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FREEDOM FROM VIOLENCE

FINAL REPORT
STOCKHOLM FORUM
o n S e c u r i t y
& Development
2
0
1
4
STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONAL
PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE
SIPRI is an independent international institute dedicated to research into conict,
armaments, arms control and disarmament. Established in 1966, SIPRI provides
data, analysis and recommendations, based on open sources, to policymakers,
researchers, media and the interested public.
The Governing Board is not responsible for the views expressed in the publications
of the Institute.
GOVERNING BOARD
Jayantha Dhanapala, Acting Chairman
(Sri Lanka)
Dr Dewi Fortuna Anwar (Indonesia)
Dr Vladimir Baranovsky (Russia)
Ambassador Lakhdar Brahimi (Algeria)
Ambassador Wolfgang Ischinger (Germany)
Professor Mary Kaldor (United Kingdom)
The Director
DIRECTOR
Dr Ian Anthony (United Kingdom)
Signalistgatan 9
SE-169 70 Solna, Sweden
Telephone: +46 8 655 97 00
Fax: +46 8 655 97 33
Email: sipri@sipri.org
Internet: www.sipri.org
2014 STOCKHOLM FORUM ON
SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT:
FREEDOM FROM VIOLENCE
FINAL REPORT

Security and Development Programme
August 2014
CONTENTS
Overview 1
Main ndings from the Forum 2
Questions for future research 3
Reports from the Forum, Friday 28 March 2014 5
1. Forum opening 7
2. Preventing violence and promoting peace: possibilities and 8
limitations for international actors
3. Preventing gender-based violence in war and peace 10
4. Syrias war economy: mapping arms transfers and strategic 13
commodity ows
5. Promoting peace, justice and good governance in the global 15
development agenda
6. Development prospects for Afghanistan 18
Reports from the pre-Forum event, Thursday 27 March 2014 21
1. China as a foreign aid donor: implications for development 23
and security
2. Impact evaluations in fragile states, conicts and disasters 25
3. Violence against humanitarian workers 27
4. Civil society and governance reform in peacebuilding 29
5. International arms transfers and military expenditure in 31
relation to security and development
6. Data limitations in conict research: overcoming the 33
status quo and building for the future
7. Whose deal? The role of the private sector in supporting g7+ 35
governments in the new deal for engagement in fragile states
8. The European Unions comprehensive approach to external 37
conicts and crises
9. Transparency and accountability in security expenditures in 39
developing countries
10. What gets measured gets done: improving indicators and 41
measurement approaches for peace, rule of law, and good
governance goals and the post-2015 framework

Acknowledgements 43
OVERVIEW
The inaugural Stockholm Forum on Security and Development was held on
28 March 2014 with the theme Freedom from Violence. The Forum was hosted by
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) and the Swedish Ministry
for Foreign Afairs (MFA).
A total of 214 people from 25 countries attended the event. Attendees represented
85 institutions, including 40 civil society organizations, 15 research institutes, and
30 international or national government organizations. The diversity of the Forum
and its inclusive format allowed high-level UN ofcials, ambassadors and other
diplomats, academics and policy experts to freely discuss the links between violence,
conict, poverty and development.
The Forum leveraged state-of-the-art research and policy ndings from think
tanks and academics in Sweden and abroad, and showcased the research and associ-
ated policy advice produced by this community to practitioners and policymakers
working on security, peace and socioeconomic development.
The event also provided a timely opportunity to take stock of the current practice
and state of knowledge on security and development, 14 years after the adoption of
UN Security Council Resolution 1325, and three years after the World Banks seminal
World Development Report 2011 on Conict, Security and Development and the agree-
ment on the New Deal for Engagement with Fragile States in Busan, South Korea.
The event was designed to create a public forum in which participants could dis-
cuss current practices and new research, and reect candidly on knowledge gaps and
action from the perspectives of practitioners, policymakers and researchers. While
the event was co-hosted by the Swedish MFA, this report was drafted by SIPRI and
does not reect the position or opinions of the MFA or other partners or institutions
represented at the Forum.
In addition to the Forum, on 27 March SIPRI and its local partnersincluding the
Dag Hammarskjld Foundation, the Folke Bernadotte Academy, the Department of
Peace and Conict Research at Uppsala University, the Preventing Sexual Violence
Initiative (UK), the Sthlm Policy Group, the Stockholm Institute of Transition
Economics (SITE) and the Kvinna till Kvinna Foundationorganized a series of pre-
Forum panels and discussions.
The following pages contain brief summaries of two days of rich discussions and
can therefore serve only as a reference guide. Please contact event organizers or ses-
sion panellists for additional information on specic topics.

Dr Gary Milante
Director, SIPRI Security and Development Programme
August 2014
MAIN FINDINGS FROM THE FORUM
1. The post-2015 global development agenda ofers a unique opportunity to promote
more secure, just and prosperous societies. Countries lagging on human develop-
ment have often also lagged in other areas, including gender equality, security,
governance, provision of justice, reduction of corruption and the existence of
capable institutions necessary to deliver these goods. International consensus is
still forming on global goals related to security, justice and governance, but the
post-2015 process is an important opportunity to identify universal goals and
targets, applicable in both the Global North and the Global South.
2. Recent setbacks in the Central African Republic and South Sudan, and the
ongoing crises in Afghanistan and Syria, highlight the challenges of building
resilience in difcult environments. The immediacy of humanitarian and secu-
rity needs in many countries makes the long-term costs of gender equality and
governance reformsincluding increased transparency, building capable civil
services and electoral reformsuntenable in the short run, but they are vital to
eforts to build long-term resilience.
3. Womens equality and participation in political processes is a fundamental aspect
of development, both in war and peace. Gender equality is the basis for ending
gender-based violence, as well as building resilient, peaceful societies. Working
toward less discrimination implies less violence and conict, as well as acceler-
ated development.
4. Forum particpants reasserted the diversity of fragility experiences, including
in countries that are not experiencing violence yet still face many development
challenges. This diversity suggests that efective reforms and useful interven-
tions must be tailored to country contexts while also achkowleding common
challenges. What happens in times of peace is just as important as what occurs
in war, although it often does not make headlines, suggesting that donors,
multilateral organizations and national leaders need to promote gender equality,
peace, good governance, stability, transparency and other reforms regardless of
the state of a conict.
QUESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
1. Following the principles of engagement agreed in Busan, the international
community has shown a commitment to promoting national leadership for
development in fragile states. How can multilateral and bilateral actors help to
incentivize peace through their engagement while acknowledging that sustain-
able peace needs to be underpinned by national ownership?
2. It is also well known that there are no one-size-ts-all solutions to conict and
poverty, but what does that imply about the role of international cooperation and
global policies in the 21st century? How should donors adjust their strategies
when negotiating with national leaders who pursue a narrow agenda with little
benets for the average citizen, or who rely on a small selectorate to stay in
ofce?
3. What lessons from the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) can help
guide the post-2015 agenda? To what extent have the conditions for successful
international cooperation changed during the last 15 years? For example, what
are the efects of the global nancial crisis, the rising threat of climate change
and increased inequality within countries for the prospects for international
cooperation and a coherent push for development and security? What will be
the implications for a new global development agenda on the least-developed
countries?
4. How do we better incorporate women into political processesincluding peace-
building, statebuilding and the global development agendafrom grassroots
movements up to United Nations processes and international negotiations? How
do womens experiences in and approaches to political processes difer from the
experiences of men?
5. How can we better utilize international humanitarian law to address violence
against humanitarian workers or gender-based violence in conict? Should such
violence be prosecuted as war crimes?
6. How can we better create, use and communicate evidence in policymaking
through better indicators on gender equality, peace and stability? Conversely,
how can we make sure we do not avoid hard-to-measure problems (i.e. the prob-
lem of what gets measured gets done and other things are avoided)?
7. What are the potential pitfalls of comprehensive approachescombining
political, civil and military actorsto crisis management (such as the erosion of
the humanitarian space)? How can multilateral and bilateral actors better work
collectively and support national ownership of development plans in fragile
contexts?

REPORTS FROM THE FORUM
FRIDAY 28 MARCH 2014
FORUM OPENING*
Participants
Hillevi Engstrm
Swedish Minister for International Development Cooperation

Emilia Pires
Timor-Leste Minister for Finance and co-chair of the International Dialogue on
Peacebuilding

Pekka Haavisto
Finnish Minister for International Development and co-chair of the International
Dialogue on Peacebuilding

Tilman Brck
SIPRI Director

Marika Griehsel (moderator)
Journalist, documentary lmmaker, producer and moderator
Summary
SIPRI Director Tilman Brck welcomed Forum participants. The opening address,
Freedom from violence for development, was given by Hillevi Engstrm. Emilia Pires
discussed emerging from conict and how to avoid falling back again. Pekka Haavisto
spoke on the role of partnerships in making peace stick.
Main ndings
Insecurity is a serious obstacle to development and underdevelopment contributes to
insecurity. If a society slips into a large-scale violence, it is easy to become trapped in
poverty and underdevelopment as well as more violence. Therefore security is inextri-
cably linked to development.
The new global development agenda (post-2015) provides an opportunity to identify
clear and measurable goals and targets. This agenda will provide the space needed to
intensify the development cooperation on peacebuilding and statebuilding, such as the
New Deal initiatives. One way in which the EU can promote freedom from violence is
through the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325.
Learning from the experience of Timor-Leste, we know that development requires
building trust between the government and its people and making it possible for people
to have ownership over their development process. The government should engage in
on-going dialogue with people at all levels everywhere.
Fragile states facing diferent challenges require bespoke solutions in order to make
substantial development progress. Development is a social experience; it requires hope
and the engagement of all people in the process.
* For more information about this session contact Dr Gary Milante (milante@sipri.org).
8 2014 stockholm forum on security and development
HIGH-LEVEL PANEL: PREVENTING VIOLENCE AND PROMOTING PEACE:
POSSIBILITIES AND LIMITATIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL ACTORS*
Participants
Lynne Featherstone
British Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for International Development
Zainab Hawa Bangura
United Nations Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in
Conict
Sarah Clife
UN Special Adviser and Assistant Secretary-General of Civilian Capacities
Hans Blix
Former Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency
Summary
High-level panelists addressed the session topic: Preventing violence and promoting
peace: possibilities and limitations for international actors. The presentations were
followed by questions from the audience.
Main ndings
An increasing number of tools, as well as political will and momentum, are now available
in eforts to decrease sexual violence. However, impunity persists and this is a serious
concern, given that a key aspect of deterrence is ending impunity. It is vital that afected
countries lead these eforts, supported by international actors such as the United
Nations, and send the message that perpetrators will be held accountable for their
crimes.
Sexual violence and gender inequality hinder development in all societiesnot just
in the Global South. Collaboration and the sharing of lessons are important in order to
realize freedom from violence for all women and girls. In the United Kingdom, eforts
have included targeting the underlying sexual norms that drive violence against women
and girls.
Despite recent setbacks (e.g. in Central African Republic, Syria and Ukraine), the panel
maintained optimism about the prospects for international cooperation, in particular
arguing that international institutions have become increasingly able and willing to
intervene in internal afairs such as civil wars. Increasing global interdependence gives
further cause for optimism. For example, while Europe may rely on Russia for energy,
Russia also has strong interests in the European market.
It is important to bring economic stimulus to peace processes to incentivize peace.
However, electoral processes, the police, courts and prisons are too often left out of
funding schemes in post-conict transitions. Donor neglect of these areas is serious,
given the key role of capable state institutions in rebuilding trust after conict.
* For more information about this session contact Dr Gary Milante (milante@sipri.org).
final report 9
Conclusions
There is increasing international capacity and willingness to support peace promotion
within states, but also considerable variation across both international actors and
national contexts. This variation is driven by local capacity, experiences, regional
norms and geopolitical factors.
For some issues, there may be inherent challenges to international cooperation. More
stringent regulations on arms transfers, for example, are difcult to achieve in the
context of national security concerns in an anarchic international order.
For other issues, success may lag behind eforts due to insufcient eforts over time.
For example, ending impunity may require a longer, consistent record of prosecuting
and punishing perpetrators of sexual violence. Building such a record is, in itself, an
institution-building process and requires time, global commitment and investment.
Research questions
1. How can national actors best import lessons from global practices? In the
absence of best practices, which good t practices and experiences can inform
national-level action?
2. How can international actors incentivize peace? Taking into account constraints
such as aid fungibility and donor incentives for aid disbursal, how can donors use
their material resources to encourage successful outcomes (e.g. disarmament,
demobilization and reintegration)?
3. Why, despite international tribunals and national eforts, is sexual violence
still associated with impunity? How can international actors help governments
credibly commit to forceful responses to sexual violence? What types of costly
signalling could enable credible commitments?
4. What areas (including civil service, statistical capacity and judiciary institutions)
are donors neglecting? It is known that these institutions play a crucial role in
rebuilding trust between a government and its citizens after a conicthow can
support be increased for these key institutions? In addition to funding, how can
international actors help rebuild vertical and horizontal trust in post-conict
settings?
10 2014 stockholm forum on security and development
PREVENTING GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE IN WAR AND PEACE*
Participants
Zainab Hawa Bangura
UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conict

Andrew Long
Senior Policy Advisor, Preventing Sexual Violence Initiative (PSVI) UK
Lena Ag
Secretary-General, Kvinna till Kvinna Foundation
Angela Muvumba Sellstrm
PhD candidate, Department of Peace and Conict Research, Uppsala University, and
Senior Research Fellow, African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes
(ACCORD)
Ismene Gizelis
Reader, Department of Government, University of Essex

Louise Olsson (moderator)
Head of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 Programme, Folke Bernadotte Academy
Summary
Panelists discussed how gender equality, womens participation and practical measures
to increase protection from physical violence may help prevent, and eventually elimi-
nate, gender-based violence (GBV).
Main ndings
Promoting gender equality is a fundamental component of working to prevent GBV. For
example, gender inequality inuences the likelihood of both violent conict and acts of
sexual violence. Considerations on how to improve gender equality therefore need to be
included in peace-promotion eforts, not least as a way to stop sexual violence.
The participation of women in peacebuilding and politics is important as it can serve
to forward womens security in eforts to create peace. Women are also often actively
involved in the work for peace at the grassroots level. However, despite womens (often
informal) role in negotiating with warring parties over ceaseres, they are rarely given
formal positions in peace negotiations, with negative efects for the sustainability of
peace.
Violence against women has developmental consequences for society as a whole, given
that women often play key roles in food provision and in the informal sector. Yet impu-
nity persists and hinders eforts to stop sexual violence and address wider forms of GBV.

* For more information about this session contact Dr Rachel Irwin (irwin@sipri.org).
final report 11
Conclusions
It is important to nd ways to include women in peace processes in order to create a
legitimate, inclusive post-conict order.
Ending impunity is key to stopping sexual violence: we need national and interna-
tional actors to make credible commitments to prosecution and punishment. The state
is mainly responsible for the safety of all its citizens.
Gender equality is the basis for ending GBV as well as building resilient, peaceful
societies. Working towards less discrimination implies less violence and conict, as
well as accelerated development.
Action points
1. Donors, international communities and national leaders should actively promote
womens participation in conict-resolution and peacebuilding eforts, both as
stakeholders and as policymakers.
2. Quotas for peacebuilding commissions, nancial incentives for higher female
participation and information campaigns on the added value brought by greater
equality may be useful tools.
3. Policy eforts should be underpinned by research on gender equality and womens
participation, including examining past peace processes, their gender balance,
and policy outputs (e.g. peace treaties) and outcomes (e.g. post-conict levels of
sexual violence, and the durability of peace).
4. Donors should support national leaders eforts to enforce legislation against
sexual violence, during peace as well in conict episodes.
5. Financial support (e.g. for awareness campaigns and capacity-building in police
forces or the judiciary system), may help national leaders full their responsibil-
ity to protect their citizens.
6. It is important that impunity is understood as a universal problem that afects
eforts to eradicate sexual violence in both prosperous (e.g. Sweden) and poorer
or conict-afected countries.
Research questions
Sexual violence
1. Future research should use existing data from case studies on variation in
scale and type of sexual violence across conicts and actors (i.e. insurgents and
governments) to advance knowledge of the drivers of sexual violence in conict
and formulate policies to eradicate such violence. Investigations also need to take
into account contexts of low to non-existent rates of sexual violence (e.g. in the
IsraelPalestine conict).
2. Eforts should include categorizing sexual violence into diferent types of
campaigns, such as population control (shaming communities into submission),
provocation (to induce violent responses) and punishment (for association with
insurgents or governments). How does sexual violence t into warring parties
strategies?
3. Is sexual violence in conict driven by the same factors as in peace? To what
extent do motivational or opportunity factors for sexual violence difer between
war and peace?
12 2014 stockholm forum on security and development
4. Research should also focus on the extent to which variation in external actions
(e.g. by donors or UN missions) may account for patterns of sexual violence. Reli-
ance on international actors that condemn sexual violence may restrain warring
parties. How can international actors incentivize warring parties to not use sexual
violence?
Womens participation
1. How can international actors promote gender equality? For example, what is the
efect of womens leadership in UN missions, or the efect of gender equality on
domestic political fora?
2. Why are womens groups often underrepresented in formal peace negotiations?
How can international actors encourage increased formal female participation?
3. In comparing peace negotiations with higher and lower levels of womens par-
ticipation, what diferences may be observed? Are there specic types of womens
groups that are conducive to building peace? Do they bring certain issues to the
table (e.g. the protection of vulnerable groups)?
final report 13
SYRIAS WAR ECONOMY: MAPPING ARMS TRANSFERS AND STRATEGIC
COMMODITY FLOWS*
Participants
Savannah de Tessires
Arms expert for the United Nations Panel of Experts on Libya

Eliot Higgins
Independent conict researcher and blogger

Hugh Grifths
Head of the Countering Illicit TrafckingMechanism Assessment Projects
(CIT-MAP), SIPRI

Lawrence Dermody
Researcher, CIT-MAP, SIPRI

Damien Spleeters
Author and reporter, Fulbright fellow at Columbia University
Summary
This session examined arms and other commodity ows that sustain the ability of the
regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad to ofer patronage and protection, as well as
the shifting military inventories of the Syrian armed forces, associated paramilitaries
and opposition groups.
Main ndings
While the international communityincluding the United Nations, the European
Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty organization (NATO) as well as certain Arab
states of the Gulfhas made eforts to forbid transporting military equipment to Syria
through sanctions and embargos or airspace denial and interception mechanisms,
potential air corridors for arms and other strategic commodities still exist. For
example, some documentary evidence shows that the Syrian currency, the pounda
strategic commodity which enables the Syrian war economy to maintain its political
economyhas been transported from Moscow by air.
Compared to the economy in areas controlled by opposition groups, the war economy
that exists in the area controlled by the Syrian Government is particularly reliant on air
transport, meaning that control of Syrias airports is vital.
In addition, maritime ows of arms and military goods also sustain the conict in
Syria. Many basic commodity ows, including foodstufs, have continued largely unaf-
fected by the conict, whereas oil sanctions imposed by the EU and other geographical
choke points have signicantly impacted the Syrian energy economy.
In tracking arms transport, it is important to attain, verify and organize data, and
improve independent data sources. Today, social media monitoring, as well as eld
* For more information about this session contact Dr Gary Milante (milante@sipri.org).
14 2014 stockholm forum on security and development
research and examination of public records, are used as data collection methods. For
example, as documented on his Brown Moses blog, Eliot Higgins has been tracking arms
inventories in Syria by looking for images of weapons across hundreds of Youtube and
Facebook channels and identifying when, where and with whom new types of weapons
appear in the war. Similarly, Damian Spleeters has traced the presence of a specic
weapon, the Belgian FN FAL rie, in Syria on the basis of relevant documentation and
pictures and videos from social media channels.
Conclusions
Military equipment, including small arms and light weapons (SALW), together with
other strategic commodities such as hard currency, oil and nished petroleum products,
inuences or sustains shifting and static conict dynamics in Syria. Many transfers and
movements are occurring but, due to the nature of the conict, relatively little has been
published in open-source reports.
Action points
1. The international community should actively respond to arms ows to Syria
which sustain the conict in Syria.
2. In cooperation with researchers and civil society, and by adopting various innova-
tive data-collection methods, the international community can better monitor and
map the transfer of arms, military equipment and other destabilizing commodity
ows to the Assad regime.
3. Social media platforms and expertise, together with existing ammunition tracing
networks, can be used to monitor ows of SALW such as man portable air defence
systems (MANPADS) to a spectrum of Syria-related opposition groups.
Research questions
1. Given the massive number of videos and pictures, as well as ship and aircraft
movements, how can we better track transfers and ights, and organize data?
Furthermore, how can we improve the discovery, attainment and verication of
this wealth of information?
2. Which entities, governments or other players were involved in the original trans-
fers and/or the subsequent transfers of military equipment to Syria?
final report 15
PROMOTING PEACE, JUSTICE AND GOOD GOVERNANCE IN THE GLOBAL
DEVELOPMENT AGENDA*
Participants
Emilia Pires
Minister for Finance, Timor-Leste

Sarah Clife
UN Special Adviser and Assistant Secretary-General of Civilian Capacities

Henk-Jan Brinkman
Chief of Policy, Planning and Application, UN Peacebuilding Support Ofce

Stafan Tillander
Swedish Ambassador, Chair of the Liberia Conguration of the UN Peacebuilding
Commission
Jordan Ryan
Assistant Administrator and Director, Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery,
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)

Dan Smith
Secretary-General, International Alert

Francesca Bomboko
Representative of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, International Dialogue on
Peacebuilding and Statebuilding

Annika Sder
Executive Director, Dag Hammarskjld Foundation

Peter Wallensteen (moderator)
Senior Professor of Peace and Conict Research, Uppsala University
Summary
Policymakers and researchers discussed ways forward for the global development
agenda. Specically, they discussed how to integrate peace, the rule of law, capable
institutions and good governance within the post-2015 framework.
Findings
Peace, justice and good governance are becoming key components of the global devel-
opment agenda for both developed and developing countries. Nevertheless, there is a
need to take the context into consideration, for example by allowing for cross-country
variation in the timeframe of development goals.
* For more information about this session contact Dr Gary Milante (milante@sipri.org).
16 2014 stockholm forum on security and development
One major challenge involves ensuring national sovereignty in relation to security and
peace targets and indicators. In the implementation and monitoring phase, challenges
include increasing the political appetite for investing in anti-corruption and security
sector reform, a lack of which may hinder progress.
Conclusions
It will be crucial to ensure that peace, rule of law and capable institutions are included
in the post-2015 agenda in order to tackle issues such as violence against women and
children, violent deaths, legal identity, access to justice and reducing corruption.
The importance of linking peace to development, and creating societies that are able to
manage conict through the judiciary or political systems rather than through violence,
is underlined by the potentially destabilizing efect of climate change and rising in-
country inequality.
Goals need to be clearly operationalized for successful implementation and realization
of universal freedom from fear and violence. All countries are mutually responsible for
living up to their commitments and monitoring each other in a transparent manner.
Action points
1. There is a need to extend goals, targets and indicators to reect peace. Policymak-
ers should take into account cross-national variation in capacity and baselines
when considering targets, while also remembering the responsibility of the
international community to promote and nancially support eforts to build more
just, safer and better-governed societies.
2. Once the post-2015 development agenda is set, donors and national actors must
implement reforms and monitor progress. Commitments may be better sustained
when a public is fully informed of its governments international commitments
(and thus more likely to punish failures to live up to these commitments). It is
therefore crucial that the international community fully involves civil society in
the process and its implications.
3. Efective public-good provision and service delivery is interconnected to peace
and security in fragile and conict-afected countries. The development agenda
must take into account what is possible in terms of socio-economic development,
given extant structures, resource constraints and culture.
Research questions
1. Research should identify the links between peace, justice and capable institutions
at a disaggregated level. For example, what is the relationship between access to
justice and the risk of communal violence? What types of judicial mechanisms can
help solve conicts that otherwise may result in violence?
2. The evidence base is still weak on how climate change and inequality are related
to peace and development. Does climate change have a direct efect on conict
propensity or is it linked to conict via its efects on economic growth? What
climate change efects are most worrying for peace and stability? Based on earlier
experiences of large migratory movements, how can international actors help
communities in more vulnerable areas cope with an inux of people?
final report 17
3. National actors could benet from more research on comparative historical case
studies. Such studies would indicate the trajectory of institutional development
across diferent contexts, which may be used to guide prioritization of diferent
types of reforms for relevant comparison cases. For example, what institutional
designs promote independent, high-quality bureaucracies? Do experiences from
countries with relatively well-functioning bureaucracies suggest introducing
admissions tests as a way to limit patronage? What institutional measures can
countries take to avoid elites using public sector funding to stay in power (e.g.
through corruption, abuses of power and other collusive arrangements)?
4. How can international actors incentivize peace-promotion eforts, such as disar-
mament, demobilization and reintegration, across regime types? What types of
incentives are likely to be efective when negotiating with leaders of competitive
autocracies as opposed to democracies?
5. Why are some societies more successful than others in rebuilding trust after a
conict? How does trust between citizens (horizontal trust) interact with trust
between citizens and their government (vertical trust)? To what extent can lack
of trust in either form explain lagging development results (e.g. via investment, or
the number of new businesses)?
18 2014 stockholm forum on security and development
DEVELOPMENT PROSPECTS FOR AFGHANISTAN*
Participants
Mohammad Nader Yama
Director of Strategic Coordination, Independent Directorate of Local Governance,
Afghanistan
Eva Johansson
Head of the Afghanistan Section, Swedish International Development Cooperation
Agency
Andreas Stefansson
Aid Coordinator, Swedish Afghanistan Committee
Anders Fnge (discussant)
Board Member (former Country Director) of the Swedish Afghanistan Committee

Bruce Koepke (moderator)
Senior Researcher, Armed Conict and Conict Management Programme, SIPRI
Summary
This session focused on the development prospects for Afghanistan in the context of the
conclusion of the security transition process at the end of 2014, when the International
Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission ofcially ends.
Main ndings
While Afghanistan has enjoyed improvement in a number of sectors, it still faces rela-
tively low levels of development-implementation capacity coupled with donor depend-
ency. Political tensions related to the signing of the Bilateral Security Agreement with
the US Government, the withdrawal of international forces and an anticipated decrease
in aid support seem to have disappointed a large section of civil society.
In order to sustain Afghanistans eforts to efectively implement development
projects, it is important to set up an enabling environment, ideally in partnership
with the international community. An inclusive approach with the participation of all
stakeholdersgovernment, civil society and the private sectoris likely to contribute to
Afghanistans state-building and peacebuilding process post-2014.
The Swedish Government has made a comprehensive and long-term commitment in
line with the agreements made at the international donor conference for Afghanistan in
Tokyo in 2012 (the Tokyo Framework), aiming to help people living in poverty, particu-
larly women and girls, and improve their living conditions in a peaceful and democratic
society. The current strategy of Swedish development assistance to Afghanistan focuses
on ve areas of cooperation: empowerment, human rights, democratic development,
education (especially girls education), and enterprise and economic integration.
* For more information about this session contact Dr Gary Milante (milante@sipri.org).
final report 19
The Swedish Committee for Afghanistan has successfully supported development
via its long-standing impartial approach and by partnering with the public and private
sectors and civil society, as well as by nurturing trust at community levels by negotiat-
ing with local staf and ofering innovative approaches (e.g. independent monitoring).
However, the key for development is the promotion of legitimacy, ideally via a bottom-
up approach, and ensuring that development agendas are seen at a community level.
Conclusions
While Afghanistan has enjoyed improvement in a number of sectors, insecurity and
corruption are likely to have an impact on the implementation of post-transition
development programmes. Yet, despite ongoing insecurity in some parts of the country,
the international community has made a comprehensive and long-term commitment
through the Tokyo Framework.
Programme implementation will be possible after 2014, in conjunction with strong
local partnerships, innovative methods to monitor programmes in insecure areas, and
continued international long-term development assistance. The priority for develop-
ment assistance must be the long-term building of a well-functioning government and
relevant ministries, and the improvement of social conditions for all Afghans, in order
to make the next stages of democratization, state-building and peacebuilding possible.
Action points
1. The international community should continue to support Afghanistan to sustain
security beyond 2014. This would assist in preparing an enabling environment for
the implementation of local development programmes.
2. The international community, including NATO and ISAF, needs to support build-
ing the capacity of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) so that they can
efectively lead security operations and maintain security in the critical districts
that are currently being challenged by insurgents.
3. There is a need for coordination among security and non-security entities with a
focus on rule of law, ghting corruption and the delivery of services.
4. The international donor community should make a sustainable and long-term
commitment to economic and human development and to enhanced governance
in Afghanistan.
5. In view of ofering future development aid, it is vital that local conditions are
taken into account.
6. The implementation of development should be achieved through the participa-
tion of major stakeholders including a broad range of civil society representatives
as well as members of the upper and lower houses of parliament.
Research questions
1. While international security forces are being phased out from Afghanistan,
one question remains: how well the ANSF will be able to secure districts so that
development programmes can be implemented?
2. How vulnerable will the ANSF be, especially in areas that, at least in the short-
term, will continue to be controlled by insurgents? How will development and
humanitarian assistance reach such insecure areas?
REPORTS FROM THE PRE-FORUM
EVENT
THURSDAY 27 MARCH 2014
22 2014 stockholm forum on security and development
final report 23
CHINA AS A FOREIGN AID DONOR: IMPLICATIONS FOR DEVELOPMENT AND
SECURITY*
Participants
Li Xiaoyun
Dean of College of Humanities and Development Studies, China Agricultural
University, and Chair of China International Development Research Network

Johanna Jansson
PhD Fellow, Department of Society and Globalization, Roskilde University

Zhou Hang
Researcher, China and Global Security Project, SIPRI

Brje Ljunggren (moderator)
Former Swedish ambassador to China and Vietnam
Summary
By exploring Chinas current policies and practices on foreign aid, this session contin-
ues the discussion on the Chinese approach to foreign aid and its implications for global
development and security.
Main ndings
While China shares some similarities with Western donors, a key diference is that
China follows the principles of self-development, no political conditions, and mutual
benet and common development, which result from its own economic development
and its experience of being an aid recipient.
On the basis of these principles, China provides an alternative view of aid. As the
Zimbabwe case shows, it is not charity but a business engaged with diferent stakehold-
ers seeking diferent interests for promoting mutual benet. Furthermore, China
emphasizes the development of the host country by improving (local) production
capacities. Paradoxically, this is a model that the rest of the international community
may be moving toward, in light of increased aid austerity.
However, as seen in the case of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), the
businessdevelopment nexus can be complicated when commercial development
nance has little or nothing to do with development aid but is nevertheless understood
as foreign aid. Eximbank of China ofers both concessional and commercial loans. It
intends to make sure that its loans can be paid back by using collateral arrangements
with secured natural resources.
Chinas formal development aid is a limited programme with positive impact on
infrastructure development and some symbolic meaning. Chinese commercial develop-
ment nance is more signicant in terms of its size, but the positive efect of this nanc-
ing on economic development also depends on how recipient countries manage it.
* For more information about this session contact Zhou Hang (hangz@sipri.org).
24 2014 stockholm forum on security and development
Conclusions
China as an emerging donor has distinctive foreign aid principles, policies and practices
that have often been criticized by traditional donors. Observers should rst analytically
make the distinction between Chinas foreign aid programme and its development
nance in order to better gauge their impacts.
While Chinas aid to Africa has generated efective results and contributed to eco-
nomic development, it also faces many challenges including lack of transparency, limited
engagement with local civil society, lack of institutionalization and communication, and
the lack of coordination between diferent agencies in China and between China and
traditional donors.
Research questions
1. With increasing transparency on the part of China and new data-gathering tools
and databases being developed, it would be timely to undertake a proper, careful
and thorough assessment of aid and nancial assistance provided by China, the
Development Assistance Committee and other donors, and to reconcile these
accounting methods for a better global understanding of comparable aid and
assistance models and practices. This efort could examine security and other
assistance and reconcile these forms of assistance in a particular context (e.g. by
starting with a single country such as DRC or South Sudan).
2. What is the impact of the proliferation of aid-related agencies in China? To what
degree do diferent aid-related agencies coordinate their eforts and how does the
Inter-agency Coordination Mechanism function?
3. How does China view the trilateral approach to foreign aid? What are the motiva-
tions of and obstacles to Chinas participation in trilateral cooperation, and how
are the trilateral projects in which China currently participates negotiated and
implemented?
final report 25
IMPACT EVALUATIONS IN FRAGILE STATES, CONFLICTS AND DISASTERS*
Participants
Tilman Brck
Director, SIPRI
Anders Olofsgrd
Deputy Director, Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics (SITE), Associate
Professor at the Stockholm School of Economics

Anastasia Aladysheva
Researcher, Life in Kyrgyzstan Project, SIPRI

Damir Esenaliev
Researcher, Life in Kyrgyzstan Project, SIPRI
Summary
The session served as a forum for sharing knowledge and ndings from ongoing impact
evaluation studies in fragile, post-conict and disaster settings, the study of which has
grown with the increased attention paid to the efects of development on security.
Main ndings
Some examples of current research at SIPRI and SITE include: microcredits in Yemen
and their efect on economic outcomes and radicalization; how to conduct impact
evaluations after major natural and man-made disasters; and educational programmes
to promote peaceful attitudes and behaviour in Kyrgyzstan (results not yet published).
Common challenges include ethical considerations in research design (e.g. with-
holding relief in control groups), reliance on survey responses when asking sensitive
questions (e.g. on support for terrorist organizations) and the cost of extensive studies.
Conclusions
Given large donor eforts to respond to disasters and the scale of human sufering,
it is crucial to continue investigating the efect of humanitarian aid on recovery and
reconstruction eforts and, in turn, development.
It is important that researchers more closely examine the links between development
and security: current projects ofer the promise of testing distinct causal pathways
between economic advancement and peace.
A smart research design and methodology helps resolve some issues (e.g. by using list
experiments when asking sensitive questions). But while experimental methods ofer
advantages relative to observational studies, there may be limits to generalization if we
rely on small-scale interventions. Replication can also prove challenging for experi-
ments.
* For more information about this session contact Damir Esenaliev (esenaliev@sipri.org).
26 2014 stockholm forum on security and development
Research questions
1. Experiments are useful for estimating efects but what about the causal mecha-
nism? Mixed methods, for example combining case studies and experiments, may
help trace the causal sequence while controlling for potential confounders.
2. There are also deeper issues that need to be resolved, such as the meaning of peace
and security. For example, what is a peaceful attitude and how do we know it when
we see it? Or should research focus on behaviour rather than attitudes?
3. Which interventions are more efective after disasters (e.g. cash grants or food
vouchers)? Under what conditions can cash grants or food voucher programmes
after disasters contribute to long-term development in addition to reconstruction
and rehabilitation?
4. How can international actors avoid contributing to existing inequalities (e.g. by
ofering microcredits to entrepreneurial individuals)?
5. What types of repeated interaction may help to build social cohesion and horizon-
tal trust in post-conict situations? How can such increased trust be sustained
after a project ends?

final report 27
VIOLENCE AGAINST HUMANITARIAN WORKERS*
Participants
Pieter-Jan van Eggermont
Humanitarian Advisor, Lkare Utan Grnser (Mdecins Sans Frontires)

Dick Clomn
International Law Advisor, Swedish Red Cross
Rachel Irwin (moderator)
Researcher, Macroeconomics of Security Programme, SIPRI
Summary
Representatives from the Swedish Red Cross and from Swedish Mdecins Sans Fron-
tires (MSF) discussed targeted violence towards humanitarian workers and facilities
in complex security environments, with a specic focus on healthcare workers. They
also discussed projects by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and
MSF International to address the issue.
Main ndings
International humanitarian law, along withinternational human rights law, presents
a framework for the respect and protection of healthcare missions and the right to
medical assistance in armed conict. However, a shift against these norms occurred
in the mid-1990s, which saw targeted violence against humanitarian workers, such as
direct attacks (murders, kidnappings), obstructions (e.g. ambulances being stopped at
checkpoints) and discrimination (i.e. staf pressured to treat one patient over another).
In 2008, ICRC identied the fact that there was no systematic attempt to get an
overview of the problem. This led to the creation of the Health Care in Danger project.
Similarly, MSF launched the Medical Care Under Fire project, which is an internal
process to collect data and share best practices.
A serious consequence of increasing violence is disruption to health-service provision
as well as the exodus of health care professionals. But violence against humanitarian
workers may itself be an efect of the erosion of wider humanitarian norms.
Violence against healthcare workers takes place within this wider context of the
shrinking humanitarian space. Military actors, such as the North Atlantic Treaty
organization (NATO), are using humanitarian discourse to legitimize military
missions. Privately contracted companies are increasingly providing humanitarian
services and some service providers use private security companies for security, in
contrast to the Red Cross movement and MSF which as a rule never use armed protec-
tion or military escorts. Finally, the UN itself can sometimes be a party to conict.
This creates a situation in which it is very difcult for MSF and ICRC to promote their
images as neutral, independent humanitarian actors.
* For more information about this session contact Dr Rachel Irwin (irwin@sipri.org).
28 2014 stockholm forum on security and development
Conclusions
Medical staf are becoming more engaged with this issue and MSF and ICRC are imple-
menting changes in their practice, but it will take time to see hard results. Complicating
any eforts is that this violence takes place within a context of general insecurity, the
changing nature of conict (intrastate vs. interstate; asymmetrical warfare) and the
shrinking humanitarian space.
However, governments can and should push back against comprehensive approaches
to crisis management because the humanitarian and military tasks should not be mixed.
Of course, health can be a peace dividend and the humanitarian mission can contribute
to statebuilding and peace as a byproduct, but the aim and intent of the mission is a
humanitarian one rst and foremost.
The lessons about maintaining humanitarian integrity are not only for conict areas
but are universal and the same standards should apply in war and peacetime. The les-
sons learnt apply as much to Syria today as to the suburbs of Stockholm during the 2013
riots.
Research questions
1. While data collection methods are improving, it is still difcult to measure the
scope and extent of violence against healthcare workers, both qualitatively and
quantitatively. How can this be overcome?
2. In what ways can we measure and analyze the decreasing humanitarian space and
its impact on the ways in which humanitarian missions are respected?
3. How can the international humanitarian legal regime and international human
rights law be better utilized to prevent violence against healthcare workers?
4. The perpetrators of violence are not only armed non-state actors, but also relatives
of patients and state-based perpetrators. How can we better reach out to these
perpetrators?
5. What are the gender aspects of violence against healthcare workers, for the
providers, patients and perpetrators?
final report 29
CIVIL SOCIETY AND GOVERNANCE REFORM IN PEACEBUILDING*
Participants
Sigrid Gruener
Programme Manager, Dag Hammarskjld Foundation
Gaudence Nyirabikali
Researcher, Mali Civil Society and Peacebuilding Project, SIPRI

Bonita Ayuko
Project Coordinator, Saferworld Kenya

Darynell Rodrguez Torres
Programme Manager Policy and Advocacy, Global Partnership for the Prevention of
Armed Conict

Annika Sder (moderator)
Executive Director, Dag Hammarskjld Foundation
Summary
This session, organized by SIPRI in collaboration with DHF, explored the potential
contributions of civil society in peacebuilding and governance reforms and presented
preliminary ndings from ongoing work in Kenya and Mali.
Main ndings
The inclusion of a broad diversity of local perspectives in peacebuilding processes is
essential in order to promote and secure locally owned and durable peace. Inclusive
peacebuilding can be achieved through deliberate policies and structures that enable
and foster the participation of a broad range of actors and stakeholders. In this respect,
civil society organizations constitute a key actor as they facilitate the participation of
individual citizens and communities by creating awareness and linking the state and
society through dialogue, policy inuence and monitoring, as well as taking part in the
implementation of certain policies.
In light of the importance of civil society in peacebuilding and governance reforms,
it is critical to strengthen the capacity of civil society organizations and to make their
voices heard in policymaking arenas.
Through SIPRIs Mali, Civil Society and Peacebuilding Project, support for capacity
building is provided through training workshops, eld research and information-
sharing seminars to increase understanding of the context and nature of conict in
Mali and to enhance public awareness about the role of civil society in building peace.
In Kenya, in order to avoid a repeat of the 20072008 election violence at the local
level, various actors, including international and national civil society organizations,
contribute to the strengthening of early warning networks, monitoring and observation
of elections, and addressing conict risks as they arise.
* For more information about this session contact Gaudence Nyirabikali (nyirabikali@sipri.org).
30 2014 stockholm forum on security and development
Conclusions
Both security and development are critical concerns in peacebuilding work to attain
sustainable peace, and sustainable peace cannot be achieved without the involvement of
the whole of society.
Research questions
1. How can inclusivity be applied in practice? How do we engage local stakeholders
in peacebuilding processes and nurture genuine locally owned and locally led
processes?
2. In what way is it possible to include so-called spoilers (e.g. militant groups and
warlords) and other marginalized groups, such as women and ethnic minorities,
in peacebuilding processes?
3. How do we dene civil society? What scope should be accorded to civil society?
Should traditional authorities be considered part of civil society? What is the role
and place of political parties in peacebuilding and governance reforms? Are they
part of civil society or of the government?
4. How can we promote efective partnerships with government actors?
final report 31
INTERNATIONAL ARMS TRANSFERS AND MILITARY EXPENDITURE IN
RELATION TO SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT*
Participants
Carina Solmirano
Senior Researcher, Military Expenditure and Arms Production Programme, SIPRI
Pieter Wezeman
Senior Researcher, Arms Transfers Programme, SIPRI
Siemon Wezeman
Senior Researcher, Arms Transfers Programme, SIPRI
Summary
Panelists presented the latest SIPRI data on global arms transfers and African military
expenditure and discussed their implications for development prospects.
Main ndings
Between the periods 20042008 and 200913 arms imports increased dramatically in
many low- and middle-income regions. For example, the increase amounted to more
than 50 per cent for Africa and 43 per cent for Asia. In South America, Colombian arms
imports increased by 142 per cent, while in Brazil they rose by 65 per cent. In compari-
son, Europe saw a 25 per cent increase and the Middle East saw a 3 per cent increase in
the same time period.
There have also been large increases in military expenditure in Africa since 2000.
For example, military expenditure has more than tripled in North Africa, while sub-
Saharan Africa has witnessed a 72 per cent increase. The top three military burdens
(military expenditure as a proportion of GDP) were found in major oil producing
countries: Algeria and Angola and South Sudan.
Conclusions
Developing regions are increasing their arms imports and military expenditure is
on the rise in Africa while parts of Europe (particularly Greece, which decreased its
imports by 57 per cent during 200913) are experiencing a decrease due to the global
nancial and economic crises.
The strong correlation between oil production and military expenditure may reect
a need to protect valuable resources for development. But high military expenditure is
potentially worrying when accompanied by low levels of accountability. This is the case
in many resource-rich countries where a relatively small proportion of state income
comes from taxes, thus undermining links between the government and its citizens.
* For more information about this session contact Siemon Wezeman (sw@sipri.org).
32 2014 stockholm forum on security and development
Research questions
1. How can international actors encourage arms transfers and military expenditures
that promote development? To what extent can we assess, ex ante, whether
additional arms acquisitions will contribute to development more than had the
equivalent resources been invested in health care or education?
2. Challenges for the research agenda include a lack of data. Africa represents the
largest share of countries of any region for which military spending data is lacking
(one-third of countries have missing data). There is also a lack of transparency:
few states in Europe will disclose why they export arms to particular countries. Is
this likely to change?
3. What institutional designs will promote the productive use of oil and mineral
resources while allowing taxation to raise a greater proportion of state income? To
what extent can lessons about resource management in rich, mature democracies,
such as Norway, be applied to poorer autocracies or unconsolidated democracies?
final report 33
DATA LIMITATIONS IN CONFLICT RESEARCH:
OVERCOMING THE STATUS QUO AND BUILDING FOR THE FUTURE*
Participants
Ghassan Baliki
Research Associate, German Institute for Economic Research (DIW Berlin)
Caitriona Dowd
Senior Research and Data Manager, Armed Conict Location and Event Dataset
(ACLED)
Jonathon Morgan
Senior Developer and Technology Lead for CrisisNET, Ushahidi
Stina Hgbladh
Project Leader and Research Coordinator, Department of Peace and Conict Research,
Uppsala University
Lotta Themnr
Project Leader, Department of Peace and Conict Research, Uppsala University
Summary
This session showcased the newest research and methodological techniques at the
forefront of conict and development data collection.
Main ndings
There is an increasing recognition of the need for alternative or new methodologies in
collecting conict event data because the existing method of using traditional media
sources has a risk of bias and there is a huge discrepancy between diferent kinds of
media sources. In this sense, Baliki has adopted crowd-seeding methods as one of the
new approaches to conict-event data gathering. The crowdseeding approach makes
use of existing civil society organizations and networks, with selected individuals
observing and reporting data points in their location.
ACLED, a comprehensive public collection of political violence data for developing
countries, provides conict-event mapping. Their conict map provides a descriptive
geo-referenced dataset showing which areas are particularly vulnerable and allowing
humanitarian and development practitioners to plan accordingly. It captures the
locations and dynamics of violence and unpacks and compares actors behaviours.
However, it is difcult to map the diferent underlying conditions of conicts such as
political, economic and social factors.
* For more information about this session contact Neil Ferguson (ferguson@sipri.org).
34 2014 stockholm forum on security and development
Ushahidi, a technology company, builds a platform that can be used as an application
for the aggregation of various forms of information, including crisis data. This data
can then be made available as a single stream of information for other developers, data
journalists and people carrying out visualization or analysis. The core of the Ushahidi
project is to provide a platform that can be used in various scenarios, rather than guiding
the use of the platform or the problems it solves.
The Uppsala Conict Data Program (UCDP) collects data for state-based conicts,
one-sided violence and non-state conicts for all years since 1975 in which 25 or more
fatalities are reported. UCDP builds its database through media coverage, reports by
non-governmental organizations and inter-governmental organizations, and networks
of regional experts in order to provide information on conict trends.
Conclusions
Conict poses a unique problem for data collection as it inhibits the capacity of individu-
als to collect data on where or when it happens, not least due to the danger faced by
data gatherers. From media sources to the crowdsourcing and crowdseeding of event
data, each methodology for overcoming these difculties and dangers has strengths
and limitations. In order to overcome issues of missing or unreliable data in the eld of
conict and development, new approaches and the renement of current procedures are
always necessary.
Research questions
The veracity of data remains problematic, particularly when data is crowsourced
or crowdseeded. An assessment of whether or not this data is representative is
required. How can such an assessment be carried out?
The level of detail of the data could be as important as its veracity. Information is
needed, not just on when or where events occur, but also about issues such as who
was involved, or the status of the victim. How can researchers create this data and
make it comparable across regions or conicts?
final report 35
WHOSE DEAL? THE ROLE OF THE PRIVATE SECTOR IN SUPPORTING G7+
GOVERNMENTS IN THE NEW DEAL FOR ENGAGEMENT IN FRAGILE STATES*
Participants
Jonas Borglin
CEO, International Council of Swedish Industry
Nicklas Svensson
Senior Consultant and Partner, Sthlm Policy Group
Summary
The Sthlm Policy Group convened this working lunch, which examined the role of the
private sector in contributing to peace and statebuilding in fragile states by bolstering
the local economy, supporting social programmes, and promoting administrative and
technical capacity building.
Main ndings
A key factor in the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States is strengthening
economic foundations to generate employment and improve livelihoods. The private
sector has an important role to play in this efort, alongside conventional development
actors such as governments and development agencies.
Companies go into unstable environments because the risk can ofer a higher reward;
however, there are many potential pitfalls. For example, although many governments
ofer tax-free benets to private investors, in the long run these are ultimately unsus-
tainable. There are also the obvious risks associated with widespread insecurity and
weak enforcement of property rights in these contexts.
In some countries, companies face enormous pressure, even by governments, to
engage in unethical and illegal activities. A company should only enter into these
markets if it can stick to it principles. A particularly detrimental precedent is set when a
company from an established democracy is the rst to break the rules.
Conclusions
Companies do not have a peacebuilding mandate. However, within the New Deal
framework they have the responsibility to do no harm: to not accidentally (or intention-
ally) contribute to conict.
The private sector is not the only mechanism for economic growth and peace. It is
essential that all actors such as the private sector, civil society as well as governments
cooperate in order to contribute to economic growth and peacebuilding.
Companies can also contribute to maintaining peace through providing jobs and
the promise of a better future. We are moving beyond corporate social responsibility
or human rights assessments as add-on activities or box-ticking exercises. Rather, in
fragile states these must be systematic.
* For more information about this session contact Nicklas Svensson (nicklas@sthlmgroup.se).
36 2014 stockholm forum on security and development
We must recognize the importance of companies using rights-based approaches,
and inclusive as well as participatory processes. Companies must avoid opportunistic
investments and focus on sustainable investments. Also, companies must get better
at risk assessments, conict sensitivity and understanding the country in which they
are operating. Finally, companies must recognize the importance of consulting local
stakeholders in their start-up and planning phases.
Research questions
1. How do we link multinational companies to job creation in g7+ countries?
2. How can we better sensitize and train managers for work in fragile contexts?
3. How can companies better cooperate with all peacebuilding actors, such as civil
society and governments?
4. Further research is required on the link between economic growth and creating
shared value. How can shared value contribute to economic growth as well as
peacebuilding? How are companies using the concept of shared value in complex
countries?
5. The emerging issue of China in Africa also deserves greater attention. How can
European companies compete with China? Is the European model a convincing
model for Africa?
final report 37
THE EUROPEAN UNIONS COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH TO EXTERNAL
CONFLICTS AND CRISES*
Participants
Ola Sohlstrm
European External Action Service

Andrew Sherrif
Head of Programme EU External Action, European Centre for Development Policy
Management

Magnus Ekengren
Associate Professor, Swedish National Defence College, Director of the Colleges
Programme for European Security Research

Johan Engvall
Post-Doctoral Researcher, Uppsala Centre for Russian and Eurasian Studies, and
Research Fellow, Institute for Security and Development Policy
Lars-Erik Lundin (moderator)
Distinguished Associate Fellow, SIPRI
Summary
The session brought together scholars and European Union (EU) ofcials to analyse
the need for a broader application of the EU Comprehensive Approach in response to a
series of new threats and challenges.
Main ndings
The Comprehensive Approach is a working method to be used by the European
Commission and EU member states. It links internal and external issues, as well as
development eforts, with the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). The
Comprehensive Approach is a response to emerging issues (e.g. corruption, organized
crime), the need for better coordination (not least between the European External
Action Service and the Commission) and increased EU attention to, and action in,
external afairs. An agreement on the broad principles was reached on 25 March in the
Political and Security Committee. Council conclusions were expected by May 2014.
Conclusions
The Comprehensive Approach may improve the EUs strategic ability to prevent and
respond to external issues, and should be seen in light of the EUs focus on external
issues, which has been strengthened through the momentum gained as a result of the
nancial crisis. However, previous research indicates a gap between policy commit-
ments and implementation due to weak political support. While several proposals echo
* For more information about this session contact Lars-Erik Lundin (lundin@sipri.org).
38 2014 stockholm forum on security and development
those made in the 2001 Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conict, evaluations
show that these have not been fully realized in practice.
Panelists suggested that the EU has historically been most efective at inducing
change when it has used its technocratic instruments (e.g. the enlargement process, and
association agreements). Intergovernmental approaches have, instead, politicized issues
(e.g. Ukraine crisis) which is to the detriment of their efectiveness.
Research questions
1. Will the EU implement the Comprehensive Approach? Are the incentives (such as
nancial crisis lessons, and the cost of non-cooperation) and structures (e.g. post-
Lisbon Treaty) for change present to a greater extent now than in previous eforts
to reform EU external afairs?
2. How will the diference between the supranational and intergovernmental bodies
of the EU inuence formulation and implementation? Are the depoliticized and
problem-solving supranational bodies presently dominating the agenda, and
what does the balance of power among EU bodies mean for the Comprehensive
Approach?
3. Under what conditions can the EU help create non-zero-sum games and concern
with absolute rather than relative gains in international relations?
final report 39
TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN SECURITY EXPENDITURES IN
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES*
Participants
Leah Wawro
Civil Society Lead, Transparency International UK

Dylan Hendrickson
Senior Fellow and Editor, Conict, Security & Development Research Group,
Kings College London
Carina Solmirano
Senior Researcher, Military Expenditure and Arms Production Programme, SIPRI
Summary
This session discussed how increased security sector transparency and civilian over-
sight can contribute to development and peacebuilding eforts in fragile contexts.
Main ndings
Secrecy, complexity and large budgets make the defence sector prone to corruption. A
lack (or low level) of transparency can cause or feed mistrust within and between states
and undermine peace. According to the 2013 Government Defence Anti-Corruption
Indexa review of corruption risk and corruption vulnerability in defence ministries
and armed forcesapproximately 70 per cent of all countries have high or critical cor-
ruption risks and only two countries have truly high levels of transparency.
Corruption and transparency in fragile states are particularly problematic. As seen in
Uganda, a certain level of military spending along with appropriately equipped military
and security forces are necessary for the restoration of security, which is an essential
condition for human and efective development. However, in the weak institutional
environment of conict-afected fragile states, military budgeting and procurement
processes are very prone to organizational inefciencies, corruption and the abuse of
political ends. Therefore, long-term and multi-dimensional responses are required.
In Latin America, while the level of transparency in military spending at the national
level (in terms of the availability of information through defence policy documents and
public annual budgets) has increased since 2000, the quality of information is still ques-
tionable. At the regional and international levels, overall participation in the relevant
transparency mechanisms, such as the UN Standardized Instrument for Reporting
Military Expenditures and UN register of Conventional Arms, has weakened over the
past decade due to a lack of political commitment, technical difculties, lack of staf or a
combination of these.
* For more information about this session contact Sam Perlo-Freeman (perlo-freeman@sipri.org).
40 2014 stockholm forum on security and development
Conclusions
Security sector transparency in fragile states is signicant because of the consistent
vicious cycle between corruption, instability and violent conict. Anti-corruption provi-
sions, as well as transparency and accountability provisions, need to be incorporated in
comprehensive reconstruction processes in conict-afected fragile states.
Research questions
1. How can international and national transparency in military expenditure, arms
procurement and transfers, and arms controls be encouraged and how can it be
optimized to contribute to peace and security?
2. How inuential is the level of democracy, oversight and transparency of the
country on levels of corruption and how will improving these factors contribute to
preventing wasteful military spending?
3. How important is civilian leadership in defence structures?
4. How can data collection about military spending and procurement be improved to
better inform civil society and government institutions?
final report 41
WHAT GETS MEASURED GETS DONE: IMPROVING INDICATORS AND
MEASUREMENT APPROACHES FOR PEACE, RULE OF LAW AND GOOD
GOVERNANCE GOALS, AND THE POST-2015 FRAMEWORK*
Participants
Gunilla Carlsson
Former member of the United Nations Secretary-Generals High-Level Panel of
Eminent Persons on the Post-2015 Development Agenda
Henk-Jan Brinkman
Chief of Policy, Planning and Application, UN Peacebuilding Support Ofce
Francesca Bomboko
Representative of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, International Dialogue on
Peacebuilding and Statebuilding
Gary Milante
Director, Macroeconomics of Security Programme, SIPRI
Henrik Hammargren
Dag Hammarskjld Foundation

Annika Sder (moderator)
Executive Director, Dag Hammarskjld Foundation
Summary
This session brought together scholars, policymakers and practitioners to take stock of
current methodologies for measuring stability, rule of law and good governance in the
International Dialogue and other approaches, and to identify obstacles to formulating
goals and indicators in the post-2015, post-Millennium Development Goal (MDG)
global development agenda.
Main ndings
The global dialogue on indicators related to peacebuilding and statebuilding is a
positive step. The world has come a long way in seriously engaging with these issues as
important components of development. The New Deal, the g7+ and the International
Dialogue, as well as the ndings of the High-Level Panel have been important steps
towards including these issues in the development paradigm. Also, this progress is
reected in the recent message from the African community in the Common African
Position on post-2015, in which peace and security together compose one of six pillars.
* For more information about this session contact Dr Gary Milante (milante@sipri.org).
42 2014 stockholm forum on security and development
Conclusions
There is broad agreement on the High-Level Panels recommendations and the aspira-
tion of creating universal goals. There is much to be commended in both the Open
Working Group and sustainable development processes. Still, it was noted that the Open
Working Group process has yielded 19 goals with 200 target areas, and that this will
likely need to be cut down in order to make the global goals accessible.
There was less agreement on the universality of targets and indicators and a tension
was identied between universal language and context-relevant implementation.
Discussants suggested that while goals and targets may be universal in language, the
targets can be adjusted in terms of speed and timeframe based on national context. The
Open Working Group has proposed that member states will negotiate individual goals
and targets. There is value to basic and far-reaching indicators, applicable for a broad set
of actors, and to moving beyond conict or fragility to broader conceptualization of
development. There is agreement that once goals are formalized, the technical expertise
exists to identify or adapt useful targets and indicators based on those that already exist.
There was concern in the panel over the fact that these issues are split into two goals
and relegated to the end cluster, as if an appendix. However, it was also noted that
peace is a complex process and a disservice may be done to the concept if a reductionist
approach is followed. That is, the complexity of peace cannot be characterized by just
one or two dimensions. There was broad consensus from the panel that inclusion of
peace, stability or governance as enabling factors is insufcient and may actually be
detrimental to the monitoring efort.
Panelists agreed that the overarching goal is not yet fully articulated, and that this
may be the source of some resistance to the concept. Also, the measurement of some
concepts is not yet fully formed; this will require further clarication on the concepts
being measured and the exact indicators.
Sources of data and reporting will be a key tension for the monitoring of these
indicators and goals. The data will need to come from national sources but it is known
that national statistical capacity is weak in the countries of most relevance and that
reporting from national sources may be biased on topics related to peacebuilding and
statebuilding. Reconciling denitions and expectations of national data collection and
universal reporting (particularly with regard to survey and perception data and expert
assessments) will be an important part of the process.
Research questions
1. The returns on investment for areas related to peacebuilding and statebuilding
are not well known. What might progress have looked like on these indicators
had they been monitored as part of the MDG process? What is the relationship
between countries that lag in these areas and other areas of human development?
2. Relatively little is known about what will steps will be necessary to undertake
a data revolution on these topics, particularly for least developed countries.
Research on statistical capacity and the steps necessary for implementation could
be timely to inform the next steps in capacity building in the post-2015 era.
final report 43
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
SIPRI extends warm thanks to the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Afairs (MFA) for
co-hosting the 2014 Stockholm Forum on Security and Development: Freedom from
Violence. We especially appreciate the guidance and engagement of Sigrn Rawet and
Jannie Lijla and their colleagues in the Conict Division of the MFAs Security Policy
Department.
We would also like to thank our partners in organizing the Forum and the pre-Forum
event, including the Dag Hammarskjld Foundation, the Folke Bernadotte Academy,
the Department of Peace and Conict Research at Uppsala University, the Preventing
Sexual Violence Initiative (United Kingdom), the Stockholm Institute of Transition
Economics, the Kvinna till Kvinna Foundation and the Sthlm Policy Group.
The 2014 Stockholm Forum on Security and Development was a collaborative efort
by an exceptional team, ably managed by Rachel Irwin. The event and this report
would not have been possible without the tireless logistical, organizational and rap-
porteurial work carried out by Elin Bergman, Laura Duran and Suyoun Jang.
Finally, thanks to all of the SIPRI staf who organized sessions, participated in
discussions, hosted visitors and otherwise made the event a success. Special thanks to
those who went above and beyond facilitating, including Stephanie Blenckner, Emily
Bloom, Cynthia Loo, Joanne Chan, Silvia Lohnk and Gisela Lenz. We would also like
to thank David Prater and David Cruickshank for editing with alacrity and Magdalena
Soderquist for her frequent web updates.
THE 2014 STOCKHOLM FORUM ON
SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT:
FREEDOM FROM VIOLENCE
On 28 March 2014 SIPRI and the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Afairs
co-hosted a high-level forumthe 2014 Stockholm Forum on Security and
Developmentwith the theme of Freedom from Violence. On 27 March
SIPRI also organized a pre-Forum event, featuring a number of parallel
sessions. Over 200 participants attended the event, which SIPRI hopes
will become an annual xture on the security and development calendar in
Stockholm.
The Forum leveraged international state-of-the-art research and policy
ndings from think tanks and academics in Sweden and abroad, and
showcased research and policy advice produced by this community at the
intersection between security, peace and socioeconomic development.
The conference sessions also drew on Scandinavian traditions of discussion,
interaction, and collaborative knowledge creation.
This report summarizes two days of rich discussions at the Forum.