The Air-Brushing of History: Stalin and Falsification

3.1 Introduction
Sixty years on from the Stalins death, his reign of terror still echoes through twentieth century
Soviet and Russian history. David King had undertaken a great deal of painstaking research looking
at the degree to which Stalin used, or manipulated, images for propaganda purposes (see
http://www.davidkingcollection.com/ or http://www.davidkingcollection.com/rainbow.swf) the
cause clbre of photo manipulation in historical research, and it was so prevalent as to be
obvious. The practice was cruelly parodied in George Orwells 1984, with the Ministry of Truth
writing history by amending previous newspapers or reports. The phrase airbrushed out of
history comes from the Stalinist practice. We will survey this particular instance in detail, as it will
allow us consider the concrete examples in the modern era later in the course.
Podcast of Jonathan Waterlow 'No Laughing Matter? Popular humour and Soviet society in Stalins
1930s,' Royal Holloway, University of London, Department of History Research Seminar, 12 March
2013, can be found at http://backdoorbroadcasting.net/2013/03/jonathan-waterlow-no-laughing-
matter-popular-humour-and-soviet-society-in-stalins-1930s/.
See the NEWSEUM site (http://www.newseum.org/berlinwall/commissar_vanishes/) for a number
of online examples from David King's book's below
King, D. The Commissar Vanishes: The Falsification of Photographs and Art in Stalins Russia. New
York; Metropolitan Books 1997. (http://www.amazon.co.uk/Commissar-Vanishes-David-
King/dp/0805052941/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1355754034&sr=1-1): (in the lecture,
principally pp. 16-17, 74-75, 83 (top two photos), 110, 115 (top two photos), 163, 188-89).
King, David. Red Star Over Russia: A Visual History of the Soviet Union. Tate Publishing; London,
2010. (http://www.amazon.co.uk/Red-Star-Over-Russia-History/dp/1854379356/ref=pd_sim_b_1)
(All pictures on the following pages for the lectures: pp. 28-29, 212-15, 240-41, 258-59, 284-85,
308-309 and 340-41).
King, David. Russian Revolutionary Posters. Tate Publishing; London, 2012.
(http://www.amazon.co.uk/Russian-Revolutionary-Posters-David-
King/dp/1849760195/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1367425496&sr=1-
1&keywords=david+king)
(All pictures on the following pages for the lectures: pp. 22-23, 38-39, 52-53, 84-85, 104-105, 108-
109, 130-133, and 136-37).
David King Collection (the first URL will work internationally, but there is a problem of scale, as
you will see.
1
The second site works for IP addresses in the UK, but is not guaranteed to do so
internationally (http://www.davidkingcollection.com/ or
http://www.davidkingcollection.com/rainbow.swf). See also a very interesting interview with
David King in Eye Magazine: http://www.eyemagazine.com/feature/article/repuations-david-king;
and an article he wrote on the issue of falsification:
www.history-ontheweb.co.uk/sources/62_photos_davidking.pdf
The term being airbushed out of history arose from Stalins desire to remove from the historical
record visually or otherwise individuals who fell from his favour, and frequently died as a
consequence. Stalin knew the power of the image, and manipulated them according. A notorious
practice consigned to the past? No, it would appear, figuratively at least: The Guardian newspaper
on New Years Eve 2011 reported allegations that the African National Congress, the ruling party in
South Africa, was doing precisely that - "airbrushing people out" of the struggle against
apartheid, to emphasise the centrality of the ANC role (see
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/dec/31/anc-centenary-airbrushing-history). And literally?
Well, think about the Four and Six examples we considered in Week 1. In 20 or 30 years time,
these publications will be the historical references for future researchers are we simply being
manipulated, or is the history of the modern age being altered as a matter of course for the
expediencies of publication?
Reflective Task
Discuss the concept of 'air-brushing' of history, figuratively, literally, and in the context of George
Orwell's 1984 (although he does not use that specific term).

1
I have just spoken to David King on the phone, and we did laugh about the problem these were all done in Flash, for
VGA screens. When he has completed his next book deadline November, I will see if we can reproduce these images
in a more modern way, using non-contact copying that is photographing the originals.

