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People of the Philippines v. Hon. Judge Palma and Romulo Intia y Morada
Case No. 219 G.R. No. L-44113 (March 31, 1977) Chapter I, Page 2, Footnote No.3

Primicias v. Municipality of Urdaneta
Case No. 244 G.R. No. L-26702 (October 18, 1979) Chapter I, Page 4, Footnote

FACTS: Private Respondent Romulo, 17 years of age, was charged with vagrancy.
Respondent Judge dismissed the case on the ground that her court “has no
jurisdiction to take further cognizance of this case” without prejudice to the re-filing
thereof in the Juvenile Court, because he believed that jurisdiction over 16 years
olds up to under 21 was transferred to the Juvenile Court by the issuance of PD 603
or the Child and Youth Welfare Code, which defines youthful offenders as those
over 9 years of age but under 21 at the time of the commission of the offense.
ISSUE: W/N the issuance of PD 603 transferred the case of the accused from the
regular courts to the Juvenile Court. HELD: The Juvenile and Domestic Relations
Court expressly confers upon it a special and limited jurisdiction over “criminal
cases wherein the accused is under 16 years of age at the time of the filing of the
case”. The subsequent issuance of PD 603 known as the Child and Youth Welfare
Code and defines a youth offender as “one who is over 9 years of age but under 21
at the time of the commission of the offense” did not by such definition transfer
jurisdiction over criminal cases involving accused who are 16 and under 21 years of
age from the regular courts to the Juvenile Court. LATIN MAXIM: 35

FACTS: Petitioner, while driving his car in the jurisdiction of Urdaneta, was charged
with violation of Ordinance No. 3, Series of 1964, “particularly, for overtaking a
truck”. Petitioner initiated an action for annulment of said ordinance and prayed for
the issuance of preliminary injunction for restraining Respondent from enforcing the
said ordinance. ISSUE: W/N Ordinance No. 3, Series of 1964, by the Municipality of
Urdaneta, Pangasinan is valid. HELD: No. Ordinance No. 3 is said to be patterned
after and based on Section 53 of Act No. 3992. However, Act No. 3992 has been
explicitly repealed by RA No. 4136 (The Land and Transportation Code). By this
express repeal, the general rule is that a later law prevails over an earlier law. Also,
an essential requisite for a valid ordinance is that it “must not contravene … the
statute” for it is fundamental principle that municipal ordinances are inferior in
status and subordinate to the laws of the state. LATIN MAXIM: 4, 6c, 49

3 Casco Philippine Chemical Co. Inc., v. Hon. Pedro Gimenez
Case No. 48 G.R. No. L-17931 (February 28, 1963) Chapter I, Page 9, Footnote

Astorga v. Villegas
Case No. 23 G.R. No. L-23475 (April 30, 1974) Chapter I, Page 11, Footnote No.37

FACTS: Petitioner was engaged in the manufacture of synthetic resin glues. It
sought the refund of the margin fees relying on RA 2609 (Foreign Exchange Margin
Fee Law) stating that the Central Bank of the Philippines fixed a uniform margin fee
of 25% on foreign exchange transactions. However, the Auditor of the Bank refused
to pass in audit and approved the said refunds upon the ground that Petitioner’s
separate importations of urea and formaldehyde is not in accord with the provisions
of Sec. 2, par. 18 of RA 2609. The pertinent portion of this statute reads: “The
margin established by the Monetary Board … shall be imposed upon the sale of
foreign exchange for the importation of the following: “XVIII. Urea formaldehyde
for the manufacture of plywood and hardwood when imported by and for the
exclusive use of end-users.” ISSUE: W/N “urea” and “formaldehyde” are exempt by
law from the payment of the margin fee.

FACTS: House Bill No. 9266 was passed from the House of Representatives to the
Senate. Senator Arturo Tolentino made substantial amendments which were
approved by the Senate. The House, without notice of said amendments, thereafter
signed its approval until all the presiding officers of both houses certified and
attested to the bill. The President also signed it and thereupon became RA 4065.
Senator Tolentino made a press statement that the enrolled copy of House Bill No.
9266 was a wrong version of the bill because it did not embody the amendments
introduced by him and approved by the Senate. Both the Senate President and the
President withdrew their signatures and denounced RA 4065 as invalid. Petitioner
argued that the authentication of the presiding officers of the Congress is
conclusive proof of a bill’s due enactment. ISSUE: W/N House Bill No. 9266 is
considered enacted and valid. HELD: Since both the Senate President and the Chief
Executive withdrew their signatures therein, the court declared that the bill was not
duly enacted and therefore did not become a law. The Constitution requires that
each House shall keep a journal. An importance of having a journal is that in the
absence of attestation or evidence of the bill’s due enactment, the court may resort
to the journals of the Congress to verify such. “Where the journal discloses that
substantial amendment were introduced and approved and were not incorporated in
the printed text sent to the President for signature, the court can declare that the
bill has not been duly enacted and did not become a law.” LATIN MAXIM: b2

HELD: The term “urea formaldehyde” used in Sec. 2 of RA 2609 refers to the
finished product as expressed by the National Institute of Science and Technology,
and is distinct and separate from “urea and formaldehyde” which are separate
chemicals used in the manufacture of synthetic resin. The one mentioned in the law
is a finished product, while the ones imported by the Petitioner are raw materials.
Hence, the importation of “urea” and “formaldehyde” is not exempt from the
imposition of the margin fee. LATIN MAXIM: 2a, 6c, 25a

4 Ichong, etc., et al. v. Hernandez, etc., and Sarmiento
Case No. 133 G.R. No. L-7995 (May 31, 1957) Chapter I, Page 11, Footnote No.42

Municipality of Jose Panganiban v. Shell Co. of the Philippines
Case No. 181 G.R. No. L-25716 (July 28, 1966) Chapter I, Page 11, Footnote No.42

FACTS: Petitioner is a Chinese merchant who questions the constitutionality of RA
1180 “An Act to Regulate the Retail Business” on the following grounds: a) It is a
violation of the Equal Protection of the Law Clause, denies them of their liberty,
property and due process of law 2) It is a violation of the constitutional requirement
that a bill’s title must reflect the subject matter of the same because “regulate”
does not really mean “nationalize” and “prohibit” 3) the Act violates International
treaties and Laws ISSUE: W/N RA 1180 is constitutional. HELD: RA 1180 is
constitutional. In the abovementioned case, what has been pointed out is the
constitutional requirement that “A bill shall embrace only one subject as expressed
in its title.” This is to prohibit duplicity in legislation because the title must be able
to apprise legislators and the public about the nature, scope, and consequences of
that particular law. Constitution precludes the encroaching of one department to
the responsibilities of the other departments. The legislature is primarily the judge
of necessity, adequacy, wisdom, reasonableness, and expediency of the law, and
the courts have no jurisdiction to question this. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 24a, d

FACTS: This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila
dismissing the Plaintiff’s complaint for the collection of sales taxes from Defendant
on the ground that the law which authorizes collection of the same is
unconstitutional. Defendant Company refused to pay taxes accruing from its sales
because according to them the taxable sites of the property sought to be taxed is
not the said Municipality. According to the Defendant, RA 1435 or Act to Provide
Means for Increasing Highway Special Fund is unconstitutional because it embraces
two subjects which are 1)amendment of the tax code, and 2) grant of taxing power
to the local government, and makes reference to Road and Bridge Fund. ISSUE:
W/N RA 1435 is constitutional. HELD: RA 1435 is constitutional because it embraces
only one subject reflected by its title “Road and Bridge Fund.” Statutory definition
prevails over ordinary usage of the term. The constitutional requirement as to the
title of the bill must be liberally construed. It should not be technically or narrowly
construed as to impede the power of legislation. When there is doubt as to its
validity, it must be resolved against the doubt and in favor of its validity. In the
abovementioned cases, what is pointed out is the constitutional requirement that “A
bill shall embrace only one subject, expressed in its title.” This is to prohibit
duplicity in legislation because the title must be able to apprise legislators and the
public about the nature, scope, and consequences of that particular law. LATIN
MAXIM: 12a, 37, d

5 People of the Philippines v. Buenviaje
Case No. 203 G.R. No. L-22945 (March 3, 1925) Chapter I, Page 12, Footnote

Alalayan v. National Power Corporation
Case No. 8 G.R. No. L-24396 (July 29, 1968) Chapter I, Page 12, Footnote No.46

FACTS: Defendant appeals the ruling of the trial court finding her guilty for the
violation of “illegal practice of medicine” and “illegally advertising oneself as a
doctor.” Defendant practices chiropractic although she has not secured a certificate
to practice medicine. She ‘treated and manipulated’ the head and body of Regino
Noble. She also contends that practice of chiropractic has nothing to do with
medicine and that unauthorized use of title of “doctor” should be understood to
refer to “doctor of medicine” and not to doctors of chiropractic, and lastly, that Act
3111 is unconstitutional as it does not express its subject. ISSUE: W/N
“chiropractic” is included in the term “practice of medicine” under Medical laws
provided in the Revised Administrative Code. HELD: Act 3111 is constitutional as
the title “An Act to Amend (enumeration of sections to be amended)” is sufficient
and it need not include the subject matter of each section. ‘Chiropractic’ is included
in the ‘practice of medicine.’ Statutory definition prevails over ordinary usage of the
term. The constitutional requirement as to the title of the bill must be liberally
construed. It should not be technically or narrowly construed as to impede the
power of legislation. When there is doubt as to its validity, it must be resolved
against the doubt and in favor of its validity. “A bill shall embrace only one subject,
expressed in its title,” to prohibit duplicity in legislation by apprising legislators and
the public about the nature, scope, and consequences of the law. LATIN MAXIM:
2a, 7a, 25c, 37, d

FACTS: Republic Act No. 3043 is entitled “An Act to Further Amend Commonwealth
Act No. 121”. In Section 3 of the same act, Respondent is empowered, in any
franchise contract for the supply of electric power constituting 50% of the electric
power and energy of that franchisee, to realize a net profit of not more than 12%
annually of its investments plus 2-month operating expenses; and NPC is allowed to
renew all existing franchise contracts so that the provisions of the act could be
given effect. ISSUE: W/N Section 3 is a subject which the bill title “An Act to
Further Amend Commonwealth Act No. 121” does not embrace, thus making it a
rider because it is violative of the constitutional provision requiring that “a bill,
which may be enacted into law, cannot embrace more than one subject, which shall
be expressed in its title.” HELD: Section 3 is constitutional. Republic Act 3043 is an
amendatory act. It is sufficient that the title makes reference to the legislation to be
amended (in this case Commonwealth Act 121). Constitutional provision is satisfied
if title is comprehensive enough to include the general object which the statute
seeks to effect without expressing each and every ends and means necessary for its
accomplishment. Title doesn’t need to be a complete index of the contents of the
act. LATIN MAXIM: 24a, 37, d

6 Cordero v. Hon. Cabatuando
Case No. 81 G.R. No. L-14542 (October 31, 1962) Chapter I, Page 12, Footnote

Tobias v. Abalos
Case No. 291 G.R. No. L-114783 (December 8, 1994) Chapter I, Page 12, Footnote

FACTS: Republic Act No. 1199 is the Agricultural Tenancy Act of the Philippines.
Section 54 of this act expressed that indigent tenants should be represented by
Public Defendant of Department of Labor. Congress then amended this in Republic
Act No. 2263: “An Act Amending Certain Sections of Republic Act No. 1199.”
Section 19 of the amendatory act says that mediation of tenancy disputes falls
under authority of Secretary of Justice. Section 20 also provides that indigent
tenants shall be represented by trial attorney of the Tenancy Mediation
Commission. ISSUE: W/N Sections 19 and 20 of Rep. Act No. 2263 is
unconstitutional because of the constitutional provision that “No bill which may be
enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in
the title of the bill.” HELD: Sections 19 and 20 are constitutional. The constitutional
requirement is complied with as long the law has a single general subject, which is
the Agricultural Tenancy Act, and the amendatory provisions no matter how diverse
they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general
subject, will be regarded as valid. Constitutional provisions relating to subject
matter and titles of statutes should not be so narrowly construed as to cripple or
impede proper legislation. LATIN MAXIM: 24a, 37, d

FACTS: Petitioners assail the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7675, otherwise
known as "An Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly
Urbanized City to be known as the City of Mandaluyong” because Article VIII,
Section 49 of this act provided that the congressional district of San Juan/
Mandaluyong shall be split into two separate districts. ISSUE: W/N the aforestated
subject is germane to the subject matter of R.A. No. 7675. HELD: RA 7675 is
constitutional. Contrary to Petitioners' assertion, the creation of a separate
congressional district for Mandaluyong is not a subject separate and distinct from
the subject of its conversion into a highly urbanized city but is a natural and logical
consequence of its conversion into a highly urbanized city Moreover, a liberal
construction of the "one title-one subject" rule has been invariably adopted by this
court so as not to cripple or impede legislation. The Constitution does not require
Congress to employ in the title of an enactment, language of such precision as to
mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the minute details therein.

