicable rules and regulations of the Board exercising
supervision and rehabilitative surveillance over him, including the rules and
regulations of the Center should confinement be required, the court shall
pronounce judgment of conviction and he/she shall serve sentence as any other
convicted person.
Section 70. Probation or Community Service for a First-Time Minor Offender in Lieu
of Imprisonment. Upon promulgation of the sentence, the court may, in its
discretion, place the accused under probation, even if the sentence provided under
this Act is higher than that provided under existing law on probation, or impose
community service in lieu of imprisonment. In case of probation, the supervision
and rehabilitative surveillance shall be undertaken by the Board through the DOH
in coordination with the Board of Pardons and Parole and the Probation
Administration. Upon compliance with the conditions of the probation, the Board
shall submit a written report to the court recommending termination of probation
and a final discharge of the probationer, whereupon the court shall issue such an
order.
The community service shall be complied with under conditions, time and place as
may be determined by the court in its discretion and upon the recommendation of
the Board and shall apply only to violators of Section 15 of this Act. The completion
of the community service shall be under the supervision and rehabilitative
surveillance of the Board during the period required by the court. Thereafter, the
Board shall render a report on the manner of compliance of said community
service. The court in its discretion may require extension of the community service
or order a final discharge.
In both cases, the judicial records shall be covered by the provisions of Sections 60
and 64 of this Act.
If the sentence promulgated by the court requires imprisonment, the period spent
in the Center by the accused during the suspended sentence period shall be
deducted from the sentence to be served.
Section 71. Records to be kept by the Department of Justice. The DOJ shall keep a
confidential record of the proceedings on suspension of sentence and shall not be
used for any purpose other than to determine whether or not a person accused
under this Act is a first-time minor offender.

People vs. Mantalaba
FACTS:The Task Force Regional Anti-Crime Emergency Response (RACER) in Butuan
City received a report from an informer that a certain Allen Mantalaba, who was
seventeen (17) years old at the time, was selling shabu at Purok 4, Barangay 3,
Agao District, Butuan City. Around 7 o'clock in the evening of October 1, 2003, the
team, armed with the marked money, proceeded to Purok 4, Barangay 3, Agao
District, Butuan City for the buy-bust operation. The two poseur-buyers
approached Allen who was sitting at a corner and said to be in the act of selling
shabu. PO1 Pajo saw the poseur-buyers and appellant talking to each other.
Afterwards, the appellant handed a sachet of shabu to one of the poseur-buyers
and the latter gave the marked money to the appellant. The poseur-buyers went
back to the police officers and told them that the transaction has been completed.
Police officers Pajo and Simon rushed to the place and handcuffed the appellant as
he was leaving the place. two separate Informations were filed before the RTC of
Butuan City against appellant for violation of Sections 5 and 11 of RA 9165. The
Court finds accused Allen Mantalaba y Udtojan GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
for illegally possessing shabu, a dangerous drug. The CA affirmed in toto the
decision of the RTC
ISSUE: WON appellant, a 17 year old, may avail the suspension of sentence
pursuant to sec. 38 and 40 of RA 9344?
RULING: The appellant was 17 years old when the buy-bust operation took place or
when the said offense was committed, but was no longer a minor at the time of the
promulgation of the RTCs Decision. It must be noted that RA 9344 took effect on
May 20, 2006, while the RTC promulgated its decision on this case on September
14, 2005, when said appellant was no longer a minor. In People v. Sarcia (G.R. No.
169641, September 10, 2009, 599 SCRA 20), it was held that while Section 38 of RA
9344 provides that suspension of sentence can still be applied even if the child in
conflict with the law is already eighteen (18) years of age or more at the time of the
pronouncement of his/her guilt, Section 40 of the same law limits the said
suspension of sentence until the child reaches the maximum age of 21. Hence, the
appellant, who is now beyond the age of 21 years can no longer avail of the
provisions of Sections 38 and 40 of RA 9344 as to his suspension of sentence,
because this has already become moot and academic.


Section 92. Delay and Bungling in the Prosecution of Drug Cases. Any government
officer or employee tasked with the prosecution of drug-related cases under this
act, who, through patent laxity, inexcusable neglect, unreasonable delay or
deliberately causes the unsuccessful prosecution and/or dismissal of the said drug
cases, shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from twelve (12) years and
one (1) day to twenty (20) years without prejudice to his/her prosecution under the
pertinent provisions of the Revised Penal Code.
Section 98. Limited Applicability of the Revised Penal Code. Notwithstanding any
law, rule or regulation to the contrary, the provisions of the Revised Penal Code
(Act No. 3814), as amended, shall not apply to the provisions of this Act, except in
the case of minor offenders. Where the offender is a minor, the penalty for acts
punishable by life imprisonment to death provided herein shall bereclusion
perpetua to death.
RPC. Art. 62. Effect of the attendance of mitigating or aggravating circumstances
and of habitual delinquency. Mitigating or aggravating circumstances and
habitual delinquency shall be taken into account for the purpose of diminishing or
increasing the penalty in conformity with the following rules:
2. The same rule shall apply with respect to any aggravating circumstance inherent
in the crime to such a degree that it must of necessity accompany the commission
thereof.




