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Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 42037 March 21, 1990
DOMINGO V. LUGTU, DEMETRIO SANCHEZ, as Provincial Fiscal of Bataan, and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and ROSA L. CANCIO, respondents.
Calixto 0. Zaldivar for private respondent.

PADILLA, J .:
This petition for review seeks to set aside the decision * of respondent Court of Appeals, promulgated on
17 September 1975, granting private respondent's petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. No. 04122-SP, entitled
"Rosa L. Cancio vs. Hon. Abraham P. Vera, etc., et al.," and setting aside the orders of the trial court
dated 19 June 1974, 11 January 1975 and 15 February 1975 which authorized the discharge of petitioner
Domingo V. Lugtu from the information so that he could be utilized as witness for the government.
Petitioner Domingo V. Lugtu, together with private respondent Rosa L. Cancio and Clodualdo F. Vitug
were charged in an information filed by the Provincial Fiscal of Bataan in the Court of First Instance of
said province, with the crime of estafa committed as follows:
. . . accused Domingo V. Lugtu, Clodualdo F. Vitug and Rosa L. Cancio, with intent to
cause damage and to defraud another with deceit, conspiring, confederating and
mutually helping one another, said accused Clodualdo Vitug and Rosa L. Cancio induced
and succeeded to make their co-accused Domingo V. Lugtu to open a checking account
with Continental Bank, Guagua Branch, and after which made and caused him to
purchase Check Boks [sic] and thereafter Domingo Lugtu signed said checks in blank
and delivered same to his co-accused Clodualdo Vitug, an Acting Paying Teller of the
Philippine National Bank, who knowing fully well that accused Domingo Lugtu had no
sufficient funds in the bank, accused Clodualdo Vitug, with grave abuse of confidence
and in excess of his authority, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously fill out
the following checks payable to "CASH" . . . drawn against the Continental Bank, after
which, said accused Clodualdo Vitug taking undue advantage of the position as such
Acting Paying Teller of the Philippine National Bank at Balanga, Bataan, endorse, encash
and pay the above-mentioned checks to himself in the aggregate amount of ONE
HUNDRED SEVENTY TWO THOUSAND AND FOUR HUNDRED (P172,400.00)
PESOS, but upon presentation of said checks to the drawee bank for payment, the
aforementioned checks were dishonored and returned unpaid because of insufficiency of
funds and/or "no arrangement" and despite repeated demands made to the accused to
remit, pay or deposit the corresponding amounts of said checks, accused failed and
refused to remit, pay or deposit the corresponding amount of the checks to the damage
and prejudice of the Philippine National Bank . . .
1

At the arraignment, all the accused pleaded not guilty. After presenting three (3) witnesses, the Provincial
Fiscal filed with the trial court a motion to discharge the accused Domingo V. Lugtu for the purpose of
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utilizing him as state witness against his co-accused. The motion was denied by Judge Abraham P. Vera.
A motion for reconsideration was filed by the Provincial Fiscal and the private prosecutor, attaching
thereto an affidavit dated 8 February 1974 of Lugtu, to which motion accused Rosa L. Cancio filed an
opposition. The parties submitted their respective reply, rejoinder and comment. Thereafter, in an Order
dated 19 June 1974, Judge Vera reconsidered his earlier order, after finding that "the prosecution has
fully complied with the requirements outlined by Sec. 9, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court," and authorized
the discharge of Lugtu from the information so that he could be utilized as government witness. Accused
Cancio filed a motion for reconsideration of the said Order of 19 June 1974, wherein she called the
attention of the trial judge to an earlier Sinumpaang Salaysay, dated 10 March 1973, executed by the
same Lugtu before the PC of Bataan. In an Order dated 11 January 1975, the court a quo denied
Cancio's motion. Her second motion for reconsideration was likewise denied on 15 February 1975.
Alleging that the trial judge committed a grave abuse of discretion, or acted in excess of his jurisdiction in
issuing the three (3) orders abovementioned, accused Cancio filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for
certiorari, praying that the three (3) orders adverted to be reversed. On 17 September 1975, respondent
appellate court promulgated the now questioned decision, setting aside the three (3) assailed orders of
the court a quo and ordering the reinstatement of Lugtu to the information.
2
Herein, petitioners' motion for
reconsideration of the decision was denied by respondent court on 24 November 1975 for lack of merit.
3

Hence, this petition.
The principal issue to be resolved in this recourse is whether or not respondent appellate court erred in
finding that the conditions required under Section 9, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court were not present
when the trial court approved the discharge of accused Lugtu from the information.
Section 9, Rule 119 of the Rules reads as follows:
Sec. 9. Discharge of one of several defendants to be witness for the prosecution.
When two or more persons are charged with the commission of a certain offense, the
competent court, at any time before they have entered upon their defense, may direct
one or more of them to be discharged with the latter's consent that he or they may be
witnesses for the government when in the judgment of the court:
(a) There is absolute necessity for the testimony of the defendant whose discharge is
requested;
(b) There is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the offense
committed, except the testimony of said defendant;
(c) The testimony of said defendant can be substantially corroborated in its material
points;
(d) Said defendant does not appear to be the most guilty;
(e) Said defendant has not at any time been convicted of any offense involving moral
turpitude.
In ruling that the first and second conditions required in the above-quoted section are not present,
respondent appellate court considered the sworn statement (Sinumpaang Salaysay) dated 10 March
1973 executed by accused Lugtu wherein he admitted his responsibility in the commission of the offense.
Another factor that persuaded the respondent court to take its position, is the testimony of the three (3)
prosecution witnesses who had already testified on the modus operandi of the swindle, by which Lugtu
opened a checking account with the Continental Bank in Guagua, Pampanga, issued checks that were
cashed by accused Vitug with the PNB Branch in Balanga, Bataan, and thereafter it was found that the
checks were not covered by sufficient funds. These circumstances, according to respondent appellate
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court, constitute direct evidence, available to the prosecution, of the offense committed, such that the
testimony of Lugtu is not absolutely necessary.
Petitioners contend, on the other hand, that Lugtu's Sinumpaang Salaysay of 10 March 1973 was not yet
presented or before the trial court at the time it resolved their (petitioners) motion for reconsideration of its
first order denying their motion for discharge of Lugtu. It was only brought to the attention of the trial judge
after private respondent Cancio filed her motion for reconsideration of the 19 June 1974 order authorizing
the discharge of Lugtu. However, according to the petitioners, the said sworn statement (10 March 1973)
was in fact passed upon by the trial judge in his order dated 15 February 1975, to writ:
. . . After considering the arguments of opposing counsels and carefully scrutinizing the
"Sinumpaang Salaysay" of Accused Lugtu before the PC C2C Marino Ravelo at the
Bataan Constabulary Command in Camp Tolentino at Balanga, Bataan on March 10,
1973, the Court is of the opinion that there is no reasonable ground to set aside its
previous order discharging the accused Domingo Lugtu from the information so that he
could be utilized as State witness . . .
4

As for the testimony of the three (3) prosecution witnesses, petitioners assert that, as correctly ruled by
the trial court, the said testimony can substantially corroborate the testimony of Lugtu in its material
points. The testimony of the three (3) witnesses centered on the modus operandi of the swindle
perpetrated by the three (3) accused.
According to petitioners, the trial court after thoroughly and exhaustively examining and evaluating the
facts and evidence on record, found Lugtu not to be the most guilty. Being a poor and ignorant man, he
was easily convinced by Vitug and Cancio (his employer) to open the account with the Continental Bank
in Guagua, which led to the commission of the offense.
In the words of the trial judge:
A perusal of the Motion for Reconsideration and the Affidavit of accused Lugtu attached
thereto explicitly show that the said accused, who the records show is unable to post a
bond, was introduced by his employer, accused Rosa L. Cancio, to Clodualdo Vitug, then
working as a teller of the Balanga, Bataan branch of the Philippine National Bank. After
the introduction, accused Lugtu, upon prodding of accused Vitug and Cancio, was made
to open a current account with the Continental Bank at Guagua, Pampanga. Thereafter,
accused Lugtu was told by his co-accused, Vitug and Cancio, to buy a checkbook and
then was made to sign all the checks therein in blank. The accused Lugtu protested to
accused Cancio why he was the one being made to open the account and to sign the
blank checks and he received the answer that if the accused [sic] were opened in the
name of accused Vitug, the bank might learn about it and he (Vitug) might lose his job.
5

Finally, petitioners state that both the court a quo and the respondent appellate court found that Lugtu has
not at any time been convicted of any offense involving moral turpitude.
The petition is impressed with merit.
From the records and evidence thus far adduced, it appears that there is absolute necessity for the
testimony of petitioner Lugtu. It should be noted that in the information, the three (3) accused were
charged with conspiring and confederating with one another in the commission of the crime charged
(estafa).
Respondent appellate court erred when it considered the testimony of the three (3) prosecution witnesses
and the Sinumpaang Salaysay dated 10 March 1973 executed by Lugtu admitting his responsibility, as
direct evidence, available to the prosecution, of the crime charged. For, respondent court itself
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acknowledged that "the three prosecution witnesses that were presented by the prosecution only
mentioned the accused Vitug and the respondent Lugtu. The petitioner (Cancio) has never been brought
into the picture."
6
Respondent court was likewise aware that "(u)nder the information there is only one
conspiracy alleged which is among the three accused and not only between the petitioner and accused
Vitug. The prosecution has adduced evidence as to the conspiracy between respondent Lugtu and the
accused Vitug. What apparently has not been clearly established is the involvement of the petitioner
(Cancio) in the conspiracy."
7
Such being the case, we agree with the finding of the trial court that the
testimony of Lugtu would be the direct evidence to link the events starting from the opening of the
checking account up to the time the checkbook in question found its way to the Philippine National Bank
branch in Balanga.
The discharge of an accused should be availed of only when there is absolute necessity for the testimony
of said accused whose discharge is requested, as when he alone has knowledge of the crime, and not
when his testimony would simply corroborate or otherwise strengthen the evidence in the hands of the
prosecution.
8

As to Lugtu's Sinumpaang Salaysay of 10 March 1973 to which respondent court gave much weight, in
the words of the Solicitor General, the statement merely complements and supplements the 8 February
1974 affidavit of Lugtu and that the first sworn statement (10 March 1973), which was executed before a
constabulary soldier who asked the questions of Lugtu, does not contain all the details as compared to
the second statement of 8 February 1974. Moreover, since there is no showing that the said Sinumpaang
Salaysay of 10 March 1973 was executed by Lugtu in the presence or with the aid of counsel in
compliance with Article IV, Section 20, of the (1973) Constitution, the same is inadmissible in evidence.
The finding of respondent appellate court that Lugtu is just as guilty as the accused Vitug and should not
be discharged as he does not appear to be not the most guilty, is untenable.
"The Rules do not disqualify an accused sought to be discharged as witness for the state merely on the
ground that he has committed a falsification himself, or that he had actually committed the crime charged.
The Rules say that it is necessary that the said defendant does not appear to be the 'most guilty,' from
which the conclusion follows that the guilt of an accused of the crime charged is no reason why he may
not be excluded as witness for the State. As a matter of fact, the candid admission of an accused, of his
participation in a crime, is a guaranty that if he will testify in court he will testify truthfully; so that even if an
accused actually participated in the offense charged in the information, he may still be made a witness."
9

The facts of record show that the trial judge who was in a position to evaluate the evidence available so
far, did not abuse his discretion. It is settled that the discharge of an accused lies within the sound
discretion of the trial court which has the exclusive responsibility to see that the conditions prescribed by
the Rule (for discharge of an accused) exist.
10