7 Ayson and Ignacio v. Provincial Board of Rizal
Case No. 11 G.R. No. 14019 (July 26, 1919)

Lidasan v. Commission on Elections
Case No. 148 G.R. No. L-28089 (October 25, 1967) Chapter I, Page 13, Footnote

FACTS: The municipal council of Navotas, Rizal adopted its Ordinance No. 13,
section 2 of which provided that “all owners and proprietors of the industry known
as fishing, with nets denominated ‘cuakit’ and ‘pantukos,’ before engaging in fishing
in the bay of this jurisdiction within three leagues from the shore-line of this
municipality, are obliged to provide themselves with a license issued by this
municipal government, after payment of a fee of P50 annually, payable every three
months.” The authority for the enactment of the ordinance was from section 2270
of the Administrative Code. ISSUE: W/N Section 2270 of the Administrative Code of
1916, now Section 2324 of the Administrative Code of 1917, is invalid. HELD:
Section 2270 of the Administrative Code of 1916, now section 2323 of the
Administrative Code of 1917 is valid. It does not violate Paragraph 17, section 5 of
the Philippine Bill which provided “that no private or local bill which may be enacted
into law shall embrace more than one subject, and that subject shall be expressed
in the title of the bill” because the Administrative Code is neither a private nor a
local bill. The Administrative Code of 1917 has for its title, “An Act amending the
Administrative Code.” It does not violate Paragraph 17, section 3 of the Jones Law,
which provided “that no bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more
than one subject and that subject shall be expressed in the title of the bill,” because
it was merely a revision of the provisions of the Administrative Code enacted for the
purpose of adapting it to the Jones Law and the Reorganization Act. LATIN MAXIM:

FACTS: Petitioner challenged Republic Act 4790, which is entitled “An Act Creating
the Municipality of Dianaton in the Province of Lanao del Sur” as unconstitutional on
the ground that it includes barrios located in another province, which is Cotabato,
violating the constitutional mandate that “No bill which may be enacted into law
shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the
bill.” This question was initially presented to the Respondents, which adopted a
resolution in favor of RA 4790, prompted by the upcoming elections. ISSUE: W/N
Republic Act 4790 is constitutional. HELD: Republic Act 4790 is null and void. The
title “An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton, in the Province of Lanao del Sur”
projects the impression that solely the province of Lanao del Sur is affected by the
creation of Dianaton. Not the slightest intimation is there that communities in the
adjacent province of Cotabato are incorporated in this new Lanao del Sur town. The
phrase “in the Province of Lanao del Sur” makes the title misleading and deceptive.
The title did not inform the members of the Congress as to the full impact of the
law; it did not apprise the people in the towns of Cotabato that were affected by the
law, and the province of Cotabato itself that part of their territory is being taken
away from their towns and provinces and added to the adjacent Province of Lanao
del Sur; it kept the public in the dark as to what towns and provinces were actually
affected by the bill. These are the pressures which heavily weigh against the
constitutionality of Republic Act 4790. LATIN MAXIM: d

8 Manila Trading & Supply Co. v. Reyes
Case No. 169 G.R. No. 43263 (October 31, 1935) Chapter I, Page 13, Footnote No.

People of the Philippines v. Ferrer
Case No. 208 G.R. No. L-32613-14 (December 27, 1972) Chapter I, Page 13,
Footnote No.50

FACTS: Respondent executed a chattel mortgage in favor of Petitioner. He failed to
pay some of the installments. Petitioner proceeded to foreclose its chattel
mortgage. The mortgaged property was sold at a public auction by the sheriff of the
City of Manila. After applying this sum, with interest, costs, and liquidated damages
to Respondent’s indebtedness, the latter owed the company a balance of P275.47
with interest. The company instituted an action for recovery when he failed to pay
the deficiency of the debt. He pleaded as a defense that the company, having
chosen to foreclose its chattel mortgage, had no further action against him for the
recovery of the unpaid balance owed by him, as provided by Act No. 4122. ISSUE:
W/N Act No. 4122, entitled “An Act to amend the Civil Code by inserting between
Sections fourteen hundred and fifty-four and fourteen hundred and fifty-five thereof
a new section, to be known as section fourteen hundred and fifty-four-A,” is valid.
HELD: Act No. 4122 is valid and enforceable. The controlling purpose of Act No.
4122 is revealed to be to close the door to abuses committed in connection with the
foreclosure of chattel mortgages when sales were payable in installments. The
general rule is adopted in this jurisdiction to the effect that a title which declares a
statute to be an act to amend a specified code is sufficient and the precise nature of
the amendatory act need not be further stated. The proper approach in cases of
this character should be to resolve all presumptions in favor of the validity of an act
in the absence of a clear conflict between it and the Constitution. LATIN MAXIM: 9a,

FACTS: Private Respondents were respectively charged with a violation of Republic
Act No. 1700, otherwise known as the Anti-Subversion Act. RA 1700 outlaws the
Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and other “subversive associations” and
punishes any person who “knowingly, willfully and by overt acts affiliates himself
with, becomes or remains a member” of the CPP or any other organization
“subversive” in nature. Tayag filed a motion challenging the validity of the statute
due to its constitutional violations. The lower court declared the statute void on the
grounds that it was a bill of attainder and that it is vague and overbroad. The cases
were dismissed, to which the Government appealed. ISSUE: W/N the title of the act
satisfies the constitutional provision on bill titles. HELD: Yes. The title of the bill
need not be a catalogue or an index of its contents, and need not recite the details
of the Act. It is a valid title if it indicates in clear terms the nature, scope and
consequences of the proposed law and its operation. A narrow and technical
construction is to be avoided, and the statute will be read fairly and reasonably in
order not to thwart the legislative intent. The Anti-Subversion act fully satisfies
these requirements. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 9d, 51d

9 Del Rosario v. Carbonell, et al.
Case No. 33 G.R. No. L-32476 (October 20, 1970)

People of the Philippines v. Valeriano Valensoy y Masa
Case No. 230 G.R. No. L-9659 (May 29, 1957) Chapter I, Page 14, Footnote No. 55

FACTS: Petitioner questions the constitutionality of RA 6132. The said Act
purportedly encompasses more than one subject for the title of the Act allegedly
THE PHILIPPINES.” The statute plainly reads: “An Act Implementing Resolution to
Both Houses Numbered Two as Amended by Resolution of Both Houses Numbered
Four of the Congress of the Philippines Calling for a Constitutional Convention,
Providing for Proportional Representation Therein and Other Details Relating to the
Election of Delegates to and the Holding of the Constitutional Convention, Repealing
for the Purpose Republic Act Four Thousand Nine Hundred Fourteen, and for Other
Purposes.” ISSUE: W/N RA 6132 is unconstitutional for embracing more than one
subject. HELD: No. The inclusion of the title is superfluous and therefore
unnecessary because the title expressly indicates that the act implements
Resolutions on both Houses Nos. 2 and 4 respectively of 1967 and 1969, and both
Resolutions No. 2 and 4 likewise categorically state in their titles that the
Constitutional Convention called for therein is “to propose amendments to the
Constitution of the Philippines,” which phrase is reiterated in Sec. 1 of both
Resolutions. The power to propose amendments to the Constitution is implied in the
call for the convention itself, whose raison d’etre is to revise the present
Constitution. It is not required that the title of the bill be an index to the body of
the act or be comprehensive in matters of detail. It is enough that it fairly indicates
the general subject and reasonably covers all the provisions of the act so as not to
mislead Congress or the people. All the details provided for in RA 6132 are germane
to and are comprehended by its title. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 9d, 51d

FACTS: Defendant was charged in the Court of First Instance of Manila for violation
of Section 26 of Act No. 1780 by concealment of a bolo. The defendant moved to
quash the information on the ground that the title of the act, which was “an Act to
regulate the importation, acquisition, possession, use, and transfer of firearms, and
to prohibit the possession of same except in compliance with the provisions of this
Act,” did not include weapons other than firearms, and that Section 26 violated the
constitutional provision that “no bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace
more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill.” ISSUES: 1.
W/N Act No. 1780 violated the one subject-one title rule 2. W/N it was inconsistent
with the Constitution. HELD: No. At the time of the enactment of Act No. 1780 on
October 12, 1907, the one subject-one title rule referred to private and local bills
only, and to bills to be enacted into a law and not to law that was already in force
and existing at the time the 1935 Constitution took effect. The provision of Section
26 germane to the subject expressed in the title of the Act remained operative
because it was not inconsistent with the Constitution, pursuant to Section 2 of
Article XVI of the 1935 Constitution. LATIN MAXIM: 30a, 36a, 46a, 50

10 People of the Philippines v. Apolonio Carlos
Case No. 204 G.R. No. L-239 (June 30, 1947) Chapter I, Page 16, Footnote No.63

People of the Philippines v. Leoncio Lim
Case No. 210 G.R. No. L-14432 (July 26, 1960) Chapter I, Page 19, Footnote No.83

FACTS: The People’s Court found the Appellant, guilty of treason. Appellant
attacked the constitutionality of the People’s Court Act on the ground that it
contained provisions which deal on matters entirely foreign to the subject matter
expressed in its title, such as: (1) a provision which retains the jurisdiction of the
Court of First Instance; (2) a provision which adds to the disqualification of Justices
of the Supreme Court and provides a procedure for their substitution; (3) a
provision which changed the existing Rules of Court on the subject of bail, and (4) a
provision which suspends Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code. ISSUE: W/N the
People’s Court Act was unconstitutional. HELD: No. The People’s Court was intended
to be a full and complete scheme with its own machinery for the indictment, trial
and judgment of treason cases. The provisions mentioned were allied and germane
to the subject matter and purposes of the People’s Court Act. The Congress is not
expected to make the title of an enactment a complete index of its contents. The
constitutional rule is satisfied if all parts of a law relate to the subject expressed in
its title. LATIN MAXIM: 9a

FACTS: In March 1954, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
pursuant to the authority granted him by Sections 3 and 4 of Act No. 4003
(Fisheries Act) issued Fisheries Administrative Order No. 37. Section 2 of said order
prohibits trawl fishing in certain areas in Samar. FAO No. 37 was subsequently
amended with FAO No. 37–1. Leoncio Lim, the accused in violation of said order,
challenged its legality on the ground that FAO No. 37–1 was contrary to Act No.
4003, the former having no fixed period and thus establishing a ban for all time
while the latter stating that prohibition “was for any single period of time not
exceeding five years’ duration.” ISSUE: W/N Section 2 of FAO No. 37–1 was invalid.
HELD: Section 2 of FAO No. 37–1 was valid. Although FAO No. 37–1 was defective
because it failed to specify a period for the ban, it was ruled that in case of
discrepancy between a basic law and a rule issued to implement it, the basic law
prevails because the rule cannot go beyond the terms and provisions of the law.
FAO No. 37–1 would be inoperative in so far as it exceeded the period of five years
for any single period of time, but it was not necessarily rendered void by the
omission. LATIN MAXIM: 37, 38a

11 KMU Labor Center v. Garcia Jr.
Case No. 68 G.R. No. 115381 (December 23, 1994)

Hijo Plantation, Inc. v. Central Bank
Case No. 57 G.R. No. L-34526 (August 9, 1988)

FACTS: DOTC Memorandum Order No. 90-395 was filed asking the LTFRB to allow
provincial bus operators to charge passengers rates within a range of 15% above
and below the LTFRB official rate for a period of one year. LTFRB issued
Memorandum Circular No.92-009 allowing for a range of plus 20% and minus 25%
of the prescribed fares. PBOAP, without a public hearing and permission from
LTFRB, availed of the deregulatory policy and announced 20% increase in existing
fares. Petitioner filed a petition opposing the increase in fares. SC issued a
temporary restraining order to prevent PBOAP from implementing fare increase.
ISSUES: 1. W/N authority given by LTFRB to PBOAP to increase prices at 20%
instead of 15% is unconstitutional on the ground that there was no filing for a
petition of purpose in the said increase. 2. W/N PBOAP proved that there was a
public necessity for the increase thus violating the Public Service Act and Rules of
the Court. HELD: 1. LTFRB did not have authority to delegate its powers to PBOAP.
2. PBOAP was not able to prove and provide such public necessity as reason for the
fare increase. LATIN MAXIM: None

FACTS: Congress approved RA No. 6125 entitled “An act imposing STABILIZATION
OF THE PHILIPPINES FOR OTHER PURPOSES” Petitioners expected to pay 4% of the
aggregate value from July 1, 1972- June 30, 1973, as provided in the Act. The
Central bank released Monetary Resolution No. 1995 which states that: For exports
of bananas shipped during the period from January 1, 1972- June 30, 1972; the
stabilization tax shall be at the rate of 6%. For exports of bananas shipped during
the period from July 1, 1972 to June 30, 1973; the stabilization tax shall be at the
rate of 4%. For exports of bananas shipped during the period from July 1, 1973-
June 30, 1974; the stabilization tax shall be at the rate of 2%. ISSUE: W/N Central
bank acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it
issued Monetary Board Resolution No. 1995. HELD: Central Bank acted with grave
abuse of discretion. In case of discrepancy between the basic law and the rule or
regulation issued to implement the said law, the basic law prevails. The rule or
regulation cannot go beyond the terms of the basic law. LATIN MAXIM: 9c

12 China Banking Corp. v. CA
Case No. 59 G.R. No. 121158 (December 5, 1996) Chapter I, Page 19, Footnote

Santos v. Honorable Estenzo
Case No. 140 G.R. No. L-14740 (September 26, 1960)

FACTS: Petitioner extended loans to Native West Corp. and its president, So Ching,
in return for promissory notes to pay the loans. Two extra mortgages were
additionally executed by So Ching and his wife on July and August 1989. The loans
matured but So Ching was not able to repay the said loans. This caused Petitioner
to file for extra judicial foreclosures of the two mortgaged properties. The
properties were to be sold/auctioned on April 3, 1993. On April 28, 1989 the court
ruled on the side of So Ching. The issuance of the preliminary injunction was
granted; therefore the sale of the two mortgaged properties was stopped. Petitioner
sought for reconsideration and elevated the case to the Court of Appeals. They
were appealing that Act No. 3135 was the governing rule in their case, instead of
Administrative Order No. 3 as So Ching was contending. ISSUE: 1. W/N Petitioner
can extra-judicially foreclose the properties. 2. W/N Administrative Order No. 3
should govern the extra judicial foreclosure. HELD: 1. Petitioner can foreclose the
properties. 2. Act No. 3135 is the governing law. Administrative Order No. 3 cannot
prevail over Act 3135. It is an elementary principle that a stature is superior to an
administrative directive. Thus, the statute cannot be repealed or amended by the
administrative directive. LATIN MAXIM: None

FACTS: The decedent is a driver for People’s Land Transportation Company, of
which Petitioners are manager and proprietor. The Workmen’s Compensation
Commission awarded the decedent’s widow the amount of P3,494.40, plus burial
expenses not exceeding P200. After 5 years, Respondent, in a civil case filed by the
mother of the decedent, ordered Petitioners to pay the award plus P500 as
attorney’s fees for failure to comply. Petitioners pray that the decision be annulled
or modified based on Section 1 Rule 11 the Rules of the Workmen’s Compensation
Commission and prays further that the P500 in atty’s fees exceeded the allowed
fees according to Sec.6 Rule 26 of the said Rules. ISSUE: 1. W/N the Rules of the
Workmen’s Compensation Commission amended R.A. No. 772 and as a result
deprived the court of its jurisdiction over the case. 2. W/N the court committed a
grave abuse of discretion in awarding the P500 in attorney’s fees. HELD: Petition
was dismissed. 1. The Commission, or any of its rules, cannot amend an act of
Congress. Furthermore, the Rule was promulgated more than 2 years after the
court had acquired jurisdiction over the main case. 2. The court did not commit
grave abuse of discretion in awarding the P500 since the said rule only applies to
the Commission and not the Court. LATIN MAXIM: 30, 35, 46a

13 Grego v. Commission on Elections
Case No. 120 G.R. No. 125955 (June 19, 1997) Chapter I, Page 23, Footnote No.98

Santos v. Municipal of Caloocan
Case No. 141 G.R. No. L-15807 (April 22, 1963)