People vs. Cabugatan
Facts: On 9 August 2002, two Informations were filed against appellant before the
Regional Trial Court of Baguio City for violations of Republic Act No. 9165 or the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. During his arraignment on 21 August
2002, appellant pleaded not guilty to both charges.
The prosecutions version of the facts shows that on 8 August 2002, a reliable
civilian informant, accompanied by a barangay kagawad, went to the Station 7 of
the Baguio City Police. The informant purportedly said that a person by the name of
Boisan Cabugatan was engaged in the illegal sale of shabu at Villacor Billiard Hall
located on Otek St., Baguio City.
Police Chief Inspector Garcia immediately formed a team to conduct a buy-bust
operation to apprehend Boisan with PO2 Del-ong as the designated poseur-buyer.
When they reached the designated place, they were met by a man wearing a black
bull cap and a gray sweatshirt with collar. This person was identified during the trial
to be appellant. PO2 Del-ong scratched his head using his left hand to alert his
fellow team members that the sale of shabu was already consummated.
Thereupon, the rest of the buy-bust team rushed towards appellant and informed
him that he was being arrested. They likewise advised him of his constitutional
rights.
Expectedly, accused presented an entirely different version of what transpired
during that afternoon and claimed that the buy-bust never took place. According to
appellant, he is a Maranaw who earns a living by peddling sunglasses in Baguio City.
At the time the supposed buy-bust operation took place, he was playing billiard
with two others at the Villacor Billiard Hall when three men in civilian clothes
arrived. Appellant identified two of the men who came inside the billiard hall to be
PO2 Del-ong and PO3 Aguirre.
The group of PO2 Del-ong allegedly frisked appellants fellow players and was able
to recover a single plastic sachet from one of them. PO2 Del-ong, who was then
standing beside appellant, held the latters hand, pointed a gun at his head, and
warned him not to do anything or else he would be shot. PO3 Aguirre then called
for a mobile car and appellant, together with his two companions, was brought to
the Station 7 of the Baguio City Police. In the police station, appellant was
handcuffed to the window rail. After a few hours, one of the arresting officers came
to see him and asked appellant if he could settle his case by paying a sum of money
to the police or he could just identify others who are engaged in drug trade in
Baguio City. Appellant likewise claimed that he learned later on that the two others
who were arrested with him were able to settle their cases and had been set free.
TC rendered finding the accused GUILTY. CA affirmed.
Issue: WON Article 63(2) of the Revised Penal Code shall be used in the
determination of the penalty to be imposed on the accused.
Held: NO. The unauthorized sale of shabu carries with it the penalty of life
imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from Five hundred thousand pesos
(P500,000.00) to Ten million pesos (P10,000,000.00). On the other hand, the
unauthorized possession of less than five grams of said substance is penalized with
a prison term of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years and a fine of
Three hundred thousand pesos (P300,000.00) up to Four hundred thousand pesos
(P400,000.00).
Section 98, Article XIII of Republic Act No. 9165 expressly provides for the limited
application of the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on said law. This section
reads:
SEC. 98. Limited Applicability of the Revised Penal Code. Notwithstanding any
law, rule or regulation to the contrary, the provisions of the Revised Penal Code
(Act No. 3815), as amended, shall not apply to the provisions of this Act, except in
the case of minor offenders. Where the offender is a minor, the penalty for acts
punishable by life imprisonment to death provided herein shall be reclusion
perpetua to death.
Under the aforesaid section, the provisions of the Revised Penal Code shall no
longer apply to the provisions of Republic Act No. 9165 except when the offender is
a minor. Thus, Article 63(2) of the Revised Penal Code shall not be used in the
determination of the penalty to be imposed on the accused. Since Section 98 of the
said law contains the word "shall," the non-applicability of the Revised Penal Code
provisions is mandatory, subject only to the exception in case the offender is a
minor.
With the advent of Republic Act No. 9165, the Courts, in determining the
appropriate minimum and maximum of the penalty to be meted out to offenders,
shall be guided solely by the pertinent part of the Indeterminate Sentence Law.
In the imposition of the proper penalty, the courts, taking into account the
circumstances attendant in the commission of the offense, are given discretion to
impose either life imprisonment or death, and the fine as provided for by law. In
light, however, of the effectivity of Republic Act No. 9346 entitled, "An Act
Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines," the imposition of
the supreme penalty of death shall only be life imprisonment and fine. Hence, the
penalty of life imprisonment imposed on appellant in Criminal Case No. 20441-R is
proper. We, however, find the fine of P1,000,000.00 to be excessive and hereby
reduce the same to P500,000.00 considering that the records do not reveal any
prior arrest or conviction of appellant for a drug-related offense.
We likewise affirm the conviction and penalty of imprisonment of twelve (12) years
and one (1) day to fifteen (15) years and the fine of P300,000.00 meted out by the
trial court with respect to Criminal Case No. 20442-R.