WHEREFORE, respondent court's Decision dated 17 September 1975 and its Resolution dated 24
November 1975 are hereby SET ASIDE. The Orders of the trial court dated 19 June 1974, 11 January
1975 and 15 February 1975 in Criminal Case No. 390 are hereby REINSTATED. The Regional Trial
Court of Bataan corresponding to the former Court of First Instance of Bataan is directed to proceed with
the trial on the merits of Criminal Case No. 390.
This decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
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FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 143093 May 21, 2007
RIMBERTO T. SALVANERA, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and LUCITA PARANE, Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
PUNO, C.J .:
On appeal are the Decision dated April 30, 1999 and the two Resolutions of the Court of Appeals, dated
September 22, 1999 and May 11, 2000, in CA-G.R. SP No. 46945. The Court of Appeals discharged
accused Feliciano Abutin and Domingo Tampelix from the Information in Criminal Case No. TM-1730 for
Murder, pending before the Regional Trial Court of Trece Martires City, to become state witnesses. The
appellate court likewise cancelled the bail bond of petitioner Rimberto Salvanera.
First, the facts:
In an Information
1
dated November 30, 1996, petitioner Rimberto Salvanera, together with Feliciano
Abutin, Edgardo Lungcay and Domingo Tampelix, is charged with the murder of Ruben Parane,
committed as follows:
That on or about October 23, 1995, in the Municipality of Gen. Trias, Province of Cavite, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and
mutually helping each other, with treachery and evident premeditation, then armed with a firearm, did,
then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack and shoot one RUBEN PARANE Y
MAGSAMBOL, inflicting gunshot wound on his body, resulting to his instantaneous death, to the damage
and prejudice of the heirs of the said victim.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
As per theory of the prosecution, petitioner was the alleged mastermind; Lungcay, the hired hitman;
Abutin, the driver of the motorcycle which carried Lungcay to the place of the commission of the crime;
while Tampelix delivered the blood money to the latter. All the accused have been arrested and detained,
except Edgardo Lungcay who remained at-large.
Respondent Lucita Parane is the spouse of victim Ruben Parane.
On January 22, 1997, petitioner applied for bail. The prosecution, on March 4, 1997, moved for the
discharge of accused Feliciano Abutin and Domingo Tampelix, to serve as state witnesses.
In an Omnibus Order
2
dated September 5, 1997, the trial court granted petitioners application for bail and
denied the prosecutions motion for the discharge of accused Abutin and Tampelix. The prosecution
moved for reconsideration but the motion was denied.
The prosecution then appealed to the Court of Appeals. It contended that the trial court committed grave
abuse of discretion when it denied the motion to discharge accused Abutin and Tampelix to be state
witnesses. It alleged that the testimonies of the two accused are absolutely necessary to establish that
petitioner masterminded the murder of Ruben Parane. The prosecution likewise claimed that it was
premature and baseless for the trial court to grant petitioners application for bail because the prosecution
had not yet rested its case in the hearing for the discharge of the two accused.
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The Court of Appeals sustained the prosecution. It discharged accused Feliciano Abutin and Domingo
Tampelix from the Information to become state witnesses, and cancelled the bail bond of petitioner
Salvanera. In its Resolution dated September 22, 1999, it denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.
Petitioner then filed his Motion for Clarification with Leave of Court. The same was also denied in a
Resolution dated May 11, 2000.
Hence, this appeal.
Petitioner enumerates the grounds for his appeal, as follows:
I. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR IN RENDERING THE
FIRST, SECOND AND THIRD ASSAILED ORDERS DEFYING LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE
THEREON WHEN IT RULED THAT THE "SUBSTANTIAL CORROBORATION" REQUIREMENT
UNDER SECTION 9, RULE 119 OF THE REVISED RULES OF COURT WAS SATISFIED BY
THE PROSECUTION DESPITE THE FACT THAT -
A. THE "SUBSTANTIAL CORROBORATION" REQUIREMENT MUST BE SATISFIED
THROUGH THE TESTIMONY OF THE OTHER PROSECUTION WITNESSES WHO
ARE NOT AN (sic) ACCUSED SOUGHT TO BE DISCHARGED AS STATE WITNESS,
NOT BY ANOTHER ACCUSED LIKEWISE SOUGHT TO BE DISCHARGED.
B. THE SWORN STATEMENT OF AN ACCUSED SOUGHT TO BE DISCHARGED
CANNOT BE USED AS EVIDENCE FOR PURPOSES OTHER THAN HIS OWN
DISCHARGE PRIOR TO THE ISSUANCE BY A COMPETENT COURT OF THE ORDER
OF HIS DISCHARGE.
C. THE TESTIMONIES OF ABUTIN AND TAMPELIX CANNOT BE SUBSTANTIALLY
CORROBORATED IN ITS MATERIAL POINTS BY THE OTHER PROSECUTION
WITNESSES.
D. THE TESTIMONY GIVEN BY AN ACCUSED SOUGHT TO BE DISCHARGED AS
STATE WITNESS CANNOT BE USED TO CORROBORATE THE TESTIMONY GIVEN
BY ANOTHER ACCUSED LIKEWISE SOUGHT TO BE DISCHARGED AS STATE
WITNESS.
II. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR IN RENDERING
THE FIRST, SECOND AND THIRD ASSAILED ORDERS, DEFYING LAW AND
JURISPRUDENCE ON THE MATTER, WHEN IT CANCELLED PETITIONER'S BAIL BOND
DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE TRIAL COURT JUDGE ALREADY RULED THAT THE
EVIDENCE OF HIS GUILT IS NOT STRONG.
3

We uphold the ruling of the Court of Appeals.
In the discharge of an accused in order that he may be a state witness, the following conditions must be
present, namely:
(1) Two or more accused are jointly charged with the commission of an offense;
(2) The motion for discharge is filed by the prosecution before it rests its case;
(3) The prosecution is required to present evidence and the sworn statement of each proposed
state witness at a hearing in support of the discharge;
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(4) The accused gives his consent to be a state witness; and
(5) The trial court is satisfied that:
a) There is absolute necessity for the testimony of the accused whose discharge is
requested;
b) There is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the offense
committed, except the testimony of said accused;
c) The testimony of said accused can be substantially corroborated in its material points;
d) Said accused does not appear to be the most guilty; and,
e) Said accused has not at any time been convicted of any offense involving moral
turpitude.
4

According to petitioner, the testimony of an accused sought to be discharged to become a state witness
must be substantially corroborated, not by a co-accused likewise sought to be discharged, but by other
prosecution witnesses who are not the accused in the same criminal case. Petitioner justifies this theory
on the general principles of justice and sound logic. He contends that it is a notorious fact in human
nature that a culprit, confessing a crime, is likely to put the blame on others, if by doing so, he will be
freed from any criminal responsibility. Thus, in the instant case, petitioner supposes that both Abutin and
Tampelix will naturally seize the opportunity to be absolved of any liability by putting the blame on one of
their co-accused. Petitioner argues that prosecution witnesses Parane and Salazar, who are not accused,
do not have personal knowledge of the circumstances surrounding the alleged conspiracy. Thus, they
could not testify to corroborate the statement of Abutin and Tampelix that petitioner is the mastermind or
the principal by induction.
We agree with the Court of Appeals in dismissing this reasoning as specious. To require the two
witnesses Parane and Salazar to corroborate the testimony of Abutin and Tampelix on the exact same
points is to render nugatory the other requisite that "there must be no other direct evidence available for
the proper prosecution of the offense committed, except the testimony of the state witness."
5
The
corroborative evidence required by the Rules does not have to consist of the very same evidence as will
be testified on by the proposed state witnesses. We have ruled that "a conspiracy is more readily proved
by the acts of a fellow criminal than by any other method. If it is shown that the statements of the
conspirator are corroborated by other evidence, then we have convincing proof of veracity. Even if the
confirmatory testimony only applies to some particulars, we can properly infer that the witness has told
the truth in other respects."
6
It is enough that the testimony of a co-conspirator is corroborated by some
other witness or evidence. In the case at bar, we are satisfied from a reading of the records that the
testimonies of Abutin and Tampelix are corroborated on important points by each others testimonies and
the circumstances disclosed through the testimonies of the other prosecution witnesses, and "to such
extent that their trustworthiness becomes manifest."
7

As part of the conspiracy, Abutin and Tampelix can testify on the criminal plan of the conspirators. Where
a crime is contrived in secret, the discharge of one of the conspirators is essential because only they
have knowledge of the crime.
8
The other prosecution witnesses are not eyewitnesses to the crime, as, in
fact, there is none. No one except the conspirators knew and witnessed the murder. The testimonies of
the accused and proposed state witnesses Abutin and Tampelix can directly link petitioner to the
commission of the crime.
In Chua v. Court of Appeals,
9
we ruled that the trial court has to rely on the information offered by the
public prosecutor as to who would best qualify as a state witness. The prosecutor knows the evidence in
his possession and the witnesses he needs to establish his case. In Mapa v. Sandiganbayan,
10
we held:
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The decision to grant immunity from prosecution forms a constituent part of the prosecution process. It is
essentially a tactical decision to forego prosecution of a person for government to achieve a higher
objective. It is a deliberate renunciation of the right of the State to prosecute all who appear to be guilty of
having committed a crime. Its justification lies in the particular need of the State to obtain the conviction of
the more guilty criminals who, otherwise, will probably elude the long arm of the law. Whether or not the
delicate power should be exercised, who should be extended the privilege, the timing of its grant, are
questions addressed solely to the sound judgment of the prosecution. The power to prosecute includes
the right to determine who shall be prosecuted and the corollary right to decide whom not to prosecute.
We further ruled:
In reviewing the exercise of prosecutorial discretion in these areas, the jurisdiction of the respondent court
is limited. For the business of a court of justice is to be an impartial tribunal, and not to get involved with
the success or failure of the prosecution to prosecute. Every now and then, the prosecution may err in the
selection of its strategies, but such errors are not for neutral courts to rectify, any more than courts should
correct the blunders of the defense. For fairness demands that courts keep the scales of justice at
equipoise between and among all litigants. Due process demands that courts should strive to maintain
the legal playing field perfectly even and perpetually level.
Lastly, we affirm the ruling of the appellate court in cancelling the bail bond of petitioner. The grant of
petitioners application for bail is premature. It has to await the testimony of state witnesses Abutin and
Tampelix. Their testimonies must be given their proper weight in determining whether the petitioner is
entitled to bail.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DENIED and the Decision and Resolutions of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 46945, dated April 30, 1999, September 22, 1999 and May 11, 2000, respectively, are
AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 152643 August 28, 2008
CONCEPCION CUENCO VDA. DE MANGUERRA and THE HON. RAMON C. CODILLA, JR.,
Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 19, petitioners,
vs.
RAUL RISOS, SUSANA YONGCO, LEAH ABARQUEZ and ATTY. GAMALIEL D.B. BONJE,
respondents.
D E C I S I O N
NACHURA, J .:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the Court of
Appeals (CA) Decision
1
dated August 15, 2001 and its Resolution
2
dated March 12, 2002. The CA
decision set aside the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Orders dated August 25, 2000
3
granting Concepcion
Cuenco Vda. de Manguerras (Concepcions) motion to take deposition, and dated November 3, 2000
4

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denying the motion for reconsideration of respondents Raul G. Risos, Susana Yongco, Leah Abarquez,
and Atty. Gamaliel D.B. Bonje.
The facts of the case, as culled from the records, follow:
On November 4, 1999, respondents were charged with Estafa Through Falsification of Public Document
before the RTC of Cebu City, Branch 19, through a criminal information dated October 27, 1999, which
was subsequently amended on November 18, 1999. The case, docketed as Criminal Case No. CBU-
52248,
5
arose from the falsification of a deed of real estate mortgage allegedly committed by respondents
where they made it appear that Concepcion, the owner of the mortgaged property known as the Gorordo
property, affixed her signature to the document. Hence, the criminal case.
6

Earlier, on September 10, 1999, Concepcion, who was a resident of Cebu City, while on vacation in
Manila, was unexpectedly confined at the Makati Medical Center due to upper gastro-intestinal bleeding;
and was advised to stay in Manila for further treatment.
7

On November 24, 1999, respondents filed a Motion for Suspension of the Proceedings in Criminal Case
No. CBU-52248 on the ground of prejudicial question. They argued that Civil Case No. CEB-20359, which
was an action for declaration of nullity of the mortgage, should first be resolved.
8
On May 11, 2000, the
RTC granted the aforesaid motion. Concepcions motion for reconsideration was denied on June 5,
2000.
9

This prompted Concepcion to institute a special civil action for certiorari before the CA seeking the
nullification of the May 11 and June 5 RTC orders. The case was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 60266
and remains pending before the appellate court to date.
10