FACTS: One of the Respondents was elected for his 3 and final term as councilor of
the 2nd District of Manila. His qualifications are being questioned by herein
Petitioner, who is also asking for the suspension of his proclamation. Petitioner
brings into consideration the fact that Respondent was removed from his position
as Deputy Sheriff upon finding of serious misconduct in an administrative case held
on October 31, 1981. Petitioner argues that Respondent should be disqualified
under Section 40(b) of the Local Government Code. Petitioner further argues that
the Local Government Code should be applied retroactively. ISSUE: W/N or not the
Section 40 of the Local Government Code should be applied retroactively due to its
wording. HELD: Section 40(b) of the Local Government Code should not be applied
retroactively. It is understood that statutes are not to be construed as intended to
have a retroactive effect so as to affect pending proceedings, unless such intent is
expressly declared or clearly and necessarily implied from the language of the
enactment. The fact that the provision of the Code in question does not qualify the
date of a candidate’s removal and that it is couched in the past tense should not
deter the court from applying the law prospectively. The term to be looked at in the
issue is REINSTATEMENT, which has a technical meaning, referring only to an
appointive position. Since Respondent was reelected, this does not fall under the
scope of the term. LATIN MAXIM: 25a, 46c

FACTS: Respondent issued Ordinance No. 24 charging slaughterhouses in the
municipality certain fees including “slaughterhouse fees,” “meat inspection fees,”
“corral fees,” “and internal organ fees,” pursuant to Commonwealth Act No. 655.
Petitioners questioned the validity or said Ordinance. ISSUE: W/N Respondent, in
the issuance of Ordinance No. 24, exceeded the limits of its jurisdiction provided by
Commonwealth Act 655. HELD: Respondent exceeded its jurisdiction in the
issuance of the said ordinance. The Commonwealth Act only allowed Respondent to
charge slaughterhouse fees. When Respondent ordained the payment of other said
fees, it overstepped the limits of its statutory grant. The only other fees that would
be acceptable were veterinary or sanitary inspection fees since it was mentioned in
the statute. Incidentally, the court ordered Respondent to refund the fees with the
exception of “slaughterhouse fees.” One of the rules of statutory construction is
that “certain sections or parts of sections of an ordinance may be held invalid
without affecting the validity of what remains, if the parts are not so interblended
and dependent that the vice of one necessarily vitiates the others.” LATIN MAXIM:
15a, 37

14 National Housing Authority v. Reyes
Case No. 85 G.R. No. 49439 (June 29, 1983)

Francisco Lao Lim v. CA and Benito Villavicencio Dy
Case No. 73 G.R. No. 87047 (October 31, 1990)

FACTS: Private Respondents owned a parcel of land of 25,000 sq/rn, subject of an
expropriation proceedings granted by the court in favor NHA. Respondents claimed
they should be paid the assessed value of P6,600.00 pursuant to PD 42. Petitioner
opposed the payment claiming that it was too excessive. He cited PD 464 which
provides just compensation not to exceed the market value declared by the owner
in the amount of P1,400.00. Respondent Judge granted the payment of P6,600.00,
but Petitioner had opposed it pursuant to PD 1224 which states that the
government shall choose between the value of real property as declared by the
owner x x x or the market value determined by the City or Provincial Assessor,
whichever is lower. ISSUE: W/N PD 464 as amended by PD 1224 determines the
valuation on just compensation. HELD: Courts accord the presumption of validity to
executive acts and legislative enactments, x x x because the legislature is
presumed to abide by the Constitution x x x. The Respondent Judge should have
followed just compensation in expropriation cases, that the lower value made by
the landowner should be the basis for fixing the price. The petition for Certiorari is
granted. LATIN MAXIM: 37

FACTS: Private Respondent entered into a contract of lease with Petitioner for a
period of 3 years. After it expired, Private Respondent refused to vacate the
premises, and hence, the filing of an ejectment suit against the Respondent. The
case was terminated by a compromise agreement, and the lease continued from
1979 to 1982, then from 1982 to 1985. The Petitioner filed another ejectment suit.
The trial court dismissed the complaint on the grounds that (1) the lease contract
has not expired; and (2) the compromise agreement entered into constitutes res
judicata. Petitioner appealed to the RTC of Manila and then to the CA which also
affirmed the decision of the trial court. ISSUE: 1. W/N the continuance of lease is
made to depend upon the will of the lessee? 2. W/N the action for ejectment is
barred by compromise agreement on res judicata? HELD: This is untenable because
the continuance of lease is not dependent upon the will of the lessee. On the
compromise agreement, the lease is not for perpetual renewals unless the language
employed indicates that it was the intention of the parties. On the second issue, the
compromise agreement does not apply because the present case requires a
different set of evidence. The compromise agreement does not foreclose any cause
of action arising from a violation of the terms thereof, and hence, res judicata does
not apply. LATIN MAXIM: 1, 11a, 26,

15 Hon. Alfredo S. Lim v. Felipe G. Pacquing;
Case No. 74 G.R. No. 115044 (January 27, 1995)

Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers’ Union
Case No. 169 G.R. No. L-25246 (September 12, 1974)

FACTS: Executive Order No. 392 was issued transferring the authority to regulate
JaiAlai from local governments to the Games and Amusements Board (GAB). The
City of Manila passed an Ordinance No. 7065 authorizing the mayor to allow the
Associated Development Corporation (ADC) to operate a JAI-ALAI. Then President
Marcos issued a PD 771 revoking all powers and authority of local governments to
grant franchise, license or permit, to Jai-Alai and other forms of gambling. Then
President Aquino issued an E.O. No. 169 expressly repealing PD. No. 810 which
revokes and cancels the franchise granted to the Philippine Jai-Alai and Amusement
Corporation. In 1998, ADC tried to operate a Jai-Alai, but the Games and
Amusement Board intervened and invoked P.D. 771 which expressly revoked all
existing franchises and permits to operate all forms of gambling issued by local
governments. ISSUE: 1. W/N the franchise granted by the City of Manila to ADC is
valid in view of E. 0. No. 392 which transferred from local governments to the GAB
the power to regulate Jai-Alai. 2. W/N the ADC is correct in assailing that P.D. 771
is violative of equal protection and non-impairment clauses of the Constitution.
HELD: R.A. 409 provides that Congress did not delegate to the City of Manila the
power “to franchise” the operation of Jai-Alai. And E.O. 392 removes the power of
local governments to issue license and permit. All laws are presumed valid and
constitutional. PD 771 was not repealed or amended by any subsequent law. It did
not violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution because the said decree
had revoked all franchises issued by the local governments without exceptions.
LATIN MAXIM: 5a, 6c, 37, 44, 50

FACTS: Petitioner, an “Iglesia ni Cristo”, was a member of the Respondent Union
which had with their Company a collective bargaining agreement containing a
closed shop provision allowed under R.A. 875: “Membership in the Union shall be
required as a condition of employment for all permanent employees workers
covered by this Agreement “ RA 3350 amended RA 875: “but such agreement shall
not cover members of any religious sect which prohibit affiliation of their members
in any such labor organization.” Petitioner resigned from Respondent Union, which
wrote a formal letter to the Company asking to separate the Petitioner from
service. ISSUE: 1. W/N RA 3350 violates right to form or join association? 2. W/N
RA 3350 is constitutional? 3. W/N the lower court committed grave abuse of
discretion when ruling that the Union should pay 500 and attorney’s fee. HELD: The
right to join associations includes the right not to join or to resign from a labor
organization. Section 1 960 of Art III of the 1935 Constitution, as well as Section 7
of Art IV of the 1973 Constitution, provide that the right to form associations for
purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged. Article 2208 of the Civil Code
provides that attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation may be awarded “when the
defendant’s act has compelled the Plaintiff to incur expenses to protect his interest”
and “in any other case where the court deems it just and equitable that attorney’s
fees and expenses of litigation should be recovered”. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 40b

16 Tañada v. Tuvera
Case No. 287 G.R. No. L-63915 (December 29, 1986) Chapter I, Page 37, Footnote

Gutierrez v. Carpio
Case No. 55 G.R. No. 31025 (August 15, 1929)

FACTS: Due process was invoked by the Petitioners in demanding the disclosure of
a number of Presidential Decrees which they claimed had not been published as
required by law. The government argued that while publication was necessary as a
rule, it was not so when it was “otherwise provided” as when the decrees
themselves declared that they were to become effective immediately upon their
approval. ISSUE: W/N the clause “otherwise provided” in Article 2 of Civil Code
pertains to the necessity of publication. HELD: No, the clause “otherwise provided”
refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of publication per se,
which cannot in any event be omitted. Publication in full should be indispensable.
Without such notice or publication, there would be no basis for the application of
the maxim “ignorantia Legis non excusat”. The court, therefore, declares that
presidential issuances of general application which have not been published shall
have no force and effect, and the court ordered that the unpublished decrees be
published in the Official Gazette immediately. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 9a

FACTS: The Litigants here compromised a civil case on July 13, 1928, agreeing that
if within a month from the date thereof the Plaintiffs failed to repurchase a certain
land, the ownership would vest in the Defendants. But when the Plaintiffs duly
tendered the amount, the Defendants appealed that by that time, August 13, 1928,
the time when the Plaintiffs tendered it, the stipulated or fixed period had already
elapsed. ISSUE: W/N the stipulated period elapsed on the time of tendering. HELD:
No. The repurchase of the land was made within the stipulated period. The above
issue depends upon the kind of month agreed upon by the parties, and on the day
from which it should be counted. Article 7 of the Civil Code had been modified by
Sec. 13 of the Administrative Code, according to which “month” now means the civil
month and not the regular-30-day month. In computing any fixed period of time,
with reference to the performance of an act required by law or contract to be done
within a certain limit of time, the day from which the time is reckoned is to be
excluded and the date of performance included, unless otherwise provided. There is
nothing in the agreement providing otherwise. LATIN MAXIM: 2a, 39a

17 Guzman v. Lichauco
Case No. 56 G.R. No. L-17986 (October 21, 1921)

U.S. v. Paniaga
Case No. 161 G.R. No. 8223 (March 4, 1914)

FACTS: Plaintiff filed two actions of unlawful detainer to recover possession of
certain properties in Manila. The trial court decided in favor of the Plaintiff. The
unsuccessful Defendants having appealed in both cases on Dec. 9, 1920 to the
Court of First Instance of Manila, it is their duty to conform with the provisions of
Sec. 88 of the CCP, as amended by Act No. 2588, in case they desire to avoid the
immediate execution of the judgment pending the appeal, to pay the Plaintiff, or to
deposit in court, “on or before the TENTH day of each Calendar month”, the sums
of money fixed by the Justice of the Peace as the reasonable value of the use and
occupation of the property held by them. The Defendants made such dilatory
payments however they failed to make such payments on or before the tenth day
of the month. As a result, the Plaintiff moved the court to execute the judgments.
The court ordered the immediate execution of the judgment. ISSUE: W/N the
payments were made on or before the Tenth day of each month.

FACTS: This is an appeal by the government from an order of the court, setting
aside the forfeiture of a bail bond. Judgment was rendered against the principal on
February 7, and the sureties were notified on the same day to produce the thereof
their principal. On Feb 28, the court ordered that the Defendant’s bond be forfeited
and the execution issued against the principal and the sureties for the amount
thereof, and that an alias warrant be issued for the arrest of the Defendant. By
various orders of the court, the sale was postponed from time to time, and finally
occurred on July 8, 1912, with government as the purchaser. On July 10, 1912, the
principal was arrested. On July 13, 1912, the court, on application of the sureties,
set aside the order of forfeiting the bond, and ordered the sheriff to annul the sale.
ISSUE: W/N the execution sale occurred on the date directed by the court. HELD:
Sec. 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides: “unless otherwise specially provided,
the time within which an act is required by law to be done shall be computed by
excluding the first day and including the last; if the last be a Sunday or a legal
holiday, it shall be excluded.” This section is only applicable if there is a
computation needed to be done. However, in this case, there is no necessity for
such computation for the date is fixed for when the act be performed. It is also
directed that the sale should take place on a named future date. The sale here of
the property must stand. LATIN MAXIM: 6c

HELD: The payment made on August 11, 1921 was one day late. The term “month”
must now be understood to refer to calendar month, inasmuch as Sec 13 of the
Administrative Code has modified Art. 7 of the civil code in so far as the latter fixes
the length of a month at thirty days. LATIN MAXIM: 25a, 25c

18 PNB v. CA
Case No. 238 G.R. No. 98382 (May 17, 1993) Chapter I, Page 47, Footnote No.195

Hidalgo v. Hidalgo
Case No. 124 G.R. No. L-25326 (May 29, 1970) and G.R. No. L-25327 (May 29,
1970) Chapter II, Page 52, Footnote No.19

FACTS: To secure payments of his loans, Private Respondent mortgages two lots to
Petitioner bank. For failure to pay the obligation, Petitioner bank extrajudicially
foreclosed the mortgaged property and won the highest bidder at the auction sale.
Then, a final deed of sale was registered in the Buacan Registry of Property in favor
of the Petitioner bank and later sold the said lots to a third party. The notices of
sale of Appellant’s foreclosed properties were published on March 28, April 11 and
April 12, 1969 issues of the newspaper Daily Record”. The date March 28, 1969
falls on a Friday, while the dates April 11 and 12 fall on a Friday and Saturday,
respectively. Section 3 of Act No. 3135 requires that the notice of auction sale shall
be “published once a week for at least three consecutive weeks”. ISSUE: W/N the
Petitioner bank complied with the requirements of weekly publication of notice of
extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgages. HELD: It must be conceded that that Article
13 is completely silent as to the definition of what is “week”. In Concepcion v.
Andueta, the term “week” was interpreted to mean as a period of time consisting of
seven consecutive days. The Defendant-Appellee bank failed to comply with the
legal requirement of publication. LATIN MAXIM: 1, 9a, 9b

FACTS: Petitioners pray to Agrarian Court to be entitled as share tenants to redeem
parcel of land they are working from the purchasers where no notice was previously
given to them by the vendor of the latter’s intention to sell the property and where
the vendor did not execute the affidavit required by Sec. 13 of the Agricultural Land
Reform Code before the registration of the deed of sale. Agrarian Court dismissed
petitions, stating that the right of redemption granted by Sec. 12 of the same code
is only for leasehold tenants and not for share tenants, claiming that share tenancy
and leasehold tenancy are within the jurisdiction of the code – that the code
expressly grants said right to leaseholders only and nobody else. Moreover, the
court held that if the intention of Congress was to extend the right of redemption to
share tenants through judicial legislation, the section would have expressly said so.
ISSUE: W/N not the right of redemption granted by Sec. 12 of the Agrarian Reform
Code addresses only leaseholders and not share tenants. HELD: Agrarian Court fell
into several erroneous assumptions and premises, reducing “agricultural lessee” to
only “leasehold tenants”. The purpose of the Agricultural Land Reform Code is the
abolition of agricultural share tenancy. The policy of the State is to establish owner
cultivatorship. Adherence to the letter would result in absurdity, injustice and
contradictions and would defeat the plain and vital purpose of the statute. LATIN
MAXIM: 9a, 9c, 11a, 12a, 36a, 37, 40a Maxims invoked by lower court: 6c, 30b, 43

19 U.S. v. Navarro
Case No. 300 G.R. No. 6160 (March 21, 1911) Chapter II, Page 52, Footnote No.20

Litex Employees Association v. Eduvala
Case No. 149 G.R. No. L-41106 (September 22, 1977) Chapter II, Page 53,
Footnote No.22

FACTS: They made an oath before an election officer in the municipality of Piddig
(in proceedings in connection with the general election held on Nov. 2, 1909) that
they owned real property with the value of P500. Evidence showed that the
Appellants, except for Daniel Navarro and Genaro Calixtro, did not own property of
the assessed value of P500. ISSUE: W/N the said statute’s true test of property
qualification to vote is the actual/market value of the property owned or the
assessed value thereof.