PD 749: GRANTING IMMUNITY FROM PROSECUTION TO GIVERS OF BRIBES AND
OTHER GIFTS AND TO THEIR ACCOMPLICES IN BRIBERY AND OTHER GRAFT CASES
AGAINST PUBLIC OFFICERS
WHEREAS, public office is a public trust: public officers are but servants of the
people, whom they must serve with utmost fidelity and integrity;
WHEREAS, it has heretofore been virtually impossible to secure the conviction and
removal of dishonest public servants owing to the lack of witnesses: the bribe or
gift-givers being always reluctant to testify against the corrupt public officials and
employees concerned for fear of being indicted and convicted themselves of
bribery and corruption;
WHEREAS, it is better by far and more socially desirable, as well as just, that the
bribe or gift giver be granted immunity from prosecution so that he may freely
testify as to the official corruption, than that the official who receives the bribe or
gift should be allowed to go free, insolently remaining in public office, and
continuing with his nefarious and corrupt practices, to the great detriment of the
public service and the public interest.
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by
virtue of the powers in me vested by the Constitution, do hereby decree and order
that:
Section 1. Any person who voluntarily gives information about any violation of
Articles 210, 211, and 212 of the Revised Penal Code; Republic Act Numbered
Three Thousand Nineteen, as amended; Section 345 of the Internal Revenue Code
and Section 3604 of the Tariff and Customs Code and other provisions of the said
Codes penalizing abuse or dishonesty on the part of the public officials concerned;
and other laws, rules and regulations punishing acts of graft, corruption and other
forms of official abuse; and who willingly testifies against any public official or
employee for such violation shall be exempt from prosecution or punishment for
the offense with reference to which his information and testimony were given, and
may plead or prove the giving of such information and testimony in bar of such
prosecution: Provided; that this immunity may be enjoyed even in cases where the
information and testimony are given against a person who is not a public official
but who is a principal, or accomplice, or accessory in the commission of any of the
above-mentioned violations: Provided, further, that this immunity may be enjoyed
by such informant or witness notwithstanding that he offered or gave the bribe or
gift to the public official or his accomplice for such gift or bribe-giving; and
Provided, finally, that the following conditions concur:
1. The information must refer to consummated violations of any of the above-
mentioned provisions of law, rules and regulations;
2. The information and testimony are necessary for the conviction of the accused
public officer;
3. Such information and testimony are not yet in the possession of the State;
4. Such information and testimony can be corroborated on its material points; and
5. The informant or witness has not been previously convicted of a crime involving
moral turpitude.
Section 2. The immunity granted hereunder shall not attach should it turn out
subsequently that the information and/or testimony is false and malicious or made
only for the purpose of harassing, molesting or in any way prejudicing the public
officer denounced. In such a case, the public officer so denounced shall be entitled
to any action, civil or criminal, against said informant or witness.
Section 3. All preliminary investigations conducted by a prosecuting fiscal, judge or
committee, and all proceedings undertaken in connection therewith, shall be
strictly confidential or private in order to protect the reputation of the official
under investigation in the event that the report proves to be unfounded or no
prima facie case is established.
Section 4. All acts, decrees and rules and regulations inconsistent with the
provisions of this decree are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
Section 5. This Decree shall take effect immediately.
DONE in the City of Manila, this 18th day of July, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen
hundred and seventy-five.
PD 1731: PROVIDING FOR REWARDS AND INCENTIVES TO GOVERNMENT
WITNESSES AND INFORMANTS AND OTHER PURPOSES
WHEREAS, reports from law enforcement agencies reveal that crimes against
National Security or Public Order and organized/syndicated crime in the country
are becoming sophisticated, diversified, and widespread;
WHEREAS, such criminal activities have resulted not only in the wanton destruction
of lives and properties but have likewise weakened the Nation's economic stability,
threatened its security and undermined the general welfare of its citizens;
WHEREAS, said criminal activities continue to grow because of inadequate
evidence-gathering process of the law and the seeming apathy of the citizens in
testifying against entrenched and feared malefactors;
WHEREAS, there is an imperative need to neutralize crimes against National
Security or Public Order or organized/syndicated crime in this country before they
grow to unmanageable proportions by providing rewards, incentives, protection
and, in certain cases, immunity from criminal prosecution to government
witnesses, so that the total commitment of our people on the side of law
enforcement may be encouraged.
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by
virtue of the powers vested in me by the Constitution, do hereby order and decree
the following:
Section 1. Definition of Terms. The following terms shall mean and be
understood/construed as follows:
(a) Government means the Republic of the Philippines, any political subdivision, or
any department, agency, or instrumentality thereof.
(b) Organized/Syndicated Crime means any crime committed by an
organized/syndicated crime group, including, but not limited to, arson, robbery
(hold-up), kidnapping for ransom, prostitution, illegal recruitment, carnapping,
smuggling and piracy, cattle rustling, illicit drug trafficking, labor rackets, land title
rackets, manufacture and/or circulation of fake documents, license, stamps,
currencies, and other government forms, counterfeiting and bank frauds, consumer
frauds and other illegal activities of such groups.
(c) Organized/Syndicated Crime Group means a group of two (2) or more persons
collaborating, confederating or mutually helping one another in the commission of
any organized/syndicated crime.
(d) Witness shall refer to any person who, having organs of sense, can perceive
and, perceiving, can make known his perception to others.
(e) Vital information shall mean any information, document, book, writing or any
other evidence necessary to build up to the people's case and/or secure the
conviction of criminals.
Section 2. Whenever in the judgment of the Minister of National Defense
testimony from, or willingness to testify by a witness, would place in danger the
witness' life or person, or the life or person of a member of his family or household,
the Minister of National Defense, upon the recommendation of the Chief of the
Philippine Constabulary or the chief of any law enforcement agency, is hereby
authorized to:
(a) Provide for the security of such witness who testified/is willing to testify, or who
provided/is willing to provide a vital information leading to the arrest and/or
prosecution of any member of an organized/syndicated crime group or person who
participated in any organized/syndicated criminal activity, or in crimes against
national security and public order.
(b) Purchase, rent or remodel protected housing facilities and to otherwise offer to
provide measures for the health, safety, and welfare of such witnesses and
potential witnesses and their families. Any person availing himself of an offer by
the Minister of National Defense to use such facilities may continue to use such
facilities for as long as the Minister of National Defense determines that there is
danger to his life or his person.
(c) Upon application of such witnesses, relocate and/or provide new identities to
them and their immediate members of their families. For all legal purposes, such
grant of new domiciles and new identities as duly certified by the Minister of
National Defense, shall be valid and binding on all courts, ministries, agencies and
instrumentalities of the government as though acquired under the provisions of
existing law.
(d) Grant monetary reward to any such witnesses in the amounts hereinbelow
provided:
1. If the penalty imposable for the crime committed is life imprisonment to death,
the amount of the reward shall be 50,000.00 pesos;
2. If the penalty imposable for the crime committed is imprisonment of from
twelve years and one day to twenty years, the amount of the reward shall be
40,000.00 pesos;
3. If the penalty imposable for the crime committed is imprisonment of from six
years and one day to twelve years, the amount of the reward shall be 30,000.00
pesos ;
4. If the penalty imposable for the crime committed is imprisonment below six
years and one day, the amount of the reward shall be 25,000.00 pesos.
Section 3. Whenever in the judgment of the prosecutor or fiscal the testimony of
any witness, who is provided security by the Minister of National Defense pursuant
to Section 2 above, is necessary, proper application for his production and
appearance shall be filed with the Ministry of National Defense.
Section 4. Any such informant or witness who shall testify, or provide vital
information, regarding the existence or activity of a group involved in the
commission of crimes against national security or public order, or of an
organized/syndicated crime or crime group, and/or the culpability of the individual
members thereof in accordance with this Decree shall, upon recommendation of
the state prosecutor, fiscal or military lawyer, as approved by the Minister of
National Defense or the Minister of Justice, as the case may be, be immune from
criminal prosecution for his participation or involvement in any such criminal
activity which is the subject of the investigation or prosecution, in addition to the
benefits under Sec. 2 hereof: Provided, that, immunity from criminal prosecution
shall, in the case of a witness offering to testify, attach only upon his actually
testifying in court in accordance with his undertaking as accepted by the state
prosecutor, fiscal, or military lawyer: Provided, further, that the following
conditions are complied with:
(a) There is absolute necessity for the testimony of the witness and/or the
information given by him regarding the existence or activity of a group involved in
crimes against national security or public order or of an organized/syndicated crime
or crime group, and/or the culpability of individual members thereof;
(b) That there is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of
the offense committed, except such testimony and/or such information given by
him;
(c) That such testimony or information can be substantially corroborated in its
material points; and
(d) The witness, if he is a suspect, respondent or defendant in a case either under
investigation, or filed in court, does not appear to be the most guilty.
Section 5. In all criminal cases, the fact of the witness' entitlement to the incentives
and other benefits provided for in this Decree shall not be admissible in evidence to
diminish or effect his credibility.
Section 6. The Minister of National Defense and the Minister of Justice are
authorized to call directly on other ministries, bureaus, offices and other
instrumentalities or agencies of the government, including government-owned or
controlled corporations, in the accomplishment of the above tasks.
Section 7. The amount of ten million pesos (P10,000,000.00) is hereby appropriated
out of any funds in the National Treasury not otherwise appropriated to carry into
effect the provisions of this Decree.
Section 8. The Minister of National Defense and the Minister of Justice shall jointly
promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to effectively implement the
provisions of this Decree.
Section 9. All laws, rules and regulations which are inconsistent with this Decree
are hereby repealed and/or modified accordingly.
Section 10. Separability clause The provisions of this Decree are hereby declared to
be separable, and in the event one or more of such provisions are held
unconstitutional, the validity of other provisions shall not be affected thereby.
Section 11. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
Done in the City of Manila, this 8th day of October, in the year of Our Lord,
nineteen hundred and eighty.

