G.R. Nos.

111771-77 November 9, 1993

ANTONIO L. SANCHEZ, petitioner,
vs.
The Honorabe HARRIET O. !E"ETRIO# $%n her &a'a&%() as *res%+%n, -.+,e o/ Re,%ona Tr%a
Co.r(, NCR, 0ran&h 71, *as%,2, The Honorabe 3RAN4LIN !RILON $%n h%s &a'a&%() as
Se&re(ar) o/ -.s(%&e2, -O5ENCITO R. Z#6O, LEONAR!O C. G#I7A0, CARLOS L. !E LEON,
RA"ONCITO C. "ISON, RE7NAL!O -. L#GT#, an+ RO!RIGO *. LORENZO, (he as( s%8
res'on+en(s %n (he%r o//%&%a &a'a&%(%es as members o/ (he S(a(e *rose&.(or9s
O//%&e2, respondents.
Mario E. Ongkiko and Marciano P. Brion, Jr. for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for respondents.

CR#Z, J.:
There is probably no more notorious person in the country today than Mayor Antonio L. Sanchez of
Calauan, Laguna, who stands accused of an unspeaable crime. !n him, the verdict has already
been rendered by many outraged persons who would immediately impose on him an angry
sentence. "et, for all the pre#udgments against him, he is under our Constitution presumed innocent
as long as the contrary has not been proved. Lie any other person accused of an offense, he is
entitled to the full and vigilant protection of the $ill of %ights.
Sanchez has brought this petition to challenge the order of the respondent #udge denying his motion
to &uash the informations for rape with homicide filed against him and si' other persons. (e shall
treat it as we would any other suit filed by any litigant hoping to obtain a #ust and impartial #udgment
from this Court.
The pertinent facts are as follows)
!n *uly +,, -../, the 0residential Anti1Crime Commission re&uested the filing of appropriate
charges against several persons, including the petitioner, in connection with the rape1slay of Mary
2ileen Sarmenta and the illing of Allan 3omez.
Acting on this re&uest, the 0anel of State 0rosecutors of the 4epartment of *ustice conducted a
preliminary investigation on August ., -../. 0etitioner Sanchez was not present but was
represented by his counsel, Atty. Marciano $rion, *r.
!n August -+, -../, 050 Commander %e' 0iad issued an 6invitation6 to the petitioner re&uesting
him to appear for investigation at Camp 7icente Lim in Canlubang, Laguna. 8t was served on
Sanchez in the morning of August -/,-../, and he was immediately taen to the said camp.
At a confrontation that same day, Sanchez was positively identified by Aurelio Centeno, and S0! 888
7ivencio Malabanan, who both e'ecuted confessions implicating him as a principal in the rape1slay
of Sarmenta and the illing of 3omez. The petitioner was then placed on 6arrest status6 and taen to
the 4epartment of *ustice in Manila.
The respondent prosecutors immediately conducted an in&uest upon his arrival, with Atty. Salvador
0anelo as his counsel.
After the hearing, a warrant of arrest was served on Sanchez. This warrant was issued on August
-/, -../, by *udge 2nrico A. Lanzanas of the %egional Trial Court of Manila, $ranch 9, in
connection with Criminal Cases 5os. ./1-+:;/: to ./1-+:;/9 for violation of Section ,, in relation to
Section -, of %.A. 5o. ;9-/. Sanchez was forthwith taen to the C8S 4etention Center, Camp
Crame, where he remains confined.
!n August -;, -../, the respondent prosecutors filed with the %egional Trial Court of Calamba,
Laguna, seven informations charging Antonio L. Sanchez, Luis Corcolon, %ogelio Corcolon, 0epito
<awit, $aldwin $rion, *r., 3eorge Medialdea and =oilo Ama with the rape and illing of Mary 2ileen
Sarmenta.
!n August +;, -../, *udge 2usta&uio 0. Sto. 4omingo of that court issued a warrant for the arrest of
all the accused, including the petitioner, in connection with the said crime.
The respondent Secretary of *ustice subse&uently e'pressed his apprehension that the trial of the
said cases might result in a miscarriage of #ustice because of the tense and partisan atmosphere in
Laguna in favor of the petitioner and the relationship of an employee, in the trial court with one of the
accused. This Court thereupon ordered the transfer of the venue of the seven cases to 0asig, Metro
Manila, where they were raffled to respondent *udge >arriet 4emetriou.
