CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

A. THE INHERENT POWERS OF THE STATE

Police Power
1. Define Police Power and clarify its scope.
Held: 1. Police power is an inherent attribute of sovereignty. It has been
defined as the power vested by the Constitution in the legislature to make, ordain, and
establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes and ordinances, either
with penalties or without, not repugnant to the Constitution, as they shall judge to be for
the good and welfare of the commonwealth, and for the subjects of the same. The
power is plenary and its scope is vast and pervasive, reaching and justifying measures
for public health, public safety, public morals, and the general welfare.
It bears stressing that police power is lodged primarily in the ational
!egislature. It cannot be e"ercised by any group or body of individuals not possessing
legislative power. The ational !egislature, however, may delegate this power to the
President and administrative boards as well as the lawmaking bodies of municipal
corporations or local government units. #nce delegated, the agents can e"ercise only
such legislative powers as are conferred on them by the national lawmaking body.
(Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Bel-Air Village Association, Inc.,
328 !"A 83#, 8$3-8$$, March 2%, 2&&&, '
st
Div. ()uno*+
$. The scope of police power has been held to be so comprehensive as to
encompass almost all matters affecting the health, safety, peace, order, morals, comfort
and convenience of the community. Police power is essentially regulatory in nature and
the power to issue licenses or grant business permits, if e"ercised for a regulatory and
not revenue%raising purpose, is within the ambit of this power.
& " "
'T(he issuance of business licenses and permits by a municipality or city is
essentially regulatory in nature. The authority, which devolved upon local government
units to issue or grant such licenses or permits, is essentially in the e"ercise of the police
power of the )tate within the contemplation of the general welfare clause of the !ocal
*overnment Code. (Ace,e-o .ptical !ompany, Inc. v. !ourt o/ Appeals, 320 !"A
3'$, March 3', 2&&&, 1n Banc ()urisima*+
2. Does Article 263(g) of the Labor Code (esting !pon the "ecretary of Labor the
discretion to deter#ine what ind!stries are indispensable to the national interest and
thereafter$ ass!#e %!risdiction oer disp!tes in said ind!stries) iolate the wor&ers'
constit!tional right to stri&e(
Held: )aid article does not interfere with the workers+ right to strike but merely
regulates it, when in the e"ercise of such right, national interests will be affected. The
rights granted by the Constitution are not absolute. They are still subject to control and
limitation to ensure that they are not e"ercised arbitrarily. The interests of both the
employers and the employees are intended to be protected and not one of them is given
undue preference.
The !abor Code vests upon the )ecretary of !abor the discretion to determine
what industries are indispensable to national interest. Thus, upon the determination of
the )ecretary of !abor that such industry is indispensable to the national interest, it will
assume jurisdiction over the labor dispute of said industry. The assumption of
jurisdiction is in the nature of police power measure. This is done for the promotion of
the common good considering that a prolonged strike or lockout can be inimical to the
national economy. The )ecretary of !abor acts to maintain industrial peace. Thus, his
certification for compulsory arbitration is not intended to impede the workers+ right to
strike but to obtain a speedy settlement of the dispute. ()hiltrea- 2or3ers 4nion
()524* v. !on/esor, 2#0 !"A 303, March '2, '00%+
1
3. )ay solicitation for religio!s p!rposes be s!b%ect to proper reg!lation by the "tate in
the e*ercise of police power(
Held: The constitutional inhibition of legislation on the subject of religion has a
double aspect. #n the one hand, it forestalls compulsion by law of the acceptance of
any creed or the practice of any form of worship. ,reedom of conscience and freedom
to adhere to such religious organi-ation or form of worship as the individual may choose
cannot be restricted by law. #n the other hand, it safeguards the free e"ercise of the
chosen form of religion. Thus, the Constitution embraces two concepts, that is, freedom
to believe and freedom to act. The first is absolute but, in the nature of things, the
second cannot be. Conduct remains subject to regulation for the protection of society.
The freedom to act must have appropriate definitions to preserve the enforcement of that
protection. In every case, the power to regulate must be so e"ercised, in attaining a
permissible end, as not to unduly infringe on the protected freedom.
.hence, even the e"ercise of religion may be regulated, at some slight
inconvenience, in order that the )tate may protect its citi-ens from injury. .ithout doubt,
a )tate may protect its citi-ens from fraudulent solicitation by re/uiring a stranger in the
community, before permitting him publicly to solicit funds for any purpose, to establish
his identity and his authority to act for the cause which he purports to represent. The
)tate is likewise free to regulate the time and manner of solicitation generally, in the
interest of public safety, peace, comfort, or convenience.
It does not follow, therefore, from the constitutional guarantees of the free
e"ercise of religion that everything which may be so called can be tolerated. It has been
said that a law advancing a legitimate governmental interest is not necessarily invalid as
one interfering with the 0free e"ercise1 of religion merely because it also incidentally has
a detrimental effect on the adherents of one or more religion. Thus, the general
regulation, in the public interest, of solicitation, which does not involve any religious test
and does not unreasonably obstruct or delay the collection of funds, is not open to any
constitutional objection, even though the collection be for a religious purpose. )uch
regulation would not constitute a prohibited previous restraint on the free e"ercise of
religion or interpose an inadmissible obstacle to its e"ercise.
2ven with numerous regulative laws in e"istence, it is surprising how many
operations are carried on by persons and associations who, secreting their activities
under the guise of benevolent purposes, succeed in cheating and defrauding a generous
public. It is in fact ama-ing how profitable the fraudulent schemes and practices are to
people who manipulate them. The )tate has authority under the e"ercise of its police
power to determine whether or not there shall be restrictions on soliciting by
unscrupulous persons or for unworthy causes or for fraudulent purposes. That
solicitation of contributions under the guise of charitable and benevolent purposes is
grossly abused is a matter of common knowledge. Certainly the solicitation of
contributions in good faith for worthy purposes should not be denied, but somewhere
should be lodged the power to determine within reasonable limits the worthy from the
unworthy. The objectionable practices of unscrupulous persons are prejudicial to worthy
and proper charities which naturally suffer when the confidence of the public in
campaigns for the raising of money for charity is lessened or destroyed. )ome
regulation of public solicitation is, therefore, in the public interest.
To conclude, solicitation for religious purposes may be subject to proper
regulation by the )tate in the e"ercise of police power. (!enteno v. Villalon-)ornillos,
23# !"A '0%, ept. ', '00$ ("egala-o*+
The Power of Eminent om!in
+. ,hat is -#inent Do#ain(
Held: 1. 2minent domain is the right or power of a sovereign state to
appropriate private property to particular uses to promote public welfare. It is an
2
indispensable attribute of sovereignty3 a power grounded in the primary duty of
government to serve the common need and advance the general welfare. Thus, the
right of eminent domain appertains to every independent government without the
necessity for constitutional recognition. The provisions found in modern constitutions of
civili-ed countries relating to the taking of property for the public use do not by
implication grant the power to the government, but limit a power which would otherwise
be without limit. Thus, our own Constitution provides that 0'p(rivate property shall not be
taken for public use without just compensation.1 (Art. ...$ "ec. /). ,urthermore, the due
process and e/ual protection clauses (1/01 Constit!tion$ Art. ...$ "ec. 1) act as
additional safeguards against the arbitrary e"ercise of this governmental power.
)ince the e"ercise of the power of eminent domain affects an individual+s right to
private property, a constitutionally%protected right necessary for the preservation and
enhancement of personal dignity and intimately connected with the rights to life and
liberty$ the need for its circumspect operation cannot be overemphasi-ed. In City of
)anila . Chinese Co##!nity of )anila we said (+2 Phil. 3+/ 31/1/)4
The e"ercise of the right of eminent domain, whether directly by the )tate,
or by its authori-ed agents, is necessarily in derogation of private rights, and the
rule in that case is that the authority must be strictly construed. o species of
property is held by individuals with greater tenacity, and none is guarded by the
Constitution and the laws more sedulously, than the right to the freehold of
inhabitants. .hen the legislature interferes with that right, and, for greater public
purposes, appropriates the land of ah individual without his consent, the plain
meaning of the law should not be enlarged by doubt'ful( interpretation. (4ensley
. )o!ntainla&e ,ater Co.$ 13 Cal.$ 326 and cases cited 313 A#. Dec.$ 5166)
The statutory power of taking property from the owner without his consent is one
of the most delicate e"ercise of governmental authority. It is to be watched with jealous
scrutiny. Important as the power may be to the government, the inviolable sanctity which
all free constitutions attach to the right of property of the citi-ens, constrains the strict
observance of the substantial provisions of the law which are prescribed as modes of the
e"ercise of the power, and to protect it from abuse " " ".
The power of eminent domain is essentially legislative in nature. It is firmly
settled, however, that such power may be validly delegated to local government units,
other public entities and public utilities, although the scope of this delegated legislative
power is necessarily narrower than that of the delegating authority and may only be
e"ercised in strict compliance with the terms of the delegating law. (6eirs o/ Al,erto
uguitan v. !ity o/ Man-aluyong, 328 !"A '3%, '$$-'$#, March '$, 2&&&, 3
r-
Div.
(7on8aga-"eyes*+
$. 2minent domain is a fundamental )tate power that is inseparable from
sovereignty. It is government+s right to appropriate, in the nature of a compulsory sale to
the )tate, private property for public use or purpose. Inherently possessed by the
national legislature, the power of eminent domain may be validly delegated to local
governments, other public entities and public utilities. ,or the taking of private property
by the government to be valid, the taking must be for public purpose and there must be
just compensation. (Mo-ay v. !ourt o/ Appeals, 2#8 !"A 98#, :e,ruary 2&, '00%+
5. "tate so#e li#itations on the e*ercise of the power of -#inent Do#ain.

Held: The limitations on the power of eminent domain are that the use must be
public, compensation must be made and due process of law must be observed. The
)upreme Court, taking cogni-ance of such issues as the ade/uacy of compensation,
necessity of the taking and the public use character or the purpose of the taking, has
ruled that the necessity of e"ercising eminent domain must be genuine and of a public
character. *overnment may not capriciously choose what private property should be
taken. (Mo-ay v. !ourt o/ Appeals, 2#8 !"A 98#, :e,ruary 2&, '00%+
6. Disc!ss the e*panded notion of p!blic !se in e#inent do#ain proceedings.
3
Held: The City of 5anila, acting through its legislative branch, has the e"press
power to ac/uire private lands in the city and subdivide these lands into home lots for
sale to bona fide tenants or occupants thereof, and to laborers and low%salaried
employees of the city.
That only a few could actually benefit from the e"propriation of the property does
not diminish its public character. It is simply not possible to provide all at once land and
shelter for all who need them.
Corollary to the e"panded notion of public use, e"propriation is not anymore
confined to vast tracts of land and landed estates. It is therefore of no moment that the
land sought to be e"propriated in this case is less than half a hectare only.
Through the years, the public use re/uirement in eminent domain has evolved
into a fle"ible concept, influenced by changing conditions. Public use now includes the
broader notion of indirect public benefit or advantage, including in particular, urban land
reform and housing. (:ilstream International Incorporate- v. !A, 28$ !"A %'#,
;an. 23, '008 (:rancisco*+
1. 7he constit!tionality of "ec. /2 of 4.P. 4lg. 001 (re8!iring radio and teleision station
owners and operators to gie to the Co#elec radio and teleision ti#e free of
charge) was challenged on the gro!nd$ a#ong others$ that it iolated the d!e
process cla!se and the e#inent do#ain proision of the Constit!tion by ta&ing
airti#e fro# radio and teleision broadcasting stations witho!t pay#ent of %!st
co#pensation. Petitioners clai# that the pri#ary so!rce of reen!e of radio and
teleision stations is the sale of airti#e to adertisers and that to re8!ire these
stations to proide free airti#e is to a!thori9e a ta&ing which is not :a de #ini#is
te#porary li#itation or restraint !pon the !se of priate property.; ,ill yo! s!stain
the challenge(
Held: 6ll broadcasting, whether by radio or by television stations, is licensed by
the government. 6irwave fre/uencies have to be allocated as there are more individuals
who want to broadcast than there are fre/uencies to assign. 6 franchise is thus a
privilege subject, among other things, to amendment by Congress in accordance with
the constitutional provision that 0any such franchise or right granted " " " shall be subject
to amendment, alteration or repeal by the Congress when the common good so
re/uires.1 (Art. <..$ "ec. 11)
Indeed, provisions for Comelec Time have been made by amendment of the
franchises of radio and television broadcast stations and such provisions have not been
thought of as taking property without just compensation. 6rt. &II, )ec. 11 of the
Constitution authori-es the amendment of franchises for 0the common good.1 .hat
better measure can be conceived for the common good than one for free airtime for the
benefit not only of candidates but even more of the public, particularly the voters, so that
they will be fully informed of the issues in an election7 0'I(t is the right of the viewers and
listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which is paramount.1
or indeed can there be any constitutional objection to the re/uirement that
broadcast stations give free airtime. 2ven in the 8nited )tates, there are responsible
scholars who believe that government controls on broadcast media can constitutionally
be instituted to ensure diversity of views and attention to public affairs to further the
system of free e"pression. ,or this purpose, broadcast stations may be re/uired to give
free airtime to candidates in an election.
In truth, radio and television broadcasting companies, which are given
franchises, do not own the airwaves and fre/uencies through which they transmit
broadcast signals and images. They are merely given the temporary privilege of using
them. )ince a franchise is a mere privilege, the e"ercise of the privilege may reasonably
be burdened with the performance by the grantee of some form of public service.
In the granting of the privilege to operate broadcast stations and thereafter
supervising radio and television stations, the )tate spends considerable public funds in
4
licensing and supervising such stations. It would be strange if it cannot even re/uire the
licensees to render public service by giving free airtime.
The claim that petitioner would be losing P9$,:;<,<<<.<< in unreali-ed revenue
from advertising is based on the assumption that airtime is 0finished product1 which, it is
said, become the property of the company, like oil produced from refining or similar
natural resources after undergoing a process for their production. 6s held in =ed Lion
4roadcasting Co. . >.C.C. (3/5 ?.". at 3/+$ 23 L. -d. 2d at 3/1$ 8!oting +1 ?.".C. "ec.
321)$ which upheld the right of a party personally attacked to reply, 0licenses to
broadcast do not confer ownership of designated fre/uencies, but only the temporary
privilege of using them.1 Conse/uently, 0a license permits broadcasting, but the licensee
has no constitutional right to be the one who holds the license or to monopoli-e a radio
fre/uency to the e"clusion of his fellow citi-ens. There is nothing in the ,irst
6mendment which prevents the government from re/uiring a licensee to share his
fre/uency with others and to conduct himself as a pro"y or fiduciary with obligations to
present those views and voices which are representative of his community and which
would otherwise, by necessity, be barred from the airwaves.1 6s radio and television
broadcast stations do not own the airwaves, no private property is taken by the
re/uirement that they provide airtime to the Comelec. (51<1BA), Inc. v. !.M1<1!,
280 !"A 33%, April 2', '008 (Men-o8a*+
0. )ay e#inent do#ain be barred by @res %!dicata@ or @law of the case@(
Held: The principle of res %!dicata$ which finds application in generally all cases
and proceedings, cannot bar the right of the )tate or its agents to e"propriate private
property. The very nature of eminent domain, as an inherent power of the )tate, dictates
that the right to e"ercise the power be absolute and unfettered even by a prior judgment
or res %!dicata. The scope of eminent domain is plenary and, like police power, can
0reach every form of property which the )tate might need for public use.1 6ll separate
interests of individuals in property are held of the government under this tacit agreement
or implied reservation. otwithstanding the grant to individuals, the e#inent do#ain$ the
highest and most e"act idea of property, remains in the government, or in the aggregate
body of the people in their sovereign capacity3 and they have the right to resume the
possession of the property whenever the public interest re/uires it.1 Thus, the )tate or
its authori-ed agent cannot be forever barred from e"ercising said right by reason alone
of previous non%compliance with any legal re/uirement.
.hile the principle of res %!dicata does not denigrate the right of the )tate to
e"ercise eminent domain, it does apply to specific issues decided in a previous case.
,or e"ample, a final judgment dismissing an e"propriation suit on the ground that there
was no prior offer precludes another suit raising the same issue3 it cannot, however, bar
the )tate or its agent from thereafter complying with this re/uirement, as prescribed by
law, and subse/uently e"ercising its power of eminent domain over the same property.
(Municipality o/ )arana=ue v. V.M. "ealty !orporation, 202 !"A #%8, ;uly 2&,
'008 ()angani,an*+
/. Disc!ss how e*propriation #ay be initiated$ and the two stages in e*propriation.
Held: 2"propriation may be initiated by court action or by legislation. In both
instances, just compensation is determined by the courts (-PAA . D!lay$ 1+/ "C=A
325 31/016).
The e"propriation of lands consists of two stages. 6s e"plained in )!nicipality of
4inan . Barcia (102 "C=A 516$ 503C50+ 31/0/6$ reiterated in Dational Power Corp. .
Eocson$ 226 "C=A 522 31//26)F
The first is concerned with the determination of the authority of the plaintiff
to e"ercise the power of eminent domain and the propriety of its e"ercise in the
conte"t of the facts involved in the suit. It ends with an order, if not dismissal of
the action, =of condemnation declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take
the property sought to be condemned, for the public use or purpose declared in
5
the complaint, upon the payment of just compensation to be determined as of the
date of the filing of the complaint= " " ".
The second phase of the eminent domain action is concerned with the
determination by the court of =the just compensation for the property sought to be
taken.= This is done by the court with the assistance of not more than three >:?
commissioners " " ".
It is only upon the completion of these two stages that e"propriation is said to
have been completed. 5oreover, it is only upon payment of just compensation that title
over the property passes to the government. Therefore, until the action for e"propriation
has been completed and terminated, ownership over the property being e"propriated
remains with the registered owner. Conse/uently, the latter can e"ercise all rights
pertaining to an owner, including the right to dispose of his property, subject to the power
of the )tate ultimately to ac/uire it through e"propriation. ("epu,lic v. alem
Investment !orporation, et. al., 7.". >o. '3%9#0, ;une 23, 2&&&, 2
n-
Div. (Men-o8a*+
12. Does the two (2) stages in e*propriation apply only to %!dicial$ and not to legislatie$
e*propriation(
Held: The @e la Aamas are mistaken in arguing that the two stages of
e"propriation " " " only apply to judicial, and not to legislative, e"propriation. 6lthough
Congress has the power to determine what land to take, it can not do so arbitrarily.
Budicial determination of the propriety of the e"ercise of the power, for instance, in view
of allegations of partiality and prejudice by those adversely affected$ and the just
compensation for the subject property is provided in our constitutional system.
.e see no point in distinguishing between judicial and legislative e"propriation as
far as the two stages mentioned above are concerned. Coth involve these stages and in
both the process is not completed until payment of just compensation is made. The
Court of 6ppeals was correct in saying that C.P. Clg. :D< did not effectively e"propriate
the land of the @e la Aamas. 6s a matter of fact, it merely commenced the e"propriation
of the subject property.
& " "
The @e la Aamas make much of the fact that ownership of the land was
transferred to the government because the e/uitable and the beneficial title was already
ac/uired by it in 1E;:, leaving them with only the naked title. Fowever, as this Court
held in Association of "#all Landowners in the Phil.$ .nc. . "ecretary of Agrarian
=efor# (115 "C=A 3+3$ 30/ 31/0/6)F
The recogni-ed rule, indeed, is that title to the property e"propriated shall
pass from the owner to the e"propriator only upon full payment of the just
compensation. Burisprudence on this settled principle is consistent both here
and in other democratic jurisdictions. & " "
("epu,lic v. alem Investment !orporation, et. al., 7.". >o. '3%9#0, ;une 23, 2&&&,
2
n-
Div. (Men-o8a*+
11. .s prior !ns!ccessf!l negotiation a condition precedent for the e*ercise of e#inent
do#ain(
Held: Citing .ron and "teel A!thority . Co!rt of Appeals (2+/ "C=A 530$
Gctober 25$ 1//5)$ petitioner insists that before eminent domain may be e"ercised by
the state, there must be a showing of prior unsuccessful negotiation with the owner of
the property to be e"propriated.
This contention is not correct. 6s pointed out by the )olicitor *eneral the current
effective law on delegated authority to e"ercise the power of eminent domain is found in
)ection 1$, Cook III of the Aevised 6dministrative Code, which provides4
6
0)2C. 1$. Power of -#inent Do#ain G The President shall determine
when it is necessary or advantageous to e"ercise the power of eminent domain
in behalf of the ational *overnment, and direct the )olicitor *eneral, whenever
he deems the action advisable, to institute e"propriation proceedings in the
proper court.1
The foregoing provision does not re/uire prior unsuccessful negotiation as a
condition precedent for the e"ercise of eminent domain. In .ron and "teel A!thority .
Co!rt of Appeals$ the President chose to prescribe this condition as an additional
re/uirement instead. In the instant case, however, no such voluntary restriction was
imposed. (MI Development !orporation v. "epu,lic, 323 !"A 8#2, ;an. 28, 2&&&,
3
r-
Div. ()angani,an*+
The Power of T!"!tion
12. Can ta*es be s!b%ect to offCsetting or co#pensation(
Held: Ta"es cannot be subject to compensation for the simple reason that the
government and the ta"payer are not creditors and debtors of each other. There is a
material distinction between a ta" and debt. @ebts are due to the *overnment in its
corporate capacity, while ta"es are due to the *overnment in its sovereign capacity. It
must be noted that a distinguishing feature of a ta" is that it is compulsory rather than a
matter of bargain. Fence, a ta" does not depend upon the consent of the ta"payer. If
any ta"payer can defer the payment of ta"es by raising the defense that it still has a
pending claim for refund or credit, this would adversely affect the government revenue
system. 6 ta"payer cannot refuse to pay his ta"es when they fall due simply because he
has a claim against the government or that the collection of a ta" is contingent on the
result of the lawsuit it filed against the government. ()hile? Mining !orporation v.
!ommissioner o/ Internal "evenue, 20$ !"A #8%, Aug. 28, '008 ("omero*+
13. ?nder Article H.$ "ection 20$ paragraph 3 of the 1/01 Constit!tion$ @3C6haritable
instit!tions$ ch!rches and parsonages or conents app!rtenant thereto$ #os8!es$
nonCprofit ce#eteries$ and all lands$ b!ildings$ and i#proe#ents$ act!ally$ directly
and e*cl!siely !sed for religio!s$ charitable or ed!cational p!rposes shall be
e*e#pt fro# ta*ation.@ I)CA clai#s that the inco#e earned by its b!ilding leased
to priate entities and that of its par&ing space is li&ewise coered by said
e*e#ption. =esole.
Held: The debates, interpellations and e"pressions of opinion of the framers of
the Constitution reveal their intent that which, in turn, may have guided the people in
ratifying the Charter. )uch intent must be effectuated.
6ccordingly, Bustice Filario *. @avide, Br., a former constitutional commissioner,
who is now a member of this Court, stressed during the Concom debates that =" " "
what is e"empted is not the institution itself " " "3 those e"empted from real estate ta"es
are lands, buildings and improvements actually, directly and e"clusively used for
religious, charitable or educational purposes. ,ather Boa/uin *. Cernas, an eminent
authority on the Constitution and also a member of the Concom, adhered to the same
view that the e"emption created by said provision pertained only to property ta"es.
In his treatise on ta"ation, 5r. Bustice Bose C. Hitug concurs, stating that ='t(he
ta" e"emption covers property ta"es only.= (!ommissioner o/ Internal "evenue v. !A,
208 !"A 83, .ct. '$, '008 ()angani,an*+
1+. ?nder Article <.H$ "ection +$ paragraph 3 of the 1/01 Constit!tion$ @3A6ll reen!es
and assets of nonCstoc&$ nonCprofit ed!cational instit!tions !sed act!ally$ directly$
and e*cl!siely for ed!cational p!rposes shall be e*e#pt fro# ta*es and d!ties.@
I)CA alleged that it @is a nonCprofit ed!cational instit!tion whose reen!es and
assets are !sed act!ally$ directly and e*cl!siely for ed!cational p!rposes so it is
e*e#pt fro# ta*es on its properties and inco#e.@
7
Held: .e reiterate that private respondent is e"empt from the payment of
property ta", but not income ta" on the rentals from its property. The bare allegation
alone that it is a non%stock, non%profit educational institution is insufficient to justify its
e"emption from the payment of income ta".
'!(aws allowing ta" e"emption are construed strictissi#i %!ris. Fence, for the
I5C6 to be granted the e"emption it claims under the abovecited provision, it must
prove with substantial evidence that >1? it falls under the classification nonCstoc&$ nonC
profit ed!cational instit!tionJ and >$? the income it seeks to be e"empted from ta"ation is
!sed act!ally$ directly$ and e*cl!siely for ed!cational p!rposes. Fowever, the Court
notes that not a scintilla of evidence was submitted by private respondent to prove that it
met the said re/uisites. (!ommissioner o/ Internal "evenue v. !A, 208 !"A 83,
.ct. '$, '008 ()angani,an*+
15. .s the I)CA an ed!cational instit!tion within the p!riew of Article <.H$ "ection +$
par. 3 of the Constit!tion(
Held: .e rule that it is not. The term =educational institution= or =institution of
learning= has ac/uired a well%known technical meaning, of which the members of the
Constitutional Commission are deemed cogni-ant. 8nder the 2ducation 6ct of 1E;$,
such term refers to schools. The school system is synonymous with formal education,
which =refers to the hierarchically structured and chronologically graded learnings
organi-ed and provided by the formal school system and for which certification is
re/uired in order for the learner to progress through the grades or move to the higher
levels.= The Court has e"amined the =6mended 6rticles of Incorporation= and =Cy%!aws=
of the I5C6, but found nothing in them that even hints that it is a school or an
educational institution.
,urthermore, under the 2ducation 6ct of 1E;$, even non%formal education is
understood to be school%based and =private auspices such as foundations and civic%
spirited organi-ations= are ruled out. It is settled that the term =educational institution,=
when used in laws granting ta" e"emptions, refers to a =" " " school seminary, college or
educational establishment " " ".= (0+ CE" 566) Therefore, the private respondent
cannot be deemed one of the educational institutions covered by the constitutional
provision under consideration. (!ommissioner o/ Internal "evenue v. !A, 208 !"A
83, .ct. '$, '008 ()angani,an*+
16. )ay the PCBB alidly co##it to e*e#pt fro# all for#s of ta*es the properties to be
retained by the )arcos heirs in a Co#pro#ise Agree#ent between the for#er and
the latter(
Held: The power to ta" and to grant e"emptions is vested in the Congress and,
to a certain e"tent, in the local legislative bodies. )ection $;>D?, 6rticle HI of the
Constitution, specifically provides4 0o law granting any ta" e"emption shall be passed
without the concurrence of a majority of all the members of the Congress.1 The PC**
has absolutely no power to grant ta" e"emptions, even under the cover of its authority to
compromise ill%gotten wealth cases.
2ven granting that Congress enacts a law e"empting the 5arcoses from paying
ta"es on their properties, such law will definitely not pass the test of the e/ual protection
clause under the Cill of Aights. 6ny special grant of ta" e"emption in favor only of the
5arcos heirs will constitute class legislation. It will also violate the constitutional rule that
0ta"ation shall be uniform and e/uitable.@ (!have8 v. )!77, 200 !"A %$$, Dec. 0,
'008 ()angani,an*+
11. Disc!ss the p!rpose of ta* treaties(
Held: The AP%8) Ta" Treaty is just one of a number of bilateral treaties which
the Philippines has entered into for the avoidance of double ta"ation. The purpose of
these international agreements is to reconcile the national fiscal legislations of the
contracting parties in order to help the ta"payer avoid simultaneous ta"ation in two
different jurisdictions. 5ore precisely, the ta" conventions are drafted with a view
8
towards the elimination of international %!ridical do!ble ta*ation " " ". (!ommissioner
o/ Internal "evenue v. .!. ;ohnson an- on, Inc., 3&0 !"A 8%, '&'-'&2, ;une 29,
'000, 3
r-
Div. (7on8aga-"eyes*+
10. ,hat is @international %!ridical do!ble ta*ation@(
Held: It is defined as the imposition of comparable ta"es in two or more states
on the same ta"payer in respect of the same subject matter and for identical periods.
(!ommissioner o/ Internal "evenue v. .!. ;ohnson an- on, Inc., 3&0 !"A 8%,
'&2, ;une 29, '000+
1/. ,hat is the rationale for doing away with international %!ridical do!ble ta*ation(
,hat are the #ethods resorted to by ta* treaties to eli#inate do!ble ta*ation(
Held: The apparent rationale for doing away with double ta"ation is to
encourage the free flow of goods and services and the movement of capital, technology
and persons between countries, conditions deemed vital in creating robust and dynamic
economies. ,oreign investments will only thrive in a fairly predictable and reasonable
international investment climate and the protection against double ta"ation is crucial in
creating such a climate.
@ouble ta"ation usually takes place when a person is resident of a contracting
state and derives income from, or owns capital in, the other contracting state and both
states impose ta" on that income or capital. In order to eliminate double ta"ation, a ta"
treaty resorts to several methods. ,irst, it sets out the respective rights to ta" of the
state of source or situs and of the state of residence with regard to certain classes of
income or capital. In some cases, an e"clusive right to ta" is conferred on one of the
contracting states3 however, for other items of income or capital, both states are given
the right to ta", although the amount of ta" that may be imposed by the state of source is
limited.
The second method for the elimination of double ta"ation applies whenever the
state of source is given a full or limited right to ta" together with the state of residence.
In this case, the treaties make it incumbent upon the state of residence to allow relief in
order to avoid double ta"ation. There are two methods of relief % the e"emption method
and the credit method. In the e"emption method, the income or capital which is ta"able
in the state of source or situs is e"empted in the state of residence, although in some
instances it may be taken into account in determining the rate of ta" applicable to the
ta"payerJs remaining income or capital. #n the other hand, in the credit method,
although the income or capital which is ta"ed in the state of source is still ta"able in the
state of residence, the ta" paid in the former is credited against the ta" levied in the
latter. The basic difference between the two methods is that in the e"emption method,
the focus is on the income or capital itself, whereas the credit method focuses upon the
ta". (!ommissioner o/ Internal "evenue v. .!. ;ohnson an- on, Inc., 3&0 !"A
8%, '&2-'&3, ;une 29, '000+
22. ,hat is the rationale for red!cing the ta* rate in negotiating ta* treaties(
Held: In negotiating ta" treaties, the underlying rationale for reducing the ta"
rate is that the Philippines will give up a part of the ta" in the e"pectation that the ta"
given up for this particular investment is not ta"ed by the other country. (!ommissioner
o/ Internal "evenue v. .!. ;ohnson an- on, Inc., 3&0 !"A 8%, '&3, ;une 29,
'000+
#. THE #ILL OF RI$HTS
The %e Proce&& Cl!%&e
21. Disc!ss the D!e Process Cla!se. Disting!ish s!bstantie d!e process fro#
proced!ral d!e process.
9
Held: )ection 1 of the Cill of Aights lays down what is known as the =due
process clause= of the Constitution.
In order to fall within the aegis of this provision, two conditions must concur,
namely, that there is a deprivation and that such deprivation is done without proper
observance of due process. .hen one speaks of due process of law, however, a
distinction must be made between matters of procedure and matters of substance. In
essence, procedural due process =refers to the method or manner by which the law is
enforced,= while substantive due process =re/uires that the law itself, not merely the
procedures by which the law would be enforced, is fair, reasonable, and just.= (!orona
v. 4nite- 6ar,or )ilots Association o/ the )hils., 283 !"A 3', Dec. '2, '00%
("omero*+
22. =espondents ?nited Karbor Pilots Association of the Philippines arg!e that d!e
process was not obsered in the adoption of PPACAG Do. 2+C/2 which proides thatF
:(a)ll e*isting reg!lar appoint#ents which hae been preio!sly iss!ed by the
4!rea! of C!sto#s or the PPA shall re#ain alid !p to 31 Dece#ber 1//2 only$; and
:(a)ll appoint#ents to harbor pilot positions in all pilotage districts shall$ henceforth$
be only for a ter# of one (1) year fro# date of effectiity s!b%ect to renewal or
cancellation by the Philippine Ports A!thority after cond!ct of a rigid eal!ation of
perfor#ance$; allegedly beca!se no hearing was cond!cted whereby :releant
goern#ent agencies; and the harbor pilots the#seles co!ld entilate their iews.
7hey also contended that the sole and e*cl!sie right to the e*ercise of harbor
pilotage by pilots has beco#e ested and can only be :withdrawn or shortened; by
obsering the constit!tional #andate of d!e process of law.
Held: They are obviously referring to the procedural aspect of the enactment.
,ortunately, the Court has maintained a clear position in this regard, a stance it has
stressed in the recent case of L!#i8!ed . Kon. -*eea (B.=. Do. 111565$ Doe#ber
10$ 1//1)$ where it declared that 0>a?s long as a party was given the opportunity to
defend his interests in due course, he cannot be said to have been denied due process
of law, for this opportunity to be heard is the very essence of due process. 5oreover,
this constitutional mandate is deemed satisfied if a person is granted an opportunity to
seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.1
In the case at bar, respondents /uestioned PP6%6# o. <D%E$ no less than four
times before the matter was finally elevated to this Tribunal. Their arguments on this
score, however, failed to persuade. & " "
either does the fact that the pilots themselves were not consulted in any way
taint the validity of the administrative order. 6s a general rule, notice and hearing, as the
fundamental re/uirements of procedural due process, are essential only when an
administrative body e"ercises its /uasi%judicial function. In the performance of its
e"ecutive or legislative functions, such as issuing rules and regulations, an
administrative body need not comply with the re/uirements of notice and hearing.
8pon the other hand, it is also contended that the sole and e"clusive right to the
e"ercise of harbor pilotage by pilots is a settled issue. Aespondents aver that said right
has become vested and can only be 0withdrawn or shortened1 by observing the
constitutional mandate of due process of law. Their argument has thus shifted from the
procedural to one of substance. It is here where PP6%6# o. <D%E$ fails to meet the
condition set by the organic law.
Pilotage, just like other professions, may be practiced only by duly licensed
individuals. !icensure is 0the granting of license especially to practice a profession.1 It is
also 0the system of granting licenses >as for professional practice? in accordance with
established standards.1 6 license is a right or permission granted by some competent
authority to carry on a business or do an act which, without such license, would be
illegal.
10
Cefore harbor pilots can earn a license to practice their profession, they literally
have to pass through the proverbial eye of a needle by taking, not one but fie
e"aminations, each followed by actual training and practice. & " "
Their license is granted in the form of an appointment which allows them to
engage in pilotage until they retire at the age of K< years. This is a vested right. 8nder
the terms of PP6%6# o. <D%E$, 0'a(ll e"isting regular appointments which have been
previously issued by the Cureau of Customs or the PP6 shall remain valid up to :1
@ecember 1EE$ only,1 and 0>a?ll appointments to harbor pilot positions in all pilotage
districts shall, henceforth, be only for a term of one >1? year from date of effectivity
subject to renewal or cancellation by the 6uthority after conduct of a rigid evaluation of
performance.1
It is readily apparent that PP6%6# o. <D%E$ unduly restricts the right of harbor
pilots to enjoy their profession before their compulsory retirement. In the past, they
enjoyed a measure of security knowing that after passing five e"aminations and
undergoing years of on%the%job training, they would have a license which they could use
until their retirement, unless sooner revoked by the PP6 for mental or physical unfitness.
8nder the new issuance, they have to contend with an annual cancellation of their
license which can be temporary or permanent depending on the outcome of their
performance evaluation. Heteran pilots and neophytes alike are suddenly confronted
with one%year terms which ipso facto e"pire at the end of that period. Aenewal of their
license is now dependent on a 0rigid evaluation of performance1 which is conducted only
after the license has already been cancelled. Fence, the use of the term 0renewal.1 It is
this pre%evaluation cancellation which primarily makes PP6%6# o. <D%E$ unreasonable
and constitutionally infirm. In a real sense, it is a deprivation of property without due
process of law. (!orona v. 4nite- 6ar,or )ilots Association o/ the )hils., 283 !"A
3', Decem,er '2, '00% ("omero*+
23. Does the d!e process cla!se enco#pass the right to be assisted by co!nsel d!ring
an ad#inistratie in8!iry(
Held: The right to counsel, which cannot be waived unless the waiver is in
writing and in the presence of counsel, is a right afforded a suspect or an accused during
custodial investigation. It is not an absolute right and may, thus, be invoked or rejected
in a criminal proceeding and, with more reason, in an administrative in/uiry. In the case
at bar, petitioners invoke the right of an acc!sed in criminal proceedings to have
competent and independent counsel of his own choice. !umi/ued, however, was not
accused of any crime in the proceedings below. The investigation conducted by the
committee " " " was for the sole purpose of determining if he could be held
ad#inistratiely liable under the law for the complaints filed against him. " " " 6s such,
the hearing conducted by the investigating committee was not part of a criminal
prosecution. & " "
.hile investigations conducted by an administrative body may at times be akin to
a criminal proceeding, the fact remains that under e"isting laws, a party in an
administrative in/uiry #ay or #ay not be assisted by co!nsel$ irrespective of the nature
of the charges and of the respondentJs capacity to represent himself, and no duty rests
on such a body to furnish the person being investigated with counsel. In an
administrative proceeding " " " a respondent " " " has the option of engaging the
services of counsel or not. " " " Thus, the right to counsel is not imperative in
administrative investigations because such in/uiries are conducted merely to determine
whether there are facts that merit disciplinary measures against erring public officers and
employees, with the purpose of maintaining the dignity of government service.
The right to counsel is not indispensable to due process unless re/uired by the
Constitution or the law. & " ". (<umi=ue- v. 1?evea, 282 !"A '29, >ov. '8, '00%
("omero*+
2+. Does an e*traditee hae the right to notice and hearing d!ring the eal!ation stage
of an e*tradition proceeding(
11
Held: Considering that in the case at bar, the e"tradition proceeding is only at its
evaluation stage, the nature of the right being claimed by the private respondent is
nebulous and the degree of prejudice he will allegedly suffer is weak, we accord greater
weight to the interests espoused by the government thru the petitioner )ecretary of
Bustice. & " "
.n tilting the balance in faor of the interests of the "tate$ the Co!rt stresses that
it is not r!ling that the priate respondent has no right to d!e process at all thro!gho!t
the length and breadth of the e*tradition proceedings. Procedural due process re/uires
a determination of what process is due, when it is due, and the degree of what is due.
)tated otherwise, a prior deter#ination sho!ld be #ade as to whether proced!ral
protections are at all d!e and when they are d!e$ which in t!rn depends on the e*tent to
which an indiid!al will be @conde#ned to s!ffer grieo!s loss.@ .e have e"plained
why an e"traditee has no right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the
e"tradition process. 6s aforesaid, P.@. o. 1<LE which implements the AP%8)
2"tradition Treaty affords an e"traditee s!fficient opport!nity to meet the evidence
against him once the petition is filed in co!rt. The ti#e for the e"traditee to know the
basis of the re/uest for his e"tradition is #erely #oed to the filing in court of the formal
petition for e"tradition. The e"traditeeJs right to know is #o#entarily withheld d!ring the
eal!ation stage of the e"tradition process to accommodate the more compelling interest
of the )tate to prevent escape of potential e"traditees which can be precipitated by
premature information of the basis of the re/uest for his e"tradition. o less compelling
at that stage of the e"tradition proceedings is the need to be more deferential to the
judgment of a co%e/ual branch of the government, the 2"ecutive, which has been
endowed by our Constitution with greater power over matters involving our foreign
relations. eedless to state, this balance of interests is not a static b!t a #oing
balance which can be adjusted as the e"tradition process moves from the administrative
stage to the judicial stage and to the e"ecution stage depending on factors that will come
into play. In sum, we rule that the te#porary hold on private respondentJs privilege of
notice and hearing is a soft restraint on his right to due process which will not deprive
him of f!nda#ental fairness should he decide to resist the re/uest for his e"tradition to
the 8nited )tates. 7here is no denial of d!e process as long as f!nda#ental fairness is
ass!red a party. (ecretary o/ ;ustice v. 6on. "alph !. <antion, 7.". >o. '30$#9,
.ct. '%, 2&&&, 1n Banc ()uno*+
The E'%!l Protection Cl!%&e
25. -*plain and disc!ss the e8!al protection of the law cla!se.
Held: 1. The e/ual protection of the law is embraced in the concept of due
process, as every unfair discrimination offends the re/uirements of justice and fair play.
It has nonetheless been embodied in a separate clause in 6rticle III, )ec. 1, of the
Constitution to provide for a more specific guaranty against any form of undue favoritism
or hostility from the government. 6rbitrariness in general may be challenged on the
basis of the due process clause. Cut if the particular act assailed partakes of an
unwarranted partiality or prejudice, the sharper weapon to cut it down is the e/ual
protection clause.
6ccording to a long line of decisions, e/ual protection simply re/uires that all
persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred
and responsibilities imposed. )imilar subjects, in other words, should not be treated
differently, so as to give undue favor to some and unjustly discriminate against others.
The e/ual protection clause does not re/uire the universal application of the laws
on all persons or things without distinction. This might in fact sometimes result in
une/ual protection, as where, for e"ample, a law prohibiting mature books to all persons,
regardless of age, would benefit the morals of the youth but violate the liberty of adults.
.hat the clause re/uires is e/uality among e/uals as determined according to a valid
classification. Cy classification is meant the grouping of persons or things similar to
each other in certain particulars and different from all others in these same particulars.
12
()hilippine ;u-ges Association v. )ra-o, 22% !"A %&3, %''-%'2, >ov. '', '003, 1n
Banc (!ru8*+
$. The e/ual protection clause e"ists to prevent undue favor or privilege. It is
intended to eliminate discrimination and oppression based on ine/uality. Aecogni-ing
the e"istence of real difference among men, the e/ual protection clause does not
demand absolute e/uality. It merely re/uires that all persons shall be treated alike,
under like circumstances and conditions both as to the privileges conferred and liabilities
enforced. Thus, the e/ual protection clause does not absolutely forbid classifications " "
". If the classification is based on real and substantial differences3 is germane to the
purpose of the law3 applies to all members of the same class3 and applies to current as
well as future conditions, the classification may not be impugned as violating the
ConstitutionJs e/ual protection guarantee. 6 distinction based on real and reasonable
considerations related to a proper legislative purpose " " " is neither unreasonable,
capricious nor unfounded. (6imagan v. )eople, 23% !"A 938, .ct. %, '00$, 1n Banc
(Aapunan*+
26. Congress enacted =.A. Do. 010/ which proides$ in "ection ++ thereof$ that @Do
-lection Gfficer shall hold office in a partic!lar city or #!nicipality for #ore than fo!r
(+) years. Any election officer who$ either at the ti#e of the approal of this Act or
s!bse8!ent thereto$ has sered for at least fo!r (+) years in a partic!lar city or
#!nicipality shall a!to#atically be reassigned by the Co##ission to a new station
o!tside the original congressional district.@ Petitioners$ who are City and )!nicipal
-lection Gfficers$ theori9e that "ection ++ of =A 010/ is iolatie of the @e8!al
protection cla!se@ of the 1/01 Constit!tion beca!se it singles o!t the City and
)!nicipal -lection Gfficers of the CG)-L-C as prohibited fro# holding office in the
sa#e city or #!nicipality for #ore than fo!r (+) years. 7hey #aintain that there is no
s!bstantial distinction between the# and other CG)-L-C officials$ and therefore$
there is no alid classification to %!stify the ob%ectie of the proision of law !nder
attac&. =esole.
Held: The Court is not persuaded by petitionersJ arguments. The =e/ual
protection clause= of the 1E;K Constitution permits a valid classification under the
following conditions4
1? The classification must rest on substantial distinction3
$? The classification must be germane to the purpose of the law3
:? The classification must not be limited to e"isting conditions only3 and
D? The classification must apply e/ually to all members of the same class.
6fter a careful study, the ineluctable conclusion is that the classification under
)ection DD of A6 ;1;E satisfies the aforestated re/uirements.
The singling out of election officers in order to =ensure the impartiality of election
officials by preventing them from developing familiarity with the people of their place of
assignment= does not violate the e/ual protection clause of the Constitution.
In L!t9 . Araneta (/0 Phil. 1+0$ 153 31/556)$ it was held that =the legislature is not
re/uired by the Constitution to adhere to a policy of Jall or noneJ=. This is so for
underinclusiveness is not an argument against a valid classification. It may be true that
all other officers of C#52!2C referred to by petitioners are e"posed to the same evils
sought to be addressed by the statute. Fowever, in this case, it can be discerned that
the legislature thought the noble purpose of the law would be sufficiently served by
breaking an important link in the chain of corruption than by breaking up each and every
link thereof. Herily, under )ection :>n? of A6 ;1;E, election officers are the highest
officials or authori-ed representatives of the C#52!2C in a city or municipality. It is
safe to say that without the complicity of such officials, large%scale anomalies in the
registration of voters can hardly be carried out. (Agripino A. De 7u8man, ;r., et al. v.
!.M1<1! (7.". >o. '20''8, ;uly '0, 2&&&, en Banc ()urisima*+

21. Are there s!bstantial distinctions between print #edia and broadcast #edia to %!stify
the re8!ire#ent for the latter to gie free airti#e to be !sed by the Co#elec to infor#
13
the p!blic of 8!alifications and progra# of goern#ent of candidates and political
parties d!ring the ca#paign period( Disc!ss.
Held: There are important differences in the characteristics of the two media
which justify their differential treatment for free speech purposes. Cecause of the
physical limitations of the broadcast spectrum, the government must, of necessity,
allocate broadcast fre/uencies to those wishing to use them. There is no similar
justification for government allocation and regulation of the print media.
In the allocation of limited resources, relevant conditions may validly be imposed
on the grantees or licensees. The reason for this is that the government spends public
funds for the allocation and regulation of the broadcast industry, which it does not do in
the case of print media. To re/uire radio and television broadcast industry to provide
free airtime for the Comelec Time is a fair e"change for what the industry gets.
,rom another point of view, the )C has also held that because of the uni/ue and
pervasive influence of the broadcast media, 0'n(ecessarily " " " the freedom of television
and radio broadcasting is somewhat lesser in scope than the freedom accorded to
newspaper and print media.1 (51<1BA), Inc. v. !.M1<1!, 280 !"A 33%, April 2',
'008 (Men-o8a*+
20. Does the death penalty law (=.A. Do. 165/) iolate the e8!al protection cla!se
considering that$ in effect$ it p!nishes only people who are poor$ !ned!cated$ and
%obless(
Held: A.6. o. KL9E specifically provides that 0'T(he death penalty shall be
imposed if the crime of rape is committed " " " when the victim is a religious or a child
below seven >K? years old.1 6pparently, the death penalty law makes no distinction. It
applies to all persons and to all classes of persons G rich or poor, educated or
uneducated, religious or non%religious. o particular person or classes of persons are
identified by the law against whom the death penalty shall be e"clusively imposed. The
law punishes with death a person who shall commit rape against a child below seven
years of age. Thus, the perpetration of rape against a 9%year old girl does not absolve or
e"empt an accused from the imposition of the death penalty by the fact that he is poor,
uneducated, jobless, and lacks catechetical instruction. To hold otherwise will not
eliminate but promote ine/ualities.
In Cecilleille =ealty and "erice Corporation . CA$ 210 "C=A 01/ 31//16)$ the
)C clarified that compassion for the poor is an imperative of every humane society but
only when the recipient is not a rascal claiming an undeserved privilege. ()eople v.