3.2 The Soviet Union
The following is for background it is an edited version of lecture notes from another University of
London International Programmes course I run. This will mean that some of the material in the
PDFs for 3.2 and 3.3 will blend together, and you might find it useful to read 3.3 immediately after
this body of text.
3.2.1 The USSR in the 1930s: An administrative difficulty
One of the things the Soviet system had to come to terms with during the first decade of its
existence was the degree to which the old capitalist regime could be rejected. As noted in the
lecture, the NEP (New Economic Policy) was a stopgap, somewhere between capitalism and
economic socialism, allowing free enterprise in a state-controlled system. The fundamental
problem facing the Soviet system was that the underlying principles of capitalist economics Adam
Smiths 'invisible hand, the aggregate of individual pursuit towards personal gain had to be
subverted. With the NEP, the Soviet Union had something more akin to a post-1945 mixed
economy than a truly socialist one, but with a high degree of state intervention. The Yugoslavian
(pre-1980) or Swedish model (before the 1990s) might be a good fit in comparison. However, this
was not the goal of the Soviet regime, both in terms of the development of the USSR and from an
ideological perspective. The word Soviet is Russian for council, and in an idealistic world, that is
how the USSR would have wanted to have been run, as a series of hierarchical Soviets, with the
legitimacy of decision-making being determined by delegation moving up the structure. This
grounds the principle of the workers owning the means of production in the system.
A fully articulated Soviet system would have made decisions from the very base of the pyramid to
the very top, from the factory to the leadership itself. This is impractical in the real world, but does
reflect the revolutionary ideal and origins of the local Soviets in the 1920s, with membership
drawn from soldiers, factory workers and the agricultural peasantry. This ideal of joint decision-
making is important, as it also embodies the idea that joint ownership (through the state) also
means socialist redistribution based on need, rather than earning capacity.
The problem the USSR faced during the 1920s was that of price as a mechanism for allocating
resources. We in the West take it for granted that price will be a way of indicating an imputed
worth of a good, and that we will judge this against our view of the worth of that good (its utility)
relative to the price. Price can be used to indicate quality or scarcity, but the final balance of supply
and demand in the capitalist system is where an equilibrium is reached between aggregate supply
and demand at a given price, or prices, for a particular good or commodity.
By the end of the 1920s Soviet economic development was handicapped by a relative price
differential of agricultural goods over industrial products. The Soviet high command needed a
more broadly based industrial sector to secure the long-term future of the USSR. Internal supply
lines, fuel production, and importantly an autonomous capacity to produce armaments (requiring
basic heavy industries in metal refining and chemicals, and a manufacturing sector capable of
producing modern ships, tanks and aircraft) needed to be developed against any future military
threat to the USSR. While that was unlikely in the economic context of the 1920s in Europe, and
then the capitalist Great Depression, 192933, the rise of radical politics in central and southern
Europe, especially after 1933, did build up tensions between east and west that finally culminated
with Operation Barbarossa in June 1941.
3.2.2 The genesis of the five-year plan
Faced with the problem in 1928 that price was causing a problem for the direction of the Soviet
Union, a decision was effectively made to remove price from the economic equation. In principle,
if not in practice, the governing council of the Soviet Union could direct all productive capacity
within its territorial domain and control. As the higher aspirations of society, in Marxist terms,
overrode individual needs, state direction of resources could be justified in the name of securing
the integrity of the Soviet state. Sacrifices needed to be made to achieve Soviet industrial and
defence goals. These sacrifices were largely made by the mass of the Soviet peoples during the
1930s, at the behest of the central Soviets in Moscow. To the extent that Russia, and the Russian
people, had a strong aversion to being invaded a curse of their history these sacrifices were
accepted. The strength of Soviet resistance when their territories were breached can be seen after
the German invasion, and to the perceived threat of NATO in the Cold War. From 1928, the state
increasingly took control of the economy. This was the genesis of the era of central planning and, in
particular, the five-year plan.
The drive towards autarky (strict national self-sufficiency) in the 1930s was accepted as a national
goal, and the price for this was civil pain to secure industrialisation. However, human nature being
what it is (and was), in an economic system incentives are seen to be important. Ultimately,
altruistic rewards will only sustain most people for so long, and they will then want something
more tangible in return for their efforts. Targets being set with increasing regularity by Soviet
governments after 1928 and resources allocated without direct reference to economic cost in price
terms meant that the profit motive was undermined, and personal gains in monetary terms were
more difficult to achieve.
3.2.3 How did the system survive in these circumstances?
Mark Harrison of Warwick University has put forward an alternative model to traditional
interpretations explaining the degree to which the USSR survived with a state-directed economy
through most of the twentieth century. His interpretation is one we will return to in the context of
the demise of the USSR, but its principal argument is compatible with the broad sweep of the
history of the Soviet Union, and the reality of the 1930s. You can find an earlier version of his
paper ('Coercion, Compliance, and the Collapse of the Soviet Command Economy') at Prof
Harrison's website
(http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/staff/academic/harrison/public/ehr02postprint.p
df.) For those who wish to delve deeper into this topic, you can read Prof Harrison's current 'work
in progress' papers
(http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/staff/academic/harrison/papers/) and some of