!n September -?, -../, the seven informations were amended to include the illing of Allan 3omez
as an aggravating circumstance.
!n that same date, the petitioner filed a motion to &uash the informations substantially on the
grounds now raised in this petition. !n September -/, -../, after oral arguments, the respondent
#udge denied the motion. Sanchez then filed with this Court the instant petition for certiorari and
prohibition with prayer for a temporary restraining order@writ of in#unction.
The petitioner argues that the seven informations filed against him should be &uashed because) -A
he was denied the right to present evidence at the preliminary investigationB +A only the !mbudsman
had the competence to conduct the investigationB /A his warrantless arrest is illegal and the court has
therefore not ac&uired #urisdiction over him, :A he is being charged with seven homicides arising
from the death of only two personsB CA the informations are discriminatory because they do not
include Teofilo Al&ueza and 2dgardo LavadiaB and ;A as a public officer, he can be tried for the
offense only by the Sandiganbayan.
The respondents submitted a Comment on the petition, to which we re&uired a %eply from the
petitioner within a non1e'tendible period of five days.
1
The %eply was filed five days late.
:
The Court
may consider his non1compliance an implied admission of the respondentsD arguments or a loss of
interest in prosecuting his petition, which is a ground for its dismissal. 5evertheless, we shall disregard
this procedural lapse and proceed to discuss his petition on the basis of the arguments before us.
The Preliminary Inestigation.
The records of the hearings held on August . and -/, -../, belie the petitionerDs contention that he
was not accorded the right to present counter1affidavits.
4uring the preliminary investigation on August ., -../, the petitionerDs counsel, Atty. Marciano $rion,
manifested that his client was waiving the presentation of a counter1affidavit, thus)
Atty. $rion, *r.)
E(Fe manifest that after reviewing them there is nothing to rebut or countermand all
these statements as far as Mayor Sanchez is concerned, (e are not going to submit
any counter1affidavit.
ACS0 =uGo to Atty. $rion)
''' ''' '''
H. So far, there are no other statements.
A. 8f there is none then, we will not submit any counter1affidavit
because we believe there is nothing to rebut or countermand with all
these statements.
H. So, you are waiving your submission of counter1affidavitI
A. "es, your honor, unless there are other witnesses who will come
up soon.
3
5onetheless, the head of the 0anel of 0rosecutors, respondent *ovencito =uGo, told Atty. $rion that
he could still file a counter1affidavit up to August +9, -../. 5o such counter1affidavit was filed.
4uring the hearing on August -D/, -../, respondent =uGo furnished the petitionerDs counsel, this
time Atty. Salvador 0anelo, with copies of the sworn statements of Centeno and Malabanan, and told
him he could submit counter1affidavits on or before August +9, -../. The following e'change
ensued)
ACS0 =uGo)
Jor the record, we are furnishing to you the sworn statement of
witness Aurelio Centeno y %o'as and the sworn statement of S0!/
7ivencio Malabanan y Angeles.
4o 8 understand from you that you are again waiving the submission
of counter1affidavitI
Atty. 0anelo)
"es.
ACS0 =uGo)
So, insofar as the respondent, Mayor Antonio Sanchez is concerned,
this case is submitted for resolution.
;
!n the other hand, there is no support for the petitionerDs subse&uent manifestation that his counsel,
Atty. $rion, was not notified of the in&uest held on August -/, -../, and that he was not furnished
with the affidavits sworn to on that date by 7ivencio Malabanan and Aurelio Centeno, or with their
supplemental affidavits dated August -C, -../. Moreover, the above1&uoted e'cerpt shows that the
petitionerDs counsel at the hearing held on August -/, -../, was not Atty. $rion but Atty. 0anelo.
The petitioner was present at that hearing and he never disowned Atty. 0anelo as his counsel.
4uring the entire proceedings, he remained &uiet and let this counsel spea and argue on his behalf.
8t was only in his tardy %eply that he has suddenly bestirred himself and would now &uestion his
representation by this lawyer as unauthorized and inofficious.
Section /, 0aragraph KdA, %ule --+ of the %ules of Court, provides that if the respondent cannot be
subpoenaed or, if subpoenaed, does not submit counter1affidavits, the investigating officer shall base
his resolution on the evidence presented by the complainant.