;immy MiBano y 5amora, 7.". >o. '20''2, ;uly 23, '000, 1n Banc ()er !uriam*+
2/. 7he .nternational "chool Alliance of -d!cators (."A-) 8!estioned the pointCofChire
classification e#ployed by .nternational "chool$ .nc. to %!stify distinction in salary
rates between foreignChires and localChires$ i.e.$ salary rates of foreignChires are
higher by 25L than their local co!nterparts$ as discri#inatory and$ therefore$ iolates
the e8!al protection cla!se. 7he .nternational "chool contended that this is
necessary in order to entice foreignChires to leae their do#icile and wor& here.
=esole.
Held: That public policy abhors ine/uality and discrimination is beyond
contention. #ur Constitution and laws reflect the policy against these evils. & " "
International law, which springs from general principles of law$ likewise
proscribes discrimination " " ". The 8niversal @eclaration of Fuman Aights, the
International Covenant on 2conomic, )ocial and Cultural Aights, the International
Convention on the 2limination of 6ll ,orms of Aacial @iscrimination, the Convention
against @iscrimination in 2ducation, the Convention >o. 111? Concerning @iscrimination
in Aespect of 2mployment and #ccupation % all embody the general principle against
discrimination, the very antithesis of fairness and justice. The Philippines, through its
Constitution, has incorporated this principle as part of its national laws.
14
'I(t would be an affront to both the spirit and letter of these provisions if the )tate,
in spite of its primordial obligation to promote and ensure e/ual employment
opportunities, closes its eyes to une/ual and discriminatory terms and conditions of
employment " " ".
@iscrimination, particularly in terms of wages, is frowned upon by the !abor
Code. 6rticle 1:9, for e"ample, prohibits and penali-es the payment of lesser
compensation to a female employee as against a male employee for work of e/ual
value. 6rticle $D; declares it an unfair labor practice for an employer to discriminate in
regards to wages in order to encourage or discourage membership in any labor
organi-ation. & " "
The foregoing provisions impregnably institutionali-e in this jurisdiction the long
honored legal truism of =2/ual pay for e/ual work.= Persons who work with substantially
e/ual /ualifications, skill, effort and responsibility, under similar conditions, should be
paid similar salaries. This rule applies to the )chool >International )chool, Inc.?, its
=international character= notwithstanding.
The )chool contends that petitioner has not adduced evidence that local%hires
perform work e/ual to that of foreign%hires. The Court finds this argument a little
cavalier. If an employer accords employees the same position and rank, the
presumption is that these employees perform e/ual work. This presumption is borne by
logic and human e"perience. If the employer pays one employee less than the rest, it is
not for that employee to e"plain why he receives less or why the others receive more.
That would be adding insult to injury. The employer has discriminated against that
employee3 it is for the employer to e"plain why the employee is treated unfairly.
The employer in this case failed to discharge this burden. There is no evidence
here that foreign%hires perform $9M more efficiently or effectively than the local%hires.
Coth groups have similar functions and responsibilities, which they perform under similar
working conditions.
The )chool cannot invoke the need to entice foreign%hires to leave their domicile
to rationali-e the distinction in salary rates without violating the principle of e/ual work
for e/ual pay.
& " "
.hile we recogni-e the need of the )chool to attract foreign%hires, salaries
should not be used as an enticement to the prejudice of local%hires. The local%hires
perform the same services as foreign%hires and they ought to be paid the same salaries
as the latter. ,or the same reason, the =dislocation factor= and the foreign%hiresJ limited
tenure also cannot serve as valid bases for the distinction in salary rates. The
dislocation factor and limited tenure affecting foreign%hires are ade/uately compensated
by certain benefits accorded them which are not enjoyed by local%hires, such as housing,
transportation, shipping costs, ta"es and home leave travel allowances.
The Constitution enjoins the )tate to =protect the rights of workers and promote
their welfare=, =to afford labor full protection.= The )tate, therefore, has the right and
duty to regulate the relations between labor and capital. These relations are not merely
contractual but are so impressed with public interest that labor contracts, collective
bargaining agreements included, must yield to the common good. )hould such
contracts contain stipulations that are contrary to public policy, courts will not hesitate to
strike down these stipulations.
In this case, we find the point%of%hire classification employed by respondent
)chool to justify the distinction in the salary rates of foreign%hires and local%hires to be an
invalid classification. There is no reasonable distinction between the services rendered
by foreign%hires and local%hires. The practice of the )chool of according higher salaries
to foreign%hires contravenes public policy and, certainly, does not deserve the sympathy
of this Court. (International chool Alliance o/ 1-ucators (IA1+ v. 6on. <eonar-o
A. Cuisum,ing, 7.". >o. '288$9, ;une ', 2&&&, '
st
Div. (Aapunan*+
15
32. Acc!sedCappellant =o#eo B. Ealos%os filed a #otion before the Co!rt as&ing that he
be allowed to f!lly discharge the d!ties of a Congress#an$ incl!ding attendance at
legislatie sessions and co##ittee #eetings despite his haing been conicted in
the first instance of a nonCbailable offense. Does being an electie official res!lt in a
s!bstantial distinction that allows different treat#ent( .s being a Congress#an a
s!bstantial differentiation which re#oes the acc!sedCappellant as a prisoner fro#
the sa#e class as all persons alidly confined !nder law(
Held: In the ultimate analysis, the issue before us boils down to a /uestion of
constitutional e/ual protection.
& " "
The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public officers has
never been an e"cuse to free a person validly in prison. The duties imposed by the
0mandate of the people1 are multifarious. The accused%appellant asserts that the duty to
legislate ranks highest in the hierarchy of government. The accused%appellant is only
one of $9< members of the Fouse of Aepresentatives, not to mention the $D members of
the )enate, charged with the duties of legislation. Congress continues to function well in
the physical absence of one or a few of its members. @epending on the e"igency of
*overnment that has to be addressed, the President or the )upreme Court can also be
deemed the highest for that particular duty. The importance of a function depends on
the need for its e"ercise. The duty of a mother to nurse her infant is most compelling
under the law of nature. 6 doctor with uni/ue skills has the duty to save the lives of
those with a particular affliction. 6n elective governor has to serve provincial
constituents. 6 police officer must maintain peace and order. ever had the call of a
particular duty lifted a prisoner into a different classification from those others who are
validly restrained by law.
6 strict scrutiny of classifications is essential lest wittingly or otherwise, insidious
discriminations are made in favor of or against groups or types of individuals.
The Court cannot validate badges of ine/uality. The necessities imposed by
public welfare may justify e"ercise of government authority to regulate even if thereby
certain groups may plausibly assert that their interests are disregarded.
.e, therefore, find that election to the position of Congressman is not a
reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement. The functions and duties of the
office are not substantial distinctions which lift him from the class of prisoners interrupted
in their freedom and restricted in liberty of movement. !awful arrest and confinement
are germane to the purposes of the law and apply to all those belonging to the same
class.
& " "
It can be seen from the foregoing that incarceration, by its nature, changes an
individual+s status in society. Prison officials have the difficult and often thankless job of
preserving the security in a potentially e"plosive setting, as well as of attempting to
provide rehabilitation that prepare inmates for re%entry into the social mainstream.
ecessarily, both these demands re/uire the curtailment and elimination of certain
rights.
Premises considered, we are constrained to rule against the accused%appellant+s
claim that re%election to public office gives priority to any other right or interest, including
the police power of the )tate. ()eople v. ;alosBos, 32$ !"A #80, :e,. 3, 2&&&, 1n
Banc (Dnares-antiago*+
The Ri(ht !(!in&t Unre!&on!)le Se!rche& !nd Sei*%re&
16
31. Disc!ss the constit!tional re8!ire#ent that a %!dge$ in iss!ing a warrant of arrest$
#!st deter#ine probable ca!se :personally.; Disting!ish deter#ination of probable
ca!se by the prosec!tor and deter#ination of probable ca!se by the %!dge.
Held: It must be stressed that the 1E;K Constitution re/uires the judge to
determine probable cause 0personally,1 a re/uirement which does not appear in the
corresponding provisions of our previous constitutions. This emphasis evinces the intent
of the framers to place a greater degree of responsibility upon trial judges than that
imposed under previous Constitutions.
In "olien . )a&asiar$ this Court pronounced4
0.hat the Constitution underscores is the e"clusive and personal
responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself of the e"istence of probable
cause. In satisfying himself of the e"istence of probable cause for the issuance
of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not re/uired to personally e"amine the
complainant and his witnesses. ,ollowing established doctrine and procedure,
he shall4 >1? personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents
submitted by the fiscal regarding the e"istence of probable cause and, on the
basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest3 or >$? if in the basis thereof he finds no
probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal+s report and re/uire the submission
of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to
the e"istence of probable cause.1
Ko . People (.bid.) summari-es e"isting jurisprudence on the matter as follows4
0!est we be too repetitive, we only wish to emphasi-e three vital matters
once more4 >irst$ as held in .nting$ the determination of probable cause by the
prosecutor is for a purpose different from that which is to be made by the judge.
.hether there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused is guilty of the
offense charged and should be held for trial is what the prosecutor passes upon.
The judge, on the other hand, determines whether a warrant of arrest should be
issued against the accused, i.e.$ whether there is a necessity for placing him
under immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice. Thus, even
if both should base their findings on one and the same proceeding or evidence,
there should be no confusion as to their distinct objectives.
"econd$ since their objectives are different, the judge cannot rely solely
on the report of the prosecutor in finding probable cause to justify the issuance of
a warrant of arrest. #bviously and understandably, the contents of the
prosecutor+s report will support his own conclusion that there is reason to charge
the accused for an offense and hold him for trial. Fowever, the judge must
decide independently. Fence, he must have supporting evidence, other than the
prosecutor+s bare report, upon which to legally sustain his own findings on the
e"istence >or none"istence? of probable cause to issue an arrest order. This
responsibility of determining personally and independently the e"istence or
none"istence of probable cause is lodged in him by no less than the most basic
law of the land. Parenthetically, the prosecutor could ease the burden of the
judge and speed up the litigation process by forwarding to the latter not only the
information and his bare resolution finding probable cause, but also so much of
the records and the evidence on hand as to enable the Fis Fonor to make his
personal and separate judicial finding on whether to issue a warrant of arrest.
Lastly$ it is not re/uired that the co#plete or entire records of the case
during the preliminary investigation be submitted to and e"amined by the judge.
.e do not intend to unduly burden trial courts by obliging them to e"amine the
complete records of every case all the time simply for the purpose of ordering the
arrest of an accused. .hat is re/uired, rather, is that the judge must have
s!fficient supporting documents >such as the complaint, affidavits, counter%
affidavits, sworn statements of witnesses or transcript of stenographic notes, if
any? upon which to make his independent judgment or, at the very least, upon
which to verify the findings of the prosecutor as to the e"istence of probable
17
cause. The point is4 he cannot rely solely and entirely on the prosecutor+s
recommendation, as Aespondent Court did in this case. 6lthough the prosecutor
enjoys the legal presumption of regularity in the performance of his official duties
and functions, which in turn gives his report the presumption of accuracy, the
Constitution, we repeat, commands the judge to personally determine probable
cause in the issuance of warrants of arrest. This Court has consistently held that
a judge fails in his bounden duty if he relies merely on the certification or the
report of the investigating officer.1 (Citations o#itted)
In the case at bench, respondent admits that he issued the /uestioned warrant
as there was 0no reason for >him? to doubt the validity of the certification made by the
6ssistant Prosecutor that a preliminary investigation was conducted and that probable
cause was found to e"ist as against those charged in the information filed.1 The
statement is an admission that respondent relied solely and completely on the
certification made by the fiscal that probable cause e"ists as against those charged in
the information and issued the challenged warrant of arrest on the sole basis of the
prosecutor+s findings and recommendations. Fe adopted the judgment of the prosecutor
regarding the e"istence of probable cause as his own. (A,-ula v. 7uiani, 32# !"A ',
:e,. '8, 2&&&, 3
r-
Div. (7on8aga-"eyes*+
32. .n an application for search warrant$ the application was acco#panied by a s&etch of
the co#po!nd at 516 "an Eose de la )ontana "t.$ )abolo$ Ceb! City$ indicating the
2Cstorey residential ho!se of priate respondent with a large :<; enclosed in a
s8!are. ,ithin the sa#e co#po!nd are residences of other people$ wor&shops$
offices$ factories and wareho!se. 7he search warrant iss!ed$ howeer$ #erely
indicated the address of the co#po!nd which is 516 "an Eose de la )ontana "t.$
)abolo$ Ceb! City. Did this satisfy the constit!tional re8!ire#ent !nder "ection 2$
Article ... that the place to be searched #!st be partic!larly described(
Held: This Court has held that the applicant should particularly describe the
place to be searched and the person or things to be sei-ed, whereer and wheneer it is
feasible. In the present case, it must be noted that the application for a search warrant
was accompanied by a sketch of the compound at 91L )an Bose de la 5ontana )t.,
5abolo, Cebu City. The sketch indicated the $%storey residential house of private
respondent with a large =&= enclosed in a s/uare. .ithin the same compound are
residences of other people, workshops, offices, factories and warehouse. .ith this
sketch as the guide, it could have been very easy to describe the residential house of
private respondent with s!fficient partic!larity so as to segregate it fro# the other
b!ildings or str!ct!res inside the sa#e co#po!nd. Cut the search warrant merely
indicated the address of the compound which is 91L )an Bose de la 5ontana )t.,
5abolo, Cebu City. This description of the place to be searched is too general and does
not pinpoint the specific house of private respondent. Thus, the inade/uacy of the
description of the residence of private respondent sought to be searched has
characteri-ed the /uestioned search warrant as a general warrant, which is violative of
the constitutional re/uirement. ()eople v. 1stra-a, 20# !"A 383, $&&, (Martine8*+
33. Can the place to be searched$ as set o!t in the warrant$ be a#plified or #odified by
the officers' own personal &nowledge of the pre#ises$ or the eidence they add!ce
in s!pport of their application for the warrant(
Held: )uch a change is proscribed by the Constitution which re/uires inter alia
the search warrant to particularly describe the place to be searched as well as the
persons or things to be sei-ed. It would concede to police officers the power of choosing
the place to be searched, even if it not be that delineated in the warrant. It would open
wide the door to abuse of the search process, and grant to officers e"ecuting a search
warrant that discretion which the Constitution has precisely removed from them. The
particulari-ation of the description of the place to be searched may properly be done
only by the Budge, and only in the warrant itself3 it cannot be left to the discretion of the
police officers conducting the search.
It is neither fair nor licit to allow police officers to search a place different from
that stated in the warrant on the claim that the place actually searched G although not
18
that specified in the warrant G is e"actly what they had in view when they applied for the
warrant and had demarcated in their supporting evidence. .hat is material in
determining the validity of a search is the place stated in the warrant itself, not what
applicants had in their thoughts, or had represented in the proofs they submitted to the
court issuing the warrant. ()eople v. !ourt o/ Appeals, 20' !"A $&&, ;une 2#, '008
(>arvasa*+
3+. ,hat is :search incidental to a lawf!l arrest;( Disc!ss.
Held: .hile a contemporaneous search of a person arrested may be effected to
discover dangerous weapons or proofs or implements used in the commission of the
crime and which search may e"tend to the area within his immediate control where he
might gain possession of a weapon or evidence he can destroy, a valid arrest must
precede the search. The process cannot be reversed.
In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, as the precedent arrest
determines the validity of the incidental search, the legality of the arrest is
/uestioned in a large majority of these cases, e.g., whether an arrest was merely
used as a prete"t for conducting a search. In this instance, the law re/uires that
there be first a lawful arrest before a search can be made G the process cannot
be reversed. ()alacat . Co!rt of Appeals$ 203 "C=A 15/$ 115 31//16)
()eople v. !hua 6o an, 3&8 !"A $32, ;une '%, '000, 1n Banc (Davi-e, ;r., !.;.*+
35. ,hat is the :plain iew; doctrine( ,hat are its re8!isites( Disc!ss.
Held: 1. #bjects falling in plain view of an officer who has a right to be in the
position to have that view are subject to sei-ure even without a search warrant and may
be introduced in evidence. The 0plain view1 doctrine applies when the following
re/uisites concur4 >a? the law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior
justification for an intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a particular area3
>b? the discovery of the evidence in plain view is inadvertent3 >c? it is immediately
apparent to the officer that the item he observes may be evidence of a crime,
contraband or otherwise subject to sei-ure. The law enforcement officer must lawfully
make an initial intrusion or properly be in a position from which he can particularly view
the area. In the course of such lawful intrusion, he came inadvertently across a piece of
evidence incriminating the accused. The object must be open to eye and hand and its
discovery inadvertent.
It is clear that an object is in plain view if the object itself is plainly e"posed to
sight. The difficulty arises when the object is inside a closed container. .here the
object sei-ed was inside a closed package, the object itself is not in plain view and
therefore cannot be sei-ed without a warrant. Fowever, if the package proclaims its
contents, whether by its distinctive configuration, its transparency, or if its contents are
obvious to an observer, then the contents are in plain view and may be sei-ed. In other
words, if the package is such that an e"perienced observer could infer from its
appearance that it contains the prohibited article, then the article is deemed in plain view.
It must be immediately apparent to the police that the items that they observe may be
evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to sei-ure. ()eople v. Doria, 3&'
!"A ##8, ;an. 22, '000, 1n Banc ()uno, ;.*+
$. ,or the doctrine to apply, the following elements must be present4
a? a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police
are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties3
b? the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who have the right to
be where they are3 and
c? the evidence must be immediately apparent3 and
d? plain view justified mere sei-ure of evidence without further search.
In the instant case, recall that P#$ Calut testified that they first located the
marijuana plants before appellant was arrested without a warrant. Fence, there was no
valid warrantless arrest which preceded the search of appellant+s premises. ote further
19
that the police team was dispatched to appellant+s &aingin precisely to search for and
uproot the prohibited flora. The sei-ure of evidence in 0plain view1 applies only where
the police officer is not searching for evidence against the accused, but inadvertently
comes across an incriminating object. Clearly, their discovery of the cannabis plants
was not inadvertent. .e also note the testimony of )P#$ Tipay that upon arriving at the
area, they first had to 0look around the area1 before they could spot the illegal plants.
Patently, the sei-ed marijuana plants were not 0immediately apparent1 and 0further
search1 was needed. In sum, the marijuana plants in /uestion were not in 0plain view1 or
0open to eye and hand.1 The 0plain view1 doctrine, thus, cannot be made to apply.
or can we sustain the trial court+s conclusion that just because the marijuana
plants were found in an unfenced lot, appellant could not invoke the protection afforded
by the Charter against unreasonable searches by agents of the )tate. The right against
unreasonable searches and sei-ures is the immunity of one+s person, which includes his
residence, his papers, and other possessions. The guarantee refers to 0the right of
personal security1 of the individual. & " ", what is sought to be protected against the
)tate+s unlawful intrusion are persons, not places. To conclude otherwise would not only
mean swimming against the stream, it would also lead to the absurd logic that for a
person to be immune against unreasonable searches and sei-ures, he must be in his
home or office, within a fenced yard or a private place. The Cill of Aights belongs as
much to the person in the street as to the individual in the sanctuary of his bedroom.
()eople v. A,e Val-e8, 7.". >o. '2020#, ept. 29, 2&&&, 1n Banc (Cuisum,ing*+
:. Considering its factual milieu, this case falls s/uarely under the plain iew
doctrine. & " ".
.hen )pencer wrenched himself free from the grasp of P#$ *aviola, he
instinctively ran towards the house of appellant. The members of the buy%bust team
were justified in running after him and entering the house without a search warrant for
they were hot in the heels of a fleeing criminal. #nce inside the house, the police
officers cornered )pencer and recovered the buy%bust money from him. They also
caught appellant in flagrante delicto repacking the marijuana bricks which were in full
view on top of a table. & " ".
Fence, appellant+s subse/uent arrest was likewise lawful, coming as it is within
the purview of )ection 9>a? of Aule 11: of the 1E;9 Aules on Criminal Procedure " " ".
)ection 9>a? is commonly referred to as the rule on in flagrante delicto arrests.
Fere two elements must concur4 >1? the person to be arrested must e"ecute an overt act
indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a
crime3 and >$? such overt act is done in the presence or within the iew of the arresting
officer. Thus, when appellant was seen repacking the marijuana, the police officers were
not only authori-ed but also duty%bound to arrest him even without a warrant. ()eople
v. 1lamparo, 320 !"A $&$, $'$-$'9, March 3', 2&&&, 2
n-
Div. (Cuisum,ing*+
36. ,hat is a :stopCandCfris&; search(
Held: 1. In the landmark case of 7erry . Ghio (22 L -d 2d 00/J 00 " Ct 1060$
3/2 ?" 1$ /22$ E!ne 12$ 1/60)$ a stop%and%frisk was defined as the vernacular
designation of the right of a police officer to stop a citi-en on the street, interrogate him,
and pat him for weapon>s?4
0" " " >.?here a police officer observes an unusual conduct which leads
him reasonably to conclude in light of his e"perience that criminal activity may be
afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently
dangerous, where in the course of investigating this behavior he identified
himself as a policeman and make reasonable in/uiries, and where nothing in the
initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his own or
others+ safety, he is entitled for the protection of himself or others in the area to
conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in an
attempt to discover weapons which might be used to assault him. )uch a search
is a reasonable search under the ,ourth 6mendment, and any weapon sei-ed
20
may properly be introduced in evidence against the person from whom they were
taken.1 (Kerrera$ A Kandboo& on Arrest$ "earch and "ei9!re and C!stodial
.nestigation$ 1//5 ed.$ p. 105J and 7erry . Ghio$ s!pra$ p. /11)
In allowing such a search, the 8nited )tates )upreme Court held that the interest
of effective crime prevention and detection allows a police officer to approach a person,
in appropriate circumstances and manner, for purposes of investigating possible criminal
behavior even though there is insufficient probable cause to make an actual arrest.
In admitting in evidence two guns sei-ed during the stop%and%frisk, the 8)
)upreme Court held that what justified the limited search was the more immediate
interest of the police officer in taking steps to assure himself that the person with whom
he was dealing was not armed with a weapon that could une"pectedly and fatally be
used against him.
It did not, however, abandon the rule that the police must, whenever practicable,
obtain advance judicial approval of searches and sei-ures through the warrant
procedure, e"cused only by e"igent circumstances. (Manalili v. !A, 28& !"A $&&,
.ct. 0, '00% ()angani,an*+
$. .e now proceed to the justification for and allowable scope of a 0stop%and%
frisk1 as a 0limited protective search of outer clothing for weapons,1 as laid down in 7erry$
thus4
.e merely hold today that where a police officer observes unusual
conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his e"perience that
criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing may
be armed and presently dangerous, where in the course of investigating this
behavior he identifies himself as a policeman and makes reasonable in/uiries,
and where nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel his
reasonable fear for his own or others+ safety, he is entitled for the protection of
himself and others in the area to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer
clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover weapons which might be used
to assault him. )uch a search is a reasonable search under the ,ourth
6mendment (7erry$ at /11. .n fact$ the Co!rt noted that the Msole %!stification' for
a stopCandCfris& was the Mprotection of the police officer and others nearby'J while
the scope of the search cond!cted in the case was li#ited to patting down the
o!ter clothing of petitioner and his co#panions$ the police officer did not place
his hands in their poc&ets nor !nder the o!ter s!rface of their gar#ents !ntil he
had felt weapons$ and then he #erely reached for and re#oed the g!ns. 7his
did not constit!te a general e*ploratory search$ .d.)
#ther notable points of 7erry are that while probable cause is not re/uired to
conduct a 0stop%and%frisk,1 it nevertheless holds that mere suspicion or a hunch will not
validate a 0stop%and%frisk.1 6 genuine reason must e"ist, in light of the police officer+s
e"perience and surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person detained
has weapons concealed about him. ,inally, a 0stop%and%frisk1 serves a two%fold interest4
>1? the general interest of effective crime prevention and detection, which underlies the
recognition that a police officer may, under appropriate circumstances and in an
appropriate manner, approach a person for purposes of investigating possible criminal
behavior even without probable cause3 and >$? the more pressing interest of safety and
self%preservation which permit the police officer to take steps to assure himself that the
person with whom he deals is not armed with a deadly weapon that could une"pectedly
and fatally be used against the police officer. (Malacat v. !ourt o/ Appeals, 283 !"A
'90, Dec. '2, '00% (Davi-e*+
31. Are searches at chec&points alid( Disc!ss.
Held: 6ccused%appellants assail the manner by which the checkpoint in /uestion
was conducted. They contend that the checkpoint manned by elements of the 5akati
Police should have been announced. They also complain of its having been conducted
in an arbitrary and discriminatory manner.
21
.e take judicial notice of the e"istence of the C#52!2C resolution imposing a
gun ban during the election period issued pursuant to )ection 9$>c? in relation to )ection
$L>/? of the #mnibus 2lection Code >Catas Pambansa Clg. ;;1?. The national and local
elections in 1EE9 were held on ; 5ay, the second 5onday of the month. The incident,
which happened on 9 6pril 1EE9, was well within the election period.
This Court has ruled that not all checkpoints are illegal. Those which are
warranted by the e"igencies of public order and are conducted in a way least intrusive to
motorists are allowed. ,or, admittedly, routine checkpoints do intrude, to a certain
e"tent, on motorists+ right to 0free passage without interruption,1 but it cannot be denied
that, as a rule, it involves only a brief detention of travelers during which the vehicle+s
occupants are re/uired to answer a brief /uestion or two. ,or as long as the vehicle is
neither searched nor its occupants subjected to a body search, and the inspection of the
vehicle is limited to a visual search, said routine checks cannot be regarded as violative
of an individual+s right against unreasonable search. In fact, these routine checks, when
conducted in a fi"ed area, are even less intrusive.
The checkpoint herein conducted was in pursuance of the gun ban enforced by
the C#52!2C. The C#52!2C would be hard put to implement the ban if its deputi-ed
agents were limited to a visual search of pedestrians. It would also defeat the purpose
for which such ban was instituted. Those who intend to bring a gun during said period
would know that they only need a car to be able to easily perpetrate their malicious
designs.
The facts adduced do not constitute a ground for a violation of the constitutional
rights of the accused against illegal search and sei-ure. P#: )uba admitted that they
were merely stopping cars they deemed suspicious, such as those whose windows are
heavily tinted just to see if the passengers thereof were carrying guns. 6t best they
would merely direct their flashlights inside the cars they would stop, without opening the
car+s doors or subjecting its passengers to a body search. There is nothing
discriminatory in this as this is what the situation demands.
.e see no need for checkpoints to be announced " " ". ot only would it be
impractical, it would also forewarn those who intend to violate the ban. 2ven so, badges
of legitimacy of checkpoints may still be inferred from their fi"ed location and the
regulari-ed manner in which they are operated. ()eople v. 4sana, 323 !"A %9$,
;an. 28, 2&&&, '
st
Div. (Davi-e, !;*+
30. Do the ordinary rights against !nreasonable searches and sei9!res apply to
searches cond!cted at the airport p!rs!ant to ro!tine airport sec!rity proced!res(
Held: Persons may lose the protection of the search and sei-ure clause by
e"posure of their persons or property to the public in a manner reflecting a lack of
subjective e"pectation of privacy, which e"pectation society is prepared to recogni-e as
reasonable. )uch recognition is implicit in airport security procedures. .ith increased
concern over airplane hijacking and terrorism has come increased security at the
nation+s airports. Passengers attempting to board an aircraft routinely pass through
metal detectors3 their carry%on baggage as well as checked luggage are routinely
subjected to "%ray scans. )hould these procedures suggest the presence of suspicious
objects, physical searches are conducted to determine what the objects are. There is
little /uestion that such searches are reasonable, given their minimal intrusiveness, the
gravity of the safety interests involved, and the reduced privacy e"pectations associated
with airline travel. Indeed, travelers are often notified through airport public address
systems, signs, and notices in their airline tickets that they are subject to search and, if
any prohibited materials or substances are found, such would be subject to sei-ure.
These announcements place passengers on notice that ordinary constitutional
protections against warrantless searches and sei-ures do not apply to routine airport
procedures.
The packs of methamphetamine hydrochloride having thus been obtained
through a valid warrantless search, they are admissible in evidence against the accused%
22
appellant herein. Corollarily, her subse/uent arrest, although likewise without warrant,
was justified since it was effected upon the discovery and recovery of 0shabu1 in her
person in flagrante delicto. ()eople v. <eila ;ohnson, 7.". >o. '3888', Dec. '8, 2&&&,
2
n-
Div. (Men-o8a*+

3/. )ay the constit!tional protection against !nreasonable searches and sei9!res be
e*tended to acts co##itted by priate indiid!als(
Held: 6s held in People . )arti (1/3 "C=A 51 31//16)$ the constitutional
protection against unreasonable searches and sei-ures refers to the immunity of oneJs
person from interference by government and it cannot be e"tended to acts committed by
private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion.
()eople v. Men-o8a, 3&' !"A ##, ;an. '8, '000, '
st
Div. (Melo*+
+2. "ho!ld the sei9ed dr!gs which are phar#ace!tically correct b!t not properly
doc!#ented s!b%ect of an illegal search beca!se the applicant :failed to allege in the
application for search warrant that the s!b%ect dr!gs for which she was applying for
search warrant were either fa&e$ #isbranded$ ad!lterated$ or !nregistered$; be
ret!rned to the owner(
Held: .ith the )tateJs obligation to protect and promote the right to health of the
people and instill health consciousness among them (Article ..$ "ection 15$ 1/01
Constit!tion)$ in order to develop a healthy and alert citi-enry (Article <.H$ "ection 1/316)$
it became mandatory for the government to supervise and control the proliferation of
drugs in the market. The constitutional mandate that =the )tate shall adopt an integrated
and comprehensive approach to health development which shall endeavor to make
essential goods, health and other social services available to all people at affordable
cost= (Article <...$ "ection 11) cannot be neglected. This is why =the )tate shall establish
and maintain an effective food and drug regulatory system.= (Article <...$ "ection 12)
The C,6@ is the government agency vested by law to make a mandatory and
authoritative determination of the true therapeutic effect of drugs because it involves
technical skill which is within its special competence. The health of the citi-enry should
never be compromised. To the layman, medicine is a cure that may lead to better
health.
If the sei-ed 9$ bo"es of drugs are pharmaceutically correct but not properly
documented, they should be promptly disposed of in the manner provided by law in
order to ensure that the same do not fall into the wrong hands who might use the drugs
underground. Private respondent cannot rely on the statement of the trial court that the
applicant =failed to allege in the application for search warrant that the subject drugs for
which she was applying for search warrant were either fake, misbranded, adulterated, or
unregistered= in order to obtain the return of the drugs. The policy of the law enunciated
in A.6. o. ;$<: is to protect the consumers as well as the licensed businessmen.
,oremost among these consumers is the government itself which procures medicines
and distributes them to the local communities through direct assistance to the local
health centers or through outreach and charity programs. #nly with the proper
government sanctions can medicines and drugs circulate the market. .e cannot afford
to take any risk, for the life and health of the citi-enry are as precious as the e"istence of
the )tate. ()eople v. ;u-ge 1strella 5. 1stra-a, 7." >o. '2$$#', ;une 2#, 2&&&,
pcl. 2
n-
Div. (Dnares-antiago*+
+1. Do =egional 7rial Co!rts hae co#petence to pass !pon the alidity or reg!larity of
sei9!re and forfeit!re proceedings cond!cted by the 4!rea! of C!sto#s and to
en%oin or otherwise interfere with these proceedings(
Held: In Eao . Co!rt of Appeals (2+/ "C=A 35$ +2C+3 31//56)$ this Court,
reiterating its rulings " " " said4
There is no /uestion that Aegional Trial Courts are devoid of any
competence to pass upon the validity or regularity of sei-ure and forfeiture
proceedings conducted by the Cureau of Customs and to enjoin or otherwise
interfere with these proceedings. The Collector of Customs sitting in sei-ure and
23
forfeiture proceedings has e*cl!sie %!risdiction to hear and determine all
/uestions touching on the sei-ure and forfeiture of dutiable goods. The Aegional
Trial Courts are precluded from assuming cogni-ance over such matters even
through petitions of certiorari, prohibition or mandamus.
It is likewise well%settled that the provisions of the Tariff and Customs
Code and that of Aepublic 6ct o. 11$9, as amended, otherwise known as 06n
6ct Creating the Court of Ta" 6ppeals,1 specify the proper fora and procedure for
the ventilation of any legal objections or issues raised concerning these
proceedings. Thus, actions of the Collector of Customs are appealable to the
Commissioner of Customs, whose decision, in turn, is subject to the e"clusive
appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Ta" 6ppeals and from there to the Court of
6ppeals.
The rule that Aegional Trial Courts have no review powers over such
proceedings is anchored upon the policy of placing no unnecessary hindrance on
the government+s drive, not only to prevent smuggling and other frauds upon
Customs, but more importantly, to render effective and efficient the collection of
import and e"port duties due the )tate, which enables the government to carry
out the functions it has been instituted to perform.
2ven if the sei-ure by the Collector of Customs were illegal, " " " we have
said that such act does not deprive the Cureau of Customs of jurisdiction
thereon.
Aespondents cite the statement of the Court of 6ppeals that regular courts still
retain jurisdiction 0where, as in this case, for lack of probable cause, there is serious
doubt as to the propriety of placing the articles under Customs jurisdiction through
sei-ureNforfeiture proceedings.1 They overlook the fact, however, that under the law, the
/uestion of whether probable cause e"ists for the sei-ure of the subject sacks of rice is
not for the Aegional Trial Court to determine. The customs authorities do not have to
prove to the satisfaction of the court that the articles on board a vessel were imported
from abroad or are intended to be shipped abroad before they may e"ercise the power
to effect customs+ searches, sei-ures, or arrests provided by law and continue with the
administrative hearings. 6s the Court held in Ponce -nrile . Hin!ya (31 "C=A 301$
300C30/ 31/116$ reiterated in Eao . Co!rt of Appeals$ s!pra and )ison . Datiidad$ 213
"C=A 13+ 31//26)4
The governmental agency concerned, the Cureau of Customs, is vested with
e"clusive authority. 2ven if it be assumed that in the e"ercise of such e"clusive
competence a taint of illegality may be correctly imputed, the most that can be
said is that under certain circumstances the grave abuse of discretion conferred
may oust it of such jurisdiction. It does not mean however that correspondingly a
court of first instance is vested with competence when clearly in the light of the
above decisions the law has not seen fit to do so. The proceeding before the
Collector of Customs is not final. 6n appeal lies to the Commissioner of Customs
and thereafter to the Court of Ta" 6ppeals. It may even reach this Court through
the appropriate petition for review. 7he proper entilation of the legal iss!es
raised is th!s indicated. Certainly a co!rt of first instance is not therein incl!ded.
.t is deoid of %!risdiction.
(Bureau o/ !ustoms v. .gario, 320 !"A 280, 20#-208, March 3&, 2&&&, 2
n-
Div.
(Men-o8a*+
The Pri+!c, of Comm%nic!tion& !nd Corre&-ondence
+2. Priate respondent =afael ". Grtane9 filed with the =egional 7rial Co!rt of N!e9on
City a co#plaint for ann!l#ent of #arriage with da#ages against petitioner 7eresita
"alcedoCGrtane9$ on gro!nds of lac& of #arriage license andOor psychological
incapacity of the petitioner. A#ong the e*hibits offered by priate respondent were
three (3) cassette tapes of alleged telephone conersations between petitioner and
!nidentified persons. 7he trial co!rt iss!ed the assailed order ad#itting all of the
24
eidence offered by priate respondent$ incl!ding tape recordings of telephone
conersations of petitioner with !nidentified persons. 7hese tape recordings were
#ade and obtained when priate respondent allowed his friends fro# the #ilitary to
wire tap his ho#e telephone. Did the trial co!rt act properly when it ad#itted in
eidence said tape recordings(
Held: Aepublic 6ct o. D$<< entitled =6n 6ct to Prohibit and Penali-e .ire
Tapping and #ther Aelated Hiolations of the Privacy of Communication, and ,or #ther
Purposes= e"pressly makes such tape recordings inadmissible in evidence. " " ".
Clearly, respondent trial court and Court of 6ppeals failed to consider the afore%
/uoted provisions of the law in admitting in evidence the cassette tapes in /uestion.
6bsent a clear showing that both parties to the telephone conversations allowed the
recording of the same, the inadmissibility of the subject tapes is mandatory under Aep.
6ct o. D$<<.
6dditionally, it should be mentioned that the above%mentioned Aepublic 6ct in
)ection $ thereof imposes a penalty of imprisonment of not less than si" >L? months and
up to si" >L? years for violation of said 6ct. (alce-o-.rtane8 v. !ourt o/ Appeals, 239
!"A ''', Aug. $, '00$ ()a-illa*+
The Ri(ht to Pri+!c,
+3. .s there a constit!tional right to priacy(
Held: The essence of privacy is the 0right to be let alone.1 In the 1EL9 case of
Briswold . Connectic!t (301 ?.". +1/$ 1+ l. ed. 2D 512 31/656)$ the 8nited )tates
)upreme Court gave more substance to the right of privacy when it ruled that the right
has a constitutional foundation. It held that there is a right of privacy which can be found
within the penumbras of the ,irst, Third, ,ourth, ,ifth and inth 6mendments. In the
1EL; case of )orfe . )!t!c (22 "C=A +2+$ +++C++5)$ we adopted the Briswold ruling
that there is a constit!tional right to priacy.
The )C clarified that the right of privacy is recogni-ed and enshrined in several
provisions of our Constitution. It is e"pressly recogni-ed in )ection :>1? of the Cill of
Aights. #ther facets of the right to privacy are protected in various provisions of the Cill
of Aights, i.e.$ )ecs. 1, $, L, ;, and 1K. (.ple v. 5orres, 7.". >o. '2%#89, ;uly 23,
'008 ()uno*+
++. .dentify the 9ones of priacy recogni9ed and protected in o!r laws.
Held: The Ciil Code provides that 0'e(very person shall respect the dignity,
personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons1 and punishes
as actionable torts several acts by a person of meddling and prying into the privacy of
another. It also holds a public officer or employee or any private individual liable for
damages for any violation of the rights and liberties of another person, and recogni-es
the privacy of letters and other private communications. The =eised Penal Code
makes a crime the violation of secrets by an officer, the revelation of trade and industrial
secrets, and trespass to dwelling. Invasion of privacy is an offense in special laws like
the 6nti%.iretapping !aw >A.6. D$<<?, the )ecrecy of Cank @eposits >A.6. 1D<9? and the
Intellectual Property Code >A.6. ;$E:?. The =!les of Co!rt on privileged communication
likewise recogni-e the privacy of certain information ("ection 2+$ =!le 1323c6$ =eised
=!les on -idence). (.ple v. 5orres, 7.". >o. '2%#89, ;uly 23, '008 ()uno*+
+5. Disc!ss why Ad#inistratie Grder Do. 320 (iss!ed by the President prescribing for a
Dational .D syste# for all citi9ens to facilitate b!siness transactions with goern#ent
agencies engaged in the deliery of basic serices and social sec!rity proisions)
sho!ld be declared !nconstit!tional.
Held: .e prescind from the premise that the right to privacy is a fundamental
right guaranteed by the Constitution, hence, it is the burden of government to show that
25
6.#. o. :<; is justified by some compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn.
6.#. o. :<; is predicated on two considerations4 >1? the need to provide our citi-ens
and foreigners with the facility to conveniently transact business with basic service and
social security providers and other government instrumentalities and >$? the need to
reduce, if not totally eradicate, fraudulent transactions and misrepresentations by
persons seeking basic services. It is debatable whether these interests are compelling
enough to warrant the issuance of 6.#. o. :<;. 4!t what is not arg!able is the
broadness$ the ag!eness$ the oerbreadth of A.G. Do. 320 which if i#ple#ented will
p!t o!r people's right to priacy in clear and present danger.
The heart of A.G. Do. 320 lies in its )ection D which provides for a Population
Aeference umber >PA? as a 0common reference number to establish a linkage among
concerned agencies1 through the use of 0Ciometrics Technology1 and 0computer
application designs.1
.t is noteworthy that A.G. Do. 320 does not state what specific biological
characteristics and what partic!lar bio#etrics technology shall be !sed to identify people
who will see& its coerage. Considering the ban8!et of options aailable to the
i#ple#entors of A.G. Do. 320$ the fear that it threatens the right to priacy of o!r people
is not gro!ndless.
A.G. Do. 320 sho!ld also raise o!r antennas for a f!rther loo& will show that it
does not state whether encoding of data is li#ited to biological infor#ation alone for
identification p!rposes. < * *. Clearly$ the indefiniteness of A.G. Do. 320 can gie the
goern#ent the roing a!thority to store and retriee infor#ation for a p!rpose other
than the identification of the indiid!al thro!gh his P=D.
7he potential for #is!se of the data to be gathered !nder A.G. Do. 320 cannot
be !nderplayed * * *. 7he #ore fre8!ent the !se of the P=D$ the better the chance of
b!ilding a h!ge and for#idable infor#ation base thro!gh the electronic lin&age of the
files. 7he data #ay be gathered for gainf!l and !sef!l goern#ent p!rposesJ b!t the
e*istence of this ast reseroir of personal infor#ation constit!tes a coert initation to
#is!se$ a te#ptation that #ay be too great for so#e of o!r a!thorities to resist.
It is plain and we hold that 6.#. o. :<; falls short of assuring that personal
information which will be gathered about our people will only be processed for
une/uivocally specified p!rposes. The lack of proper safeguards in this regard of 6.#.
o. :<; may interfere with the individual+s liberty of abode and travel by enabling
authorities to track down his movement3 it may also enable unscrupulous persons to
access confidential information and circumvent the right against self%incrimination3 it may
pave the way for 0fishing e"peditions1 by government authorities and evade the right
against unreasonable searches and sei-ures. 7he possibilities of ab!se and #is!se of
the P=D$ bio#etrics and co#p!ter technology are accent!ated when we consider that
the indiid!al lac&s control oer what can be read or placed on his .D$ #!ch less erify
the correctness of the data encoded. 7hey threaten the ery ab!ses that the 4ill of
=ights see&s to preent.
The ability of a sophisticated data center to generate a comprehensive cradleCtoC
grae dossier on an individual and transmit it over a national network is one of the most
graphic threats of the computer revolution. The computer is capable of producing a
comprehensive dossier on individuals out of information given at different times and for
varied purposes. & " ". Aetrieval of stored data is simple. .hen information of a
privileged character finds its way into the computer, it can be e"tracted together with
other data on the subject. #nce e"tracted, the information is putty in the hands of any
person. The end of privacy begins.
'T(he Court will not be true to its role as the ultimate guardian of the people+s
liberty if it would not immediately smother the sparks that endanger their rights but would
rather wait for the fire that could consume them.
3A6nd we now hold that when the integrity of a f!nda#ental right is at sta&e$ this
Co!rt will gie the challenged law$ ad#inistratie order$ r!le or reg!lation a stricter
26
scr!tiny. .t will not do for the a!thorities to ino&e the pres!#ption of reg!larity in the
perfor#ance of official d!ties. Dor is it eno!gh for the a!thorities to proe that their act
is not irrational for a basic right can be di#inished$ if not defeated$ een when the
goern#ent does not act irrationally. 7hey #!st satisfactorily show the presence of
co#pelling state interest and that the law$ r!le$ or reg!lation is narrowly drawn to
precl!de ab!ses. This approach is demanded by the 1E;K Constitution whose entire
matri" is designed to protect human rights and to prevent authoritarianism. In case of
doubt, the least we can do is to lean towards the stance that will not put in danger the
rights protected by the Constitution.
7he right to priacy is one of the #ost threatened rights of #an liing in a #ass
society. The threats emanate from various sources G governments, journalists,
employers, social scientists, etc. In the case at bar, the threat comes from the e"ecutive
branch of government which by issuing 6.#. o. :<; pressures the people to surrender
their privacy by giving information about themselves on the prete"t that it will facilitate
delivery of basic services. Bien the recordC&eeping power of the co#p!ter$ only the
indifferent will fail to perceie the danger that A.G. Do. 320 gies the goern#ent the
power to co#pile a deastating dossier against !ns!specting citi9ens. & " " '.(e close
with the statement that the right to privacy was not engraved in our Constitution for
flattery. (.ple v. 5orres, 7.". >o. '2%#89, ;uly 23, '008 ()uno*+
+6. "ho!ld in ca#era inspection of ban& acco!nts be allowed( .f in the affir#atie$
!nder what circ!#stances sho!ld it be allowed(
Held: The issue is whether petitioner may be cited for indirect contempt for her
failure to produce the documents re/uested by the #mbudsman. 6nd whether the order
of the #mbudsman to have an in ca#era inspection of the /uestioned account is
allowed as an e"ception to the law on secrecy of bank deposits >A.6. o. 1D<9?.
6n e"amination of the secrecy of bank deposits law >A.6. o. 1D<9? would reveal
the following e"ceptions4
1) .here the depositor consents in writing3
2) Impeachment cases3
3) Cy court order in bribery or dereliction of duty cases against public officials3
+) @eposit is subject of litigation3
5) )ec. ;, A.6. o. :<1E, in cases of une"plained wealth as held in the case of
PD4 . Bancayco (122 Phil. 523$ 520 31/656).
The order of the #mbudsman to produce for in ca#era inspection the subject
accounts with the 8nion Cank of the Philippines, Bulia Hargas Cranch, is based on a
pending investigation at the #ffice of the #mbudsman against 6mado !agdameo, et. al.
for violation of A.6. o. :<1E, )ec. : >e? and >g? relative to the Boint Henture 6greement
between the Public 2states 6uthority and 656AI.
.e rule that before an in camera inspection may be allowed, there must be a
pending case before a court of competent jurisdiction. ,urther, the account must be
clearly identified, the inspection limited to the subject matter of the pending case before
the court of competent jurisdiction. The bank personnel and the account holder must be
notified to be present during the inspection, and such inspection may cover only the
account identified in the pending case.
In ?nion 4an& of the Philippines . Co!rt of Appeals, we held that 0)ection $ of
the !aw on )ecrecy of Cank @eposits, as amended, declares bank deposits to be
Oabsolutely confidential+ e"cept4
1? In an e"amination made in the course of a special or general e"amination of
a bank that is specifically authori-ed by the 5onetary Coard after being
satisfied that there is reasonable ground to believe that a bank fraud or
serious irregularity has been or is being committed and that it is necessary to
look into the deposit to establish such fraud or irregularity,
27
$? In an e"amination made by an independent auditor hired by the bank to
conduct its regular audit provided that the e"amination is for audit purposes
only and the results thereof shall be for the e"clusive use of the bank,
:? 8pon written permission of the depositor,
D? In cases of impeachment,
9? 8pon order of a competent court in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of
public officials, or
L? In cases where the money deposited or invested is the subject matter of the
litigation1.
In the case at bar, there is yet no pending litigation before any court of competent
authority. .hat is e"isting is an investigation by the #ffice of the #mbudsman. In short,
what the #ffice of the #mbudsman would wish to do is to fish for additional evidence to
formally charge 6mado !agdameo, et. al.$ with the )andiganbayan. Clearly, there was
no pending case in court which would warrant the opening of the bank account for
inspection.