PD 1732: PROVIDING IMMUNITY FROM CRIMINAL PROSECUTION TO
GOVERNMENT WITNESSES AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
WHEREAS, reports of law enforcement agencies reveal that activities of criminal
elements in the country have become sophisticated, diversified and widespread;
WHEREAS, these activities have resulted not only in the wanton destruction of lives
and property, but have likewise weakened the Nation's economic stability,
threatened its security and undermined the general welfare of its citizens;
WHEREAS, crime continues to grow due to, among other reasons, the limited and
inadequate system of evidence-gathering and the seeming apathy and reluctance
of the citizenry in testifying against criminal elements for fear of reprisal;
WHEREAS, it is imperative to provoke the total involvement of the citizenry in the
campaign against these criminal elements by providing immunity from criminal
prosecution to any witness who shall give vital information to the government
concerning the existence, operation and activity of such criminal elements, and to
provide for a compulsory process against uncooperative and recalcitrant witnesses;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by
virtue of the power in me vested by the Constitution, do hereby order and decree
the following:
Section 1. As used in this Act, the following terms shall mean or be interpreted and
construed as hereunder defined:
(a) `Witness' shall refer to any person who, having organs of sense, can perceive,
and perceiving, can make known his perceptions to others.
(b) `Court' shall refer to any military or civil court, quasi-judicial body or special
court/tribunal.
(c) `Agency' shall refer to any government agency, instrumentality or body and/or
officer of said agency, instrumentality or body, which/who is legally authorized to
perform investigation or law enforcement functions, and to gather or receive
information and/or evidence in connection with such functions.
(d) `Vital information' shall mean any information, document, record, book, writing,
or any other evidence, necessary to build up the people's case and/or secure the
conviction of criminals.
(e) Organized/syndicated crime group including, but not limited to, arson, robbery
(hold-up), kidnapping for ransom, prostitution, illegal recruitment, carnapping,
smuggling and piracy, cattle rustling, illicit drug trafficking, labor rackets, land title
rackets, manufacture and/or circulation of fake documents, license, stamps,
currencies and other government forms, counterfeiting and bank frauds, consumer
frauds and other illegal activities of such groups.
(f) Organized/syndicated crime group means a group of two (2) or more persons
collaborating, confederating or mutually helping one another in the commission of
any organized/syndicated crime.
Section 2. There is hereby created a Special Committee to be composed of the
Minister of National Defense, the Minister of Justice, the Tanodbayan or their duly
authorized representatives, which shall exercise the function as hereinafter
provided for. The members of the Committee shall choose from among
themselves, the chairman who shall preside over its deliberations. The unanimous
vote of all the members of the Committee shall be required for the issuance of an
order under Section 3 hereof compelling a witness to testify or to produce other
evidence mentioned in said Section, or to recommend to the President under
Section 6 hereof the arrest and confinement of a person refusing to comply with
the Committee's order for him to testify. All other decisions of the Committee shall
be by a majority vote.
Section 3. Whenever in the judgment of the state prosecution, fiscal, special
counsel, investigator, or military lawyer, the testimony of any witness, or the
production of documents, papers, books, records, writings or other evidence by
such witness in any case or proceedings before any court or investigative agency
involving a crime against national security or public order, as defined in the Revised
Penal Code, or a syndicated/organized crime as herein defined, or any other crime
punishable with penalty of at least prision mayor, is absolutely necessary, and such
witness has refused to testify or produce other evidence by invoking his
constitutional privilege against self-incrimination, such state prosecutor, fiscal,
special counsel, investigator or military lawyer shall apply in writing to the
Committee for the issuance of an order enjoining such witness to testify or produce
such evidence, stating therein the reasons for the application. The Committee,
upon receipt of such application, shall, without delay, resolve such application,
taking into consideration the following:
(a) The absolute necessity of the testimony of the witness and/or the production of
documents, papers, books, records, writings, or other evidence so requested;
(b) That there is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of
the offense committed, except the testimony of said witness and/or the production
of the documents, papers, books, records, writings or other evidence so requested;
(c) That the testimony of said witness or the other evidence requested can be
substantially corroborated in its material points; and
(d) The witness, if he is suspect, respondent or defendant in a case under
investigation or filed in court, does not appear to be the most guilty.
The Committee may summon the state prosecutor, fiscal, special counsel,
investigator or military lawyer making the application to clarify any matter relative
to the application or to further substantiate the same. A resolution of the
Committee denying the application shall be final and unappealable. If the
Committee resolves to grant the application, it shall forthwith issue an order
directing and compelling the witness to testify and/or produce the other evidence
so requested: Provided, however, that no person shall be compelled to testify on
matters considered privileged under Sections 20 and 21, Rule 130 of the Revised
Rules of Court.
Section 4. A witness who, by virtue of an order issued under the preceding Section,
is compelled to testify or produce documents, papers, books, records, writings, or
other evidence, shall enjoy immunity from criminal prosecution and cannot be
subjected to any penalty of forfeiture for any transaction, matter or thing
concerning that which he is compelled to do and/or testify in any proceedings,
except in the cases provided in Section 5 hereof.
Section 5. No witness shall be exempt from prosecution for perjury or contempt
committed while giving testimony or producing evidence under compulsion
pursuant to this Decree.
Section 6. Whenever a witness in any case or proceeding before any court, quasi-
judicial body, special order issued by the Committee requiring him to testify or to
produce documents, papers, books, records, writings, and other evidence, the
President, upon recommendation of the Committee, may order his arrest and
confinement in any jail contiguous to the place of trial or investigation until such
time that the witness is willing to give such testimony or produce such evidence.
The witness so detained may request a reconsideration of the President's order of
arrest and confinement: Provided, however, that the execution of the order shall
not be stayed by such request. The President may, before acting thereon, refer the
request to the Committee or to any of his staff before resolving the same. A person
ordered confined by the President shall not be allowed temporary liberty on bail,
provided, however, that the President may, in his discretion, and under such terms
and conditions as he may impose, order his temporary release.
Section 7. The Committee formed pursuant to this Decree shall promulgate rules
and regulations for the effective implementation hereof.
Section 8. The provision of any law, decree, order, rule and regulation inconsistent
with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed or modified.
Section 9. Separability clause. The provisions of this Decree are hereby declared to
be separable, and in the event one or more of such provisions are held
unconstitutional, the validity of other provisions shall not be affected thereby.
Section 10. This Act shall take effect upon approval.
Done in the City of Manila, this 8th day of October, in the year of Our Lord,
nineteen hundred and eighty.
1987 Constitution ART. XIII Section 18. The Commission on Human Rights shall
have the following powers and functions:
(1) Investigate, on its own or on complaint by any party, all forms of human rights
violations involving civil and political rights;
(2) Adopt its operational guidelines and rules of procedure, and cite for contempt
for violations thereof in accordance with the Rules of Court;
(3) Provide appropriate legal measures for the protection of human rights of all
persons within the Philippines, as well as Filipinos residing abroad, and provide for
preventive measures and legal aid services to the under-privileged whose human
rights have been violated or need protection;
(4) Exercise visitorial powers over jails, prisons, or detention facilities;
(5) Establish a continuing program of research, education, and information to
enhance respect for the primacy of human rights;
(6) Recommend to Congress effective measures to promote human rights and to
provide for compensation to victims of violations of human rights, or their families;
(7) Monitor the Philippine Government's compliance with international treaty
obligations on human rights;
(8) Grant immunity from prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose
possession of documents or other evidence is necessary or convenient to
determine the truth in any investigation conducted by it or under its authority;
(9) Request the assistance of any department, bureau, office, or agency in the
performance of its functions;
(10) Appoint its officers and employees in accordance with law; and
(11) Perform such other duties and functions as may be provided by law.