*ust as the accused may renounce the right to be present at the preliminary investigation
<
, so may
he waive the right to present counter1affidavits or any other evidence in his defense.
At any rate, it is settled that the absence of a preliminary investigation does not impair the validity of
the information or otherwise render the same defective and neither does it affect the #urisdiction of
the court over the case or constitute a ground for &uashing the information.
=
8f no preliminary investigation has been held, or if it is flawed, the trial court may, on motion of the
accused, order an investigation or reinvestigation and hold the proceedings in the criminal case in
abeyance.
7
8n the case at bar, however, the respondent #udge saw no reason or need for such a step.
Jinding no arbitrariness in her factual conclusions, we shall defer to her #udgment.
J!risdiction of the Om"!dsman
8nvoing the case of #eloso . #omingo,
>
the petitioner submits that the proceedings conducted by the
4epartment of *ustice are null and void because it had no #urisdiction over the case. >is claim is that it is
the !ffice of the !mbudsman that is vested with the power to conduct the investigation of all cases
involving public officers lie him, as the municipal mayor of Calauan, Laguna.
The !mbudsman is indeed empowered under Section -C, paragraph K-A of %.A. ;99? to investigate
and prosecute, any illegal act or omission of any public official. >owever, as we held only two years
ago in the case of$g!inaldo . #omagas,
9
this authority 6is not an e'clusive authority but rather a
shared or concurrent authority in. respect of the offense charged.6
0etitioners finally assert that the information and amended information filed in this
case needed the approval of the !mbudsman. 8t is not disputed that the information
and amended information here did not have the approval of the !mbudsman.
>owever, we do not believe that such approval was necessary at all. 8n #eloso .
#omingo, -.- SC%A. C:C K-..?A, the Court held that the !mbudsman has authority
to investigate charges of illegal or omissions on the part of any public official, i.e., any
crime imputed to a public official. 8t must, however, be pointed out that the authority
of the !mbudsman to investigate 6any EillegalF act or omission of any public official6
K-.- SC%A at CC?A isnot an e%cl!sie authority but rather a shared or concurrent
authority in respect of the offense here charged, i.e., the crime of sedition. Thus, the
non1involvement of the office of the !mbudsman in the present case does not have
any adverse legal conse&uence upon the authority the panel of prosecutors to file
and prosecute the information or amended information.
8n fact, other investigatory agencies, of the government such as the 4epartment of *ustice, in
connection with the charge of sedition,
11
and the 0residential Commission on 3ood 3overnment, in ill1
gotten wealth cases,
11
may conduct the investigation,
The $rrest
(as petitioner Sanchez arrested on August -/, -../I
6Arrest6 is defined under Section -, %ule --/ of the %ules of Court as the taing of a person into
custody in order that he may be bound to answer for the commission of an offense. Lnder Section +
of the same %ule, an arrest is effected by an actual restraint of the person to be arrested or by his
voluntary submission to the custody of the person maing the arrest.
Application of actual force, manual touching of the body, physical restraint or a formal declaration of
arrest is not, re&uired. 8t is enough that there be an intent on the part of one of the parties to arrest
the other and an intent onthe part of the other to submit, under the belief and impression that
submission is necessary.
1:
The petitioner was taen to Camp 7icente Lim, Canlubang, Laguna, by virtue of a letter1invitation
issued by 050 Commander %e' 0iad re&uesting him to appear at the said camp for investigation.
8n Ba"st . &ational Intelligence Board
13
this Court declared)
$e that as it may, it is not idle to note that ordinarily, an invitation to attend a hearing
and answer some &uestions, which the person invited may heed or refuse at his
pleasure, is not illegal or constitutionally ob#ectionable. Lnder certain circumstances,
however, such an invitation can easily assume a different appearance. Thus, 'here
the initation comes from a po'erf!l gro!p composed predominantly of ranking
military officers issued at a time when the country has #ust emerged from martial rule
and when the suspension of the privilege of the writ of ha"eas corp!s has not
entirely been lifted, and the designated interrogation site is a military camp, the same
can be easily taen, not as a strictly ol!ntary initation which it purports to be,
but as an a!thoritatie command which one can only defy at his peril. . . . K2mphasis
suppliedA
8n the case at bar, the invitation came from a high1raning military official and the investigation of
Sanchez was to be made at a military camp. Although in the guise of a re&uest, it was obviously a
command or an order of arrest that the petitioner could hardly he e'pected to defy. 8n fact,
apparently cowed by the 6invitation,6 he went without protest Kand in informal clothes and slippers
onlyA with the officers who had come to fetch him.