Pones of privacy are recogni-ed and protected in our laws. The Civil Code
provides that 0'e(very person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of
mind of his neighbors and other persons1 and punishes as actionable torts several acts
for meddling and prying into the privacy of another. It also holds public officer or
employee or any private individual liable for damages for any violation of the rights and
liberties of another person, and recogni-es the privacy of letters and other private
communications. The Aevised Penal Code makes a crime of the violation of secrets by
an officer, revelation of trade and industrial secrets, and trespass to dwelling. Invasion
of privacy is an offense in special laws like the anti%.iretapping !aw$ the "ecrecy of
4an& Deposits Act, and the Intellectual Property Code. (<our-es 5. Mar=ue8 v. 6on.
Aniano A. Desierto, 7.". >o. '39882, ;une 2%, 2&&', 1n Banc ()ar-o*+
Freedom of E"-re&&ion
+1. Disting!ish :contentCbased restrictions; on free speech fro# :contentCne!tral
restrictions$; and gie e*a#ple of each.
Held: ContentCbased restrictions are imposed because of the content of the
speech and are, therefore, subject to the clear%and%present danger test. ,or e"ample, a
rule such as that involved in "anidad . Co#elec (101 "C=A 52/ 31//26)$ prohibiting
columnists, commentators, and announcers from campaigning either for or against an
issue in a plebiscite must have compelling reason to support it, or it will not pass muster
under strict scrutiny. These restrictions are censorial and therefore they bear a heavy
presumption of constitutional invalidity. In addition, they will be tested for possible
overbreadth and vagueness.
ContentCne!tral restrictions, on the other hand, like )ec. 11>b? of A.6. o. LLDL,
which prohibits the sale or donation of print space and air time to political candidates
during the campaign period, are not concerned with the content of the speech. These
regulations need only a substantial governmental interest to support them. 6 deferential
standard of review will suffice to test their validity. The clear%and%present danger rule is
inappropriate as a test for determining the constitutional validity of laws, like )ec. 11>b?
of A.6. o. LLDL, which are not concerned with the content of political ads but only with
their incidents. To apply the clear%and%present danger test to such regulatory measures
would be like using a sledgehammer to drive a nail when a regular hammer is all that is
needed.
The test for this difference in the level of justification for the restriction of speech
is that content%based restrictions distort public debate, have improper motivation, and
are usually imposed because of fear of how people will react to a particular speech. o
such reasons underlie content%neutral regulations, like regulation of time, place and
manner of holding public assemblies under C.P. Clg. ;;<, the Public 6ssembly 6ct of
1E;9. (.smena v. !.M1<1!, 288 !"A $$%, March 3', '008 (Men-o8a*+
28
+0. Does the cond!ct of e*it poll by A4" C4D present a clear and present danger of
destroying the credibility and integrity of the electoral process as it has the tendency
to sow conf!sion considering the rando#ness of selecting interiewees$ which
f!rther #a&es the e*it poll highly !nreliable$ to %!stify the pro#!lgation of a Co#elec
resol!tion prohibiting the sa#e(
Held: )uch arguments are purely speculative and clearly untenable. >irst$ by
the very nature of a survey, the interviewees or participants are selected at random, so
that the results will as much as possible be representative or reflective of the general
sentiment or view of the community or group polled. "econd$ the survey result is not
meant to replace or be at par with the official Comelec count. It consists merely of the
opinion of the polling group as to who the electorate in general has probably voted for,
based on the limited data gathered from polled individuals. >inally$ not at stake are the
credibility and the integrity of the elections, which are e"ercises that are separate and
independent from the e"it polls. The holding and the reporting of the results of e"it polls
cannot undermine those of the elections, since the former is only part of the latter. If at
all, the outcome of one can only be indicative of the other.
The C#52!2C+s concern with the possible noncommunicative effect of e"it polls
G disorder and confusion in the voting centers G does not justify a total ban on them.
8ndoubtedly, the assailed Comelec Aesolution is too broad, since its application is
without /ualification as to whether the polling is disruptive or not. There is no showing,
however, that e"it polls or the means to interview voters cause chaos in voting centers.
either has any evidence been presented proving that the presence of e"it poll reporters
near an election precinct tends to create disorder or confuse the voters.
5oreover, the prohibition incidentally prevents the collection of e"it poll data and
their use for any purpose. The valuable information and ideas that could be derived
from them, based on the voters+ answers to the survey /uestions will forever remain
unknown and une"plored. 8nless the ban is restrained, candidates, researchers, social
scientists and the electorate in general would be deprived of studies on the impact of
current events and of election%day and other factors on voters+ choices.
The absolute ban imposed by the Comelec cannot, therefore, be justified. It
does not leave open any alternative channel of communication to gather the type of
information obtained through e"it polling. #n the other hand, there are other valid and
reasonable ways and means to achieve the Comelec end of avoiding or minimi-ing
disorder and confusion that may be brought about by e"it surveys.
.ith foregoing premises, it is concluded that the interest of the state in reducing
disruption is outweighed by the drastic abridgment of the constitutionally guaranteed
rights of the media and the electorate. Quite the contrary, instead of disrupting elections,
e"it polls G properly conducted and publici-ed G can be vital tools for the holding of
honest, orderly, peaceful and credible elections3 and for the elimination of election%fi"ing,
fraud and other electoral ills. (AB-!B> Broa-casting !orporation v. !.M1<1!,
7.". >o. '33$8#, ;an. 28, 2&&&, 1n Banc ()angani,an*+
+/. "ection 5.+ of =.A. Do. /226 (>air -lection Act) which proidesF :"!reys affecting
national candidates shall not be p!blished fifteen (15) days before an election and
s!reys affecting local candidates shall not be p!blished seen (1) days before an
election.; 7he "ocial ,eather "tations$ .nc. (",")$ a priate nonCstoc&$ nonCprofit
social research instit!tion cond!cting s!reys in ario!s fieldsJ and Pa#ahalan
P!blishing Corporation$ p!blisher of the )anila "tandard$ a newspaper of general
circ!lation$ which feat!res newsworthy ite#s of infor#ation incl!ding election
s!reys$ challenged the constit!tionality of aforesaid proision as it constit!tes a
prior restraint on the e*ercise of freedo# of speech witho!t any clear and present
danger to %!stify s!ch restraint. "ho!ld the challenge be s!stained(
Held: ,or reason hereunder given, we hold that )ection 9.D of A.6. o. E<<L
constitutes an unconstitutional abridgment of freedom of speech, e"pression, and the
press.
29
To be sure, )ection 9.D lays a prior restraint on freedom of speech, e"pression,
and the press by prohibiting the publication of election survey results affecting
candidates within the prescribed periods of fifteen >19? days immediately preceding a
national election and seven >K? days before a local election. Cecause of the preferred
status of the constitutional rights of speech, e"pression, and the press, such a measure
is vitiated by a weighty presumption of invalidity. Indeed, 0any system of prior restraints
of e"pression comes to this Court bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutional
validity " " ". The *overnment Othus carries a heavy burden of showing justification for
the enforcement of such restraint.+1 There is thus a reversal of the normal presumption
of validity that inheres in every legislation.
or may it be argued that because of 6rt. I&%C, )ec. D of the Constitution, which
gives the Comelec supervisory power to regulate the enjoyment or utili-ation of franchise
for the operation of media of communication, no presumption of invalidity attaches to a
measure like )ec. 9.D. ,or as we have pointed out in sustaining the ban on media
political advertisements, the grant of power to the Comelec under 6rt. I&%C, )ec. D is
limited to ensuring 0e/ual opportunity, time, space, and the right to reply1 as well as
uniform and reasonable rates of charges for the use of such media facilities for 0public
information campaigns and forums among candidates.1
& " "
or can the ban on election surveys be justified on the ground that there are
other countries " " " which similarly impose restrictions on the publication of election
surveys. 6t best this survey is inconclusive. It is noteworthy that in the 8nited )tates no
restriction on the publication of election survey results e"ists. It cannot be argued that
this is because the 8nited )tates is a mature democracy. either are there laws
imposing an embargo on survey results, even for a limited period, in other countries. & "
".
.hat test should then be employed to determine the constitutional validity of
)ection 9.D7 The 8nited )tates )upreme Court " " " held in ?nited "tates . G' 4rienF
'6( government regulation is sufficiently justified >1? if it is within the constitutional
power of the government3 >$? if it furthers an important or substantial
governmental interest3 >:? if the governmental interest is unrelated to the
suppression of free e"pression3 and >D? if the incidental restriction on alleged
,irst 6mendment freedoms >of speech, e"pression and press? is no greater than
is essential to the furtherance of that interest (3/1 ?.". 361$ 22 L. -d. 2d 6/2$
602 31/606 3brac&eted n!#bers added6).
This is so far the most influential test for distinguishing content%based from
content%neutral regulations and is said to have 0become canonical in the review of such
laws.1 It is noteworthy that the G' 4rien test has been applied by this Court in at least
two cases (Adiong . Co#elec$ 221 "C=A 112 31//26J Gs#ena . Co#elec$ s!pra.).
8nder this test, even if a law furthers an important or substantial governmental
interest, it should be invalidated if such governmental interest is 0not unrelated to the
suppression of free e"pression.1 5oreover, even if the purpose is unrelated to the
suppression of free speech, the law should nevertheless be invalidated if the restriction
on freedom of e"pression is greater than is necessary to achieve the governmental
purpose in /uestion.
#ur in/uiry should accordingly focus on these two considerations as applied to
)ec. 9.D.
>irst. )ec. 9.D fails to meet criterion >:? of the G' 4rien test because the causal
connection of e"pression to the asserted governmental interest makes such interest 0not
unrelated to the suppression of free e"pression.1 Cy prohibiting the publication of
election survey results because of the possibility that such publication might undermine
the integrity of the election, )ec. 9.D actually suppresses a whole class of e"pression,
while allowing the e"pression of opinion concerning the same subject matter by
30
newspaper columnists, radio and TH commentators, armchair theorists, and other
opinion makers. In effect, )ec. 9.D shows a bias for a particular subject matter, if not
viewpoint, by preferring personal opinion to statistical results. The constitutional
guarantee of freedom of e"pression means that 0the government has no power to restrict
e"pression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its contents.1 The
inhibition of speech should be upheld only if the e"pression falls within one of the few
unprotected categories dealt with in Chaplins&y . Dew Ka#pshire (315 ?.". 560$ 511C
512$ 06 L. -d. 1231$ 1235 31/+26)$ thus4
There are certain well%defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the
prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to raise any
Constitutional problem. These include the lewd and obscene, the profane, the
libelous, and the insulting or Ofighting+ words G those which by their very utterance
inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace. ')(uch
utterances are no essential part of any e"position of ideas, and are of such slight
social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is
clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.
or is there justification for the prior restraint which )ec. 9.D lays on protected
speech. In Dear . )innesota (203 ?.". 6/1$ 115C116$ 15 l. -d. 1351$ 1361 31/316)$ it
was held4
'T(he protection even as to previous restraint is not absolutely unlimited. Cut the
limitation has been recogni-ed only in e"ceptional cases " " ". o one would
/uestion but that a government might prevent actual obstruction to its recruiting
service or the publication of the sailing dates of transports or the number and
location of troops. #n similar grounds, the primary re/uirements of decency may
be enforced against obscene publications. The security of the community life
may be protected against incitements to acts of violence and the overthrow by
force of orderly government " " ".
Thus, " " " the prohibition imposed by )ec. 9.D cannot be justified on the ground
that it is only for a limited period and is only incidental. The prohibition may be for a
limited time, but the curtailment of the right of e"pression is direct, absolute, and
substantial. It constitutes a total suppression of a category of speech and is not made
less so because it is only for a period of fifteen >19? days immediately before a national
election and seven >K? days immediately before a local election.
This sufficiently distinguishes )ec. 9.D from A.6. o. LLDL, )ec. 11>b?, which this
Court found to be valid in Dational Press Cl!b . Co#elec (s!pra.)$ and Gs#ena .
Co#elec (s!pra.). ,or the ban imposed by A.6. o. LLDL, )ec. 11>b? is not only
authori-ed by a specific constitutional provision (Art. .<CC$ "ec. +)$ but it also provided
an alternative so that, as this Court pointed out in Gs#ena$ there was actually no ban
but only a substitution of media advertisements by the Comelec space, and Comelec
hour.
"econd. 2ven if the governmental interest sought to be promoted is unrelated to
the suppression of speech and the resulting restriction of free e"pression is only
incidental, )ec. 9.D nonetheless fails to meet criterion >D? of the G' 4rien test, namely,
that the restriction be not greater than is necessary to further the governmental interest.
6s already stated, )ec. 9.D. aims at the prevention of last%minute pressure on voters, the
creation of bandwagon effect, 0junking1 of weak or 0losing1 candidates, and resort to the
form of election cheating called 0dagdag%bawas.1 Praiseworthy as these aims of the
regulation might be, they cannot be attained at the sacrifice of the fundamental right of
e"pression, when such aim can be more narrowly pursued by punishing unlawful acts$
rather than speech because of apprehension that such speech creates the danger of
such evils. Thus, under the 6dministrative Code of 1E;K (4&. H$ 7it. .$ "!btit. C$ Ch 1$
"ec. 3316)$ the Comelec is given the power4
To stop any illegal activity, or confiscate, tear down, and stop any
!nlawf!l$ libelous, #isleading or false election propaganda$ after due notice and
hearing.
31
This is surely a less restrictive means than the prohibition contained in )ec. 9.D.
Pursuant to this power of the Comelec, it can confiscate bogus survey results calculated
to mislead voters. Candidates can have their own surveys conducted. o right of reply
can be invoked by others. o principle of e/uality is involved. It is a free market to
which each candidate brings his ideas. 6s for the purpose of the law to prevent
bandwagon effects, it is doubtful whether the *overnment can deal with this natural%
enough tendency of some voters. )ome voters want to be identified with the 0winners.1
)ome are susceptible to the herd mentality. Can these be legitimately prohibited by
suppressing the publication of survey results which are a form of e"pression7 It has
been held that 0'mere( legislative preferences or beliefs respecting matters of public
convenience may well support regulation directed at other personal activities, but be
insufficient to justify such as diminishes the e"ercise of rights so vital to the maintenance
of democratic institutions.1
To summari-e then, we hold that )ec. 9.D. is invalid because >1? it imposes a
prior restraint on the freedom of e"pression, >$? it is a direct and total suppression of a
category of e"pression even though such suppression is only for a limited period, and >:?
the governmental interest sought to be promoted can be achieved by means other than
the suppression of freedom of e"pression. (ocial 2eather tations, Inc., v.
!.M1<1!, 7.". >o. '$%9%', May 9, 2&&', 1n Banc (Men-o8a*+
52. Disc!ss the @doctrine of fair co##ent@ as a alid defense in an action for libel or
slander.
Held: ,air commentaries on matters of public interest are privileged and
constitute a valid defense in an action for libel or slander. The doctrine of fair comment
means that while in general every discreditable imputation publicly made is deemed
false, because every man is presumed innocent until his guilt is judicially proved, and
every false imputation is deemed malicious, nevertheless, when the discreditable
imputation is directed against a public person in his public capacity, it is not necessarily
actionable. In order that such discreditable imputation to a public official may be
actionable, it must either be a false allegation of fact or a comment based on a false
supposition. If the comment is an e"pression of opinion, based on established facts,
then it is immaterial that the opinion happens to be mistaken, as long as it might
reasonably be inferred from the facts. (BorBal v. !A, 3&' !"A ', ;an. '$, '000, 2
n-
Div. (Bellosillo*+
51. ,hat is the :raison d'etre; for the Dew Ior& 7i#es . "!llian (316 ?" 25+) holding
that honest criticis#s on the cond!ct of p!blic officials and p!blic fig!res are
ins!lated fro# libel %!dg#ents(
Held: The guarantees of freedom of speech and press prohibit a public official or
public figure from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official
conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with actual malice, i.e.$ with
knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.
The raison d'etre for the Dew Ior& 7i#es doctrine was that to re/uire critics of
official conduct to guarantee the truth of all their factual assertions on pain of libel
judgments would lead to self%censorship, since would%be critics would be deterred from
voicing out their criticisms even if such were believed to be true, or were in fact true,
because of doubt whether it could be proved or because of fear of the e"pense of having
to prove it. (BorBal v. !A, 3&' !"A ', ;an. '$, '000, 2
n-
Div. (Bellosillo*+
52. ,ho is a :p!blic fig!re$; and therefore s!b%ect to p!blic co##ent(
Held: '.(e deem private respondent a public figure within the purview of the
Dew Ior& 7i#es ruling. 6t any rate, we have also defined 0public figure1 in Ayers
Prod!ction Pty.$ Ltd. . Cap!long (B.=. Dos. 02302 and 023/0$ 2/ April 1/00$ 162
"C=A 061) as G
32
& " " a person who, by his accomplishments, fame, mode of living, or by
adopting a profession or calling which gives the public a legitimate interest in his
doings, his affairs and his character, has become a Opublic personage.+ Fe is, in
other words, a celebrity. #bviously, to be included in this category are those who
have achieved some degree of reputation by appearing before the public, as in
the case of an actor, a professional baseball player, a pugilist, or any other
entertainer. The list is, however, broader than this. It includes public officers,
famous inventors and e"plorers, war heroes and even ordinary soldiers, infant
prodigy, and no less a personage than the *reat 2"alted Auler of the lodge. It
includes, in short, anyone who has arrived at a position where the public
attention is focused upon him as a person.
The ,C!T >,irst ational Conference on !and Transportation? was an
undertaking infused with public interest. It was promoted as a joint project of the
government and the private sector, and organi-ed by top government officials and
prominent businessmen. ,or this reason, it attracted media mileage and drew public
attention not only to the conference itself but to the personalities behind as well. 6s its
2"ecutive @irector and spokesman, private respondent conse/uently assumed the
status of a public figure.
Cut even assuming e*Cgratia arg!#enti that private respondent, despite the
position he occupied in the ,C!T, would not /ualify as a public figure, it does not
necessarily follow that he could not validly be the subject of a public comment even if he
was not a public official or at least a public figure, for he could be, as long as he was
involved in a public issue. If a matter is a subject of public or general interest, it cannot
suddenly become less so merely because a private individual is involved or because in
some sense the individual did not voluntarily choose to become involved. The public+s
primary interest is in the event3 the public focus is on the conduct of the participant and
the content, effect and significance of the conduct, not the participant+s prior anonymity
or notoriety. (BorBal v. !A, 3&' !"A ', ;an. '$, '000, 2
n-
Div. (Bellosillo*+
53. 7he Gffice of the )ayor of Las Pinas ref!sed to iss!e per#it to petitioners to hold
rally a rally in front of the E!stice Kall of Las Pinas on the gro!nd that it was
prohibited !nder "!pre#e Co!rt -n 4anc =esol!tion dated E!ly 1$1//0 in A.). Do.
/0C1C22C"C$ entitled$ @=eF B!idelines on the Cond!ct of De#onstrations$ Pic&ets$
=allies and Gther "i#ilar Batherings in the Hicinity of the "!pre#e Co!rt and All
Gther Co!rts.@ Petitioners th!s initiated the instant proceedings. 7hey s!b#it that
the "!pre#e Co!rt graely ab!sed its discretion andOor acted witho!t or in e*cess of
%!risdiction in pro#!lgating those g!idelines.
Held: .e shall first dwell on the critical argument made by petitioners that the
rules constitute an abridgment of the peopleJs aggregate rights of free speech, free
e"pression, peaceful assembly and petitioning government for redress of grievances
citing )ec. D, 6rticle III of the 1E;K Constitution that =no law shall be passed abridging=
them.
It is true that the safeguarding of the peopleJs freedom of e"pression to the end
that individuals may speak as they think on matters vital to them and that falsehoods
may be e"posed through the processes of education and discussion, is essential to free
government. Cut freedom of speech and e"pression despite its indispensability has its
limitations. It has never been understood as the absolute right to speak whenever,
however, and wherever one pleases, for the manner, place, and time of public
discussion can be constitutionally controlled. 'T(he better policy is not liberty untamed
but liberty regulated by law where every freedom is e"ercised in accordance with law
and with due regard for the rights of others.
Conventional wisdom tells us that the realities of life in a comple" society
preclude an absolutist interpretation of freedom of e"pression where it does not involve
pure speech but speech plus physical actions like picketing. There are other significant
societal values that must be accommodated and when they clash, they must all be
weighed with the promotion of the general welfare of the people as the ultimate
objective. In balancing these values, this Court has accorded freedom of e"pression a
33
preferred position in light of its more comparative importance. Fence, our rulings now
musty in years hold that only the narrowest time, place and manner regulations that are
specifically tailored to serve an important governmental interest may justify the
application of the balancing of interests test in derogation of the peopleJs right of free
speech and e"pression. .here said regulations do not aim particularly at the evils
within the allowable areas of state control but, on the contrary, sweep within their ambit
other activities as to operate as an overhanging threat to free discussion, or where upon
their face they are so vague, indefinite, or ine"act as to permit punishment of the fair use
of the right of free speech, such regulations are void.
Prescinding from this premise, the Court reiterates that judicial independence
and the fair and orderly administration of justice constitute paramount governmental
interests that can justify the regulation of the publicJs right of free speech and peaceful
assembly in the vicinity of courthouses. In the case of .n =eF -#il P. E!rado, the Court
pronounced in no uncertain terms that4
=" " " freedom of e"pression needs on occasion to be adjusted to and
accommodated with the re/uirements of e/ually important public interests. #ne
of these fundamental public interests is the maintenance of the integrity and
orderly functioning of the administration of justice. There is no antinomy between
free e"pression and the integrity of the system of administering justice. ,or the
protection and maintenance of freedom of e"pression itself can be secured only
within the conte"t of a functioning and orderly system of dispensing justice, within
the conte"t, in other words, of viable independent institutions for delivery of
justice which are accepted by the general community. " " "= (.n =eF -#il P.
E!rado$ 2+3 "C=A 2//$ 323C32+ 31//56)
It is sadly observed that judicial independence and the orderly administration of
justice have been threatened not only by contemptuous acts inside, but also by irascible
demonstrations outside, the courthouses. They wittingly or unwittingly, spoil the ideal of
sober, non%partisan proceedings before a cold and neutral judge. 2ven in the 8nited
)tates, a prohibition against picketing and demonstrating in or near courthouses, has
been ruled as valid and constitutional notwithstanding its limiting effect on the e"ercise
by the public of their liberties. & " "
The administration of justice must not only be fair but must also appear to be fair
and it is the duty of this Court to eliminate everything that will diminish if not destroy this
judicial desideratum. To be sure, there will be grievances against our justice system for
there can be no perfect system of justice but these grievances must be ventilated
through appropriate petitions, motions or other pleadings. )uch a mode is in keeping
with the respect due to the courts as vessels of justice and is necessary if judges are to
dispose their business in a fair fashion. It is the traditional conviction of every civili-ed
society that courts must be insulated from every e"traneous influence in their decisions.
The facts of a case should be determined upon evidence produced in court, and should
be uninfluenced by bias, prejudice or sympathies. (In "eE )etition to Annul 1n Banc
"esolution A.M. 08-%-&2-! - "icar-o !. Valmonte an- 4nion o/ <aFyers an-
A-vocates /or 5ransparency in 7overnment (4<A5*, 7.". >o. '3$#2', ept. 20,
'008+
5+. Did the "!pre#e Co!rt co##it an act of %!dicial legislation in pro#!lgating -n 4anc
=esol!tion A.). /0C1C22C"C$ entitled$ @=eF B!idelines on the Cond!ct of
De#onstrations$ Pic&ets$ =allies and Gther "i#ilar Batherings in the Hicinity of the
"!pre#e Co!rt and All Gther Co!rts(@
Held: Petitioners also claim that this Court committed an act of judicial
legislation in promulgating the assailed resolution. They charge that this Court amended
provisions of Catas Pambansa >C.P.? Clg. ;;<, otherwise known as =the Public 6ssembly
6ct,= by converting the sidewalks and streets within a radius of two hundred >$<<?
meters from every courthouse from a public forum place into a =no rally= -one. Thus,
they accuse this Court of " " " violating the principle of separation of powers.
34
.e reject these low watts arguments. Public places historically associated with
the free e"ercise of e"pressive activities, such as streets, sidewalks, and parks, are
considered, witho!t #ore, to be public fora. In other words, it is not any law that can
imbue such places with the public nature inherent in them. Cut even in such public fora,
it is settled jurisprudence that the government may restrict speech plus activities and
enforce reasonable time, place, and manner regulations as long as the restrictions are
content%neutral, are narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and
leave open ample alternative channels of communication.
Contrary therefore to petitioners+ impression, C.P. Clg. ;;< did not establish
streets and sidewalks, among other places, as public fora. 6 close look at the law will
reveal that it in fact prescribes reasonable time, place, and manner regulations. Thus, it
re/uires a written permit for the holding of public assemblies in public places subject,
even, to the right of the mayor to modify the place and time of the public assembly, to
impose a rerouting of the parade or street march, to limit the volume of loud speakers or
sound system and to prescribe other appropriate restrictions on the conduct of the public
assembly.
The e"istence of C.P. Clg. ;;<, however, does not preclude this Court from
promulgating rules regulating conduct of demonstrations in the vicinity of courts to
assure our people of an impartial and orderly administration of justice as mandated by
the Constitution. To insulate the judiciary from mob pressure, friendly or otherwise, and
isolate it from public hysteria, this Court merely moved away the situs of mass actions
within a $<<%meter radius from every courthouse. In fine, C.P. Clg. ;;< imposes general
restrictions to the time, place and manner of conducting concerted actions. #n the other
hand, the resolution of this Court regulating demonstrations adds specific restrictions as
they involve judicial independence and the orderly administration of justice. There is
thus no discrepancy between the two sets of regulatory measures. )imply put, C.P. Clg.
;;< and the assailed resolution complement each other. .e so hold following the rule in
legal hermeneutics that an apparent conflict between a court rule and a statutory
provision should be harmoni-ed and both should be given effect if possible. (In "eE
)etition to Annul 1n Banc "esolution A.M. 08-%-&2-! - "icar-o !. Valmonte an-
4nion o/ <aFyers an- A-vocates /or 5ransparency in 7overnment (4<A5*, 7.".
>o. '3$#2', ept. 20, '008+
55. "ho!ld lie #edia coerage of co!rt proceedings be allowed(
Held: The propriety of granting or denying permission to the media to broadcast,
record, or photograph court proceedings involves weighing the constitutional guarantees
of freedom of the press, the right of the public to information and the right to public trial,
on the one hand, and on the other hand, the due process rights of the defendant and the
inherent and constitutional power of the courts to control their proceedings in order to
permit the fair and impartial administration of justice. Collaterally, it also raises issues on
the nature of the media, particularly television and its role in society, and of the impact of
new technologies on law.
The records of the Constitutional Commission are bereft of discussion regarding
the subject of cameras in the courtroom. )imilarly, Philippine courts have not had the
opportunity to rule on the /uestion s/uarely.
.hile we take notice of the )eptember 1EE< report of the 8nited )tates Budicial
Conference 6d Foc Committee on Cameras in the Courtroom, still the current rule
obtaining in the ,ederal Courts of the 8nited )tates prohibits the presence of television
cameras in criminal trials. Aule 9: of the ,ederal Aules of Criminal Procedure forbids
the taking of photographs during the progress of judicial proceedings or radio
broadcasting of such proceedings from the courtroom. 6 trial of any kind or in any court
is a matter of serious importance to all concerned and should not be treated as a means
of entertainment. To so treat it deprives the court of the dignity which pertains to it and
departs from the orderly and serious /uest for truth for which our judicial proceedings
are formulated.
35
Courts do not discriminate against radio and television media by forbidding the
broadcasting or televising of a trial while permitting the newspaper reporter access to the
courtroom, since a television or news reporter has the same privilege, as the news
reporter is not permitted to bring his typewriter or printing press into the courtroom.
In -stes . 7e*as (301 ?.". 532)$ the 8nited )tates )upreme Court held that
television coverage of judicial proceedings involves an inherent denial of due process
rights of a criminal defendant. Hoting 9%D, the Court through 5r. Bustice Clark, identified
four >D? areas of potential prejudice which might arise from the impact of the cameras on
the jury, witnesses, the trial judge and the defendant. The decision in part pertinently
stated4
=2"perience likewise has established the prejudicial effect of telecasting
on witnesses. .itnesses might be frightened, play to the camera, or become
nervous. They are subject to e"traordinary out%of%court influences which might
affect their testimony. 6lso, telecasting not only increases the trial judgeJs
responsibility to avoid actual prejudice to the defendant3 it may as well affect his
own performance. Budges are human beings also and are subject to the same
psychological reactions as laymen. ,or the defendant, telecasting is a form of
mental harassment and subjects him to e"cessive public e"posure and distracts
him from the effective presentation of his defense.
=The television camera is a powerful weapon which intentionally or
inadvertently can destroy an accused and his case in the eyes of the public.=
Aepresentatives of the press have no special standing to apply for a writ of
mandate to compel a court to permit them to attend a trial, since within the courtroom a
reporterJs constitutional rights are no greater than those of any other member of the
public. 5assive intrusion of representatives of the news media into the trial itself can so
alter or destroy the constitutionally necessary judicial atmosphere and decorum that the
re/uirements of impartiality imposed by due process of law are denied the defendant
and a defendant in a criminal proceeding should not be forced to run a gauntlet of
reporters and photographers each time he enters or leaves the courtroom.
Considering the prejudice it poses to the defendantJs right to due process as well
as to the fair and orderly administration of justice, and considering further that the
freedom of the press and the right of the people to information may be served and
satisfied by less distracting, degrading and prejudicial means, live radio and television
coverage of court proceedings shall not be allowed. Hideo footages of court hearings for
news purposes shall be restricted and limited to shots of the courtroom, the judicial
officers, the parties and their counsel taken prior to the commencement of official
proceedings. o video shots or photographs shall be permitted during the trial proper.
(upreme !ourt 1n Banc "esolution "eE <ive 5V an- "a-io !overage o/ the
6earing o/ )resi-ent !ora8on !. A=uinoGs <i,el !ase, -ate- .ct. 22, '00'+
56. "ho!ld the Co!rt allow lie #edia coerage of the anticipated trial of the pl!nder and
other cri#inal cases filed against for#er President Eoseph -. -strada before the
"andiganbayan in order :to ass!re the p!blic of f!ll transparency in the proceedings
of an !nprecedented case in o!r history; as re8!ested by the Papisanan ng #ga
4rod&aster ng Pilipinas(
Held: The propriety of granting or denying the instant petition involve the
weighing out of the constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press and the right to
public information, on the one hand, and the fundamental rights of the accused, on the
other hand, along with the constitutional power of a court to control its proceedings in
ensuring a fair and impartial trial.
.hen these rights race against one another, jurisprudence tells us that the right
of the accused must be preferred to win.
.ith the possibility of losing not only the precious liberty but also the very life of
an accused, it behooves all to make absolutely certain that an accused receives a
36
verdict solely on the basis of a just and dispassionate judgment, a verdict that would
come only after the presentation of credible evidence testified to by unbiased witnesses
unswayed by any kind of pressure, whether open or subtle, in proceedings that are
devoid of histrionics that might detract from its basic aim to ferret veritable facts free
from improper influence, and decreed by a judge with an unprejudiced mind, unbridled
by running emotions or passions.
@ue process guarantees the accused a presumption of innocence until the
contrary is proved in a trial that is not lifted above its individual settings nor made an
object of public+s attention and where the conclusions reached are induced not by any
outside force or influence but only by evidence and argument given in open court,
where fitting dignity and calm ambiance is demanded.
.itnesses and judges may very well be men and women of fortitude, able to
thrive in hardy climate, with every reason to presume firmness of mind and resolute
endurance, but it must also be conceded that 0television can work profound changes in
the behavior of the people it focuses on.1 2ven while it may be difficult to /uantify the
influence, or pressure that media can bring to bear on them directly and through the
shaping of public opinion, it is a fact, nonetheless, that, indeed, it does so in so many
ways and in varying degrees. The conscious or unconscious effect that such a coverage
may have on the testimony of witnesses and the decision of judges cannot be evaluated
but, it can likewise be said, it is not at all unlikely for a vote of guilt or innocence to yield
to it. It might be farcical to build around them an impregnable armor against the
influence of the most powerful media of public opinion.
To say that actual prejudice should first be present would leave to near nirvana
the subtle threats to justice that a disturbance of the mind so indispensable to the calm
and deliberate dispensation of justice can create. The effect of television may escape
the ordinary means of proof, but it is not far%fetched for it to gradually erode our basal
conception of a trial such as we know it now.
6n accused has a right to a public trial but it is a right that belongs to him, more
than anyone else, where his life or liberty can be held critically in balance. 6 public trial
aims to ensure that he is fairly dealt with and would not be unjustly condemned and that
his rights are not compromised in secret conclaves of long ago. 6 public trial is not
synonymous with publici-ed trial3 it only implies that the court doors must be open to
those who wish to come, sit in the available seats, conduct themselves with decorum
and observe the trial process. In the constitutional sense, a courtroom should have
enough facilities for a reasonable number of the public to observe the proceedings, not
too small as to render the openness negligible and not too large as to distract the trial
participants from their proper functions, who shall then be totally free to report what they
have observed during the proceedings.
The courts recogni-e the constitutionally embodied freedom of the press and the
right to public information. It also approves of media+s e"alted power to provide the most
accurate and comprehensive means of conveying the proceedings to the public and in
ac/uainting the public with the judicial process in action3 nevertheless, within the
courthouse, the overriding consideration is still the paramount right of the accused to
due process which must never be allowed to suffer diminution in its constitutional
proportions. Bustice Clark thusly pronounced, 0while a ma"imum freedom must be
allowed the press in carrying out the important function of informing the public in a
democratic society, its e"ercise must necessarily be subject to the maintenance of
absol!te fairness in the judicial process.1
& " "
The Integrated Car of the Philippines " " " e"pressed its own concern on the live
television and radio coverage of the criminal trials of 5r. 2strada3 to paraphrase4 !ive
television and radio coverage can negate the rule on e"clusion of witnesses during the
hearings intended to assure a fair trial3 at stake in the criminal trial is not only the life and
liberty of the accused but the very credibility of the Philippine criminal justice system,
and live television and radio coverage of the trial could allow the 0hooting throng1 to
37
arrogate unto themselves the task of judging the guilt of the accused, such that the
verdict of the court will be acceptable only if popular3 and live television and radio
coverage of the trial will not subserve the ends of justice but will only pander to the
desire for publicity of a few grandstanding lawyers.
& " "
8nlike other government offices, courts do not e"press the popular will of the
people in any sense which, instead, are tasked to only adjudicate controversies on the
basis of what alone is submitted before them. 6 trial is not a free trade of ideas. or is a
competing market of thoughts the known test of truth in a courtroom. ("eE "e=uest
"a-io-5V coverage o/ the 5rial in the an-igan,ayan o/ the )lun-er !ases against
the /ormer )resi-ent ;oseph 1. 1stra-a, A.M. >o. &'-$-&3-!, ;une 20, 2&&', 1n
Banc (Vitug*+
Freedom of Reli(ion
51. Disc!ss why the 7erona r!ling (%!stifying the e*p!lsion fro# p!blic schools of
children of Eehoah's ,itnesses who ref!se to sal!te the flag and sing the national
anthe# d!ring flag cere#ony as prescribed by the >lag "al!te Law) sho!ld be
abandoned.
Held: #ur task here is e"tremely difficult, for the :<%year old decision of this
court in Berona upholding the flag salute law and approving the e"pulsion of students
who refuse to obey it, is not lightly to be trifled with.
It is somewhat ironic however, that after the Berona ruling had received
legislative cachet by its incorporation in the 6dministrative Code of 1E;K, the present
Court believes that the time has come to ree"amine it. The idea that one may be
compelled to salute the flag, sing the national anthem, and recite the patriotic pledge,
during a flag ceremony on pain of being dismissed from one+s job or of being e"pelled
from school, is alien to the conscience of the present generation of ,ilipinos who cut
their teeth on the Cill of Aights which guarantees their rights to free speech (7he flag
sal!te$ singing the national anthe# and reciting the patriotic pledge are all for#s of
!tterances.) and the free e"ercise of religious profession and worship.
Aeligious freedom is a fundamental right which is entitled to the highest priority
and the amplest protection among human rights, for it involves the relationship of man to
his Creator (Chief E!stice -nri8!e ). >ernando's separate opinion in Ber#an .
4arangan$ 135 "C=A 51+$ 532C531).
0The right to religious profession and worship has a two%fold aspect, vi-.,
freedom to believe and freedom to act on one+s belief. The first is absolute as
long as the belief is confined within the realm of thought. The second is subject
to regulation where the belief is translated into e"ternal acts that affect the public
welfare1 (E. Cr!9$ Constit!tional Law$ 1//1 -d.$ pp. 116C111).
Petitioners stress " " " that while they do not take part in the compulsory flag
ceremony, they do not engage in 0e"ternal acts1 or behavior that would offend their
countrymen who believe in e"pressing their love of country through the observance of
the flag ceremony. They /uietly stand at attention during the flag ceremony to show their
respect for the rights of those who choose to participate in the solemn proceedings.
)ince they do not engage in disruptive behavior, there is no warrant for their e"pulsion.
0The sole justification for a prior restraint or limitation on the e"ercise of
religious freedom (according to the late Chief E!stice Cla!dio 7eehan&ee in his
dissenting opinion in Ber#an . 4arangan$ 135 "C=A 51+$ 511) is the e"istence
of a grave and present danger of a character both grave and imminent, of a
serious evil to public safety, public morals, public health or any other legitimate
public interest, that the )tate has a right >and duty? to prevent.1 6bsent such a
38
threat to public safety, the e"pulsion of the petitioners from the schools is not
justified.
The situation that the Court directly predicted in Berona that4
0'T(he flag ceremony will become a thing of the past or perhaps
conducted with very few participants, and the time will come when we would
have citi-ens untaught and uninculcated in and not imbued with reverence for the
flag and love of country, admiration for national heroes, and patriotism G a
pathetic, even tragic situation, and all because a small portion of the school
population imposed its will, demanded and was granted an e"emption.1
has not come to pass. .e are not persuaded that by e"empting the Behovah+s
.itnesses from saluting the flag, singing the national anthem and reciting the patriotic
pledge, this religious group which admittedly comprises a 0small portion of the school
population1 will shake up our part of the globe and suddenly produce a nation 0untaught
and uninculcated in and unimbued with reverence for the flag, patriotism, love of country
and admiration for national heroes. 6fter all, what the petitioners seek only is e"emption
from the flag ceremony, not e"clusion from the public schools where they may study the
Constitution, the democratic way of life and form of government, and learn not only the
arts, sciences, Philippine history and culture but also receive training for a vocation or
profession and be taught the virtues of 0patriotism, respect for human rights,
appreciation for national heroes, the rights and duties of citi-enship, and moral and
spiritual values ("ec. 3326$ Art. <.H$ 1/01 Constit!tion) as part of the curricula. 2"pelling
or banning the petitioners from Philippine schools will bring about the very situation that
this Court had feared in Berona. ,orcing a small religious group, through the iron hand
of the law, to participate in a ceremony that violates their religious beliefs, will hardly be
conducive to love of country or respect for duly constituted authorities.
6s 5r. Bustice Backson remarked in ,est Hirginia . 4arnette$ 31/ ?.". 62+
(1/+3)F
0" " " To believe that patriotism will not flourish if patriotic ceremonies are
voluntary and spontaneous instead of a compulsory routine is to make an
unflattering statement of the appeal of our institutions to free minds. " " " .hen
they >diversity? are so harmless to others or to the )tate as those we deal with
here, the price is not too great. Cut freedom to differ is not limited to things that
do not matter much. That would be a mere shadow of freedom. The test of its
substance is the right to differ as to things that touch the heart of the e"isting
order.1
0,urthermore, let it be noted that coerced unity and loyalty even to the
country, " " " G assuming that such unity and loyalty can be attained through
coercion G is not a goal that is constitutionally obtainable at the e"pense of
religious liberty. 6 desirable end cannot be promoted by prohibited means.1
()eyer . Debras&a$ 262 ?.". 3/2$ 61 L. ed. 12+2$ 12+6)
5oreover, the e"pulsion of members of Behovah+s .itnesses from the schools
where they are enrolled will violate their right as Philippine citi-ens, under the 1E;K
Constitution, to receive free education, for it is the duty of the )tate to 0protect and
promote the right of all citi-ens to /uality education " " " and to make such education
accessible to all1 ("ec. 1$ Art. <.H).
In Hictoriano . -li9alde =ope ,or&ers' ?nion$ 5/ "C=A 5+$ 12C15$ we upheld the
e"emption of members of the Iglesia i Cristo, from the coverage of a closed shop
agreement between their employer and a union because it would violate the teaching of
their church not to join any labor group4
0" " " It is certain that not every conscience can be accommodated by all
the laws of the land3 but when general laws conflict with scruples of conscience,
e"emptions ought to be granted unless some Ocompelling state interests+
39
intervenes. ("herbert . 4erner$ 31+ ?.". 3/0$ 12 L. -d. 2d /65$ /12$ 03 ". Ct.
11/2).;
.e hold that a similar e"emption may be accorded to the Behovah+s .itnesses
with regard to the observance of the flag ceremony out of respect for their religious
beliefs, however 0bi-arre1 those beliefs may seem to others. evertheless, their right not
to participate in the flag ceremony does not give them a right to disrupt such patriotic
e"ercises. Paraphrasing the warning cited by this Court in Don . Da#es ..$ 105 "C=A
523$ 535$ while the highest regard must be afforded their right to the free e"ercise of
their religion, 0this should not be taken to mean that school authorities are powerless to
discipline them1 if they should commit breaches of the peace by actions that offend the
sensibilities, both religious and patriotic, of other persons. If they /uietly stand at
attention during the flag ceremony while their classmates and teachers salute the flag,
sing the national anthem and recite the patriotic pledge, we do not see how such
conduct may possibly disturb the peace, or pose 0a grave and present danger of a
serious evil to public safety, public morals, public health or any other legitimate public
interest that the )tate has a right >and duty? to prevent.; (1,ralinag v. 5he Division
uperinten-ent o/ chools o/ !e,u, 2'0 !"A 29#, 2#0-2%3, March ', '003, 1n
Banc (7rino-A=uino*+
50. A preCtaped 7H progra# of the .glesia Di Cristo (.DC) was s!b#itted to the )7=C4
for reiew. 7he latter classified it as :rated <; beca!se it was shown to be attac&ing
another religion. 7he .DC protested by clai#ing that its religio!s freedo# is per se
beyond reiew by the )7=C4. "ho!ld this contention be !pheld(
Held: The right to religious profession and worship has a two%fold aspect, i9.$
freedom to believe and freedom to act on oneJs belief. The first is absolute as long as
the belief is confined within the realm of thought. The second is subject to regulation
where the belief is translated into e"ternal acts that affect the public welfare.
The Iglesia i CristoJs postulate that its religious freedom is per se beyond review
by the 5TACC should be rejected. Its public broadcast on TH of its religious programs
brings it out of the bosom of internal belief. Television is a medium that reaches even
the eyes and ears of children. The e"ercise of religious freedom can be regulated by the
)tate when it will bring about the clear and present danger of a substantive evil which
the )tate is duty%bound to prevent, i.e.$ serious detriment to the more overriding interest
of public health, public morals, or public welfare. 6 laisse9 faire policy on the e"ercise of
religion can be seductive to the liberal mind but history counsels the Court against its
blind adoption as religion is and continues to be a volatile area of concern in our society
today. =,or sure, we shall continue to subject any act pinching the space for the free
e"ercise of religion to a heightened scrutiny but we shall not leave its rational e"ercise to
the irrationality of man. ,or when religion divides and its e"ercise destroys, the )tate
should not stand still.= (Iglesia >i !risto v. !A, 290 !"A 920, ;uly 2#, '00# ()uno*+
5/. Did the )7=C4 act correctly when it rated :<; the .glesia Di CristoQs preCtaped 7H
progra# si#ply beca!se it was fo!nd to be @attac&ing@ another religion(
Held: The 5TACC may disagree with the criticisms of other religions by the
Iglesia i Cristo but that gives it no e"cuse to interdict such criticisms, however unclean
they may be. 8nder our constitutional scheme, it is not the task of the )tate to favor any
religion by protecting it against an attack by another religion. Aeligious dogma and
beliefs are often at war and to preserve peace among their followers, especially the
fanatics, the establishment clause of freedom of religion prohibits the )tate from leaning
towards any religion. HisCRCis religious differences, the )tate enjoys no ban/uet of
options. eutrality alone is its fi"ed and immovable stance. In fine, the 5TACC cannot
s/uelch the speech of the IC simply because it attacks another religion. In a )tate
where there ought to be no difference between the appearance and the reality of
freedom of religion, the remedy against bad theology is better theology. The bedrock of
freedom of religion is freedom of thought and it is best served by encouraging the
marketplace of dueling ideas. .hen the lu"ury of time permits, the marketplace of ideas
demands that speech should be met by more speech for it is the spark of opposite
40
speech, the heat of colliding ideas, that can fan the embers of truth. (Iglesia >i !risto
v. !A, 290 !"A 920, ;uly 2#, '00# ()uno*+
62. .s solicitation for the constr!ction of a ch!rch coered by P.D. Do. 156+ and$
therefore$ p!nishable if done witho!t the necessary per#it for solicitation fro# the
D",D(
Held: >irst. )olicitation of contributions for the construction of a church is not
solicitation for =charitable or public welfare purpose= but for a religious purpose, and a
religious purpose is not necessarily a charitable or public welfare purpose. 6 fund
campaign for the construction or repair of a church is not like fund drives for needy
families or victims of calamity or for the construction of a civic center and the like. !ike
solicitation of subscription to religious maga-ines, it is part of the propagation of religious
faith or evangeli-ation. )uch solicitation calls upon the virtue of faith, not of charity, save
as those solicited for money or aid may not belong to the same religion as the solicitor.
)uch solicitation does not engage the philanthropic as much as the religious fervor of the
person who is solicited for contribution.
"econd. The purpose of the @ecree is to protect the public against fraud in view
of the proliferation of fund campaigns for charity and other civic projects. #n the other
hand, since religious fund drives are usually conducted among those belonging to the
same religion, the need for public protection against fraudulent solicitations does not
e"ist in as great a degree as does the need for protection with respect to solicitations for
charity or civic projects as to justify state regulation.
7hird. To re/uire a government permit before solicitation for religious purpose
may be allowed is to lay a prior restraint on the free e"ercise of religion. )uch restraint,
if allowed, may well justify re/uiring a permit before a church can make )unday
collections or enforce tithing. Cut in A#erican 4ible "ociety . City of )anila (121 Phil.
306 31/516)$ we precisely held that an ordinance re/uiring payment of a license fee
before one may engage in business could not be applied to the appellantJs sale of bibles
because that would impose a condition on the e"ercise of a constitutional right. It is for
the same reason that religious rallies are e"empted from the re/uirement of prior permit
for public assemblies and other uses of public parks and streets >C.P. Clg. ;;<, )ec.