RA 6646: AN ACT INTRODUCING ADDITIONAL REFORMS IN THE ELECTORAL
SYSTEM AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
Section 26. COMELEC Hearings and Proceedings. - In all hearings, inquiries, and
proceedings of the Commission, including preliminary investigations of election
offenses, no person subpoenaed to testify as a witness shall be excused from
attending and testifying or from producing books, papers, correspondence,
memoranda and other records on the ground that the testimony or evidence,
documentary or otherwise, required of him, may tend to incriminate him or subject
him to prosecution: Provided, That no person shall be prosecuted criminally for or
on account of any matter concerning which he is compelled, after having claimed
the privilege against self-incrimination, to testify and produce evidence,
documentary or otherwise.
Under such terms and conditions as it may determine, the Commission may grant
immunity from criminal prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose
possession and production of documents or other evidence may be necessary to
determine the truth in any hearing, inquiry or proceeding being conducted by the
Commission or under its authority, in the performance or in the furtherance of its
constitutional functions and statutory objectives. The immunity granted under this
and the immediately preceding paragraph shall not exempt the witness from
criminal prosecution for perjury or false testimony.
RA 6770: Ombudsman Act of 1989
Section 17. Immunities. In all hearings, inquiries, and proceedings of the
Ombudsman, including preliminary investigations of offenses, nor person
subpoenaed to testify as a witness shall be excused from attending and testifying
or from producing books, papers, correspondence, memoranda and/or other
records on the ground that the testimony or evidence, documentary or otherwise,
required of him, may tend to incriminate him or subject him to prosecution:
provided, that no person shall be prosecuted criminally for or on account of any
matter concerning which he is compelled, after having claimed the privilege against
self-incrimination, to testify and produce evidence, documentary or otherwise.
Under such terms and conditions as it may determine, taking into account the
pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court, the Ombudsman may grant immunity
from criminal prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose possession and
production of documents or other evidence may be necessary to determine the
truth in any hearing, inquiry or proceeding being conducted by the Ombudsman or
under its authority, in the performance or in the furtherance of its constitutional
functions and statutory objectives. The immunity granted under this and the
immediately preceding paragraph shall not exempt the witness from criminal
prosecution for perjury or false testimony nor shall he be exempt from demotion or
removal from office.
Any refusal to appear or testify pursuant to the foregoing provisions shall be
subject to punishment for contempt and removal of the immunity from criminal
prosecution.