8t may not be amiss to observe that under %.A. 5o. 9:/,, the re&uisites of a 6custodial investigation6
are applicable even to a person not formally arrested but merely 6invited6 for &uestioning.
8t should liewise be noted that at Camp 7icente Lim, the petitioner was placed on 6arrest status6
after he was pointed to by Centeno and Malabanan as the person who first raped Mary 2ileen
Sarmenta. %espondent =uGo himself acnowledged during the August -/, -../ hearing that, on the
basis of the sworn statements of the two state witnesses, petitioner had been 6arrested.6
(e agree with the petitioner that his arrest did not come under Section C, %ule --/ of the %ules of
Court, providing as follows)
Sec. C. $rrest 'itho!t 'arrant( 'hen la'f!l. M A peace officer or a private person
may, without a warrant, arrest a person)
KaA (hen, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offenseB
KbA (hen an offense has in fact #ust been committed and he has personal nowledge
of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed itB and
KcA (hen the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escapes from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final #udgment or temporarily confined
while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.
8t is not denied that the arresting officers were not present when the petitioner allegedly participated
in the illing of Allan 3omez and the rape1slay of Mary 2ileen Sarmenta. 5either did they have any
personal nowledge that the petitioner was responsible therefor because the basis of the arrest was
the sworn statements of Centeno and Malabanan. Moreover, as the rape and illing of Sarmenta
allegedly too place on *une +,1*une +., -../, or forty1si' days before the date of the arrest, it
cannot be said that the offense had 6in fact #ust been committed6 when the petitioner was arrested.
The original warrantless arrest of the petitioner was doubtless illegal. 5evertheless, the %egional
Trial Court lawfully ac&uired #urisdiction over the person of the petitioner by virtue of the warrant of
arrest it issued on August +;, -../ against him and the other accused in connection with the rape1
slay cases. 8t was belated, to be sure, but it was nonetheless legal.
2ven on the assumption that no warrant was issued at all, we find that the trial court still lawfully
ac&uired #urisdiction over the person of the petitioner. The rule is that if the accused ob#ects to the
#urisdiction of the court over his person, he may move to &uash the information, but only on that
ground. 8f, as in this case, the accused raises other grounds in the motion to &uash, he is deemed to
have waived that ob#ection and to have submitted his person to the #urisdiction of that court.
1;
The Court notes that on August -/, -../, after the petitioner was unlawfully arrested, *udge
Lanzanas issued a warrant of arrest against Antonio L. Sanchez in connection with Criminal Cases
5os. ./1-+:;/: to ./1-+:;/9 for violation of %.A 5o. ;9-/.
1<
0ending the issuance of the warrant of
arrest for the rape1slay cases, this first warrant served as the initial #ustification for his detention.
The Court also adverts to its uniform ruling that the filing of charges, and the issuance of the
corresponding warrant of arrest, against a person invalidly detained will cure the defect of that
detention or at least deny him the right to be released because of such defect. ? Applicable by analogy to the
case at bar is %ule -?+ Section : of the %ules of Court that)
Sec, :. )hen 'rit is not allo'ed or discharge a!thori*ed. M 8f it appears that the
person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under
process issued by a court or #udge or by virtue of a #udgment or order of a court of
record, and that the court or #udge had #urisdiction to issue the process, render the
#udgment, or mae the order, the writ shall not be allowedB or if the #urisdiction
appears after the writ is allowed, the person shall not be discharged by reason of any
informality or defect in the process, #udgment, or order. 5or shall, anything in this rule
be held to authorize the discharge of a person charged with or convicted of an
offense in the 0hilippines or of a person suffering imprisonment under lawful
#udgment.
8n one case,
1=
the petitioner, sued on ha"eas corp!s on the ground that she had been arrested by virtue
of a *ohn 4oe warrant. 8n their return, the respondents declared that a new warrant specifically naming
her had been issued, thus validating her detention. (hile frowning at the tactics of the respondents, the
Court said)
The, case has, indeed, become moot and academic inasmuch as the new warrant of
arrest complies with the re&uirements of the Constitution and the %ules of Court
regarding the particular description of the person to be arrested. (hile the first
warrant was un&uestionably void, being a general warrant, release of the petitioner
for that reason will be a futile act as it will be followed by her immediate re1arrest
pursuant to the new and valid warrant, returning her to the same prison she will #ust
have left. This Court will not participate in such a meaningless charade.