FACTS: Respondent, Officer-in-Charge of Bureau of Labor Relations, required
referendum election among Petitioners to ascertain their wishes as to their
affiliation with Federation of Free Workers. Petitioners contended that there was no
statutory authorization for the Respondent to require referendum election and that
Respondent and the Bureau were beyond jurisdiction. ISSUE: W/N there is a
statute authorizing Respondents and giving them jurisdiction. HELD: Article 226 of
the Labor Code addresses this. Respondent and the Bureau were within jurisdiction.
Petition denied. Article 226 of Labor Code is very clear concerning executive
department’s “original and exclusive authority to act”. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 9c, 20a,

HELD: It was the intention of the legislator as proved from an examination of the
immediate context of provisions of the statute defining “property qualifications” of a
voter, and of the statute as a whole. In the statute, property qualification is an
alternative to qualification based upon an annual payment. Both qualifications are
under a single head, suggesting an intimate relation between the two in the mind of
the legislator. Another section of the statute disqualifies people who are delinquent
in the payment of public taxes assessed since Aug. 13, 1898, from voting. This
provision was directed to the case of delinquency in the payment of land taxes as
well as all other taxes. The statute as a whole (as an election law) is intended to
secure purity of the ballot box. If the property qualification is actual/market value,
it would be highly improbable to enforce the statute within a reasonable time
because it will be difficult to determine. LATIN MAXIM: 10, 11a, 12a, 28, 36a, 37

20 Regalado v. Yulo
Case No. 255 G.R. No. L-42293 (February 13, 1935) Chapter II, Page 55, Footnote

B.E. San Diego Inc. v. CA
Case No. 26 G.R. No. 80223 (February 5, 1993) Chapter II, Page 56, Footnote No.

FACTS: Petitioner was Justice of Peace of Malinao, Albay. On November 16, 1931,
Act No. 3899 which provided for the age retirement among justices was approved.
A few years later, Petitioner became 65 years of age (age retirement as provided by
Sec. 203 of the Administrative Code, amended further by Act. No. 3899). Shortly
thereafter, Esteban T. Villar was appointed as Justice of Peace to take the place of
Petitioner. On December 17, 1934, Villar assumed office. ISSUE: W/N under the
provisions of Section 203 of the Administrative Code, as further amended by Act
No. 3899, the Justices of Peace and auxiliary justices appointed prior to the
approval of the Act shall cease to hold office upon reaching the age of 65. HELD:
Justices appointed prior to the approval of the Act will not be affected by said
amendment (Act No. 3899). LATIN MAXIM: 1, 46a

FACTS: On March 3, 1986, Petitioner instituted an action in the RTC of Valenzuela
against Private Respondent De Jesus for recovery of possession of a parcel of land
in said area. In her defense, De Jesus argued that the land in question was covered
by PD 2016 (a complementary provision of PD 1517, which aims to protect tenants
from unjust eviction.) ISSUE: W/N PD 2016 is a valid defense of De Jesus in
upholding her rights as a lessee. HELD: PD 2016 is a valid ground for De Jesus in
invoking her rights as a tenant. While it may depart from its source, PD 1517, said
provision still aims to protect the tenants from unscrupulous landowners from
demanding a steep price for the land, as well as unjust eviction. LATIN MAXIM:
12a, 25a

21 Araneta v. Dinglasan
Case No. 84 G.R. No. L-2044 (August 26, 1949) Chapter II, Page 56, Footnote No.

Endencia and Jugo v. David
Case No. 98 G.R. No. L-6355-56 (August 31, 1953) Chapter II, Page 56, Footnote

FACTS: Executive Orders, in pursuance of Commonwealth Act No. 671 (Emergency
Powers Act), were questioned for its validity until the National Assembly Convention
of 1942 ISSUE: W/N the proclamations are valid. HELD: These Executive Orders are
valid because they have been enacted during the time of the inability of the
Congress to function. That when Congress convened again on Jan. 1, 1942, said
proclamations were also terminated. LATIN MAXIM: 2a, 9a

FACTS: RA 590 declares that no salary received by a public officer shall be
considered exempt from income tax, payment of which is hereby declared not to be
a diminution of his compensation fixed by law. While Art. 8, Sec. 9 of the
Constitution states that judges shall receive compensation as fixed by law, which
shall not be diminished during their continuance in office. Petitioners question the
legality of RA 590. ISSUE: W/N RA 590 unconstitutional. HELD: No. Saying that the
taxing of the salary of a judicial officer is not a decrease in compensation is a clear
interpretation of “Which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office”,
by the Legislature. Through the separation of powers, such a task must be done by
the Judiciary. Judicial officers are exempt from taxes on his salary not for his own
benefit but for the public, to secure and preserve his independence of judicial
thought and action. LATIN MAXIM: 1, 6c, 7a, 24a

22 Daoang v. Municipal Judge of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte
Case No. 84 G.R. No. L-34568 (March 28, 1988) Chapter II, Page 61, Footnote

CIR v. Limpan Investment Corporation
Case No. 77 G.R. No. L-28571 and L-28644 (July 31, 1970) Chapter II, Page 62,
Footnote No.55

FACTS: Prior to this case, Petitioners contested the adoption of Quirino Bonilla and
Wilson Marcos by, Antero Agonoy and Amanda Agonoy, stating that under Art. 335
of the Civil Code, that those who have legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged
natural children, or children by legal fiction, cannot adopt. Petitioners stated that
the Agonoys already had a daughter of the Estrella Agonoy, who is the deceased
mother of the Petitioners, and that the Agonoys also have the Petitioners as
grandchildren. Furthermore, the Petitioners argued that the adopting would
introduce a foreign element into the family unit, and would result in the reduction
of their legitimes in terms of inheritance. The Respondent Court ruled in favor for
Agonoy. ISSUE: W/N the Respondent Court erred in their decision. HELD: No, the
court was correct. In enumerating the persons who cannot adopt in Art. 335, the
children mentioned therein have a clearly defined meaning in law and, do not
include grandchildren. To add grandchildren in this article where no grandchild is
included would violate the legal maxim that, what is expressly included would
naturally exclude what is not included. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 9a, 30a

FACTS: In 1959 and 1960, Respondent Corporation filed income tax returns which
later were bases for deficiency due to disallowance by the BIR. Brought to the Court
of Tax Appeals, the deficiencies on both cases were decided upon at P26,137 and
P7,240.48, resolved at September 20, 1967 (L-28571) and December 11, 1967 (L-
28644) respectively. ISSUE: W/N the CTA committed an error in its fixed date of
the payment of surcharges and interests. HELD: The CTA’s decision on the date of
payment of surcharges and interests are in error. Section 51 of the NIRC provides
the following- On Tax shown on the return, in failure to pay the required amount on
or before the date prescribed, interest upon such unpaid amount shall be collected
as part of the tax, at the rate of one per centum a month, from the date prescribed
for the payment until paid, provided that the maximum amount for the interest
doesn’t exceed the amount corresponding to a period of 3 years. The same goes
with deficiencies, except that the additional tax must be paid within 30 days of the
notice, else the same interests apply. With regard to surcharge, if the amount in
the notice isn’t paid within 30 days, a surcharge of 5 per centum of the amount of
tax unpaid. In L-28571, the interest shall be computed from September 7, 1962 to
September 6, 1965, at 1% for 3 years, plus the surcharge of 5% on failure to pay
the deficiency tax. In L-28644, from April 4, 1963 to April 3, 1966, the interest
shall be at 1% a month for 3 years, plus the 5% surcharge. LATIN MAXIM: 1, 6c,
7a, 24a, 26

23 Cebu Portland Cement v. Municipality of Naga, Cebu
Case No. 53 G.R. Nos. 24116-17 (August 22, 1968) Chapter II, Page 62, Footnote

Resins, Inc. v. Auditor General
Case No. 260 G.R. No. L-17888 (October 29, 1968) Chapter II, Page 62, Footnote

FACTS: Efforts of defendant Treasurer to collect from Plaintiff municipal license tax
from 1960, 1961, as well as penalties, amounting to a total sum of P204,300, have
all been met with rebuff. Municipal tax imposed by Amended Ordinance No. 21.
Finally on June 26, 1961, defendant Treasurer decides to avail of Civil remedies as
provided for under Sec. 2304 of the Revised Administrative Code; he gives Plaintiff
a period of ten (10) days within which to settle the account from receipt thereof. On
July 6, 1961, defendant Treasurer notified the Plant Manager of the Plaintiff that he
was distraining 100,000 bags of Apo Cement in satisfaction of Plaintiff’s delinquency
in municipal license tax; notice was received by Plant Officer-in-Charge Vicente T.
Garagay, who acknowledged the distraint. Said articles (the cement bags) will be
sold by public auction to the highest bidder on July 27, 1961, proceeds thereof will
in part be utilized to settle the account. Despite notice of sale, it did not take place
on July 27, 1961 but on January 30, 1962 ISSUE: W/N the distraint and public
auction were valid.

FACTS: Petitioner seeks a refund from Respondent Central Bank on the claim that it
was exempt from the margin fee under RA 2609 for the importation of “UREA AND
FORMALDEHYDE”, as separate units used for the production of synthetic glue. The
specific language of the Act speaks of “UREA FORMALDEHYDE”, a finished product
which is distinct and different from “UREA” and “FORMALDEHYDE”. Petitioner
argues his view, citing the statements made on the floor of the Senate, during
consideration of the bill before said House, by members thereof (referring to the
Journal). Petitioner would assail as devoid of support in law the action taken by the
Respondent Auditor General in an endorsement to Central Bank causing it to
overrule its previous resolution and to adopt the view in such endorsement to the
effect that the importation of urea and formaldehyde, as separate units, did not
come within the purview of the statutory language that granted such exemption.
ISSUE: W/N Petitioner’s allegations are valid. HELD: The Act clearly states “UREA
FORMALDEHYDE” as a finished product and not “UREA” and “FORMALDEHYDE” as
separate units. Individual statements made by Senators do not necessarily reflect
the view of the Senate. Much less do they indicate the view of the House of
Representatives. If there was any mistake in the printing of the bill, it should be
corrected by legislation and not by judicial decree. The Auditor General was just
doing his duty, following what was written in the statute. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 7a, 43

HELD: Both actions are valid. According to the Revised Administrative Code: “The
remedy by distraint shall proceed as follows: Upon failure of the person owing any
municipal tax or revenue to pay the same, at the time required, the municipal
treasurer may seize and distraint any personal property belonging to such person or
any property subject to the tax lien, in sufficient quantity to satisfy the tax or
charge in question, together with any increment thereto incident to delinquency and
the expenses of the distraint.” The clear and explicit language of the law leaves no
room for doubt. Also, this being a direct appeal to the Supreme Court, Plaintiff must
be deemed to have accepted as conclusive the findings of the lower court which
upheld the validity of the auction. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 7a, 43

24 Quijano v. Development Bank of the Philippines
Case No. 248 G.R. No. L-26419 (October 16, 1970) Chapter II, Page 62, Footnote

KMMRC Credit Union v. Manila Railroad Company
Case No. 66 G.R. No. L-25316 (February 28, 1979)

FACTS: Petitioners filed an application for an urban estate loan with the
Rehabilitation Finance Corporation (RFC), predecessor-in-intent of Respondent.
They mortgaged real estate properties to secure the loan; loan was approved on
April 30, 1953. Mortgage contract was executed by Petitioners in favor of DBP on
March 23, 1954. As of July 31, 1965, outstanding obligation of the Petitioners with
DBP was P13, 983.59. Petitioner wrote Respondent offering to pay P14, 000 for his
outstanding obligation out of his back pay pursuant to RA 897 (Back Pay Law).
Respondent advised Petitioners of the non-acceptance of this offer on the ground
that the loan was not incurred before or subsisting on June 20, 1953, when RA 897
was approved. Respondent filed on October 14, 1965 an application for the
foreclosure of real estate mortgage executed by the Petitioners; Respondent Sheriff
scheduled the public auction after advising Petitioner of the application for
foreclosure filed by DBP. ISSUE: W/N the obligation of the Petitioners was
subsisting at the time of the approval of RA 897, the Amendatory Act of June 20,
1953, to RA 304, the original Back Pay Law. W/N the trial court erred in declaring
that the loan of the Petitioners was not subsisting when RA 897 was enacted on
June 20, 1953. HELD: RA 897 has clear provisions that expressly require that the
obligations for which back pay certificates may be accepted as payments must be
subsisting at the time RA 897 was approved (June 20, 1953). While Petitioner’s
loan was approved on April 30, 1953, they only availed of it much later on March
23, 1954. The obligation therefore attaches only on March 23, 1954. It cannot be
said that there was an obligation subsisting at the time of the approval of RA 897.
LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 7a, 43

FACTS: The Petitioner filed a case for mandamus which the lower court has denied.
Petitioner seeks to overturn the ruling relying on a right that, according to the
Petitioner, RA 2023 grants to them. Paragraphs 1 & 2 of section 62 of RA 2023
compels employers to deduct from the salaries or wages of members of credit
unions the debts of the employees and pay it to said credit union. The lower court
has already granted there is no such right granting first priority to the loan to credit
unions in the payroll collection. ISSUE: W/N RA 2023 converts KMMRC credit
union’s credit into a first priority credit. HELD: No. The Supreme Court affirmed the
decision of the lower court. The RA Petitioner relies on clearly does not state the
loans shall be granted first priority in the salary collections. According to Justice
Recto in a subsequent opinion, “it is well established that only specific legal rights
are enforceable by mandamus, that the right sought to be enforced must be certain
and clear, and the writ not issue in cases where the right is doubtful”. Justice
Barrera adds: ”… the writ never issues in doubtful cases. It neither confers powers
nor imposes duties. It is simply a command to exercise a power already possessed
and to perform a duty already imposed. LATIN MAXIM: 7a