On August 16, 2000, the counsel of Concepcion filed a motion to take the latters deposition.
11
He
explained the need to perpetuate Concepcions testimony due to her weak physical condition and old
age, which limited her freedom of mobility.
On August 25, 2000, the RTC granted the motion and directed that Concepcions deposition be taken
before the Clerk of Court of Makati City.
12
The respondents motion for reconsideration was denied by the
trial court on November 3, 2000. The court ratiocinated that procedural technicalities should be brushed
aside because of the urgency of the situation, since Concepcion was already of advanced age.
13
After
several motions for change of venue of the deposition-taking, Concepcions deposition was finally taken
on March 9, 2001 at her residence.
14

Aggrieved, respondents assailed the August 25 and November 3 RTC orders in a special civil action for
certiorari before the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 62551.
15

On August 15, 2001, the CA rendered a Decision
16
favorable to the respondents, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the August 25, 2000 and November 3, 2000 orders
of the court a quo are hereby SET ASIDE, and any deposition that may have been taken on the
authority of such void orders is similarly declared void.
SO ORDERED.
17

At the outset, the CA observed that there was a defect in the respondents petition by not impleading the
People of the Philippines, an indispensable party. This notwithstanding, the appellate court resolved the
matter on its merit, declaring that the examination of prosecution witnesses, as in the present case, is
governed by Section 15, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure and not Rule 23 of the
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Rules of Court. The latter provision, said the appellate court, only applies to civil cases. Pursuant to the
specific provision of Section 15, Rule 119, Concepcions deposition should have been taken before the
judge or the court where the case is pending, which is the RTC of Cebu, and not before the Clerk of Court
of Makati City; and thus, in issuing the assailed order, the RTC clearly committed grave abuse of
discretion.
18

In its Resolution dated March 12, 2002 denying petitioners motion for reconsideration, the CA added that
the rationale of the Rules in requiring the taking of deposition before the same court is the constitutional
right of the accused to meet the witnesses face to face. The appellate court likewise concluded that Rule
23 could not be applied suppletorily because the situation was adequately addressed by a specific
provision of the rules of criminal procedure.
19

Hence, the instant petition raising the following issues:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT RULE 23 OF THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE APPLIES TO THE
DEPOSITION OF PETITIONER.
II.
WHETHER OR NOT FAILURE TO IMPLEAD THE "PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES" IN A
PETITION FOR CERTIORARI ARISING FROM A CRIMINAL CASE A QUO CONSTITUTES A
WAIVABLE DEFECT IN THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI.
20

It is undisputed that in their petition for certiorari before the CA, respondents failed to implead the People
of the Philippines as a party thereto. Because of this, the petition was obviously defective. As provided in
Section 5, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, all criminal actions are prosecuted under
the direction and control of the public prosecutor. Therefore, it behooved the petitioners (respondents
herein) to implead the People of the Philippines as respondent in the CA case to enable the Solicitor
General to comment on the petition.
21

However, this Court has repeatedly declared that the failure to implead an indispensable party is not a
ground for the dismissal of an action. In such a case, the remedy is to implead the non-party claimed to
be indispensable. Parties may be added by order of the court, on motion of the party or on its own
initiative at any stage of the action and/or such times as are just. If the petitioner/plaintiff refuses to
implead an indispensable party despite the order of the court, the latter may dismiss the
complaint/petition for the petitioners/plaintiffs failure to comply.
22

In this case, the CA disregarded the procedural flaw by allowing the petition to proceed, in the interest of
substantial justice. Also noteworthy is that, notwithstanding the non-joinder of the People of the
Philippines as party-respondent, it managed, through the Office of the Solicitor General, to file its
Comment on the petition for certiorari. Thus, the People was given the opportunity to refute the
respondents arguments.
Instructive is the Courts pronouncement in Commissioner Domingo v. Scheer
23
in this wise:
There is nothing sacred about processes or pleadings, their forms or contents. Their sole purpose
is to facilitate the application of justice to the rival claims of contending parties. They were
created, not to hinder and delay, but to facilitate and promote, the administration of justice. They
do not constitute the thing itself, which courts are always striving to secure to litigants. They are
designed as the means best adapted to obtain that thing. In other words, they are a means to an
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end. When they lose the character of the one and become the other, the administration of justice
is at fault and courts are correspondingly remiss in the performance of their obvious duty.
24

Accordingly, the CA cannot be faulted for deciding the case on the merits despite the procedural defect.
On the more important issue of whether Rule 23 of the Rules of Court applies to the instant case, we rule
in the negative.
It is basic that all witnesses shall give their testimonies at the trial of the case in the presence of the
judge.
25
This is especially true in criminal cases in order that the accused may be afforded the opportunity
to cross-examine the witnesses pursuant to his constitutional right to confront the witnesses face to
face.
26
It also gives the parties and their counsel the chance to propound such questions as they deem
material and necessary to support their position or to test the credibility of said witnesses.
27
Lastly, this
rule enables the judge to observe the witnesses demeanor.
28

This rule, however, is not absolute. As exceptions, Rules 23 to 28 of the Rules of Court provide for the
different modes of discovery that may be resorted to by a party to an action. These rules are adopted
either to perpetuate the testimonies of witnesses or as modes of discovery. In criminal proceedings,
Sections 12,
29
13
30
and 15,
31
Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which took effect on
December 1, 2000, allow the conditional examination of both the defense and prosecution witnesses.
In the case at bench, in issue is the examination of a prosecution witness, who, according to the
petitioners, was too sick to travel and appear before the trial court. Section 15 of Rule 119 thus comes
into play, and it provides:
Section 15. Examination of witness for the prosecution. When it satisfactorily appears that a
witness for the prosecution is too sick or infirm to appear at the trial as directed by the court, or
has to leave the Philippines with no definite date of returning, he may forthwith be conditionally
examined before the court where the case is pending. Such examination, in the presence of the
accused, or in his absence after reasonable notice to attend the examination has been served on
him, shall be conducted in the same manner as an examination at the trial. Failure or refusal of
the accused to attend the examination after notice shall be considered a waiver. The statement
taken may be admitted in behalf of or against the accused.
Petitioners contend that Concepcions advanced age and health condition exempt her from the
application of Section 15, Rule 119 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, and thus, calls for the application
of Rule 23 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.
The contention does not persuade.
The very reason offered by the petitioners to exempt Concepcion from the coverage of Rule 119 is at
once the ground which places her squarely within the coverage of the same provision. Rule 119
specifically states that a witness may be conditionally examined: 1) if the witness is too sick or infirm to
appear at the trial; or 2) if the witness has to leave the Philippines with no definite date of returning. Thus,
when Concepcion moved that her deposition be taken, had she not been too sick at that time, her motion
would have been denied. Instead of conditionally examining her outside the trial court, she would have
been compelled to appear before the court for examination during the trial proper.
Undoubtedly, the procedure set forth in Rule 119 applies to the case at bar. It is thus required that the
conditional examination be made before the court where the case is pending. It is also necessary that the
accused be notified, so that he can attend the examination, subject to his right to waive the same after
reasonable notice. As to the manner of examination, the Rules mandate that it be conducted in the same
manner as an examination during trial, that is, through question and answer.
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137

At this point, a query may thus be posed: in granting Concepcions motion and in actually taking her
deposition, were the above rules complied with? The CA answered in the negative. The appellate court
considered the taking of deposition before the Clerk of Court of Makati City erroneous and contrary to the
clear mandate of the Rules that the same be made before the court where the case is pending.
Accordingly, said the CA, the RTC order was issued with grave abuse of discretion.
We agree with the CA and quote with approval its ratiocination in this wise:
Unlike an examination of a defense witness which, pursuant to Section 5, Rule 119 of the
previous Rules, and now Section 13, Rule 119 of the present Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, may be taken before any "judge, or, if not practicable, a member of the Bar in good
standing so designated by the judge in the order, or, if the order be made by a court of superior
jurisdiction, before an inferior court to be designated therein," the examination of a witness for the
prosecution under Section 15 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (December 1, 2000)
may be done only "before the court where the case is pending."
32

Rule 119 categorically states that the conditional examination of a prosecution witness shall be made
before the court where the case is pending. Contrary to petitioners contention, there is nothing in the rule
which may remotely be interpreted to mean that such requirement applies only to cases where the
witness is within the jurisdiction of said court and not when he is kilometers away, as in the present case.
Therefore, the court may not introduce exceptions or conditions. Neither may it engraft into the law (or the
Rules) qualifications not contemplated.
33
When the words are clear and categorical, there is no room for
interpretation. There is only room for application.
34

Petitioners further insist that Rule 23 applies to the instant case, because the rules on civil procedure
apply suppletorily to criminal cases.
It is true that Section 3, Rule 1 of the Rules of Court provides that the rules of civil procedure apply to all
actions, civil or criminal, and special proceedings. In effect, it says that the rules of civil procedure have
suppletory application to criminal cases. However, it is likewise true that the criminal proceedings are
primarily governed by the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Considering that Rule 119 adequately
and squarely covers the situation in the instant case, we find no cogent reason to apply Rule 23
suppletorily or otherwise.
To reiterate, the conditional examination of a prosecution witness for the purpose of taking his deposition
should be made before the court, or at least before the judge, where the case is pending. Such is the
clear mandate of Section 15, Rule 119 of the Rules. We find no necessity to depart from, or to relax, this
rule. As correctly held by the CA, if the deposition is made elsewhere, the accused may not be able to
attend, as when he is under detention. More importantly, this requirement ensures that the judge would
be able to observe the witness deportment to enable him to properly assess his credibility. This is
especially true when the witness testimony is crucial to the prosecutions case.
While we recognize the prosecutions right to preserve its witness testimony to prove its case, we cannot
disregard rules which are designed mainly for the protection of the accuseds constitutional rights. The
giving of testimony during trial is the general rule. The conditional examination of a witness outside of the
trial is only an exception, and as such, calls for a strict construction of the rules.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision and Resolution dated
August 25, 2000 and March 12, 2002, respectively, in CA-G.R. SP No. 62551, are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
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138

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 167710 June 5, 2009
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
JOVEN DE GRANO, ARMANDO DE GRANO, DOMINGO LANDICHO and ESTANISLAO LACABA,
Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
PERALTA, J .:
This is a petition for review on certiorari, under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to annul and set
aside the Resolutions
1
dated January 25, 2005 and April 5, 2005, issued by the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. SP No. 88160.
The antecedents are as follows:
On November 28, 1991, an Information for murder committed against Emmanuel Mendoza was filed with
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 6, Tanauan, Batangas, against Joven de Grano (Joven),
Armando de Grano (Armando), and Estanislao Lacaba (Estanislao), together with their co-accused
Leonides Landicho (Leonides), Domingo Landicho (Domingo), and Leonardo Genil (Leonardo), who were
at-large.
2
It was docketed as Criminal Case No. 2730, the pertinent portion of which reads:
That on April 21, 1991, between 9:00 oclock and 10:00 oclock in the evening, in Barangay Balakilong,
[M]unicipality of Laurel, [P]rovince of Batangas, and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, all the
above named accused, conspiring, confederating, and helping one another, motivated by common design
and intent to kill, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously, and by means of treachery and
with evident premeditation, shoot EMMANUEL MENDOZA with firearms, inflicting upon him eight gunshot
wounds and causing his death thereby, thus committing the crime of MURDER to the damage and
prejudice of his heirs in the amount as the Honorable Court shall determine.
3

Duly arraigned, Joven, Armando, and Estanislao pleaded "not guilty" to the crime as charged; while their
co-accused Leonides, Leonardo, and Domingo remained at-large. Thereafter, respondents filed a motion
for bail contending that the prosecutions evidence was not strong.
4

Meanwhile, considering that one of the accused was the incumbent Mayor of Laurel, Batangas at the time
when the crime was committed, Senior State Prosecutor Hernani T. Barrios moved that the venue be
transferred from the RTC, Branch 6, Tanauan, Batangas to any RTC in Manila. Consequently, the case
was transferred to the RTC Manila for re-raffling amongst its Branches. The case was re-docketed as
Criminal Case No. 93-129988 and was initially re-raffled to Branches 6, 9, and 11 before being finally
raffled to Branch 27, RTC, Manila.
5

Before transferring the case to the RTC, Branch 27, Manila, the trial court deferred the resolution of
respondents motion for bail and allowed the prosecution to present evidence. Thereafter, the hearing of
the application for bail ensued, wherein the prosecution presented Teresita and Dr. Leonardo Salvador.
After finding that the prosecutions evidence to prove treachery and evident premeditation was not strong,
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139

the RTC, Branch 11, Manila, granted respondents motion for bail. A motion for reconsideration was filed,
but it was denied.
6