:'a(?. To read the @ecree, therefore, as including within its reach solicitations for
religious purposes would be to construe it in a manner that it violates the ,ree 2"ercise
of Aeligion Clause of the Constitution " " ". (!oncurring .pinion, Men-o8a, V.V., ;.,
in !enteno v. Villalon-)ornillos, 23# !"A '0%, ept. ', '00$+
61. ,hat is a p!rely ecclesiastical affair to which the "tate can not #eddle(
Held: 6n ecclesiastical affair is 0one that concerns doctrine, creed, or form of
worship of the church, or the adoption and enforcement within a religious association of
needful laws and regulations for the government of the membership, and the power of
e"cluding from such associations those deemed not worthy of membership.1 Cased on
this definition, an ecclesiastical affair involves the relationship between the church and
its members and relate to matters of faith, religious doctrines, worship and governance
of the congregation. To be concrete, e"amples of this so%called ecclesiastical affairs to
which the )tate cannot meddle are proceedings for e"communication, ordinations of
religious ministers, administration of sacraments and other activities with attached
religious significance. ()astor Dionisio V. Austria v. ><"!, 7.". >o. '2$382, Aug. '#,
'000, '
st
Div. (Aapunan*+
62. Petitioner is a religio!s #inister of the "eenth Day Adentist ("DA). Ke was
dis#issed beca!se of alleged #isappropriation of deno#inational f!nds$ willf!l
breach of tr!st$ serio!s #iscond!ct$ gross and habit!al neglect of d!ties and
co##ission of an offense against the person of his e#ployer's d!ly a!thori9ed
representatie. Ke filed an illegal ter#ination case against the "DA before the labor
arbiter. 7he "DA filed a #otion to dis#iss ino&ing the doctrine of separation of
Ch!rch and "tate. "ho!ld the #otion be granted(
41
Held: .here what is involved is the relationship of the church as an employer
and the minister as an employee and has no relation whatsoever with the practice of
faith, worship or doctrines of the church, i.e.$ the minister was not e"communicated or
e"pelled from the membership of the congregation but was terminated from
employment, it is a purely secular affair. Conse/uently, the suit may not be dismissed
invoking the doctrine of separation of church and the state. ()astor Dionisio V. Austria
v. ><"!, 7.". >o. '2$382, Aug. '#, '000, '
st
Div. (Aapunan*+
The Ri(ht of the Peo-le to Inform!tion on .!tter& of P%)lic Concern
63. Disc!ss the scope of the right to infor#ation on #atters of p!blic concern.
Held: In Hal#onte . 4el#onte$ Er.$ the Court emphasi-ed that the information
sought must be 0matters of public concern,1 access to which may be limited by law.
)imilarly, the state policy of full public disclosure e"tends only to 0transactions involving
public interest1 and may also be 0subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law.1
6s to the meanings of the terms 0public interest1 and 0public concern,1 the Court, in
Legaspi . Ciil "erice Co##ission$ elucidated4
0In determining whether or not a particular information is of public concern
there is no rigid test which can be applied. OPublic concern+ like Opublic interest+ is
a term that eludes e"act definition. Coth terms embrace a broad spectrum of
subjects which the public may want to know, either because these directly affect
their lives, or simply because such matters naturally arouse the interest of an
ordinary citi-en. In the final analysis, it is for the courts to determine on a case
by case basis whether the matter at issue is of interest or importance, as it
relates to or affects the public.1
Considered a public concern in the above%mentioned case was the 0legitimate
concern of citi-ens to ensure that government positions re/uiring civil service eligibility
are occupied only by persons who are eligibles.1 )o was the need to give the general
public ade/uate notification of various laws that regulate and affect the actions and
conduct of citi-ens, as held in 7anada. !ikewise did the 0public nature of the loanable
funds of the *)I) and the public office held by the alleged borrowers >members of the
defunct Catasang Pambansa?1 /ualify the information sought in Hal#onte as matters of
public interest and concern. In A8!inoC"ar#iento . )orato (223 "C=A 515$ 522C23$
Doe#ber 13$ 1//1)$ the Court also held that official acts of public officers done in
pursuit of their official functions are public in character3 hence, the records pertaining to
such official acts and decisions are within the ambit of the constitutional right of access
to p!blic records.
8nder Aepublic 6ct o. LK1:, public officials and employees are mandated to
0provide information on their policies and procedures in clear and understandable
language, 'and( ensure openness of information, public consultations and hearing
whenever appropriate " " ",1 e"cept when 0otherwise provided by law or when re/uired
by the public interest.1 In particular, the law mandates free public access, at reasonable
hours, to the annual performance reports of offices and agencies of government and
government%owned or controlled corporations3 and the statements of assets, liabilities
and financial disclosures of all public officials and employees.
In general, writings coming into the hands of public officers in connection with
their official functions must be accessible to the public, consistent with the policy of
transparency of governmental affairs. This principle is aimed at affording the people an
opportunity to determine whether those to whom they have entrusted the affairs of the
government are honestly, faithfully and competently performing their functions as public
servants. 8ndeniably, the essence of democracy lies in the free%flow of thought3 but
thoughts and ideas must be well%informed so that the public would gain a better
perspective of vital issues confronting them and, thus, be able to critici-e as well as
participate in the affairs of the government in a responsible, reasonable and effective
manner. Certainly, it is by ensuring an unfettered and uninhibited e"change of ideas
among a well%informed public that a government remains responsive to the changes
42
desired by the people. (!have8 v. )!77, 200 !"A %$$, Dec. 0, '008,
()angani,an*+
6+. ,hat are so#e of the recogni9ed restrictions to the right of the people to infor#ation
on #atters of p!blic concern(
Held:
1? ational security matters and intelligence information. This jurisdiction
recogni-es the common law holding that there is a governmental privilege
against public disclosure with respect to state secrets regarding military,
diplomatic and other national security matters. !ikewise, information on inter%
government e"changes prior to the conclusion of treaties and e"ecutive
agreements may be subject to reasonable safeguards for the sake of national
interest3
$? Trade or industrial secrets >pursuant to the Intellectual Property Code 'A.6.
o. ;$E:, approved on Bune L, 1EEK( and other related laws? and banking
transactions >pursuant to the )ecrecy of Cank @eposits 6ct 'A.6. o. 1D<9,
as amended(?3
:? Criminal matters, such as those relating to the apprehension, the prosecution
and the detention of criminals, which courts may not in/uire into prior to such
arrest, detention and prosecution3
D? #ther confidential information. The 2thical )tandards 6ct >A.6. o. LK1:,
enacted on ,ebruary $<, 1E;E? further prohibits public officials and
employees from using or divulging 0confidential or classified information
officially known to them by reason of their office and not made available to
the public.1 >)ec. K'c(, ibid.? #ther acknowledged limitations to information
access include diplomatic correspondence, closed door Cabinet meetings
and e"ecutive sessions of either house of Congress, as well as the internal
deliberations of the )upreme Court.
(!have8 v. )!77, 200 !"A %$$, Dec. 0, '008 ()angani,an*+
65. .s the alleged illCgotten wealth of the )arcoses a #atter of p!blic concern s!b%ect to
this right(
Held: .ith such pronouncements of our government, whose authority emanates
from the people, there is no doubt that the recovery of the 5arcosesJ alleged ill%gotten
wealth is a matter of public concern and imbued with public interest. .e may also add
that 0ill%gotten wealth1 refers to assets and properties purportedly ac/uired, directly or
indirectly, by former President 5arcos, his immediate family, relatives and close
associates through or as a result of their improper or illegal use of government funds or
properties3 or their having taken undue advantage of their public office3 or their use of
powers, influences or relationships, 0resulting in their unjust enrichment and causing
grave damage and prejudice to the ,ilipino people and the Aepublic of the Philippines.1
Clearly, the assets and properties referred to supposedly originated from the government
itself. To all intents and purposes, therefore, they belong to the people. 6s such, upon
reconveyance they will be returned to the public treasury, subject only to the satisfaction
of positive claims of certain persons as may be adjudged by competent courts. 6nother
declared overriding consideration for the e"peditious recovery of ill%gotten wealth is that
it may be used for national economic recovery.
.e believe the foregoing dis/uisition settles the /uestion of whether petitioner
has a right to respondentsJ disclosure of any agreement that may be arrived at
concerning the 5arcoses+ purported ill%gotten wealth. (!have8 v. )!77, 200 !"A
%$$, Dec. 0, '008 ()angani,an*+
Freedom of A&&oci!tion
66. Does the right of ciil serants to organi9e incl!de their right to stri&e( Clarify.
43
Held: )pecifically, the right of civil servants to organi-e themselves was
positively recogni-ed in Association of Co!rt of Appeals -#ployees (ACA-) . >errerC
Calle%a (223 "C=A 5/6$ Doe#ber 15$ 1//1). Cut, as in the e"ercise of the rights of free
e"pression and of assembly, there are standards for allowable limitations such as the
legitimacy of the purposes of the association$ the overriding considerations of national
security and the preservation of democratic institutions (People . >errer$ +0 "C=A 302$
Dece#ber 21$ 1/12$ per Castro$ E.$ where the Co!rt$ while !pholding the alidity of the
AntiC"!bersion Act which o!tlawed the Co##!nist Party of the Philippines and other
@s!bersie@ organi9ations$ clarified$ @,hateer interest in freedo# of speech and
freedo# of association is infringed by the prohibition against &nowing #e#bership in the
Co##!nist Party of the Philippines$ is so indirect and so ins!bstantial as to be clearly
and heaily o!tweighed by the oerriding considerations of national sec!rity and the
preseration of de#ocratic instit!tions in this co!ntry.@ .t ca!tioned$ tho!gh$ that @the
need for pr!dence and circ!#spection 3cannot be oere#phasi9ed6 in 3the lawQs6
enforce#ent$ operating as it does in the sensitie area of freedo# of e*pression and
belief.@)
6s regards the right to strike, the Constitution itself /ualifies its e"ercise with the
proviso =in accordance with law.= This is a clear manifestation that the state may, by law,
regulate the use of this right, or even deny certain sectors such right. 2"ecutive #rder
o. 1;< (.ss!ed by for#er President Cora9on C. A8!ino on E!ne 1$ 1/01) which
provides guidelines for the e"ercise of the right of government workers to organi-e, for
instance, implicitly endorsed an earlier C)C circular which =enjoins under pain of
administrative sanctions, all government officers and employees from staging strikes,
demonstrations, mass leaves, walkouts and other forms of mass action which will result
in temporary stoppage or disruption of public service= (C"C )e#orand!# Circ!lar Do.
6$ s. 1/01$ dated April 21$ 1/01) by stating that the Civil )ervice law and rules governing
concerted activities and strikes in the government service shall be observed.
It is also settled in jurisprudence that, in general, workers in the public sector do
not enjoy the right to strike. Alliance of Concerned Boern#ent ,or&ers . )inister of
Labor and -#ploy#ent (12+ "C=A 1$ A!g!st 3$ 1/03$ also per B!tierre9$ Er.$ E.)
rationali-ed the proscription thus4
=The general rule in the past and up to the present is that the Jterms and
conditions of employment in the *overnment, including any political subdivision
or instrumentality thereof are governed by law.J & " ". )ince the terms and
conditions of government employment are fi*ed by law, government workers
cannot use the same weapons employed by the workers in the private sector to
secure concessions from their employers. The principle behind labor unionism in
private industry is that industrial peace cannot be secured through compulsion by
law. Aelations between private employers and their employees rest on an
essentially voluntary basis. )ubject to the minimum re/uirements of wage laws
and other labor and welfare legislation, the terms and conditions of employment
in the unioni-ed private sector are settled through the process of collective
bargaining. In government employment, however, it is the legislature and, where
properly given delegated power, the administrative heads of government which
fi" the terms and conditions of employment. 6nd this is effected through statutes
or administrative circulars, rules, and regulations, not through collective
bargaining agreements.= (.bid.$ p. 13)
6fter delving into the intent of the framers of the Constitution, the Court affirmed
the above rule in "ocial "ec!rity "yste# -#ployees Association ("""-A) . Co!rt of
Appeals (115 "C=A 606$ E!ly 20$ 1/0/) and e"plained4
=*overnment employees may, therefore, through their unions or
associations, either petition the Congress for the betterment of the terms and
conditions of employment which are within the ambit of legislation or negotiate
with the appropriate government agencies for the improvement of those which
are not fi"ed by law. If there be any unresolved grievances, the dispute may be
referred to the Public )ector !abor%5anagement Council for appropriate action.
Cut employees in the civil service may not resort to strikes, walkouts and other
44
temporary work stoppages, like workers in the private sector, to pressure the
*overnment to accede to their demands. 6s now provided under )ec. D, Aule III
of the Aules and Aegulations to *overn the 2"ercise of the Aight of *overnment
2mployees to )elf%#rgani-ation, which took effect after the instant dispute arose,
J't(he terms and conditions of employment in the government, including any
political subdivision or instrumentality thereof and government%owned and
controlled corporations with original charters are governed by law and employees
therein shall not strike for the purpose of securing changes 'thereto(.JJ (.bid.$ p.
6/0)
(;acinto v. !ourt o/ Appeals, 28' !"A #9%, >ov. '$, '00%, 1n Banc
()angani,an*+
61. Petitioners p!blic school teachers wal&ed o!t of their classes and engaged in #ass
actions d!ring certain dates in "epte#ber 1//2 protesting the alleged !nlawf!l
withholding of their salaries and other econo#ic benefits. 7hey also raised national
iss!es$ s!ch as the re#oal of ?" bases and the rep!diation of foreign debts$ in
their #ass actions. 7hey ref!sed to ret!rn to wor& despite orders to do so and
s!bse8!ently were fo!nd g!ilty of cond!ct pre%!dicial to the best interests of the
serice for haing absented the#seles witho!t proper a!thority$ fro# their schools
d!ring reg!lar school days$ and penali9ed. 7hey denied that they engaged in :stri&e;
b!t clai#ed that they #erely e*ercised a constit!tionally g!aranteed right S the right
to peaceably asse#ble and petition the goern#ent for redress of grieances C and$
therefore$ sho!ld not hae been penali9ed. "ho!ld their contention be !pheld(
Held: Petitioners, who are public schoolteachers and thus government
employees, do not seek to establish that they have a right to strike. Aather, they
tenaciously insist that their absences during certain dates in )eptember 1EE< were a
valid e"ercise of their constitutional right to engage in peaceful assembly to petition the
government for a redress of grievances. They claim that their gathering was not a strike,
therefore, their participation therein did not constitute any offense. )P"7A . Lag!io
("!pra$ per Darasa$ E.$ now CE.) and AC7 . Carino (.bid.), in which this Court declared
that =these Jmass actionsJ were to all intents and purposes a strike3 they constituted a
concerted and unauthori-ed stoppage of, or absence from, work which it was the
teachersJ duty to perform, undertaken for essentially economic reasons,= should not
principally resolve the present case, as the underlying facts are allegedly not identical.
"tri&e, as defined by law, means any temporary stoppage of work done by the
concerted action of employees as a result of an industrial or labor dispute. 6 labor
dispute includes any controversy or matter concerning terms and conditions of
employment3 or the association or representation of persons in negotiating, fi"ing,
maintaining, changing or arranging the terms and conditions of employment, regardless
of whether the disputants stand in the pro"imate relation of employers and employees.
.ith these premises, we now evaluate the circumstances of the instant petition.
It cannot be denied that the mass action or assembly staged by the petitioners
resulted in the non%holding of classes in several public schools during the corresponding
period. Petitioners do not dispute that the grievances for which they sought redress
concerned the alleged failure of public authorities % essentially, their =employers= % to fully
and justly implement certain laws and measures intended to benefit them materially " "
". 6nd probably to clothe their action with permissible character (.n %!stifying their #ass
actions$ petitioners li&en their actiity to the proCbases rally led by for#er President
Cora9on C. A8!ino on "epte#ber 12$ 1//1$ participated in$ as well$ by p!blic school
teachers who conse8!ently absented the#seles fro# their classes. Do ad#inistratie
charges were allegedly instit!ted against any of the participants.), they also raised
national issues such as the removal of the 8.). bases and the repudiation of foreign
debt. In 4alingasan . Co!rt of Appeals (B.=. Do. 12+610$ E!ly 31$ 1//1$ per =egalado$
E.), however, this Court said that the fact that the conventional term =strike= was not used
by the participants to describe their common course of action was insignificant, since the
substance of the situation, and not its appearance, was deemed controlling.
)oreoer$ the petitioners here * * * were not penali9ed for the e*ercise of their
right to asse#ble peacef!lly and to petition the goern#ent for a redress of grieances.
45
=ather$ the Ciil "erice Co##ission fo!nd the# g!ilty of cond!ct pre%!dicial to the best
interest of the serice for haing absented the#seles witho!t proper a!thority$ fro#
their schools d!ring reg!lar school days$ in order to participate in the #ass protest$ their
absence inel!ctably res!lting in the nonCholding of classes and in the depriation of
st!dents of ed!cation$ for which they were responsible. Kad petitioners aailed
the#seles of their free ti#e C recess$ after classes$ wee&ends or holidays C to dra#ati9e
their grieances and to dialog!e with the proper a!thorities within the bo!nds of law$ no
one C not the D-C"$ the C"C or een this Co!rt C co!ld hae held the# liable for the
alid e*ercise of their constit!tionally g!aranteed rights. As it was$ the te#porary
stoppage of classes res!lting fro# their actiity necessarily disr!pted p!blic serices$
the ery eil so!ght to be forestalled by the prohibition against stri&es by goern#ent
wor&ers. 7heir act by their nat!re was en%oined by the Ciil "erice law$ r!les and
reg!lations$ for which they #!st$ therefore$ be #ade answerable. (;acinto v. !A, 28'
!"A #9%, >ov. '$, '00%, 1n Banc ()angani,an*+
The Non/Im-!irment Cl!%&e
60. .s the constit!tional prohibition against i#pairing contract!al obligations absol!te(
Held: 1. or is there merit in the claim that the resolution and memorandum
circular violate the contract clause of the Cill of Aights.
The e"ecutive order creating the P#26 was enacted to further implement the
social justice provisions of the 1EK: Constitution, which have been greatly enhanced and
e"panded in the 1E;K Constitution by placing them under a separate 6rticle (Article <...).
The 6rticle on )ocial Bustice was aptly described as the =heart of the new Charter= by
the President of the 1E;L Constitutional Commission, retired Bustice Cecilia 5uno-
Palma. )ocial justice is identified with the broad scope of the police power of the state
and re/uires the e"tensive use of such power. & " ".
The constitutional prohibition against impairing contractual obligations is not
absolute and is not to be read with literal e"actness. It is restricted to contracts with
respect to property or some object of value and which confer rights that may be asserted
in a court of justice3 it has no application to statutes relating to public subjects within the
domain of the general legislative powers of the )tate and involving the public rights and
public welfare of the entire community affected by it. It does not prevent a proper
e"ercise by the )tate of its police power by enacting regulations reasonably necessary
to secure the health, safety, morals, comfort, or general welfare of the community, even
though contracts may thereby be affected, for such matters cannot be placed by contract
beyond the power of the )tate to regulate and control them.
Herily, the freedom to contract is not absolute3 all contracts and all rights are
subject to the police power of the )tate and not only may regulations which affect them
be established by the )tate, but all such regulations must be subject to change from time
to time, as the general well%being of the community may re/uire, or as the circumstances
may change, or as e"perience may demonstrate the necessity. 6nd under the Civil
Code, contracts of labor are e"plicitly subject to the police power of the )tate because
they are not ordinary contracts but are impressed with public interest. 6rticle 1K<<
thereof e"pressly provides4
6rt. 1K<<. The relations between capital and labor are not merely
contractual. They are so impressed with public interest that labor contracts must
yield to the common good. Therefore, such contracts are subject to the special
laws on labor unions, collective bargaining, strikes and lockouts, closed shop,
wages, working conditions, hours of labor and similar subjects.
The challenged resolution and memorandum circular being valid implementations
of 2.#. o. KEK >Creating the P#26?, which was enacted under the police power of the
)tate, they cannot be struck down on the ground that they violate the contract clause.
To hold otherwise is to alter long%established constitutional doctrine and to subordinate
46
the police power to the contract clause. (5he !on/erence o/ Maritime Manning
Agencies, Inc. v. ).1A, 2$3 !"A ###, April 2', '009 (Davi-e, ;r.*+
$. Petitioners pray that the present action should be barred, because private
respondents have voluntarily e"ecuted /uitclaims and releases and received their
separation pay. Petitioners claim that the present suit is a =grave derogation of the
fundamental principle that obligations arising from a valid contract have the force of law
between the parties and must be complied with in good faith.=
The Court disagrees. Burisprudence holds that the constitutional guarantee of
non%impairment of contract is subject to the police power of the state and to reasonable
legislative regulations promoting health, morals, safety and welfare. ot all /uitclaims
are per se invalid or against public policy, e"cept >1? where there is clear proof that the
waiver was wangled from an unsuspecting or gullible person, or >$? where the terms of
settlement are unconscionable on their face. In these cases, the law will step in to annul
the /uestionable transactions. )uch /uitclaim and release agreements are regarded as
ineffective to bar the workers from claiming the full measure of their legal rights.
In the case at bar, the private respondents agreed to the /uitclaim and release in
consideration of their separation pay. )ince they were dismissed allegedly for business
losses, they are entitled to separation pay under 6rticle $;: of the !abor Code. 6nd
since there was thus no e"tra consideration for the private respondents to give up their
employment, such undertakings cannot be allowed to bar the action for illegal dismissal.
(Bogo-Me-ellin ugarcane )lanters Association, Inc. v. ><"!, 20# !"A '&8, '2$,
()angani,an*+
:. #nly slightly less abstract but nonetheless hypothetical is the contention of
CA2C6 that the imposition of the H6T on the sales and leases of real estate by virtue of
contracts entered prior to the effectivity of the law would violate the constitutional
provision that =o law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed.= It is enough
to say that the parties to a contract cannot, through the e"ercise of prophetic
discernment, fetter the e"ercise of the ta"ing power of the )tate. ,or not only are
e"isting laws read into contracts in order to fi" obligations as between parties, but the
reservation of essential attributes of sovereign power is also read into contracts as a
basic postulate of the legal order. The policy of protecting contracts against impairment
presupposes the maintenance of a government which retains ade/uate authority to
secure the peace and good order of society.
In truth, the Contract Clause has never been thought as a limitation on the
e"ercise of the )tateJs power of ta"ation save only where a ta" e"emption has been
granted for a valid consideration. & " ". (5olentino v. ecretary o/ :inance, 239
!"A #3&, #89-#8#, Aug. 29, '00$, 1n Banc (Men-o8a*+
D. )ince timber licenses are not contracts, the non%impairment clause " " "
cannot be invoked.
& " ", even if it is to be assumed that the same are contracts, the instant case
does not involve a law or even an e"ecutive issuance declaring the cancellation or
modification of e"isting timber licenses. Fence, the non%impairment clause cannot as
yet be invoked. evertheless, granting further that a law has actually been passed
mandating cancellations or modifications, the same cannot still be stigmati-ed as a
violation of the non%impairment clause. This is because by its very nature and purpose,
such a law could have only been passed in the e"ercise of the police power of the state
for the purpose of advancing the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology,
promoting their health and enhancing their general welfare. & " ".
In short, the non%impairment clause must yield to the police power of the state.
,inally, it is difficult to imagine " " " how the non%impairment clause could apply
with respect to the prayer to enjoin the respondent )ecretary from receiving, accepting,
processing, renewing or approving new timber license for, save in cases of renewal, no
contract would have as yet e"isted in the other instances. 5oreover, with respect to
47
renewal, the holder is not entitled to it as a matter of right. (.posa v. :actoran, ;r., 22$
!"A %02 ('003*+
9. 6nent petitionersJ contention that the forcible refund of incentive benefits is an
unconstitutional impairment of a contractual obligation, suffice it to state that ='n(ot all
contracts entered into by the government will operate as a waiver of its non%suability3
distinction must be made between its sovereign and proprietary acts. The acts involved
in this case are governmental. Cesides, the Court is in agreement with the )olicitor
*eneral that the incentive pay or benefit is in the nature of a bonus which is not a
demandable or enforceable obligation. (Bla=uera v. Alcala, 209 !"A 3##, $$#, ept.
'', '008, 1n Banc ()urisima*+
The In/C%&todi!l In+e&ti(!tion Ri(ht& of !n Acc%&ed Per&on
6/. "tate the proced!re$ g!idelines and d!ties which the arresting$ detaining$ initing$ or
inestigating officer or his co#panions #!st do and obsere at the ti#e of #a&ing an
arrest and again at and d!ring the ti#e of the c!stodial interrogation.
Held: !astly, considering the heavy penalty of death and in order to ensure that
the evidence against an accused were obtained through lawful means, the Court, as
g!ardian of the rights of the people lays down the procedure, guidelines and duties
which the arresting, detaining, inviting, or investigating officer or his companions must do
and observe at the time of making an arrest and again at and during the time of the
custodial interrogation in accordance with the Constitution, jurisprudence and Aepublic
6ct o. KD:; (An Act Defining Certain =ights of Person Arrested$ Detained or ?nder
C!stodial .nestigation as well as the D!ties of the Arresting$ Detaining$ and
.nestigating Gfficers and Proiding Penalties for Hiolations 7hereof). It is high%time to
educate our law%enforcement agencies who neglect either by ignorance or indifference
the so%called 5iranda rights which had become insufficient and which the Court must
update in the light of new legal developments4
1? The person arrested, detained, invited or under custodial investigation must
be informed in a language known to and understood by him of the reason for
the arrest and he must be shown the warrant of arrest, if any. 2very other
warnings, information or communication must be in a language known to and
understood by said person3
$? Fe must be warned that he has a right to remain silent and that any
statement he makes may be used as evidence against him3
:? Fe must be informed that he has the right to be assisted at all times and
have the presence of an independent and competent lawyer, preferably of his
own choice3
D? Fe must be informed that if he has no lawyer or cannot afford the services of
a lawyer, one will be provided for him3 and that a lawyer may also be
engaged by any person in his behalf, or may be appointed by the court upon
petition of the person arrested or one acting on his behalf3
9? That whether or not the person arrested has a lawyer, he must be informed
that no custodial investigation in any form shall be conducted e"cept in the
presence of his counsel of after a valid waiver has been made3
L? The person arrested must be informed that, at any time, he has the right to
communicate or confer by the most e"pedient means % telephone, radio,
letter or messenger % with his lawyer >either retained or appointed?, any
member of his immediate family, or any medical doctor, priest or minister
chosen by him or by any one from his immediate family or by his counsel, or
be visited byNconfer with duly accredited national or international non%
government organi-ation. It shall be the responsibility of the officer to ensure
that this is accomplished3
K? Fe must be informed that he has the right to waive any of said rights
provided it is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently and ensure that he
understood the same3
;? In addition, if the person arrested waives his right to a lawyer, he must be
informed that it must be done in writing and in the presence of counsel,
48
otherwise, he must be warned that the waiver is void even if he insist on his
waiver and chooses to speak3
E? That the person arrested must be informed that he may indicate in any
manner at any time or stage of the process that he does not wish to be
/uestioned with warning that once he makes such indication, the police may
not interrogate him if the same had not yet commenced, or the interrogation
must cease if it has already begun3
1<? The person arrested must be informed that his initial waiver of his right to
remain silent, the right to counsel or any of his rights does not bar him from
invoking it at any time during the process, regardless of whether he may
have answered some /uestions or volunteered some statements3
11? Fe must also be informed that any statement or evidence, as the case may
be, obtained in violation of any of the foregoing, whether inculpatory or
e"culpatory, in whole or in part, shall be admissible in evidence.
()eople v. Mahinay, 3&2 !"A $99, :e,. ', '000, 1n Banc ()er !uriam*+
12. -*plain the &ind of infor#ation that is re8!ired to be gien by law enforce#ent
officers to s!spect d!ring c!stodial inestigation.
Held: 'I(t is settled that one+s right to be informed of the right to remain silent and
to counsel contemplates the transmission of meaningful information rather just the
ceremonial and perfunctory recitation of an abstract constitutional principle. It is not
enough for the interrogator to merely repeat to the person under investigation the
provisions of )ection 1$, 6rticle III of the 1E;K Constitution3 the former must also e"plain
the effects of such provision in practical terms G e.g., what the person under
investigation may or may not do G and in a language the subject fairly understands. The
right to be informed carries with it a correlative obligation on the part of the police
investigator to e"plain, and contemplates effective communication which results in the
subject+s understanding of what is conveyed. )ince it is comprehension that is sought to
be attained, the degree of e"planation re/uired will necessarily vary and depend on the
education, intelligence, and other relevant personal circumstances of the person
undergoing investigation. In further ensuring the right to counsel, it is not enough that
the subject is informed of such right3 he should also be asked if he wants to avail of the
same and should be told that he could ask for counsel if he so desired or that one could
be provided him at his re/uest. If he decides not to retain a counsel of his choice or
avail of one to be provided for him and, therefore, chooses to waive his right to counsel,
such waiver, to be valid and effective, must still be made with the assistance of counsel,
who, under prevailing jurisprudence, must be a lawyer. ()eople v. !anoy, 328 !"A
389, March '%, 2&&&, '
st
Div. (Davi-e, !;*+
11. ,hat is the #eaning of :co#petent co!nsel; !nder "ection 12 of the 4ill of =ights(
Held: The meaning of 0competent counsel1 was e"plained in People . Deniega
(251 "C=A 626$ 631) as follows4
0" " " 'T(he lawyer called to be present during such investigation should
be as far as reasonably possible, the choice of the individual undergoing
/uestioning. If the lawyer were one furnished in the accused+s behalf, it is
important that he should be competent and independent, i.e.$ that he is willing to
fully safeguard the constitutional rights of the accused, as distinguished from one
who would merely be giving a routine, peremptory and meaningless recital of the
individual+s rights. In People . 4asay (21/ "C=A +2+$ +10)$ this Court stressed
that an accused+s right to be informed of the right to remain silent and to counsel
Ocontemplates the transmission of meaningful information rather than just the
ceremonial and perfunctory recitation of an abstract constitutional principle.+
0Ideally therefore, a lawyer engaged for an individual facing custodial
investigation >if the latter could not afford one? Oshould be engaged by the
accused >himself?, or by the latter+s relative or person authori-ed by him to
engage an attorney or by the court, upon proper petition of the accused or
person authori-ed by the accused to file such petition.+ !awyers engaged by the
police, whatever testimonials are given as proof of their probity and supposed
49
independence, are generally suspect, as in many areas, the relationship between
lawyers and law enforcement authorities can be symbiotic.
0" " " The competent or independent lawyer so engaged should be
present from the beginning to end, i.e.$ at all stages of the interview, counseling
or advising caution reasonably at every turn of the investigation, and stopping the
interrogation once in a while either to give advice to the accused that he may
either continue, choose to remain silent or terminate the interview.1
()eople v. 1spiritu, 3&2 !"A 933, :e,. 2, '000, 3
r-
Div. ()angani,an*+
12. Can a PAG lawyer be considered an independent co!nsel within the conte#plation
of "ection 12$ Article ...$ 1/01 Constit!tion(
Held: In People . Gracoy$ 22+ "C=A 15/ 31//36J People . 4and!la$ 232 "C=A
566 31//+6$ the )C has held that a P6# lawyer can be considered an independent
counsel within the contemplation of the Constitution considering that he is not a special
counsel, public or private prosecutor, counsel of the police, or a municipal attorney
whose interest is admittedly adverse to that of the accused%appellant. Thus, the
assistance of a P6# lawyer satisfies the constitutional re/uirement of a competent and
independent counsel for the accused. ()eople v. Bacor, 3&# !"A 922, April 3&,
'000, 2
n-
Div. (Men-o8a*+
13. .s the confession of an acc!sed gien spontaneo!sly$ freely and ol!ntarily to the
)ayor ad#issible in eidence$ considering that the )ayor has :operational
s!perision and control; oer the local police and #ay arg!ably be dee#ed a law
enforce#ent officer(
Held: .hile it is true that a municipal mayor has 0operational supervision and
control1 over the local police and may arguably be deemed a law enforcement officer for
purposes of applying )ection 1$>1? and >:? of 6rticle III of the Constitution, however,
appellant+s confession to the mayor was not made in response to any interrogation by
the latter. In fact, the mayor did not /uestion the appellant at all. o police authority
ordered appellant to talk to the mayor. It was appellant himself who spontaneously,
freely and voluntarily sought the mayor for a private meeting. The mayor did not know
that appellant was going to confess his guilt to him. ,hen appellant tal&ed with the
#ayor as a confidant and not as a law enforce#ent officer$ his !nco!nselled confession
to hi# did not iolate his constit!tional rights. Thus, it has been held that the
constitutional procedures on custodial investigation do not apply to a spontaneous
statement, not elicited through /uestioning by the authorities, but given in an ordinary
manner whereby appellant orally admitted having committed the crime. .hat the
Constitution bars is the compulsory disclosure of incriminating facts or confessions. The
rights under )ection 1$ are guaranteed to preclude the slightest use of coercion by the
)tate as would lead the accused to admit something false, not to prevent him from freely
and voluntarily telling the truth. ()eople v. An-an, 2#0 !"A 09, March 3, '00%+
1+. Are confessions #ade in response to 8!estions by news reporters ad#issible in
eidence(
An&wer: Ies. Confessions made in response to /uestions by news reporters,
not by the police or any other investigating officer, are admissible. In People . Hi9carra$
115 "C=A 1+3$ 152 31/026$ where the accused, under custody, gave spontaneous
answers to a televised interview by several press reporters in the office of the chief of
the CI), it was held that statements spontaneously made by a suspect to news reporters
on a televised interview are deemed voluntary and are admissible in evidence. In
)eople v. An-an, 2#0 !"A 09, March 3, '00%$ it was held that appellant+s
confessions to the news reporters were given free from any undue influence from the
police authorities. The news reporters acted as news reporters when they interviewed
appellant. They were not acting under the direction and control of the police. They did
not force appellant to grant them an interview and reenact the commission of the crime.
In fact, they asked his permission before interviewing him. The )upreme Court further
ruled that appellant+s verbal confessions to the newsmen are not covered by )ection
1$>1? and >:? of 6rticle III of the Constitution and, therefore, admissible in evidence.
50
15. Disc!ss the two &inds of inol!ntary or coerced confessions !nder "ection 12$ Article
... of the 1/01 Constit!tion. .ll!strate how the Co!rt sho!ld appreciate said
inol!ntary or coerced confessions.
Held: There are two kinds of involuntary or coerced confessions treated in this
constitutional provision4 >1? those which are the product of third degree methods such as
torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, which are dealt with in paragraph $ of
)ection 1$, and >$? those which are given without the benefit of 5iranda warnings, which
are the subject of paragraph 1 of the same )ection 1$.
6ccused%appellant claims that his confession was obtained by force and threat.
6side from this bare assertion, he has shown no proof of the use of force and violence
on him. Fe did not seek medical treatment nor even a physical e"amination. Fis
allegation that the fact that he was made to sign the confession five times is proof that
he refused to sign it.
& " "
.e discern no sign that the confession was involuntarily e"ecuted from the fact
that it was signed by accused%appellant five times.
& " "
2"trajudicial confessions are presumed voluntary, and, in the absence of
conclusive evidence showing the declarant+s consent in e"ecuting the same has been
vitiated, such confession will be sustained.
5oreover, the confession contains details that only the perpetrator of the crime
could have given. & " ". It has been held that voluntariness of a confession may be
inferred from its being replete with details which could possibly be supplied only by the
accused, reflecting spontaneity and coherence which cannot be said of a mind on which
violence and torture have been applied. .hen the details narrated in an e"trajudicial
confession are such that they could not have been concocted by one who did not take
part in the acts narrated, where the claim of maltreatment in the e"traction of the
confession is unsubstantiated and where abundant evidence e"ists showing that the
statement was voluntarily e"ecuted, the confession is admissible against the declarant.
There is greater reason for finding a confession to be voluntary where it is corroborated
by evidence ali!nde which dovetails with the essential facts contained in such
confession.
Cut what renders the confession of accused%appellant inadmissible is the fact
that accused%appellant was not given the 5iranda warnings effectively. 8nder the
Constitution, an uncounseled statement, such as it is called in the 8nited )tates from
which 6rticle III, )ection 1$>1? was derived, is presumed to be psychologically coerced.
)wept into an unfamiliar environment and surrounded by intimidating figures typical of
the atmosphere of police interrogation, the suspect really needs the guiding hand of
counsel.
ow, under the first paragraph of this provision, it is re/uired that the suspect in
custodial interrogation must be given the following warnings4 >1? he must be informed of
his right to remain silent3 >$? he must be warned that anything he says can and will be
used against him3 and >:? he must be told that he has a right to counsel, and that if he is
indigent, a lawyer will be appointed to represent him.
& " "
There was thus only a perfunctory reading of the 5iranda rights to accused%
appellant without any effort to find out from him whether he wanted to have counsel and,
if so, whether he had his own counsel or he wanted the police to appoint one for him.
This kind of giving of warnings, in several decisions of this Court, has been found to be
merely ceremonial and inade/uate to transmit meaningful information to the suspect.
51
2specially in this case, care should have been scrupulously observed by the police
investigator that accused%appellant was specifically asked these /uestions considering
that he only finished the fourth grade of the elementary school. & " "
5oreover, 6rticle III, )ection 1$>1? re/uires that counsel assisting suspects in
custodial interrogations be competent and independent. Fere, accused%appellant was
assisted by 6tty. @e los Aeyes, who, though presumably competent, cannot be
considered an 0independent counsel1 as contemplated by the law for the reason that he
was station commander of the .P@ at the time he assisted accused%appellant. & " ".
This is error. 6s observed in People . 4and!la (232 "C=A 566 31//+6)$ the
independent counsel re/uired by 6rticle III, )ection 1$>1? cannot be special counsel,
public or private prosecutor, municipal attorney, or counsel of the police whose interest is
admittedly adverse to the accused. In this case, 6tty. @e los Aeyes, as PC Captain and
)tation Commander of the .P@, was part of the police force who could not be e"pected
to have effectively and scrupulously assisted accused%appellant in the investigation. To
allow such a happenstance would render illusory the protection given to the suspect
during custodial investigation. ()eople v. .,rero, 332 !"A '0&, 22& H 2&8, May '%,
2&&&, 2
n-
Div. (Men-o8a*+
16. ,hat are the re8!ire#ents for an e*traC%!dicial confession of an acc!sed to be
ad#issible in eidence(
Held: 1. In jurisprudence, no confession can be admitted in evidence unless it
is given4
1? ,reely and voluntarily, without compulsion, inducement or trickery3
$? Rnowingly based on an effective communication to the individual under
custodial investigation of his constitutional rights3 and
:? Intelligently with full appreciation of its importance and comprehension of its
conse/uences.
#nce admitted, the confession must inspire credibility or be one which the normal
e"perience of mankind can accept as being within the realm of probability.
6 confession meeting all the foregoing re/uisites constitutes evidence of a high
order since it is supported by the strong presumption that no person of normal mind will
knowingly, freely and deliberately confess that he is the perpetrator of a crime unless
prompted by truth and conscience. .hen all these re/uirements are met and the
confession is admitted in evidence, the burden of proof that it was obtained by undue
pressure, threat or intimidation rests upon the accused. ()eople v. :a,ro, 2%% !"A
'0, Aug. '', '00% ()angani,an*+
$. umerous decisions of this Court rule that for an e"trajudicial confession to be
admissible, it must be4 1? voluntary3 $? made with the assistance of competent and
independent counsel3 :? e"press3 and D? in writing.
The mantle of protection afforded by the above%/uoted constitutional provision
covers the period from the time a person is taken into custody for the investigation of his
possible participation in the commission of a crime or from the time he is singled out as a
suspect in the commission of the offense although not yet in custody. The e"clusionary
rule is premised on the presumption that the defendant is thrust into an unfamiliar
atmosphere running through menacing police interrogation procedures where the
potentiality for compulsion, physical or psychological is forcefully apparent.
Fowever, the rule is not intended as a deterrent to the accused from confessing
guilt if he voluntarily and intelligently so desires but to protect the accused from admitting
what he is coerced to admit although untrue. ()eople v. Base, 320 !"A '98, '#0-
'%', March 3&, 2&&&, '
st
Div. (Dnares-antiago*+
52
11. .s the choice of a lawyer by a person !nder c!stodial inestigation who cannot afford
the serices of a co!nsel e*cl!sie as to precl!de other e8!ally co#petent and
independent attorneys fro# handling his defense(
Held: It must be remembered in this regard that while the right to counsel is
immutable, the option to secure the services of counsel de parte is not absolute. Indeed
G
The phrase 0competent and independent1 and 0preferably of his own
choice1 were e"plicit details which were added upon the persistence of human
rights lawyers in the 1E;L Constitutional Commission who pointed out cases
where, during the martial law period, the lawyers made available to the detainee
would be one appointed by the military and therefore beholden to the military.
(Citing . =ecord of the Constit!tional Co##ission 131C13+J . 4ernas$ 7he
Constit!tion of the =ep!blic of the Philippines$ 1/01 1
st
ed.$ p. 3+1)
& " " " " " " " "
.ithal, the word 0preferably1 under )ection 1$>1?, 6rticle : of the 1E;K
Constitution does not convey the message that the choice of a lawyer by a
person under investigation is e"clusive as to preclude other e/ually competent
and independent attorneys from handling his defense. If the rule were otherwise,
then, the tempo of a custodial investigation will be solely in the hands of the
accused who can impede, nay, obstruct the progress of the interrogation by
simply selecting a lawyer who for one reason or another, is not available to
protect his interest. This absurd scenario could not have been contemplated by
the framers of the charter.
.hile the initial choice in cases where a person under custodial investigation
cannot afford the services of a lawyer is naturally lodged in the police investigators, the
accused really has the final choice as he may reject the counsel chosen for him and ask
for another one. 6 lawyer provided by the investigators is deemed engaged by the
accused where he never raised any objection against the former+s appointment during
the course of the investigation and the accused thereafter subscribes to the veracity of
his statement before the swearing officer.
Herily, to be an effective counsel 0'a( lawyer need not challenge all the /uestions
being propounded to his client. The presence of a lawyer is not intended to stop an
accused from saying anything which might incriminate him but, rather, it was adopted in
our Constitution to preclude the slightest coercion as would lead the accused to admit
something false (People . Lay!so$ 115 "C=A +1 31/0/6). The counsel, however,
sho!ld neer preent an acc!sed fro# freely and ol!ntarily telling the tr!th.; ()eople v.
Base, 320 !"A '98, '#0-'%', March 3&, 2&&&, '
st
Div. (Dnares-antiago*+
10. "ho!ld co!rts be allowed to disting!ish between preli#inary 8!estioning and
c!stodial inestigation proper when applying the e*cl!sionary r!le(
Held: The e"clusionary rule sprang from a recognition that police interrogatory
procedures lay fertile grounds for coercion, physical and psychological, of the suspect to
admit responsibility for the crime under investigation. It was not intended as a deterrent
to the accused from confessing guilt, if he voluntarily and intelligently so desires but to
protect the accused from admitting what he is coerced to admit although untrue. !aw
enforcement agencies are re/uired to effectively communicate the rights of a person
under investigation and to insure that it is fully understood. 6ny measure short of this
re/uirement is considered a denial of such right. Courts are not allowed to distinguish
between preliminary /uestioning and custodial investigation proper when applying the
e"clusionary rule. 6ny information or admission given by a person while in custody
which may appear harmless or innocuous at the time without the competent assistance
of an independent counsel should be struck down as inadmissible. It has been held,
however, that an admission made to news reporters or to a confidant of the accused is
not covered by the e"clusionary rule.
53
The admission allegedly made by the appellant is not in the form of a written
e"tra%judicial confession3 the admission was allegedly made to the arresting officer
during an 0informal talk1 at the police station after his arrest as a prime suspect in the
rape and killing of " " ". The arresting policeman testified that the appellant admitted
that he was with the victim on the evening of Banuary 1$, 1EED, the probable time of the
commission of the crime and that he carried her on his shoulder but that he was too
drunk to remember what subse/uently happened. The arresting policeman admitted
that he did not inform the appellant of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to
counsel. .e note that the alleged admission is incriminating because it places the
accused in the company of the victim at the time the crime was probably committed.
The e"clusionary rule applies.
The accused was under arrest for the rape and killing of " " " and any statement
allegedly made by him pertaining to his possible complicity in the crime without prior
notification of his constitutional rights is inadmissible in evidence. The policeman+s
apparent attempt to circumvent the rule by insisting that the admission was made during
an 0informal talk1 prior to custodial investigation prior is not tenable. The appellant was
not invited to the police station as part of a general in/uiry for any possible lead to the
perpetrators of the crime under investigation. 6t the time the alleged admission was
made the appellant was in custody and had been arrested as the prime suspect in the
rape and killing of " " ". The e"clusionary rule presumes that the alleged admission was
coerced, the very evil the rule stands to avoid. )upportive of such presumption is the
absence of a written e"tra%judicial confession to that effect and the appellant+s denial in
court of the alleged oral admission. The alleged admission should be struck down as
inadmissible. ()eople v. Bravo, 3'8 !"A 8'2, >ov. 22, '000, 1n Banc (7on8aga-
"eyes*+
1/. -*plain the proced!re for o!tCofCco!rt identification of s!spects and the test to
deter#ine the ad#issibility of s!ch identification.
Held: 1. In People . 7eehan&ee$ Er. (2+/ "C=A 5+$ Gctober 6$ 1//5)$ the Court
" " " e"plained the procedure for out%of%court identification and the test to determine the
admissibility of such identification. It listed the following ways of identifying the suspects
during custodial investigation4 show%up, mug shots and line%ups. The Court there ruled4
0" " ". #ut%of%court identification is conducted by the police in various
ways. It is done thru showC!ps where the suspect alone is brought face to face
with the witness for identification. It is done thru #!g shots where photographs
are shown to the witness to identify the suspect. It is also done thru line !ps
where a witness identifies the suspect from a group of persons lined up for the
purpose. )ince corruption of o!tCofCco!rt identification contaminates the integrity
of in co!rt identification during the trial of the case, courts have fashioned out
rules to assure its fairness and its compliance with the re/uirements of
constitutional due process. In resolving the admissibility of and relying on out%of%
court identification of suspects, courts have adopted the totality of circ!#stances
test where they consider the following factors, i9F >1? the witness+ opportunity to
view the criminal at the time of the crime3 >$? the witness+ degree of attention at
that time3 >:? the accuracy of any prior description given by the witness3 >D? the
level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the identification3 >9? the length
of time between the crime and the identification3 and >L? the suggestiveness of
the identification procedure.1 (.bid.$ p. /5) ()eople v. 5imon, 28' !"A 9%%,
>ov. '2, '00% ()angani,an*+
$. " " ". The totality test has been fashioned precisely to assure fairness as well
as compliance with constitutional re/uirements of due process in regard to out%of%court
identification. These cited factors must be considered to prevent contamination of the
integrity of in%court identifications better. ()eople v. 7amer, 32# !"A ##&, :e,. 20,
2&&&, 2
n-
Div. (Cuisum,ing*+
02. Does the prohibition for c!stodial inestigation cond!cted witho!t the assistance of
co!nsel e*tend to a person in a police lineC!p( Conse8!ently$ is the identification by
54
priate co#plainant of acc!sed who was not assisted by co!nsel d!ring police lineC
!p ad#issible in eidence(
Held: The prohibition " " " does not e"tend to a person in a police line%up
because that stage of an investigation is not yet a part of custodial investigation. It has
been repeatedly held that custodial investigation commences when a person is taken
into custody and is singled out as a suspect in the commission of the crime under
investigation and the police officers begin to ask /uestions on the suspect+s participation
therein and which tend to elicit an admission. The stage of an investigation wherein a
person is asked to stand in a police line%up has been held to be outside the mantle of
protection of the right to counsel because it involves a general in/uiry into an unsolved
crime and is purely investigatory in nature. It has also been held that an uncounseled
identification at the police line%up does not preclude the admissibility of an in%court
identification. The identification made by the private complainant in the police line%up
pointing to Pavillare as one of his abductors is admissible in evidence although the
accused%appellant was not assisted by counsel. & " " ()eople v. )avillare, 320 !"A
#8$, #0$-#09, April 9, 2&&&, 1n Banc ()er !uriam*+
01. Petitioner in a case :* * * posits the theory that since he had no co!nsel d!ring the
c!stodial inestigation when his !rine sa#ple was ta&en and che#ically e*a#ined$
-*hibits :L; and :)$; * * * are also inad#issible in eidence since his !rine sa#ple
was deried in effect fro# an !nco!nselled e*traC%!dicial confession. Petitioner
clai#s that the ta&ing of his !rine sa#ple allegedly iolates Article ...$ "ection 2 of
the Constit!tion * * *.; "ho!ld his contentions be !pheld(
Held: .e are not persuaded. The right to counsel begins from the time a
person is taken into custody and placed under investigation for the commission of a
crime, i.e.$ when the investigating officer starts to ask /uestions to elicit information
andNor confession or admissions from the accused. )uch right is guaranteed by the
Constitution and cannot be waived e"cept in writing and in the presence of counsel.