25 Davao Light & Power Co. v. Commissioner of Customs
Case No. 29 G.R. No. L-28739 (March 29, 1972)

Alfredo Ramos v. Court of Appeals
Case No. 252 G.R. No. L-41295 (December 4, 1989) Chapter II, Page 62, Footnote

FACTS: Petitioner is the grantee of a legislative franchise to install, operate and
maintain an electric light, heat and power plant in the municipality of Davao. On
two different occasions it imported materials and equipment for installation in its
facilities. Petitioner is arguing that the taxes levied against its imports should be
waived by the collector of customs in Cebu (the materials were delivered at the port
of Cebu) pursuant to section 17 of (pre-commonwealth) Act 3636 (Standard Electric
Power and Light Franchise Law) which states that if any competing company should
be granted franchise more favorable than the one previously granted to another
company, the latter shall enjoy the same advantages given in the other franchise.
ISSUE: W/N section 17 of act 3636 applies to the case of Petitioner. HELD: No.
Firstly, the provision cited by Petitioner states that the franchise must be granted to
a ‘competing party’. NPC, to which the contract with tax exemptions was given, is
not a competing party to Petitioner. Secondly, Petitioner cannot rely on RA 358 as
amended by RA 987 to support its tax exemption. Exemption from taxation is never
presumed, it is always explicitly stated. LATIN MAXIM: 6c

FACTS: The municipality of Hagonoy, Bulacan sued Ramos et al for the recovery of
its 74 hectare fishpond. Atty. Angel Cruz, a private lawyer and head of the Cruz,
Durian and Academia law firm, volunteered himself and his firm to serve as counsel
for the municipality. He stipulated in the complaint that the municipality is obliged
to pay them not less than 20% of the amount to be recovered. Petitioners move to
disqualify said private law firm as counsel on the ground that it is illegal for the
municipality to hire a private counsel. ISSUE: W/N it is legal for the municipality to
hire a private counsel in filing a case. HELD: No. Under section 1683 of the Revised
Administrative Code, the provincial fiscal shall represent the province and any
municipality or municipal thereof in any court. Furthermore, under section 3 of the
Local Autonomy Act, the municipal attorney shall act as legal counsel for the
municipality and perform such duties and exercise such powers as may be assigned
to them by the council. The municipality’s interest would be best protected if the
municipal attorney handles its litigation. These laws are implemented as well so as
not to burden the municipality with the expense of hiring a private lawyer. LATIN

26 Floresca v. Philex Mining Corporation
Case No. 47 G.R. No. L- 30642 (April 30, 1985)

Enrile v. Salazar
Case No. 40 G.R. No. 92163 (June 5, 1990)

FACTS: Petitioners are the surviving family of deceased employees of Respondent
Corporation who died as a result of a cave-in while working in underground mining
operations. Petitioners, with the exception of Floresca, recovered damages under
the Workmen’s Compensation Act. However, a later report on the accident showed
there was negligence on the part of Respondent Corporation. Thereafter, Petitioners
filed a civil suit to recover damages for Respondent Corporation’s reckless and
wanton negligence. ISSUE: W/N Petitioners have the right to choose between
availing of the worker’s right under the Workmen’s Compensation Act or suing in
the regular courts under the Civil Code for higher damages. HELD: Petitioners may
sue in the regular courts under the Civil Code for higher damages. However, in light
of the fact that they have already recovered damages from the Workmen’s
Compensation Act, if they are awarded a greater amount in the regular courts, the
amount received from this Act shall be deducted to prevent the instance of double
recovery. An injured party cannot pursue both courses of action simultaneously. In
allowing Petitioners to sue in regular courts, the Court stated that it did not
legislate in this case but rather, applied and gave effect to the constitutional
guarantees of social justice. LATIN MAXIM: 1, 17, 40a

FACTS: Petitioner was arrested and charged with the crime of rebellion with murder
and multiple frustrated murders allegedly committed during a failed coup attempt
from November 29 to December 10, 1990. Petitioners contend that they are being
charged for a criminal offense that does not exist in the statute books because
technically, the crime of rebellion cannot be complexed with other offenses
committed on the occasion thereof. ISSUE: W/N case of Petitioners falls under the
Hernandez doctrine. HELD: The doctrine in the case People v. Hernandez remains
as the binding doctrine operating to prohibit the complexing of rebellion with any
other offense committed on the occasion thereof. The charges of murder and
multiple frustrated murders are absorbed in the crime of simple rebellion.
Therefore, charges against Petitioners in the information should be understood as
that of simple rebellion under the RPC. Furthermore, in a concurring opinion, Justice
Feliciano states that if the court ruled that the charges of murder could be
prosecuted separately from rebellion, then the principle of non-retroactivity would
be violated. LATIN MAXIM: 1, 46a, 48

27 Manikad v. Tanodbayan
Case No. 162 G.R. No. 65097 (February 20, 1984) Chapter II, Page 63, Footnote

Senarillos v. Hermosisimo
Case No. 278 G.R. No. L-10662 (December 14, 1956) Chapter II, Page 67,
Footnote No.74

FACTS: Petitioners were members of the Export Processing Zone Authority (EPZA)
Police Force and were charged with crimes of smuggling, theft and violations of
AntiGraft Law and Anti-Fencing Law before the Respondent. Petitioners argue that
the power to investigate complaints of this nature are lodged exclusively upon the
EPZA and is not in the Respondent’s jurisdiction. Section 7 of P.D. 1716-A states:
“The EPZA in the exercise of its sole police authority over the export processing
zones shall have the power to receive and investigate complaints relative to
violation of penal laws committed inside the zones owned and administered by the
Authority…” ISSUE: W/N Section 7 of P.D. 1716-A precludes the Respondent from
investigating complaints within the Export Processing Zone. HELD: No, the use of
“sole” in P.D. 1716-A refers to police authority. Although the EPZA Police Force is
the only police authority within the Zone, it is not the only authority that may
investigate complaints, especially those which fall under the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 7a, 35

FACTS: Petitioner was appointed as Chief of Police in Sibonga, Cebu. Upon the
charges filed by Petitioner, Senarillos was suspended by Municipal Mayor of Sibonga
and investigated by a “police committee” composed of 3 councilors created by
Resolution No.2 Series 1952 of the municipal council. The committee came up with
an adverse decision subsequently signed by the members of the council. This was
appealed to and affirmed by the Commissioner of Civil Service and by the Civil
Service Board of Appeals. ISSUE: W/N Sibonga had jurisdiction to investigate the
Chief of Police Senarillos. HELD: No. Under RA No.557 the investigation of police
officers must be conducted by council itself and not by a mere committee thereof.
Sibonga therefore had no jurisdiction to investigate the Chief of Police Senarillos.
RA No.557 has eliminated the provision authorizing investigation by a committee
council. Hence, the decision against him was invalid, even if concurred in by the
rest of the councilors. The fact that the decision of the Municipal Council was issued
before the decision of the Supreme Court cannot validate the action of the police
committee. The initial proceeding was illegal ab initio and the subsequent
reaffirmation of the decision of the municipal council by the civil service authorities
could not validate the proceeding. LATIN MAXIM: 1, 3a, 6b, 7a

28 People of the Philippines v. Moro Macarandang
Case No. 211 G.R. No. L-12088 (December 23, 1959) Chapter II, Page 69,
Footnote No.87

People of the Philippines v. Mapa
Case No. 213 G.R. No. L-22301 (August 30, 1967) Chapter II, Page 69, Footnote

FACTS: Defendant was accused and convicted of illegal possession of firearms in
Lanao. Defendant, admitting the ownership and possession of the firearm and
ammunitions, invokes as his legal excuse the appointment issued to him by
Governor Dimakuta as secret agent shown in the Governor’s letter which he
presented as and evidence. He was granted this appointment for having shown
good faith by previously surrendering to the office of the Governor a firearm. He
has then been appointed as SECRET AGENT to assist on the maintenance of peace
and order campaigns and is authorized to hold and carry in his possession 1 Riot
shotgun. ISSUE: W/N a Secret Agent tasked to assist in the maintenance of peace
and order falls among those authorized to possess firearms. HELD: Yes. It may be
true that the Governor has no authority to issue any firearm license or permit but
section 879 of the Revised Administrative Code provides the “peace officers” are
exempted from the requirements relating to the issuance of license to possess
firearms. The appointment sufficiently put him in the category of “peace officer”
equivalent even to a Municipal Police expressly covered by section 879. Wherefore
the decision appealed from is reversed and the Defendant acquitted. LATIN MAXIM:
9a, 24a

FACTS: Defendant was accused of illegal possession of firearms. He invokes in his
defense that he was an appointed Secret Agent of the provincial Governor of
Batangas. He sought to be acquitted as the case of People v. Macarandang used the
same defense providing evidences of his appointment. ISSUE: W/N a Secret Agent
falls among those authorized to possess firearms. HELD: No. The court held that
the law cannot be any clearer. The law does not contain any exception for secret
agent therefore holding this position would not constitute a sufficient defense to a
prosecution for a crime of illegal possession of firearm and ammunitions. Wherefore
the conviction of the accused must stand. The Court’s ruling overturned that of
People v. Macarandang. LATIN MAXIM: 1, 6c, 7a, 30a, 35, 46c

29 Co v. CA
Case No. 65 G.R. No. 100776 (October 28, 1993) Chapter II, Page 69, Footnote

Sy Kiong v. Sarmiento
Case No. 150 G.R. No. L-2934 (November 29, 1951)

FACTS: Petitioner delivered to the salvaging firm on September 1, 1983 a check
drawn against the Associated Citizens’ Bank, postdated November 30, 1983. The
check was deposited on January 3, 1984. It was dishonored two days later, the
tersely-stated reason given by the bank being: “CLOSED ACCOUNT.” A criminal
complaint for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 was filed by the salvage
company against Petitioner. At the time of the issuance of the check, the delivery of
a “rubber” or “bouncing” check as a guarantee for an obligation was not considered
a punishable offense, an official promulgation made in a Circular of the Ministry of
Justice. ISSUE: W/N Petitioner is criminally liable. HELD: No. According to them,
Que v. People should not be applied retroactively in accordance with the
prospectivity principle of judicial rulings and the operative fact doctrine. The
decision in Que should not be given retroactive effect to the prejudice of Co and
others similarly situated who relied on the opinion of the Secretary of Justice. LATIN
MAXIM: 1, 2a, 46a

FACTS: Petitioner is the owner of a duly licensed grocery store located in the City of
Manila and an importer of flour who sells either to bakeries or to retail dealers for
purposes of retail. Sometime in September 1948, the Treasurer of the City of
Manila assessed against him the sum of 566.50php which represents the alleged
deficiency municipal license tax due from him on his gross sales of flour to bakeries
after deducting the sales made to retail dealers for purposes of resale. ISSUE: W/N
the sales of flour made by the Petitioner to bakeries to be manufactured into bread
are retail or wholesale. HELD: The sale of flour to bakeries to be manufactured into
bread and to be resold to the public, in the absence of any express provision of law
on the matter, should be treated as a sale at retail and should subject the vendor to
the retail tax law. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 7a, 24a, 37, 43

30 Sumulong v. Commission on Elections
Case No. 149 G.R. No. 48634 (October 8, 1941)

Central Capiz v. Ramirez
Case No. 56 G.R. No. L-16197 (March 12, 1920) Chapter III, Page 79, Footnote

FACTS: On September 15, 1941, Respondent granted the Popular Front Party of
Abad Santos the exclusive right to propose the minority election inspector in the
first congressional district of Pampanga, and to the Popular Front Party of
Petitioner, the minority inspector in the second congressional district of the said
province. Eleven days later, Respondent modified its ruling and awarded the
minority inspector to the Popular Front Party of Abad Santos. ISSUE: W/N
Respondent committed grave abuse of discretion. HELD: Where the minimum
number of votes required by law was polled by a mere coalition or alliance of
minority parties, the right to minority representation in the board of election
inspectors to which such coalition is entitled, cannot be claimed by any of the
component parties which have thereafter separated. Respondent shall have the
discretion to choose the minority inspector. LATIN MAXIM: 36a, 37, d

FACTS: Private Respondent contracted with Petitioner Corporation for a term of 30
years, a supply of all sugar cane produced on her plantation, which was to be
converted later into a right in rem and recorded in the Registry of Property as an
encumbrance upon the land, and binding to all future owners of the same. The
Respondent refuses to push through with the contract thinking it might violate Act
No. 2874, “An Act to amend and compile the laws relating to lands of public
domain, and for other purposes,” since more than 61 percent of the capital stock of
the corporation is held and owned by persons who are not citizens of the Philippine
Islands or of the United States. The land involved is a private agricultural land.
ISSUE: W/N said Act no. 2874 is applicable to agricultural lands, in the Philippine
Islands which are privately owned. HELD: The limit and purpose of the Legislature
in adopting Act No. 2874 was and is to limit its application to lands of public domain
and that lands held in private ownership are not included therein and are not
affected in any manner whatsoever thereby. Jones Law of 1916: “That no bill may
be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject, and that subject shall be
expressed in the title of the bill.” LATIN MAXIM: d

31 Eugenio v. Drilon
Case No. 104 G.R. No. 109404 (January 22, 1996) Chapter III, Page 81, Footnote

People of the Philippines v. Purisima
Case No. 221 G.R. Nos. L-42050-66 (November 20, 1978) Chapter III, Page 76,
Footnote No.16

FACTS: Private Respondent purchased on installment basis from Petitioner, two
lots. Private respondent suspended payment of his amortizations because of
nondevelopment on the property. Petitioner then sold one of the two lots to
spouses Relevo and the title was registered under their name. Respondent prayed
for annulment of sale and reconveyance of the lot to him. Applying P.D. 957 “The
Subdivision and Condominium Buyers’ Protective Decree”, the Human Settlements
Regulatory Commission ordered Petitioner to complete the development, reinstate
Private Respondent’s purchase contract over one lot and immediately refund him of
the payment (including interest) he made for the lot sold to the spouses. Petitioner
claims that the Exec. Sec. erred in applying P.D. 957 saying it should have not been
given retroactive effect and that non-development does not justify the non-
payment of the amortizations. ISSUE: W/N the Executive Secretary acted with
grave abuse of discretion when he decided P.D. 957 will be given retroactive effect.
HELD: No. Respondent Executive Secretary did not act with grave abuse of
discretion and P.D. 957 is to given retroactive effect so as to cover even those
contracts executed prior to its enactment in 1976. P.D. 957 did not expressly
provide for retroactivity in its entirety, but such can be plainly inferred from the
unmistakable intent of the law. “The intent of the statute is the law.” LATIN MAXIM:

FACTS: Twenty-six petitions for review were filed charging the respective
Defendant with “illegal possession of deadly weapon” in violation of Presidential
Decree No. 9. An order quashed the information because it did not allege facts
which constitute the offense penalized by P.D. No. 9. It failed to state one essential
element of the crime, viz.: that the carrying outside of the residence of the accused
of a bladed, pointed, or blunt weapon is in furtherance or on the occasion of,
connected with or related to subversion, insurrection, or rebellion, organized
lawlessness or public disorder. Petitioners argued that a perusal of P.D. No. 9 shows
that the prohibited acts need not be related to subversive activities and that they
are essentially malum prohibitum penalized for reasons of public policy. ISSUE:
W/N P.D. No. 9 shows that the prohibited acts need not be related to subversive
activities. HELD: The primary rule in the construction and interpretation of a
legislative measure is to search for and determine the intent and spirit of the law.
Legislative intent is the controlling factor. Because of the problem of determining
what acts fall under P.D. 9, it becomes necessary to inquire into the intent and
spirit of the decree and this can be found among others in the preamble or
“whereas” clauses which enumerate the facts or events which justify the
promulgation of the decree and the stiff sanctions stated therein. LATIN MAXIM: 9a,

32 People of the Philippines v. Echaves
Case No. 207 G.R. Nos. L-47757-61 (January 28, 1980) Chapter III, Page 77,
Footnote No.22

Aboitiz Shipping Corporation v. City of Cebu
Case No. 4 G.R. No. L-14526 (March 31, 1965) Chapter III, Page 82, Footnote

FACTS: The issue is whether or not P.D. 772, which penalizes squatting and similar
acts applies to agricultural lands. The lower court denied the motion and ruled that
agricultural land is not part of P.D. 772 on the basis of Ejusdem Generis (of the
same kind or species) since its preamble does not mention the Secretary of
Agriculture. The order of dismissal by Echaves was then appealed to the Supreme
Court, thus bringing the case at hand. ISSUE: Whether or not P.D. 772 applies to
agricultural lands HELD: The Supreme Court held the same ruling that the lower
court did, declaring that P.D. 772 does not apply to pasture lands because its
preamble shows that “it was intended to apply to squatting in urban communities or
more particularly to illegal constructions in squatter areas made by well-to-do
individuals.” But the Supreme Court disagreed to the lower court’s usage of the
maxim Ejusdem Generis because the intent of the decree is unmistakable. It stated
that “the rule of Ejusdem Generis is merely a tool for statutory construction which
is resorted to when the legislative is uncertain.” LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 36b

FACTS: The Petitioner contends that the ordinance implemented by Respondent
should be declared null and void because the ordinance seeks to generate revenue
by collecting wharfage from vessels which dock at the public wharves of piers
located in the said City but owned by the National Government. According to
Respondent, the legislature made no distinction between those owned by the City
of Cebu and the National Government and that consequently, both fall within the
scope of the power granted. Petitioners assail this construction erroneous in the
light of the meaning of “public wharf” as it may have bearing on the right to charge
wharfage. ISSUE: W/N the City of Cebu, through its ordinance, has the right to
charge wharfages from docks which are owned by the National Government. HELD:
The term “public” refers to the nature of use of the pier or wharves. Hence, the
power to impose wharfage rests on a different basis and that is ownership. The
Court also referred to the previous subsection of the questioned portion of the
ordinance pointing out that it implies a distinction with regard to those docks that
are owned by the City and those of the National Government. The Court states that
only those which are constructed by the City shall be considered as its property.
LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 25a, 36b

33 Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. TMX Sales, Inc.
Case No. 80 G.R. No. 83736 (January 15, 1992) Chapter III, Page 83, Footnote

Feliciano v. Aquino
Case No. 105 G.R. No. 10201 (September 23, 1957) Chapter III, Page 83, Footnote

FACTS: Respondent Company wants a refund to an erroneously collected tax as
provided in Sec. 292 of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC) which includes a
two-year prescription. The Petitioner claims that the prescriptive period provided in
the law for refund of such tax is already expired since it is already more than two
years from the date the quarterly income tax was paid. The Respondent contends,
on the other hand, that the date of filing of the final payment (Final Adjustment
Return) is the one that should be considered with respect to the prescriptive period
and not the quarterly payment made. ISSUE: W/N the two-year prescriptive period
provided in Sec. 292 of the National Internal Revenue Code commence to run from
the date the quarterly income tax was paid or from the date of filing of the Final
Adjustment Return (final payment). HELD: The date of filing of the final payment
should be considered. The Supreme Court said that, “Sec. 292 of the NIRC should
be interpreted in relation to the other provisions of the Tax Code in order to give
effect the legislative intent and to avoid an application of the law which may lead to
inconvenience and absurdity. The intention of the legislator must be ascertained
from the whole text of the law and every part of the act is to be taken into view.”
LATIN MAXIM: 11a, 36b, 36d

FACTS: Respondent was proclaimed as elected Mayor of Concepcion, Tarlac. Four
days after the proclamation, defeated candidate Petitioner instituted quo warranto
proceedings, challenging Petitioner’s eligibility on the ground that Respondent was
not yet 23 years old at the time of his election. Aquino claimed that age
requirement refers only to the age at assumption of office. He appealed that the
existence of a semi-colon, converted into a comma in the 1951 Revised
Administrative Code, does not require him to possess the remaining qualifications
at the time of the election but rather at the time of the assumption of office,
provided that he had fulfilled the first two requirements. ISSUE: W/N the election of
Aquino is unlawful and illegal. HELD: The primary rule of statutory construction is
that punctuation marks cannot be disregarded unless there is reason to do
contrary. Punctuation marks are aids of low degree and can never control against
the intelligible meaning of written words. No reason is shown why, after plainly and
unequivocally requiring that the candidates of other elective offices should possess
the age qualification “at the time of the election”, the law should suddenly change
the requirement for the case of municipal officers. No argument is needed to show
that where the candidate is mentioned as eligible or ineligible in the said section,
taking part in the election is meant, not capacity to assume office. Decision of the
lower court is affirmed and the election of Respondent is declared unlawful and
illegal. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 9d, 11a, 11e, 36b

34 US. v. Hart
Case No. 159 G.R. No. L-8327 (March 28, 1913)

In re: Estate of Johnson
Case No. 131 G.R. No. 12767 (November 16, 1918) Chapter III, Page 86, Footnote

FACTS: Respondent was caught in a gambling house and was penalized under Act
No. 519 which punishes “every person found loitering about saloons or dram shops
or gambling houses, or tramping or straying through the country without visible
means of support”. The said portion of the law is divided into two parts, separated
by the comma, separating those caught in gambling houses and those straying
through the country without means of support. Though it was proven that Hart and
the other Defendants had “visible means of support”, it was under the first part of
the portion of law for which they were charged with. The prosecution persisted that
the phrase “without visible means of support” was in connection to the second part
of the said portion of Act No. 519, therefore was not a viable defense. ISSUE: How
should the provision be interpreted? HELD: The construction of a statute should be
based upon something more substantial than mere punctuation. If the punctuation
gives it a meaning which is reasonable and is in apparent accord with legislative
will, it may be as an additional argument for adopting the literal meaning of the
words in the statute as thus punctuated. An argument based on punctuations alone
is not conclusive and the court will not hesitate to change the punctuation when
necessary to give the act the effect intended by the legislature, disregarding
superfluous and incorrect punctuation marks, or inserting others when necessary.
Inasmuch as defendant had, “visible means of support” and that the absence of
such was necessary for the conviction for gambling and loitering in saloons and
gambling houses, defendants are acquitted. LATIN MAXIM: 11e, 33

FACTS: Petitioner was a native of Sweden and a naturalized citizen of the United
States but died and left a will in Manila. Sec. 636 of the Code of the Civil Procedure
states “Will made here by an alien—will made within the Philippine Islands by a
citizen or subject of another state or country, which is executed in accordance with
the law of the state or country of which he is a citizen or subject, and which might
be proved, allowed by the law of his own state or country, may be proved, allowed
and recorded in the Philippine Islands and shall have the same effect as if executed
according to the laws of these Islands.” The will of Johnson was probated and
allowed in the lower court, but Petitioner contends that Sec. 636 is applicable only
to wills of aliens; and in this connection, attention is directed to the fact that the
epigraph of this section speaks only of the will made here by an alien and to further
fact that the word “state” in the body of the section is not capitalized. ISSUE: W/N
the will of Petitioner, a citizen of the U.S and therefore an alien, is covered by Sec.
636. HELD: The fact that the words “state” and “country” are not capitalized does
not mean that the United States is excluded from the phrase “another state or
country”. It is a rule of hermeneutics that punctuation and capitalization are aids of
low degree in interpreting the language of a statute and can never control against
the intelligible meaning of the written words. The epigraph, or heading, of a section
being nothing more than a convenient index to the contents of the provision,
cannot have the effect of limiting the operative words contained in the body of the
text. Petitioner, being a US citizen, thus an alien, is covered by Sec. 636. The will
duly probated. LATIN MAXIM: 24a, 25a, 26, 37, 42a, 48

35 People of the Philippines v. Yabut
Case No. 231 G.R. No. 85472 (September 27, 1993) Chapter III, Page 87, Footnote

People of the Philippines v. Mendoza
Case No.112 G.R. No. L-38076 (November 4, 1933)

FACTS: Defendant was convicted for homicide. While serving sentence, he killed
another prisoner. He was consequently charged for murder. After conviction, he
was punished with the maximum period for murder, in accordance with Art. 160 of
the Revised Penal Code. ISSUE: W/N the lower court erred in applying Art. 160.
HELD: No. Respondent relied on the word “another” appearing in the English
translation of the head note of Art. 160, and suggests that the law is applicable only
when the new crime committed by a person serving sentence is different from the
crime for which he is serving sentence. According to him, his conviction for murder
is not different because it involved homicide. No such deduction is warranted from
the text itself, or from the Spanish caption. When the text of the law is clear and
unambiguous, there is no need to resort to the preamble, heading, epigram or head
note of a section for interpretation of the text, which are mere catchwords or
reference aids, consulted to remove, not create doubts. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 7a

FACTS: Respondents were accused for violation of Section 2654 of the
Administrative Code for allegedly depositing in the official ballot box 51 official
ballots which they prepared without the knowledge and consent of the voters. They
were tried and convicted. ISSUE: W/N the evidence is sufficient to convict. HELD:
No. What was presented and admitted was evidence in a previous election case
which has no probative value to establish the guilt of the defendants in the criminal
case. The English text of Section 2654 is defective as the head note clearly shows
that this section is only applicable when a person fraudulently deposit’s a ballot in
the ballot box. The evidence presented was insufficient to convict that defendants
fraudulently deposited the ballots in question. Judgment was reversed. LATIN
MAXIM: 50, d

36 People of the Philippines v. Manaba
Case No. 110 G.R. No. L-39037 (October 30, 1933)

U.S. v. Quintanar
Case No. 162 G.R. No. 5654 (August 27, 1910)

FACTS: Defendant was charged for rape. The complaint was signed by the Chief of
Police. After trial, Defendant was convicted but the judgment was set aside and the
case dismissed on his motion that the court had no jurisdiction over his person or
the subject matter, because the complaint was not signed by the offended party.
Subsequently, the offended party signed a complaint charging Defendant of rape.
Defendant asked for dismissal on the ground of double jeopardy, but it was denied
and he was convicted. ISSUE: W/N the Defendant was placed in double jeopardy.
HELD: No. Whether or not Defendant was placed in double jeopardy depends on
whether or not he was tried on a valid complaint in the first case. Art. 334 of the
Revised Penal Code requires the offended party to file the complaint. As the first
complaint was not signed by the offended party, it was not a valid complaint in
accordance with law, and the judgment of the court was void for lack of jurisdiction
over subject matter, and defendant was never in jeopardy. The Spanish equivalent
of the word “filed” is not bound in the Spanish text which is controlling, because it
was the Spanish text approved by the legislature. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 36a

FACTS: Defendants, on the night of March 1, 1908 were caught in the act of
smoking opium, in violation of Sec. 32 of Act No. 1761, the “Opium Law”. On
appeal, Defendants contend that they could not be legally convicted for they rely on
the Spanish translation of the Act which provides that it will take effect “despues
del primero de Marzo.” (after the first of March) ISSUE: W/N the Defendant should
be punished under Act No 1761 which takes effect “despues del primero de Marzo.”
HELD: The translation of the Defendant is not accurate. The English and original
text says: “on and after March 1, 1908”. Where the Act was originally promulgated
in English, it shall prevail over its translation. LATIN MAXIM: 6c

37 Employees’ Club, Inc. v. China Banking Corporation
Case No. 39 G.R. No. 40188 (July 27, 1934)

McMicking v. Lichauco
Case No. 175 G.R. No. 7896 (March 30, 1914) Chapter III, Page 88, Footnote

FACTS: Respondent Corporation contends that the order requires it to surrender the
register of deeds of the City of Manila which is the duplicate of TCT No. 21192 so
that the contract lease might be noted and entered in the corresponding records.
They argue that the contract lease cannot be registered in the register of deeds
because it is not a real right; and under the Civil Code and the Mortgage Law, only
real rights can be registered. The only exceptions, which it does not harbor, are a
term exceeding three years, rent to corresponding years paid in advance, or an
express covenant requiring the lease to be registered. ISSUE: W/N contract lease
under the Mortgage law is not a real right and not be registered. HELD: The
property in question is NOT under the Mortgage law but under Act No. 496, or the
Torrens system, Sec. 51 and 52. This act expressly provides that all interests must
be registered in order to affect third persons, which includes the interest arising
from the contract of lease in favor of the Respondent. The Spanish text of the law
was relied upon by the Petitioner – the Mortgage Law. But the English enacted by
the Legislature, Act No. 496, should prevail. LATIN MAXIM: 9c, 49