The prosecution then filed a petition for certiorari with the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 41110, which
was denied. Aggrieved, they sought recourse before this Court in G.R. No. 129604. In a Resolution dated
July 12, 1999, this Court granted the petition and set aside the decision of the CA together with the Order
of the RTC granting bail to the respondents. The RTC was also ordered to immediately issue a warrant of
arrest against the accused. The resolution was also qualified to be immediately executory.
7
As a result,
Estanislao was re-arrested, but Joven and Armando were not.
8

However, upon respondents motion for reconsideration, this Court, in a Resolution dated September 4,
2001, resolved to remand the case to the RTC. We noted that, in view of the transmittal of the records of
the case to this Court in connection with the petition, the trial court deferred the rendition of its decision.
Consequently, the case was remanded to the RTC for further proceedings, including the rendition of its
decision on the merits.
After the presentation of the parties respective sets of evidence, the RTC rendered a Decision
9
dated
April 25, 2002, finding several accused guilty of the offense as charged, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, CONSIDERING ALL THE FOREGOING, this Court finds the accused JOVEN DE
GRANO, ARMANDO DE GRANO, DOMINGO LANDICHO and ESTANISLAO LACABA, guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of MURDER, qualified by treachery, and there being no modifying
circumstance attendant, hereby sentences them to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua, and to
indemnify the heirs of Emmanuel Mendoza the sum of P50,000.00 and to pay the costs.
The case as against accused Leonides Landicho and Leonardo Genil is hereby sent to the files or
archived cases to be revived as soon as said accused are apprehended.
Let alias warrants of arrest be issued against accused Leonardo Genil and Leonides Landicho.
Only Estanislao was present at the promulgation despite due notice to the other respondents.
Respondents, thru counsel, then filed a Joint Motion for Reconsideration dated May 8, 2002, praying that
the Decision dated April 25, 2002 be reconsidered and set aside and a new one be entered acquitting
them based on the following grounds, to wit:
1. The Honorable Court erred in basing the decision of conviction of all accused solely on the
biased, uncorroborated and baseless testimony of Teresita Duran, the common-law wife of the
victim;
2. The Honorable Court erred in not giving exculpatory weight to the evidence adduced by the
defense, which was amply corroborated on material points;
3. The Honorable Court erred in not finding that the failure of the prosecution to present rebuttal
evidence renders the position of the defense unrebutted;
4. The Honorable Court erred in adopting conditional or preliminary finding of treachery of the
Supreme Court in its Resolution dated July 12, 1999; and
5. The Honorable Court erred in rendering a verdict [sic] of conviction despite the fact that the
guilt of all the accused were not proven beyond reasonable doubt.
10

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140

In its Opposition, the prosecution pointed out that while the accused jointly moved for the reconsideration
of the decision, all of them, except Estanislao, were at-large. Having opted to become fugitives and be
beyond the judicial ambit, they lost their right to file such motion for reconsideration and to ask for
whatever relief from the court.
11

Acting on respondents motion for reconsideration, the RTC issued an Order
12
dated April 15, 2004
modifying its earlier decision by acquitting Joven and Armando, and downgrading the conviction of
Domingo and Estanislao from murder to homicide. The decretal portion of the Order reads:
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court modifies its decision and finds accused
DOMINGO LANDICHO and ESTANISLAO LACABA, "GUILTY" beyond reasonable doubt, as principal of
the crime of Homicide, and in default of any modifying circumstance, sentences them to an indeterminate
prison term of SIX (6) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of Prision Mayor, as minimum, to TWELVE YEARS [and]
ONE DAY of Reclusion Temporal, as maximum. Said accused shall be credited with the full period of their
preventive imprisonment pursuant to B.P. Blg. 85.1avvphi1
Accused ARMANDO DE GRANO and JOVEN DE GRANO are hereby ACQUITTED on the basis of
reasonable doubt. They are likewise declared free of any civil liability.
To the extent herein altered or modified, the Decision dated April 25, 2002 stands.
SO ORDERED.
13

Estanislao filed a Notice of Appeal, while the prosecution sought reconsideration of the Order arguing
that:
1. There was absolutely no basis for this Court to have taken cognizance of the "Joint Motion for
Reconsideration" dated May 8, 2002, citing Sec. 6, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court.
2. The testimony of Teresita Duran deserves credence. The delay in the taking of Ms. Durans
written statement of the events she witnessed is understandable considering that Joven de Grano
was the mayor of the municipality where the crime was committed and that another accused,
Estanislao Lacaba, was a policeman in the same municipality.
3. The crime committed is murder.
4. Accused Armando de Grano and Joven de Grano participated in the conspiracy.
On September 28, 2004, the RTC issued an Order
14
denying the motion and giving due course to
Estanislaos notice of appeal.
Petitioner, thru Assistant City Prosecutor Cesar Glorioso of the Office of the Manila City Prosecutor, with
the assistance of private prosecutor Atty. Michael E. David, filed a Petition
15
for certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court before the CA arguing that:
(a) the private respondents, having deliberately evaded arrest after being denied bail and
deliberately failing to attend the promulgation of the Decision despite due notice, lost the right to
move for reconsideration of their conviction; and
(b) the grounds relied upon by respondent RTC in modifying its Decision are utterly erroneous.
16

Petitioner alleged that it had no other plain, adequate, and speedy remedy, considering that the State
could not appeal a judgment of acquittal. However, by way of exception, a judgment of acquittal in a
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141

criminal case may be assailed in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court upon a
showing by the petitioner that the lower court, in acquitting the accused, committed not only reversible
errors of judgment, but also grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, or a
denial of due process, thus rendering the assailed judgment void. Consequently, the accused cannot be
considered at risk of double jeopardy.
17

Respondent De Grano filed a Motion to Dismiss,
18
arguing that the verification and certification portion of
the petition was flawed, since it was signed only by counsel and not by the aggrieved party. Also, the
petition did not contain the conformity of the Solicitor General.
19

On January 31, 2005, petitioner, through the private prosecutor, filed an Opposition to Motion to
Dismiss.
20
Petitioner explained that, for lack of material time, it failed to secure the conformity of the Office
of the Solicitor General (OSG) when it filed the petition, but it would nevertheless obtain it. A day after
filing the petition, the private prosecutor sought the OSGs conformity in a letter
21
dated January 12, 2005.
The OSG, in turn, informed the private prosecutor that rather than affixing its belated conformity, it would
rather await the initial resolution of the CA.
22
Also, so as not to preempt the action of the Department of
Justice (DOJ) on the case, the OSG instructed the private prosecutor to secure the necessary
endorsement from the DOJ for it to pursue the case. Anent the verification and certification of the petition
having been signed by the private prosecutor, petitioner explained that private complainant Teresita was
in fear for her life as a result of the acquittal of former Mayor Joven de Grano, but she was willing to
certify the petition should she be given ample time to travel to Manila.
23

However, in a Resolution
24
dated January 25, 2005, which was received by the petitioner on the same
day it filed its Opposition or on January 31, 2005, the petition was dismissed outright by the CA on the
grounds that it was not filed by the OSG and that the assailed Orders were only photocopies and not
certified true copies. The dispositive portion of the Resolution reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this petition is hereby OUTRIGHTLY DISMISSED.
Petitioner timely filed a Motion for Reconsideration.
25
In addition to the justifications it raised in its earlier
Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss, petitioner argued that the petition was not only signed by the private
prosecutor, it was also signed by the prosecutor who represented the petitioner in the criminal
proceedings before the trial court. Petitioner also maintains that the certified true copies of the assailed
Orders were accidentally attached to its file copy instead of the one it submitted. To rectify the mistake, it
attached the certified true copies of the assailed Orders.
26
This was opposed by the respondents in their
Comment/Opposition to Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.
27
lawphi1
Meanwhile, in its 1st Indorsement
28
dated March 15, 2005, DOJ Secretary Raul M. Gonzalez, endorsed
the petition filed by the Assistant City Prosecutor, with the assistance of the private prosecutor, to the
Solicitor General for his conformity.
On April 5, 2005, the CA issued a Resolution
29
denying the motion, thus:
WHEREFORE, petitioners motion for reconsideration is hereby DENIED.
In denying the motion, the CA opined that the rule on double jeopardy prohibits the state from appealing
or filing a petition for review of a judgment of acquittal that was based on the merits of the case. If there is
an acquittal, an appeal therefrom, if it will not put the accused in double jeopardy, on the criminal aspect,
may be undertaken only by the State through the Solicitor General. It added that a special civil action for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court may be filed by the person aggrieved. In such case, the
aggrieved parties are the State and the private offended party or complainant. Moreover, the records
reveal that the petition was not filed in the name of the offended party; and worse, the verification and
certification of non-forum shopping attached to the petition was signed not by the private offended party,
but by her counsel. Notwithstanding the efforts exerted by the petitioner to secure the confirmation of the
TRIAL jrp
142

OSG and the endorsement of the DOJ, there is no showing of any subsequent participation of the OSG in
the case.
Hence, the petition raising the following issues:
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR AND GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT DISMISSED THE
PETITION FOR CERTIORARI ON THE GROUND OF DOUBLE JEOPARDY.
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR AND GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT DISMISSED THE
PETITION FOR CERTIORARI FOR NOT HAVING BEEN FILED BY THE OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR
GENERAL NOR IN THE NAME OF THE OFFENDED PARTY.
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR AND GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION WHEN IT DISMISSED THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI ON THE GROUND THAT THE
VERIFICATION AND CERTIFICATION ATTACHED TO THE PETITION WAS SIGNED BY THE
PRIVATE COUNSEL AND NOT BY THE OFFENDED PARTY.
30

Petitioner, through the Solicitor General, argues that, except for Estanislao, none of the respondents
appeared at the promulgation of the Decision. Neither did they surrender after promulgation of the
judgment of conviction, nor filed a motion for leave to avail themselves of the judicial remedies against the
decision, stating the reasons for their absence. The trial court thus had no authority to take cognizance of
the joint motion for reconsideration filed by the respondents as stated in Section 6, Rule 120 of the 2000
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. As such, the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Having been issued without jurisdiction, the Order dated April 15, 2004 is
void. Consequently, no double jeopardy attached to such void Order. The CA, therefore, committed
reversible error when it dismissed the petition for certiorari on the ground of double jeopardy.
31

Petitioner also contends that, with the endorsement of the DOJ and the letter of the OSG manifesting its
intention to pursue the petition, the OSG had in fact conformed to the filing of the petition and agreed to
pursue the same. Had the CA given the OSG ample time to file the necessary pleading, the petition would
not have been dismissed for the reason that it was filed by the said office.
32

With respect to the verification and certification of non-forum shopping, petitioner invokes a liberal
application of the Rules for private complainants failure to personally sign it. Petitioner maintains that out
of extreme fear arising from the unexpected acquittal of Joven, private complainant was reluctant to travel
to Manila. After she was taken out of the witness protection program, she took refuge in the Visayas and
she was there at the time her signature was required. Since the period for filing the petition for certiorari
was about to lapse, and it could not be filed without the verification and certification of non-forum
shopping, the private prosecutor was left with no option but so sign it, instead of allowing the deadline to
pass without filing the petition.
33

Moreover, petitioner maintains that the OSG has the authority to sign the verification and certification of
the present petition, because the real party-in-interest is the OSG itself as the representative of the
State.
34

On their part, respondents contend that the petition for certiorari questioning the order of acquittal is not
allowed and is contrary to the principle of double jeopardy. Respondents argue that, contrary to the
OSGs contention, respondents Joven and Domingos absence during the promulgation of the Decision
dated April 25, 2002 did not deprive the trial court of its authority to resolve their Joint Motion for
Reconsideration, considering that one of the accused, Estanislao, was present during the promulgation.
35

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143

Joven, Armando, and Domingo maintain that while they were not present during the promulgation of the
RTC Decision, Estanislao, who was under police custody, attended the promulgation of the said Decision.
Thus, when they filed their Joint Motion for Reconsideration, which included that of Estanislao, the RTC
was not deprived of its authority to resolve the joint motion.
36

Respondents insist that the CA properly dismissed the petition for certiorari, as it was not instituted by the
OSG on behalf of the People of the Philippines, and that the verification and certification portion thereof
was not signed by private complainant Teresita.
37

