Going Beyond Borders;

A Portrait of Professor Jan Johanson

jukka hohenthal
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Jan Johanson began his academic career at the Stockholm School of Economics in
the 1960s. At the time, microeconomic theory provided the prevailing understanding
of the world of business. Looking through its lens often meant a birds eye view and
consequently an oversimplified, serene and friction-free depiction of business as real
people and firms were left out of the equation and replaced by production functions
and the theoretical construct of an economic man. As Johanson moves to Uppsala
University to work under the legendary Professor Sune Carlson he commences a journey
that will eventually put him at odds with the theory and its proponents. This journey
however will also put him in touch with a group of scholars in Uppsala and lead to
the formulation of two contributions to management research that have had a lasting
impact: the Uppsala Internationalization Process model and the Network Theory.
by jukka hohenthal
M E R C U R Y M E R C U R Y
GOING
BEYOND
BORDERS
F
E
A
T
U
R
E
A PORTRAIT OF
PROFESSOR
JAN JOHANSON
an Johanson has a long and successful career
within academia. He started at The Stock-
holm School of economics, but was lured to
Uppsala by Sune Carlson, who was building
a management section at Uppsala Univer-
sity. Jan Johanson has worked with and in-
fluenced, and been influenced by academics
who have then left Uppsala to become pro-
fessors all around Sweden, as well as abroad,
in countries like Denmark, England, the us,
France and South Korea.
Living in the small town of Sigtuna be-
tween Uppsala and Stockholm, with his
wife and five children, several dogs and a
blind cat, he never travelled much and thus
his reputation was formed by what he wrote.
This also meant that people interested in
meeting Jan Johanson had to come to Up-
psala which resulted in a series of interest-
ing academics coming to discuss and present
their work. The Uppsala view has slowly
penetrated the academic world to become a
dominant paradigm, and it has also influenced the
way organizations like the Swedish trade council
and consulting firms give advice to international-
izing firms.
Ever since the industrial revolution Sweden has
been dependent on export and international trade
for its riches. Firms like Ericsson had a significant
international presence almost from their incep-
tion. The brand Ericsson was, for example, famous
enough to be used in a poem
1
written in 1923, by the
revolutionary Russian poet Vladimir Mayakovsky,
to depict his glowing emotions over a phone call
from his lover. Other Swedish brands have also
reached an iconic status in such ways that driving a
Volvo signifies intellectual safety consciousness and
ikea signifies both hipster culture and frustration.
Today about half of the Swedish gdp comes from
export and Sweden is dependent on international
trade for upholding the welfare state. Swedish firms
have become international out of necessity, as the
home market is too small to support economies
of scale in most industries. A majority of Swedish
firms with more than 50 employees are involved
in international business and thus have to handle
the increased complexity that international trade
usually leads to, and therefore a certain level of
knowledge about how to conduct business across
borders is vital for them.
We have seen countless examples of how diffi-
cult it is to transfer successful business models from
one market to another. One interesting example is
the us bank, Merrill Lynch
2
. During the Japanese
growth period of the 80s and 90s, people in Japan
became increasingly rich and in the middle of the
90s there were over 10 trillion usd in household
savings. A lack of social security led people to save a
high proportion of their income and this money was
mainly put in savings accounts with very low inter-
est rates. Merrill Lynch saw this as a tremendous
opportunity. Why would not people in Japan want
a return of 6 or 7% as their customers got in the us
instead of the 1% they got in Japanese banks?
Merrill Lynch tried to enter the Japanese mar-
ket twice with very little success. The first time
they wanted to build their own network of offices
in Japan, but as they understood that they only had
a few customers for each office, they decided to
leave the market. Later when the Japanese econo-
my started to slump, and after the Japanese bubble,
the fourth largest broker in Japan was failing and
Merrill Lynch decided to buy it to get access to their
employees, offices and customers. By transferring
American management and marketing methods to
Japan they believed that they would be able to turn
it around and capture a large chunk of the Japanese
market. This, however, also failed. Merrill Lynch
lost several hundred million usd in a few years by
underestimating the difficulties of working in a very
different cultural setting.
The dependence of the Swedish economy on
international trade has also led to considerable aca-
demic interest for the phenomenon and both in in-
ternational economics and international business,
Swedish researchers have become internationally
recognized. The Hecksher-Ohlin theorem and the
Uppsala internationalization process model are
widely used for analyzing international trade and
internationalization of firms.