FACTS: This is an appeal on a judgment in favor of current Respondent against
Defendant Chu Chan Chac. However, there was another case pending in its
duration: an appeal in the judgment in favor of Antonio Flor Mata – where
judgment execution is. And likewise, in the duration of Mata’s judgment, there was
yet another pending appeal where Defendant Lichauco owed his Aunt Clara
Lichauco P17,666.60. ISSUE: With these two cases, who has preference over the
funds owed by Lichauco. HELD: Preference should be secured to Mata
notwithstanding the appeal. The preference on Mata was based on Art. 1924 of the
new Code of Civil Procedure, which secures preference to sentencias firmes only
(judgments which are final in the sense that no appeal lies therefrom). Mata must
have immediate recourse to the property of Lichauco based on the first judgment.
However, until the allotment of time for perfecting of a bill is not done yet and the
appeal was not taken, the judgment, strictly, is not Sentencia Firme as used in
Spanish legal terminology – where it would be explained that the right to share in
the distribution of the debtor (Lichauco) could not accrue the judgment creditor
(Mata) until he has the right to. One must take into account that classification and
the incidents of judgments, orders and decrees that were once under Spanish
Terminology have been modified under the new Code of Civil Procedure, drawn in
part from American and English precedents. One should look rather to the spirit
than the letter of the law. The lien of a judgment is not necessarily destroyed by
the perfecting of an appeal but simply suspended. Even if there was a new
judgment, it is simply reversed, not destroyed. LATIN MAXIM: 9c, 49

38 Alonzo v. Intermediate Appellate Court
Case No. 11 G.R. No. L-72873 (May 28, 1987) Chapter III, Page 89, Footnote

Vda. De Macabenta v. Davao Stevedore Terminal Company
Case No. 156 G.R. No. L-27489 (April 30, 1970) Chapter III, Page 89, Footnote

FACTS: Five siblings inherited in equal pro indiviso shares a parcel of land
registered in the name of their deceased parents. Two siblings sold their share to
the same vendee. By virtue of such agreements, the Petitioners occupied after the
said sales, 2/5 of the lot, representing the portions bought. They subsequently
enclosed their portion with a fence and built a semi-concrete house. One of the
sisters filed a complaint invoking the right to redeem the area sold. The trial court
dismissed this complaint because the time had lapsed, not having been exercised
within 30 days from notice of the sales. ISSUE: 1. W/N there was a valid notice. 2.
W/N Art. 1088 of the Civil Code was interpreted correctly. HELD: Although there
was no written notice, there was actual knowledge of the sales satisfying the
requirement of the law. It is unbelievable that the co-heirs were unaware of the
sale, with the erection of a permanent semi-concrete structure. While Art. 1088 of
the Civil Code stresses the need for a written notice of sale; the Petitioners claimed
that because there was no written notice, despite their obvious knowledge of it, the
30-day period for redemption had not yet begun. The intent of the lawmakers was
to ensure that the redemptioner was properly notified of the sale and to indicate
the date of such notice as the starting time of the 30-day period of redemption. The
co-heirs in this case were undeniably informed of the sales although no notice in
writing was given to them. LATIN MAXIM: 1, 8, 9a, 10, 11d, 11e, 12a, 17

FACTS: At the time the decedent met the vehicular accident on September 12,
1961, which led to his death 16 days later, the claimant-widow was not yet married
to the decedent although they had already been living together as husband and
wife for the past 3 months. However, on the day following the accident, they were
lawfully wedded. The claimant widow gave birth on April 8, 1962, to the
posthumous daughter of the deceased, Racquel. ISSUE: W/N the widow and
posthumous child are considered dependents under the Workmen’s Compensation
Act. HELD: Yes. According to the Workmen’s Compensation Act, a widow living with
the deceased or actually dependent upon him totally or partly as well as her
daughter, if under 18 years of age or incapable of supporting herself, and
unmarried, whether or not actually dependent on the deceased are considered
dependents. Although not his wife at the time of the accident but at the time of his
death, are still considered dependents under the Act. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 7a, 9c,
12a, 37

39 Tinio, et al. v. Frances, et al.
Case No. 290 G.R. No. L-7747 (November 29, 1955) Chapter III, Page 90, Footnote

Home Insurance Company v. Eastern Shipping Lines
Case No. 125 G.R. No. 34382 (July 20, 1983) Chapter III, Page 91, Footnote No.64

FACTS: Sergio Nicolas applied for a parcel of land in Nueva Ecija and was approved
in 1917. In 1943, the final proof was approved by the Director of Lands who issued
a patent in his favor, but because Sergio Nicolas died, he was substituted by his
heirs, represented by his widow. In 1947, the heirs transferred their rights to the
homestead to the Defendants, with approval by the Secretary of Agriculture and
Commerce, and secured the issuance of a homestead patent in their favor. In 1953,
heirs of the deceased Sergio Nicolas wanted to annul the sale of a homestead and
to recover the land, together with the fruits of the land as damages. ISSUE: W/N
the sale or transfer of right of the heirs of Sergio Nicolas over the parcel of land was
valid. HELD: No. Conveyances made by the heirs of the homesteader to the
Defendants do not comply with the first requirement of Sec. 20 of the Public Lands
Act that the Director of lands is satisfied from proofs submitted by the homesteader
that he could not continue with his homestead through no fault of his own, and that
the conveyance must be made with the prior or previous approval of the Secretary
of Agriculture and Commerce. Thus the conveyance made by the heirs of Nicolas
was null and void. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 9b, 37, 38b, 48

FACTS: Plaintiff Company instituted two cases of recovery of damages against
Defendant Company. The Petitioner Company claimed for reimbursement with
regard to the amounts of insurance paid to the consignees due to losses suffered by
the cargoes and goods shipped. In this regard, the lower court dismissed the two
cases on the ground that the Plaintiff failed to provide its legal capacity to sue.
ISSUE: W/N the lower court is correct in holding that the Plaintiff lacks legal
capacity to sue which resulted in the dismissal of the two cases. HELD: Yes. The law
on the matter is that a suing foreign company, such as Plaintiff Company, must, in
order to be capacitated to sue in the Philippine jurisdiction, prove legal capacity by
establishing either that its transaction upon which the complaint was based was an
isolated one or that is was duly licensed or authorized by law to transact in the
Philippines. Otherwise, no cause of action accrues in favor of the Plaintiff as it has
no legal right to seek relief from the court. In the case at bar, the insurance
contracts between the Plaintiff and the Defendant were executed long before the
Plaintiff secured its license to transact business in the Philippines. Therefore, said
insurance contracts were void from the beginning as the purpose was contrary to
public policy. LATIN MAXIM: 4, 8, 9c, 11a, 36a, 37

40 Luzon Stevedoring Company v. Trinidad
Case No. 154 G.R. No. 18316 (September 23, 1922) Chapter III, Page 91, Footnote

Go Chioco v. Martinez
Case No. 113 G.R. No. 19864 and 19685 (October 17, 1923) Chapter III, Page 93,
Footnote No.93

FACTS: Plaintiff is a corporation duly organized under the laws of the Philippine
Islands, doing business in the City of Manila. Engaging in a stevedoring business,
consisting of loading and unloading of cargo from vessels in ports, at certain rates
of charge per unit of cargo, Plaintiff Company hopes to recover from Defendant, the
Internal Revenue Collector, the sum of P2,422.81, which had been paid under
protest. Defendant alleged that during the first quarter of 1921, the Plaintiff was
engaged in business as a contractor, with its gross receipts from the said business
amounting to P242, 281.33. Under the provisions of Sec. 1462 of Act No. 2711, the
percentage tax amount was levied and assessed toward the stevedoring business.
ISSUE: W/N the Plaintiff is considered a "contractor" provided by Sec. 1462 of Act
No. 2711. HELD: A contractor is defined as one who renders service in the course of
an independent occupation, representing the will of his employer only as to the
result of his work, and not as to the means by which it is accomplished. Plaintiff is
not a "contractor" based on Sec. 1462 of Act No. 2711. Therefore, the tax paid by
the Plaintiff was illegally collected and should be repaid. LATIN MAXIM: 2a, 4, 5b,
9c, 11a, 28

FACTS: Petitioner made a loan of P40,000 to Respondent. They executed a
promissory note stipulating that Respondent Hermanos will pay back the loan within
three months. On the same day, Respondent Hermanos signed another promissory
note and sent a check of P1,800 to Petitioner, which was cashed. After three
months, Respondent Hermanos was unable to pay the principal. He now executed a
new promissory note, again due within the next three months, and with this note,
Respondent Hermanos sent a check for P1,800. Again, he could not pay so they
executed another promissory note and sent another check worth P1,800. This cycle
was repeated a total of 7 times, with the third cycle's promissory note bring due
only a month later and with a check for only P600. Then Respondent Hermanos
paid P25,000 for the principal and refused to pay for the remaining P15,000.
Therefore, Petitioner filed a complaint. The trial court ruled that the interest rate of
18% was in violation of the Usury Law (Act 2655 as amended by Act No. 2992).
Thus, he must give back P11,850 from the interest and forfeits the remaining
P15,000. ISSUE: W/N the charging of a usurious interest of 18% forfeits the
principal loaned together with the interest. HELD: No, since only the interest is
forfeited. Taking into consideration the history of the Usury Law, the intent of the
framers is clear. In a previous law RA 2073, the principal loan was forfeited
together with the interest. However, unlike the previous law, the current law RA
2655 provides for stricter rules and alternative punishments for violations. The
current law also does not expressly mention that the principal is also forfeited. As a
rule of construction, when the intent of a law is ambiguous, one may consult the
history of the law and its preamble to ascertain the framers intent. LATIN MAXIM:
9a, 9c, 36a, 37

41 US v. De Guzman
Case No. 297 G.R. No. L-9144 (March 27, 1915) Chapter III, Page 94, Footnote

Basiana v. Luna
Case no. 31 G.R. Nos. L-34135-36 (February 24, 1981) Chapter III, Page 95,
Footnote No.102

FACTS: Defendant, along with Pedro and Serapio Macarling, was convicted of
asesinato (murder) and sentenced to life imprisonment. Defendant was discharged
before he pleaded on the condition that he promised to appear and testify as a
witness for the Government against his co-accused. Upon reaching the witness
stand, Defendant denied all knowledge of the murder. He denied ever saying
anything that implicated his co-accused and swore that statements made by him
were made in fear of the police officers. The Solicitor-General asks for the discharge
of the Respondent though it may result in a palpable miscarriage of justice,
nevertheless, the law provides for his dismissal and expressly bars a future
prosecution. ISSUE: W/N Defendant should be discharged. HELD: Sec. 19 and 20
are constitutional. There is no provision for perjury should the Defendant fail to
comply with the agreement with the State. However, looking at the legislative
history of the statute, it can be gleaned that faithful performance is necessary to
avail of the bar to criminal prosecution. Failure of the Defendant in the case at bar
to faithfully and honestly carry out his undertaking to appear as witness and to tell
the truth at the trial of his co-accused deprived him of the right to plead his formal
dismissal as a bar to his prosecution. Finally, discharge cannot be an acquittal since
it was made prior to his trial. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 22a, b2

FACTS: Petitioner entered into a private agreement with Cipriano Luna to prospect
with Luna getting 60% and Petitioner receiving the rest. Petitioner prospected 183
claims, 93 were recorded for him with the rest going to Luna, a clear disregard of
their agreement. Realizing that there was something wrong with the declaration of
location records, Luna amended the declarations with the intention of clearing claim
names and tie points; Petitioner however, disclaimed such consent. Consequently,
Luna cancelled the registration and created their own groups of claims overlapping
Petitioner’s claims. Petitioner alleges that his claims were valid, and were merely
abandoned for failure to pay occupation fees. ISSUE: W/N Petitioner’s mining
claims are valid. HELD: Sec. 47 par. 2 of the Mining Law (C.A. No. 137) provides:
“For the purpose of this section, a permanent and prominent object used as a tie
point MAY be an intersection of known roads; a junction of known rivers or creeks,
a known public or private structure; a corner of approved public, private or mineral
land survey; a kilometer post of public road; or location monument or triangulation
station established by the Bureau of Lands, Bureau of Mines, Army Corps of
engineers, Bureau of Cost and Geodetic Survey, or other government agencies.” An
initial post is not enumerated as a valid tie point. Petitioner’s contention that the
word MAY suggests non-exclusivity is untenable since it goes against the legislator’s
intent to eliminate claim jumping and overlapping claims. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 30a,
33, 36b

42 Baga v. PNB
Case No. 27 G.R. No. L-9695 (September 10, 1956) Chapter III, Page 95, Footnote

De Villa v. CA
Case No. 88 G.R. No. 87416 (April 8, 1991) Chapter III, Page 96, Footnote No.110

FACTS: Petitioner was the recipient of benefits with Respondent as the guardian
under RA 390 or the Uniform Veterans Guardianship Act which was passed with the
intention of being modeled after the US version. RA 390 provides that a
guardianship can only be terminated upon reaching the age of majority. Petitioner
alleges that she has married and has become emancipated under Art. 399 of the
New Civil Code thus terminating the guardianship. ISSUE: W/N Art. 399 of the Civil
Code shall prevail over RA 390. HELD: No. The Civil Code does not prevail. It was
the clear intent of the legislator to create a uniform law for material aid. Inserting
provisions of the Civil Code would result in discordance with intent. RA 390 is a
special law and thus must be taken to constitute an exception to the general law
which is the Civil Code. RA 390 Sec. 23 applies notwithstanding any other
provisions of law relating to judicial restoration and discharge of guardians. LATIN
MAXIM: 9a, 50, b2

FACTS: Petitioner was charged with a violation of BP 22 (Bouncing Checks Law) for
issuing a worthless check. However, he contends that the check was drawn against
a dollar account with a foreign bank, and is therefore, not covered by the said law.
ISSUE: W/N the Makati Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over the case in
question. HELD: The Makati Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction. The determinative
factor (in determining venue) is the place of the issuance of the check. The offense
was committed in Makati and therefore, the same is controlling and sufficient to
vest jurisdiction in the Makati Regional Trial Court. The Court acquires jurisdiction
over the case and over the person of the accused upon the filing of a complaint or
information in court which initiates a criminal action. With regard to Petitioner’s
allegation that the check is not covered by BP 22, it will be noted that the law does
not distinguish the currency involved in the case. Thus, the Court revealed that the
records of Batasan, Vol. III unmistakably show that the intention of the lawmakers
is to apply the law to whatever currency may be the subject thereof. LATIN MAXIM:
9a, 17, 24b, 26, 43, b2

43 National Police Commission v. De Guzman, Jr.
Case No. 185 G.R. No. 106724 (February 9, 1994) Chapter III, Page 96, Footnote

China Banking Corporation v. Ortega
Case No. 21 G.R. No. L-34964 (January 31, 1973)