Fowever, what the Constitution prohibits is the use of physical or moral compulsion to
e"tort communication from the accused, but not an inclusion of his body in evidence,
when it may be material. In fact, an accused may validly be compelled to be
photographed or measured, or his garments or shoes removed or replaced, or to move
his body to enable the foregoing things to be done, without running afoul of the
proscription against testimonial compulsion. The situation in the case at bar falls within
the e"emption under the freedom from testimonial compulsion since what was sought to
be e"amined came from the body of the accused. This was a mechanical act the
accused was made to undergo which was not meant to unearth undisclosed facts but to
ascertain physical attributes determinable by simple observation. In fact, the record
shows that petitioner and his co%accused were not compelled to give samples of their
urine but they in fact voluntarily gave the same when they were re/uested to undergo a
drug test. (7utang v. )eople, 339 !"A $%0, ;uly '', 2&&&, 2
n-
Div. (De <eon*+
The Ri(ht to #!il
02. .n bail application where the acc!sed is charged with a capital offense$ will it be
proper for the %!dge to grant bail witho!t cond!cting hearing if the prosec!tor
interposes no ob%ection to s!ch application( ,hy(
Held: Burisprudence is replete with decisions compelling judges to conduct the
re/uired hearings in bail applications, in which the accused stands charged with a capital
offense. The absence of objection from the prosecution is never a basis for the grant of
bail in such cases, for the judge has no right to presume that the prosecutor knows what
he is doing on account of familiarity with the case. =)aid reasoning is tantamount to
ceding to the prosecutor the duty of e"ercising judicial discretion to determine whether
the guilt of the accused is strong. Budicial discretion is the domain of the judge before
whom the petition for provisional liberty will be decided. The mandated duty to e"ercise
discretion has never been reposed upon the prosecutor.=
55
Imposed in 4aylon . "ison (2+3 "C=A 20+$ April 6$ 1//5) was this mandatory
duty to conduct a hearing despite the prosecutionJs refusal to adduce evidence in
opposition to the application to grant and fi" bail. (;oselito V. >arciso v. :lor Marie
ta. "omana-!ru8, 7.". >o. '3$9&$, March '%, 2&&&, 3
r-
Div. ()angani,an*+
03. ,hat are the d!ties of the %!dge in cases of bail applications where the acc!sed is
charged with capital offense(
Held: 4asco . =apatalo (26/ "C=A 222$ )arch 5$ 1//1) enunciated the
following duties of the trial judge in such petition for bail4
1? otify the prosecutor of the hearing of the application for bail or re/uire him to
submit his recommendation3
$? Conduct a hearing of the application for bail regardless of whether or not the
prosecution refuses to present evidence to show that the guilt of the accused
is strong for the purpose of enabling the court to e"ercise its sound discretion3
:? @ecide whether the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong based on the
summary of evidence of the prosecution3
D? If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the
approval of the bailbond. #therwise, petition should be denied.
The Court added4 =The above%enumerated procedure should now leave no room
for doubt as to the duties of the trial judge in cases of bail applications. )o basic and
fundamental is it to conduct a hearing in connection with the grant of bail in the proper
cases that it would amount to judicial apostasy for any member of the judiciary to
disclaim knowledge or awareness thereof.=
6dditionally, the courtJs grant or refusal of bail must contain a summary of the
evidence for the prosecution, on the basis of which should be formulated the judgeJs own
conclusion on whether such evidence is strong enough to indicate the guilt of the
accused. The summary thereof is considered an aspect of procedural due process for
both the prosecution and the defense3 its absence will invalidate the grant or the denial
of the application for bail. (;oselito V. >arciso v. :lor Marie ta. "omana-!ru8, 7.".
>o. '3$9&$, March '%, 2&&&, 3
r-
Div. ()angani,an*+
0+. "ho!ld the acc!sed who re#ained at large after their coniction be allowed
proisional liberty( Can the bail bond that the acc!sed preio!sly posted be !sed
d!ring the entire period of appeal(
Held: @espite an order of arrest from the trial court and two warnings from the
Court of 6ppeals, petitioners had remained at large. It is a"iomatic that for one to be
entitled to bail, he should be in the custody of the law, or otherwise, deprived of liberty.
The purpose of bail is to secure one+s release and it would be incongruous to grant bail
to one who is free. Petitioners+ Compliance and 5otion " " " came short of an
unconditional submission to respondent court+s lawful order and to its jurisdiction.
The trial court correctly denied petitioners+ motion that they be allowed
provisional liberty after their conviction, !nder their respectie bail bonds. 6part from the
fact that they were at large, )ection 9, Aule 11D of the Aules of Court, as amended by
)upreme Court 6dministrative Circular 1$%ED, provides that4
& " "
The Court, in its discretion, may allow the accused to continue on provisional
liberty under the same bail bond during the period to appeal subject to the consent of the
bondsman.
The bail bond that the accused previously posted can only be used during the
19%day period to appeal >Aule 1$$? and not during the entire period of appeal. This is
consistent with )ection $>a? of Aule 11D which provides that the bail 0shall be effective
upon approval and remain in force at all stages of the case, unless sooner cancelled,
!ntil the pro#!lgation of the %!dg#ent of the =egional 7rial Co!rt$ irrespective of whether
56
the case was originally filed in or appealed to it.1 This amendment, introduced by )C
6dministrative Circular 1$%ED is a departure from the old rules which then provided that
bail shall be effective and remain in force at all stages of the case until its full
determination, and thus even during the period of appeal. 5oreover, under the present
rule, for the accused to continue his provisional liberty on the same bail bond during the
period to appeal, consent of the bondsman is necessary. ,rom the record, it appears
that the bondsman " " " filed a motion in the trial court " " " for the cancellation of
petitioners+ bail bond for the latter+s failure to renew the same upon its e"piration.
#btaining the consent of the bondsman was, thus, foreclosed. (Magu--atu v. !ourt o/
Appeals, 32# !"A 3#2, :e,. 23, 2&&&, '
st
Div. (Aapunan*+
05. .s a condition in an application for bail that acc!sed be first arraigned before he
co!ld be granted bail alid(
Held: In re/uiring that petitioner be first arraigned before he could be granted
bail, the trial court apprehended that if petitioner were released on bail he could, by
being absent, prevent his early arraignment and thereby delay his trial until the
complainants got tired and lost interest in their cases. Fence, to ensure his presence at
the arraignment, approval of petitioner+s bail bonds should be deferred until he could be
arraigned. 6fter that, even if petitioner does not appear, trial can proceed as long as he
is notified of the date of the hearing and his failure to appear is unjustified, since under
6rt. III, )ec. 1D>$? of the Constitution, trial in absencia is authori-ed. This seems to be
the theory of the trial court in its " " " order conditioning the grant of bail to petitioner on
his arraignment.
This theory is mistaken. In the first place " " " in cases where it is authori-ed,
bail should be granted before arraignment, otherwise the accused may be precluded
from filing a motion to /uash. ,or if the information is /uashed and the case is
dismissed, there would then be no need for the arraignment of the accused. In the
second place, the trial court could ensure the presence of petitioner at the arraignment
precisely by granting bail and ordering his presence at any stage of the proceedings,
such as arraignment. 8nder Aule 11D, )ec. $>b? of the Aules on Criminal Procedure,
one of the conditions of bail is that 0the accused shall appear before the proper court
whenever so re/uired by the court or these Aules,1 while under Aule 11L, )ec. 1>b? the
presence of the accused at the arraignment is re/uired.
#n the other hand, to condition the grant of bail to an accused on his arraignment
would be to place him in a position where he has to choose between >1? filing a motion
to /uash and thus delay his release on bail because until his motion to /uash can be
resolved, his arraignment cannot be held, and >$? foregoing the filing of a motion to
/uash so that he can be arraigned at once and thereafter be released on bail. These
scenarios certainly undermine the accused+s constitutional right not to be put on trial
e"cept upon valid complaint or information sufficient to charge him with a crime and his
right to bail. (<avi-es v. !A, 32$ !"A 32', :e,. ', 2&&&, 2
n-
Div. (Men-o8a*+
The Ri(ht to )e Informed of the N!t%re !nd C!%&e of Acc%&!tion !(!in&t the
Acc%&ed
06. ,hat are the ob%ecties of the right to be infor#ed of the nat!re and ca!se of
acc!sations against the acc!sed(
Held: Instructive in this regard is )ection L, Aule 11< of the Aules of Court " " ".
The purpose of the above%/uoted rule is to inform the accused of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him, a right guaranteed by no less than the fundamental
law of the land (Article ...$ "ection 1+326$ 1/01 Constit!tion). 2laborating on the
defendant+s right to be informed, the Court held in Pecho . People (262 "C=A 510) that
the objectives of this right are4
1? To furnish the accused with such a description of the charge against him as
will enable him to make the defense3
57
$? To avail himself of his conviction or ac/uittal for protection against a further
prosecution for the same cause3 and
:? To inform the court of the facts alleged, so that it may decide whether they
are sufficient in law to support a conviction, if one should be had.
It is thus imperative that the Information filed with the trial court be complete G to
the end that the accused may suitably prepare for his defense. Corollary to this, an
indictment must fully state the elements of the specific offense alleged to have been
committed as it is the recital of the essentials of a crime which delineates the nature and
cause of accusation against the accused.
& " "
In the case under scrutiny, the information does not allege the #inority of the
icti# " " " although the same was proven during the trial " " ". The omission is not
merely formal in nature since doctrinally, an accused cannot be held liable for more than
what he is indicted for. It matters not how conclusive and convincing the evidence of
guilt may be, but an accused cannot be convicted of any offense, not charged in the
Complaint or Information on which he is tried or therein necessarily included. Fe has a
right to be informed of the nature of the offense with which he is charged before he is put
on trial. To convict an accused of an offense higher than that charged in the Complaint
or Information on which he is tried would constitute unauthori-ed denial of that right.
()eople v. Bayya, 32% !"A %%', March '&, 2&&&, 1n Banc ()urisima*+
The Ri(ht to ! F!ir Tri!l
01. ,hat is the p!rpose of the r!le barring trial or sentence of an insane person( ,hat
are the reasons !nderlying it(
Held: The rule barring trial or sentence of an insane person is for the protection
of the accused, rather than of the public. It has been held that it is inhuman to re/uire an
accused disabled by *od to make a just defense for his life or liberty. To put a legally
incompetent person on trial or to convict and sentence him is a violation of the
constitutional rights to a fair trial3 and this has several reasons underlying it. ,or one, the
accuracy of the proceedings may not be assured, as an incompetent defendant who
cannot comprehend the proceedings may not appreciate what information is relevant to
the proof of his innocence. 5oreover, he is not in a position to e"ercise many of the
rights afforded a defendant in a criminal case, e.g.$ the right to effectively consult with
counsel, the right to testify in his own behalf, and the right to confront opposing
witnesses, which rights are safeguards for the accuracy of the trial result. "econd$ the
fairness of the proceedings may be /uestioned, as there are certain basic decisions in
the course of a criminal proceeding which a defendant is e"pected to make for himself,
and one of these is his plea. 7hird$ the dignity of the proceedings may be disrupted, for
an incompetent defendant is likely to conduct himself in the courtroom in a manner
which may destroy the decorum of the court. 2ven if the defendant remains passive, his
lack of comprehension fundamentally impairs the functioning of the trial process. 6
criminal proceeding is essentially an adversarial proceeding. If the defendant is not a
conscious and intelligent participant, the adjudication loses its character as a reasoned
interaction between an individual and his community and becomes and invective against
an insensible object. >o!rth, it is important that the defendant knows why he is being
punished, a comprehension which is greatly dependent upon his understanding of what
occurs at trial. 6n incompetent defendant may not reali-e the moral reprehensibility of
his conduct. The societal goal of institutionali-ed retribution may be frustrated when the
force of the state is brought to bear against one who cannot comprehend its
significance. ()eople v. 1stra-a, 333 !"A #00, %'8-%'0, ;une '0, 2&&&, 1n Banc
()uno*+
The Ri(ht to !n Im-!rti!l Tri!l
58
00. ,hat are the two principal legal and philosophical schools of tho!ght on how to deal
with the rain of !nrestrained p!blicity d!ring the inestigation and trial of high profile
cases(
Held: There are two >$? principal legal and philosophical schools of thought on
how to deal with the rain of unrestrained publicity during the investigation and trial of
high profile cases. The 4ritish approach the problem with the pres!#ption that publicity
will prejudice a jury. Thus, 2nglish courts readily stay and stop criminal trials when the
right of an accused to fair trial suffers a threat. The A#erican approach is different. 8)
courts assume a s&eptical approach about the potential effect of pervasive publicity on
the right of an accused to a fair trial. They have developed different strains of tests to
resolve this issue, i.e., substantial probability of irreparable harm, strong likelihood, clear
and present danger, etc. (1stra-a v. Desierto, 7.". >os. '$#%'&-'9, March 2, 2&&',
1n Banc ()uno*+
0/. "ho!ld the G#b!ds#an be stopped fro# cond!cting the inestigation of the cases
filed against petitioner (for#er President) -strada d!e to the barrage of pre%!dicial
p!blicity on his g!ilt(
Held: Petitioner " " " contends that the respondent #mbudsman should be
stopped from conducting the investigation of the cases filed against him due to the
barrage of prejudicial publicity on his guilt. Fe submits that the respondent #mbudsman
has developed bias and is all set to file the criminal cases in violation of his right to due
process.
& " "
This is not the first ti#e the issue of trial by publicity has been raised in this Court
to stop the trials or annul convictions in high profile criminal cases. In People .
7eehan&ee$ Er. (2+/ "C=A 5+ 31//56), later reiterated in the case of Larranaga . Co!rt
of Appeals$ et al. (201 "C=A 501 at pp. 5/6C5/1 31//06), we laid down the doctrine that4
0.e cannot sustain appellant+s claim that he was denied the right to
impartial trial due to prejudicial publicity. It is true that the print and broadcast
media gave the case at bar pervasive publicity, just like all high profile and high
stake criminal trials. 7hen and now$ we r!le that the right of an acc!sed to a fair
trial is not inco#patible to a free press. To be sure, responsible reporting
enhances an accused+s right to a fair trial for, as well pointed out, a responsible
press has always been regarded as the handmaiden of effective judicial
administration, especially in the criminal field " " ". The press does not simply
publish information about trials but guards against the miscarriage of justice by
subjecting the police, prosecutors, and judicial processes to e"tensive public
scrutiny and criticism.
Pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of an accused to
fair trial. The mere fact that the trial of appellant was given a day%to%day, gavel%
to%gavel coverage does not by itself prove that the publicity so permeated the
mind of the trial judge and impaired his impartiality. ,or one, it is impossible to
seal the minds of members of the bench from pre%trial and other off%court
publicity of sensational criminal cases. The state of the art of our communication
system brings news as they happen straight to our breakfast tables and right to
our bedrooms. These news form part of our everyday menu of the facts and
fictions of life. ,or another, our idea of a fair and impartial judge is not that of a
hermit who is out of touch with the world. .e have not installed the jury system
whose members are overly protected from publicity lest they lose their
impartiality. " " ". #ur judges are learned in the law and trained to disregard off%
court evidence and on%camera performances of parties to a litigation. Their mere
e"posure to publications and publicity stunts does not per se fatally infect their
impartiality.
6t best, appellant can only conjure possibility of pre%!dice on the part of
the trial judge due to the barrage of publicity that characteri-ed the investigation
59
and trial of the case. In )artelino$ et al. . Ale%andro$ et al.$ we rejected this
standard of possibility of prejudice and adopted the test of act!al pre%!dice as we
ruled that to warrant a finding of prejudicial publicity, there must be allegation and
proof that the judges have been unduly influenced, not simply that they might be,
by the barrage of publicity. In the case at bar, the records do not show that the
trial judge developed act!al bias against appellant as a conse/uence of the
e"tensive media coverage of the pre%trial and trial of his case. The totality of
circ!#stances of the case does not prove that the trial judge ac/uired a fi*ed
opinion as a result of prejudicial publicity which is incapable of change even by
evidence presented during the trial. 6ppellant has the burden to prove this actual
bias and he has not discharged the burden.1
.e e"pounded further on this doctrine in the subse/uent case of ,ebb . Kon.
=a!l de Leon$ etc. (2+1 "C=A 652 31//56) and its companion cases, i9.F
06gain, petitioners raise the effect of prejudicial publicity on their right to
due process while undergoing preliminary investigation. .e find no procedural
impediment to its early invocation considering the substantial risk to their liberty
whole undergoing a preliminary investigation.
& " "
The democratic settings, media coverage of trials of sensational cases
cannot be avoided and oftentimes, its e"cessiveness has been aggravated by
kinetic developments in the telecommunications industry. ,or sure, few cases
can match the high volume and high velocity of publicity that attended the
preliminary investigation of the case at bar. #ur daily diet of facts and fiction
about the case continues unabated even today. Commentators still bombard the
public with views not too many of which are sober and sublime. Indeed, even the
principal actors in the case G the CI, the respondents, their lawyers and their
sympathi-ers G have participated in this media blit-. The possibility of media
abuses and their threat to a fair trial notwithstanding, criminal trials cannot be
completely closed to the press and public. In the seminal case of =ich#ond
Dewspapers$ .nc. . Hirginia$ it was wisely held4
O" " "
>a? The historical evidence of the evolution of the criminal trial in
6nglo%6merican justice demonstrates conclusively that at the time this
ation+s organic laws were adopted, criminal trials both here and in
2ngland had long been presumptively open, thus giving assurance that
the proceedings were conducted fairly to all concerned and discouraging
perjury, the misconduct of participants, or decisions based on secret bias
or partiality. In addition, the significant community therapeutic value of
public trials was recogni-ed4 when a shocking crime occurs, a community
reaction of outrage and public protest often follows, and thereafter the
open processes of justice serve an important prophylactic purpose,
providing an outlet for community concern, hostility, and emotion. To work
effectively, it is important that society+s criminal process Osatisfy the
appearance of justice,+ #ffutt v. 8nited )tates, :D; 8) 11, 1D, EE ! 2d 11,
K9 ) Ct 11, which can best be provided by allowing people to observe
such process. ,rom this unbroken, uncontradicted history, supported by
reasons as valid today as in centuries past, it must be concluded that a
presumption of openness inheres in the very nature of a criminal trial
under this ation+s system of justice, Cf., e.g., !evine v. 8nited )tates,
:L$ 8) L1<, D ! 2d $d E;E, ;< ) Ct 1<:;.
>b? The freedoms of speech, press, and assembly, e"pressly
guaranteed by the ,irst 6mendment, share a common core purpose of
assuring freedom of communication on matters relating to the functioning
of government. In guaranteeing freedoms such as those of speech and
press, the ,irst 6mendment can be read as protecting the right of
60
everyone to attend trials so as give meaning to those e"plicit guarantees3
the ,irst 6mendment right to receive information and ideas means, in the
conte"t of trials, that the guarantees of speech and press, standing alone,
prohibit government from summarily closing courtroom doors which had
long been open to the public at the time the ,irst 6mendment was
adopted. 5oreover, the right of assembly is also relevant, having been
regarded not only as an independent right but also as a catalyst to
augment the free e"ercise of the other ,irst 6mendment rights with which
it was deliberately linked by the draftsmen. 6 trial courtroom is a public
place where the people generally G and representatives of the media G
have a right to be present, and where their presence historically has been
thought to enhance the integrity and /uality of what takes place.
>c? 2ven though the Constitution contains no provision which by its
terms guarantees to the public the right to attend criminal trials, various
fundamental rights, not e"pressly guaranteed, have been recogni-ed as
indispensable to the enjoyment of enumerated rights. The right to attend
criminal trial is implicit in the guarantees of the ,irst 6mendment4 without
the freedom to attend such trials, which people have e"ercised for
centuries, important aspects of freedom of speech and of the press could
be eviscerated.+
Ce that as it may, we recogni-e that pervasive and prejudicial publicity
under certain circumstances can deprive an accused of his due process right to
fair trial. Thus, in )artelino$ et al. . Ale%andro$ et al.$ we held that to warrant a
finding of prejudicial publicity there must be allegation and proof that the judges
have been unduly influenced, not simply that they might be, by the barrage of
publicity. In the case at bar, we find nothing in the records that will prove that the
tone and content of the publicity that attended the investigation of petitioners
fatally infected the fairness and impartiality of the @#B Panel. Petitioners cannot
just rely on the subliminal effects of publicity on the sense of fairness of the @#B
Panel, for these are basically unbeknown and beyond knowing. To be sure, the
@#B Panel is composed of an 6ssistant Chief )tate Prosecutor and )enior )tate
Prosecutors. Their long e"perience in criminal investigation is a factor to
consider in determining whether they can easily be blinded by the klieg lights of
publicity. Indeed, their $L%page Aesolution carries no indubitable indicia of bias
for it does not appear that they considered any e"tra%record evidence e"cept
evidence properly adduced by the parties. The length of time the investigation
was conducted despite it summary nature and the generosity with which they
accommodated the discovery motions of petitioners speak well of their fairness.
6t no instance, we note, did petitioners seek the dis/ualification of any member
of the @#B Panel on the ground of bias resulting from their bombardment of
prejudicial publicity.1
6pplying the above ruling, we hold that there is not eno!gh eidence to warrant this
Co!rt to en%oin the preli#inary inestigation of the petitioner by the respondent
G#b!ds#an. Petitioner needs to offer more than hostile headlines to discharge his
burden of proof. Fe needs to show more than weighty social science evidence to
successfully prove the impaired capacity of a judge to render a bias%free decision. .ell
to note, the cases against the petitioner are still !ndergoing preliminary investigation by
a special panel of prosecutors in the office of the respondent #mbudsman. o
allegation whatsoever has been made by the petitioner that the minds of the members of
this special panel have already been infected by bias because of the pervasive
prejudicial publicity against him. Indeed, the special panel has yet to come out with its
findings and the Court cannot second guess whether its recommendation will be
unfavorable to the petitioner. (1stra-a v. Desierto, 7.". >os. '$#%'&-'9, March 2,
2&&', 1n Banc ()uno*+
The Ri(ht !(!in&t Self/Incrimin!tion
/2. Disc!ss the types of i##!nity stat!tes. ,hich has broader scope of protection(
61
Held: #ur immunity statutes are of 6merican origin. In the 8nited )tates, there
are two types of statutory immunity granted to a witness. They are the transactional
immunity and the use%and%derivative%use immunity. Transactional immunity is broader in
the scope of its protection. Cy its grant, a witness can no longer be prosecuted for any
offense whatsoever arising out of the act or transaction. In contrast, by the grant of use%
and%derivative%use immunity, a witness is only assured that his or her particular
testimony and evidence derived from it will not be used against him or her in a
subse/uent prosecution. (Mapa, ;r. v. an-igan,ayan, 23' !"A %83, %0%-%08, April
2#, '00$, 1n Banc ()uno*+
/1. .s the grant of i##!nity to an acc!sed willing to testify for the goern#ent a special
priilege and therefore #!st be strictly constr!ed against the acc!sed(
Held: '.(e reject respondent court+s ruling that the grant of section 9 immunity
must be strictly construed against the petitioners. It simplistically characteri-ed the grant
as a special privilege, as if it was gifted by the government, e* gratia. In taking this
posture, it misread the raison d' etre and the long pedigree of the right against self%
incrimination isCRCis immunity statutes.
The days of in/uisition brought about the most despicable abuses against human
rights. ot the least of these abuses is the e"pert use of coerced confessions to send to
the guillotine even the guiltless. To guard against the recurrence of this totalitarian
method, the right against self%incrimination was ensconced in the fundamental laws of all
civili-ed countries. #ver the years, however, came the need to assist government in its
task of containing crime for peace and order is a necessary matri" of public welfare. To
accommodate the need, the right against self%incrimination was stripped of its
absoluteness. Immunity statutes in varying shapes were enacted which would allow
government to compel a witness to testify despite his plea of the right against self%
incrimination. To insulate these statutes from the virus of unconstitutionality, a witness is
given what has come to be known as transactional or a use%derivative%use immunity " "
". Quite clearly, these immunity statutes are not a bonan-a from government. Those
given the privilege of immunity paid a high price for it G the surrender of their precious
right to be silent. #ur hierarchy of values demands that the right against self%
incrimination and the right to be silent should be accorded greater respect and
protection. !aws that tend to erode the force of these preeminent rights must
necessarily be given a liberal interpretation in favor of the individual. The government
has a right to solve crimes but it must do it, rightly. (Mapa, ;r. v. an-igan,ayan, 23'
!"A %83, 8&9-8&#, April 2#, '00$, 1n Banc ()uno*+
The Ri(ht !(!in&t o%)le 0eo-!rd,
/2. Disc!ss the two &inds of do!ble %eopardy.
Held: #ur Cill of Aights deals with two >$? kinds of double jeopardy. The first
sentence of Clause $<, )ection 1, 6rticle III of the Constitution ordains that 0no person
shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense.1 The second
sentence of said clause provides that 0if an act is punishable by a law and an ordinance,
conviction or ac/uittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the
same act.1 Thus, the first sentence prohibits double jeopardy of punishment for the
same offense whereas, the second contemplates double jeopardy of punishment for the
same act. 8nder the first sentence, one may be twice put in jeopardy of punishment of
the same act, provided that he is charged with different offenses, or the offense charged
in one case is not included in, or does not include, the crime charged in the other case.
The second sentence applies, even if the offense charged are not the same, owing to
the fact that one constitutes a violation of an ordinance and the other a violation of
statute. If the two charges are based on one and the same act, conviction or ac/uittal
under either the law or the ordinance shall bar a prosecution under the other.
Incidentally, such conviction or ac/uittal is not indispensable to sustain the plea of
double jeopardy of punishment or the same offense. )o long as jeopardy has been
attached under one of the informations charging said offense, the defense may be
62
availed of in the other case involving the same offense, even if there has been neither
conviction nor ac/uittal in either case.
2lsewhere stated, where the offense charged are penali-ed either by different
sections of the same statute or by different statutes, the important in/uiry relates to the
identity of offenses charged. The constitutional protection against double jeopardy is
available only where an identity is shown to e"ist between the earlier and the
subse/uent offenses charged. The /uestion of identity or lack of identity of offenses is
addressed by e"amining the essential elements of each of the two offenses charged, as
such elements are set out in the respective legislative definitions of the offenses
involved. ()eople v. CuiBa-a, 290 !"A '0', ;uly 2$, '00#+
/3. ,hat #!st be proed to s!bstantiate a clai# of do!ble %eopardy( ,hen #ay legal
%eopardy attach(
Held: To substantiate a claim of double jeopardy, the following must be proven4
>1? 6 first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second3 >$? the first jeopardy
must have been validly terminated3 >:? the second jeopardy must be for the same
offense, or the second offense includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged
in the first information, or is an attempt to commit the same or is a frustration thereof.
!egal jeopardy attaches only4 >1? upon a valid indictment3 >b? before a competent
court3 >c? after arraignment3 >d? when a valid plea has been entered3 and >e? the case
was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the e"press consent of the accused.
(!uison v. !A, 280 !"A '90, April '9, '008 ()angani,an*+
/+. .n its decision in a cri#inal case$ the E!dge pro#!lgated only the ciil aspect of the
case$ b!t not the cri#inal. ,ill the pro#!lgation of the cri#inal aspect later
constit!te do!ble %eopardy(
Held: Petitioner contends that =the promulgation by Budge Aamos on 6pril D,
1EE9 of the Aespondent CourtJs decision of Bune :<, 1EE1 by reading its dispositive
portion has effectiely ter#inated the cri#inal cases against the petitioner * * *.@ In
other words, petitioner claims that the first jeopardy attached at that point.
The Court is not persuaded. 6s a rule, a criminal prosecution includes a civil
action for the recovery of indemnity. Fence, a decision in such case disposes of both
the criminal as well as the civil liabilities of an accused. Fere, trial court promulgated
only the civil aspect of the case, but not the criminal.
'T(he promulgation of the C6 @ecision was not complete. In fact and in truth, the
promulgation was not merely incomplete3 it was also void. In e"cess of its jurisdiction,
the trial judge rendered a substantially incomplete promulgation on 6pril D, 1EE9, and he
repeated his mistake in his 6pril 1$, 1EEL #rder. .e emphasi-e that grave abuse of
discretion rendered the aforementioned act of the trial court void. )ince the criminal
cases have not yet been terminated, the first jeopardy has not yet attached. Fence,
double jeopardy cannot prosper as a defense.
.e must stress that Aespondent CourtJs /uestioned @ecision did not modify or
amend its Buly :<, 1EE1 @ecision. It merely ordered the promulgation of the judgment of
conviction and the full e"ecution of the penalty it had earlier imposed on petitioner.
(!uison v. !A, 280 !"A '90, April '9, '008 ()angani,an*+
The Ri(ht !(!in&t E" Po&t F!cto L!w& !nd #ill& of Att!inder
/5. ,hat is a bill of attainder( .s P.D. 1066 a bill of attainder(
Held: 'T(he Court, in People . >errer (B.=. Dos. LC32613C1+$ Dece#ber 21$
1/12$ +0 "C=A 302)$ defined a bill of attainder as a legislative act which inflicts
punishment on individuals or members of a particular group without a judicial trial.
63
2ssential to a bill of attainder are a specification of certain individuals or a group of
individuals, the imposition of a punishment, penal or otherwise, and the lack of judicial
trial. This last element, the total lack of court intervention in the finding of guilt and the
determination of the actual penalty to be imposed, is the most essential. P.@. o. 1;LL
does not possess the elements of a bill of attainder. It does not seek to inflict
punishment without a judicial trial. owhere in the measure is there a finding of guilt and
an imposition of a corresponding punishment. .hat the decree does is to define the
offense and provide for the penalty that may be imposed, specifying the /ualifying
circumstances that would aggravate the offense. There is no encroachment on the
power of the court to determine after due hearing whether the prosecution has proved
beyond reasonable doubt that the offense of illegal possession of firearms has been
committed and that the /ualifying circumstances attached to it has been established also
beyond reasonable doubt as the Constitution and judicial precedents re/uire. (Misolas
v. )anga, '8' !"A #$8, #90-##&, ;an. 3&, '00&, 1n Banc (!ortes*+
/6. ,hat is an e* post facto law( .s =.A. Do. 02+/ an e* post facto law(
Held: -* post facto law, generally, prohibits retrospectivity of penal laws. A.6.
;$DE is not a penal law. It is a substantive law on jurisdiction which is not penal in
character. Penal laws are those acts of the !egislature which prohibit certain acts and
establish penalties for their violations3 or those that define crimes, treat of their nature,
and provide for their punishment. A.6. KEK9, which amended P.@. 1L<L as regards the
)andiganbayan+s jurisdiction, its mode of appeal and other procedural matters, has been
declared by the Court as not a penal law, but clearly a procedural statute, i.e.$ one which
prescribes rules of procedure by which courts applying laws of all kinds can properly
administer justice. ot being a penal law, the retroactive application of A.6. ;$DE cannot
be challenged as unconstitutional.
Petitioner+s and intervenors+ contention that their right to a two%tiered appeal
which they ac/uired under A.6. KEK9 has been diluted by the enactment of A.6. ;$DE, is
incorrect. The same contention has already been rejected by the court several times
considering that the right to appeal is not a nat!ral right but statutory in nature that can
be regulated by law. The mode of procedure provided for in the statutory right of appeal
is not included in the prohibition against e* post facto laws. A.6. ;$DE pertains only to
matters of procedure, and being merely an amendatory statute it does not partake the
nature of an e* post facto law. It does not mete out a penalty and, therefore, does not
come within the prohibition. 5oreover, the law did not alter the rules of evidence or the
mode of trial. It has been ruled that adjective statutes may be made applicable to
actions pending and unresolved at the time of their passage.
6t any rate, A.6. ;$DE has preserved the accused+s right to appeal to the
)upreme Court to review /uestions of law. #n the removal of the intermediate review of
facts, the )upreme Court still has the power of review to determine if the presumption of
innocence has been convincingly overcome. ()an/ilo M. <acson v. 5he 1?ecutive
ecretary, et. al., 7.". >o. '28&0#, ;an. 2&, '000 (Martine8*+
A.INISTRATI1E LAW
/1. Describe the Ad#inistratie Code of 1/01
Held: The Code is a general law and 0incorporates in a unified document the
major structural, functional and procedural principles of governance (7hird ,hereas
Cla!se$ Ad#inistratie Code of 1/01) and 0embodies changes in administrative
structures and procedures designed to serve the people.1 (>o!rth ,hereas Cla!se$
Ad#inistratie Code of 1/01) The Code is divided into seven >K? books. These books
contain provisions on the organi-ation, powers and general administration of
departments, bureaus and offices under the e"ecutive branch, the organi-ation and
functions of the Constitutional Commissions and other constitutional bodies, the rules on
the national government budget, as well as guidelines for the e"ercise by administrative
agencies of /uasi%legislative and /uasi%judicial powers. The Code covers both the
internal administration, i.e.$ internal organi-ation, personnel and recruitment, supervision
64
and discipline, and the effects of the functions performed by administrative officials on
private individuals or parties outside government. (.ple v. 5orres, 7.". >o. '2%#89,
;uly 23, '008 ()uno*+
/0. ,hat is ad#inistratie power(
Held: Ad#inistratie power is concerned with the work of applying policies and
enforcing orders as determined by proper governmental organs. It enables the
President to fi" a uniform standard of administrative efficiency and check the official
conduct of his agents. To this end, he can issue administrative orders, rules and
regulations. (.ple v. 5orres, 7.". >o. '2%#89, ;uly 23, '008 ()uno*+
//. ,hat is an ad#inistratie order(
Held: 6n ad#inistratie order is an ordinance issued by the President which
relates to specific aspects in the administrative operation of government. It must be in
harmony with the law and should be for the sole purpose of implementing the law and
carrying out the legislative policy. (.ple v. 5orres, 7.". >o. '2%#89, ;uly 23, '008
()uno*+
122. ,hat is the Boern#ent of the =ep!blic of the Philippines(
An&wer: The Boern#ent of the =ep!blic of the Philippines refers to the
corporate governmental entity through which the functions of the government are
e"ercised throughout the Philippines, including, save as the contrary appears from the
conte"t, the various arms through which political authority is made effective in the
Philippines, whether pertaining to the autonomous regions, the provincial, city, municipal
or barangay subdivisions or other forms of local government. (ec. 2('*, Intro-uctory
)rovisions, 1?ecutive .r-er >o. 202+
121. ,hat is a goern#ent instr!#entality( ,hat are incl!ded in the ter#
goern#ent instr!#entality(
An&wer: 6 goern#ent instr!#entality refers to any agency of the national
government, not integrated within the department framework, vested with special
functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed with some if not all corporate powers,
administering special funds, enjoying operational autonomy, usually through a charter.
The term includes regulatory agencies, chartered institutions and government%owned or
controlled corporations. (ec. 2('&*, Intro-uctory )rovisions, 1?ecutive .r-er >o.
202+
122. ,hat is a reg!latory agency(
An&wer: 6 reg!latory agency refers to any agency e"pressly vested with
jurisdiction to regulate, administer or adjudicate matters affecting substantial rights and
interest of private persons, the principal powers of which are e"ercised by a collective
body, such as a commission, board or council. (ec. 2(''*, Intro-uctory )rovisions,
1?ecutive .r-er >o. 202+
123. ,hat is a chartered instit!tion(
An&wer: 6 chartered instit!tion refers to any agency organi-ed or operating
under a special charter, and vested by law with functions relating to specific
constitutional policies or objectives. This term includes state universities and colleges
and the monetary authority of the )tate. (ection 2('2*, Intro-uctory )rovisions,
1?ecutive .r-er >o. 202+
12+. ,hen is a goern#entCowned or controlled corporation dee#ed to be perfor#ing
proprietary f!nction( ,hen is it dee#ed to be perfor#ing goern#ental f!nction(
Held: *overnment%owned or controlled corporations may perform governmental
or proprietary functions or both, depending on the purpose for which they have been
65
created. If the purpose is to obtain special corporate benefits or earn pecuniary profit,
the function is proprietary. If it is in the interest of health, safety and for the
advancement of public good and welfare, affecting the public in general, the function is
governmental. Powers classified as 0proprietary1 are those intended for private
advantage and benefit. (Bla=uera v. Alcala, 209 !"A 3##, $29, ept. '', '008, 1n
Banc ()urisima*+
125. Does the petition for ann!l#ent of procla#ation of a candidate #erely inole
the e*ercise by the CG)-L-C of its ad#inistratie power to reiew$ reise and
reerse the actions of the board of canassers and$ therefore$ %!stifies nonC
obserance of proced!ral d!e process$ or does it inole the e*ercise of the
CG)-L-CQs 8!asiC%!dicial f!nction(
Held: Taking cogni-ance of private respondentJs petitions for annulment of
petitionerJs proclamation, C#52!2C was not merely performing an administrative
function. The administrative powers of the C#52!2C include the power to determine
the number and location of polling places, appoint election officials and inspectors,
conduct registration of voters, deputi-e law enforcement agencies and governmental
instrumentalities to ensure free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections, register
political parties, organi-ations or coalition, accredit citi-enJs arms of the Commission,
prosecute election offenses, and recommend to the President the removal of or
imposition of any other disciplinary action upon any officer or employee it has deputi-ed
for violation or disregard of its directive, order or decision. In addition, the Commission
also has direct control and supervision over all personnel involved in the conduct of
election. Fowever, the resolution of the adverse claims of private respondent and
petitioner as regards the e"istence of a manifest error in the /uestioned certificate of
canvass re/uires the C#52!2C to act as an arbiter. It behooves the Commission to
hear both parties to determine the veracity of their allegations and to decide whether the
alleged error is a manifest error. Fence, the resolution of this issue calls for the e"ercise
by the C#52!2C of its /uasi%judicial power. It has been said that where a power rests
in judgment or discretion, so that it is of judicial nature or character, but does not involve
the e"ercise of functions of a judge, or is conferred upon an officer other than a judicial
officer, it is deemed /uasi%judicial. The C#52!2C therefore, acting as /uasi%judicial
tribunal, cannot ignore the re/uirements of procedural due process in resolving the
petitions filed by private respondent. (:e-erico . an-oval v. !.M1<1!, 7.". >o.
'338$2, ;an. 2#, 2&&& ()uno*+
126. Disc!ss the Doctrine of Pri#ary E!risdiction (or Prior =esort).
Held: Courts cannot and will not resolve a controversy involving a /uestion
which is within the jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal, especially where the /uestion
demands the e"ercise of sound administrative discretion re/uiring the special
knowledge, e"perience and services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical
and intricate matters of fact.
In recent years, it has been the jurisprudential trend to apply this doctrine to
cases involving matters that demand the special competence of administrative agencies
even if the /uestion involved is also judicial in character. It applies 0where a claim is
originally cogni-able in the courts, and comes into play whenever enforcement of the
claim re/uires the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme, have been
placed within the special competence of an administrative body3 in such case, the
judicial process is suspended pending referral of such issues to the administrative body
for its view.1
In cases where the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is clearly applicable, the court
cannot arrogate unto itself the authority to resolve a controversy, the jurisdiction over
which is lodged with an administrative body of special competence. (Villa/lor v. !A,
28& !"A 28%+
121. Disc!ss the Doctrine of -*ha!stion of Ad#inistratie =e#edies. -n!#erate
e*ceptions thereto.
66
Held: 1. Cefore a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court, it is a
pre%condition that he should have availed of all the means of administrative processes
afforded him. Fence, if a remedy within the administrative machinery can still be
resorted to by giving the administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on
a matter that comes within his jurisdiction then such remedy should be e"hausted first
before the court+s judicial power can be sought. The premature invocation of court+s
jurisdiction is fatal to one+s cause of action. 6ccordingly, absent any finding of waiver or
estoppel the case is susceptible of dismissal for lack of cause of action. This doctrine of
e"haustion of administrative remedies was not without its practical and legal reasons, for
one thing, availment of administrative remedy entails lesser e"penses and provides for a
speedier disposition of controversies. It is no less true to state that the courts of justice
for reasons of comity and convenience will shy away from a dispute until the system of
administrative redress has been completed and complied with so as to give the
administrative agency concerned every opportunity to correct its error and to dispose of
the case.
This doctrine is disregarded4
1? when there is a violation of due process3
$? when the issue involved is purely a legal /uestion3
:? when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or e"cess
of jurisdiction3
D? when there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency concerned3
9? when there is irreparable injury3
L? when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of
the President bears the implied and assumed approval of the latter3
K? when to re/uire e"haustion of administrative remedies would be
unreasonable3
;? when it would amount to a nullification of a claim3
E? when the subject matter is a private land in land case proceeding3
1<? when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and ade/uate remedy, and
11? when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention.
()aat v. !A, 2## !"A '#% ('00%*+
$. on%e"haustion of administrative remedies is not jurisdictional. It only renders
the action premature, i.e.$ claimed cause of action is not ripe for judicial determination
and for that reason a party has no cause of action to ventilate in court. (!arale v.
A,arintos, 2#0 !"A '32+
THE LAW OF PU#LIC OFFICERS
120. Define Appoint#ent. Disc!ss its nat!re.
Held: 6n 0appointment1 to a public office is the une/uivocal act of designating or
selecting by one having the authority therefor of an individual to discharge and perform
the duties and functions of an office or trust. The appointment is deemed complete once
the last act re/uired of the appointing authority has been complied with and its
acceptance thereafter by the appointee in order to render it effective. 6ppointment
necessarily calls for an e"ercise of discretion on the part of the appointing authority. In
Pa#antasan ng L!ngsod ng )aynila . .nter#ediate Appellate Co!rt (1+2 "C=A 22)$
reiterated in >lores . Drilon (223 "C=A 560)$ this Court has held4
0The power to appoint is, in essence, discretionary. The appointing power
has the right of choice which he may e"ercise freely according to his judgment,
deciding for himself who is best /ualified among those who have the necessary
/ualifications and eligibilities. It is a prerogative of the appointing power " " ".1
(At p. 51/)

Indeed, it may rightly be said that the right of choice is the heart of the power to appoint.
In the e"ercise of the power of appointment, discretion is an integral thereof.
(Bermu-e8 v. 5orres, 3'' !"A %33, Aug. $, '000, 3
r-
Div. (Vitug*+
67
12/. )ay the Ciil "erice Co##ission$ or the "!pre#e Co!rt$ alidly n!llify an
appoint#ent on the gro!nd that so#ebody else is better 8!alified(
Held: The head of an agency who is the appointing power is the one most
knowledgeable to decide who can best perform the functions of the office. 6ppointment
is an essentially discretionary power and must be performed by the officer vested with
such power according to his best lights, the only condition being that the appointee
should possess the /ualifications re/uired by law. If he does, then the appointment
cannot be faulted on the ground that there are others better /ualified who should have
been preferred. Indeed, this is a prerogative of the appointing authority which he alone
can decide. The choice of an appointee from among those who possess the re/uired
/ualifications is a political and administrative decision calling for considerations of
wisdom, convenience, utility and the interests of the service which can best be made by
the head of the office concerned, the person most familiar with the organi-ational
structure and environmental circumstances within which the appointee must function.
6s long as the appointee is /ualified the Civil )ervice Commission has no choice
but to attest to and respect the appointment even if it be proved that there are others
with superior credentials. The law limits the Commission+s authority only to whether or
not the appointees possess the legal /ualifications and the appropriate civil service
eligibility, nothing else. If they do then the appointments are approved because the
Commission cannot e"ceed its power by substituting its will for that of the appointing
authority. either can we. ("imonte v. !!, 2$$ !"A 9&$-9&9, May 20, '009, 1n
Banc (Bellosillo, ;.*+
112. Does the :ne*tCinCran&; r!le i#port any #andatory or pere#ptory re8!ire#ent
that the person ne*tCinCran& #!st be appointed to the acancy(
Held: The 0ne"t%in%rank rule is not absolute3 it only applies in cases of
promotion, a process which denotes a scalar ascent of an officer to another position
higher either in rank or salary. 6nd even in promotions, it can be disregarded for sound
reasons made known to the ne"t%in%rank, as the concept does not import any mandatory
or peremptory re/uirement that the person ne"t%in%rank must be appointed to the
vacancy. The appointing authority, under the Civil )ervice !aw, is allowed to fill
vacancies by promotion, transfer of present employees, reinstatement, reemployment,
and appointment of outsiders who have appropriate civil service eligibility, not
necessarily in that order. There is no legal fiat that a vacancy must be filled only by
promotion3 the appointing authority is given wide discretion to fill a vacancy from among
the several alternatives provided by law.
.hat the Civil )ervice !aw provides is that if a vacancy is filled by promotion, the
person holding the position ne"t in rank thereto 0shall be considered for promotion.1
In 7ad!ran . Ciil "erice Co##ission (131 "C=A 66 31/0+6), the Court
construed that phrase to mean that the person ne"t%in%rank 0would be among the first to
be considered for the vacancy, if /ualified.1 In "antiago$ Er. . Ciil "erice Co##ission
(110 "C=A 133 31/0/6), the Court elaborated the import of the rule in the following
manner4
0#ne who is ne"t%in%rank is entitled to preferential consideration for
promotion to the higher vacancy but it does not necessarily follow that he and no
one else can be appointed. The rule neither grants a vested right to the holder
nor imposes a ministerial duty on the appointing authority to promote such
person to the ne"t higher position " " "1
(A,ila v. !!, '08 !"A '&2, ;une 3, '00', 1n Banc (:eliciano*+
111. 7he Philippine Dational =ed Cross (PD=C) is a goern#entCowned and
controlled corporation with an original charter !nder =.A. Do. /5$ as a#ended. .ts
charter$ howeer$ was a#ended to est in it the a!thority to sec!re loans$ be
e*e#pted fro# pay#ent of all d!ties$ ta*es$ fees and other charges$ etc. ,ith the
a#end#ent of its charter$ has it been :i#pliedly conerted to a priate corporation;(
68
Held: The test to determine whether a corporation is government owned or
controlled, or private in nature is simple. Is it created by its own charter for the e"ercise
of a public function, or by incorporation under the general corporation law7 Those with
special charters are government corporations subject to its provisions, and its
employees are under the jurisdiction of the Civil )ervice Commission. The PAC was
not 0impliedly converted to a private corporation1 simply because its charter was
amended to vest in it the authority to secure loans, be e"empted from payment of all
duties, ta"es, fees and other charges, etc. (!ampore-on-o v. ><"!, 7.". >o.