RA 6981: AN ACT PROVIDING FOR A WITNESS PROTECTION, SECURITY AND
BENEFIT PROGRAM AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in
Congress assembled::
Section 1. Name of Act. - This Act shall be known as the "Witness Protection,
Security and Benefit Act".
Section 2. Implementation of Program. - The Department of Justice, hereinafter
referred to as the Department, through its Secretary, shall formulate and
implement a "Witness Protection, Security and Benefit Program", hereinafter
referred to as the Program, pursuant to and consistent with the provisions of this
Act.
The Department may call upon any department, bureau, office or any other
executive agency to assist in the implementation of the Program and the latter
offices shall be under legal duty and obligation to render such assistance.
Section 3. Admission into the Program. - Any person who has witnessed or has
knowledge or information on the commission of a crime and has testified or is
testifying or about to testify before any judicial or quasi-judicial body, or before any
investigating authority, may be admitted into the Program:
Provided, That:
the offense in which his testimony will be used is a grave felony as defined under
the Revised Penal Code, or its equivalent under special laws;lawphi1
his testimony can be substantially corroborated in its material points;
he or any member of his family within the second civil degree of consanguinity or
affinity is subjected to threats to his life or bodily injury or there is a likelihood that
he will be killed, forced, intimidated, harassed or corrupted to prevent him from
testifying, or to testify falsely, or evasively, because or on account of his testimony;
and
he is not a law enforcement officer, even if he would be testifying against the other
law enforcement officers. In such a case, only the immediate members of his family
may avail themselves of the protection provided for under this Act.
If the Department, after examination of said applicant and other relevant facts, is
convinced that the requirements of this Act and its implementing rules and
regulations have been complied with, it shall admit said applicant to the Program,
require said witness to execute a sworn statement detailing his knowledge or
information on the commission of the crime, and thereafter issue the proper
certification. For purposes of this Act, any such person admitted to the Program
shall be known as the Witness.
Section 4. Witness in Legislative Investigations. - In case of legislative investigations
in aid of legislation, a witness, with his express consent, may be admitted into the
Program upon the recommendation of the legislative committee where his
testimony is needed when in its judgment there is pressing necessity therefor:
Provided, That such recommendation is approved by the President of the Senate or
the Speaker of the House of Representatives, as the case may be.
Section 5. Memorandum of Agreement With the Person to be Protected. - Before a
person is provided protection under this Act, he shall first execute a memorandum
of agreement which shall set forth his responsibilities including:
to testify before and provide information to all appropriate law enforcement
officials concerning all appropriate proceedings in connection with or arising from
the activities involved in the offense charged;
to avoid the commission of the crime;lawphi1
to take all necessary precautions to avoid detection by others of the facts
concerning the protection provided him under this Act;
to comply with legal obligations and civil judgments against him;
to cooperate with respect to all reasonable requests of officers and employees of
the Government who are providing protection under this Act; and
to regularly inform the appropriate program official of his current activities and
address.1awphi1
Section 6. Breach of the Memorandum of Agreement. - Substantial breach of the
memorandum of agreement shall be a ground for the termination of the protection
provided under this Act: Provided, however, That before terminating such
protection, the Secretary of Justice shall send notice to the person involved of the
termination of the protection provided under this Act, stating therein the reason
for such termination.
Section 7. Confidentiality of Proceedings. - All proceedings involving application for
admission into the Program and the action taken thereon shall be confidential in
nature. No information or documents given or submitted in support thereof shall
be released except upon written order of the Department or the proper court.
Any person who violates the confidentiality of said proceedings shall upon
conviction be punished with imprisonment of not less than one (1) year but not
more than six (6) years and deprivation of the right to hold a public office or
employment for a period of five (5) years.
Section 8. Rights and Benefits. - The witness shall have the following rights and
benefits:ITC-ALF
To have a secure housing facility until he has testified or until the threat,
intimidation or harassment disappears or is reduced to a manageable or
tolerable level. When the circumstances warrant, the Witness shall be
entitled to relocation and/or change of personal identity at the expense of
the Program. This right may be extended to any member of the family of
the Witness within the second civil degree of consanguinity or affinity.
The Department shall, whenever practicable, assist the Witness in
obtaining a means of livelihood. The Witness relocated pursuant to this Act
shall be entitled to a financial assistance from the Program for his support
and that of his family in such amount and for such duration as the
Department shall determine.
In no case shall the Witness be removed from or demoted in work because
or on account of his absences due to his attendance before any judicial or
quasi-judicial body or investigating authority, including legislative
investigations in aid of legislation, in going thereto and in coming
therefrom: Provided, That his employer is notified through a certification
issued by the Department, within a period of thirty (30) days from the date
when the Witness last reported for work: Provided, further, That in the
case of prolonged transfer or permanent relocation, the employer shall
have the option to remove the Witness from employment after securing
clearance from the Department upon the recommendation of the
Department of Labor and Employment.
Any Witness who failed to report for work because of witness duty shall be paid his
equivalent salaries or wages corresponding to the number of days of absence
occasioned by the Program. For purposes of this Act, any fraction of a day shall
constitute a full day salary or wage. This provision shall be applicable to both
government and private employees.
To be provided with reasonable travelling expenses and subsistence
allowance by the Program in such amount as the Department may
determine for his attendance in the court, body or authority where his
testimony is required, as well as conferences and interviews with
prosecutors or investigating officers.
To be provided with free medical treatment, hospitalization and medicines
for any injury or illness incurred or suffered by him because of witness duty
in any private or public hospital, clinic, or at any such institution at the
expense of the Program.
If a Witness is killed, because of his participation in the Program, his heirs
shall be entitled to a burial benefit of not less than Ten thousand pesos
(P10,000.00) from the Program exclusive of any other similar benefits he
may be entitled to under other existing laws.
In case of death or permanent incapacity, his minor or dependent children
shall be entitled to free education, from primary to college level in any
state, or private school, college or university as may be determined by the
Department, as long as they shall have qualified thereto.
Section 9. Speedy Hearing or Trial. - In any case where a Witness admitted into the
Program shall testify, the judicial or quasi-judicial body, or investigating authority
shall assure a speedy hearing or trial and shall endeavor to finish said proceeding
within three (3) months from the filing of the case.
Section 10. State Witness. - Any person who has participated in the commission of
a crime and desires to be a witness for the State, can apply and, if qualified as
determined in this Act and by the Department, shall be admitted into the Program
whenever the following circumstances are present:
the offense in which his testimony will be used is a grave felony as defined
under the Revised Penal Code or its equivalent under special laws;
there is absolute necessity for his testimony;
there is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of
the offense committed:
his testimony can be substantially corroborated on its material points;
he does not appear to be most guilty; and
he has not at any time been convicted of any crime involving moral
turpitude.
An accused discharged from an information or criminal complaint by the court in
order that he may be a State Witness pursuant to Section 9 and 10 of Rule 119 of
the Revised Rules of Court may upon his petition be admitted to the Program if he
complies with the other requirements of this Act. Nothing in this Act shall prevent
the discharge of an accused, so that he can be used as a State Witness under Rule
119 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Section 11. Sworn Statement. - Before any person is admitted into the Program
pursuant to the next preceding Section he shall execute a sworn statement
describing in detail the manner in which the offense was committed and his
participation therein. If after said examination of said person, his sworn statement
and other relevant facts, the Department is satisfied that the requirements of this
Act and its implementing rules are complied with, it may admit such person into
the Program and issue the corresponding certification.
If his application for admission is denied, said sworn statement and any other
testimony given in support of said application shall not be admissible in evidence,
except for impeachment purposes.
Section 12. Effect of Admission of a State Witness into the Program. - The
certification of admission into the Program by the Department shall be given full
faith and credit by the provincial or city prosecutor who is required not to include
the Witness in the criminal complaint or information and if included therein, to
petition the court for his discharge in order that he can utilized as a State Witness.
The Court shall order the discharge and exclusion of the said accused from the
information.
Admission into the Program shall entitle such State Witness to immunity from
criminal prosecution for the offense or offenses in which his testimony will be given
or used and all the rights and benefits provided under Section 8 hereof.
Section 13. Failure or Refusal of the Witness to Testify. - Any Witness registered in
the Program who fails or refuses to testify or to continue to testify without just
cause when lawfully obliged to do so, shall be prosecuted for contempt. If he
testifies falsely or evasively, he shall be liable to prosecution for perjury. If a State
Witness fails or refuses to testify, or testifies falsely or evasively, or violates any
condition accompanying such immunity without just cause, as determined in a
hearing by the proper court, his immunity shall be removed and he shall be subject
to contempt or criminal prosecution. Moreover, the enjoyment of all rights and
benefits under this Act shall be deemed terminated.
The Witness may, however, purge himself of the contumacious acts by testifying at
any appropriate stage of the proceedings.
Section 14. Compelled Testimony. - Any Witness admitted into the Program
pursuant to Sections 3 and 10 of this Act cannot refuse to testify or give evidence
or produce books, documents, records or writings necessary for the prosecution of
the offense or offenses for which he has been admitted into the Program on the
ground of the constitutional right against self-incrimination but he shall enjoy
immunity from criminal prosecution and cannot be subjected to any penalty or
forfeiture for any transaction, matter or thing concerning his compelled testimony
or books, documents, records and writings produced.
In case of refusal of said Witness to testify or give evidence or produce books,
documents, records, or writings, on the ground of the right against self-
incrimination, and the state prosecutor or investigator believes that such evidence
is absolutely necessary for a successful prosecution of the offense or offenses
charged or under investigation, he, with the prior approval of the department, shall
file a petition with the appropriate court for the issuance of an order requiring said
Witness to testify, give evidence or produce the books, documents, records, and
writings described, and the court shall issue the proper order.
The court, upon motion of the state prosecutor or investigator, shall order the
arrest and detention of the Witness in any jail contiguous to the place of trial or
investigation until such time that the Witness is willing to give such testimony or
produce such documentary evidence.
Section 15. Perjury or Contempt. - No Witness shall be exempt from prosecution for
perjury or contempt committed while giving testimony or producing evidence
under compulsion pursuant to this Act. The penalty next higher in degree shall be
imposed in case of conviction for perjury. The procedure prescribed under Rule 71
of the Rules of Court shall be followed in contempt proceedings but the penalty to
be imposed shall not be less than one (1) month but not more than one (1) year
imprisonment.
Section 16. Credibility of Witness. - In all criminal cases, the fact of the entitlement
of the Witness to the protection and benefits provided for in this Act shall not be
admissible in evidence to diminish or affect his credibility.
Section 17. Penalty for Harassment of Witness. - Any person who harasses a
Witness and thereby hinders, delays, prevents or dissuades a Witness from:
attending or testifying before any judicial or quasi-judicial body or investigating
authority;
reporting to a law enforcement officer or judge the commission or possible
commission of an offense, or a violation of conditions or probation, parole, or
release pending judicial proceedings;
seeking the arrest of another person in connection with the offense;
causing a criminal prosecution, or a proceeding for the revocation of a parole or
probation; or
performing and enjoying the rights and benefits under this Act or attempts to do
so, shall be fined not more than Three thousand pesos (P3,000.00) or suffer
imprisonment of not less than six (6) months but not more than one (1) year, or
both, and he shall also suffer the penalty of perpetual disqualification from holding
public office in case of a public officer.
Section 18. Rules and Regulations. - The Department shall promulgate such rules
and regulations as may be necessary to implement the intent and purposes of this
Act. Said rules and regulations shall be published in two (2) newspapers of general
circulation.
Section 19. Repealing Clause. - All laws, decrees, executive issuances, rules and
regulations inconsistent with this Act are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
Section 20. Funding. - The amount of Ten million pesos (P10,000,000.00) is hereby
authorized to be appropriated out of any funds in the National Treasury not
otherwise appropriated to carry into effect the purpose of this Act.
Expenses incurred in the implementation of the Program may be recovered as part
of the cost or indemnity imposed upon the accused.
Furthermore, other funding schemes or sources, subject to the limitations of the
law, shall be allowed in furtherance hereof.
Section 21. Separability Clause. - The declaration of unconstitutionality or invalidity
of any provision of this Act shall not affect the other provisions hereof.
Section 22. Effectivity. - This Act shall take effect after fifteen (15) days following its
publication in two (2) newspapers of general circulation.
Approved: April 24, 1991