The by far most cited article within interna-
tional business research in the world is the 1977
article, The Internationalization Process of the Firm
is through these connections that the firm develops
new knowledge and tests the knowledge they have.
In these meetings we have the moments-of-truth,
when what we believe is confronted by reality, and
knowledge based on experience is developed.
The Uppsala internationalization process model
contains several insights that were to be included in
management theory later. One was the realization
that firms possess several kinds of knowledge. They
decided to use a division of knowledge into explicit
and experiential knowledge. Explicit knowledge is
formal knowledge that can easily be transferred be-
tween persons, and thereby also between firms.
Experiential knowledge is knowledge adapted
for the specific needs of the situation and the firm.
Experiential knowledge is developed by acting in a
specific setting, such as a foreign market. It is hard
for a firm to know what knowledge they lack as they
are to do something new. Experiential knowledge
is built into the way the firm acts and the relation-
ships it has, and is thus hard to transfer, copy and
use by other firms. The competitive advantage of
firms usually resides in the experiential knowledge
of a firm.
ikea is an interesting example of how an incre-
mental learning process can create a business mod-
el that has been very hard to copy. The basic idea
of Ingvar Kamprad, founder of ikea, was that he
wanted to sell cheap furniture through mail order.
Difficulties in finding suppliers forced him to look
outside of the usual channels and start buying from
firms who did not normally produce furniture, and
from countries that Swedish furniture firms did not
usually buy from. The development of a superior lo-
gistics system to handle their novel supply system
gave ikea a cost advantage that no one has yet been
able to match.
Another insight was that we should talk about
commitment instead of investment, when firms en-
ter new markets. Investments only capture parts
of what firms do in new markets. Commitment
captures both the financial, temporal and atten-
tion aspects of what the firm does. It captures the
attention and strategic intent of a firm in a way that
investment does not.
a Model of Knowledge Development and Increas-
ing Foreign Market Commitment by Jan Johanson
and Jan-Erik Vahlne. In this article they introduce
two concepts to explain how firms expand into new
markets: knowledge creation (learning) and com-
mitment. The model was based on studies of how
Swedish firms grew across borders after the Second
World War. Jan Johansons view on how interna-
tionalization was carried out was formed through
an in depth study of Sandviks attempts to enter for-
eign markets. This study of Sandvik was followed by
studies of other big and small Swedish firms, mainly
in the industrial sector that was, and to some extent
still is, the dominant sector in Sweden.
Going out and studying what managers
actually do was something that Sune Carlson
had emphasized. Sune Carlson, who was the first
professor of Business Studies at Uppsala University,
started the discipline of international business
studies in Uppsala. He had a unique position in the
crossroads between research, management and
politics, that can only be compared to John Maynard
Keynes in England or Peter Drucker in the us.
Sune Carlson defended his dissertation at the
University of Chicago in 1936
3
and went on to work
for the un. When he returned to academia as a pro-
fessor of administration, as business studies was
known then, first at the Stockholm School of Eco-
nomics and then at Uppsala University, he managed
to get Swedish ceos to keep a journal where they
wrote down what they did during their days. Based
on these journals he wrote and published the first
comprehensive study of what managers actually do,
in the book Executive Behavior.
One of his key findings was that managers spend
little time on strategic or even tactical issues, and
much time reacting to minor and major emergen-
cies. Instead of a puppet master, managers often be-
come the puppets whose strings are pulled by what
others do. This book has influenced well known
management researchers like Henry Mintzberg and
Rosabeth Moss Kanter and through them the way
we teach and develop managers at most business
schools in the world.
Sune Carlson saw the need to develop know-
ledge about international business and also a need to
make management research more relevant through
studies of how firms actually act. The work on top
managers that Sune Carlson did also lead the group
of researchers in Uppsala to realize that if they were
to understand what really goes on in firms they have
to study middle managers.
According to Jan Johanson, the middle manag-
ers are the unsung heroes of business. These manag-
ers travel around the world, meeting potential cus-
tomers, and by their actions shape the development
of the firm. These managers transcend the bound-
aries of the firm, connecting it to other contexts. It
John Maynard Keynes
was one of the most
influential economists
of the 20th century who
worked both at Cambridge
University and for the
British government in
various positions. His work
on employment, interest
and money is still used
by finance departments
around the world. He
had an impact on both
academia and the world
economy. Keynes past
away in 1946.