'20&$0, Aug. #, '000, '
st
Div. ()ar-o*+
112. ,hat is a pri#arily confidential position( ,hat is the test to deter#ine whether a
position is pri#arily confidential or not(
Held: 6 pri#arily confidential position is one which denotes not only confidence
in the aptitude of the appointee for the duties of the office but primarily close intimacy
which ensures freedom from intercourse without embarrassment or freedom from
misgivings or betrayals of personal trust or confidential matters of state. (De los "antos
. )allare$ 01 Phil. 20/ 31/526)
8nder the pro*i#ity r!le, the occupant of a particular position could be
considered a confidential employee if the predominant reason why he was chosen by
the appointing authority was the latter+s belief that he can share a close intimate
relationship with the occupant which ensures freedom of discussion without fear or
embarrassment or misgivings of possible betrayal of personal trust or confidential
matters of state. .ithal, where the position occupied is more remote from that of the
appointing authority, the element of trust between them is no longer predominant. (!!
v. alas, 2%$ !"A $'$, ;une '0, '00%+
113. Does the Ciil "erice Law conte#plate a reiew of decisions e*onerating
officers or e#ployees fro# ad#inistratie charges(
Held: Cy this ruling, we now e"pressly abandon and overrule e"tant
jurisprudence that 0the phrase Oparty adversely affected by the decision+ refers to the
government employee against whom the administrative case is filed for the purpose of
disciplinary action which may take the form of suspension, demotion in rank or salary,
transfer, removal or dismissal from office1 and not included are 0cases where the penalty
imposed is suspension for not more than thirty >:<? days or fine in an amount not
e"ceeding thirty days salary1 (Paredes . Ciil "erice Co##ission$ 1/2 "C=A 0+$ 05)
or 0when respondent is e"onerated of the charges, there is no occasion for appeal.1
()ende9 . Ciil "erice Co##ission$ 22+ "C=A /65$ /60) In other words, we overrule
prior decisions holding that the Civil )ervice !aw 0does not contemplate a review of
decisions e"onerating officers or employees from administrative charges1 enunciated in
Paredes . Ciil "erice Co##ission (1/2 "C=A 0+)J )ende9 . Ciil "erice
Co##ission (22+ "C=A /65)J )agpale . Ciil "erice Co##ission (215 "C=A 3/0)J
Daarro . Ciil "erice Co##ission and -*port Processing Aone A!thority (226 "C=A
221) and more recently Del Castillo . Ciil "erice Co##ission (231 "C=A 10+). (!!
v. )e-ro .. Dacoycoy, 7.". >o. '398&9, April 20, '000, 1n Banc ()ar-o*+
11+. ,hat is preentie s!spension( Disc!ss its nat!re.
Held: Imposed during the pendency of an administrative investigation,
preventive suspension is not a penalty in itself. It is merely a measure of precaution so
that the employee who is charged may be separated, for obvious reasons, from the
scene of his alleged misfeasance while the same is being investigated. Thus preventive
suspension is distinct from the administrative penalty of removal from office such as the
one mentioned in )ec. ;>d? of P.@. o. ;<K. .hile the former may be imposed on a
respondent during the investigation of the charges against him, the latter is the penalty
which may only be meted upon him at the termination of the investigation or the final
disposition of the case. (BeBa, r. v. !A, 2&% !"A #80, March 3', '002 ("omero*+
69
115. Disc!ss the &inds of preentie s!spension !nder the Ciil "erice Law. ,hen
#ay a ciil serice e#ployee placed !nder preentie s!spension be entitled to
co#pensation(
Held: There are two kinds of preventive suspension of civil service employees
who are charged with offenses punishable by removal or suspension4 >1? preventive
suspension pending inestigation >)ec. 91, Civil )ervice !aw, 2# o. $E$? and >$?
preventive suspension pending appeal if the penalty imposed by the disciplining
authority is suspension or dismissal and, after review, the respondent is e"onerated
>)ection DK, par. D, Civil )ervice !aw, 2# o. $E$?.
Preventive suspension pending inestigation is not a penalty. It is a measure
intended to enable the disciplining authority to investigate charges against respondent
by preventing the latter from intimidating or in any way influencing witnesses against
him. If the investigation is not finished and a decision is not rendered within that period,
the suspension will be lifted and the respondent will automatically be reinstated. If after
investigation respondent is found innocent of the charges and is e"onerated, he should
be reinstated. Fowever, no compensation was due for the period of preventive
suspension pending investigation. The Civil )ervice 6ct of 1E9E >A.6. o. $$L<?
providing for compensation in such a case once the respondent was e"onerated was
revised in 1EK9 and the provision on the payment of salaries during suspension was
deleted.
Cut although it is held that employees who are preventively suspended pending
inestigation are not entitled to the payment of their salaries even if they are e"onerated,
they are entitled to compensation for the period of their suspension pending appeal if
eventually they are found innocent.
Preventive suspension pending inestigation " " " is not a penalty but only a
means of enabling the disciplining authority to conduct an unhampered investigation.
#n the other hand, preventive suspension pending appeal is actually punitive although it
is in effect subse/uently considered illegal if respondent is e"onerated and the
administrative decision finding him guilty is reversed. Fence, he should be reinstated
with full pay for the period of the suspension. (7loria v. !A, 7.". >o. '3'&'2, April 2',
'000, 1n Banc (Men-o8a*+
116. ,hat is the doctrine of forgieness or condonation( Does it apply to pending
cri#inal cases(
Held: 1. 6 public official cannot be removed for administrative misconduct
committed during a prior term, since his re%election to office operates as a condonation
of the officer+s previous misconduct to the e"tent of cutting off the right to remove him
therefor. The foregoing rule, however, finds no application to criminal cases pending
against petitioner. (Aguinal-o v. antos, 2'2 !"A %#8, %%3 ('002*+
$. 6 reelected local official may not be held administratively accountable for
misconduct committed during his prior term of office. The rationale for this holding is that
when the electorate put him back into office, it is presumed that it did so with full
knowledge of his life and character, including his past misconduct. If, armed with such
knowledge, it still reelects him, then such reelection is considered a condonation of his
past misdeeds. (Mayor Alvin B. 7arcia v. 6on. Arturo !. MoBica, et al., 7.". >o.
'30&$3, ept. '&, '000 (Cuisum,ing*+
111. ,hat are the sit!ations coered by the law on nepotis#(
Held: 8nder the definition of nepotism, one is guilty of nepotism if an
appointment is issued in favor of a relative within the third civil degree of consanguinity
or affinity of any of the following4
a? appointing authority3
b? recommending authority3
c? chief of the bureau or office3 and
70
d? person e"ercising immediate supervision over the appointee.
Clearly, there are four situations covered. In the last two mentioned situations, it
is immaterial who the appointing or recommending authority is. To constitute a violation
of the law, it suffices that an appointment is e"tended or issued in favor of a relative
within the third civil degree of consanguinity or affinity of the chief of the bureau or office,
or the person e"ercising immediate supervision over the appointee. (!! v. )e-ro ..
Dacoycoy, 7.". >o. '398&9, April 20, '000, 1n Banc ()ar-o*+
110. Disting!ish :ter#; of office fro# :ten!re; of the inc!#bent.
Held: In the law of public officers, there is a settled distinction between 0term1
and 0tenure.1 0'T(he term of an office must be distinguished from the tenure of the
incumbent. The term means the time during which the officer may claim to hold office as
of right, and fi"es the interval after which the several incumbents shall succeed one
another. The tenure represents the term during which the incumbent actually holds the
office. The term of office is not affected by the hold%over. The tenure may be shorter
than the term for reasons within or beyond the power of the incumbent.1 (5helma ).
7amin-e v. !.A, 7.". >o. '$&339, Dec. '3, 2&&&, 1n Banc ()ar-o*+
11/. Disc!ss the operation of the rotational plan insofar as the ter# of office of the
Chair#an and )e#bers of the Constit!tional Co##issions is concerned.
Held: In =ep!blic . .#perial (/6 Phil. 112 31/556)$ we said that 0the operation of
the rotational plan re/uires two conditions, both indispensable to its workability4 >1? that
the terms of the first three >:? Commissioners should start on a co##on date$ and >$?
that any vacancy due to death, resignation or disability before the e"piration of the term
should only be filled only for the !ne*pired balance of the ter#.;
Conse/uently, the terms of the first Chairmen and Commissioners of the
Constitutional Commissions under the 1E;K Constitution must start on a co##on date$
irrespectie of the ariations in the dates of appoint#ents and 8!alifications of the
appointees$ in order that the e"piration of the first terms of seven, five and three years
should lead to the reg!lar rec!rrence of the twoCyear interal between the e"piration of
the terms.
6pplying the foregoing conditions " " ", we rule that the appropriate starting point
of the ter#s of office of the first appointees to the Constit!tional Co##issions !nder the
1/01 Constit!tion #!st be on >ebr!ary 2$ 1/01$ the date of the adoption of the 1E;K
Constitution. In case of a belated appointment or /ualification, the interval between the
start of the term and the actual /ualification of the appointee must be co!nted against
the latter. (5helma ). 7amin-e v. !.A, 7.". >o. '$&339, Dec. '3, 2&&&, 1n Banc
()ar-o*+
122. ,hat is the holdCoer doctrine( ,hat is its p!rpose(
Held: 1. The concept of holdover when applied to a public officer implies that
the office has a fi"ed term and the incumbent is holding onto the succeeding term. It is
usually provided by law that officers elected or appointed for a fi"ed term shall remain in
office not only for that term but until their successors have been elected and /ualified.
.here this provision is found, the office does not become vacant upon the e"piration of
the term if there is no successor elected and /ualified to assume it, but the present
incumbent will carry over until his successor is elected and /ualified, even though it be
beyond the term fi"ed by law.
6bsent an e"press or implied constitutional or statutory provision to the contrary,
an officer is entitled to stay in office until his successor is appointed or chosen and has
/ualified. The legislative intent of not allowing holdover must be clearly e"pressed or at
least implied in the legislative enactment, otherwise it is reasonable to assume that the
law%making body favors the same.
71
Indeed, the law abhors a vacuum in public offices, and courts generally indulge in
the strong presumption against a legislative intent to create, by statute, a condition which
may result in an e"ecutive or administrative office becoming, for any period of time,
wholly vacant or unoccupied by one lawfully authori-ed to e"ercise its functions. This is
founded on obvious considerations of public policy, for the principle of holdover is
specifically intended to prevent public convenience from suffering because of a vacancy
and to avoid a hiatus in the performance of government functions. (<ecaro8 v.
an-igan,ayan, 3&9 !"A 30%, March 29, '000, 2
n-
Div. (Bellosillo*+
$. The rule is settled that unless 0holding over be e"pressly or impliedly
prohibited, the incumbent may continue to hold over until someone else is elected and
/ualified to assume the office.1 This rule is demanded by the 0most obvious
re/uirements of public policy, for without it there must fre/uently be cases where, from a
failure to elect or a refusal or neglect to /ualify, the office would be vacant and the public
service entirely suspended.1 #therwise stated, the purpose is to prevent a hiatus in the
government pending the time when the successor may be chosen and inducted into
office. (7alarosa v. Valencia, 22% !"A %28, >ov. '', '003, 1n Banc (Davi-e, ;r.*+
121. ,hat is resignation( ,hat are the re8!isites of a alid resignation(
Held: 1. It is the act of giving up or the act of an officer by which he declines his
office and renounces the further right to use it. It is an e"pression of the incumbent in
some form, e"press or implied, of the intention to surrender, renounce, and relin/uish
the office and the acceptance by competent and lawful authority. To constitute a
complete and operative resignation from public office, there must be4 >a? an intention to
relin/uish a part of the term3 >b? an act of relin/uishment3 and >c? an acceptance by the
proper authority. The last one is re/uired by reason of 6rticle $:; of the Aevised Penal
Code. (angguniang Bayan o/ an An-res, !atan-uanes v. !A, 28$ !"A 2%#,
;an. '#, '008+
$. Aesignation " " " is a factual /uestion and its ele#ents are beyond /uibble4
there #!st be an intent to resign and the intent #!st be co!pled by acts of
relin8!ish#ent (Bon9ales . Kernande9$ 2 "C=A 220 31/616). The validity of a
resignation is not governed by any formal re/uirement as to form. It can be oral. It can
be written. It can be e"press. It can be implied. 6s long as the resignation is clear, it
must be given legal effect. (1stra-a v. Desierto, 7.". >os. '$#%'&-'9, March 2, 2&&',
en Banc ()uno*+
122. ,hat is abandon#ent of an office( ,hat are its re8!isites( Kow is it
disting!ished fro# resignation(
Held: Abandon#ent of an office has been defined as the voluntary
relin/uishment of an office by the holder, with the intention of terminating his possession
and control thereof. Indeed, abandonment of office is a species of resignation3 while
resignation in general is a formal relin/uishment, abandonment is a voluntary
relin/uishment through nonuser.
6bandonment springs from and is accompanied by deliberation and freedom of
choice. Its concomitant effect is that the former holder of an office can no longer legally
repossess it even by forcible reoccupancy.
Clear intention to abandon should be manifested by the officer concerned. )uch
intention may be e"press or inferred from his own conduct. Thus, the failure to perform
the duties pertaining to the office must be with the officer+s actual or imputed intention to
abandon and relin/uish the office. 6bandonment of an office is not wholly a matter of
intention3 it results from a complete abandonment of duties of such continuance that the
law will infer a relin/uishment. Therefore, there are two essential elements of
abandonment3 first$ an intention to abandon and, second$ an overt or 0e"ternal1 act by
which the intention is carried into effect. (angguniang Bayan o/ an An-res,
!atan-uanes v. !A, 28$ !"A 2%#, ;an. '#, '008+
72
123. ,hen #ay !nconsented transfers be considered anathe#a to sec!rity of ten!re(
Held: 6s held in "ta. )aria . Lope9 (31 "C=A 631$ 653 citing .bane9 .
Co##ission on -lections$ LC26550$ April 21$ 1/61$ 1/ "C=A 1222$ 1212 and "ection 12
of the 7a* Code).
=" " " the rule that outlaws unconsented transfers as anathema to
security of tenure applies only to an officer who is appointed % not merely
assigned % to a particular station. )uch a rule does not pr'o(scribe a transfer
carried out under a specific statute that empowers the head of an agency to
periodically reassign the employees and officers in order to improve the service
of the agency. " " "=
The guarantee of security of tenure under the Constitution is not a guarantee of
perpetual employment. It only means that an employee cannot be dismissed >or
transferred? from the service for causes other than those provided by law and after due
process is accorded the employee. .hat it seeks to prevent is capricious e"ercise of
the power to dismiss. Cut where it is the law%making authority itself which furnishes the
ground for the transfer of a class of employees, no such capriciousness can be raised
for so long as the remedy proposed to cure a perceived evil is germane to the purposes
of the law. (Agripino A. De 7u8man, ;r., et al. v. !.M1<1!, 7.". >o. '20''8, ;uly
'0, 2&&&, 1n Banc ()urisima*+
12+. Disc!ss Abolition of Gffice(
Held: The creation and abolition of public offices is primarily a legislative
function. It is acknowledged that Congress may abolish any office it creates without
impairing the officerJs right to continue in the position held and that such power may be
e"ercised for various reasons, such as the lack of funds or in the interest of economy.
Fowever, in order for the abolition to be valid, it must be made in good faith, not for
political or personal reasons, or in order to circumvent the constitutional security of
tenure of civil service employees.
6n abolition of office connotes an intention to do away with such office wholly and
permanently, as the word =abolished= denotes. .here one office is abolished and
replaced with another office vested with similar functions, the abolition is a legal nullity.
Thus, in ?.P. 4oard of =egents . =as!l (222 "C=A 605 31//16) we said4
It is true that a valid and bona fide abolition of an office denies to the
incumbent the right to security of tenure (De la Llana . Alba$ 112 "C=A 2/+
31/026). Fowever, in this case, the renaming and restructuring of the P*F and
its component units cannot give rise to a valid and bona fide abolition of the
position of P*F @irector. This is because where the abolished office and the
offices created in its place have similar functions, the abolition lacks good faith
(Eose L. B!errero . Kon. Antonio H. Ari9abal$ B.=. Do. 01/20$ E!ne +$ 1//2$
106 "C=A 120 31//26). .e hereby apply the principle enunciated in Ce9ar A.
Dario . Kon. "alador ). )ison (116 "C=A 0+ 31/0/6) that abolition which
merely changes the nomenclature of positions is invalid and does not result in
the removal of the incumbent.
The above notwithstanding, and assuming that the abolition of the
position of the P*F @irector and the creation of a 8P%P*F 5edical Center
@irector are valid, the removal of the incumbent is still not justified for the reason
that the duties and functions of the two positions are basically the same.
This was also our ruling in B!errero . Ari9abal (106 "C=A 120 31//26)$ wherein
we declared that the substantial identity in the functions between the two offices was
indicia of bad faith in the removal of petitioner pursuant to a reorgani-ation. (Ale?is !.
!anoni8a-o, et al. v. 6on. Ale?an-er ). Aguirre, et al., 7.". >o. '33'32, ;an. 29,
2&&&, 1n Banc (7on8aga-"eyes*+
125. ,hat is reorgani9ation( ,hen is it alid( ,hen is it inalid(
73
Held: 1. Aeorgani-ation takes place when there is an alteration of the e"isting
structure of government offices or units therein, including the lines of control, authority
and responsibility between them. It involves a reduction of personnel, consolidation of
offices, or abolition thereof by reason of economy or redundancy of functions. aturally,
it may result in the loss of oneJs position through removal or abolition of an office.
Fowever, for a reorgani-ation to be valid, it must also pass the test of good faith, laid
down in Dario . )ison (116 "C=A 0+ 31/0/6)4
" " " 6s a general rule, a reorgani-ation is carried out in =good faith= if it is
for the purpose of economy or to make bureaucracy more efficient. In that event,
no dismissal >in case of dismissal? or separation actually occurs because the
position itself ceases to e"ist. 6nd in that case, security of tenure would not be a
Chinese wall. Ce that as it may, if the =abolition= which is nothing else but a
separation or removal, is done for political reasons or purposely to defeat
security of tenure, or otherwise not in good faith, no valid =abolition= takes place
and whatever =abolition= is done, is void ab initio. There is an invalid =abolition=
as where there is merely a change of nomenclature of positions, or where claims
of economy are belied by the e"istence of ample funds.
(Ale?is !. !anoni8a-o, et al. v. 6on. Ale?an-er ). Aguirre, et al., 7.". >o. '33'32,
;an. 29, 2&&&, 1n Banc (7on8aga-"eyes*+
$. .hile the President+s power to reorgani-e can not be denied, this does not
mean however that the reorgani-ation itself is properly made in accordance with law.
.ell%settled is the rule that reorgani-ation is regarded as valid provided it is pursued in
good faith. Thus, in Dario . )ison, this Court has had the occasion to clarify that4
06s a general rule, a reorgani-ation is carried out in Ogood faith+ if it is for the
purpose of economy or to make the bureaucracy more efficient. In that event no
dismissal or separation actually occurs because the position itself ceases to
e"ist. 6nd in that case the security of tenure would not be a Chinese wall. Ce
that as it may, if the abolition which is nothing else but a separation or removal, is
done for political reasons or purposely to defeat security of tenure, or otherwise
not in good faith, no valid abolition takes place and whatever abolition done is
void ab initio. There is an invalid abolition as where there is merely a change of
nomenclature of positions or where claims of economy are belied by the
e"istence of ample funds.1 (116 "C=A 0+)
(<arin v. 1?ecutive ecretary, 28& !"A %'3, .ct. '#, '00%+
126. ,hat are the circ!#stances eidencing bad faith in the re#oal of e#ployees as
a res!lt of reorgani9ation and which #ay gie rise to a clai# for reinstate#ent or
reappoint#ent)(
Held:
'+ .here there is a significant increase in the number of positions in the new
staffing pattern of the department or agency concerned3
2+ .here an office is abolished and another performing substantially the same
functions is created3
3+ .here incumbents are replaced by those less /ualified in terms of status of
appointment, performance and merit3
$+ .here there is a reclassification of offices in the department or agency
concerned and the reclassified offices perform substantially the same
functions as the original offices3
9+ .here the removal violates the order of separation provided in )ection :
hereof.
(ec. 2, ".A. >o. ##9#I <arin v. 1?ecutive ecretary, 28& !"A %'3, .ct. '#, '00%+
ELECTION LAWS
74
121. Disc!ss the reason behind the principle of ballot secrecy. )ay the cond!ct of
e*it polls transgress the sanctity and the secrecy of the ballot to %!stify its
prohibition(
Held: The reason behind the principle of ballot secrecy is to avoid vote buying
through voter identification. Thus, voters are prohibited from e"hibiting the contents of
their official ballots to other persons, from making copies thereof, or from putting
distinguishing marks thereon so as to be identified. 6lso proscribed is finding out the
contents of the ballots cast by particular voters or disclosing those of disabled or illiterate
voters who have been assisted. Clearly, what is forbidden is the association of voters
with their respective votes, for the purpose of assuring that the votes have been cast in
accordance with the instructions of a third party. This result cannot, however, be
achieved merely through the voters+ verbal and confidential disclosure to a pollster of
whom they have voted for.
In e"it polls, the contents of the official ballot are not actually e"posed.
,urthermore, the revelation of whom an elector has voted for is not compulsory, but
voluntary. Hoters may also choose not to reveal their identities. Indeed, narrowly
tailored countermeasures may be prescribed by the Comelec, so as to minimi-e or
suppress incidental problems in the conduct of e"it polls, without transgressing the
fundamental rights of our people. (AB-!B> Broa-casting !orporation v.
!.M1<1!, 7.". >o. '33$8#, ;an. 28, 2&&&, 1n Banc ()angani,an*+
120. Disc!ss the #eaning and p!rpose of residency re8!ire#ent in -lection Law.
Held: 1. The meaning and purpose of the residency re/uirement were
e"plained recently in our decision in A8!ino . Co#elec (2+0 "C=A +22$ +22C+21
31//56)$ as follows4
& " " 'T(he place 0where a party actually or constructively has his
permanent home,1 where he, no matter where he may be found at any given
time, eventually intends to return and remain, i.e.$ his domicile, is that to which
the Constitution refers when it speaks of residence for the purposes of election
law. The manifest purpose of this deviation from the usual conceptions of
residency in law as e"plained in Ballego . Hera is 0to e"clude strangers or
newcomers unfamiliar with the conditions and needs of the community1 from
taking advantage of favorable circumstances e"isting in that community for
electoral gain. .hile there is nothing wrong with the practice of establishing
residence in a given area for meeting election law re/uirements, this nonetheless
defeats the essence of representation, which is to place through the assent of
voters those most cogni-ant and sensitive to the needs of a particular district, if a
candidate falls short of the period of residency mandated by law for him to
/ualify. That purpose could be obviously best met by individuals who have either
had actual residence in the area for a given period or who have been domiciled
in the same area either by origin or by choice.
(Marcita Mam,a )ere8 v. !.M1<1!, 7.". >o. '330$$, .ct. 28, '000, 1n Banc
(Men-o8a*+
$. The Constitution and the law re/uires residence as a /ualification for seeking
and holding elective public office, in order to give candidates the opportunity to be
familiar with the needs, difficulties, aspirations, potentials for growth and all matters vital
to the welfare of their constituencies3 likewise, it enables the electorate to evaluate the
office seekers+ /ualifications and fitness for the job they aspire for. Inasmuch as Hicente
I. 2mano has proven that he, together with his family, >1? had actually resided in a
house he bought in 1EK: in Cagayan de #ro City3 >$? had actually held office there
during his three terms as provincial governor of 5isamis #riental, the provincial capitol
being located therein3 and >:? has registered as voter in the city during the period
re/uired by law, he could not be deemed 0a stranger or newcomer1 when he ran for and
was overwhelmingly voted as city mayor. 2lection laws must be liberally construed to
give effect to the popular mandate. (5orayno, r. v. !.M1<1!, 33% !"A 9%$, Aug.
0, 2&&&, 1n Banc ()angani,an*+
75
:. *enerally, in re/uiring candidates to have a minimum period of residence in
the area in which they seek to be elected, the Constitution or the law intends to prevent
the possibility of a 0stranger or newcomer unac/uainted with the conditions and needs of
a community and not identified with the latter from 'seeking( an elective office to serve
that community.1 )uch provision is aimed at e"cluding outsiders 0from taking advantage
of favorable circumstances e"isting in that community for electoral gain.1 2stablishing
residence in a community merely to meet an election law re/uirement defeats the
purpose of representation4 to elect through the assent of voters those most cogni-ant
and sensitive to the needs of the community. This purpose is 0best met by individuals
who have either had actual residence in the area for a given period or who have been
domiciled in the same area either by origin or by choice.1 (5orayno, r. v. !.M1<1!,
33% !"A 9%$, Aug. 0, 2&&&, 1n Banc ()angani,an*+
12/. Does the fact that a person is registered as a oter in one district proof that he is
not do#iciled in another district(
Held: The fact that a person is registered as a voter in one district is not proof
that he is not domiciled in another district. Thus, in >aypon . N!irino (/6 Phil. 2/+
31/5+6)$ this Court held that the registration of a voter in a place other than his residence
of origin is not sufficient to consider him to have abandoned or lost his residence.
(Marcita Mam,a )ere8 v. !.M1<1!, 7.". >o. '330$$, .ct. 28, '000, 1n Banc
(Men-o8a*+
132. ,hat is the Lone Candidate Law( ,hat are its salient proisions(
An&wer: The !one Candidate !aw is "epu,lic Act >o. 8209$ enacted on E!ne
6$ 1//1. )ection $ thereof provides that 08pon the e"piration of the deadline for the
filing of the certificate of candidacy in a special election called to fill a vacancy in an
elective position other than for President and Hice%President, when there is only one >1?
/ualified candidate for such position, the lone candidate shall be proclaimed elected to
the position by proper proclaiming body of the Commission on 2lections without holding
the special election upon certification by the Commission on 2lections that he is the only
candidate for the office and is thereby deemed elected.1
)ection : thereof provides that 0the lone candidate so proclaimed shall assume
office not earlier than the scheduled election day, in the absence of any lawful ground to
deny due course or cancel the certificate of candidacy in order to prevent such
proclamation, as provided for under )ections LE and K; of Catas Pambansa Cilang ;;1
also known as the #mnibus 2lection Code.1
131. ,ho are dis8!alified to r!n in a special election !nder the Lone Candidate Law(
An&wer: )ection D of the !one Candidate !aw provides that 0In addition to the
dis/ualifications mentioned in )ections 1$ and L; of the #mnibus 2lection Code and
)ection D< of Aepublic 6ct o. K1L<, otherwise known as the !ocal *overnment Code,
whenever the evidence of guilt is strong, the following persons are dis/ualified to run in a
special election called to fill the vacancy in an elective office, to wit4
a? 6ny elective official who has resigned from his office by accepting an
appointive office or for whatever reason which he previously occupied but
has caused to become vacant due to his resignation3 and
b? 6ny person who, directly or indirectly, coerces, bribes, threatens, harasses,
intimidates or actually causes, inflicts or produces any violence, injury,
punishment, torture, damage, loss or disadvantage to any person or persons
aspiring to become a candidate or that of the immediate member of his
family, his honor or property that is meant to eliminate all other potential
candidate.1
132. ,hat is the p!rpose of the law in re8!iring the filing of certificate of candidacy
and in fi*ing the ti#e li#it therefor(
76
Held: The evident purpose of the law in re/uiring the filing of certificate of
candidacy and in fi"ing the time limit therefor are4 >a? to enable the voters to know, at
least si"ty days before the regular election, the candidates among whom they are to
make the choice, and >b? to avoid confusion and inconvenience in the tabulation of the
votes cast. ,or if the law did not confine the choice or election by the voters to the duly
registered candidates, there might be as many persons voted for as there are voters,
and votes might be cast even for unknown or fictitious persons as a mark to identify the
votes in favor of a candidate for another office in the same election. (Miran-a v. A,aya,
7.". >o. '3#39', ;uly 28, '000+
133. )ay a dis8!alified candidate and whose certificate of candidacy was denied d!e
co!rse andOor canceled by the Co#elec be alidly s!bstit!ted(
Held: 2ven on the most basic and fundamental principles, it is readily
understood that the concept of a substitute presupposes the e"istence of the person to
be substituted, for how can a person take the place of somebody who does not e"ist or
who never was. The Court has no other choice but to rule that in all instances
enumerated in )ection KK of the #mnibus 2lection Code, the e"istence of a valid
certificate of candidacy seasonably filed is a re/uisite sine 8!a non.
6ll told, a dis/ualified candidate may only be substituted if he had a valid
certificate of candidacy in the first place because, if the dis/ualified candidate did not
have a valid and seasonably filed certificate of candidacy, he is and was not a candidate
at all. If a person was not a candidate, he cannot be substituted under )ection KK of the
Code. (Miran-a v. A,aya, 7.". >o. '3#39', ;uly 28, '000, en Banc (Melo*+
13+. "ho!ld the otes cast for the s!bstit!ted candidate be considered otes for the
s!bstit!te candidate(
An&wer: "epu,lic Act >o. 0&&#, otherwise &nown as the >air -lection Act$
provides in )ection 1$ thereof4 0In case of valid substitutions after the official ballots
have been printed, the votes cast for the substituted candidates shall be considered as
stray votes but shall not invalidate the whole ballot. ,or this purpose, the official ballots
shall provide spaces where the voters may write the name of the substitute candidates if
they are voting for the latter4 Provided, however, That if the substitute candidate is of the
same family name, this provision shall not apply.1
135. ,hat is the effect of the filing of certificate of candidacy by electie officials(
An&wer: !.M1<1! "esolution >o. 3#3#$ pro#!lgated )arch 1$ 2221$
i#ple#enting the >air -lection Act (=.A. Do. /226) provides in )ection $L thereof4 0any
elective official, whether national or local, who has filed a certificate of candidacy for the
same or any other office shall not be considered resigned from his office.1
ote that )ection LK of the #mnibus 2lection Code and the first proviso in the
third paragraph of )ection 11 of Aepublic 6ct o. ;D:L which modified said )ection LK,
were e"pressly repealed and rendered ineffective, respectively, by )ection 1D
>Aepealing Clause? of The ,air 2lection 6ct >A.6. o. E<<L?.
136. ,hat &ind of :#aterial #isrepresentation; is conte#plated by "ection 10 of the
G#nib!s -lection Code as a gro!nd for dis8!alification of a candidate( Does it
incl!de the !se of s!rna#e(
Held: Therefore, it may be concluded that the material misrepresentation
contemplated by )ection K; of the >#mnibus 2lection? Code refers to /ualifications for
elective office. This conclusion is strengthened by the fact that the conse/uences
imposed upon a candidate guilty of having made a false representation in his certificate
of candidacy are grave G to prevent the candidate from running or, if elected, from
serving, or to prosecute him for violation of the election laws. It could not have been the
intention of the law to deprive a person of such a basic and substantial political right to
be voted for a public office upon just any innocuous mistake.
77
'6(side from the re/uirement of materiality, a false representation under )ection
K; must consist of a 0deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which
would otherwise render a candidate ineligible.1 In other words, it must be made with an
intention to deceive the electorate as to one+s /ualifications for public office. The use of
a surname, when not intended to mislead or deceive the public as to one+s identity, is not
within the scope of the provision. (Victorino alce-o II v. !.M1<1!, 7.". >o.
'3988#, Aug. '#, '000, 1n Banc (7on8aga-"eyes*+
131. ,ho has a!thority to declare fail!re of elections and the calling of special
election( ,hat are the three instances where a fail!re of election #ay be declared(
Held: The C#52!2C+s authority to declare failure of elections is provided in our
election laws. )ection D of A6 K1LL provides that the Comelec sitting en banc by a
majority vote of its members may decide, among others, the declaration of failure of
election and the calling of special election as provided in )ection L of the #mnibus
2lection Code. & " "
There are three instances where a failure of election may be declared, namely,
>a? the election in any polling place has not been held on the date fi"ed on account of
force #a%e!re$ violence, terrorism, fraud or other analogous causes3 >b? the election in
any polling place has been suspended before the hour fi"ed by law for the closing of the
voting on account of force #a%e!re$ violence, terrorism, fraud or other analogous causes3
or >c? after the voting and during the preparation and transmission of the election returns
or in the custody or canvass thereof, such election results in a failure to elect on account
of force #a%e!re$ violence, terrorism, fraud or other analogous causes. In these
instances, there is a resulting failure to elect. This is obvious in the first two scenarios,
where the election was not held and where the election was suspended. 6s to the third
scenario, where the preparation and the transmission of the election returns give rise to
the conse/uence of failure to elect, it must " " ", be interpreted to mean that nobody
emerged as a winner. (Banaga, ;r. v. !.M1<1!, 33# !"A %&', ;uly 3', 2&&&, 1n
Banc (Cuisum,ing*+
130. ,hat are the two conditions that #!st conc!r before the CG)-L-C can act on a
erified petition see&ing to declare a afail!re of election(
Held: Cefore the C#52!2C can act on a verified petition seeking to declare a
failure of election two conditions must concur, namely4 >1? no voting took place in the
precinct or precincts on the date fi"ed by law, or even if there was voting, the election
resulted in a failure to elect3 and >$? the votes not cast would have affected the result of
the election. ote that the cause of such failure of election could only be any of the
following4 force #a%e!re$ violence, terrorism, fraud or other analogous causes.
Thus, in Banaga, ;r. v. !.M1<1! (336 "C=A 121$ E!ly 31$ 2222$ -n 4anc
3N!is!#bing6), the )C held4
0.e have painstakingly e"amined the petition filed by petitioner Canaga
before the Comelec. Cut we found that petitioner did not allege at all that elections
were either not held or suspended. either did he aver that although there was
voting, nobody was elected. #n the contrary, he conceded that an election took
place for the office of vice%mayor of Parana/ue City, and that private respondent
was, in fact, proclaimed elected to that post. .hile petitioner contends that the
election was tainted with widespread anomalies, it must be noted that to warrant a
declaration of failure of election the commission of fraud must be such that it
prevented or suspended the holding of an election, or marred fatally the preparation
and transmission, custody and canvass of the election returns. These essential facts
ought to have been alleged clearly by the petitioner below, but he did not.1
13/. Cite instances when Co#elec #ay or #ay not alidly declare fail!re of elections.
Held: In )it#!g . CG)-L-C (232 "C=A 5+ 31//+6)$ petitioner instituted with
the C#52!2C an action to declare fail!re of election in forty%nine precincts where less
than a /uarter of the electorate were able to cast their votes. Fe also lodged an election
78
protest with the Aegional Trial Court disputing the result of the election in all precincts in
his municipality. The Comelec denied #ot! proprio and without due notice and hearing
the petition to declare failure of election despite petitioner+s argument that he has
meritorious grounds in support thereto, that is, massive disenfranchisement of voters
due to terrorism. #n review, we ruled that the Comelec did not gravely abuse its
discretion in denying the petition. It was not proven that no actual voting took place.
either was it shown that even if there was voting, the results thereon would be
tantamount to failure to elect. Considering that there is no concurrence of the conditions
seeking to declare failure of election, there is no longer need to receive evidence on
alleged election irregularities.
In "ardea . CG)-L-C (225 "C=A 31+ 31//36)$ all election materials and
paraphernalia with the municipal board of canvassers were destroyed by the
sympathi-ers of the losing mayoralty candidate. The board then decided to use the
copies of election returns furnished to the municipal trial court. Petitioner therein filed a
petition to stop the proceedings of the board of canvassers on the ground that it had no
authority to use said election returns obtained from the municipal trial court. The petition
was denied. e"t, he filed a petition assailing the composition of the board of
canvassers. @espite that petition, the board of canvassers proclaimed the winning
candidates. !ater on, petitioner filed a petition to declare a fail!re of election alleging
that the attendant facts would justify declaration of such failure. #n review, we ruled that
petitioner+s first two actions involved pre%proclamation controversies which can no longer
be entertained after the winning candidates have been proclaimed. Aegarding the
petition to declare a failure of election, we held that the destruction and loss of copies of
election returns intended for the municipal board of canvassers on account of violence is
not one of the causes that would warrant the declaration of failure of election. The
reason is that voting actually took place as scheduled and other valid election returns
still e"isted. 5oreover, the destruction or loss did not affect the result of the election.
.e also declared that there is failure of elections only when the will of the electorate has
been muted and cannot be ascertained. If the will of the people is determinable, the
same must as far as possible be respected.
& " "
In Loong . CG)-L-C (251 "C=A 1 31//66)$ the petition for annulment of
election results or to declare failure of elections in Parang, )ulu, on the ground of
statistical improbability and massive fraud was granted by the C#52!2C. 2ven before
the technical e"amination of election documents was conducted, the Comelec already
observed badges of fraud just by looking at the election results in Parang. evertheless,
the Comelec dismissed the petition for annulment of election results or to declare failure
of elections in the municipalities of Tapul, Panglima 2stino, Pata, )iasi and Ralinggalang
Calauag. The C#52!2C dismissed the latter action on ground of untimeliness of the
petition, despite a finding that the same badges of fraud evident from the results of the
election based on the certificates of canvass of votes in Parang, are also evident in the
election results of the five mentioned municipalities. .e ruled that Comelec committed
grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the petition as there is no law which provides for
a reglementary period to file annulment of elections when there is yet no proclamation.
7he election res!lted in a fail!re to elect on acco!nt of fra!d. 6ccordingly, we ordered
the Comelec to reinstate the aforesaid petition. Those circumstances, however, are not
present in this case, so that reliance on Loong by petitioner Canaga is misplaced.
(Banaga, ;r. v. !.M1<1!, 33# !"A %&', ;uly 3', 2&&&, 1n Banc (Cuisum,ing*+
1+2. .s a petition to declare fail!re of election different fro# a petition to ann!l the
election res!lts(
Held: 6 prayer to declare failure of elections and a prayer to annul the election
results " " " are actually of the same nature. .hether an action is for declaration of
failure of elections or for annulment of election results, based on allegations of fraud,
terrorism, violence or analogous, the #mnibus 2lection Code denominates them
similarly. (Banaga, ;r. v. !.M1<1!, 33# !"A %&', ;uly 3', 2&&&, 1n Banc
(Cuisum,ing*+
79
1+1. ,hat conditions #!st conc!r before the Co#elec can act on a erified petition
see&ing to declare a fail!re of election( .s low t!rnCo!t of oters eno!gh basis to
grant the petition(
Held: Cefore C#52!2C can act on a verified petition seeking to declare a
failure of election, two >$? conditions must concur4 first$ no voting has taken place in the
precinct or precincts on the date fi"ed by law or, even if there was voting, the election
nevertheless results in failure to elect3 and, second$ the votes not cast would affect the
result of the election.
There can be failure of election in a political unit only if the will of the majority has
been defiled and cannot be ascertained. Cut, if it can be determined, it must be
accorded respect. 6fter all, there is no provision in our election laws which re/uires that
a majority of registered voters must cast their votes. 6ll the law re/uires is that a
winning candidate must be elected by a plurality of valid votes, regardless of the actual
number of ballots cast. Thus, even if less than $9M of the electorate in the /uestioned
precincts cast their votes, the same must still be respected. (Mitmug v. !.M1<1!,
23& !"A 9$, :e,. '&, '00$, 1n Banc (Bellosillo*+
1+2. Disting!ish a petition to declare fail!re of elections fro# an election protest.
Held: .hile petitioner may have intended to institute an election protest by
praying that said action may also be considered an election protest, in our view,
petitioner+s action is a petition to declare a failure of elections or annul election results. It
is not an election protest.
,irst, his petition before the Comelec was instituted pursuant to )ection D of
Aepublic 6ct o. K1LL in relation to )ection L of the #mnibus 2lection Code. )ection D
of A6 K1LL refers to :postpone#ent$ fail!re of election and special elections; while
)ection L of the #mnibus 2lection Code relates to :fail!re of election.; It is simply
captioned as :Petition to Declare >ail!re of -lections andOor >or Ann!l#ent of
-lections.;
)econd, an election protest is an ordinary action while a petition to declare a
failure of elections is a special action under the 1EE: Comelec Aules of Procedure as
amended. 6n election protest is governed by Aule $< on ordinary actions, while a
petition to declare failure of elections is covered by Aule $L under special actions.
In this case, petitioner filed his petition as a special action and paid the
corresponding fee therefor. Thus, the petition was docketed as )P6%E;%:;:. This
conforms to petitioner+s categori-ation of his petition as one to declare a failure of
elections or annul election results. In contrast, an election protest is assigned a docket
number starting with 02PC,1 meaning election protest case.
Third, petitioner did not comply with the re/uirements for filing an election
protest. Fe failed to pay the re/uired filing fee and cash deposits for an election protest.
,ailure to pay filing fees will not vest the election tribunal jurisdiction over the case.
)uch procedural lapse on the part of a petitioner would clearly warrant the outright
dismissal of his action.
,ourth, an en banc decision of Comelec in an ordinary action becomes final and
e"ecutory after thirty >:<? days from its promulgation, while an en banc decision in a
special action becomes final and e"ecutory after five >9? days from promulgation, unless
restrained by the )upreme Court (Co#elec =!les of Proced!re$ =!le 10$ "ection 13 3a6$
3b6). ,or that reason, a petition cannot be treated as both an election protest and a
petition to declare failure of elections.
,ifth, the allegations in the petition decisively determine its nature. Petitioner
alleged that the local elections for the office of vice%mayor in Parana/ue City held on
5ay 11, 1EE;, denigrates the true will of the people as it was marred with widespread
anomalies on account of vote buying, flying voters and glaring discrepancies in the
80
election returns. Fe averred that those incidents warrant the declaration of a failure of
elections.
*iven these circumstances, public respondent cannot be said to have gravely
erred in treating petitioner+s action as a petition to declare failure of elections or to annul
election results. (Banaga, ;r. v. !.M1<1!, 33# !"A %&', ;uly 3', 2&&&, 1n Banc
(Cuisum,ing*+
1+3. ,hat are preCprocla#ation cases$ and e*ceptions thereto( ,hat Co!rt has
%!risdiction oer preCprocla#ation cases(
Held: 6s a general r!le, candidates and registered political parties involved in an
election are allowed to file pre%proclamation cases before the Comelec. Pre%
proclamation cases refer to any /uestion pertaining to or affecting the proceedings of the
board of canvassers which may be raised by any candidate or by any registered political
party or coalition of political parties before the board or directly with the Commission, or
any matter raised under )ections $::, $:D, $:9 and $:L in relation to the preparation,
transmission, receipt, custody and appreciation of election returns ("ection 2+1$
G#nib!s -lection Code). The Comelec has e"clusive jurisdiction over all pre%
proclamation controversies ("ection 2+2$ s!pra). 6s an e*ception, however, to the
general rule, )ection 19 of Aepublic 6ct K1LL prohibits candidates in the presidential,
vice%presidential, senatorial and congressional elections from filing pre%proclamation
cases. It states4
0)ec. 19. PreCProcla#ation Cases Dot Allowed in -lections for President$
HiceCPresident$ "enator$ and )e#bers of the Ko!se of =epresentaties. % ,or
purposes of the elections for President, Hice%President, )enator and 5ember of
the Fouse of Aepresentatives, no pre%proclamation cases shall be allowed on
matters relating to the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and
appreciation of election returns or the certificates of canvass, as the case may
be. Fowever, this does not preclude the authority of the appropriate canvassing
body #ot! proprio or upon written complaint of an interested person to correct
manifest errors in the certificate of canvass or election returns before it.1
The prohibition aims to avoid delay in the proclamation of the winner in the election,
which delay might result in a vacuum in these sensitive posts. The law, nonetheless,
provides an e*ception to the e*ception. The second sentence of )ection 19 allows the
filing of petitions for correction of #anifest errors in the certificate of canvass or election
returns even in elections for president, vice%president and members of the Fouse of
Aepresentatives for the si#ple reason that the correction of manifest error will not
prolong the process of canvassing nor delay the proclamation of the winner in the
election. The rule is consistent with and complements the authority of the Comelec
under the Constitution to =enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the
conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall= ("ection 2316$ Article
.<CC$ 1/01 Constit!tion) and its power to =decide, e"cept those involving the right to
vote, all /uestions affecting elections.= ("ection 2336$ Article .<CC$ s!pra) (:e-erico .
an-oval v. !.M1<1!, 7.". >o. '338$2, ;an. 2#, 2&&& ()uno*+
1++. ,ho has a!thority to r!le on petitions for correction of #anifest error in the
certificate of canass or election ret!rns(
Held: The authority to rule on petitions for correction of manifest error is vested
in the Co#elec en banc. )ection K of Aule $K of the 1EE: C#52!2C Aules of
Procedure >took effect on ,ebruary 19, 1EE:? provides that if the error is discovered
before proclamation, the board of canvassers may #ot! proprio, or upon verified petition
by any candidate, political party, organi-ation or coalition of political parties, after due
notice and hearing, correct the errors committed. The aggrieved party may appeal the
decision of the board to the Commission and said appeal shall be heard and decided by
the Commission en banc. )ection 9, however, of the same rule states that a petition for
correction of manifest error may be filed directly with the Commission en banc provided
that such errors could not have been discovered during the canvassing despite the
81
e"ercise of due diligence and proclamation of the winning candidate had already been
made. (:e-erico . an-oval v. !.M1<1!, 7.". >o. '338$2, ;an. 2#, 2&&& ()uno*+
1+5. Disting!ish -lection Protest fro# Petition for N!o ,arranto.
Held: In "a#ad . CG)-L-C$ we e"plained that a petition for 8!o warranto
under the #mnibus 2lection Code raises in issue the disloyalty or ineligibility of the
winning candidate. It is a proceeding to unseat the respondent from office but not
necessarily to install the petitioner in his place. 6n election protest is a contest between
the defeated and winning candidates on the ground of frauds or irregularities in the
casting and counting of the ballots, or in the preparation of the returns. It raises the
/uestion of who actually obtained the plurality of the legal votes and therefore is entitled
to hold the office. (Dumayas, ;r. v. !.M1<1!, 7.". >os. '$'092-93, April 2&, 2&&',
1n Banc (Cuisum,ing*+

1+6. ,hat is a co!nterCprotest( ,hen sho!ld it be filed(
Held: 8nder the Comelec Aules of Procedure, the protestee may incorporate in
his answer a counter%protest. It has been said that a counter%protest is tantamount to a
counterclaim in a civil action and may be presented as a part of the answer within the
time he is re/uired to answer the protest, i.e.$ within five >9? days upon receipt of the
protest, unless a motion for e"tension is granted, in which case it must be filed before
the e"piration of the e"tended time.
6s early as in the case of Arrieta . =odrig!e9 (51 Phil. 111)$ the )C had firmly
settled the rule that the counter%protest must be filed within the period provided by law,
otherwise, the forum loses its jurisdiction to entertain the belatedly filed counter%protest.
(Aho v. !.M1<1!, 2%0 !"A $#3, ept. 29, '00%, 1n Banc (5orres*+
1+1. ,hat is the effect of death of a party in an election protest( "ho!ld it warrant the
dis#issal of the protest(
Held: 6n election protest involves both the private interests of the rival
candidates and the public interest in the final determination of the real choice of the
electorate, and for this reason, an election contest necessarily survives the death of the
protestant or the protestee. It is true that a public office is personal to the public officer
and is not a property transmissible to his heirs upon death, thus, upon the death of the
incumbent, no heir of his may be allowed to continue holding his office in his place. Cut
while the right to a public office is personal and e"clusive to the public officer, an election
protest is not purely personal and e"clusive to the protestant or to the protestee such
that after the death of either would oust the court of all authority to continue the protest
proceedings. 6n election contest, after all, involves not merely conflicting private
aspirations but is imbued with paramount public interests. The death of the protestant
neither constitutes a ground for the dismissal of the contest nor ousts the trial court of its
jurisdiction to decide the election contest. (De !astro v. !.M1<1!, 2#% !"A 8&#,
:e,. %, '00%+
1+0. Does the fact that one or a few candidates in an election got 9ero otes in one or
a few precincts ade8!ately s!pport a finding that the election ret!rns are statistically
i#probable(
Held: ,rom e"periences in past elections, it is possible for one candidate or
even a few candidates to get -ero votes in one or a few precincts.