his already published works (look for the 'postprint' links against a number of titles of the following
page: http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/staff/academic/harrison/public/)
Harrison argues that the Soviet system replaced monetary incentive with coercion as the
motivating medium from Stalins accession to power. Death, or the threat of death, replaced profit.
Estimates range from between 1030 million that were 'removed' from the Soviet population
through the period of Stalins Great Terror of the 1930s in the pursuit of forced industrialisation
and the cementing of Stalins political power base. The influence of the kulaks was seen as a
divisive force in the reform of Soviet agriculture. Perhaps 300,000 kulak households were deported
away from their areas of settlement to free land for agricultural reform, and this extends to maybe
1.32.2 million households that were moved or liquidated to galvanise Soviet farming. Those who
survived with their lives might find themselves in the hated Gulag camps (where perhaps 3.3
million prisoners of all types were held on the eve of the Second World War). The dislocation of
farming expertise associated with this forced reform was initially to the detriment of overall
agricultural efficiency. This contributed to the extent of the 193031 grain failures, and the death
of perhaps seven million through starvation and famine over the period 193233. Repression as an
acceptable policy was actively discussed and endorsed amongst senior party officials as a way of
giving leadership to the country in time of reform. Factory absenteeism would routinely be
punished by dismissal, eviction from factory or state housing and the loss of coincidental benefits.
This came on top of the political elimination of Stalins enemies, or, frankly, anyone who could be
conceived as posing a threat to Stalins regime. This also had the added disadvantage of removing a
stratum of intellectuals, who while they were most capable of expressing dissent, were also the
most capable of effecting change. It is almost not possible to speak dispassionately about this
episode of Soviet history, and the preceding discussion on economic efficiency might seem
somewhat churlish in comparison. It is possible to argue that the human capital of a nation is both
its most enduring and most valuable resource. Here is a terrible example of the waste of such a
precious resource.
The divergence of experience after 1928 was remarkable. According to Prof Eric Hobsbawm, Stalin
initiated 'breakneck industrialisation' in that year by allowing a greater role for centralised planning
and the creation of a central administration to support Gosplan. In contrast, the USA was on the
eve of a decade-long depression. Over the decade 192838, it is reasonable to say that Soviet
industrial production nearly tripled; in the USA, industrial output in 1938 was still 10% below its
1928 level. Stalins administration set a number of strategic targets for industrialisation and
agricultural reform, and Gosplan was used as a facilitating institution to achieve these goals. The
principal device was the use of five-year plans over the period 192941 (starting in 1928). This was
pursued with ruthless desire by every means by Stalin, with ideological warfare and political
terror being used as tools alongside the planning and construction of productive capacity. There
was widespread use of propaganda to promote national economic goals, with a countrywide re-
motivation' of economic activity. There was a focus on heavy industry and energy creation,
especially in the development of an industrial factory sector large enough to propel Soviet
development further forward. In parallel to this, there was to be the collectivisation of agriculture
(returning the organisation, to a degree, back to the state that it had been in under private, large
estate management before 1917) and trade union reform to facilitate more flexible labour
responses to achieve planning goals. Though not to the same degree as War Communism, the
operation of the economy was to be 'as if at war', and, as noted, open coercion 'the Great Terror'
would underpin the drive to further economic growth.
Possibly the most enduring aspect of this whole package was Gosplan, which still formally existed,
and still operated as part of Soviet economic planning, at the demise of the USSR in 1991. Gosplan
was the State Planning Commission (Committee) and dated from 1921; its purpose was to assist
the planning and implementation of government economic policy. From 1926 Gosplan was the
principal agency collecting and processing economic data to inform policy and planning. However,
it was not until 1928 that the core of economic strategy came to rest in the agency, and from 1931
it was the principal agency directing planning. From 1928, there was a better central operation of
Gosplan with increased civil service support and emphasis on the construction of planning
horizons for the Soviet economy. The upward emphasis on planning did propel the Soviet economy
forward, although the targets for the first five year plan were not finalised until 1930, and some
were set so high that they were not achieved until after the Second World War. However, the years
of 192829 were when the direction of Stalin was converted into plans (if not wholly workable
ones) by Gosplan. The pressure of strengthening coercion made it easier for the centralised
planners to impose on individual regions and factories production targets. This is the period when
the forced collectivisation of agriculture really began to bite. The emphasis was to bring agriculture
into state control, so that it could be made more efficient (through the operations of larger farms),
and so that the state could appropriate any surpluses to use to fund new industrial investment
where simple redirection of funds could not achieve the desired growth. Electrification, inland
transportation, capital goods production and heavy industry were the areas given priorities, to
better integrate the Soviet industrial sector. Rationing was also introduced to help mitigate the
dislocation to internal supplies of foods to the main body of the population while the new system
began to be revised. The crisis of grain production 193033 hindered agricultural reform and the
driving forward of industrialisation, as well as taking a huge cost in human life. Grain production
was still 10% below its 1930 figure in 1935, and the 1932 harvest was possibly only about 60% of
the 1930 one. However, by the end of 1932, perhaps three out of five rural families were in
collectivised farms.