The same doctrine has been consistently followed by the Court,
17
more recently in the +mil case.
1>
The Informations
The petitioner submits that the seven informations charging seven separate homicides are absurd
because the two victims in these cases could not have died seven times.
This argument was correctly refuted by the Solicitor 3eneral in this wise)
Thus, where there are two or more offenders who commit rape, the homicide
committed on the occasion or by reason of each rape, must be deemed as a
constituent of the special comple' crime of rape with homicide. Therefore, there will
be as many crimes of rape with homicide as there are rapes committed.
8n effect, the presence of homicide &ualifies the crime of rape, thereby raising its
penalty to the highest degree. Thus, homicide committed on the occasion or by
reason of rape, loses its character as an independent offense, but assumes a new
character, and functions lie a &ualifying circumstance. >owever,by fiction of law, it
merged with rape to constitute an constituent element of a special comple' crime of
rape with homicide with a specific penalty which is in the highest degree, i.e. death
Kreduced to recl!sion perpet!a with the suspension of the application of the death
penalty by the ConstitutionA.
8t is clearly provided in %ule --? of the %ules of Court that)
Sec. -/. #!plicity of offense. A complaint or information must charge but one offense,
e'cept only in those cases in which e'isting laws prescribe a simple punishment for
various offenses.
%ape with homicide comes within the e'ception under %.A. +;/+ and %.A. :---, amending the
%evised 0enal Code.
The petitioner and his si' co1accused are not charged with only one rape committed by him in
conspiracy with the other si'. 2ach one of the seven accused is charged with having himself raped
Sarmenta instead of simply helping Sanchez in committing only one rape. 8n other words, the
allegation of the prosecution is that the girl was raped seven times, with each of the seven accused
taing turns in abusing her with the assistance of the other si'. Afterwards, their lust satisfied, all
seven of them decided to ill and thus silence Sarmenta.
2very one of the seven accused is being charged separately for actually raping Sarmenta and later
illing her instead of merely assisting the petitioner in raping and then slaying her. The separate
informations filed against each of them allege that each of the seven successive rapes is comple'ed
by the subse&uent slaying of Sarmenta and aggravated by the illing of Allan 3omez by her seven
attacers. The separate rapes were committed in succession by the seven accused, culminating in
the slaying of Sarmenta.
8t is of course absurd to suggest that Mary 2ileen Sarmenta and Allan 3omez were illed seven
times, but the informations do not mae such a suggestion. 8t is the petitioner who does so and is
thus hoist by his own petard.
The $lleged #iscrimination
The charge of discrimination against the petitioner because of the non1inclusion of Teofilo Al&ueza
and 2dgardo Lavadia in the informations must also be dismissed.
(hile the prosecuting officer is re&uired by law to charge all those who in his opinion, appear to be
guilty, he nevertheless cannot be compelled to include in the information a person against whom he
believes no sufficient evidence of guilt e'ists.
19
The appreciation of the evidence involves the use of
discretion on the part of the prosecutor, and we do not find in the case at bar a clear showing by the
petitioner of a grave abuse of such discretion.
:1
The decision of the prosecutor may be reversed or modified by the Secretary of *ustice or in special
cases by the 0resident of the 0hilippines.
:1
$ut even this Court cannot order the prosecution of a
person against whom the prosecutor does not find sufficient evidence to support at least a prima
facie case. The courts try and absolve or convict the accused but as a rule have no part in the initial
decision to prosecute him.
The possible e'ception is where there is an unmistaable showing of a grave abuse of discretion
that will #ustify #udicial intrusion into the precincts of the e'ecutive. $ut in such a case the proper
remedy to call for such e'ception is a petition for mandam!s, not certiorari or prohibition.
::
Moreover,
before resorting to this relief, the party seeing the inclusion of another person as a co1accused in the
same case must first avail itself of other ade&uate remedies such as the filing of a motion for such
inclusion.
:3
At any rate, it is a preposterous contention that because no charges have been filed against Al&ueza
and Lavadia, the charges against the petitioner and his co1accused should also be dropped.