Respondents also argue that the petition for certiorari before this Court should be dismissed, since the
verification and certification thereof were signed by a solicitor of the OSG, not private complainant.
The petition is meritorious.
Before considering the merits of the petition, we will first address the technical objections raised by
respondents.
As regards the issue of the signatory of the verification and certification of non-forum shopping, a liberal
application of the Rules should be applied to the present case.
The purpose of requiring a verification is to secure an assurance that the allegations in the petition have
been made in good faith; or are true and correct, not merely speculative. This requirement is simply a
condition affecting the form of pleadings, and noncompliance therewith does not necessarily render it
fatally defective.
38
Truly, verification is only a formal, not a jurisdictional, requirement. Hence, it was
sufficient that the private prosecutor signed the verification.
With respect to the certification of non-forum shopping, it has been held that the certification requirement
is rooted in the principle that a party-litigant shall not be allowed to pursue simultaneous remedies in
different fora, as this practice is detrimental to an orderly judicial procedure.
39
However, this Court has
relaxed, under justifiable circumstances, the rule requiring the submission of such certification considering
that although it is obligatory, it is not jurisdictional.
40
Not being jurisdictional, it can be relaxed under the
rule of substantial compliance.
In Donato v. Court of Appeals
41
and Wee v. Galvez,
42
the Court noted that the petitioners were already in
the United States; thus, the signing of the certification by their authorized representatives was deemed
sufficient compliance with the Rules. In Sy Chin v. Court of Appeals,
43
the Court upheld substantial justice
and ruled that the failure of the parties to sign the certification may be overlooked, as the parties case
was meritorious. In Torres v. Specialized Packaging and Development Corporation,
44
the Court also
found, among other reasons, that the extreme difficulty to secure all the required signatures and the
apparent merits of the substantive aspects of the case constitute compelling reasons for allowing the
petition.
In Ortiz v. Court of Appeals
45
and similar rulings, the following has always been pointed out:
The attestation contained in the certification on non-forum shopping requires personal knowledge by the
party who executed the same. To merit the Courts consideration, petitioners here must show reasonable
cause for failure to personally sign the certification. The petitioners must convince the court that the
outright dismissal of the petition would defeat the administration of justice.
Thus, petitioners need only show that there was reasonable cause for the failure to sign the certification
against forum shopping, and that the outright dismissal of the petition would defeat the administration of
justice.
46

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144

We find that the particular circumstances of this case advance valid reasons for private complainants
failure to sign the certification. As pointed out in the petition, it was out of extreme fear that private
complainant failed to personally sign the certification. It is to be noted that when Armando and Joven
were acquitted, Teresita was already out of the witness protection program and was in hiding in the
Visayas. As such, she could not travel to Manila to personally sign the petition. Moreover, as maintained
by the petitioner, since the period for filing the petition for certiorari was about to lapse, the private
prosecutor was left with no option but to sign the verification and certification, instead of allowing the
period to file the petition to pass without it being filed. A relaxation of the procedural rules, considering the
particular circumstances, is justified. The requirement was thus substantially complied with.
As summarized in Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Court of Appeals,
47
when a strict and literal application
of the rules on non-forum shopping and verification would result in a patent denial of substantial justice,
they may be liberally construed. An unforgiving application of the pertinent provisions of the Rules will not
be given premium if it would impede rather than serve the best interests of justice in the light of the
prevailing circumstances in the case under consideration.
We reiterate our holding in City Warden of the Manila City Jail v. Estrella,
48
that the signature of the
Solicitor General on the verification and certification of non-forum shopping in a petition before the CA or
with this Court is substantial compliance with the requirement under the Rules, considering that the OSG
is the legal representative of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and its agencies and
instrumentalities; more so, in a criminal case where the People or the State is the real party-in-interest
and is the aggrieved party.
49

Also, respondents contention that there is no showing of any subsequent participation of the OSG in the
petition before the CA does not hold water. In the letter dated January 18, 2004, the OSG instructed the
private prosecutor to secure the necessary endorsement from the DOJ for it to pursue the case. In its 1st
Indorsement dated March 15, 2005, DOJ Secretary Raul M. Gonzalez, endorsed the petition to the
Solicitor General for his conformity. When the CA denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration for its
outright dismissal of the petition, the OSG filed motions
50
for extension of time to file the present petition.
Moreover, the OSG filed a Comment
51
on respondents Motion for Reconsideration.
52
Thus, any doubt
regarding the endorsement, conformity, and participation of the OSG in the petitions is dispelled.
Now on the substantive aspect.
A peculiar situation exists in the instant case. Petitioner has sought recourse before the CA, via a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65, from an Order of the trial court drastically modifying its earlier findings
convicting the respondents of the crime of murder, by acquitting Joven and Armando, and downgrading
the convictions of their co-accused from murder to homicide; this, notwithstanding that all the accused,
except Estanislao Lacaba, failed to personally appear at the promulgation of the Decision despite due
notice thereof.
Petitioner contends that its petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with the CA was the
proper remedy, since the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when it entertained the Joint Motion for Reconsideration with respect to Armando and Joven
despite the fact that they had not regained their standing in court.
Petitioners recourse to the CA was correct.
A writ of certiorari is warranted when (1) any tribunal, board or officer has acted without or in excess of its
or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (2)
there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
53
An act of
a court or tribunal may be considered as grave abuse of discretion when the same was performed in a
capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion
must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty, or to a virtual refusal to
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perform a duty enjoined by law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner
because of passion or hostility.
54

By way of exception, a judgment of acquittal in a criminal case may be assailed in a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, but only upon a clear showing by the petitioner that the lower court,
in acquitting the accused, committed not merely reversible errors of judgment but also grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, or to a denial of due process, thus rendering the
assailed judgment void.
55
In which event, the accused cannot be considered at risk of double jeopardy
the revered constitutional safeguard against exposing the accused to the risk of answering twice for the
same offense.
Double jeopardy has the following essential elements: (1) the accused is charged under a complaint or an
information sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction; (2) the court has jurisdiction; (3) the
accused has been arraigned and he has pleaded; and (4) he is convicted or acquitted, or the case is
dismissed without his express consent.
56

Although this Court does not absolutely preclude the availment of the remedy of certiorari to correct an
erroneous acquittal, the petitioner must clearly and convincingly demonstrate that the lower court blatantly
abused its authority to a point so grave and so severe as to deprive it of its very power to dispense
justice.
57

Under English common law, exceptions to the pleas of prior conviction or acquittal existed where the trial
court lacked jurisdiction, the theory being that a defendant before such a court was not actually placed in
jeopardy.
58
Hence, any acquittal or conviction before a court having no jurisdiction would not violate the
principle of double jeopardy since it failed to attach in the first place.
Section 14(2),
59
Article III of the Constitution, authorizing trials in absentia, allows the accused to be
absent at the trial but not at certain stages of the proceedings, to wit: (a) at arraignment and plea, whether
of innocence or of guilt; (b) during trial, whenever necessary for identification purposes; and (c) at the
promulgation of sentence, unless it is for a light offense, in which case, the accused may appear by
counsel or representative. At such stages of the proceedings, his presence is required and cannot be
waived.
60

Section 6, Rule 120 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the Rules applicable at the time the
Decision was promulgated, provides:
Section 6. Promulgation of judgment. The judgment is promulgated by reading it in the presence of the
accused and any judge of the court in which it was rendered. However, if the conviction is for a light
offense the judgment may be pronounced in the presence of his counsel or representative. When the
judge is absent or outside the province or city, the judgment may be promulgated by the clerk of court.
If the accused is confined or detained in another province or city, the judgment may be promulgated by
the executive judge of the Regional Trial Court having jurisdiction over the place of confinement or
detention upon request of the court which rendered the judgment. The court promulgating the judgment
shall have authority to accept the notice of appeal and to approve the bail bond pending appeal; provided,
that if the decision of the trial court convicting the accused changed the nature of the offense from non-
bailable to bailable, the application for bail can only be filed and resolved by the appellate court.
The proper clerk of court shall give notice to the accused, personally or through his bondsman or warden
and counsel, requiring him to be present at the promulgation of the decision. If the accused was tried in
absentia because he jumped bail or escaped from prison, the notice to him shall be served at his last
known address.
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In case the accused fails to appear at the scheduled date of promulgation of judgment despite notice, the
promulgation shall be made by recording the judgment in the criminal docket and serving him a copy
thereof at his last known address or thru his counsel.
If the judgment is for conviction and the failure of the accused to appear was without justifiable cause, he
shall lose the remedies available in these Rules against the judgment and the court shall order his arrest.
Within fifteen (15) days from promulgation of judgment however, the accused may surrender and file a
motion for leave of court to avail of these remedies. He shall state the reasons for his absence at the
scheduled promulgation and if he proves that his absence was for a justifiable cause, he shall be allowed
to avail of said remedies within fifteen (15) days from notice.
61

Thus, the accused who failed to appear without justifiable cause shall lose the remedies available in the
Rules against the judgment. However, within 15 days from promulgation of judgment, the accused may
surrender and file a motion for leave of court to avail of these remedies. He shall state in his motion the
reasons for his absence at the scheduled promulgation, and if he proves that his absence was for a
justifiable cause, he shall be allowed to avail of said remedies within 15 days from notice.
62

When the Decision dated April 25, 2002 was promulgated, only Estanislao Lacaba was present.
Subsequently thereafter, without surrendering and explaining the reasons for their absence, Joven,
Armando, and Domingo joined Estanislao in their Joint Motion for Reconsideration. In blatant disregard of
the Rules, the RTC not only failed to cause the arrest of the respondents who were at large, it also took
cognizance of the joint motion.
The RTC clearly exceeded its jurisdiction when it entertained the joint Motion for Reconsideration with
respect to the respondents who were at large. It should have considered the joint motion as a motion for
reconsideration that was solely filed by Estanislao. Being at large, Joven and Domingo have not regained
their standing in court. Once an accused jumps bail or flees to a foreign country, or escapes from prison
or confinement, he loses his standing in court; and unless he surrenders or submits to the jurisdiction of
the court, he is deemed to have waived any right to seek relief from the court.
63

Thus, Joven, Armando, and Domingo, were not placed in double jeopardy because, from the very
beginning, the lower tribunal had acted without jurisdiction. Verily, any ruling issued without jurisdiction is,
in legal contemplation, necessarily null and void and does not exist. In criminal cases, it cannot be the
source of an acquittal.
64

However, with respect to Estanislao, the RTC committed no reversible error when it entertained the
Motion for Reconsideration. He was in custody and was present at the promulgation of the judgment.
Hence, the RTC never lost jurisdiction over his person. Consequently, the RTCs ruling downgrading his
conviction from murder to homicide stands. For Estanislao, and for him alone, the proscription against
double jeopardy applies.
Factual matters cannot be inquired into by this Court in a certiorari proceeding. We can no longer be
tasked to go over the proofs presented by the parties and analyze, assess and weigh them again to
ascertain if the trial court was correct in according superior credit to this or that piece of evidence of one
party or the other.
65
The sole office of a writ of certiorari is the correction of errors of jurisdiction, including
the commission of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, and does not include a
review of the RTCs evaluation of the evidence and the factual findings based thereon.
66

True, were it not for the procedural lapses of the RTC and its blatant disregard of the Rules, the finality of
respondents acquittal and their co-accuseds conviction of homicide instead of murder would have been
barred by the rule on double jeopardy.
We may tolerate an erroneous acquittal borne from an attempt to protect the innocent or from an attempt
to uphold the accuseds treasured right to a fair trial, but when these concerns are not evident, an
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erroneous acquittal is a source of substantial dismay and warrants this Courts corrective action via a
special writ of error.
Moreover, although the CA dismissed the appeal filed before it, the RTC Judge cannot hide behind such
fact considering that the dismissal of the appeal was not based on the validity of the assailed Order of the
RTC, but was based on technical rules and the rule against double jeopardy.
It is to be stressed that judges are dutybound to have more than a cursory acquaintance with laws and
jurisprudence. Failure to follow basic legal commands constitutes gross ignorance of the law from which
no one may be excused, not even a judge.
67
The Code of Judicial Conduct mandates that "a judge shall
be faithful to the law and maintain professional competence."
68
It bears stressing that competence is one
of the marks of a good judge. When a judge displays an utter lack of familiarity with the Rules, he erodes
the publics confidence in the competence of our courts. Such is gross ignorance of the law. Having
accepted the exalted position of a judge, he/she owes the public and the court the duty to be proficient in
the law.
69