Peter Drucker was an
influential management
thinker born in Vienna in
1909 who died in the US
in 2005. He consulted for
many of the biggest firms
in the world and influenced
management theory
through his 39 books
and countless articles in
magazines like Harvard
Business Review and the
Economist.
M E R C U R Y M E R C U R Y
To introduce a glimmer
of common sense into
theories can lead to all
kinds of confusion
firm. Cultural distance will, to some extent, work
for understanding trade development between
countries, but it is not very useful on a company
level. Psychic distance is simply everything that
hinders a firm to enter a market.
According to Johanson and Vahlne, firms in-
ternationalize in an incremental fashion. They
start with low commitment entry modes in coun-
tries with a low psychic distance. As they develop
experiential knowledge of the market and of how
to internationalize, they go on to higher commit-
ment modes and countries with a higher psychic
distance. It is usually not a question of investment
decisions where firms ponder which market to en-
ter, and after a rational evaluation of the various op-
tions, choose one. Instead it is the middle managers
who find and exploit opportunities by committing
resources they control.
This view also raises an interesting question
about where decisions are made in firms. Accord-
ing to Jan Johanson, what top managers see and un-
derstand about what happens in the firm, is filtered
through what the middle managers wants them to
see. It is therefore very difficult for headquarters
to become directly involved in an internationaliza-
tion process. Successful internationalization is thus
dependent on empowered middle managers, with
leeway to make decisions based on their superior
knowledge about the situation at hand.
The Uppsala model has its roots in trying to rec-
oncile the theory of the firm as it was formulated
by, among others, the future Nobel laureates Ronald
Coase and Oliver Williamson, with observed inter-
nationalization patterns among Swedish firms. The
research group in Uppsala found it impossible to
use the received theory to understand the observed
pattern and had to start looking for alternative ways
of conceptualizing the way firms internationalized.
According to Jan Johanson, they explored all lit-
erature they could lay their hands on, to find expla-
nations for what they saw. A key to understanding
was found in the writings of another future Nobel
laureate, Herbert Simon, and in an attempt to con-
ceptualise a theory of the growth of the firm, by
Edith Penrose. Both Penrose and Simon were con-
sidered mavericks among economists.
Simon, who died in 2001, not only developed
management as a science, but was alsooneof thefirst
researchers to use computer simulations in research
on human behavior. He also founded the Carnegie
Tech School of Management Research, which prob-
ably is the most influential force in shaping modern
management thinking. He did groundbreaking work
in psychology, artificial intelligence, computer sci-
ence, economics, sociology and pedagogy.
Two of his most famous concepts are satisfic-
ing, the idea that in choosing among alternatives we
very seldom try to find the best option, and bounded
A third insight was that market entry is not a ques-
tion of single choices; instead we have to see it as a
process. Jan spent the first fifteen years of his career
coming to grips with a processual view of business.
Most economic theory tends to see business as sin-
gle investment decision, production, functions and
demand/supply structures, and miss out on the ever
changing fluidity of real business.
By studying what firms do, Jan Johanson and
Jan-Erik Vahlne could formulate a model in which
firms commit to a market, gather experiential
knowledge, increase their commitment, and thus
gather more experiential knowledge. In other stud-
ies over the last 35 years, this incremental process
has been studied over and over again and the results
seem to be rather robust. Firms tend to start with
low commitment entry modes, like export, and then
go on to high commitment entry modes, like subsid-
iaries. Internationalization is thus a process and not
a discrete investment decision for management to
evaluate and decide on.
Afourth insight, that was formulated earlier, but
included in the model, was the concept of psychic
distance. Psychic distance consists of the cultural,
economic and legal differences between countries.
The prediction is that firms will start their inter-
nationalization in countries with a low psychic
distance, and then go on to countries with a higher
psychic distance. This relationship is also a robust
one. Globalization has not had any great impact on
where firms start their internationalization. For Jan
Johanson this concept was never that interesting,
but within international business research it is one
of the most discussed and used concepts we have.
Psychic distance is a wider concept than cultur-
al distance, which is what we usually talk about in
connection to international business. Cultural dis-
tance is a way of looking at the difference between
countries, even though countries can have several
cultures, to determine how difficult it will be to in-
teract between them. The more different, the hard-
er it should be to establish business relationships
between the countries.