RA 9165: Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002
Section 33. Immunity from Prosecution and Punishment. Notwithstanding the
provisions of Section 17, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure and
the provisions of Republic Act No. 6981 or the Witness Protection, Security and
Benefit Act of 1991, any person who has violated Sections 7, 11, 12, 14, 15, and 19,
Article II of this Act, who voluntarily gives information about any violation of
Sections 4, 5, 6, 8, 10, 13, and 16, Article II of this Act as well as any violation of the
offenses mentioned if committed by a drug syndicate, or any information leading
to the whereabouts, identities and arrest of all or any of the members thereof; and
who willingly testifies against such persons as described above, shall be exempted
from prosecution or punishment for the offense with reference to which his/her
information of testimony were given, and may plead or prove the giving of such
information and testimony in bar of such prosecution: Provided, That the following
conditions concur:
(1) The information and testimony are necessary for the conviction of the
persons described above;
(2) Such information and testimony are not yet in the possession of the
State;
(3) Such information and testimony can be corroborated on its material
points;
(4) the informant or witness has not been previously convicted of a crime
involving moral turpitude, except when there is no other direct evidence
available for the State other than the information and testimony of said
informant or witness; and
(5) The informant or witness shall strictly and faithfully comply without
delay, any condition or undertaking, reduced into writing, lawfully imposed
by the State as further consideration for the grant of immunity from
prosecution and punishment.
Provided, further, That this immunity may be enjoyed by such informant or witness
who does not appear to be most guilty for the offense with reference to which
his/her information or testimony were given: Provided, finally, That there is no
direct evidence available for the State except for the information and testimony of
the said informant or witness.
Section 34. Termination of the Grant of Immunity. The immunity granted to the
informant or witness, as prescribed in Section 33 of this Act, shall not attach should
it turn out subsequently that the information and/or testimony is false, malicious
or made only for the purpose of harassing, molesting or in any way prejudicing the
persons described in the preceding Section against whom such information or
testimony is directed against. In such case, the informant or witness shall be
subject to prosecution and the enjoyment of all rights and benefits previously
accorded him under this Act or any other law, decree or order shall be deemed
terminated.
In case an informant or witness under this Act fails or refuses to testify without just
cause, and when lawfully obliged to do so, or should he/she violate any condition
accompanying such immunity as provided above, his/her immunity shall be
removed and he/she shall likewise be subject to contempt and/or criminal
prosecution, as the case may be, and the enjoyment of all rights and benefits
previously accorded him under this Act or in any other law, decree or order shall be
deemed terminated.
In case the informant or witness referred to under this Act falls under the
applicability of this Section hereof, such individual cannot avail of the provisions
under Article VIII of this Act.