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions dated January 25, 2005 and April 5, 2005,
issued by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 88160, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
pertinent portions of the Order dated April 15, 2004 issued by the Regional Trial Court, convicting
Domingo Landicho of the crime of Homicide and acquitting Armando de Grano and Joven de Grano, are
ANNULLED and DELETED. In all other aspects, the Order stands.
To the extent herein altered or modified, the pertinent portions of the Decision dated April 25, 2002 of the
Regional Trial Court are REINSTATED.
The Office of the Court Administrator is DIRECTED to INVESTIGATE Judge Teresa P. Soriaso for
possible violation/s of the law and/or the Code of Judicial Conduct in issuing the Order dated April 15,
2004 in Criminal Case No. 93-129988.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 186001 October 2, 2009
ANTONIO CABADOR, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
ABAD, J .:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari, assailing the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision of
August 4, 2008
1
and Resolution of October 28, 2008
2
in CA-G.R. SP 100431 that affirmed the August 31,
2006 Order
3
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City.
The facts are not disputed.
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On June 23, 2000 the public prosecutor accused petitioner Antonio Cabador before the RTC of Quezon
City in Criminal Case Q-00-93291 of murdering, in conspiracy with others, Atty. Jun N. Valerio.
4
On
February 13, 2006, after presenting only five witnesses over five years of intermittent trial, the RTC
declared at an end the prosecutions presentation of evidence and required the prosecution to make a
written or formal offer of its documentary evidence within 15 days from notice.
5
But the public prosecutor
asked for three extensions of time, the last of which was to end on July 28, 2006. Still, the prosecution did
not make the required written offer.
On August 1, 2006 petitioner Cabador filed a motion to dismiss the case,
6
complaining of a turtle-paced
proceeding in the case since his arrest and detention in 2001 and invoking his right to a speedy trial.
Further, he claimed that in the circumstances, the trial court could not consider any evidence against him
that had not been formally offered. He also pointed out that the prosecution witnesses did not have
knowledge of his alleged part in the crime charged.
Unknown to petitioner Cabador, however, four days earlier or on July 28, 2006 the prosecution asked the
RTC for another extension of the period for its formal offer, which offer it eventually made on August 1,
2006, the day Cabador filed his motion to dismiss.
7

On August 31, 2006 the RTC issued an Order treating petitioner Cabadors August 1, 2006 motion to
dismiss as a demurrer to evidence. And, since he filed his motion without leave of court, the RTC
declared him to have waived his right to present evidence in his defense. The trial court deemed the case
submitted for decision insofar as he was concerned. Cabador filed a motion for reconsideration of this
Order but the RTC denied it on February 19, 2007.
8
Cabador questioned the RTCs actions before the CA
but on August 4, 2008 the latter denied his petition and affirmed the lower courts actions.
9
With the CAs
denial of his motion for reconsideration, on October 28, 2008 petitioner came to this Court via a petition
for review on certiorari.
The issue in this case is whether or not petitioner Cabadors motion to dismiss before the trial court was in
fact a demurrer to evidence filed without leave of court, with the result that he effectively waived his right
to present evidence in his defense and submitted the case for decision insofar as he was concerned.
The trial proper in a criminal case usually has two stages: first, the prosecutions presentation of evidence
against the accused and, second, the accuseds presentation of evidence in his defense. If, after the
prosecution has presented its evidence, the same appears insufficient to support a conviction, the trial
court may at its own initiative or on motion of the accused dispense with the second stage and dismiss
the criminal action.
10
There is no point for the trial court to hear the evidence of the accused in such a
case since the prosecution bears the burden of proving his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The order of
dismissal amounts to an acquittal.
But because some have in the past used the demurrer in order to delay the proceedings in the case, the
remedy now carries a caveat. When the accused files a demurrer without leave of court, he shall be
deemed to have waived the right to present evidence and the case shall be considered submitted for
judgment.
11
On occasions, this presents a problem such as when, like the situation in this case, the
accused files a motion to dismiss that, to the RTC, had the appearance of a demurrer to evidence.
Cabador insists that it is not one but the CA, like the lower court, ruled that it is.
This Court held in Enojas, Jr. v. Commission on Elections
12
that, to determine whether the pleading filed
is a demurer to evidence or a motion to dismiss, the Court must consider (1) the allegations in it made in
good faith; (2) the stage of the proceeding at which it is filed; and (3) the primary objective of the party
filing it.
Here, the pertinent portions of petitioner Cabadors motion to dismiss read as follows:
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2. On November 9, 2001, the accused was arrested and subsequently brought to the Quezon
City jail through a commitment order dated November 21, 2001 where he had been detained
during the course of this case.
3. The accused was arraigned on January 8, 2002 and trial began soon after.
4. UP-OLA entered its appearance as counsel for the accused on January 20, 2005.
5. On February 10, 2006, the Honorable Court terminated the presentation of evidence for the
prosecution considering that the case has been going on for 5 years already and during that
period the prosecution has only presented 5 witnesses. Moreover, xxx there had been numerous
postponements due to failure of the prosecution to ensure the presence of its witnesses.
6. In an order dated March 31, 2006, the Honorable court required the public prosecutor to submit
its formal offer of evidence within fifteen (15) days from receipt of such order.
7. On April 17, 2006, the public prosecutor was again absent so the presentation of evidence for
the accused was reset to June 6, 2006.
8. During the same hearing, the Prosecution was again granted an additional fifteen (15) days
within which to file their formal offer of evidence.
9. On June 6, 2006, the public prosecutor again failed to appear and to file their formal offer of
evidence. In an order, the Honorable Court again extended to the prosecution an additional
fifteen (15) days from receipt of the order within which to file their formal offer of evidence.
10. On June 28, 2006, the Honorable Court issued an order granting the prosecution a thirty-day
extension, or until July 28, 2006 within which to file their formal offer of evidence since the public
prosecutor was on leave.
11. Upon the expiration of the extension granted by the Honorable Court, the prosecution failed to
file their formal offer of evidence.
10. (Sic) Despite three (3) extensions, the prosecution failed to file formal offer of evidence.
11. (Sic) Sec. 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides that "the court shall consider no
evidence which has not been formally offered." A formal offer is necessary, since judges are
required to base their findings of fact and their judgment solely and strictly upon the evidence
offered by the parties at the trial (Ong vs. CA, GR No. 117103). Hence, without any formal offer of
evidence, this Honorable Court has no evidence to consider.
12. The charge against the accused has no leg to stand on. The witnesses that had been
presented by the prosecution testified mainly on the occurrences on the night of the incident and
had no knowledge of any connection with or any participation by the accused in the incident.
13. The hearings of the case have been delayed since 2001 through no fault of the defense to the
prejudice of the rights of the accused to a speedy trial, mandated by no less than Art. III, Sec. 16
of the Constitution.
14. Since UP-OLA had entered its appearance in 2005, the case had been reset for twelve (12)
times, most of which are due to the fault or absence of the prosecution. For the five year duration
of the case, the prosecution still has not presented any evidence to prove the guilt of the accused
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beyond reasonable doubt. Meanwhile, the accused has been unduly stripped of this liberty for
more than five (5) years upon an unsubstantiated charge.
15. The accused was injured and debilitated in the course of his arrest which resulted in the
amputation of his left leg. His movement is severely hampered and his living conditions are less
adequate. To subject him to further delays when there is no substance to the charge against him
would tantamount to injustice.
13

It can be seen from the above that petitioner Cabador took pains to point out in paragraphs 2, 3, 5, 6, 7,
8, 9, 10, 11, "10 (sic)," 13, 14, and 15 above how trial in the case had painfully dragged on for years. The
gaps between proceedings were long, with hearings often postponed because of the prosecutors
absence. This was further compounded, Cabador said, by the prosecutions repeated motions for
extension of time to file its formal offer and its failure to file it within such time. Cabador then invoked in
paragraph 13 above his right to speedy trial. But the RTC and the CA simply chose to ignore these
extensive averments and altogether treated Cabadors motion as a demurrer to evidence because of a
few observations he made in paragraphs "11 (sic)" and 12 regarding the inadequacy of the evidence
against him.
In criminal cases, a motion to dismiss may be filed on the ground of denial of the accuseds right to
speedy trial.
14
This denial is characterized by unreasonable, vexatious, and oppressive delays without
fault of the accused, or by unjustified postponements that unreasonably prolonged the trial.
15
This was the
main thrust of Cabadors motion to dismiss and he had the right to bring this up for a ruling by the trial
court.
Cabador of course dropped a few lines in his motion to dismiss in paragraphs "11 (sic)" and 12, saying
that the trial court "has no evidence to consider," "the charge has no leg to stand on," and that "the
witnesses x x x had no knowledge of any connection with or any participation by the accused in the
incident." But these were mere conclusions, highlighting what five years of trial had accomplished.
The fact is that Cabador did not even bother to do what is so fundamental in any demurrer. He did not
state what evidence the prosecution had presented against him to show in what respects such evidence
failed to meet the elements of the crime charged. His so-called "demurrer" did not touch on any particular
testimony of even one witness. He cited no documentary exhibit. Indeed, he could not because, he did
not know that the prosecution finally made its formal offer of exhibits on the same date he filed his motion
to dismiss.
16
To say that Cabador filed a demurrer to evidence is equivalent to the proverbial blind man,
touching the side of an elephant, and exclaiming that he had touched a wall.
Besides, a demurrer to evidence assumes that the prosecution has already rested its case. Section 23,
Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, reads:
Demurrer to evidence. After the prosecution rests its case, the court may dismiss the action on the
ground of insufficiency of evidence (1) on its own initiative after giving the prosecution the opportunity to
be heard or (2) upon demurrer to the evidence filed by the accused with or without leave of court.
(Emphasis supplied)1awphi1
Here, after the prosecution filed its formal offer of exhibits on August 1, 2006, the same day Cabador filed
his motion to dismiss, the trial court still needed to give him an opportunity to object to the admission of
those exhibits. It also needed to rule on the formal offer. And only after such a ruling could the
prosecution be deemed to have rested its case. Since Cabador filed his motion to dismiss before he could
object to the prosecutions formal offer, before the trial court could act on the offer, and before the
prosecution could rest its case, it could not be said that he had intended his motion to dismiss to serve as
a demurrer to evidence.
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In sum, tested against the criteria laid down in Enojas, the Court finds that petitioner Cabador filed a
motion to dismiss on the ground of violation of his right to speedy trial, not a demurrer to evidence. He
cannot be declared to have waived his right to present evidence in his defense.
On a final note, a demurrer to evidence shortens the proceedings in criminal cases. Caution must,
however, be exercised
17
in view of its pernicious consequence on the right of the accused to present
evidence in his defense, the seriousness of the crime charged, and the gravity of the penalty involved.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, the August 4, 2008 Decision and the October 28, 2008
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP 100431 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the
August 31, 2006 Order of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 81 is NULLIFIED. The latter
court is DIRECTED to resolve petitioner Antonio Cabadors motion to dismiss based on the
circumstances surrounding the trial in the case.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 174504 March 21, 2011
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. SANDIGANBAYAN (Third division) and MANUEL G. BARCENAS, Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
DEL CASTILLO, J .:
The dismissal order arising from the grant of a demurrer to evidence amounts to an acquittal and cannot
be appealed because it would place the accused in double jeopardy. The order is reviewable only by
certiorari if it was issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
This is a Petition for Certiorari which seeks to nullify the Sandiganbayans July 26, 2006 Resolution
1

which granted private respondents demurrer to evidence.
Factual Antecedents
On May 21, 2004, private respondent was charged with violation of Section 89 of Presidential Decree
(P.D.) No. 1445
2
before the Sandiganbayan. The Information reads
That on or about December 19, 1995, and for sometime prior or subsequent thereto at Toledo City,
Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused MANUEL G. BARCENAS, a high-ranking public officer, being a Vice-Mayor of Toledo City, and
committing the offense in relation to office, having obtained cash advances from the City Government of
Toledo in the total amount of SIXTY-ONE THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED SIXTY FIVE PESOS
(P61,765.00), Philippine Currency, which he received by reason of his office, for which he is duty bound
to liquidate the same within the period required by law, with deliberate intent and intent to gain, did then
and there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally fail to liquidate said cash advances of P61,765.00, Philippine
Currency, despite demands to the damage and prejudice of the government in the aforesaid amount.
3