J!risdiction of the Sandigan"ayan
The petitioner argued earlier that since most of the accused were incumbent public officials or
employees at the time of the alleged commission of the crimes, the cases against them should come
under the #urisdiction of the Sandiganbayan and not of the regular courts. This contention was
withdrawn in his %eply but we shall discuss it #ust the same for the guidance of all those concerned.
Section :, paragraph KaA of 0.4. 5o, -;?;, as amended by 0.4. 5o.-,;-, provides)
Sec. :. J!risdiction. M The Sandiganbayan shall e'ercise)
aA 2'clusive original #urisdiction in all cases involving)
K-A 7iolations of %epublic Act 5o. /?-., as amended, otherwise
nown as the Anti13raft and Corrupt 0ractices Act, %epublic Act 5o.
-/9., and Chapter 88, Section +, Title 788 of the %evised 0enal Code)
K+A !ther offenses or felonies committed by public officers and
employees in relation to their office, including those employed in
government1owned or controlled corporations, whether simple or
comple'ed with other crimes, where the penalty prescribed by law is
higher than prision correccional or imprisonment for si' K;A years, or a
fine of 0;,???.??. . . . K2mphasis suppliedA
The crime of rape with homicide with which the petitioner stands charged obviously does not fall
under paragraph K-A, which deals with graft and corruption cases. 5either is it covered by paragraph
K+A because it is not an offense committed in relation to the office of the petitioner.
8n Montilla , ,ilario,
:;
this Court described the 6offense committed in relation to the office6 as follows)
ETFhe relation between the crime and the office contemplated by the Constitution is,
in our opinion, direct and not accidental. To fall into the intent of the Constitution, the
relation has to be such that, in the legal sense, the offense cannot e'ist without the
office. 8n other words, the office must be a constituent element of the crime as
defined in the statute, such as, for instance, the crimes defined and punished in
Chapter Two to Si', Title Seven, of the %evised 0enal Code.
0ublic office is not of the essence of murder. The taing of human life is either
murder or homicide whether done by a private citizen or public servant, and the
penalty is the same e'cept when the perpetrator. being a public functionary too
advantage of his office, as alleged in this case, in which event the penalty is
increased.
$ut the use or abuse of office does not adhere to the crime as an elementB and even
as an aggravating circumstance, its materiality arises not from the allegations but on
the proof, not from the fact that the criminals are public officials but from the manner
of the commission of the crime
There is no direct relation between the commission of the crime of rape with homicide and the
petitionerDs office as municipal mayor because public office is not an essential element of the crime
charged. The offense can stand independently of the office. Moreover, it is not even alleged in the
information that the commission of the crime charged was intimately connected with the
performance of the petitionerDs official functions to mae it fall under the e'ception laid down
in People . Monte-o.
:<
8n that case, a city mayor and several detectives were charged with murder for the death of a
suspect as a result of a 6third degree6 investigation held at a police substation. The appearance of a
senator as their counsel was &uestioned by the prosecution on the ground that he was inhibited by
the Constitution from representing them because they were accused of an offense committed in
relation to their office. The Court agreed. 8t held that even if their position was not an essential
ingredient of the offense, there was nevertheless an intimate connection between the office and the
offense, as alleged in the information, that brought it within the definition of an offense 6committed in
relation to the public office.6
As Chief *ustice Concepcion said)
8t is apparent from these allegations that, although public office is not an element of
the crime of murder in abstract, as committed by the main respondents herein,
according to the amended information, the offense therein charged is intimately
connected with their respective offices and was perpetrated while they were in the
performance, though improper or irregular, of their official functions. 8ndeed they had
no personal motive to commit the crime and they would not have committed it had
they not held their aforesaid offices. The co1defendants of respondent Leroy S.
$rown, obeyed his instructions because he was their superior officer, as Mayor of
$asilan City. K2mphasis suppliedA.
(e have read the informations in the case at bar and find no allegation therein that the crime of rape
with homicide imputed to the petitioner was connected with the discharge of his functions as
municipal mayor or that there is an 6intimate connection6 between the offense and his office. 8t
follows that the said crime, being an ordinary offense, is triable by the regular courts and not the
Sandiganbayan.