)tanding alone and without more, the bare fact that a candidate for public office
received -ero votes in one or two precincts can not ade/uately support a finding that the
subject election returns are statistically improbable. 6 no%vote for a particular candidate
in election returns is but one strand in the web of circumstantial evidence that those
election returns were prepared under 0duress, force and intimidation.1 In the case of
?na Pibad . Co#elec (23 "C=A 500 31/606)$ the )C warned that the doctrine of
statistical improbability must be viewed restrictively, the utmost care being taken lest in
penali-ing the fraudulent and corrupt practices, innocent voters become disenfranchised,
82
a result which hardly commends itself. 5oreover, the doctrine of statistical improbability
involves a /uestion of fact and a more prudential approach prohibits its determination e*
parte. (Arthur V. Velayo v. !.M1<1!, 7.". >o. '39#'3, March 0, 2&&&, 1n Banc
()uno*+
1+/. ,hat Co!rt has %!risdiction oer election protests and 8!o warranto proceedings
inoling "angg!niang Pabataan ("P) elections(
Held: 6ny contest relating to the election of members of the )angguniang
Rabataan >including the chairman? G whether pertaining to their eligibility or the manner
of their election G is cogni-able by 5TCs, 5CTCs, and 5eTCs. )ection L of Comelec
Aesolution o. $;$D which provides that cases involving the eligibility or /ualification of
)R candidates shall be decided by the CityN5unicipal 2lection #fficer whose decision
shall be final, applies only to proceedings before the election. Cefore proclamation,
cases concerning eligibility of )R officers and members are cogni-able by the 2lection
#fficer. Cut after the election and proclamation, the same cases become 8!o warranto
cases cogni-able by 5TCs, 5CTCs, and 5eTCs. The distinction is based on the
principle that it is the proclamation which marks off the jurisdiction of the courts from the
jurisdiction of election officials.
The case of Eose ). )ercado . 4oard of -lection "!perisors (2+3 "C=A +23$
B.=. Do. 12/113$ April 6$ 1//5)$ in which this Court ruled that election protests involving
)R elections are to be determined by the Coard of 2lection )upervisors was decided
under the aegis of Comelec Aesolution o. $DEE, which took effect on 6ugust $K, 1EE$.
Fowever, Comelec Aesolution o. $;$D, which took effect on ,ebruary L, 1EEL and was
passed pursuant to A.6. K;<;, in relation to 6rts. $9$%$9: of the #mnibus 2lection
Code, has since transferred the cogni-ance of such cases from the Coard of 2lection
)upervisors to the 5TCs, 5CTCs and 5eTCs. Thus, the doctrine of )ercado is no
longer controlling. (:rancis Aing <. Mar=ue8 v. !.M1<1!, 7.". >o. '2%3'8, Aug. 29,
'000, 1n Banc ()urisima*+
THE LAW OF PU#LIC CORPORATIONS
152. ,hat is an a!tono#o!s region(
An&wer: 6n a!tono#o!s region consists of provinces, cities, municipalities, and
geographical areas sharing common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage,
economic and social structures, and other relevant characteristics within the framework
of the Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as the territorial integrity of the
Aepublic of the Philippines. (ec. '9, Art. J, '08% !onstitution+
151. ,hat are ad#inistratie regions( Are they considered territorial and political
s!bdiisions of the "tate( ,ho has the power to create ad#inistratie regions(
Held: 6dministrative regions are mere groupings of contiguous provinces for
administrative purposes. They are not territorial and political subdivisions like provinces,
cities, municipalities and barangays. .hile the power to merge administrative regions is
not e"pressly provided for in the Constitution, it is a power which has traditionally been
lodged with the President to facilitate the e"ercise of the power of general supervision
over local governments. (A,,as v. !.M1<1!, '%0 !"A 28%, >ov. '&, '080, 1n
Banc (!ortes*+
152. .s there a conflict between the power of the President to #erge ad#inistratie
regions with the constit!tional proision re8!iring a plebiscite in the #erger of local
goern#ent !nits(
Held: There is no conflict between the power of the President to merge
administrative regions with the constitutional provision re/uiring a plebiscite in the
merger of local government units because the re/uirement of a plebiscite in a merger
e"pressly applies only to provinces, cities, municipalities or barangays, not to
83
administrative regions. (A,,as v. !.M1<1!, '%0 !"A 28%, >ov. '&, '080, 1n Banc
(!ortes*+
153. ,hat is the )etropolitan )anila Deelop#ent A!thority ())DA)( .s it a local
goern#ent !nit or p!blic corporation endowed with legislatie power( )ay it alidly
e*ercise police power( Kow is it disting!ished fro# the for#er )etro )anila Co!ncil
())C) created !nder PD Do. 02+(
Held: )etropolitan or )etro )anila is a body co#posed of seeral local
goern#ent !nits S i.e.$ twelve >1$? cities and five >9? municipalities " " ". ,ith the
passage of =ep!blic Act Do. 1/2+ in 1//5$ )etropolitan )anila was declared as a
:special deelop#ent and ad#inistratie region; and the Ad#inistration of :#etrowide;
basic serices affecting the region placed !nder :a deelop#ent a!thority; referred to as
the ))DA.
The goerning board of the ))DA is the )etro )anila Co!ncil. The Council is
composed of the mayors of the component 1$ cities and 9 municipalities, the president
of the 5etro 5anila Hice%5ayors+ !eague and the president of the 5etro 5anila
Councilors+ !eague. The Council is headed by a Chairman who is appointed by the
President and vested with the rank of cabinet member. 6s the policy%making body of the
55@6, the 5etro 5anila Council approves metro%wide plans, programs and projects,
and issues the necessary rules and regulations for the implementation of said plans3 it
approves the annual budget of the 55@6 and promulgates the rules and regulations for
the delivery of basic services, collection of service and regulatory fees, fines and
penalties. & " "
Clearly, the scope of the 55@6+s function is limited to the delivery of the seven
>K? basic services. #ne of these is transport and traffic management " " ".
It will be noted that the powers of the 55@6 are limited to the following acts4
formulation, coordination, regulation, implementation, preparation, management,
monitoring, setting of policies, installation of a system and administration. 7here is no
syllable in =.A. Do. 1/2+ that grants the ))DA police power$ let alone legislatie power.
2ven the 5etro 5anila Council has not been delegated any legislative power. 8nlike the
legislative bodies of the local government units, there is no provision in A.6. o. KE$D
that empowers the 55@6 or its Council 0to enact ordinances, approve resolutions and
appropriate funds for the general welfare1 of the inhabitants of 5etro 5anila. The 55@6
is " " " a 0development authority.1 It is an agency created for the purpose of laying down
policies and coordinating with the various national government agencies, people+s
organi-ations, non%governmental organi-ations and the private sector for the efficient
and e"peditious delivery of basic services in the vast metropolitan area. All its f!nctions
are ad#inistratie in nat!re and these are actually summed up in the charter itself " " ".
"econdly$ the ))DA is not the sa#e entity as the ))C in angalang. Altho!gh
the ))C is the forer!nner of the present ))DA$ an e*a#ination of Presidential Decree
Do. 02+$ the charter of the ))C$ shows that the latter possessed greater powers which
were not bestowed on the present ))DA.
5etropolitan 5anila was first created in 1EK9 by Presidential @ecree o. ;$D. It
comprised the *reater 5anila 6rea composed of the contiguous four >D? cities of 5anila,
Que-on, Pasay and Caloocan, and the thirteen >1:? municipalities " " ". 5etropolitan
5anila was created as a response to the finding that the rapid growth of population and
the increase of social and economic re/uirements in these areas demand a call for
simultaneous and unified development3 that the public services rendered by the
respective local governments could be administered more efficiently and economically if
integrated under a system of central planning3 and this coordination, 0especially in the
maintenance of peace and order and the eradication of social and economic ills that
fanned the flames of rebellion and discontent 'were( part of the reform measures under
5artial !aw essential to the safety and security of the )tate.1
)etropolitan )anila was established as a :p!blic corporation; " " ".
84
7he ad#inistration of )etropolitan )anila was placed !nder the )etro )anila
Co##ission ())C) * * *.
7he ))C was the :central goern#ent; of )etro )anila for the purpose of
establishing and administering programs providing services common to the area. 6s a
0central government1 it had the power to levy and collect ta"es and special assessments,
the power to charge and collect fees3 the power to appropriate money for its operation,
and at the same time, review appropriations for the city and municipal units within its
jurisdiction. It was bestowed the power to enact or approve ordinances, resolutions and
fi" penalties for violation of such ordinances and resolutions. It also had the power to
review, amend, revise or repeal all ordinances, resolutions and acts of any of the " " "
cities and " " " municipalities comprising 5etro 5anila.
& " "
7he creation of the ))C also carried with it the creation of the "angg!niang
4ayan. This was composed of the members of the component city and municipal
councils, barangay captains chosen by the 55C and sectoral representatives appointed
by the President. The "angg!niang 4ayan had the power to recommend to the 55C
the adoption of ordinances, resolutions or measures. .t was the ))C itself$ howeer$
that possessed legislatie powers. 6ll ordinances, resolutions and measures
recommended by the "angg!niang 4ayan were subject to the 55C+s approval.
5oreover, the power to impose ta"es and other levies, the power to appropriate money,
and the power to pass ordinances or resolutions with penal sanctions were vested
e"clusively in the 55C.
7h!s$ )etropolitan )anila had a :central goern#ent$; i.e.$ the ))C which f!lly
possessed legislatie and police powers. ,hateer legislatie powers the co#ponent
cities and #!nicipalities had were all s!b%ect to reiew and approal by the ))C.
After President Cora9on A8!ino ass!#ed power$ there was a clamor to restore
the autonomy of the local government units in 5etro 5anila. Fence, )ections 1 and $ of
6rticle & of the 1E;K Constitution " " ". The Constitution, however, recogni-ed the
necessity of creating metropolitan regions not only in the e"isting ational Capital
Aegion but also in potential e/uivalents in the Hisayas and 5indanao. & " "
The Constitution itself e"pressly provides that Congress may, by law, create
0special metropolitan political subdivisions1 which shall be subject to approval by a
majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected3 the
jurisdiction of this subdivision shall be limited to basic services re/uiring coordination3
and the cities and municipalities comprising this subdivision shall retain their basic
autonomy and their own local e"ecutive and legislative assemblies ("ection 11$ Article
<$ 1/01 Constit!tion). Pending enactment of this law, the Transitory Provisions of the
Constitution gave the President of the Philippines the power to constitute the
5etropolitan 6uthority " " ".
In 1EE<, President 6/uino issued 2"ecutive #rder o. :E$ and constituted the
5etropolitan 5anila 6uthority >556?. The powers and functions of the 55C were
devolved to the 556. It ought to be stressed, however, that not all powers and
functions of the 55C were passed to the 556. The 556+s power was limited to the
0delivery of basic urban services re/uiring coordination in 5etropolitan 5anila.1 The
556+s governing body, the 5etropolitan 5anila Council, although composed of the
mayors of the component cities and municipalities, was merely given the power of4 >1?
formulation of policies on the delivery of basic services re/uiring coordination and
consolidation3 and >$? promulgation of resolutions and other issuances, approval of a
code of basic services and the e"ercise of its rule%making power.1
?nder the 1/01 Constit!tion$ the local government units became primarily
responsible for the governance of their respective political subdivisions. The ))A's
%!risdiction was li#ited to addressing common problems involving basic services that
transcended local boundaries. .t did not hae legislatie power. Its power was merely to
provide the local government units technical assistance in the preparation of local
85
development plans. 6ny semblance of legislative power it had was confined to a 0review
'of( legislation proposed by the local legislative assemblies to ensure consistency among
local governments and with the comprehensive development plan of 5etro 5anila,1 and
to 0advise the local governments accordingly.1
,hen =.A. Do. 1/2+ too& effect$ )etropolitan )anila beca#e a :special
deelop#ent and ad#inistratie region; and the ))DA a :special deelop#ent
a!thority; whose f!nctions were :witho!t pre%!dice to the a!tono#y of the affected local
goern#ent !nits.; 7he character of the ))DA was clearly defined in the legislatie
debates enacting its charter.
& " "
Clearly$ the ))DA is not a political !nit of goern#ent. The power delegated to
the 55@6 is that given to the 5etro 5anila Council to promulgate administrative rules
and regulations in the implementation of the 55@6+s functions. 7here is no grant of
a!thority to enact ordinances and reg!lations for the general welfare of the inhabitants
of the #etropolis. This was e"plicitly stated in the last Committee deliberations prior to
the bill+s presentation to Congress. & " "
.t is th!s beyond do!bt that the ))DA is not a local goern#ent !nit or a p!blic
corporation endowed with legislatie power. It is not even a 0special metropolitan
political subdivision1 as contemplated in )ection 11, 6rticle & of the Constitution. The
creation of a 0special metropolitan political subdivision1 re/uires the approval by a
majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected. A.6. o.
KE$D was not submitted to the inhabitants of 5etro 5anila in a plebiscite. The Chairman
of the 55@6 is not an official elected by the people, but appointed by the President with
the rank and privileges of a cabinet member. In fact, part of his function is to perform
such other duties as may be assigned to him by the President $ whereas in local
government units, the President merely e"ercises supervisory authority. This
emphasi-es the ad#inistratie character of the 55@6.
Clearly then$ the ))C !nder P.D. Do. 02+ is not the sa#e entity as the ))DA
!nder =.A. Do. 1/2+. ?nli&e the ))C$ the ))DA has no power to enact ordinances for
the welfare of the co##!nity. It is the local government units, acting through their
respective legislative councils, that possess legislative power and police power. In the
case at bar, the )angguniang Panlungsod of 5akati City did not pass any ordinance or
resolution ordering the opening of eptune )treet, hence, its proposed opening by
petitioner 55@6 is illegal " " ". (MMDA v. Bel-Air Village Association, Inc., 328
!"A 83#, March 2%, 2&&&, '
st
Div. ()uno*+
15+. Disc!ss the concept of local a!tono#y.
Held: 6utonomy is either decentrali9ation of ad#inistration or decentrali9ation of
power. There is decentrali9ation of ad#inistration when the central government
delegates administrative powers to political subdivisions in order to broaden the base of
government and in the process to make local governments more responsive and
accountable, and ensure their fullest development as self%reliant communities and make
them more effective partners in the pursuit of national development and social progress.
6t the same time, it relieves the central government of the burden of managing local
affairs and enables it to concentrate on national concerns. The President e"ercises
general supervision over them, but only to ensure that local affairs are administered
according to law. Fe has no control over their acts in the sense that he can substitute
their judgments with his own.
Decentrali9ation of power$ on the other hand, involves an abdication of political
power in favor of local government units declared autonomous. In that case, the
autonomous government is free to chart its own destiny and shape its own future with
minimum intervention from central authorities. 6ccording to a constitutional author,
decentrali-ation of power amounts to 0self%immolation,1 since in that event, the
autonomous government becomes accountable not to the central authorities but to its
86
constituency. (<im,ona v. Mangelin, '%& !"A %8#, :e,. 28, '080, 1n Banc
(armiento*+
155. ,hat &ind of local a!tono#y is conte#plated by the Constit!tion( ,hat abo!t
the &ind of a!tono#y conte#plated insofar as the a!tono#o!s regions are
concerned(
Held: 1. The principle of local autonomy under the 1E;K Constitution simply
means 0decentrali-ation.1 It does not make local governments sovereign within the state
or an 0imperium in imperio.1 Aemaining to be an intra sovereign subdivision of one
sovereign nation, but not intended, however, to be an i#peri!# in i#perio$; the local
government unit is autonomous in the sense that it is given more powers, authority,
responsibilities and resources. Power which used to be highly centrali-ed in 5anila, is
thereby deconcentrated, enabling especially the peripheral local government units to
develop not only at their own pace and discretion but also with their own resources and
assets. (Alvare8 v. 7uingona, ;r., 292 !"A #09, ;an. 3', '00#, 1n Banc
(6ermosisima*+
$. The constitutional guarantee of local autonomy in the Constitution refers to
the ad#inistratie autonomy of local government units or, cast in more technical
language, the decentrali-ation of government authority.
#n the other hand, the creation of autonomous regions in 5uslim 5indanao and
the Cordilleras, which is peculiar to the 1E;K Constitution, contemplates the grant of
political autonomy and not just administrative autonomy to these regions. Thus, the
provision in the Constitution for an autonomous regional government with a basic
structure consisting of an e"ecutive department and a legislative assembly and special
courts with personal, family and property law jurisdiction in each of the autonomous
regions. (!or-illera Broa- !oalition v. !.A, '8' !"A $09, ;an. 20, '00&, 1n Banc
(!ortes*+
156. ,hether or not the .nternal =een!e allot#ents (.=As) are to be incl!ded in the
co#p!tation of the aerage ann!al inco#e of a #!nicipality for p!rposes of its
conersion into an independent co#ponent city(
Held: Ies. The IA6s are items of income because they form part of the gross
accretion of the funds of the local government unit. The IA6s regularly and
automatically accrue to the local treasury without need of any further action on the part
of the local government unit. They thus constitute income which the local government
can invariably rely upon as the source of much needed funds.
& " "
'T(o reiterate, IA6s are a regular, recurring item of income3 nil is there a basis,
too, to classify the same as a special fund or transfer, since IA6s have a technical
definition and meaning all its own as used in the !ocal *overnment Code that
une/uivocally makes it distinct from special funds or transfers referred to when the Code
speaks of 0funding support from the national government, its instrumentalities and
government%owned or controlled corporations.1
Thus, @epartment of ,inance #rder o. :9%E: correctly encapsuli-es the full
import of the above dis/uisition when it defined 686! IC#52 to be 0revenues and
receipts reali-ed by provinces, cities and municipalities from regular sources of the !ocal
*eneral ,und incl!ding the internal reen!e allot#ent and other shares provided for in
)ections $;D, $E< and $E1 of the Code, but e"clusive of non%recurring receipts, such as
other national aids, grants, financial assistance, loan proceeds, sales of fi"ed assets,
and similar others1. )uch order, constituting e"ecutive or contemporaneous construction
of a statute by an administrative agency charged with the task of interpreting and
applying the same, is entitled to full respect and should be accorded great weight by the
courts, unless such construction is clearly shown to be in sharp conflict with the
Constitution, the governing statute, or other laws. (Alvare8 v. 7uingona, ;r., 292 !"A
#09, ;an. 3', '00#, 1n Banc (6ermosisima, ;r., ;.*+
87
151. "tate the i#portance of drawing with precise stro&es the territorial bo!ndaries of
a local goern#ent !nit.
Held: The importance of drawing with precise strokes the territorial boundaries
of a local unit of government cannot be overemphasi-ed. The boundaries must be clear
for they define the limits of the territorial jurisdiction of a local government unit. It can
legitimately e"ercise powers of government only within the limits of its territorial
jurisdiction. Ceyond these limits, its acts are !ltra ires. eedless to state, any
uncertainty in the boundaries of local government units will sow costly conflicts in the
e"ercise of governmental powers which ultimately will prejudice the people+s welfare.
This is the evil sought to be avoided by the !ocal *overnment Code in re/uiring that the
land area of a local government unit must be spelled out in metes and bounds, with
technical descriptions. (Mariano, ;r. v. !.M1<1!, 2$2 !"A 2'', 2'%-2'0, Mar. %,
'009, 1n Banc ()uno*+
150. =.A. 105+ was enacted conerting the )!nicipality of )a&ati into a highly
!rbani9ed city. "ection 2 thereof did not proide for a cadastral type of description of
its bo!ndary b!t #erely proided that the bo!ndary of the new city of )a&ati shall be
the bo!ndary of the present #!nicipality of )a&ati. Petitioners contended in a
petition bro!ght the "C that =.A. 105+ was defectie beca!se it did not co#ply with
the re8!ire#ent in the Local Boern#ent Code that :the territorial %!risdiction of
newly created or conerted cities sho!ld be described by #etes and bo!nds$ with
technical descriptions.; Dote that at the ti#e the law was enacted$ there was a
pending bo!ndary disp!te between )a&ati and one of its neighbors$ 7ag!ig$ before
the reg!lar co!rt. "ho!ld the contention be !pheld(
Held: *iven the facts of the cases at bench, we cannot perceive how this evil
>uncertainty in the boundaries of local government units will sow costly conflicts in the
e"ercise of government powers which ultimately will prejudice the people+s welfare? can
be brought about by the description made in )ection $ of A.6. o. K;9D. Petitioners
have not demonstrated that the delineation of the land area of the proposed City of
5akati will cause confusion as to its boundaries. .e note that said delineation did not
change even by an inch the land area previously covered by 5akati as a municipality.
)ection $ did not add, subtract, divide, or multiply the established land area of 5akati. In
language that cannot be any clearer, )ection $ stated that the city+s land area 0shall
comprise the present territory of the municipality.1
The deliberations of Congress will reveal that there is a legitimate reason why the
land area of the proposed City of 5akati was not defined by metes and bounds, with
technical descriptions. 6t the time of the consideration of A.6. o. K;9D, the territorial
dispute between the municipalities of 5akati and Taguig over ,ort Conifacio was under
court litigation. #ut of a becoming sense of respect to a co%e/ual department of
government, the legislators felt that the dispute should be left to the courts to decide.
They did not want to foreclose the dispute by making a legislative finding of fact which
could decide the issue. This would have ensued if they defined the land area of the
proposed city by its e"act metes and bounds, with technical descriptions. .e take
judicial notice of the fact that Congress has also refrained from using the metes and
bounds description of the land area of other local government units with unsettled
boundary disputes.
.e hold that the e"istence of a boundary dispute does not per se present an
insurmountable difficulty which will prevent Congress from defining with reasonable
certitude the territorial jurisdiction of a local government unit. In the cases at bench,
Congress maintained the e"isting boundaries of the proposed City of 5akati but as an
act of fairness, made them subject to the ultimate resolution by the courts. Considering
these peculiar circumstances, we are not prepared to hold that )ection $ of A.6. o.
K;9D is unconstitutional. .e sustain the submission of the )olicitor *eneral in this
regard, i9F
0*oing now to )ections K and D9< of the !ocal *overnment Code, it is
beyond cavil that the re/uirement started therein, i9F Othe territorial jurisdiction of
88
newly created or converted cities should be described by metes and bounds, with
technical descriptions1 G was made in order to provide a means by which the
area of said cities may be reasonably ascertained. In other words, the
re/uirement on metes and bounds was meant merely as a tool in the
establishment of local government units. It is not an end in itself. -rgo$ so long
as the territorial jurisdiction of a city may be reasonably ascertained, i.e., by
referring to common boundaries with neighboring municipalities, as in this case,
then, it may be concluded that the legislative intent behind the law has been
sufficiently served.
Certainly, Congress did not intend that laws creating new cities must
contain therein detailed technical descriptions similar to those appearing in
Torrens titles, as petitioners seem to imply. To re/uire such description in the law
as a condition sine 8!a non for its validity would be to defeat the very purpose
which the !ocal *overnment Code seeks to serve. The manifest intent of the
Code is to empower local government units and to give them their rightful due. It
seeks to make local governments more responsive to the needs of their
constituents while at the same time serving as a vital cog in national
development. To invalidate A.6. o. K;9D on the mere ground that no cadastral
type of description was used in the law would serve the letter but defeat the spirit
of the Code. It then becomes a case of the master serving the slave, instead of
the other way around. This could not be the intendment of the law.1 & " "
(Mariano, ;r. v. !.M1<1!, 2$2 !"A 2'', 2'%-2'0, Mar. %, '009, 1n Banc ()uno*+
15/. ,hat is the #eaning of @deol!tion@(
An&wer: The term =devolution= refers to the act by which the ational
government confers power and authority upon the various local government units to
perform specific functions and responsibilities. (ec. '%(e*, 2
n-
par., <ocal 7overnment
!o-e+
162. Kae the powers of the Land 7ransportation Gffice (L7G) to register$ tricycles in
partic!lar$ as well as to iss!e licenses for the driing thereof$ been deoled li&ewise
to local goern#ent !nits(
Held: #nly the powers of the !and Transportation ,ranchising Aegulatory Coard
>!T,AC? to regulate the operation of tricycles%for%hire and to grant franchises for the
operation thereof have been devolved to local governments under the !ocal *overnment
Code. Clearly unaffected by the !ocal *overnment Code are the powers of the !T#
under A.6. o. D1:L re/uiring the registration of all kinds of motor vehicles 0used or
operated on or upon any public highway1 in the country. This can be gleaned from the
e"plicit language of the statute itself, as well as the corresponding guidelines issued by
the @#TC. In fact, even the power of !*8s to regulate the operation of tricycles and to
grant franchises for the operation thereof is still subject to the guidelines prescribed by
the @#TC. (<5. v. !ity o/ Butuan, 7.". >o. '3'9'2, ;an. 2&, 2&&&, 3
r-
Div. (Vitug*+
161. Disting!ish the power to grant a license or per#it to do b!siness and the power
to iss!e a license to engage in the practice of a partic!lar profession.
Held: @istinction must be made between the grant of a license or permit to do
business and the issuance of a license to engage in the practice of a particular
profession. The first is usually granted by the local authorities and the second is issued
by the Coard or Commission tasked to regulate the particular profession. 6 business
permit authori-es the person, natural or otherwise, to engage in business or some form
of commercial activity. 6 professional license, on the other hand, is the grant of authority
to a natural person to engage in the practice or e"ercise of his or her profession.
In the case at bar, what is sought by petitioner >6cebedo #ptical Company, Inc.?
from respondent City 5ayor is a permit to engage in the business of running an optical
shop. It does not purport to seek a license to engage in the practice of optometry as a
corporate body or entity, although it does have in its employ, persons who are duly
licensed to practice optometry by the Coard of 2"aminers in #ptometry.
89
& " "
In the present case, the objective of the imposition of subject conditions on
petitioner+s business permit could be attained by re/uiring the optometrists in petitioner+s
employ to produce a valid certificate of registration as optometrists, from the Coard of
2"aminers in #ptometry. 6 business permit is issued primarily to regulate the conduct of
business and the City 5ayor cannot, through the issuance of such permit, regulate the
practice of a profession, like that of optometry. )uch a function is within the e"clusive
domain of the administrative agency specifically empowered by law to supervise the
profession, in this case the Professional Aegulations Commission and the Coard of
2"aminers in #ptometry. (Ace,e-o .ptical !ompany, Inc. v. !A, 320 !"A 3'$,
March 3', 2&&&, 1n Banc ()urisima*+
162. )ay a local goern#ent !nit alidly a!thori9e an e*propriation of priate property
thro!gh a #ere resol!tion of its law#a&ing body(
Held: The !ocal *overnment Code e"pressly and clearly re/uires an ordinance
or a local law for that purpose. 6 resolution that merely e"presses the sentiment or
opinion of the 5unicipal Council will not suffice. The case of Proince of Ca#arines "!r
. Co!rt of Appeals which held that a mere resolution may suffice to support the e"ercise
of eminent domain by a local government unit is not in point because the applicable law
at that time was C.P. ::K, the previous !ocal *overnment Code, which had provided that
a mere resolution would enable an !*8 to e"ercise eminent domain. In contrast, A.6.
K1L<, the present !ocal *overnment Code, e"plicitly re/uired an ordinance for this
purpose. (Municipality o/ )arana=ue v. V.M. "ealty !orp., 202 !"A #%8, ;uly 2&,
'008 ()angani,an*+
163. ,hat are the re8!isites before a Local Boern#ent ?nit can alidly e*ercise the
power of e#inent do#ain(
Held:
1? 6n ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council authori-ing the local
chief e"ecutive, in behalf of the !*8, to e"ercise the power of eminent
domain or pursue e"propriation proceedings over a particular private
property3
$? The power of eminent domain is e"ercised for public use, purpose or welfare,
or for the benefit of the poor and the landless3
:? There is payment of just compensation, as re/uired under )ection E, 6rticle
III of the Constitution, and other pertinent laws3
D? 6 valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner of the
property sought to be e"propriated, but said offer was not accepted.
(Municipality o/ )arana=ue v. V.M. "ealty !orp., 202 !"A #%8, ;uly 2&, '008
()angani,an*+
16+. )ay the "angg!niang Panlalawigan alidly disapproe a resol!tion or ordinance
of a #!nicipality calling for the e*propriation of priate property to be #ade site of a
>ar#ers Center and Gther Boern#ent "ports >acilities on the gro!nd that said
:e*propriation is !nnecessary considering that there are still aailable lots of the
#!nicipality for the establish#ent of a goern#ent center;(
Held: 8nder the !ocal *overnment Code, the )angguniang Panlalawigan is
granted the power to declare a municipal resolution invalid on the sole ground that it is
beyond the power of the )angguniang Cayan or 5ayor to issue. 6s held in Hela9co .
4las (B.=. Do. LC32+56$ E!ly 32$ 1/02$ 115 "C=A 5+2$ 5++C5+5)$ 0The only ground upon
which a provincial board may declare any municipal resolution, ordinance or order
invalid is when such resolution, ordinance, or order is Obeyond the powers conferred
upon the council or president making the same.+ 6 strictly legal /uestion is before the
provincial board in its consideration of a municipal resolution, ordinance, or order. The
provincial board+s disapproval of any resolution, ordinance, or order must be premised
specifically upon the fact that such resolution, ordinance, or order is outside the scope of
90
the legal powers conferred by law. If a provincial board passes these limits, it usurps the
legislative functions of the municipal council or president. )uch has been the consistent
course of e"ecutive authority.1 (Mo-ay v. !A, 2#8 !"A 98#, :e,. 2&, '00%+
165. ?nder "ection 0$ Article < of the Constit!tion$ @376he ter# of office of electie
local officials * * * shall be three years and no s!ch official shall sere for #ore than
three consec!tie ter#s.@ Kow is this ter# li#it for electie local officials to be
interpreted(
Held: The term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to the right
to be elected as well as the right to sere in the sa#e electie position. Conse/uently, it
is not enough that an individual has served three consecutive terms in an elective local
office, he must also have been elected to the same position for the same number of
times before the dis/ualification can apply. (BorBa, ;r. v. !.M1<1! an- !apco, ;r.,
7.". >o. '33$09, ept. 3, '008, 209 !"A '9%, 1n Banc (Men-o8a*+
!ase >o. '. "!ppose A is a iceC#ayor who beco#es #ayor by reason of the
death of the inc!#bent. "i* #onths before the ne*t election$ he resigns and is twice
elected thereafter. Can he r!n again for #ayor in the ne*t election(
AnsFerE Ies, because although he has already first served as mayor by
succession and subse/uently resigned from office before the full term e"pired, he has
not actually served three full terms in all for the purpose of applying the term limit. 8nder
6rt. &, )ec. ;, voluntary renunciation of the office is not considered as an interruption in
the continuity of his service for the full term only if the term is one 0for which he was
elected.1 )ince 6 is only completing the service of the term for which the deceased and
not he was elected, 6 cannot be considered to have completed one term. Fis
resignation constitutes an interruption of the full term.
!ase >o. 2. "!ppose 4 is elected )ayor and$ d!ring his first ter#$ he is twice
s!spended for #iscond!ct for a total of 1 year. .f he is twice reelected after that$ can he
r!n for one #ore ter# in the ne*t election(
AnsFerE Ies, because he has served only two full terms successively.
In both cases, the mayor is entitled to run for reelection because the two
conditions for the application of the dis/ualification provisions have not concurred,
namely, that the local official concerned has been elected three consecutive times and
that he has fully served three consecutive terms. In the first case, even if the local
official is considered to have served three full terms notwithstanding his resignation
before the end of the first term, the fact remains that he has not been elected three
times. In the second case, the local official has been elected three consecutive times,
but he has not fully sered three consecutive terms.
!ase >o. 3. 7he case of iceC#ayor C who beco#es #ayor by s!ccession
inoles a total fail!re of the two conditions to conc!r for the p!rpose of applying Art. <$
"ec. 0. "!ppose he is twice elected after that ter#$ is he 8!alified to r!n again in the
ne*t election(
AnsFerE Ies, because he was not elected to the office of mayor in the first term
but simply found himself thrust into it by operation of law. either had he served the full
term because he only continued the service, interrupted by the death, of the deceased
mayor. (BorBa, ;r. v. !.M1<1! an- !apco, ;r., 7.". >o. '33$09, ept. 3, '008, 209
!"A '9%, 1n Banc (Men-o8a*+
166. ,hat are the policies e#bodied in the constit!tional proision barring electie
local officials$ with the e*ception of barangay officials$ fro# sering #ore than three
consec!tie ter#s(
Held: To prevent the establishment of political dynasties is not the only policy
embodied in the constitutional provision in /uestion >barring elective local officials, with
the e"ception of barangay officials, from serving more than three consecutive terms?.
91
The other policy is that of enhancing the freedom of choice of the people. To consider,
therefore, only stay in office regardless of how the official concerned came to that office
G whether by election or by succession by operation of law G would be to disregard one
of the purposes of the constitutional provision in /uestion. (BorBa, ;r. v. !.M1<1! an-
!apco, ;r., 7.". >o. '33$09, ept. 3, '008, 209 !"A '9%, 1n Banc (Men-o8a*+
161. Lon9anida was preio!sly elected and sered two consec!tie ter#s as #ayor
of "an Antonio$ Aa#bales prior to the )ay 1//5 #ayoral elections. .n the )ay 1//5
elections he again ran for #ayor of "an Antonio$ Aa#bales and was proclai#ed
winner. Ke ass!#ed office and discharged the rights and d!ties of #ayor !ntil
)arch 1//0 when he was ordered to acate the post by reason of the CG)-L-C
decision on the election protest against hi# which declared his opponent E!an Ale9
the d!ly elected #ayor. Ale9 sered the re#aining portion of the 1//5C1//0
#ayoral ter#. .s Lon9anida still 8!alified to r!n for #ayor of "an Antonio$ Aa#bales
in the )ay 1//0 local elections(
Held: The two re/uisites for the application of the three term rule was absent.
>irst$ !on-anida cannot be considered as having been duly elected to the post in the
5ay 1EE9 elections, and second, he did not fully serve the 1EE9%1EE; mayoral term by
reason of involuntary relin/uishment of office. 6fter a re%appreciation and revision of the
contested ballots the C#52!2C itself declared by final judgment that !on-anida lost in
the 5ay 1EE9 mayoral elections and his previous proclamation as winner was declared
null and void. Fis assumption of office as mayor cannot be deemed to have been by
reason of a valid election but by reason of a void proclamation. It has been repeatedly
held by the )C that a proclamation subse/uently declared void is no proclamation at all
and while a proclaimed candidate may assume office on the strength of the proclamation
of the Coard of Canvassers he is only a presumptive winner who assumes office subject
to the final outcome of the election protest. !on-anida did not serve a term as mayor of
)an 6ntonio, Pambales from 5ay 1EE9 to 5arch 1EE; because he was not duly elected
to the post3 he merely assumed office as presumptive winner, which presumption was
later overturned by the C#52!2C when it decided with finality that !on-anida lost in the
5ay 1EE9 mayoral elections.
"econd$ !on-anida cannot be deemed to have served the 5ay 1EE9 to 1EE;
term because he was ordered to vacate his post before the e"piration of the term. Fis
opponentsJ contention that !on-anida should be deemed to have served one full term
from 5ay 1EE9%1EE; because he served the greater portion of that term has no legal
basis to support it3 it disregards the second re/uisite for the application of the
dis/ualification, i.e.$ that he has fully served three consecutive terms. The second
sentence of the constitutional provision under scrutiny states, =Holuntary renunciation of
office for any length of ti#e shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of
service for the full term for which he was elected.= The clear intent of the framers of the
Constitution to bar any attempt to circumvent the three%term limit by a voluntary
renunciation of office and at the same time respect the peopleJs choice and grant their
elected official full service of a term is evident in this provision. Holuntary renunciation of
a term does not cancel the renounced term in the computation of the three term limit3
conversely, involuntary severance from office for any length of time short of the full term
provided by law amounts to an interruption of continuity of service. !on-anida vacated
his post a few months before the ne"t mayoral elections, not by voluntary renunciation
but in compliance with the legal process of writ of e"ecution issued by the C#52!2C to
that effect. )uch involuntary severance from office is an interruption of continuity of
service and thus, !on-anida did not fully serve the 1EE9%1EE; mayoral term.
In sum, !on-anida was not the duly elected mayor and that he did not hold office
for the full term3 hence, his assumption of office from 5ay 1EE9 to 5arch 1EE; cannot be
counted as a term for purposes of computing the three term limit. (<on8ani-a v.
!.M1<1!, 3'' !"A #&2, ;uly 28, '000, 1n Banc (7on8aga-"eyes*+
160. )ay the President alidly withhold a portion of the internal reen!e allot#ents of
Local Boern#ent ?nits legally d!e the# by ad#inistratie fiat(
92
Held: The Constitution vests the President with the power of supervision, not
control, over local government units >!*8s?. )uch power enables him to see to it that
!*8s and their officials e"ecute their tasks in accordance with law. .hile he may issue
advisories and seek their cooperation in solving economic difficulties, he cannot prevent
them from performing their tasks and using available resources to achieve their goals.
Fe may not withhold or alter any authority or power given them by the law. Thus, the
withholding of a portion of internal revenue allotments legally due them cannot be
directed by administrative fiat.
& " "
)ection D of 6# :K$ cannot " " " be upheld. 6 basic feature of local fiscal
autonomy is the a!to#atic release of the shares of !*8s in the ational internal
revenue. This is mandated by no less than the Constitution. The !ocal *overnment
Code ("ec. 2063a6) specifies further that the release shall be made directly to the !*8
concerned within five >9? days after every /uarter of the year and :shall not be s!b%ect to
any lien or holdbac& that #ay be i#posed by the national goern#ent for whateer
p!rpose.; 6s a rule, the term 0shall1 is a word of command that must be given a
compulsory meaning.1 The provision is, therefore, imperative.
)ection D of 6# :K$, however, orders the withholding, effective Banuary 1, 1EE;,
of 1< percent of the !*8s+ IA6 0pending the assessment and evaluation by the
@evelopment Cudget Coordinating Committee of the emerging fiscal situation1 in the
country. )uch withholding clearly contravenes the Constitution and the law. 6lthough,
temporary, it is e/uivalent to a holdback, which means 0something held back or withheld.
#ften temporarily.1 Fence, the 0temporary1 nature of the retention by the national
government does not matter. 6ny retention is prohibited.
In sum, while )ection 1 of 6# :K$ may be upheld as an advisory effected in
times of national crisis, )ection D thereof has no color of validity at all. The latter
provision effectively encroaches on the fiscal autonomy of local governments.
Concededly, the President was well%intentioned in issuing his #rder to withhold the
!*8s+ IA6, but the rule of law re/uires that even the best intentions must be carried out
within the parameters of the Constitution and the law. Herily, laudable purposes must be
carried out by legal methods. ()imentel, ;r. v. Aguirre, 7.". >o. '32088, 33# !"A
2&', ;uly '0, 2&&&, 1n Banc ()angani,an*+
16/. ,hat is #eant by fiscal a!tono#y of Local Boern#ents( Does it r!le o!t in any
#anner national goern#ent interention by way of s!perision in order to ens!re
that local progra#s are consistent with national goals(
Held: 8nder e"isting law, local government units, in addition to having
administrative autonomy in the e"ercise of their functions, enjoy fiscal autonomy as well.
,iscal autonomy means that local governments have the power to create their own
sources of revenue in addition to their e/uitable share in the national ta"es released by
the national government, as well as the power to allocate their resources in accordance
with their own priorities. It e"tends to the preparation of their budgets, and local officials
in turn have to work within the constraints thereof. They are not formulated at the
national level and imposed on local governments, whether they are relevant to local
needs and resources or not. Fence, the necessity of a balancing of viewpoints and the
harmoni-ation of proposals from both local and national officials$ who in any case are
partners in the attainment of national goals.
!ocal fiscal autonomy does not, however, rule out any manner of national
government intervention by way of supervision, in order to ensure that local programs,
fiscal and otherwise, are consistent with national goals. )ignificantly, the President, by
constitutional fiat, is the head of the economic and planning agency of the government
("ection /$ Article <.. of the Constit!tion)$ primarily responsible for formulating and
implementing continuing, coordinated and integrated social and economic policies, plans
and programs ("ection 3$ Chapter 1$ "!btitle C$ 7itle ..$ 4oo& H$ -G 2/2 3Ad#inistratie
Code of 1/016) for the entire country. Fowever, under the Constitution, the formulation
and the implementation of such policies and programs are subject to 0consultations with
93
the appropriate public agencies, various private sectors, and local government units.1
The President cannot do so unilaterally. ()imentel, ;r. v. Aguirre, 33# !"A 2&', ;uly
'0, 2&&&, 1n Banc ()angani,an*+
112. ,hat are the re8!isites before the President #ay interfere in local fiscal #atters(
Held: " " " 'T(he !ocal *overnment Code provides ("ec. 20+. "ee also Art. 31/
of the =!les and =eg!lations .#ple#enting the Local Boern#ent Code of 1//1)4
0" " " 'I(n the event the national government incurs an unmanaged public
sector deficit, the President of the Philippines is hereby authori-ed, upon the
recommendation of 'the( )ecretary of ,inance, )ecretary of the Interior and !ocal
*overnment and )ecretary of Cudget and 5anagement, and subject to
consultation with the presiding officers of both Fouses of Congress and the
presidents of the liga, to make the necessary adjustments in the internal revenue
allotment of local government units but in no case shall the allotment be less than
thirty percent >:<M? of the collection of national internal revenue ta"es of the third
fiscal year preceding the current fiscal year " " "1
There are therefore several re/uisites before the President may interfere in local
fiscal matters4 >1? an unmanaged public sector deficit of the national government3 >$?
consultations with the presiding officers of the )enate and the Fouse of Aepresentatives
and the presidents of the ario!s local leag!esJ and >:? the corresponding
recommendation of the secretaries of the @epartment of ,inance, Interior and !ocal
*overnment, and Cudget and 5anagement. ,urthermore, any adjustment in the
allotment shall in no case be less than thirty percent >:<M? of the collection of national
internal revenue ta"es of the third fiscal year preceding the current one. ()imentel, ;r. v.
Aguirre, 33# !"A 2&', ;uly '0, 2&&&, 1n Banc ()angani,an*+
111. Disting!ish an ordinance fro# a #ere resol!tion.
Held: 6 municipal ordinance is different from a resolution. 6n ordinance is a law,
but a resolution is merely a declaration of the sentiment or opinion of a lawmaking body
on a specific matter. 6n ordinance possesses a general and permanent character, but a
resolution is temporary in nature. 6dditionally, the two are enacted differently G a third
reading is necessary for an ordinance, but not for a resolution, unless decided otherwise
by a majority of all the )anggunian members. (Municipality o/ )arana=ue v. V.M.
"ealty !orporation, 202 !"A #%8, ;uly 2&, '008 ()angani,an*+
112. Gn its first reg!lar session$ #ay the "angg!nian transact b!siness other than
the #atter of adopting or !pdating its e*isting r!les or proced!re(
Held: .e cannot infer the mandate of the >!ocal *overnment? Code that no
other business may be transacted on the first regular session e"cept to take up the
matter of adopting or updating rules. 6ll that the law re/uires is that 0on the first regular
session " " " the sangg!nian concerned shall adopt or update its e"isting rules or
procedures.1 There is nothing in the language thereof that restricts the matters to be
taken up during the first regular session merely to the adoption or updating of the house
rules. If it were the intent of Congress to limit the business of the local council to such
matters, then it would have done so in clear and une/uivocal terms. Cut as it is, there is
no such intent.
5oreover, adopting or updating of house rules would necessarily entail work
beyond the day of the first regular session. @oes this mean that prior thereto, the local
councilJs hands were tied and could not act on any other matter7 That would certainly
be absurd for it would result in a hiatus and a paralysis in the local legislatureJs work
which could not have been intended by the law. (Malon8o v. Kamora, 3'' !"A 22$,
;uly 2%, '000, 1n Banc ("omero*+
113. )ay an inc!#bent HiceCBoernor$ while conc!rrently the Acting Boernor$
contin!e to preside oer the sessions of the "angg!niang Panlalawigan ("P)( .f no$
who #ay preside in the #eanti#e(
94
Held: Ceing the acting governor, the Hice%governor cannot continue to
simultaneously e"ercise the duties of the latter office, since the nature of the duties of
the Provincial *overnor calls for a full%time occupant to discharge them. )uch is not only
consistent with but also appears to be the clear rationale of the new >!ocal *overnment?
Code wherein the policy of performing dual functions in both offices has already been
abandoned. To repeat, the creation of a temporary vacancy in the office of the *overnor
creates a corresponding vacancy in the office of the Hice%*overnor whenever the latter
acts as *overnor by virtue of such temporary vacancy. This event constitutes an
0inability1 on the part of the regular presiding officer >Hice%*overnor? to preside during
the )P sessions, which thus calls for the operation of the remedy set in 6rticle DE>b? of
the !ocal *overnment Code G concerning the election of a temporary presiding officer.
The continuity of the 6cting *overnor+s >Hice%*overnor? powers as presiding officer of
the )P is suspended so long as he is in such capacity. 8nder )ection DE>b?, 0in the
event of the inability of the regular presiding officer to preside at the sanggunian session,
the members present and constituting a /uorum shall elect from among themselves a
temporary presiding officer.1 (7am,oa, ;r. v. Aguirre, ;r., 7.". >o. '3$2'3, ;uly 2&,
'000, 1n Banc (Dnares-antiago*+
11+. ,hat is recall(
Held: Aecall is a mode of removal of a public officer by the people before the
end of his term of office. The peopleJs prerogative to remove a public officer is an
incident of their sovereign power and in the absence of constitutional restraint, the power
is implied in all governmental operations. )uch power has been held to be
indispensable for the proper administration of public affairs. ot undeservedly, it is
fre/uently described as a fundamental right of the people in a representative
democracy. (7arcia v. !.M1<1!, 22% !"A '&8, .ct. 9, '003, 1n Banc ()uno*+
115. ,hat is the gro!nd for recall( .s this s!b%ect to %!dicial in8!iry(
Held: ,ormer )enator 6/uilino Pimentel, Br., a major author of the subject law in
his book 7he Local Boern#ent Code of 1//1F 7he Pey to Dational Deelop#ent,
stressed the same reason why the substantive content of a vote of lack of confidence is
beyond any in/uiry, thus4
0There is only one ground for recall of local government officials4 loss of
confidence. This means that the people may petition or the Preparatory Aecall
6ssembly may resolve to recall any local elective official without specifying any
particular ground e"cept loss of confidence. There is no need for them to bring
up any charge of abuse or corruption against the local elective officials who are
subject of any recall petition.