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The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 27990 and raffled to the Third Division. On October 20,
2004, private respondent was arraigned for which he pleaded not guilty. The prosecution presented its
lone witness, Manolo Tulibao Villad, Commission on Audit (COA) State Auditor. Thereafter, the
prosecution filed its formal offer of evidence and rested its case.
On April 20, 2006, private respondent filed a motion
4
for leave to file demurrer to evidence. On June 16,
2006, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution
5
granting the motion. On June 30, 2006, private
respondent filed his demurrer
6
to evidence.
Sandiganbayans Ruling
On July 26 2006, the Sandiganbayan promulgated the assailed Resolution, viz:
WE find the demurrer to evidence well taken.
The testimony of the prosecutions lone witness City Auditor Manolo Tulibao confirming his Report
(Exhibit "D") that the accused had indeed liquidated his cash advances did not help the prosecution but
rather weakened its cause of action against the accused. At the time this case was filed in Court, the
accused had already liquidated his cash advances subject matter hereof in the total amount of
P61,765.00. Hence, We find the element of damages wanting in this case.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Demurrer to Evidence is hereby granted and this case is hereby ordered
DISMISSED.
7

Issue
Whether the Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in giving due course to and eventually granting the demurrer to evidence.
8

Petitioners Arguments
Petitioner contends that the prosecution was able to establish all the elements of the offense defined and
penalized under Section 89 of P.D. No. 1445: (1) the private respondent, an accountable officer, received
cash advances in the total amount of P120,000.00 to defray the expenses of the Public Assistance
Committee and Committee on Police Matters covering the period January-March 1993, (2) the purpose of
the cash advance has been served, (3) the private respondent settled his cash advances only in March
1996, (4) the city auditor sent a demand letter to the private respondent to settle the cash advance within
72 hours from receipt thereof, and (5) the private respondent received said letter on December 22, 1995
but failed to liquidate the same within the aforestated period.
Although it concedes that the private respondent eventually settled the subject cash advances sometime
in March 1996, petitioner theorizes that damage is not one of the elements of the offense charged.
Hence, the settlement of the cash advance would not exonerate the private respondent but only mitigate
his criminal liability. Otherwise, the purpose of the law would be rendered futile since accountable officers
can easily make cash advances and liquidate the same beyond the period prescribed by law without
being penalized for doing so.
Finally, petitioner argues that double jeopardy does not lie in this case because the order of dismissal
was issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
Private Respondents Arguments
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Private respondent counters that the grant of a demurrer to evidence is equivalent to an acquittal from
which the prosecution cannot appeal as it would place the accused in double jeopardy. Further, assuming
that the Sandiganbayan erroneously granted the demurrer, this would, at most, constitute an error of
judgment and not an error of jurisdiction. Thus, certiorari does not lie to correct the grant of the demurrer
to evidence by the Sandiganbayan.
Our Ruling
The petition lacks merit.
An order of dismissal arising from the grant of a demurrer to evidence has the effect of an acquittal unless
the order was issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
In criminal cases, the grant of a demurrer
9
is tantamount to an acquittal and the dismissal order may not
be appealed because this would place the accused in double jeopardy.
10
Although the dismissal order is
not subject to appeal, it is still reviewable but only through certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
11

For the writ to issue, the trial court must be shown to have acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction such as where the prosecution was denied the opportunity to
present its case or where the trial was a sham thus rendering the assailed judgment void.
12
The burden is
on the petitioner to clearly demonstrate that the trial court blatantly abused its authority to a point so grave
as to deprive it of its very power to dispense justice.
13

In the case at bar, the Sandiganbayan granted the demurrer to evidence on the ground that the
prosecution failed to prove that the government suffered any damage from private respondents non-
liquidation of the subject cash advance because it was later shown, as admitted by the prosecutions
witness, that private respondent liquidated the same albeit belatedly.
Sections 89 and 128 of P.D. No. 1445 provide
SECTION 89. Limitations on Cash Advance. No cash advance shall be given unless for a legally
authorized specific purpose. A cash advance shall be reported on and liquidated as soon as the
purpose for which it was given has been served. No additional cash advance shall be allowed to any
official or employee unless the previous cash advance given to him is first settled or a proper accounting
thereof is made.
SECTION 128. Penal Provision. Any violation of the provisions of Sections 67, 68, 89, 106, and 108 of
this Code or any regulation issued by the Commission [on Audit] implementing these sections,
shall be punished by a fine not exceeding one thousand pesos or by imprisonment not exceeding six (6)
months, or both such fine and imprisonment in the discretion of the court. (Emphasis supplied.)
On the other hand, COA Circular No. 90-331
14
or the "Rules and Regulations on the Granting, Utilization
and Liquidation of Cash Advances" which implemented Section 89 of P.D. No. 1445 pertinently provided
5. LIQUIDATION OF CASH ADVANCES
5.1 The AO (Accountable Officer) shall liquidate his cash advance as follows:
5.1.1 Salaries, Wages, etc. - within 5 days after each 15 day/ end of the month pay period.
5.1.2 Petty Operating Expenses and Field Operating Expenses - within 20 days after the end of the year;
subject to replenishment during the year.
5.1.3 Foreign Travel - within 60 days after return to the Philippines.
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Failure of the AO to liquidate his cash advance within the prescribed period shall constitute a valid cause
for the withholding of his salary.
x x x x
5.7 When a cash advance is no longer needed or has not been used for a period of two (2) months, it
must be returned to or deposited immediately with the collecting officer.
5.8 All cash advances shall be fully liquidated at the end of each year. Except for petty cash fund, the AO
shall refund any unexpended balance to the Cashier/Collecting Officer who will issue the necessary
official receipt.
x x x x
9. DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE COA AUDITOR
x x x x
9.6 Upon failure of the AO to liquidate his cash advance within one month for AOs within the station and
three months for AOs outside the station from date of grant of the cash advance, the Auditor shall issue a
letter demanding liquidation or explanation for non-liquidation.
9.7 If 30 days have elapsed after the demand letter is served and no liquidation or explanation is
received, or the explanation received is not satisfactory, the Auditor shall advise the head of the agency
to cause or order the withholding of the payment of any money due the AO. The amount withheld shall be
applied to his (AO's) accountability. The AO shall likewise be held criminally liable for failure to settle his
accounts.
15
(Emphasis supplied.)
As can be seen, contrary to the findings of the Sandiganbayan, actual damage to the government arising
from the non-liquidation of the cash advance is not an essential element of the offense punished under
the second sentence of Section 89 of P.D. No. 1445 as implemented by COA Circular No. 90-331.
Instead, the mere failure to timely liquidate the cash advance is the gravamen of the offense. Verily, the
law seeks to compel the accountable officer, by penal provision, to promptly render an account of the
funds which he has received by reason of his office.
16

Nonetheless, even if the Sandiganbayan proceeded from an erroneous interpretation of the law and its
implementing rules, the error committed was an error of judgment and not of jurisdiction. Petitioner failed
to establish that the dismissal order was tainted with grave abuse of discretion such as the denial of the
prosecutions right to due process or the conduct of a sham trial. In fine, the error committed by the
Sandiganbayan is of such a nature that can no longer be rectified on appeal by the prosecution because
it would place the accused in double jeopardy.
17

In United States v. Kilayko,
18
the accused was charged with a violation under Section 12 of the Chattel
Mortgage Law
19
which prohibited the mortgagor from selling the mortgaged property without the consent
of the mortgagee while the debt secured remained outstanding. The accused was arraigned for which he
pleaded not guilty. Thereafter, he moved to dismiss the Information. After the prosecution and defense
entered into a stipulation of facts, the trial court dismissed the case. On appeal by the prosecution to this
Court, we acknowledged that the trial court erred in interpreting Section 12 when it ruled that the
subsequent payment of the secured debt extinguished the accuseds criminal liability arising from the
unlawful sale of the mortgaged property. Nonetheless, we ruled that the judgment dismissing the
Information, although based upon an erroneous interpretation of the law, was in effect a judgment on the
merits from which no appeal lay on the part of the prosecution as it would place the accused in double
jeopardy.
20
1avvphi1
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155

In another case, People v. City Court of Silay,
21
after the prosecution had presented its evidence and
rested its case, the accused filed a motion to dismiss for insufficiency of evidence. The trial court granted
the motion and dismissed the case. On appeal by the prosecution to this Court, we were of the view that
the dismissal order was erroneous and resulted to a miscarriage of justice. However, we ruled that such
error cannot be corrected because double jeopardy had already set in:
In the case of the herein respondents, however, the dismissal of the charge against them was one on the
merits of the case which is to be distinguished from other dismissals at the instance of the accused. All
the elements of double jeopardy are here present, to wit: (1) a valid information sufficient in form and
substance to sustain a conviction of the crime charged, (2) a court of competent jurisdiction, and (3) an
unconditional dismissal of the complaint after the prosecution had rested its case, amounting to the
acquittal of the accused. The dismissal being one on the merits, the doctrine of waiver of the accused to a
plea of double jeopardy cannot be invoked.
It is clear to Us that the dismissal of the criminal case against the private respondents was erroneous.
As correctly stated in the Comment of the Acting Solicitor General, the accused were not charged with
substitution of genuine "tarjetas" with false ones. The basis for the accusation was that the accused
entered false statements as to the weight of the sugar cane loaded in certain cane cars in "tarjetas" which
were submitted to the laboratory section of the company. The act of making a false entry in the "tarjetas"
is undoubtedly an act of falsification of a private document, the accused having made untruthful
statements in a narration of facts which they were under obligation to accomplish as part of their duties -
Ernesto de la Paz, as overseer of Hda. Malisbog, and the other accused as scalers of the offended party,
the Hawaiian-Philippine Company, thereby causing damage to the latter.
However erroneous the order of respondent Court is, and although a miscarriage of justice resulted from
said order, to paraphrase Justice Alex Reyes in People vs. Nieto, 103 Phil. 1133, such error cannot now
be righted because of the timely plea of double jeopardy.
22

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 172777 October 19, 2011
BENJAMIN B. BANGAYAN, JR., Petitioner,
vs.
SALLY GO BANGAYAN, Respondent.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 172792
RESALLY DE ASIS DELFIN, Petitioner,
vs.
SALLY GO BANGAYAN, Respondent.
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156

D E C I S I O N
MENDOZA, J .:
These are consolidated petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure assailing the March 14, 2006 Decision
1
and the May 22, 2006 Resolution
2
of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 83704 entitled "Sally Go-Bangayan v. Hon. Luisito C. Sardillo, in his
capacity as Presiding Judge of RTC-Caloocan City, Branch 126, Benjamin B. Bangayan, Jr. and Resally
de Asis Delfin."
The Facts
This case stemmed from a complaint-affidavit filed by respondent Sally Go-Bangayan (Sally Go) accusing
petitioners Benjamin Bangayan, Jr. (Benjamin, Jr.) and Resally de Asis Delfin (Resally) of having
committed the crime of bigamy.
3

On March 7, 1982, Benjamin, Jr. married Sally Go in Pasig City and they had two children.
4
Later, Sally
Go learned that Benjamin, Jr. had taken Resally as his concubine whom he subsequently married on
January 5, 2001 under the false name, "Benjamin Z. Sojayco."
5
Benjamin, Jr. fathered two children with
Resally. Furthermore, Sally Go discovered that on September 10, 1973, Benjamin, Jr. also married a
certain Azucena Alegre (Azucena) in Caloocan City.
The City Prosecutor of Caloocan City conducted a preliminary investigation and thereafter issued a
Resolution dated June 5, 2002 recommending the filing of an information for bigamy against Benjamin, Jr.
and Resally for having contracted a marriage despite knowing fully well that he was still legally married to
Sally Go.
6
The information was duly filed on November 15, 2002 and was raffled to the Regional Trial
Court of Caloocan City, Branch 126 (RTC) where it was docketed as Criminal Case No. C-66783.
7

After the arraignment, during which petitioners both pleaded not guilty to the charge against them, the
prosecution presented and offered its evidence.
8
On September 8, 2003, Benjamin, Jr. and Resally
separately filed their respective motions for leave to file a demurrer to evidence.
9
This was granted by the
RTC in its Order dated September 29, 2003.
10