3.2.4. The Coming of War

From 1937 until the war in 1941, political suppression took a greater prominence, during which the
military was strengthened at the expense of consumer production. However, the new agricultural
and production regime had delivered, and Stalin could boast on the international stage as to the
effectiveness of socialism in effecting economic growth in contrast to stagnation in the US and only
slow recovery in the rest of Western Europe. There were some positives for the USSR, including
reduced infant mortality, an improvement in literacy rates and life expectancy (for most of the
USSR, excepting the Great Terror), and a genuine sense of national pride generated by the way the
nation had reached a position of industrial strength and defensive security in the 1930s while
the capitalist system foundered. The rouble was not supplanted, but central planning became the
main determining factor in industrial production. This was problematical, as if the cost of
production was imputed, most production was inefficient in terms of the monetary value of the
resources used to achieve the final output. Gosplan and the civil service that grew up around it
was over-centralised, until the circumstances of the Second World War forced greater flexibility
and delegation on the system, and became over-reliant on 'targets' in the 1930s, rather than needs
or feasible production targets. During the era of the five-year plans, the achievement of output
goal was often chaotic, with shortages and bottlenecks in production being common. One harsh
economic consequence of the five-year plans was the minimisation of social provision and
personal consumption to achieve the goals desired for industrial infrastructure. Much of the
production gains were achieved at the expense of forced savings (not paying workers in
proportion to their productivity increases), although at the end of the second set of five-year plans,
there was greater emphasis on consumer production for the home market than previously.
Compulsory collectivisation was disastrous to agriculture, from the famine in 193233 through to
the production declines during the 1930s, which Soviet agriculture was slow to recover from. The
Great Terror, as noted, removed a stratum of society most able and sufficiently flexible to be at
the vanguard of economic change, but Stalin preferred to implement reform through the 'Terror'.
We can see this from the fact that when the 1937 population census figure produced a population
figure 10% below 1932 projections, Stalin had the architects of the census shot (literally),
suppressed the publication of the census (which did not see the public light of day for 50 years)
and ordered a new census for 1939. The 1939 census takers, in concern for their own hides, came
up with a figure of 172 million a more acceptable one to Stalin than the 1937 figure. So we must
also remember that the economic energising also came with an almost complete suppression of
social freedom.