The most famous way to measure cultural dis-
tance was developed by the Dutch psychologist
Geert Hofstede. Hofstede studied the difference in
how employees and managers viewed management
in the various branches of ibm. These studies made
it possible to divide the countries of the world ac-
cording to four different criteria: power distance, in-
dividualism versus collectivism, masculinity versus
femininity, and uncertainty avoidance.
Based on a classification of the studied coun-
tries, it is possible to calculate a cultural difference
between nations, thus making predictions on how
difficult it will be to enter that market. But if we
use the concept of psychic distance instead, we take
down the aggregation level from the nation to the
acute problems. This may mean that a number of
partly contradictory goals have to be reached at the
same time. Each decision-maker in such a situation
attempts to find a satisfactory solution to his own
set of problems, taking into consideration how the
others are solving theirs.
This replacement of a rational economic man
with a satisfacing actor who is prepared to accept
good enough solutions, opened up a possibility of
introducing learning and dispersed knowledge into
the theories and this was something that Jan Johan-
son found intriguing. Even though he saw learning
as a central facet of business activity, they could not
use the word learning in their publications, as it
was not an accepted part of the theory of the firm
in the 1970s. Instead they talked about knowledge
creation. To understand what knowledge was, they
had to search for researchers who had used it and
defined it in economic settings in a way that would
capture the different facets of the concept. They
found a clue in the writings of Edith Penrose.
Edith Penrose
4
was another maverick econo-
mist who spent a large part of her career outside of
rationality - that even if we want to act rationally,
in most situations we are incapable of acquiring and
processing the information that we need. Both these
concepts have been instrumental for research on
human action. In his speech, introducing Herbert
Simon at the Nobel Prize ceremony in 1978, Sune
Carlson described him with the following words:
Simon rejects the assumptions made in the clas-
sical theory of the firm of an omniscient, rational,
profit-maximizing entrepreneur. Instead, he starts
from the psychology of learning, with its less com-
plicated rules of choice and its more moderate de-
mands on the memory and the calculating capacity
of the decision-maker. He replaces the entrepreneur
of the classical school with a number of cooperating
decision-makers, whose capacities for rational ac-
tion are limited by a lack of knowledge of the total
consequences of their decisions and by personal
and social ties. Since these decision-makers cannot
choose a best alternative, as can the classical entre-
preneur, they have to be content with a satisfactory
alternative. Individual firms therefore, strive not to
maximize profits but to find acceptable solutions to
Ronald Coase was born
in England and worked
mainly in the US as an
economist. He received the
Nobel Prize in Economics
in 1991 mainly for his work
on the theory of the firm.
Coase was born in 1910 in
London.
Oliver Williamson won the
Nobel Prize in economics
in 2009 for his work on
transaction cost theory. He
is a professor at Berkeley,
California.
M E R C U R Y M E R C U R Y
Jan Johanson is Emeritus
Professor of International
Business at the Department
of Business Studies
(Uppsala University).
He has published a
plethora of books and
articles including The
Internationalization Process
of the Firm and Business
Networks. He is also the
cofounder of The IMP
Group.
Henry Mintzberg is a
prominent professor of
management at McGill
University in Canada. His
alternative way of looking
at strategy and opposition
against the dominant
view based on Porter has
received a lot of interest
both within and outside
academia.
Rosabeth Moss
Kanter is a professor
at Harvard Business
School whose work on
change management and
management in general has
been very influential.
group in Uppsala tried to introduce relevance into
the economic theories and as Jan Johanson says
to introduce a glimmer of common sense into the
theories can lead to all kinds of confusion. Much of
economic theories are developed for macro levels,
where individual actors are relatively unimportant,
but if we are to understand the actions of individuals
and firms, we have to develop theories that work
for these, instead of economic theory building
on simplified and unrealistic assumptions about
human action, as much of the economic theory did
(and does).
According to Jan Johanson the relationship be-
tween knowledge development and commitment is
almost trivial. But for economic theory, that is not
concerned with the mid level in the form of firms,
it makes no sense to include these concepts. If we
are to understand the actions of firms, we have to
develop a theory of the mid-level, and this is where
he has concentrated his efforts. This also meant that
although they studied the actions of individuals, the
firm was seen as a repository of individual knowl-
edge to simplify the theoretical reasoning.