On October 20, 2003, Benjamin, Jr. filed his Demurrer to Evidence, praying that the criminal case for
bigamy against him be dismissed for failure of the prosecution to present sufficient evidence of his guilt.
11

His plea was anchored on two main arguments: (1) he was not legally married to Sally Go because of the
existence of his prior marriage to Azucena; and (2) the prosecution was unable to show that he and the
"Benjamin Z. Sojayco Jr.," who married Resally, were one and the same person.
12

In its December 3, 2003 Order,
13
the RTC dismissed the criminal case against Benjamin, Jr. and Resally
for insufficiency of evidence.
14
It reasoned out that the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable
doubt that Benjamin, Jr. used the fictitious name, Benjamin Z. Sojayco Jr., in contracting his marriage with
Resally.
15
Corollarily, Resally cannot be convicted of bigamy because the prosecution failed to establish
that Resally married Benjamin, Jr.
16

Aggrieved, Sally Go elevated the case to the CA via a petition for certiorari. On March 14, 2006, the CA
promulgated its Decision
17
granting her petition and ordering the remand of the case to the RTC for
further proceedings. The CA held that the following pieces of evidence presented by the prosecution were
sufficient to deny the demurrer to evidence: (1) the existence of three marriages of Benjamin, Jr. to
Azucena, Sally Go and Resally; (2) the letters and love notes from Resally to Benjamin, Jr.; (3) the
admission of Benjamin, Jr. as regards his marriage to Sally Go and Azucena; and (4) Benjamin, Jr.s
admission that he and Resally were in some kind of a relationship.
18
The CA further stated that Benjamin,
Jr. was mistaken in claiming that he could not be guilty of bigamy because his marriage to Sally Go was
null and void in light of the fact that he was already married to Azucena. A judicial declaration of nullity
TRIAL jrp
157

was required in order for him to be able to use the nullity of his marriage as a defense in a bigamy
charge.
19

Petitioners motions for reconsideration were both denied by the CA in a Resolution dated May 22,
2006.
20

Hence, these petitions.
The Issues
Petitioner Benjamin, Jr. raises the following issues:
1. Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals in a certiorari proceedings may inquire into the
factual matters presented by the parties in the lower court, without violating the constitutional right
of herein petitioner (as accused in the lower court) against double jeopardy as enshrined in
Section 21, Article III of the 1987 Constitution.
2. Whether or not the order of the trial court that granted the Demurrer to Evidence filed by the
petitioners as accused therein was issued with grave abuse of discretion that is tantamount to
lack of jurisdiction or excess of jurisdiction as to warrant the grant of the relief as prayed for in the
Petition for Certiorari filed by respondent Sally [Go-Bangayan].
3. Whether or not the prosecution was indeed denied due process when the trial court allegedly
ignored the existence [of the] pieces of evidence presented by the prosecution.
21

On the other hand, petitioner Resally poses the following questions:
1. Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals committed serious errors of law in giving due
course to the petition for certiorari notwithstanding the lack of legal standing of the herein
respondent (petitioner therein) as the said petition was filed without the prior conformity and/or
imprimatur of the Office of the Solicitor General, or even the City Prosecutors Office of Caloocan
City
2. Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals committed serious errors of law in ordering the
further proceedings of the case as it would violate the right of the accused against double
jeopardy.
22

Essentially, the issues which must be resolved by this Court are:
1. Whether Sally Go had the legal standing to file a petition for certiorari before the CA despite
the lack of consent of either the Office of the Solicitor General or the Office of the City Prosecutor
(OCP) of Caloocan.
2. Whether petitioners right against double jeopardy was violated by the CA when it reversed the
December 3, 2003 RTC Order dismissing the criminal case against them.
The Courts Ruling
The Court finds merit in the petitions.
Only the OSG, and not the private offended party, has the authority to question the order granting the
demurrer to evidence in a criminal case.
TRIAL jrp
158

Petitioner Resally argues that Sally Go had no personality to file the petition for certiorari before the CA
because the case against them (Resally and Benjamin, Jr.) is criminal in nature. It being so, only the OSG
or the OCP of Caloocan may question the RTC Order dismissing the case against them.
23
Respondents
intervention as the offended party in the prosecution of the criminal case is only limited to the
enforcement of the civil liability.
24

Sally Go counters that as the offended party, she has an interest in the maintenance of the criminal
prosecution against petitioners and quotes Merciales v. Court of Appeals
25
to support her position: "The
right of offended parties to appeal an order of the trial court which deprives them of due process has
always been recognized, the only limitation being that they cannot appeal any adverse ruling if to do so
would place the accused in double jeopardy." Moreover, the OSG and the OCP had impliedly consented
to the filing of the petition before the CA because they did not interpose any objection.
26

This Court leans toward Resallys contention that Sally Go had no personality to file the petition for
certiorari before the CA. It has been consistently held that in criminal cases, the acquittal of the accused
or the dismissal of the case against him can only be appealed by the Solicitor General, acting on behalf of
the State.
27
The private complainant or the offended party may question such acquittal or dismissal only
insofar as the civil liability of the accused is concerned.
28
As explained in the case of People v.
Santiago:
29
1awphil
It is well-settled that in criminal cases where the offended party is the State, the interest of the
private complainant or the private offended party is limited to the civil liability. Thus, in the
prosecution of the offense, the complainant's role is limited to that of a witness for the prosecution. If a
criminal case is dismissed by the trial court or if there is an acquittal, an appeal therefrom on the
criminal aspect may be undertaken only by the State through the Solicitor General. Only the
Solicitor General may represent the People of the Philippines on appeal. The private offended party
or complainant may not take such appeal. However, the said offended party or complainant may appeal
the civil aspect despite the acquittal of the accused.
In a special civil action for certiorari filed under Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court wherein it is
alleged that the trial court committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction or on
other jurisdictional grounds, the rules state that the petition may be filed by the person aggrieved. In such
case, the aggrieved parties are the State and the private offended party or complainant. The complainant
has an interest in the civil aspect of the case so he may file such special civil action questioning the
decision or action of the respondent court on jurisdictional grounds. In so doing, complainant should not
bring the action in the name of the People of the Philippines. The action may be prosecuted in name of
said complainant. [Emphases Supplied]
A perusal of the petition for certiorari filed by Sally Go before the CA discloses that she sought
reconsideration of the criminal aspect of the case. Specifically, she prayed for the reversal of the trial
courts order granting petitioners demurrer to evidence and the conduct of a full blown trial of the criminal
case. Nowhere in her petition did she even briefly discuss the civil liability of petitioners. It is apparent that
her only desire was to appeal the dismissal of the criminal case against the petitioners. Because bigamy
is a criminal offense, only the OSG is authorized to prosecute the case on appeal. Thus, Sally Go did not
have the requisite legal standing to appeal the acquittal of the petitioners.
Sally Go was mistaken in her reading of the ruling in Merciales. First, in the said case, the OSG joined the
cause of the petitioner, thereby meeting the requirement that criminal actions be prosecuted under the
direction and control of the public prosecutor.
30
Second, the acquittal of the accused was done without
due process and was declared null and void because of the nonfeasance on the part of the public
prosecutor and the trial court.
31
There being no valid acquittal, the accused therein could not invoke the
protection of double jeopardy.
TRIAL jrp
159

In this case, however, neither the Solicitor General nor the City Prosecutor of Caloocan City joined the
cause of Sally Go, much less consented to the filing of a petition for certiorari with the appellate court.
Furthermore, she cannot claim to have been denied due process because the records show that the trial
court heard all the evidence against the accused and that the prosecution had formally offered the
evidence before the court granted the demurrer to evidence. Thus, the petitioners acquittal was valid,
entitling them to invoke their right against double jeopardy.
Double jeopardy had already set-in
Petitioners contend that the December 3, 2003 Order of dismissal issued by the RTC on the ground of
insufficiency of evidence is a judgment of acquittal. The prosecution is, thus, barred from appealing the
RTC Order because to allow such an appeal would violate petitioners right against double jeopardy.
32

They insist that the CA erred in ordering the remand of the case to the lower court for further proceedings
because it disregarded the constitutional proscription on the prosecution of the accused for the same
offense.
33

On the other hand, Sally Go counters that the petitioners cannot invoke their right against double
jeopardy because the RTC decision acquitting them was issued with grave abuse of discretion, rendering
the same null and void.
34

A demurrer to evidence is filed after the prosecution has rested its case and the trial court is required to
evaluate whether the evidence presented by the prosecution is sufficient enough to warrant the conviction
of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. If the court finds that the evidence is not sufficient and grants
the demurrer to evidence, such dismissal of the case is one on the merits, which is equivalent to the
acquittal of the accused.
35
Well-established is the rule that the Court cannot review an order granting the
demurrer to evidence and acquitting the accused on the ground of insufficiency of evidence because to
do so will place the accused in double jeopardy.
36

The right of the accused against double jeopardy is protected by no less than the Bill of Rights (Article III)
contained in the 1987 Constitution, to wit:
Section 21. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an act is
punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another
prosecution for the same act.
Double jeopardy attaches if the following elements are present: (1) a valid complaint or information; (2) a
court of competent jurisdiction; (3) the defendant had pleaded to the charge; and (4) the defendant was
acquitted, or convicted or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his
express consent.
37
However, jurisprudence allows for certain exceptions when the dismissal is
considered final even if it was made on motion of the accused, to wit:
(1) Where the dismissal is based on a demurrer to evidence filed by the accused after the
prosecution has rested, which has the effect of a judgment on the merits and operates as an
acquittal.
(2) Where the dismissal is made, also on motion of the accused, because of the denial of his right
to a speedy trial which is in effect a failure to prosecute.
38

The only instance when the accused can be barred from invoking his right against double jeopardy is
when it can be demonstrated that the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction, such as where the prosecution was not allowed the opportunity to make its case
against the accused or where the trial was a sham.
39
For instance, there is no double jeopardy (1) where
the trial court prematurely terminated the presentation of the prosecution's evidence and forthwith
TRIAL jrp
160

dismissed the information for insufficiency of evidence;
40
and (2) where the case was dismissed at a time
when the case was not ready for trial and adjudication.
41

In this case, all four elements of double jeopardy are doubtless present. A valid information for the crime
of bigamy was filed against the petitioners, resulting in the institution of a criminal case against them
before the proper court. They pleaded not guilty to the charges against them and subsequently, the case
was dismissed after the prosecution had rested its case. Therefore, the CA erred in reversing the trial
courts order dismissing the case against the petitioners because it placed them in double jeopardy.
As previously discussed, an acquittal by virtue of a demurrer to evidence is not appealable because it will
place the accused in double jeopardy. However, it may be subject to review only by a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court showing that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction or a denial of due process.
42

Grave abuse of discretion has been defined as that capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment which is
tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. "The abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in
contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of
passion and hostility."
43
The party questioning the acquittal of an accused should be able to clearly
establish that the trial court blatantly abused its discretion such that it was deprived of its authority to
dispense justice.
44

The CA determined that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in ignoring the evidence
presented by the prosecution and granting petitioners demurrer to evidence on the ground that the
prosecution failed to establish by sufficient evidence the existence of the crime.
45
An examination of the
decision of the trial court, however, yields the conclusion that there was no grave abuse of discretion on
its part. Even if the trial court had incorrectly overlooked the evidence against the petitioners, it only
committed an error of judgment, and not one of jurisdiction, which could not be rectified by a petition for
certiorari because double jeopardy had already set in.
46

As regards Sally Gos assertion that she had been denied due process, an evaluation of the records of
the case proves that nothing can be further from the truth. Jurisprudence dictates that in order for a
decision of the trial court to be declared null and void for lack of due process, it must be shown that a
party was deprived of his opportunity to be heard.
47
Sally Go cannot deny that she was given ample
opportunity to present her witnesses and her evidence against petitioners. Thus, her claim that she was
denied due process is unavailing.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. The March 14, 2006 Decision and the May 22, 2006
Resolution of the Court of Appeals are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The December 3, 2003 Order of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 126, Caloocan City, in Criminal Case No. C-66783, granting the Demurrer to
Evidence of petitioners Benjamin B. Bangayan, Jr. and Resally de Asis Delfin and dismissing the case
against them is hereby REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.