RA 9485: Anti-Red Tape Act of 2007
SEC. 15. Immunity; Discharge of Co-Respondent/Accused to be a Witness. - Any
public official or employee or any person having been charged with another under
this Act and who voluntarily gives information pertaining to an investigation or who
willingly testifies therefore, shall be exempt from prosecution in the case/s where
his/her information and testimony are given. The discharge may be granted and
directed by the investigating body or court upon the application or petition of any
of the respondent/accused-informant and before the termination of the
investigation: Provided, That:
(a) There is absolute necessity for the testimony of the respondent/accused-
informant whose discharge is requested;
(b) There is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the
offense committed, except the testimony of said respondent/accused-informant;
(c) The testimony of said respondent/accused-informant can be substantially
corroborated in its material points;
(d) The responden/accused-informant has not been previously convicted of a crime
involving moral turpitude; and
(e) Said responden/accused-informant does not appear to be the most guilty.
Evidence adduced in support of the discharge shall automatically form part of the
records of the investigation. Should the investigating body or court deny the
motion or request for discharge as a witness, his/her sworn statement shall be
inadmissible as evidence.

Quarto vs. Marcelo
Facts: The DPWH Secretary created a committee to investigate alleged anomalous
transactions involving the repairs and/or purchase of spare parts of DPWH service
vehicles with the DPWH Internal Audit Service to conduct the actual investigation.
The DPWH-IAS discovered that from March to December 2001, several emergency
repairs and/or purchase of spare parts of hundreds of DPWH service vehicles,
which were approved and paid by the government, did not actually take place,
resulting in government losses of approximately P143 million for this ten-month
period alone. The committee then filed before the Office of the Ombudsman
complaints charging the petitioner, the respondents, who are officials and
employees of the DPWH, and other private individuals who purportedly benefitted
from the anomalous transactions.
The Ombudsman filed with the Sandiganbayan

several information charging the
said DPWH officials and employees with plunder,

estafa through falsification of
official/commercial documents and violation of Section 3(e), RA No. 3019. On the
other hand, the Ombudsman granted the respondents' request for immunity in
exchange for their testimonies and cooperation in the prosecution of the cases
filed.
Issue: Whether the Ombudsman has the authority to grant immunity from
prosecution to witnesses
Held: Yes. RA No. 6770 specifically empowers the Ombudsman to grant
immunity "in any hearing, inquiry or proceeding being conducted by the
Ombudsman or under its authority, in the performance or in the furtherance of its
constitutional functions and statutory objectives." In the exercise of his
investigatory and prosecutorial powers, he enjoys the same latitude of discretion in
determining what constitutes sufficient evidence to support a finding of probable
cause and the degree of participation of those involved or the lack thereof. His
findings and conclusions on these matters are not ordinarily subject to review by
the courts except when he gravely abuses his discretion, which the petitioner has
failed to establish in this case.

People vs. Sandiganbayan
Facts: This case arose from the issuance of two Tax Credit Certificates in favor of
JAM Liner, Inc. which were investigated and found fraudulent by the Presidential
Task Force 156, created by then President Joseph E. Estrada.
The principal respondent in this case, Homero A. Mercado, was the President of
JAM Liner, Inc. The other respondents, Antonio A. Belicena, Uldarico P. Andutan Jr.,
Raul C. De Vera, and Rosanna P. Diala, were Department of Finance (DOF) officials
formerly assigned at its One-Stop Shop Inter-Agency Tax Credit and Drawback
Center (DOF One-Stop Shop).
Sometime in 2000, showing willingness to testify against the criminal syndicate that
allegedly ran the tax credit scam at the DOF One-Stop Shop, Mercado applied with
the Department of Justice (DOJ) for immunity as state witness under its witness
protection program. On June 5, 2000 the DOJ favorably acted on the application
and granted immunity to Mercado.
The first information alleged that respondent DOF officials approved and issued in
1996 Tax Credit Certificate 7711 for P7,350,444.00 in favor of JAM Liner, Inc. for
domestic capital equipment although it did not qualify for such tax credit. The
second Information alleged that they further illegally issued in 1996 Tax Credit
Certificate 7708 for P4,410,265.50 in favor of the same company covering its
purchase of six Mitsubishi buses.
Mercado filed a motion for reconsideration or reinvestigation before the
Ombudsman, citing the DOJs grant of immunity to him. Ombudsman executed an
Immunity Agreement

with Mercado. The agreement provided that, in consideration
for granting him immunity from suit, Mercado would produce all relevant
documents in his possession and testify against the accused in all the cases,
criminal or otherwise, that may be filed against them. Accordingly, on the same
date, the Ombudsman filed a motion to discharge Mercado from the information
involving him.
But on April 30, 2008 the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution, denying the
Ombudsmans motion. The Ombudsman filed a motion for reconsideration but the
court denied it on November 6, 2008, hence, this petition of the People of the
Philippines.
Issue: WON the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in refusing to
recognize the immunity from criminal prosecution that the Ombudsman granted
respondent Mercado and, as a result, in declining to discharge him from the
information as a state witness.
Held: Respondents De Vera and Diala, Mercados co-accused who opposed the
grant of immunity to him, contend that the immunity that the Ombudsman gave
Mercado does not bind the court, which in the meantime already acquired
jurisdiction over the case against him. That immunity merely relieves Mercado
from any further proceedings, including preliminary investigation, which the state
might still attempt to initiate against him.
The filing of the criminal action against an accused in court does not prevent the
Ombudsman from exercising the power that the Congress has granted him. The
Ombudsman premised its grant of immunity to Mercado on his undertaking to
produce all the documents in his possession relative to the DOF tax credit scam and
to testify in all pending criminal, civil, and administrative cases against those
involved. Indeed, he had consistently cooperated even prior to immunity
agreement in the investigation and prosecution of the case. His testimony gave the
prosecution a clearer picture of the transactions that led to the issuance of the
subject certificates.
Here, the Sandiganbayan held that Mercados testimony is not absolutely
necessary because the state has other direct evidence that may prove the offenses
charged. It held that Mercardos testimony, in large part, would only help (1)
identify numerous documents and (2) disclose matters that are essentially already
contained in such documents.
But the records, particularly Mercados consolidated affidavit, show that his
testimony if true could be indispensable in establishing the circumstances that led
to the preparation and issuance of fraudulent tax credit certificates. Indeed,
nobody appears to be in a better position to testify on this than he, as president of
JAM Liner, Inc., the company to which those certificates were issued.
Respondents further contend that Mercado should not be granted immunity
because he also benefited from the unlawful transactions. But the immunity
granted to Mercado does not blot out the fact that he committed the offense.
While he is liable, the State saw a higher social value in eliciting information from
him rather than in engaging in his prosecution.
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition, SETS ASIDE the Sandiganbayans
Resolutions.

Mapa, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan