CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION VS THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

194 SCRA 317

Political Law: Ex Officio Officials-Members of the Cabinet-Singularity of Office-EO 284

FACTS: In July 1987, then President Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order No. 284 which
allowed members of the Cabinet, their undersecretaries and assistant secretaries to hold other
government offices or positions in addition to their primary positions subject to limitations set
therein. The Civil Liberties Union (CLU) assailed this EO averring that such law is
unconstitutional. The constitutionality of EO 284 is being challenged by CLU on the principal
submission that it adds exceptions to Sec 13, Article 7 of the Constitution which provides:

Sec. 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or
assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or
employment during their tenure. They shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly practice
any other profession, participate in any business, or be financially interested in any contract
with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision,
agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or
their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their office.

CLU avers that by virtue of the phrase unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, the only
exceptions against holding any other office or employment in Government are those provided in
the Constitution, namely: (i) The Vice-President may be appointed as a Member of the Cabinet
under Sec 3, par. (2), Article 7; and (ii) the Secretary of Justice is an ex-officio member of the
Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of Sec 8 (1), Article 8.

ISSUE: Whether or not EO 284 is constitutional.

HELD: No, it is unconstitutional. It is clear that the 1987 Constitution seeks to prohibit the
President, Vice-President, members of the Cabinet, their deputies or assistants from holding
during their tenure multiple offices or employment in the government, except in those cases
specified in the Constitution itself and as above clarified with respect to posts held without
additional compensation in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law and as required by the
primary functions of their office, the citation of Cabinet members (then called Ministers) as
examples during the debate and deliberation on the general rule laid down for all appointive
officials should be considered as mere personal opinions which cannot override the
constitutions manifest intent and the peoples understanding thereof.

In the light of the construction given to Sec 13, Art 7 in relation to Sec 7, par. (2), Art IX-B of the
1987 Constitution, EO 284 is unconstitutional. Ostensibly restricting the number of positions that
Cabinet members, undersecretaries or assistant secretaries may hold in addition to their
primary position to not more than 2 positions in the government and government corporations,
EO 284 actually allows them to hold multiple offices or employment in direct contravention of the
express mandate of Sec 13, Art 7 of the 1987 Constitution prohibiting them from doing so,
unless otherwise provided in the 1987 Constitution itself.




DELA CRUZ VS COURT OF APPEALS
NOVEMBER 29, 2001

FACTS: Twenty petitioners were members of the Board of Directors of the National
Housing Authority (NHA) from 1991 to 1996. On September 19, 1997, the Commission
on Audit issued Memorandum No. 97-038 directing all unit heads/ auditors/ team
leaders of the national government agencies and government owned and controlled
corporations which have effected payment of any form of additional compensation or
renumeration to cabinet secretaries, their deputies and assistants, or their
representatives in violation of the rule on multiple positions, to:
a.) immediately cause the disallowance of such additional compensation or
renumeration given to and received by the concerned officials, and

b.) effect the refund of the same from the time of the finality of the Supreme
Court En Banc Decision in the consolidated cases of Civil Liberties Union vs.
Executive Secretary and Anti- Graft League of the Philippines, Inc. et. al. vs.
Secretary of Agrarian Reform, et. al., promulgated on February 22, 1991.

The COA Memorandum further stated that the said Supreme Court Decision, which
became final and executory on August 19, 1991 declared Executive Order No. 284
unconstitutional insofar as it allows Cabinet members, their deputies and assistants to
hold other offices in addition to their primary offices and to receive compensations
therefore.

Accordingly on October 23, 1997, NHA Resident Auditor Salvador J. Vasquez issued
Notice of Disallowance No. 97-011-061 disallowing in audit the payment of
representation allowances and per diems amounting to P276,600.00 of "Cabinet
members who were ex- officio members of the National Housing Authority Board of
Directors and/ or their respective alternates who actually received the payments."

Petitioner through then Chairman dela Serna of the NHA Board of Directors, appealed
from the Notice of Disallowance to the Commission on Audit on these following
grounds:

a.) that the SC Decision in Civil Liberties and Anti Graft League of the Philippines; was
clarified in the resolution of the Court en banc that the constitutional ban against
multiple positions applies only to the members of the Cabinet, their deputies and
assistants. It does not cover appointive officials with equivalent rank or those lower
than the position of Assistant Secretary; and

b.) The National Housing Authority Directors are not Secretaries, Undersecretaries or
Assistant Secretaries and that they occupy positions lower than the position of Assistant
Secretary.

On September 22, 1998, the COA issued Decision No. 98-381 denying petitioners'
appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not COA erred in disallowing compensation in favor of NHA Board
Members

HELD: No. Under Sec. 7 of P.D. 757 or the law in creating NHA, the persons mandated
by law to sit as members of he NHA Board are the following: 1. Secretary of Public
Works, Transportation and Communications, 2. the Director- General of the National
Economic and Development Authority 3.) The Secretary of Finance 4.) the Secretary of
Labor 5.) the Secretary of Industry 6.) the Executive Secretary and 7.) the General
Manager of the NHA.

While petitioners are not among those officers, however, they are "alternates" of the
said officers, "whose acts shall be considered as acts of the principals". Section 13,
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution provides that:

Sec. 13. The President, Vice President, the Members of the Cabinet and their deputies
or assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other
office or employment during their tenure.
The Court, in Civil Liberties and Anti Graft League of the Philippines interpreted in Sec.
13 to mean that the prohibition in holding dual or multiple offices must not be construed
as applying to posts occupied by Executive officials specified therein without additional
compensation in an ex officio capacity as provided by law and as required by the
primary functions of said officials' office.

It should be obvious that, if say, Secretary of Finance attends a meeting of the Monetary
Board as an ex- offficio member, he is actually in legal contemplation performing the
primary function of his principal office in defining policy in monetary banking matters,
which come under the jurisdiction of his department. For such attendance, he is not
entitled to collect any extra compensation whether be in the form of per diemm or an
honorarium or an allowance or some other such euphemism. Such additional
prohibition is prohibited in the Constitution.

In rendering its challenged decision, the COA did not gravely abuse its discretion.
Petition DISMISSED in favor of the respondents.













SARMIENTO VS MISON
156 SCRA 549
Political Law Appointment of Head of Bureaus Officers Requiring Confirmation by
the Commission on Appointments

FACTS: This is the 1
st
major case under the 1987 Constitution. In 1987, Salvador Mison
was appointed as the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs by then president
Corazon Aquino. Ulpiano Sarmiento III and Juanito Arcilla, being members of the bar,
taxpayers, and professors of constitutional law questioned the appointment of Mison
because it appears that Misons appointment was not submitted to the Commission on
Appointments (COA) for approval. Sarmiento insists that uner the new Constitution,
heads of bureaus require the confirmation of the COA.

Meanwhile, Sarmiento also sought to enjoin Guillermo Carague, the then Secretary of
the Department of Budget, from disbursing the salary payments of Mison due to the
unconstitutionality of Misons appointment.

ISSUE: Whether or not the appointment of heads of bureaus needed confirmation by
the Commission on Appointment.

HELD: No. In the 1987 Constitution, the framers removed heads of bureaus as one of
those officers needing confirmation by the Commission on Appointment. Under
the 1987 Constitution, there are four (4) groups of officers whom the President shall
appoint. These four (4) groups are:

First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and
consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other
officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution;

Second, all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise
provided for by law;

Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint;

Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the
President alone.

The first group above is the only public officers appointed by the president which require
confirmation by the COA. The second, third, and fourth group do not require
confirmation by the COA. The position of Mison as the head of the Bureau of Customs
does not belong to the first group hence he does not need to be confirmed by the COA.






IBP VS ZAMORA
AUGUST 15, 2000

FACTS: Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Sec. 18, Art. VII of the
Constitution, the President directed the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate
with each other for the proper deployment and utilization of the Marines to assist the
PNP in preventing or suppressing criminal or lawless violence. The President declared
that the services of the Marines in the anti-crime campaign are merely temporary in
nature and for a reasonable period only, until such time when the situation shall have
improved. The IBP filed a petition seeking to declare the deployment of the Philippine
Marines null and void and unconstitutional.

ISSUES:

(1) Whether or not the Presidents factual determination of the necessity of calling the
armed forces is subject to judicial review

(2) Whether or not the calling of the armed forces to assist the PNP in joint visibility
patrols violates the constitutional provisions on civilian supremacy over the military and
the civilian character of the PNP

HELD: When the President calls the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless
violence, invasion or rebellion, he necessarily exercises a discretionary power solely
vested in his wisdom. Under Sec. 18, Art. VII of the Constitution, Congress may revoke
such proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus and the Court may review the sufficiency of the factual basis thereof. However,
there is no such equivalent provision dealing with the revocation or review of the
Presidents action to call out the armed forces. The distinction places the calling out
power in a different category from the power to declare martial law and power to
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, otherwise, the framers of the
Constitution would have simply lumped together the 3 powers and provided for their
revocation and review without any qualification.

The reason for the difference in the treatment of the said powers highlights the intent to
grant the President the widest leeway and broadest discretion in using the power to call
out because it is considered as the lesser and more benign power compared to the
power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the power to impose
martial law, both of which involve the curtailment and suppression of certain basic civil
rights and individual freedoms, and thus necessitating safeguards by Congress and
review by the Court.

In view of the constitutional intent to give the President full discretionary power to
determine the necessity of calling out the armed forces, it is incumbent upon the
petitioner to show that the Presidents decision is totally bereft of factual basis. The
present petition fails to discharge such heavy burden, as there is no evidence to support
the assertion that there exists no justification for calling out the armed forces.

The Court disagrees to the contention that by the deployment of the Marines, the civilian
task of law enforcement is militarized in violation of Sec. 3, Art. II of the Constitution.
The deployment of the Marines does not constitute a breach of the civilian supremacy
clause. The calling of the Marines constitutes permissible use of military assets for
civilian law enforcement. The local police forces are the ones in charge of the visibility
patrols at all times, the real authority belonging to the PNP

Moreover, the deployment of the Marines to assist the PNP does not unmake the
civilian character of the police force. The real authority in the operations is lodged with
the head of a civilian institution, the PNP, and not with the military. Since none of the
Marines was incorporated or enlisted as members of the PNP, there can be no
appointment to civilian position to speak of. Hence, the deployment of the Marines in the
joint visibility patrols does not destroy the civilian character of the PNP.

































DE RAMA VS COURT OF APPEALS
FEBRUARY 28, 2001

FACTS: Upon his assumption to the position of Mayor of Pagbilao Quezon, petitioner Conrado de Rama
wrote a letter to the Civil Service Commission (CSC) seeking the recall of the appointments of fourteen
(14) municipal employees. Petitioner justified that his recall request were on allegation that the
appointments of the said employees were midnight appointments of the former mayor, Ma. Evelyn S.
Abeja done in violation of Article VII, Section 15 of the 1987 Constitution which provides:
Sec. 15, Article VII: Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of
his term, the President or Acting President shall not make appointments except temporary appointments
to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public
safety.

While the matter was pending before CSC, three of the employees filed with the CSC a claim of their
salary payments, alleging that although appointments were declared by Conrado Gulim, Director II of
CSC Field Office; petitioner withheld their salaries and benefits pursuant to Office Order No. 95-01 which
was issued on June 30, 1995 wherein appointments of said 14 employees were recalled.

On April 30, the CSC denied petitioners request for lack of merit. Petitioner then filed a motion for
reconsideration to which CSC denied. Aside from the fact that petitioner failed to present evidence to
revocation of said appointments, the CSC reiterated in its ruling that these subject appointments are
deemed valid.

ISSUE: Whether or not 14 municipal employees should be recalled.

HELD: Recall of appointments may be done on the following grounds:
1. Non- compliance with the procedures of the criteria
2. Failure to pass through the agencys Selection and Promotion Board
3. Violation of the existing collective agreement between management and employees relative to
promotion and
4. Violation of other existing civil service laws, rules and regulations
In the case at bar, the only reason advanced by the petitioner to justify the recall was that these are
midnight appointments. Sec. 15 of Article VII only states that midnight appointments were specifically
those made within two months immediately prior to the next presidential elections applies only to
President and Acting President.

DISSENTING OPINION BY J.MENDOZA

Article VII Sec. 15 of the 1987 Constitution binds not only the President nor the Acting President but also
the mayors who are vested with the power of appointment since this rule flows from the principle that a
public office is a public trust. In Aytona v. Castillo, the Court did not need a specific constitutional
provision to rule that the making of 350 appointments after proclamation of a new President and during
the last hours of the Chief Executive could not be considered consistent with good faith. The hurried
appointments of respondents detract from that degree of good faith, morality and propriety required for
appointments made by a faithful and prudent caretaker in order to be considered valid.

MONSANTO VS FACTORAN
170 SCRA 190
Pardon Does not Extinguish Civil Liabilities & It is Prospective

FACTS: Monsanto was the Asst Treasurer of Calbayug City. She was charged for the crime of
Estafa through Falsification of Public Documents. She was found guilty and was sentenced to
jail. She was however granted pardon by Marcos. She then wrote a letter to the Minister of
Finance for her to be reinstated to her former position since it was still vacant. She was also
requesting for back pays. The Minister of Finance referred the issue to the Office of the
President and Factoran denied Monsantos request averring that Monsanto must first seek
appointment and that the pardon does not reinstate her former position. Also, Monsanto avers
that by reason of the pardon, she should no longer be compelled to answer for the civil liabilities
brought about by her acts.

ISSUE: Whether or not Monsanto should be reinstated to her former post.

HELD: A pardon looks to the future. It is not retrospective. It makes no amends for the past. It
affords no relief for what has been suffered by the offender. It does not impose upon the
government any obligation to make reparation for what has been suffered. Since the offense
has been established by judicial proceedings, that which has been done or suffered while they
were in force is presumed to have been rightfully done and justly suffered, and no satisfaction
for it can be required. This would explain why petitioner, though pardoned, cannot be entitled to
receive backpay for lost earnings and benefits. On the other hand, civil liability arising from
crime is governed by the RPC. It subsists notwithstanding service of sentence, or for any reason
the sentence is not served by pardon, amnesty or commutation of sentence. Petitioners civil
liability may only be extinguished by the same causes recognized in the Civil Code, namely:
payment, loss of the thing due, remission of the debt, merger of the rights of creditor and debtor,
compensation and novation.

FACTS:

In a decision by the Sandiganbayan convicted petitioner Salvacion A. Monsanto was
accused of the crime of estafa thru falsification of public documents and sentenced them
to imprisonment and to indemnify the government in the sum of P4,892.50 representing
the balance of the amount defrauded and to pay the costs proportionately.
She was given an absolute pardon by President Marcos which she accepted.
Petitioner requested that she be restored to her former post as assistant city treasurer
since the same was still vacant, she also asked for the backpay for the entire period of
her suspension.
Finance Ministry ruled that petitioner may be reinstated to her position without the
necessity of a new appointment

The Office of the President said that that acquittal, not absolute pardon, of a former
public officer is the only ground for reinstatement to his former position and entitlement
to payment of his salaries, benefits and emoluments due to him during the period of his
suspension pendente lite.
In fact, in such a situation, the former public official must secure a reappointment before
he can reassume his former position. And a pardon shall in no case exempt the culprit
from payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon him by the sentence.
Petitioner argued that general rules on pardon cannot apply to her case by reason of the
fact that she was extended executive clemency while her conviction was still pending
appeal in this Court. There having been no final judgment of conviction, her employment
therefore as assistant city treasurer could not be said to have been terminated or
forfeited.
The court viewed that is not material when the pardon was bestowed, whether before or
after conviction, for the result would still be the same

ISSUE:

1. Effects of a full and absolute pardon
2. WON a public officer, who has been granted an absolute pardon by the Chief Executive,
is entitled to reinstatement to her former position without need of a new appointment.

HELD:

(1) A pardon reaches both the punishment prescribed for the offense and the guilt of the
offender; and when the pardon is full, it releases the punishment and blots out of existence the
guilt, so that in the eye of the law the offender is as innocent as if he had never committed the
offense. If granted before conviction, it prevents any of the penalties and disabilities,
consequent upon conviction, from attaching; if granted after conviction, it removes the penalties
and disabilities and restores him to all his civil rights; it makes him, as it were, a new man, and
gives him a new credit and capacity. But unless expressly grounded on the persons innocence
(which is rare), it cannot bring back lost reputation for honesty, integrity and fair dealing.

A pardon looks to the future. It is not retrospective. It makes no amends for the past. It affords
no relief for what has been suffered by the offender. It does not impose upon the government
any obligation to make reparation for what has been suffered.

(2) No. To insist on automatic reinstatement because of a mistaken notion that the pardon
virtually acquitted one from the offense of estafa would be grossly untenable. A pardon, albeit
full and plenary, cannot preclude the appointing power from refusing appointment to anyone
deemed to be of bad character, a poor moral risk, or who is unsuitable by reason of the
pardoned conviction. The absolute disqualification or ineligibility from public office forms part of
the punishment prescribed by the Revised Penal Code for estafa thru falsification of public
documents.
The pardon granted to petitioner has resulted in removing her disqualification from holding
public employment but it cannot go beyond that. To regain her former post as assistant city
treasurer, she must re-apply and undergo the usual procedure required for a new appointment.









RANDOLF DAVID VS ARROYO
G.R. NO. 1711396 MAY 3, 2006

FACTS:
During the celebration of People Power I, President Arroyo issued Presidential
Proclamation 1017 (PP 1017 for brevity) declaring a state of national emergency. The
President also issued General Order (G.O.) No. 5 implementing PP 1017.
The President stated that over the past months, elements in political opposition have
conspired with extreme left represented by NDF- CCP- NPA and military adventurists,
which caused her to declare such order. The President considered aims to oust the
President and take- over reigns of government as clear and present danger.

On March 3, President Arroyo lifted PP 1017. Solicitor General argued that the basis of
declaring PP 1017 was that the intent of the Constitution is to give full discretionary
powers to the President in determining the necessity of calling out the AFP.

However despite the contentions of the Solicitor General, the Magdalo group indicted
the Oakwood mutiny and called to wear red bands on their left arms to show disgust. At
the same time Oplan Hackle I was discovered, which constitutes plans of bombings and
attacks on PMA Alumni Homecoming in Baguio, the same event where the President
was invited. The next morning after the alumni homecoming celebration, a bomb was
found inside the campus.

PNP Chief Arturo Lomibao also intercepted information that PNP- SAF members are
planning to defect from the administration, while on the same view Congressman
Peping Cojuanco plotted moves to bring down the Arroyo Administration. Huge number
of soldiers joined the rallies to provide critical mass and armed component to Anti-
Arroyo protests.

Bombings of telephone communication towers and cell sites in Bulacaan and Bataan
was also considered as an additional factual basis after the issuance of PP 1017 and
GO 5. Because of these incidental series of events which clearly presents a critical
situation, President Arroyo cancelled all activities related to EDSA People Power I.
Mike Arroyo, then Executive Secretary, announced that warrantless arrest and
takeover of facilities can be implemented.

Succeeding this announcement was the arrest of Randy David, a Filipino journalist and
UP professor due to a mistake of fact that he was actually involved in the street rallies.
Seizure of Daily Tribune, Malaya and Abante-- all local news publication, took place
which, according to the PNP, was meant to show a strong presence to tell the media
outlets not to connive or do anything that would help rebels in bringing down the
government. Police also arrested Congressman Crispin Beltran, who then represented
the Anakpawis Party.



ISSUE:

1. Whether or not the issuance of Presidential Proclamation PP 1017 is
unconstitutional?
2. Whether or not the arrest of Randy David and the seizure of Daily Tribune et. al.,
is unconstitutional?


HELD: Respondents claim that such petition is moot and academic based on the
issuance of PP 1017, but the Court rejects such contention. A moot and academic case
is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy. In this case, the Court is
convinced that the President was justified in issuing PP 1017 which calls for military aid.

Most people then equate it to martial law, but such case is different wherein the basis
then was the 1973 Constitution. Under the present 1987 Constitution, the President
may summon armed forces to aid him in supporting lawless violence.

The President's declaration of state rebellion was merely an act declaring a status or
conduction of a public moment of interest. State of national emergency, however, is the
prerogative of the President. Her exercise of emergency powers such as the taking
over of privately owned utility requires delegation from the Congress, which is entirely
different from the martial law.

As to the seizure of the Daily Tribune and the arrest of Randy David, the Court
considers those actions unlawful based on the fact that it violates the constitutional
mandate of freedom of expression.



















RANDOLF DAVID VS ARROYO
G.R. NO. 1711396 MAY 3, 2006
489 SCRA 160 Political Law The Executive Branch Presidential Proclamation 1017 Take
Care Clause Take Over Power Calling Out Power - Bill of Rights - Freedom of Speech
Overbreadth

FACTS: In February 2006, due to the escape of some Magdalo members and the discovery of a
plan (Oplan Hackle I) to assassinate the president, then president Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
(GMA) issued Presidential Proclamation 1017 (PP1017) and is to be implemented by General
Order No. 5 (GO 5). The said law was aimed to suppress lawlessness and the connivance of
extremists to bring down the government.

Pursuant to such PP, GMA cancelled all plans to celebrate EDSA I and at the same time
revoked all permits issued for rallies and other public organization/meeting. Notwithstanding the
cancellation of their rally permit, Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU) head Randolf David proceeded to
rally which led to his arrest.

Later that day, the Daily Tribune, which Cacho-Olivares is the editor, was raided by the CIDG
and they seized and confiscated anti-GMA articles and write ups. Later still, another known anti-
GMA news agency (Malaya) was raided and seized. On the same day, Beltran of Anakpawis,
was also arrested. His arrest was however grounded on a warrant of arrest issued way back in
1985 for his actions against Marcos. His supporters cannot visit him in jail because of the
current imposition of PP 1017 and GO 5.

In March, GMA issued PP 1021 which declared that the state of national emergency ceased to
exist. David and some opposition Congressmen averred that PP1017 is unconstitutional for it
has no factual basis and it cannot be validly declared by the president for such power is reposed
in Congress. Also such declaration is actually a declaration of martial law. Olivares-Cacho also
averred that the emergency contemplated in the Constitution are those of natural calamities and
that such is an overbreadth. Petitioners claim that PP 1017 is an overbreadth because it
encroaches upon protected and unprotected rights. The Sol-Gen argued that the issue has
become moot and academic by reason of the lifting of PP 1017 by virtue of the declaration of
PP 1021. The Sol-Gen averred that PP 1017 is within the presidents calling out power, take
care power and take over power.

ISSUE: Whether or not PP 1017 and GO 5 is constitutional.

HELD: PP 1017 and its implementing GO are partly constitutional and partly unconstitutional.
The issue cannot be considered as moot and academic by reason of the lifting of the questioned
PP. It is still in fact operative because there are parties still affected due to the alleged violation
of the said PP. Hence, the SC can take cognition of the case at bar. The SC ruled that PP 1017
is constitutional in part and at the same time some provisions of which are unconstitutional. The
SC ruled in the following way;





Resolution by the SC on the Factual Basis of its declaration
The petitioners were not able to prove that GMA has no factual basis in issuing PP 1017 and
GO 5. A reading of the Solicitor Generals Consolidated Comment and Memorandum shows a
detailed narration of the events leading to the issuance of PP 1017, with supporting reports
forming part of the records. Mentioned are the escape of the Magdalo Group, their audacious
threat of the Magdalo D-Day, the defections in the military, particularly in the Philippine Marines,
and the reproving statements from the communist leaders. There was also the Minutes of the
Intelligence Report and Security Group of the Philippine Army showing the growing alliance
between the NPA and the military. Petitioners presented nothing to refute such events. Thus,
absent any contrary allegations, the Court is convinced that the President was justified in
issuing PP 1017 calling for military aid. Indeed, judging the seriousness of the incidents, GMA
was not expected to simply fold her arms and do nothing to prevent or suppress what she
believed was lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. However, the exercise of such power or
duty must not stifle liberty.

Resolution by the SC on the Overbreadth Theory
First and foremost, the overbreadth doctrine is an analytical tool developed for testing on their
faces statutes in free speech cases. The 7 consolidated cases at bar are not primarily freedom
of speech cases. Also, a plain reading of PP 1017 shows that it is not primarily directed to
speech or even speech-related conduct. It is actually a call upon the AFP to prevent or
suppress all forms of lawless violence. Moreover, the overbreadth doctrine is not intended for
testing the validity of a law that reflects legitimate state interest in maintaining comprehensive
control over harmful, constitutionally unprotected conduct. Undoubtedly, lawless violence,
insurrection and rebellion are considered harmful and constitutionally unprotected conduct.
Thus, claims of facial overbreadth are entertained in cases involving statutes which, by their
terms, seek to regulate only spoken words and again, that overbreadth claims, if entertained at
all, have been curtailed when invoked against ordinary criminal laws that are sought to be
applied to protected conduct. Here, the incontrovertible fact remains that PP 1017 pertains to a
spectrum of conduct, not free speech, which is manifestly subject to state regulation.

Resolution by the SC on the Calling Out Power Doctrine
On the basis of Sec 17, Art 7 of the Constitution, GMA declared PP 1017. The SC considered
the Presidents calling-out power as a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom, it
stressed that this does not prevent an examination of whether such power was exercised within
permissible constitutional limits or whether it was exercised in a manner constituting grave
abuse of discretion. The SC ruled that GMA has validly declared PP 1017 for the Constitution
grants the President, as Commander-in-Chief, a sequence of graduated powers. From the
most to the least benign, these are: the calling-out power, the power to suspend the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus, and the power to declare Martial Law. The only criterion for the
exercise of the calling-out power is that whenever it becomes necessary, the President may
call the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. And such
criterion has been met.

Resolution by the SC on the Take Care Doctrine
Pursuant to the 2
nd
sentence of Sec 17, Art 7 of the Constitution (He shall ensure that the laws
be faithfully executed.) the president declared PP 1017. David et al averred that PP 1017
however violated Sec 1, Art 6 of the Constitution for it arrogated legislative power to the
President. Such power is vested in Congress. They assail the clause to enforce obedience to
all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon
my direction. The SC noted that such provision is similar to the power that granted former
President Marcos legislative powers (as provided in PP 1081). The SC ruled that the assailed
PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants GMA the authority to promulgate decrees.
Legislative power is peculiarly within the province of the Legislature. Sec 1, Article 6
categorically states that [t]he legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the
Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives. To be sure,
neither Martial Law nor a state of rebellion nor a state of emergency can justify GMA[s exercise
of legislative power by issuing decrees. The president can only take care of the carrying out of
laws but cannot create or enact laws.

Resolution by the SC on the Take Over Power Doctrine
The president cannot validly order the taking over of private corporations or institutions such as
the Daily Tribune without any authority from Congress. On the other hand, the word emergency
contemplated in the constitution is not limited to natural calamities but rather it also includes
rebellion. The SC made a distinction; the president can declare the state of national emergency
but her exercise of emergency powers does not come automatically after it for such exercise
needs authority from Congress. The authority from Congress must be based on the following:
(1) There must be a war or other emergency.
(2) The delegation must be for a limited period only.
(3) The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the Congress may prescribe.
(4) The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national policy declared by
Congress.

Resolution by the SC on the Issue that PP 1017 is a Martial Law Declaration
The SC ruled that PP 1017 is not a Martial Law declaration and is not tantamount to it. It is a
valid exercise of the calling out power of the president by the president.




















GUDANI VS SENGA
G.R. NO. 170165 AUGUST 15, 2006

FACTS: Senator Biazon invited senior officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) including
General Gudani to appear before a public hearing in the Senate Committee on National Defense and
Security wherein Hello Garci controversy of President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo emerged. Upon the
discretion of the President, AFP Chief of Staff Senga issued a memorandum prohibiting General Gudani
and company from appearing before the Senate Committee without Presidental approval. However,
General Gudani and Col. Batulan still attended the said committee in compliance with Senator Biazon.

ISSUE: Whether or not the President can prevent military officers from testifying at a legislative inquiry.

HELD: The President has a constitutional authority to prohibit members of the AFP from attending a
Senate hearing by virtue of her power as a commander-in-chief. This is under her prerogative as the
highest official of the AFP. Note that it is not an invocation of her executive privilege, but on the Chief
Executive's power to control the actions and speech of the members of the AFP. Non compliance of the
military subordinates would violate the principle that "the civilian authority is supreme over the military
authority".


The ability of the President to prevent military officers from testifying before Congress does not turn on
executiveprivilege, but on the Chief Executives power as commander-in-chief to control the actions and
speech of members of the armed forces. The Presidents prerogatives as commander-in-chief are not
hampered by the same limitations as in executive privilege.

FACTS: On Sept. 22, 2005, Sen. Biazon invited several senior officers of the AFP, including Gen.
Gudani, to appear at a publichearing before the Senate Committee on National Defense and Security
concerning the conduct of the 2004 elections wherein allegations of massive cheating and the Hello
Garci tapes emerged. AFP Chief of Staff Gen. Senga issued a Memorandum, prohibiting Gen. Gudani,
Col. Balutan and company from appearing before the Senate Committee without Presidential approval.
Nevertheless, Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan testified before said Committee, prompting Gen. Senga to
order them subjected to General Court Martial proceedings for willfully violating an order of
a superior officer. In the meantime, President Arroyo issued EO 464, which was subsequently declared
unconstitutional.

ISSUE: Whether or not the President can prevent military officers from testifying at a legislative inquiry

RULING: We hold that the President has constitutional authority to do so, by virtue of her power as
commander-in-chief, and that as a consequence a military officer who defies such injunction is liable
under military justice. At the same time, we also hold that any chamber of Congress which seeks the
appearance before it of a military officer against the consent of the President has adequate remedies
under law to compel such attendance. Any military official whom Congress summons to testify before it
may be compelled to do so by the President. If the President is not so inclined, the President may be
commanded by judicial order to compel the attendance of the military officer. Final judicial orders have
the force of the law of the land which the President has the duty to faithfully execute.

Ability of President to prevent military officers from testifying before Congress is based on
Commander-in-chief powers.

As earlier noted, we ruled in Senate that the President may not issue a blanket requirement of prior
consent on executive officials summoned by the legislature to attend a congressional hearing. In doing
so, the Court recognized the considerable limitations on executive privilege, and affirmed that
the privilege must be formally invoked on specified grounds. However, the ability of the President to
prevent military officers from testifying before Congress does not turn on executive privilege, but on the
Chief Executives power as commander-in-chief to control the actions and speech of members of
the armed forces. The Presidents prerogatives as commander-in-chief are not hampered by the same
limitations as in executive privilege.

RATIONALE: Our ruling that the President could, as a general rule, require military officers to seek
presidential approval before appearing before Congress is based foremost on the notion that a contrary
rule unduly diminishes the prerogatives of the President as commander-in-chief. Congress holds
significant control over the armed forces in matters such as budget appropriations and the approval of
higher-rank promotions, yet it is on the President that the Constitution vests the title as commander-in-
chief and all the prerogatives and functions appertaining to the position. Again, the exigencies of military
discipline and the chain of command mandate that the Presidents ability to control the individual
members of the armed forces be accorded the utmost respect. Where a military officer is torn between
obeying the President and obeying the Senate, the Court will without hesitation affirm that the officer has
to choose the President. After all, the Constitution prescribes that it is the President, and not the Senate,
who is the commander-in-chief of the armed forces.

Remedy is judicial relief

At the same time, the refusal of the President to allow members of the military to appear before Congress
is still subject to judicial relief. The Constitution itself recognizes as one of the legislatures functions is the
conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation. Inasmuch as it is ill-advised for Congress to interfere with the
Presidents power as commander-in-chief, it is similarly detrimental for the President to unduly interfere
with Congresss right to conduct legislative inquiries. The impasse did not come to pass in this petition,
since petitioners testified anyway despite the presidential prohibition. Yet the Court is aware that with its
pronouncement today that the President has the right to require prior consent from members of the armed
forces, the clash may soon loom or actualize.

We believe and hold that our constitutional and legal order sanctions a modality by which members of the
military may be compelled to attend legislative inquiries even if the President desires otherwise, a
modality which does not offend the Chief Executives prerogatives as commander-in-chief. The remedy
lies with the courts.

The fact that the executive branch is an equal, coordinate branch of government to the legislative creates
a wrinkle to any basic rule that persons summoned to testify before Congress must do so. There is
considerable interplay between the legislative and executive branches, informed by due deference and
respect as to their various constitutional functions. Reciprocal courtesy idealizes this relationship; hence,
it is only as a last resort that one branch seeks to compel the other to a particular mode of behavior. The
judiciary, the third coordinate branch of government, does not enjoy a similar dynamic with either the
legislative or executive branches. Whatever weakness inheres on judicial power due to its inability to
originate national policies and legislation, such is balanced by the fact that it is the branch empowered by
the Constitution to compel obeisance to its rulings by the other branches of government.
















SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS ERMITA
APRIL 20, 2006 G.R. NO. 169777
Nature of the Case: These are six consolidated cases docketed as following:

G.R. No. 169777 = Senate of the Philippines vs. Eduardo Ermita
G.R. No. 169659 = Bayan Muna vs. Eduardo Ermita
G.R. No. 169660 = Francisco Chavez vs. Eduardo Ermita
G.R. No. 169667 = Alternative Law Groups vs. Eduardo Ermita
G.R. No. 169834 = PDP Laban vs. Eduardo Ermita
G.R. No. 171246 = Jose Anselmo Cadiz v. Eduardo Ermita

FACTS: These consolidated cases are petitions for certiorari stating that the President
has abused her power by issuing Executive Order No. 464 dated September 28, 2005.
Petitioners herein pray that such order be declared as null and void for being
unconstitutional.
In the exercise of its legislative power, the Senate of the Philippines through its various
Committees conducts inquiries and investigations in aid of legislation which call for
attendance of officials and employees of the executive department, bureaus, and offices
including those employed in the Government Owned and Controlled Corporations, the
Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine National Police (PNP).

On September 21 - 23, 2005 the Committee of the Senate issued invitations to various
officials of the Executive Department for them to appear on September 29, 2005 as
resource speakers in a public hearing on the railway project of North Luzon Railways
Corporation with the China National Machinery Group. Such railway project is called
the North Railway Project.

The Senate issued invitations on several AFP officials for them to attend as resource
persons in a public hearing scheduled on Sept. 28, 2005 for the privilege speech of the
following senators: Sen. Aquilino Pimentel, Jr., Sen. Jinggoy Estrada, Sen. Rodolfo
Biazon, Sen. Jamby Madrigal, Sen. Biazon. Also invited to the hearing was the AFP
Chief of Staff, General Generoso Senga who by letter dated September 28, 2005
requested for its postponement due to a pressing operational situation that demands his
utmost attention.

On September 28, 2005 Senate Franklin Drilon received from Executive Secretary
Eduardo Ermita a letter respectfully requesting for the postponement of the hearing to
which various executive officials have been invited in order for said officials to study and
prepare for various issues so they can better enlighten the Senate Committee on its
investigation.

Senate Pres. Drilon however was unable to grant such request because it was sent
belatedly and all preparations are complete within that week. He also received a letter
from NorthRail project President Jose L. Cortes Jr. requesting that the hearing of the
NorthRail project be postponed or cancelled until a copy of the report of UP Law Center
on contract agreements related to the project had been secured.

On Sept. 28, 2005, the President issued Executive Order # 464 entitled Ensuring
Observance of Principle of Separation of Powers, Adherence to Rule on Executive
Privilege and Respect for Rights of Public Officials Appearing in Legislative Inquiries in
Aid of Legislation under the Constitution and for other Purposes", which states that all
heads of the executive branch shall secure the consent of the President prior to
appearing before either house of the Congress; public officials may not divulge
confidential classified information officially known to them by reason of their office and
not made available to the public to prejudice the public interest and that executive
matters shall only be conducted in executive session.

On September 28, Sen. Pres. Franklin Drilon received from Executive Secretary
Eduardo Ermita a copy of E.O. 464 and that executive officials invited were not able to
attend because they failed to secure the required consent from the President.

On October 3, 2005, three petitions docketed as G.R. No. 169659 (Bayan Muna vs.
Eduardo Ermita), 169660 (Francisco Chavez vs. Eduardo Ermita) and 169667
(Alternative Law Groups vs. Eduardo Ermita) were filed before the court also
challenging the constitutionality of E.O. 464.

In G.R. No. 169659 Bayan Muna v. Eduardo Ermita, partylist Bayan Muna and HR
members Satur Ocampo, Crispin Beltran, Rafael Mariano, Liza Maza, Joel Virador and
Teodoro Casino, COURAGE = organization of Govt employees and CODAL (Counsels
for Defense of Liberties) pray that E.O. 464 be declared unconstitutional and that
Executive Sec. Eduardo Ermita be prohibited from imposing sanctions on officials who
appear before Congress due to congressional summons. They also contend that E.O.
464 infringes on their rights and impedes them to fulfil their respective obligations.

In G.R. No. 169660 Francisco Chavez vs. Eduardo Ermita, Francisco Chavez claims
that his constitutional rights as a citizen and taxpayer and law practicioner are affected
by the enforcement of E.O. 464 thus he prays that such order be declared null and
unconstitutional.

In G.R. No. 169667 Alternative Law Groups vs. Eduardo Ermita, ALG claims that the
group has legal standing to institute the petition to enforce its constitutional right to
information on matters of public concern.

On October 11, 2005, Senate of the Philippines alleging that it has a vital interest in the
resolution of the issue of validity in E.O. 464, claims that it prohibits the valid exercise of
the Senates powers and functions and conceals information of great public interest and
concern.

On October 14, 2005, PDP- Laban a registered political party w/ members elected in the
Congress filed a similar petition.


ISSUE:
1. Whether respondents committed grave abuse of discretion in executing E.O.
464.
2. Whether E.O. 464 violates the following provisions of the Constitution: Art. II Sec.
28, Art. III Sec. 4, Art. III Sec. 7, Art. VI Sec. I, Art. VI, Sec. 21, Art. VI Sec. 22,
Article XI sec. 1 and Art. XIII sec. 16.
3. Whether E.O. 464 contravenes the power of inquiry vested in the Congress.
4. Whether E.O. 464 violates the right of the people to information on matters of
public concern.

HELD: E.O. 464 to the extent that it bars the appearance of executive officials before
the Congress, deprives the Congress of the information in the possession of these
officials. The power of inquiry, a power vested in the Congress, is expressly recognized
in Sec. 21 of Article VI because, according to the Court, a legislative body cannot
legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions
which the legislation intended to affect or change; thus, making it an essential and
appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function.

However, even when the inquiry is in aid of legislation, there are still recognized
exemptions to the power of inquiry which exemptions fall under the rubric of executive
privilege.

The executive privilege, whether asserted against Congress, the courts, or the public; is
recognized only in relation to certain types of information of a sensitive character.
Executive privilege per se is not meant to cover up embarrassing information. It is a
relative concept, the validity of its assertion to a great extent depends upon the political
situation of the country.



















AMPATUAN VS PUNO
JUNE 7, 2011

FACTS: On 24 Nov. 2009, the day after the Maguindanao Massacre, then Pres. Arroyo
issuedProclamation 1946, placing the Provinces of Maguindanao and Sultan
Kudarat and the City of Cotabato under a state ofemergency. She directed the AFP
and the PNP to undertake such measures as may be allowed by the Constitution and
by law to prevent and suppress all incidents of lawless violence in the named places.

Three days later, she also issued AO 273 transferring supervision of the ARMM from
the Office of the President to the DILG. She subsequently issued AO 273-A, which
amended the former AO (the term transfer used in AO 273 was amended to
delegate, referring to the supervision of the ARMM by the DILG).

Claiming that the Presidents issuances encroached on the ARMMs autonomy,
petitioners Datu Zaldy Uy Ampatuan, Ansaruddin Adiong, and Regie Sahali-Generale,
all ARMM officials, filed this petition for prohibition under Rule 65. The alleged that the
Presidents proclamation and orders encroached on the ARMMs autonomy as these
issuances empowered the DILG Secretary to take over ARMMs operations and to seize
the regional governments powers. They also claimed that the President had no factual
basis for declaring a state ofemergency, especially in the Province of Sultan
Kudarat and the City of Cotabato, where no critical violent incidents occurred. The
deployment of troops and the taking over of the ARMM constitutes an invalid exercise of
the Presidentsemergency powers. Petitioners asked that Proclamation 1946 as well as
AOs 273 and 273-A be declared unconstitutional.

ISSUE:

1. Whether Proclamation 1946 and AOs 273 and 273-A violate the principle of local
autonomy under Sec. 16 Art. X of the Constitution and Sec. 1 Art. V of RA 9054
(The Expanded ARMM Act)
2. Whether or not President Arroyo invalidly exercised emergency powers when
she called out the AFP and the PNP to prevent and suppress all incidents of
lawless violence in Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat, and Cotabato City
3. Whether or not the President had factual bases for her actions

HELD:

1. NO. The DILG Secretary did not take over control of the powers of the ARMM.
After law enforcement agents took the respondent Governor of ARMM into
custody for alleged complicity in the Maguindanao Massacre, the ARMM Vice-
Governor, petitioner Adiong, assumed the vacated post on 10 Dec. 2009
pursuant to the rule on succession found in Sec. 12 Art.VII of RA 9054. In turn,
Acting Governor Adiong named the then Speaker of the ARMM Regional
Assembly, petitioner SahaliGenerale, Acting ARMM Vice-Governor. The DILG
Secretary therefore did not take over the administration or the operations of the
ARMM.

2. The deployment is not by itself an exercise of emergency powers as understood
under Section 23 (2), Article VI of the Constitution, which provides:

SECTION 23. x x x (2) In times of war or other nationalemergency, the Congress
may, by law, authorize the President, for a limited period and subject to such
restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and proper to carry
out a declared national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution of the
Congress, such powers shall cease upon the next adjournment thereof.

The President did not proclaim a national emergency, only a state of emergency in the
three places mentioned. And she did not act pursuant to any law enacted by Congress
that authorized her to exercise extraordinary powers. The calling out of the armed
forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence in such places is a power that
the Constitution directly vests in the President. She did not need a congressional
authority to exercise the same.

3. The Presidents call on the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence
springs from the power vested in her under Section 18, Article VII of the
Constitution, which provides:

Section 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of allarmed forces of the
Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to
prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. x x x

While it is true that the Court may inquire into the factual bases for the Presidents
exercise of the above power, it would generally defer to her judgment on the matter. As
the Court acknowledged in Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Hon. Zamora, it is clearly
to the President that the Constitution entrusts the determination of the need for calling
out the armed forces to prevent and suppress lawless violence. Unless it is shown that
such determination was attended by grave abuse of discretion, the Court will accord
respect to the Presidents judgment. Thus, the Court said:

If the petitioner fails, by way of proof, to support the assertion that the President acted
without factual basis, then this Court cannot undertake an independent investigation
beyond the pleadings. The factual necessity of calling out the armed forces is not easily
quantifiable and cannot be objectively established since matters considered for
satisfying the same is a combination of several factors which are not always accessible
to the courts. Besides the absence of textual standards that the court may use to judge
necessity, information necessary to arrive at such judgment might also prove
unmanageable for the courts. Certain pertinent information might be difficult to verify, or
wholly unavailable to the courts. In many instances, the evidence upon which
the President might decide that there is a need to call out the armed forces may be of a
nature not constituting technical proof.

On the other hand, the President, as Commander-in-Chief has a vast
intelligence network to gather information, some of which may be classified as highly
confidential or affecting the security of the state. In the exercise of the power to call, on-
the-spot decisions may be imperatively necessary in emergency situations to avert
great loss of human lives and mass destruction of property. Indeed, the decision to call
out the military to prevent or suppress lawless violence must be done swiftly and
decisively if it were to have any effect at all. x x x.

Here, petitioners failed to show that the declaration of a state of emergency in the
Provinces of Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat and Cotabato City, as well as the
Presidents exercise of the calling out power had no factual basis. They simply alleged
that, since not all areas under the ARMM were placed under a state of emergency, it
follows that the takeover of the entire ARMM by the DILG Secretary had no basis too.

The imminence of violence and anarchy at the time the President issued
Proclamation 1946 was too grave to ignore and she had to act to prevent further
bloodshed and hostilities in the places mentioned. Progress reports also indicated that
there was movement in these places of both high-powered firearms and armed men
sympathetic to the two clans. Thus, to pacify the peoples fears and stabilize the
situation, the President had to take preventive action. She called out the armed
forces to control the proliferation of loose firearms and dismantle the armed groups that
continuously threatened the peace and security in the affected places.

Since petitioners are not able to demonstrate that the proclamation of state of
emergency in the subject places and the calling out of the armed forces to prevent or
suppress lawless violence there have clearly no factual bases, the Court must respect
the Presidents actions.