This focus on the mid level later led Jan Jo-
hanson to go on to try to understand how firms are
connected. He thus worked on network theory for a
long time. This focus on business relationships also
stems from the empirical work done. What they
saw was that firms do not compete the way theory
would stipulate. Instead firms tend to emphasize
cooperation with customers and suppliers and to
some extent even with competitors.
The focus on business relationships as the build-
ing blocks of industries instead of the firm, leads us
to see markets as something else than a place where
firms compete against each other for each new busi-
ness deal. Business is usually conducted in long last-
ing relationships where repeat business is the norm
and where most firms can only function against
the backdrop of such business relationships. Enter-
ing new markets is costly and time consuming and
without a steady income from existing business it
becomes much harder.
Afocus on business relationships also has an im-
pact on how we see international business. Entering
a new market usually means finding a customer in
that market to sell to, and whatever cultural dis-
tance between the countries, it will be mitigated by
the business relationships.
Jan Johanson spent the first fifteen years trying
to understand the processual aspects of business,
the next fifteen trying to make sense of the inter-
connected network world, and the remainder trying
to put these together. Networks are basically struc-
tures, and were studied as such for a long time. To
introduce dynamic aspects into networks is harder,
and describing them as they are always in motion
makes the models difficult to understand.
academia, working and living in Switzerland during
the Second World War, later in Canada, and then in
the us, where she started her work on The theory
of the growth of the firm. The McCarthy era witch-
hunts led her and her husband to leave for work
abroad, and after stints in Australia, Iraq, Lebanon
and Egypt, she ended up at the London School of
Economics with a chair in Asian economics.
She was never quite accepted into the canon of
economic theory. Instead her reputation grewoutside
of mainstreameconomics andtoday she is a must read
for researchers and others interested instrategy, espe-
cially in the various resource/knowledge based views
on how firms manage to compete on markets. The
Uppsala School of international business was early in
discovering and using her theories for explaining how
and why firms grow. According to Jan Johanson, dis-
covering Penrose was a revelation because she man-
agedtoexplainthe role of knowledge inthe expansion
of firmactivities: Penrose managedtoconnect resourc-
es to knowledge in a way that made sense.
WhenPenrose startedto work onhowfirms grow,
she discovered that received economic theory was too
static to be able to handle change at company level.
Mainstream economic theory had no companies in
it, the firm was simply a set of supply and demand
functions, and thus she had to search elsewhere. In
her view, firms exist becausetheyarebetter at creating
knowledge than markets. Since it is the growth in
knowledge that makes it possible for companies
to expand into new markets and new product
areas, learning becomes a central driving force for
development. Like Penrose and Simon, the research
not per se the difference in the level
of economic development, but rather
the organization of economic life. In
developed markets, we have invested
a great deal in rules and regulations,
and we have installed institutions
and so on that control these. In
emerging markets, the growth of this
institutional environment often lags
behind the growth of the market (and
that is an understatement). Often,
business arrangements are therefore
based on less solid grounds, as we
in the western world tend to see it,
namely connections, social relations,
or other forms of trust guarantees. To
learn your way in this, for western firms
unfamiliar, ambiguous and complex
environment, is what makes doing
business in emerging markets a struggle.
A second issue that has drawn the
interest of academics is the success
of some companies fromemerging
markets that have succeeded to
challenge developed-market players.
Well known examples of this are
Cemex fromMexico, Hyundai from
South Korea, Infosys fromIndia and
Haier and Lenovo fromChina. All
of these companies challenged the
existing dominant multinationals in
their regions, and won territory on
the global market. Explanations of
the success of these companies are
definitely not limited to low labor
cost benefits in the home market, or
successful copy-cat behavior. Many of
themhave actually developed some
great advantages of their own, and
their capacity to develop innovations is
not to be underestimated.
Finally, this leads into the discussion
about the changing (economic) balance
in the world. China feels like the place
to be today if you want to keep in
touch with your global competitors,
and Chinese companies expand heavily
abroad, also in Sweden, taking hold of
some of the flagships of the Swedish
economy. And if Chinas economic
success will appear persistent, then the
countrys business culture may perhaps
set a new moral standard. Maybe
Western countries will then be part of
the next wave of emerging markets?
This summer I visited two conferences
and both of themhosted numerous
sessions and panel discussions around
emerging markets. These often resulted
in lively debates on the question of
whether we enter a new geo-political
era and what that will mean for us.
It is peculiar that the first country you
might think of when you hear the term
emerging markets is China, almost
the biggest market in the world! It is
also China that is mentioned in this
summers conference discussions as a
country that plays a determining role
in todays geo-political rebalancing.
It is intriguing that we label such an
important country as emerging. It
makes me wonder what it takes for a
market to become emerging, or for a
market that once was emerging to stop
being so. Although there are several
definitions of what an emerging market
is, there appear to be no official rules
for when markets stop being emerging
and become, well, developed.
Over time many different markets
have been labeled emerging markets.
In the 1970s, countries like Mexico,
Thailand, Indonesia, and South Korea
were markets characterized by rapid
growth and industrialization. Korea,
together with Hong Kong, Singapore
and Taiwan were so successful that
they later were referred to as the
Asian Tigers. After the fall of the Iron
Curtain, the countries in Central and
Eastern Europe came into focus, later
to be renamed as transition markets.
Then the era of the BRIC markets
started and most recently a number of
up and coming markets in Africa are
added to the family. Only a handful
of these former emerging markets are
now included in the lists of developed
countries.
So what issues do academics in
international business discuss with
regard to emerging markets? One
issue is of course the challenges
that confront firms fromdeveloped
economies doing business in
these emerging markets. The most
important difference between
developed and emerging markets is
Rian Drogendijk
The International Perspective
Economic and Political Rebalancing
and the Role of Emerging Markets
Jan Johanson does not think that the influence of
either the internationalization process model or net-
work theory is going to go away any time soon. There
have been claims that increased globalization and
new tools in the form of computers, management
and data analysis, have made older theories obsolete,
but Jan Johanson says that There are claims that we
somehow have become more rational, but reality is
still elusive and complex. We are still limited in our
rationality and introducing more information does
not make it easier for us to handle reality.
We still need to work on simplifications of real-
ity to make sense of the world, and these two mod-
els work. They give us a possibility to understand
complex phenomena. Jan Johanson says that such
steps towards adapting to an Anglo-American way
to view research, has led us in Sweden to follow
the stream towards more rigorous research. But we
risk losing the advantage we have had in Sweden,
in which companies have been open and possible to
approach for researchers. By working close to reali-
ty, relevance has been our thing and we have been
able to take steps in understanding business, that
have been harder for American researchers, where
it is much harder to get access to companies.
Jan Johanson was able to work on problems that
interested him and develop his knowledge over long
periods of time, as universities had more resources
and he and his associates did not have to try to find
external funding for this research, in the same way
as academics have to do today. This made it pos-
sible to really dig into the problem and to develop a
new paradigm for how we view international busi-
ness. Going against the dominant paradigm is much
harder in a system where the representatives of that
paradigm usually decides who will get research
funding and where chances are that they would
be unwilling to support research that goes against
their own contributions within the field. It is also
much harder to publish articles that go against the
dominant logic of the field.
Globalization, digitalization, migration and
harmonization of laws and regulations have made
Swedish companies more dependent on under-
standing the threats and opportunities in a global
economy. This has made the work of Jan Johanson
even more relevant today than it was 35 years ago.
The incorporation of network theory in the interna-
tionalization model has also made it more relevant
for firms working in an interconnected network
economy. Jan Johanson has also worked on born
globals, web based business and internationaliza-
tion of services, but he claims that the basic model
still holds for for these types of firms too. The con-
tributions that might change our view on the inter-
nationalization process come from entrepreneur-
ship research rather than international business
research according to Jan Johanson.
I tell people that the model
is based on common sense
and is therefore rather
trivial. This seems to
upset some people who
want to see it as more
profound than it really is
NOTES
1

The poem About That.
2

Merrill Lynch was one the
financial institutions hit
hardest by the 2008 crisis
and it was later taken over
by Bank of America.
3

Sune Carlsons thesis
was later rewritten and
the resulting book is still
considered as a minor
classic in economics.
4

The description of
Penroses life is taken
from Christos Pitelis
introduction to the 2009
edition of Theory of the
growth of the firm (Oxford
University Press).
M E R C U R Y M E R C U R Y