A further point needs to be considered here in explaining the effectiveness of the Soviet system
from 1941. While the SovietGerman agreement to invade and share Poland cannot be seen as
being one of high principle, it did allow Stalin an additional year to prepare for war, and offered a
buffer of non-Soviet territory once any invasion began. The 194145 Eastern Front is known in
Russia as the 'Great Patriotic War'. While improvements in economic management certainly had an
impact in improving the Soviet war effort, it would be extremely unwise to underestimate the
willingness of the Soviets to make sacrifices in repelling an invading enemy. In many respects, this
is the war Lenin and Stalin had been preparing for. This preparation was not simply economic, but
ideological: avoiding invasion spoke deeply to the Russian population and a cultural history in
which military threat from outside had been a very real threat for many centuries. Therefore, the
will to succeed underpinned the Soviet war effort, and in this strong parallels can be drawn with
the nature of the British home front and the desire not only to win, but to build a better Britain as
a consequence of victory. While it may be true that the supply of western munitions and supplies
was critical in supporting the Soviet war effort, it was the combination of a change in the economic
system, the rapid industrialisation against an undetermined threat during the 1920s and 1930s,
and a willingness of the population and leadership in the USSR to adapt and apply themselves in
trying times that meant the system of central planning survived and was strengthened by the
experience of the Second World War.
Reflective Task
Discuss the relationship between coercion and terror in the USSR during the 1930s, and the
economic and political control of the Communist Party.
3.3 The Soviet Union Under Stalin

The BBC documentary 'War of the Century - When Hitler Fought Stalin', which I mentioned in
passing, can be found on YouTube (such as at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G7jpOLytiZg),
and is available for purchase as well (http://www.amazon.com/War-Century-Hitler-Fought-
Stalin/dp/B00097DY6G). However, this should be considered more as background.
Having given a broad discussion about the background to the purges and loss of Soviet life in the
1930s and 1940s, we need to actually consider the man himself. The BBC History site is a good
place to start (http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/historic_figures/stalin_joseph.shtml). With regards
to the number of people who died at Stalin's orders, that following is particularly depressing
('Hitler vs. Stalin: Who Killed More?' March 10, 2011, Timothy Snyder, The New York Review of
Books, http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2011/mar/10/hitler-vs-stalin-who-killed-
more/?pagination=false). Similarly, Cynthia Haven's report on Norman Naimark's research on the
matter hardly makes cheery reading (http://news.stanford.edu/news/2010/september/naimark-
stalin-genocide-092310.html). The same applies to Prof William D Rubinstein's summary of his
own research (http://www.socialaffairsunit.org.uk/blog/archives/001190.php).
Reflective Task
During the 1932-33 famine, perhaps seven million members of the Soviet Union lost their lives as
Stalin forced through the collectivisation of agriculture. Including the political purges of the 'Great
Terror' (1937-38), estimates run from 10-30 millions dying in the Soviet Union in the 1930s,
although we would probably favour a figure of 'over ten million' based on more modern re-
evaluations of the period. Stalin achieved one of his principal objectives through the 1930s the
forced industrialisation of the USSR in part because of this massive sacrifice of human life.
Discuss what you know of Stalin in this context.

3.4 The Image as Propaganda
David King has very kindly granted us permission to reproduce a number of his images from the
three books cited in the lectures. Therefore the reflective task for 3.4 and 3.5 will ask you to
review and comment on the selected images given to you in the accompanying files.
Reflective Task
Please review and comment on the material in the PowerPoint file 3.4, which considers material
from David King's Red Star Over Russia: A Visual History of the Soviet Union and Russian
Revolutionary Posters.

3.5 Falsification
As noted in 3.4, David King has allowed us to reproduce a number images from his published
works. Here, we are going to address The Commissar Vanishes: The Falsification of Photographs
and Art in Stalins Russia directly.