In the case of -ardone . Co##ission on -lections$ et al.$ 22+ "C=A
+6+$ +12 (1//1), the Court ruled that Oloss of confidence+ as a ground for recall is
a political /uestion. In the words of the Court, Jwhether or not the electorate of
the municipality of )ulat has lost confidence in the incumbent mayor is a political
/uestion.+1
(7arcia v. !.M1<1!, 22% !"A '&8, .ct. 9, '003, 1n Banc ()uno*+
116. 7he #e#bers of the Preparatory =ecall Asse#bly (P=A) of the proince of
4ataan adopted a resol!tion calling for the recall of Boernor Barcia. .t was
ad#itted$ howeer$ by the proponents of the recall resol!tion that only those
#e#bers of the asse#bly inclined to agree were notified of the #eeting where said
resol!tion was adopted :as a #atter of strategy and sec!rity.; 7hey %!stified these
selectie notices on the gro!nd that the law (Local Boern#ent Code) does not
specifically #andate the giing of notice. "ho!ld this s!b#ission be s!stained(
Held: .e reject this submission of the respondents. The due process clause of
the Constitution re/uiring notice as an element of fairness is inviolable and should
always be considered part and parcel of every law in case of its silence. The need for
notice to all the members of the assembly is also imperative for these members
95
represent the different sectors of the electorate of Cataan. To the e"tent that they are
not notified of the meeting of the assembly, to that e"tent is the sovereign voice of the
people they represent nullified. The resolution to recall should articulate the majority will
of the members of the assembly but the majority will can be genuinely determined only
after all the members of the assembly have been given a fair opportunity to e"press the
will of their constituents. eedless to stress, the re/uirement of notice is mandatory for it
is indispensable in determining the collective wisdom of the members of the Preparatory
Aecall 6ssembly. Its non%observance is fatal to the validity of the resolution to recall
petitioner *arcia as *overnor of the province of Cataan. (7arcia v. !.M1<1!, 7.".
>o. '''9'', ept. 2', '003I 22% !"A '&&, .ct. 9, '003, 1n Banc ()uno*+
111. ,ill it be proper for the Co##ission on -lections to act on a petition for recall
signed by %!st one person(
Held: 6 petition for recall signed by just one person is in violation of the statutory
$9M minimum re/uirement as to the number of signatures supporting any petition for
recall. )ec. LE>d? of the !ocal *overnment Code of 1EE1 e"pressly provides that Jrecall
of any elective " " " municipal " " " official may also be validly initiated upon petition of
at least twenty%five percent >$9M? of the total number of registered voters in the local
government unit concerned during the election in which the local official sought to be
recalled was elected.J The law is plain and une/uivocal as to what constitutes recall
proceedings4 only a petition of at least $9M of the total number of registered voters may
validly initiate recall proceedings. (Ango,ung v. !.M1<1!, 7.". >o. '2#9%#, March
9, '00%+
110. "ection 1+ of the Local Boern#ent Code proides that :no recall shall ta&e
place within one year * * * i##ediately preceding a reg!lar local election.; ,hat
does the ter# :reg!lar local election$; as !sed in this section$ #ean(
Held: The term 0regular local election1 under )ec. KD of the !ocal *overnment
Code of 1EE1 which provides that 0no recall shall take place within one >1? year " " "
immediately preceding a regular local election1 refers to one where the position of the
official sought to be recalled is to be actually contested and filled by the electorate
(Paras . Co#elec$ B.=. Do. 12316/$ Do. +$ 1//6). The one%year time bar will not
apply where the local official sought to be recalled is a 5ayor and the approaching
election is a barangay election. (Ango,ung v. !.M1<1!, 7.". >o. '2#9%#, March 9,
'00%+
11/. Does the word :=ecall; in paragraph (b) of "ection 1+ of the Local Boern#ent
Code incl!de the conening of the Preparatory =ecall Asse#bly and the filing by it of
a recall resol!tion( Disc!ss.
Held: Petitioner contends that the term 0recall1 in )ec. KD >b? refers to a process,
in contrast to the term 0recall election1 found in )ec. KD >a?, which obviously refers to an
election. Fe claims that 0when several barangay chairmen met and convened on 5ay
1E, 1EEE and unanimously resolved to initiate the recall, followed by the taking of votes
by the PA6 on 5ay $E, 1EEE for the purpose of adopting a resolution Oto initiate the recall
of Bovito Claudio as 5ayor of Pasay City for loss of confidence,+ the process of recall
began1 and, since 5ay $E, 1EEE was less than a year after he had assumed office, the
PA6 was illegally convened and all proceedings held thereafter, including the filing of the
recall petition on Buly $, 1EEE, were null and void.
The C#52!2C, on the other hand, maintains that the process of recall starts
with the filing of the petition for recall and ends with the conduct of the recall election,
and that, since the petition for recall in this case was filed on Buly $, 1EEE, e"actly one
year and a day after petitioner+s assumption of office, the recall was validly initiated
outside the one%year prohibited period.
Coth petitioner Claudio and the C#52!2C thus agree that the term 0recall1 as
used in )ec. KD refers to a process. They disagree only as to when the process starts
for purpose of the one%year limitation in paragraph >b? of )ec. KD.
96
.e can agree that recall is a process which begins with the convening of the
preparatory recall assembly or the gathering of the signatures at least $9M of the
registered voters of a local government unit, and then proceeds to the filing of a recall
resolution or petition with the C#52!2C, the verification of such resolution or petition,
the fi"ing of the date of the recall election, and the holding of the election on the
scheduled date. Fowever, as used in paragraph >b? of )ec. KD, 0recall1 refers to the
election itself by means of which voters decide whether they should retain their local
official or elect his replacement.
& " "
To sum up, the term 0recall1 in paragraph >b? refers to the recall election and not
to the preliminary proceedings to initiate recall G
1? Cecause )ec. KD speaks of limitations on 0recall1 which, according to )ec. LE,
is a power which shall be e"ercised by the registered voters of a local
government unit. )ince the voters do not e"ercise such right e"cept in an
election, it is clear that the initiation of recall proceedings is not prohibited
within the one%year period provided in paragraph >b?3
$? Cecause the purpose of the first limitation in paragraph >b? is to provide
voters a sufficient basis for judging an elective local official, and final judging
is not done until the day of the election3 and
:? Cecause to construe the limitation in paragraph >b? as including the initiation
of recall proceedings would unduly curtail freedom of speech and of
assembly guaranteed in the Constitution.
(;ovito .. !lau-io v. !.M1<1!, 7.". >o. '$&9#&, May $, 2&&&, 1n Banc
(Men-o8a*+
102. ,ho has the legal a!thority to represent a #!nicipality in laws!its(
Held: #nly the provincial fiscal, provincial attorney, and municipal attorney
should represent a municipality in its lawsuits. #nly in e"ceptional instances may a
private attorney be hired by a municipality to represent it in lawsuits. ("amos v. !A,
2#0 !"A 3$, March 3, '00%+
101. ,hat are the e*ceptional instances when a priate attorney #ay be alidly hired
by a #!nicipality in its laws!its(
Held: In Alins!g . =7C 4r. 50$ "an Carlos City$ Degros Gccidental (225 "C=A
553$ A!g. 23$ 1//3)$ it was held that 0the law allows a private counsel to be hired by a
municipality only when the municipality is an adverse party in a case involving the
provincial government or another municipality or city within the province. This provision
has its apparent origin in De B!ia . 7he A!ditor Beneral (++ "C=A 16/$ )arch 2/$
1/1/) where the Court held that the municipality+s authority to employ a private attorney
is e"pressly limited only to situations where the provincial fiscal would be dis/ualified to
serve and represent it.1 ("amos v. !A, 2#0 !"A 3$, March 3, '00%+
102. Cite instances when the proincial fiscal #ay be dis8!alified to represent in co!rt
a partic!lar #!nicipality.
Held: 6s held in -nri8!e9$ "r. . Bi#ene9 (121 Phil. /32 31/626)$ the provincial
fiscal may be dis/ualified to represent in court a particular municipality in the following
instances4
1? If and when original jurisdiction of case involving the municipality is vested in
the )upreme Court3
$? .hen the municipality is a party adverse to the provincial government or to
some other municipality in the same province3 and
:? .hen, in a case involving the municipality, he, or his wife, or child, is
pecuniarily involved, as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise.
("amos v. !A, 2#0 !"A 3$, March 3, '00%+
97
103. )ay a #!nicipality be represented by a priate law fir# which had ol!nteered
its serices gratis$ in collaboration with the #!nicipal attorney and the fiscal(
Held: o. )uch representation will be violative of )ection 1E;: of the old
6dministrative Code. This strict coherence to the letter of the law appears to have been
dictated by the fact that 0the municipality should not be burdened with e"penses of hiring
a private lawyer1 and that 0the interests of the municipality would be best protected if a
government lawyer handles its litigations.1
Private lawyers may not represent municipalities on their own. either may they
do so even in collaboration with authori-ed government lawyers. This is anchored on
the principle that only accountable public officers may act for and in behalf of public
entities and that public funds should not be e"pended to hire private lawyers. ("amos
v. !A, 2#0 !"A 3$, March 3, '00%+
10+. )ay a #!nicipality adopt the wor& already perfor#ed in good faith by a priate
lawyer$ which wor& proed beneficial to it(
Held: 6lthough a municipality may not hire a private lawyer to represent it in
litigations, in the interest of substantial justice, however, it was held that a municipality
may adopt the work already performed in good faith by such private lawyer, which work
is beneficial to it >1? provided that no injustice is thereby heaped on the adverse party
and >$? provided further that no compensation in any guise is paid therefor by said
municipality to the private lawyer. 8nless so e"pressly adopted, the private lawyer+s
work cannot bind the municipality. ("amos v. !A, 2#0 !"A 3$, March 3, '00%+
105. )ay the P!nong 4arangay alidly appoint or re#oe the barangay treas!rer$ the
barangay secretary$ and other appointie barangay officials witho!t the conc!rrence
of the #a%ority of all the #e#bers of the "angg!niang 4arangay(
Held: The !ocal *overnment Code e"plicitly vests on the p!nong barangay,
upon approval by a majority of all the members of the sangg!niang barangay, the power
to appoint or replace the barangay treasurer, the barangay secretary, and other
appointive barangay officials. Herily, the power of appointment is to be e"ercised
conjointly by the p!nong barangay and a majority of all the members of the sangg!niang
barangay. .ithout such conjoint action, neither an appointment nor a replacement can
be effectual.
6pplying the rule that the power to appoint includes the power to remove, the
/uestioned dismissal from office of the barangay officials by the p!nong barangay
without the concurrence of the majority of all the members of the "angg!niang
4arangay cannot be legally justified. To rule otherwise could also create an absurd
situation of the "angg!niang 4arangay members refusing to give their approval to the
replacements selected by the p!nong barangay who has unilaterally terminated the
services of the incumbents. It is likely that the legislature did not intend this absurdity to
follow from its enactment of the law. ("amon Al=ui8ola, r. v. 7allar-o .col, 7.". >o.
'32$'3, Aug. 2%, '000, 3
r-
Div. (Vitug*+
PU#LIC INTERNATIONAL LAW
106. ,hat is the doctrine of incorporation( Kow is it applied by local co!rts(
Held: 8nder the doctrine of incorporation, rules of international law form part of
the law of the land and no further legislative action is needed to make such rules
applicable in the domestic sphere.
The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals >or local
courts? are confronted with situations in which there appears to be a conflict between a
rule of international law and the provisions of the Constitution or statute of the local
state. 2fforts should first be e"erted to harmoni-e them, so as to give effect to both
since it is to be presumed that municipal law was enacted with proper regard for the
98
generally accepted principles of international law in observance of the Incorporation
Clause in )ection $, 6rticle II of the Constitution. In a situation however, where the
conflict is irreconcilable and a choice has to be made between a rule of international law
and municipal law, jurisprudence dictates that municipal law should be upheld by the
municipal courts for the reason that such courts are organs of municipal law and are
accordingly bound by it in all circumstances. The fact that international law has been
made part of the law of the land does not pertain to or imply the primacy of international
law over national or municipal law in the municipal sphere. The doctrine of
incorporation, as applied in most countries, decrees that rules of international law are
given e/ual standing with, but are not superior to, national legislative enactments.
6ccordingly, the principle of le* posterior derogat priori takes effect G a treaty may repeal
a statute and a statute may repeal a treaty. In states where the Constitution is the
highest law of the land, such as the Aepublic of the Philippines, both statutes and
treaties may be invalidated if they are in conflict with the Constitution. (ecretary o/
;ustice v. 6on. "alph !. <antion, 7.". >o. '30$#9, ;an. '8, 2&&&, 1n Banc (Melo*+
101. .s soereignty really absol!te and allCenco#passing( .f not$ what are its
restrictions and li#itations(
Held: .hile sovereignty has traditionally been deemed absolute and all%
encompassing on the domestic level, it is however subject to restrictions and limitations
voluntarily agreed to by the Philippines, e"pressly or impliedly, as a member of the family
of nations. Cy the doctrine of incorporation, the country is bound by generally accepted
principles of international law, which are considered to be automatically part of our own
laws. #ne of the oldest and most fundamental rules in international law is pacta s!nt
seranda G international agreements must be performed in good faith. 6 state which has
contracted valid international obligations is bound to make in its legislations such
modifications as may be necessary to ensure the fulfillment of the obligations.
Cy their inherent nature, treaties really limit or restrict the absoluteness of
sovereignty. Cy their voluntary act, nations may surrender some aspects of their state
power in e"change for greater benefits granted by or derived from a convention or pact.
6fter all, states, like individuals, live with coe/uals, and in pursuit of mutually covenanted
objectives and benefits, they also commonly agree to limit the e"ercise of their otherwise
absolute rights. Thus, treaties have been used to record agreements between )tates
concerning such widely diverse matters as, for e"ample, the lease of naval bases, the
sale or cession of territory, the termination of war, the regulation of conduct of hostilities,
the formation of alliances, the regulation of commercial relations, the settling of claims,
the laying down of rules governing conduct in peace and the establishment of
international organi-ations. The sovereignty of a state therefore cannot in fact and in
reality be considered absolute. Certain restrictions enter into the picture4 >1? limitations
imposed by the very nature of membership in the family of nations and >$? limitations
imposed by treaty stipulations. (5ana-a v. Angara, 2%2 !"A '8, May 2, '00%
()angani,an*+
100. ,hat #!st a person who feels aggrieed by the acts of a foreign soereign do to
espo!se his ca!se(
Held: 8nder both Public International !aw and Transnational !aw, a person who
feels aggrieved by the acts of a foreign sovereign can ask his own government to
espouse his cause through diplomatic channels.
Private respondent can ask the Philippine government, through the ,oreign
#ffice, to espouse its claims against the Foly )ee. Its first task is to persuade the
Philippine government to take up with the Foly )ee the validity of its claims. #f course,
the ,oreign #ffice shall first make a determination of the impact of its espousal on the
relations between the Philippine government and the Foly )ee. #nce the Philippine
government decides to espouse the claim, the latter ceases to be a private cause.
6ccording to the Permanent Court of International Bustice, the forerunner of the
International Court of Bustice4
99
0Cy taking up the case of one of its subjects and by resorting to diplomatic
action or international judicial proceedings on his behalf, a )tate is in reality
asserting its own rights G its right to ensure, in the person of its subjects, respect
for the rules of international law.1 (7he )aro##atis Palestine Concessions$ 1
K!dson$ ,orld Co!rt =eports 2/3$ 322 31/2+6)
(6oly ee, 5he v. "osario, ;r., 238 !"A 92$, 933-93$, Dec. ', '00$, 1n Banc
(Cuiason*+
10/. Disc!ss the "tat!s of the Hatican and the Koly "ee in .nternational Law.
Held: Cefore the anne"ation of the Papal )tates by Italy in 1;K<, the Pope was
the monarch and he, as the Foly )ee, was considered a subject of International !aw.
.ith the loss of the Papal )tates and the limitation of the territory under the Foly )ee to
an area of 1<;.K acres, the position of the Foly )ee in International !aw became
controversial.
In 1E$E, Italy and the Foly )ee entered into the !ateran Treaty, where Italy
recogni-ed the e"clusive dominion and sovereign jurisdiction of the Foly )ee over the
Hatican City. It also recogni-ed the right of the Foly )ee to receive foreign diplomats, to
send its own diplomats to foreign countries, and to enter into treaties according to
International !aw.
The !ateran Treaty established the statehood of the Hatican City 0for the purpose
of assuring to the Foly )ee absolute and visible independence and of guaranteeing to it
indisputable sovereignty also in the field of international relations.1
In view of the wordings of the !ateran Treaty, it is difficult to determine whether
the statehood is vested in the Foly )ee or in the Hatican City. )ome writers even
suggested that the treaty created two international persons % the Foly )ee and Hatican
City.
The Hatican City fits into none of the established categories of states, and the
attribution to it of 0sovereignty1 must be made in a sense different from that in which it is
applied to other states. In a community of national states, the Hatican City represents an
entity organi-ed not for political but for ecclesiastical purposes and international objects.
@espite its si-e and object, the Hatican City has an independent government of its own,
with the Pope, who is also head of the Aoman Catholic Church, as the Foly )ee or Fead
of )tate, in conformity with its traditions, and the demands of its mission in the world.
Indeed, the world%wide interests and activities of the Hatican City are such as to make it
in a sense an 0international state.1
#ne authority wrote that the recognition of the Hatican City as a state has
significant implication % that it is possible for any entity pursuing objects essentially
different from those pursued by states to be invested with international personality.
Inasmuch as the Pope prefers to conduct foreign relations and enter into
transactions as the Foly )ee and not in the name of the Hatican City, one can conclude
that in the PopeJs own view, it is the Foly )ee that is the international person.
The Aepublic of the Philippines has accorded the Foly )ee the status of a foreign
sovereign. The Foly )ee, through its 6mbassador, the Papal uncio, has had
diplomatic representations with the Philippine government since 1E9K. This appears to
be the universal practice in international relations. (6oly ee, 5he v. "osario, ;r., 238
!"A 92$, 933-93$, Dec. ', '00$, 1n Banc (Cuiason*+
1/2. ,hat are international organi9ations( Disc!ss their nat!re.
Held: .nternational organi9ations are institutions constituted by international
agreement between two or more )tates to accomplish common goals. The legal
personality of these international organi-ations has been recogni-ed not only in
municipal law, but in international law as well.
100
Permanent international commissions and administrative bodies have been
created by the agreement of a considerable number of )tates for a variety of
international purposes, economic or social and mainly non%political. In so far as they are
autonomous and beyond the control of any one )tate, they have distinct juridical
personality independent of the municipal law of the )tate where they are situated. 6s
such, they are deemed to possess a species of international personality of their own.
(1A:D1!-ACD v. ><"!, 2&# !"A 283, :e,. '$, '002+
1/1. Disc!ss the basic i##!nities of international organi9ations and the reason for
affording the# s!ch i##!nities.
Held: #ne of the basic immunities of an international organi-ation is immunity
from local jurisdiction, i.e.$ that it is immune from legal writs and processes issued by the
tribunals of the country where it is found. The obvious reason for this is that the
subjection of such an organi-ation to the authority of the local courts would afford a
convenient medium through which the host government may interfere in their operations
or even influence or control its policies and decisions3 besides, such subjection to local
jurisdiction would impair the capacity of such body to discharge its responsibilities
impartially on behalf of its member%states. (1A:D1!-ACD v. ><"!, 2&# !"A 283,
:e,. $, '002+
1/2. Disc!ss the two conflicting concepts of soereign i##!nity fro# s!it.
Held: There are two conflicting concepts of sovereign immunity, each widely
held and firmly established. 6ccording to the classical or absolute theory, a sovereign
cannot, without its consent, be made a respondent in the courts of another sovereign.
6ccording to the newer or restrictive theory, the immunity of the sovereign is recogni-ed
only with regard to public acts or acts %!re i#perii of a state, but not with regard to private
acts or acts %!re gestionis.
)ome states passed legislation to serve as guidelines for the e"ecutive or judicial
determination when an act may be considered as %!re gestionis. The 8nited )tates
passed the ,oreign )overeign Immunities 6ct of 1EKL, which defines a commercial
activity as 0either a regular course of commercial conduct or a particular commercial
transaction or act.1 ,urthermore, the law declared that the 0commercial character of the
activity shall be determined by reference to the nature of the course of conduct or
particular transaction or act, rather than by reference to its purpose.1 The Canadian
Parliament enacted in 1E;$ an 6ct to Provide ,or )tate Immunity in Canadian Courts.
The 6ct defines a 0commercial activity1 as any particular transaction, act or conduct or
any regular course of conduct that by reason of its nature, is of a 0commercial character.1
The restrictive theory, which is intended to be a solution to the host of problems
involving the issue of sovereign immunity, has created problems of its own. !egal
treatises and the decisions in countries which follow the restrictive theory have difficulty
in characteri-ing whether a contract of a sovereign state with a private party is an act
%!re gestionis or an act %!re i#perii.
The restrictive theory came about because of the entry of sovereign states into
purely commercial activities remotely connected with the discharge of governmental
functions. This is particularly true with respect to the Communist states which took
control of nationali-ed business activities and international trading. (6oly ee, 5he v.
"osario, ;r., 238 !"A 92$, Dec. ', '00$, 1n Banc (Cuiason*+
1/3. Cite so#e transactions by a foreign state with priate parties that were
considered by the "!pre#e Co!rt as acts :%!re i#perii; and acts :%!re gestionis.;
Held: This Court has considered the following transactions by a foreign state
with private parties as acts %!re i#perii4 >1? the lease by a foreign government of
apartment buildings for use of its military officers ("y8!ia . Lope9$ 0+ Phil. 312 31/+/6)J
>$? the conduct of public bidding for the repair of a wharf at a 8nited )tates aval )tation
(?nited "tates of A#erica . =!i9$ s!pra.)J and >:? the change of employment status of
base employees ("anders . Heridiano$ 162 "C=A 00 31/006).
101
#n the other hand, this Court has considered the following transactions by a
foreign state with private parties as acts %!re gestionis4 >1? the hiring of a cook in the
recreation center, consisting of three restaurants, a cafeteria, a bakery, a store, and a
coffee and pastry shop at the Bohn Fay 6ir )tation in Caguio City, to cater to 6merican
servicemen and the general public (?nited "tates of A#erica . =odrigo$ 102 "C=A 6++
31//26J and >$? the bidding for the operation of barber shops in Clark 6ir Case in 6ngeles
City (?nited "tates of A#erica . B!into$ 102 "C=A 6++ 31//26). The operation of the
restaurants and other facilities open to the general public is undoubtedly for profit as a
commercial and not a governmental activity. Cy entering into the employment contract
with the cook in the discharge of its proprietary function, the 8nited )tates government
impliedly divested itself of it sovereign immunity from suit. (6oly ee, 5he v. "osario,
;r., 238 !"A 92$, Dec. ', '00$, 1n Banc (Cuiason*+
1/+. ,hat sho!ld be the g!idelines to deter#ine what actiities and transactions shall
be considered :co##ercial; and as constit!ting acts :%!re gestionis; by a foreign
state(
Held: In the absence of legislation defining what activities and transactions shall
be considered 0commercial1 and as constituting acts %!re gestionis$ we have to come out
with our own guidelines, tentative they may be.
Certainly, the mere entering into a contract by a foreign state with a private party
cannot be the ultimate test. )uch an act can only be the start of the in/uiry. The logical
/uestion is whether the foreign state is engaged in the activity in the regular course of
business. If the foreign state is not engaged regularly in a business or trade, the
particular act or transaction must then be tested by its nature. If the act is in pursuit of a
sovereign activity, or an incident thereof, then it is an act %!re i#perii$ especially when it
is not undertaken for gain or profit.
6s held in ?nited "tates of A#erica . B!into (s!pra.)4
0There is no /uestion that the 8nited )tates of 6merica, like any other
state, will be deemed to have impliedly waived its non%suability if it has entered
into a contract in its proprietary or private capacity. It is only when the contract
involves its sovereign or governmental capacity that no such waiver may be
implied.1
(6oly ee, 5he v. "osario, ;r., 238 !"A 92$, Dec. ', '00$, 1n Banc (Cuiason*+
1/5. )ay the Koly "ee be s!ed for selling the land it ac8!ired by donation fro# the
Archdiocese of )anila to be #ade site of its #ission or the Apostolic D!nciat!re in
the Philippines b!t which p!rpose cannot be acco#plished as the land was occ!pied
by s8!atters who ref!sed to acate the area(
Held: In the case at bench, if petitioner >Foly )ee? has bought and sold lands in
the ordinary course of a real estate business, surely the said transaction can be
categori-ed as an act %!re gestionis. Fowever, petitioner has denied that the ac/uisition
and subse/uent disposal of !ot 9%6 were made for profit but claimed that it ac/uired said
property for the site of its mission or the 6postolic unciature in the Philippines. & " "
!ot 9%6 was ac/uired by petitioner as a donation from the 6rchdiocese of 5anila.
The donation was made not for commercial purpose, but for the use of petitioner to
construct thereon the official place of residence of the Papal uncio. The right of a
foreign sovereign to ac/uire property, real or personal, in a receiving state, necessary for
the creation and maintenance of its diplomatic mission, is recogni-ed in the 1EL1 Hienna
Convention on @iplomatic Aelations. This treaty was concurred in by the Philippine
)enate and entered into force in the Philippines on ovember 19, 1EL9.
In 6rticle :1>a? of the Convention, a diplomatic envoy is granted immunity from
the civil and administrative jurisdiction of the receiving state over any real action relating
to private immovable property situated in the territory of the receiving state which the
envoy holds on behalf of the sending state for the purposes of the mission. If this
102
immunity is provided for a diplomatic envoy, with all the more reason should immunity be
recogni-ed as regards the sovereign itself, which in this case is the Foly )ee.
The decision to transfer the property and the subse/uent disposal thereof are
likewise clothed with a governmental character. Petitioner did not sell !ot 9%6 for profit
or gain. It merely wanted to dispose off the same because the s/uatters living thereon
made it almost impossible for petitioner to use it for the purpose of the donation. (6oly
ee, 5he v. "osario, ;r., 238 !"A 92$, Dec. ', '00$, 1n Banc (Cuiason*+
1/6. Kow is soereign or diplo#atic i##!nity pleaded in a foreign co!rt(
Held: In Public International !aw, when a state or international agency wishes to
plead sovereign or diplomatic immunity in a foreign court, it re/uests the ,oreign #ffice
of the state where it is sued to convey to the court that said defendant is entitled to
immunity.
In the 8nited )tates, the procedure followed is the process of 0suggestion,1
where the foreign state or the international organi-ation sued in an 6merican court
re/uests the )ecretary of )tate to make a determination as to whether it is entitled to
immunity. If the )ecretary of )tate finds that the defendant is immune from suit, he, in
turn, asks the 6ttorney *eneral to submit to the court a 0suggestion1 that the defendant
is entitled to immunity. In 2ngland, a similar procedure is followed, only the ,oreign
#ffice issues a certification to that effect instead of submitting a 0suggestion1.
In the Philippines, the practice is for the foreign government or the international
organi-ation to first secure an e"ecutive endorsement of its claim of sovereign or
diplomatic immunity. Cut how the Philippine ,oreign #ffice conveys its endorsement to
the courts varies. In .nternational Catholic )igration Co##ission . Calle%a$ 1/2 "C=A
132 (1//2)$ the )ecretary of ,oreign 6ffairs just sent a letter directly to the )ecretary of
!abor and 2mployment, informing the latter that the respondent%employer could not be
sued because it enjoyed diplomatic immunity. In ,orld Kealth Grgani9ation . A8!ino$
+0 "C=A 2+2 (1/12)$ the )ecretary of ,oreign 6ffairs sent the trial court a telegram to
that effect. In 4aer . 7i9on$ 51 "C=A 1 (1/1+)$ the 8.). 2mbassy asked the )ecretary
of ,oreign 6ffairs to re/uest the )olicitor *eneral to make, in behalf of the commander of
the 8nited )tates aval Case at #longapo City, Pambales, a 0suggestion1 to respondent
Budge. The )olicitor *eneral embodied the 0suggestion1 in a 5anifestation and
5emorandum as a#ic!s c!riae.
In the case at bench, the @epartment of ,oreign 6ffairs, through the #ffice of
!egal 6ffairs moved with this Court to be allowed to intervene on the side of petitioner.
The Court allowed the said @epartment to file its memorandum in support of petitioner+s
claim of sovereign immunity.
In some cases, the defense of sovereign immunity was submitted directly to the
local courts by the respondents through their private counsels. In cases where the
foreign states bypass the ,oreign #ffice, the courts can in/uire into the facts and make
their own determination as to the nature of the acts and transactions involved. (6oly
ee, 5he v. "osario, ;r., 238 !"A 92$, Dec. ', '00$, 1n Banc (Cuiason*+
1/1. .s the deter#ination of the e*ec!tie branch of the goern#ent that a state or
instr!#entality is entitled to soereign or diplo#atic i##!nity s!b%ect to %!dicial
reiew$ or is it a political 8!estion and therefore$ concl!sie !pon the co!rts(
Held: The issue of petitioner+s >The Foly )ee? non%suability can be determined
by the trial court without going to trial in light of the pleadings " " ". Cesides, the
privilege of sovereign immunity in this case was sufficiently established by the
5emorandum and Certification of the @epartment of ,oreign 6ffairs. 6s the department
tasked with the conduct of the Philippines+ foreign relations, the @epartment of ,oreign
6ffairs has formally intervened in this case and officially certified that the 2mbassy of the
Foly )ee is a duly accredited diplomatic mission to the Aepublic of the Philippines
e"empt from local jurisdiction and entitled to all the rights, privileges and immunities of a
diplomatic mission or embassy in this country. The determination of the e"ecutive arm of
103
government that a state or instrumentality is entitled to sovereign or diplomatic immunity
is a political /uestion that is conclusive upon the courts. .here the plea of immunity is
recogni-ed and affirmed by the e"ecutive branch, it is the duty of the courts to accept
this claim so as not to embarrass the e"ecutive arm of the government in conducting the
country+s foreign relations. 6s in .nternational Catholic )igration Co##ission and in
,orld Kealth Grgani9ation$ we abide by the certification of the @epartment of ,oreign
6ffairs. (6oly ee, 5he v. "osario, ;r., 238 !"A 92$, Dec. ', '00$, 1n Banc
(Cuiason*+
1/0. ,hat is e*tradition( 7o who# does it apply(
Held: It is the 0process by which persons charged with or convicted of crime
against the law of a )tate and found in a foreign )tate are returned by the latter to the
former for trial or punishment. It applies to those who are merely charged with an
offense but have not been brought to trial3 to those who have been tried and convicted
and have subse/uently escaped from custody3 and those who have been convicted in
absentia. It does not apply to persons merely suspected of having committed an offense
but against whom no charge has been laid or to a person whose presence is desired as
a witness or for obtaining or enforcing a civil judgment.1 (2eston, :al3, DG Amato,
International <aF an- .r-er, 2
n-
e-., p. #3& ('00&*, cite- in Dissenting .pinion,
)uno, ;., in ecretary o/ ;ustice v. 6on. "alph !. <antion, 7.". >o. '30$#9, ;an.
'8, 2&&&, 1n Banc+
1//. Disc!ss the basis for allowing e*tradition.
Held: 2"tradition was first practiced by the 2gyptians, Chinese, Chaldeans and
6ssyro%Cabylonians but their basis for allowing e"tradition was unclear. )ometimes, it
was granted due to pacts3 at other times, due to plain good will. The classical
co##entators on international law thus focused their early views on the nat!re of the
d!ty to surrender an e"traditee %%% whether the duty is legal or moral in character.
*rotius and Hattel led the school of thought that international law imposed a legal d!ty
called ciitas #a*i#a to e"tradite criminals. In sharp contrast, Puffendorf and Cillot led
the school of thought that the so%called duty was but an @i#perfect obligation which could
become enforceable only by a contract or agreement between states.
5odern nations tilted towards the view of Puffendorf and Cillot that under
international law there is no duty to e"tradite in the absence of treaty, whether bilateral or
multilateral. Thus, the 8) )upreme Court in ?" . =a!scher (11/ ?" +21$ +11$ 1 " Ct.
23+$ 236$ 32 L. ed. +25 310066)$ held4 0" " " it is only in #odern ti#es that the nations of
the earth have imposed upon themselves the obligation of delivering up these fugitives
from justice to the states where their crimes were committed, for trial and punishment.
This has been done generally by treaties " " " Prior to these treaties, and apart from
them there was no well%defined obligation on one country to deliver up such fugitives to
another3 and though such delivery was often made it was upon the principle of comity " "
".1 (Dissenting .pinion, )uno, ;., in ecretary o/ ;ustice v. 6on. "alph !. <antion,
7.". >o. '30$#9, ;an. '8, 2&&&, 1n Banc+
222. ,hat is the nat!re of an e*tradition proceeding( .s it a&in to a cri#inal
proceeding(
Held: '6(n e"tradition proceeding is s!i generis. It is not a cri#inal proceeding
which will call into operation all the rights of an accused as guaranteed by the Cill of
Aights. To begin with, the process of e*tradition does not inole the deter#ination of
the g!ilt or innocence of an acc!sed. Fis guilt or innocence will be adjudged in the court
of the state where he will be e"tradited. Fence, as a rule, constitutional rights that are
only relevant to determine the guilt or innocence of an accused cannot be invoked by an
e"traditee especially by one whose e"tradition papers are still undergoing evaluation. 6s
held by the 8) )upreme Court in ?nited "tates . BalanisF
06n e"tradition proceeding is not a criminal prosecution, and the
constitutional safeguards that accompany a criminal trial in this country do not
shield an accused from e"tradition pursuant to a valid treaty.1 (,iehl$ -*tradition
104
Law at the CrossroadsF 7he 7rend 7oward -*tending Breater Constit!tional
Proced!ral Protections 7o >!gities >ighting -*tradition fro# the ?nited "tates$
1/ )ichigan Eo!rnal of .nternational Law 12/$ 1+1 31//06$ citing ?nited "tates .
Balanis$ +2/ >. "!pp. 1215 3D. Conn. 1/116)
There are other differences between an e"tradition proceeding and a criminal
proceeding. 6n e"tradition proceeding is summary in natural while criminal proceedings
involve a full%blown trial. In contradistinction to a criminal proceeding, the rules of
evidence in an e"tradition proceeding allow admission of evidence under less stringent
standards. In terms of the /uantum of evidence to be satisfied, a criminal case re/uires
proof beyond reasonable doubt for conviction while a fugitive may be ordered e"tradited
0upon showing of the e"istence of a prima facie case.1 ,inally, unlike in a criminal case
where judgment becomes e"ecutory upon being rendered final, in an e"tradition
proceeding, our courts may adjudge an individual e"traditable but the President has the
final discretion to e"tradite him. The 8nited )tates adheres to a similar practice whereby
the )ecretary of )tate e"ercises wide discretion in balancing the e/uities of the case and
the demands of the nationJs foreign relations before making the ultimate decision to
e"tradite.
As an e*tradition proceeding is not cri#inal in character and the eal!ation stage
in an e*tradition proceeding is not a&in to a preli#inary inestigation$ the d!e process
safeg!ards in the latter do not necessarily apply to the for#er. This we hold for the
procedural due process re/uired by a given set of circumstances 0must begin with a
determination of the precise nat!re of the goern#ent f!nction inoled as well as the
priate interest that has been affected by goern#ental action.; The concept of due
process is fle*ible for 0not all situations calling for procedural safeguards call for the
same kind of procedure.1 (ecretary o/ ;ustice v. 6on. "alph !. <antion, 7.". >o.
'30$#9, .ct. '%, 2&&&, 1n Banc ()uno*+
221. ,ill the retroactie application of an e*tradition treaty iolate the constit!tional
prohibition against @e* post facto@ laws(
Held: The prohibition against e* post facto law applies only to criminal
legislation which affects the substantial rights of the accused. This being so, there is no
merit in the contention that the ruling sustaining an e"tradition treaty+s retroactive
application violates the constitutional prohibition against e* post facto laws. The treaty is
neither a piece of criminal legislation nor a criminal procedural statute. (2right v. !A,
239 !"A 3$', Aug. '9, '00$ (Aapunan*+
222. Disc!ss the r!les in the interpretation of e*tradition treaties.
Held: '6(ll treaties, including the AP%8) 2"tradition Treaty, should be interpreted
in light of their intent. othing less than the Hienna Conention on the Law of 7reaties to
which the Philippines is a signatory provides that 0a treaty shall be interpreted in good
faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in
their conte"t and in light of its ob%ect and p!rpose.1 & " ". It cannot be gainsaid that
today, countries like the Philippines forge e"tradition treaties to arrest the dramatic rise
of international and transnational crimes like terrorism and drug trafficking. 2"tradition
treaties provide the assurance that the punishment of these crimes will not be frustrated
by the frontiers of territorial sovereignty. Implicit in the treaties should be the unbending
commitment that the perpetrators of these crimes will not be coddled by any signatory
state.
It ought to follow that the AP%8) 2"tradition Treaty calls for an interpretation that
will minimi-e if not prevent the escape of e"traditees from the long arm of the law and
e"pedite their trial. & " "
'6(n e/ually compelling factor to consider is the !nderstanding of the parties
themselves to the AP%8) 2"tradition Treaty as well as the general interpretation of the
iss!e in 8!estion by other co!ntries with si#ilar treaties with the Philippines. The rule is
recogni-ed that while courts have the power to interpret treaties, the meaning given
them by the departments of government particularly charged with their negotiation and
105
enforcement is accorded great weight. The reason for the rule is laid down in "antos ...
. Dorthwest Grient Airlines$ et al. (212 "C=A 256$ 261 31//26), where we stressed that a
treaty is a joint e"ecutive%legislative act which enjoys the presumption that 0it was first
carefully studied and determined to be constitutional before it was adopted and given the
force of law in the country.1 (ecretary o/ ;ustice v. 6on. "alph !. <antion, 7.". >o.
'30$#9, .ct. '%, 2&&&, 1n Banc ()uno*+
223. ,hat is a 7reaty( Disc!ss.
Held: 6 treaty, as defined by the Hienna Conention on the Law of 7reaties, is
0an international instrument concluded between )tates in written form and governed by
international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related
instruments, and whatever its particular designation.1 There are many other terms used
for a treaty or international agreement, some of which are4 act, protocol, agreement,
co#pro#is dQ arbitrage, concordat, convention, declaration, e"change of notes, pact,
statute, charter and #od!s iendi. 6ll writers, from Fugo *rotius onward, have pointed
out that the names or titles of international agreements included under the general term
treaty have little or no significance. Certain terms are useful, but they furnish little more
than mere description
6rticle $>$? of the Hienna Convention provides that 0the provisions of paragraph 1
regarding the use of terms in the present Convention are without prejudice to the use of
those terms, or to the meanings which may be given to them in the internal law of the
)tate.1 (BADA> (Bagong Alyansang Ma3a,ayan* v. 1?ecutive ecretary "onal-o
Kamora, 7.". >o. '389%&, .ct. '&, 2&&&, 1n Banc (Buena*+
22+. Disc!ss the binding effect of treaties and e*ec!tie agree#ents in international
law.
Held: 'I(n international law, there is no difference between treaties and e"ecutive
agreements in their binding effect upon states concerned, as long as the functionaries
have remained within their powers. International law continues to make no distinction
between treaties and e"ecutive agreements4 they are e/ually binding obligations upon
nations. (BADA> (Bagong Alyansang Ma3a,ayan* v. 1?ecutive ecretary "onal-o
Kamora, 7.". >o. '389%&, .ct. '&, 2&&&, 1n Banc (Buena*+
225. Does the Philippines recogni9e the binding effect of e*ec!tie agree#ents een
witho!t the conc!rrence of the "enate or Congress(
Held: In our jurisdiction, we have recogni-ed the binding effect of e"ecutive
agreements even without the concurrence of the )enate or Congress. In Co##issioner
of C!sto#s . -astern "ea 7rading (3 "C=A 351$ 356C351 31/616)$ we had occasion to
pronounce4
0" " " the right of the 2"ecutive to enter into binding agreements witho!t
the necessity of subse/uent Congressional approval has been confir#ed by long
!sage. ,rom the earliest days of our history we have entered into e"ecutive
agreements covering such subjects as commercial and consular relations, most%
favored%nation rights, patent rights, trademark and copyright protection, postal
and navigation arrangements and the settlement of claims. 7he alidity of these
has neer been serio!sly 8!estioned by o!r co!rts. @
(BADA> (Bagong Alyansang Ma3a,ayan* v. 1?ecutive ecretary "onal-o Kamora,
7.". >o. '389%&, .ct. '&, 2&&&, 1n Banc (Buena*+
226. ,hat is a @protocol de clot!re@( ,ill it re8!ire conc!rrence by the "enate(
Held: 6 final act, sometimes called protocol de clot!re$ is an instrument which
records the winding up of the proceedings of a diplomatic conference and usually
includes a reproduction of the te"ts of treaties, conventions, recommendations and other
acts agreed upon and signed by the plenipotentiaries attending the conference. It is not
the treaty itself. It is rather a summary of the proceedings of a protracted conference
which may have taken place over several years. It will not re/uire the concurrence of
106
the )enate. The documents contained therein are deemed adopted without need for
ratification. (5ana-a v. Angara, 2%2 !"A '8, May 2, '00% ()angani,an*+
221. ,hat is the :#ostCfaoredCnation; cla!se( ,hat is its p!rpose(
An&wer: 1. The most%favored%nation clause may be defined, in general, as a
pledge by a contracting party to a treaty to grant to the other party treatment not less
favorable than that which has been or may be granted to the 0most favored1 among
other countries. The clause has been commonly included in treaties of commercial
nature.
There are generally two types of most%favored%nation clause, namely, conditional
and unconditional. 6ccording to the clause in its unconditional form, any advantage of
whatever kind which has been or may in future be granted by either of the contracting
parties to a third )tate shall simultaneously and unconditionally be e"tended to the other
under the same or e/uivalent conditions as those under which it has been granted to the
third )tate. (alonga L Dap, )u,lic International <aF, 9
th
1-ition, '002, pp. '$'-'$2+
$. The purpose of a most favored nation clause is to grant to the contracting
party treatment not less favorable than that which has been or may be granted to the
=most favored= among other countries. The most favored nation clause is intended to
establish the principle of e/uality of international treatment by providing that the citi-ens
or subjects of the contracting nations may enjoy the privileges accorded by either party
to those of the most favored nation (!ommissioner o/ Internal "evenue v. .!.
;ohnson an- on, Inc., 3&0 !"A 8%, '&%-'&8, ;une 29, '000, 3
r-
Div. (7on8aga-
"eyes*+
220. ,hat is the essence of the principle behind the @#ostCfaoredCnation@ cla!se as
applied to ta* treaties(
Held: The essence of the principle is to allow the ta"payer in one state to avail
of more liberal provisions granted in another ta" treaty to which the country of residence
of such ta"payer is also a party provided that the subject matter of ta"ation " " " is the
same as that in the ta" treaty under which the ta"payer is liable.
In !ommissioner o/ Internal "evenue v. .!. ;ohnson an- on, Inc., 3&0
!"A 8%, ;une 29, '000, the )C did not grant the claim filed by ).C. Bohnson and )on,
Inc., a non%resident foreign corporation based in the 8)6, with the CIA for refund of
overpaid withholding ta" on royalties pursuant to the most%favored%nation clause of the
AP%8) Ta" Treaty in relation to the AP%.est *ermany Ta" Treaty. It held4
*iven the purpose underlying ta" treaties and the rationale for the most
favored nation clause, the concessional ta" rate of 1< percent provided for in the
AP%*ermany Ta" Treaty should apply only if the ta"es imposed upon royalties in
the AP%8) Ta" Treaty and in the AP%*ermany Ta" Treaty are paid under similar
circumstances. This would mean that private respondent >).C. Bohnson and
)on, Inc.? must prove that the AP%8) Ta" Treaty grants similar ta" reliefs to
residents of the 8nited )tates in respect of the ta"es imposable upon royalties
earned from sources within the Philippines as those allowed to their *erman
counterparts under the AP%*ermany Ta" Treaty.
The AP%8) and the AP%.est *ermany Ta" Treaties do not contain
similar provisions on ta" crediting. 6rticle $D of the AP%*ermany Ta" Treaty " " "
e"pressly allows crediting against *erman income and corporation ta" of $<M of
the gross amount of royalties paid under the law of the Philippines. #n the other
hand, 6rticle $: of the AP%8) Ta" Treaty, which is the counterpart provision with
respect to relief for double ta"ation, does not provide for similar crediting of $<M
of the gross amount of royalties paid. & " "
& " " The entitlement of the 1<M rate by 8.). firms despite the absence
of matching credit >$<M for royalties? would derogate from the design behind the
most favored nation clause to grant e/uality of international treatment since the
107
ta" burden laid upon the income of the investor is not the same in the two
countries. The similarity in the circumstances of payment of ta"es is a condition
for the enjoyment of most favored nation treatment precisely to underscore the
need for e/uality of treatment.
22/. ,hat is ratification( Disc!ss its f!nction in the treatyC#a&ing process.
Held: Aatification is generally held to be an e"ecutive act, undertaken by the
head of state or of the government, as the case may be, through which the formal
acceptance of the treaty is proclaimed. 6 )tate may provide in its domestic legislation
the process of ratification of a treaty. The consent of the )tate to be bound by a treaty is
e"pressed by ratification when4 >a? the treaty provides for such ratification, >b? it is
otherwise established that the negotiating )tates agreed that ratification should be
re/uired, >c? the representative of the )tate has signed the treaty subject to ratification,
or >d? the intention of the )tate to sign the treaty subject to ratification appears from the
full powers of its representative, or was e"pressed during the negotiation. (BADA>
(Bagong Alyansang Ma3a,ayan* v. 1?ecutive ecretary "onal-o Kamora, 7.". >o.
'389%&, .ct. '&, 2&&&, 1n Banc (Buena*+
212. -*plain the :pacta s!nt seranda; r!le.
Held: #ne of the oldest and most fundamental rules in international law is pacta
s!nt seranda S international agreements must be performed in good faith. 06 treaty
engagement is not a mere moral obligation but creates a legally binding obligation on the
parties " " ". 6 state which has contracted valid international obligations is bound to
make in its legislations such modifications as may be necessary to ensure the fulfillment
of the obligations undertaken.1 (5ana-a v. Angara, 2%2 !"A '8, May 2, '00%
()angani,an*+
211. -*plain the @reb!s sic stantib!s@ r!le (i.e.$ things re#aining as they are). Does it
operate a!to#atically to render a treaty inoperatie(
Held: 6ccording to Eess!p, the doctrine constitutes an attempt to formulate a
legal principle which would justify non%performance of a treaty obligation if the conditions
with relation to which the parties contracted have changed so materially and so
une"pectedly as to create a situation in which the e"action of performance would be
unreasonable. The key element of this doctrine is the vital change in the condition of the
contracting parties that they could not have foreseen at the time the treaty was
concluded.
The doctrine of reb!s sic stantib!s does not operate automatically to render the
treaty inoperative. There is a necessity for a formal act of rejection, usually made by the
head of state, with a statement of the reasons why compliance with the treaty is no
longer re/uired. (antos III v. >orthFest .rient Airlines, 2'& !"A 29#, ;une 23,
'002+
212. ,hat is the :doctrine of effectie nationality; (gen!ine lin& doctrine)(
Held: This principle is e"pressed in Article 5 of the Kag!e Conention of 1/32
on the Conflict of Dationality Laws as follows4
6rt. 9. .ithin a third )tate a person having more than one nationality
shall be treated as if he had only one. .ithout prejudice to the application of its
law in matters of personal status and of any convention in force, a third )tate
shall, of the nationalities which any such person possesses, recogni-e
e"clusively in its territory either the nationality of the country in which he is
habitually and principally resident or the nationality of the country with which in
the circumstances he appears to be in fact most closely connected. (:rival-o v.
!.M1<1!, '%$ !"A 2$9, ;une 23, '080+

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