FACTS: RA 6975, otherwise known as “An Act Establishing the PNP Under a
Reorganized Dept. of the Interior and Local Government,” laid down the compulsory
retirement age of PNP officers. Respondents argue that the age of retirement (56)
of said law cannot be applied to them since they are covered by Sec. 89 of the
same law (which temporarily extended the age of retirement). In other words,
Respondents wanted to be extended the same privileges as the local police. Hence,
they contend that the term “INP” includes both the former members of the
Philippine Constabulary (PC) and the local police force who were earlier constituted
as the Integrated National Police (INP). ISSUE: W/N the legislative intent was to
classify the INP as applicable only to the local police force. HELD: The intent was to
classify the INP in such manner that Sec. 89 of RA 6975 is applicable only to the
local police force. The use of the term INP is not synonymous with the PC. Had it
been otherwise, the statute could have just made a uniform reference to the
members of the whole PNP for retirement purposes and not just the INP. Indeed,
the law distinguishes INP from the PC and it cannot be construed that “INP” as used
in Sec. 89 includes the members of the PC. The legislature did intend to exclude the
members of the PC from the coverage of Sec. 89 insofar as the retirement age is
concerned. LATIN MAXIM: 9c, 11a, 12a, 27, b2

FACTS: A complaint was filed against B&B Forest Development Corporation for the
collection of a sum of money. The trial court declared the said corporation in
default. The Plaintiff sought the garnishment of the bank deposit of B&B Forest with
current Petitioner Bank. Thus, a notice of garnishment was issued by the Deputy
Sheriff and served on Petitioner Bank through its cashier, Tan Kim Liong. He
refused to disclose the sought information, citing the provisions of RA 1405 which
prohibits the disclosure of any information relative to bank deposits to any person
except upon written permission of the depositor. Furthermore, RA 1405 also
imposes criminal liability on any official or employee of a banking institution who
breaks the confidential nature of this law. ISSUE: W/N a banking institution may
validly refuse to comply with a court process garnishing the bank deposit of a
judgment debtor, by invoking RA 1405. HELD: No. It was not the intention of the
lawmakers to place bank deposits beyond the reach of execution to satisfy a final
judgment. The discussion of the conference committee report of the two houses of
Congress indicates that the prohibition against examination of or inquiry into a bank
deposit under RA 1405 does not preclude its being garnished to insure satisfaction
of a judgment. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 11e, 12b, 30b, 35, 38b, 43, b2

44 Mayon Motors v. Acting CIR
Case No. 173 G.R. No. 15000 (March 29, 1961) Chapter III, Page 96, Footnote

Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato
Case No. 67 G.R. No. 118910 (November 16, 1995)

FACTS: Petitioner Company imported 17 Pontiac automobiles in three different
shipments. Respondent assessed against Petitioner deficiency advance sales tax on
the automobiles. Petitioner requested for reconsideration and, this request having
been denied, it recurred to the Court of Tax Appeals. After the hearing, said court
modified Respondent’s decision by requiring Petitioner to pay a sum more than
what the acting Commissioner on Internal Revenue assessed and denying its claim
for a refund. Hence this appeal. Petitioner assails the procedure adopted by the tax
court and insists the court’s interpretation of the Tax Code erroneous invoking a
statement made by then Congressman Ferdinand Marcos during the deliberations
on the amendments for the Tax Code. ISSUE: W/N the opinion of a legislator in the
deliberations of a law, controlling in the interpretation of the law. HELD: No. Courts
are not bound by a legislator’s opinion expressed in congressional debates
regarding the interpretation of a particular legislation. It is deemed to be a mere
personal opinion of the legislator. LATIN MAXIM: b2

FACTS: Petitioners seek for reconsideration of Kilosbayan, et al. v. Guingona. The
Court has determined that Petitioner has no standing to sue but did not dismiss the
case. Petitioners insist that the PCSO cannot hold and conduct charity sweepstakes,
lotteries and other similar activities in collaboration or joint venture with any other
party because of the clause “except for the activities mentioned in the preceding
paragraph (A)” in paragraph (B) of Sec. 1 of RA 1169 as amended by BP 42.
ISSUE: W/N under its charter (RA 1169, as amended) the Philippine Charity
Sweepstakes Office can enter in any form of association or collaboration with any
party in operating an on-line lottery. HELD: No. Petitioner’s interpretation fails to
take into account not only the location of the phrase in paragraph (B), when it
should be in paragraph (A) had that been the intention of the lawmaking authority,
but also the phrase “by itself.” What the PCSO is prohibited from doing is from
investing in a business engaged in sweepstakes, races, lotteries and other similar
activities. It is prohibited from doing so “whether in collaboration, association or
joint venture” with others or “by itself.” LATIN MAXIM: 34, 36b

45 Luzon Stevedoring Co., Inc. v. Luzon Marine Department Union
Case No. 77 G.R. No. 9265 (April 29, 1957)

Commissioner of Customs v. Court of Tax Appeals
Case No. 71 G.R. Nos. 48886-8 (July 21, 1993) Chapter III, Page 101, Footnote

FACTS: Petitioner files a case to review a resolution issued by the Court of
Industrial Relations ruling that the 20 minutes’ rest given to employees after
mealtime should not be deducted from the four hours of overtime work. Employees
of the company are seamen working in tugboats from 6:00 am – 6:00 pm (12
hours of work, four hours overtime), given three free meals a day and 20 minutes’
rest after mealtime. ISSUE: 1. W/N the definition for "hours of work" as presently
applied to dry land laborers equally applicable to seamen. 2. W/N a different
criterion should be applied by virtue of the fact that the seamen's employment is
completely different in nature as well as in condition of work from that of a dry land
laborer. HELD: The definition of “hours of work” equally applies to seamen and no
need for a different criterion. Sec. 1 of C.A. No. 444, known as the Eight-Hour
Labor Law, provides that “when the work is not continuous, the time during which
the laborer is not working and can leave his working place and can reset
completely, shall not be counted” in the eight working hours. A laborer need not
leave the premises of the factory, shop or boat in order that his period of rest shall
not be counted, it being enough that he “cease to work,” and may rest completely.

FACTS: Iligan Express Corporation maintains a berthing facility at Kiwalan, Iligan
City. Respondent Company availed of such facilities and as thus assessed berthing
fees by the Collector of Custom which were paid by the said shipping company
under protest. ISSUE: W/N a vessel berthing at a privately-owned wharf should be
charged berthing fees under Sec. 2901 of the Tariff and Custom Code, as amended
by P.D. 34. HELD: No. Liability does not attach if the port is privately-owned. Sec.
2901 of the Tariff and Custom Code, as amended by P.D. 34 speaks of the “national
ports” only. Sec. 2901 did not distinguish between national ports and private ports
until it was amended by the presidential decree, and this amendment indicates a
legislative intent to change the meaning of the provision from the original. Since
the said law limits the berthing taxes to national ports only, it is obvious that the
private ports are not included. Kiwalan is not a national port in the Custom
memorandum circular 33-73 or E.O. 72. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 25d, 30a

46 Buenaseda v. Secretary Flavier
Case No. 40 G.R. No. 106719 (September 21, 1993) Chapter III, Page 104,
Footnote No.141

Carolina Industries Inc. v. CMS Stock Brokerage Inc.
Case No. 47 G.R. No. L-46908 (May 17, 1980) Chapter III, Page 106, Footnote

FACTS: The Private Respondents filed an administrative complaint with the
Ombudsman against the Petitioner for the violation of the Anti-graft and Corrupt
Practices Act. In response, the Ombudsman filed an order directing the preventive
suspension of the Petitioners, who were employees of the national center for mental
health. The Respondent argue that the preventive suspension laid by the
Ombudsman under Sec. 24 of RA 6770 is contemplated in by Sec. 13(8) of Art. 9 of
the 1987 Constitution, while the Petitioner contends that the Ombudsman can only
recommend to the Heads of Departments and other agencies the preventive
suspension of officials and employees facing administrative investigation conducted
by his office. ISSUE: W/N the Ombudsman has the power to preventively suspend
government officials working in other offices other than that of the Ombudsman
pending the investigation of administrative complaints. HELD: Yes. The
Ombudsman has the power to suspend the employees of the said institution may it
be in punitive or preventive suspension. Sec. 13(3) of the Constitution refers to
“suspension” in its punitive sense, as the same speaks of penalties in administrative
cases, while Sec. 24 of RA 6770 grants the Ombudsman the power to preventively
suspend public officials and employees facing administrative charges. This statute is
procedural and may arise in order to facilitate a speedy and efficient investigation
on cases filed against the officers. A preventive measure is not in itself a
punishment but a preliminary step in an administrative investigation. LATIN
MAXIM: 27, 28

FACTS: Petitioner opened a margin account with Respondent for purchasing,
carrying and selling stocks and securities listed in the Makati stock exchange.
Within three months, the Petitioner’s amount deposited was completely wiped out
without his permission. Respondent says there was consent but the evidence did
not suffice to prove such consent. Respondent now question the appellate court’s
ruling on their violation of the SEC rules and securities Act, and how these statutes
are interpreted, the appellate court used foreign jurisprudence in coming up with
this decision. ISSUE: W/N there is a violation of the rules and Regulations of stock
trading. HELD: If the law renders the customers as incapable of protecting himself,
it is the duty of the broker to do so. The courts use of a ruling in foreign case is
only right because the prevailing laws are patterned after those of the United
States. LATIN MAXIM: 6d, 9

47 Zamora v. Collector of Internal Revenue
Case No. 176 G. R. No L-15290 (May 31, 1963)

Tamayo v. Gsell
Case No. 282 G. R. No 10765 (December 22, 1916) Chapter III, Page 106,
Footnote No.149

FACTS: Mariano Zamora, owner of the Bay View Hotel and Farmacia Zamora
Manila, filed his income tax returns for the years 1951 and 1952. The Collector of
Internal Revenue found that he failed to file his return of the capital gains derived
from the sale of certain real properties and claimed deductions which were not
allowable. Mariano Zamora and his deceased sister Felicidad Zamora, bought a
piece of land located in Manila on May 16, 1944, for P132,000.00 and sold it for
P75,000.00 on March 5, 1951. They also purchased a lot located in Q.C. for
P68,959.00 on January 19, 1944 which they sold for P94,000.00 on Feb. 9, 1951.
The CTA ordered the estate of the late Felicidad Zamora, to pay the sum of
P235.00, representing alleged deficiency income tax and surcharge due from said
estate. Esperanza Zamora appealed and alleged that the CTA erred. ISSUE: W/N
the CTA erred in computing the taxes due for payment by Mariano Zamora. HELD:
No. The appraisal is correct and the court found no plausible reason to disturb the
same. LATIN MAXIM: b2

FACTS: This is an action for damages against the Defendant for personal injuries
suffered by Braulio Tamayo, 11-year old son of the Plaintiff. The injury was
attributed to the boy’s inexperience in the work which he had been assigned for the
first time and without prior instruction. ISSUE: W/N the plaintiff is entitled to
recover damages under the Employer’s Liability Act. HELD: Yes. The Legislature
intended that the measure of damages in personal injury cases brought under the
Employer’s Liability Act to be the same as that in the country from which the Act
was taken, being of American origin. LATIN MAXIM: b2

48 Ossorio v. Posadas
Case No. 93 G.R. No. L-31088 (December 3, 1929)

Campos Rueda Corp. v. Sta. Cruz Timber Co. and Felix
Case No. 17 G.R. No. L-6884 (March 21, 1956)

FACTS: Plaintiff and appellant filed for the recovery from the Defendant Collector of
Internal Revenue the sum of P56,246.72, which the Defendant, according to the
complaint, collected from the Plaintiff in excess of what he should have collected by
way of income tax. ISSUE: W/N the paraphernal property of the Plaintiff’s wife
constitutes her “separate estate” within the scope and meaning of this phrase for
the purposes of the additional income tax. HELD: Yes. It is ordered that the
Defendant make two separate assessments of the additional income tax, one
against the Plaintiff, and the other against his wife on her paraphernal property,
returning the sum of P56,203.59 to said plaintiff, without prejudice to his levying
against and collecting from said Plaintiff’s wife upon her own separate individual
declaration, in accordance with law, the additional income tax for the income from
her paraphernal property. LATIN MAXIM: b2

FACTS: The Court of First Instance of Manila dismissed the case of Petitioner
against Respondent to recover the value of two promissory notes for the amounts
of P1,125 and P1,075, for lack of jurisdiction; holding that the two notes constitute
two separate causes of action involving less than P2,000. The Municipal Court
likewise dismissed the case of Petitioner Corporation against Respondents for
collection of the same promissory notes object of the former action, on the ground
that the amount of two notes, which Petitioner now consolidated under a single
cause of action, was in excess of its jurisdiction. ISSUE: W/N the Municipal Court of
Manila has jurisdiction over the subject matter of appellant’s complaint. HELD: No.
The jurisdiction of a court depends, not upon the value or demand in each single
case of action contained in the complaint, but upon the totality of the demand in all
the causes of action. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 7a

49 Ang Giok Chio vs. Springfield Fire & Marine Insurance Co.
Case No. 8 G.R. No. 33637 (December 31, 1931)

Pando v. Kette and Sellner
Case No. 99 G.R. No. 32124 (March 27, 1930)

FACTS: Petitioner’s warehouse was destroyed by fire while the policy taken out with
Respondent for the amount of P10,000 was in force. The Respondent Company has
appealed claiming that Petitioner violated a rider on the insurance contract. ISSUE:
W/N a rider as forming part of the contract of insurance is null and void because it
does not comply with the Philippine Insurance Act. HELD: Yes. A rider attached to
the face of the insurance policy and referred to in the contract of insurance, is valid
and sufficient under Sec. 65 of the Philippine Insurance Act as it was taken
verbatim from Sec. 2605 of the Civil Code of California which states, “The section
as it now reads is in harmony with the rule that a warranty may be contained in
another instrument than the policy when expressly referred to in the policy as
forming a part thereof.” LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 7a, b2

FACTS: This is a foreclosure of mortgage. In pursuant thereof, the sheriff on
January 30, 1929, posted notices of the sale of the land in said writ in 3 public
places, to wit, upon the land itself, at the market, and on the municipal building of
Pasay. Notice of the sale was sent to the newspaper La Opinion for publication, and
the editor certified that he published it once a week for 3 consecutive weeks, more
particularly on the 2nd, 9th, and 15th of February, 1929 and the sale took place on
February 19, 1929. ISSUE: W/N the posted notices of the sale in 3 public places
and publication in La Opinion once a week for 3 consecutive weeks satisfied the
requirements of the law regarding the notice of the sale in question. HELD: Yes.
The Provision of our Code of Civil Procedure having been adopted from Sec. 692 of
the California Code, the requirements of the law regarding the notice of the sale in
question have been substantially complied with. LATIN MAXIM: b2