You also get a broader view from Tamara Machmut-Jhashi review of King's The Commissar
Vanishes (http://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=2514). For those of you in the UK, Kat
Hayes report for Independent Television News (ITN) in the UK reviews a more contemporary
example reviewing Stalin (and Hitler's) practices
(http://www.itn.co.uk/And%20Finally/58454/how-hitler-and-stalin-erased-people-from-history).
All of these reinforce the message from the lecture, and David King's research.
Reflective Task
Please review and comment on the material in the PowerPoint file 3.5, which considers material
from David King's The Commissar Vanishes: The Falsification of Photographs and Art in Stalins
Russia.
3.6 Conclusion
Here, the comment on the lecture overall is embodied in the question below.

Reflective Task
Why did Stalin pursue a policy of 'air-brushing' history during his control of the USSR through the
alteration of images and photographs?

New Researchers: The Book, Film and Public History
3.7 Interview with Andy and Izzy about their own work:
The Damned United and In the Name of the Father
Both Izzy and Andy have just finished their final year at Royal Holloway, with both graduating with
the BA(Hons) in History. I taught both of them in their second year on two linked courses: HS2301
Research Skills and HS2300 Independent Essay. I supervised them on my independent essay
seminar (Post-1965 Anglo-American History through film, book, TV and rock opera), and when
we interviewed them about their own work, they had just handed in their 5,000-6,000 word
research essay. They selected their own topics, but the constraint was that it had to deal with a
British or American topic in the main which took place in 1965 or after where a historical film or
documentary had been made, based on a previously published book. Izzy chose
Proved Innocent: The Story of Gerry Conlon of the Guildford Four by Gerry Conlon (1994)
(http://www.amazon.co.uk/Proved-Innocent-Story-Conlon-
Guildford/dp/0140230629/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1375029023&sr=1-
1&keywords=proven+innocent+conlon); and
In the Name of the Father directed by Jim Sheridan (1994) (http://www.amazon.co.uk/Name-
Father-DVD-Daniel-Day-
Lewis/dp/B00008XFAL/ref=sr_1_1?s=dvd&ie=UTF8&qid=1375029130&sr=1-
1&keywords=in+the+name+of+the+father).

See also The Guildford Four: in the name of justice by Richard Holt, The Telegraph, 4 June 2010
(http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/crime/7795117/The-Guildford-Four-in-the-name-of-
justice.html); and
Empire magazine's review of In the Name of the Father:
http://www.empireonline.com/reviews/reviewcomplete.asp?FID=13670
Gerry Conlon's death was met with a number of review articles in 2014: Gerry Conlon spent final
days talking about injustices, mourners hear, Henry McDonald, The Guardian, 28 June 2014
(http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2014/jun/28/gerry-conlon-funeral-solicitor-eulogy-fight-
injustices); and Gerry Conlon: Tormented in life, remembered in death, Raf Sanchez, The Telegraph,
21 Jun 2014; (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/northernireland/10917057/Gerry-Conlon-
Tormented-in-life-remembered-in-death.html)
Andy went for
The Damned United by David Peace (2008) (http://www.amazon.co.uk/The-Damned-Utd-
ebook/dp/B002RI90DG/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1375029313&sr=1-
1&keywords=the+damned+united)
The Damned United directed by Tom Hooper (2009) (http://www.amazon.co.uk/Damned-United-
DVD-Michael-Sheen/dp/B001TV0AHW/ref=sr_1_1?s=dvd&ie=UTF8&qid=1375029217&sr=1-
1&keywords=the+damned+united)
See also Guardian book club: The Damned Utd by David Peace
(http://www.guardian.co.uk/books/booksblog/2009/jul/17/guardian-book-club-damned-utd); and
A Soccer Coach Divides and Doesnt Conquer by A. O. Scott, 8 October 2009, The New York Times
(http://movies.nytimes.com/2009/10/09/movies/09damned.html?_r=0)
Reflective Task:
Discuss the issues surrounding the conversion of books on historical topics into historical films, as
discussed in weeks four, five and six of this course.