.oncl!sion
As above demonstrated, all of the grounds invoed by the petitioner are not supported by the facts
and the applicable law and #urisprudence. They must, therefore, all be re#ected. 8n conse&uence, the
respondent #udge, who has started the trial of the criminal cases against the petitioner and his co1
accused, may proceed therewith without further hindrance.
8t remains to stress that the decision we mae today is not a decision on the merits of the criminal
cases being tried below. These will have to be decided by the respondent #udge in accordance with
the evidence that is still being received. At this time, there is yet no basis for #udgment, only
uninformed con#ecture. The Court will caution against such irrelevant public speculations as they can
be based only on imperfect nowledge if not officious ignorance.
(>2%2J!%2, the petition is 48SM8SS24. The respondent #udge is 48%2CT24 to continue with the
trial of Criminal Cases 5os. -?--:-, -?--:+, -?--:/, -?--::, -?--:C, -?--:; and -?--:9 and to
decide them with deliberate dispatch.
S! !%42%24.
/eliciano, Padilla, Bidin, 0egalado, #aide, Jr., 0omero, &ocon, Melo, 1!iason, P!no and 2it!g,
JJ., conc!r.
&arasa, ..J., took no part.
Bellosillo, J., is on leae.
*EO*LE O3 THE *HILI**INES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ER"ELIN!A
SE@#I6O, 5ICENTE T#"ANGAN, an+ NENITO
"EL5I!A, accused-appellants.
! E C I S I O N
!A5I!E, -R., J.A
Accused1appellants 2rmelito Se&uiGo, 7icente Tumangan and 5enito
Melvida appeal from the decision
E-F
of +: Jebruary -..: Kpromulgated on -
March -..:A of the %egional Trial Court K%TCA of Cebu City, $ranch +-, in
Criminal Case 5o. C$L1++:,;, finding them guilty of the crime of robbery with
homicide as charged in an information
E+F
whose accusatory portion reads)
That on or about 24th day of April, 1991 at 12:00 oclock noon, more or less at the
Public i!h"ay, #itio $ahu!, %aran!ay Antipolo, &unicipality of &edellin, Pro'ince
of (ebu, Philippines, and "ithin the )urisdiction of this onorable (ourt, the abo'e*
named accused, conspirin! and confederatin! and helpin! one another, did then and
there "illfully, unla"fully and feloniously "ith deliberate intent and intent to !ain, did
then and there "illfully, unla"fully and feloniously take, steal and carry a"ay the
payroll money in the amount of +,+T- T./#A01 +,23 /01431 +,+T-
#3230 P3#.# A01 156100 7P80,855915:, Philippine (urrency, belon!in! to ad9
;ose Anca)as A!ricultural (orporation to the dama!e and pre)udice of said corporation
in the amount aforestated, and on the occasion thereof, did then and there "illfully,
unla"fully and feloniously takin! ad'anta!e of their superior number and stren!th
and "ith intent to kill, attack, assault and shoot Pedro %roniola "ho "as backridin!
<sic= a motorcycle, thereby inflictin! upon him <a= !unshot "ound on the head, and as
a result thereof said Pedro %roniola died thereafter9
(.0T4A4- T. $A>9
This information was filed in due course after receipt by the !ffice of the
0rovincial prosecutor of Cebu of the record in Criminal Case 5o. :9/.1M of
the Third Municipal Circuit Trial Court KMCTCA of 4aanbantayan1Medellin,
0rovince of Cebu, where a complaint for highway robbery with homicide under
0.4. 5o. C/+ was filed on +C April -..- against the accused1appellants.
E/F
8n connection with the same incident, a separate information for illegal
possession of firearms was filed against accused 7icente Tumangan with the
%TC of Cebu, which was doceted as Criminal Case 5o. C$L1+++.9 and
assigned to $ranch -C of the said court.
E:F
Jor reasons undisclosed, the said
case and this case were not consolidated for #oint trial.
8n Criminal Case 5o. C$L1++:,;, the witnesses presented by the
prosecution in its evidence in chief were 2ugenio 3odinez, *immy Serafin,
police officers 2lpidio Luna, Alfredo Mondigo and Mario %emulta, 4r. Arturo
Sormillon, lt. Myrna Areola, 2milio 4aclan, Atty. 0erpetua Socorro $elarmino,
and 0resentacion vda. de $roniola, while !lympio Lozano was presented as
rebuttal witness.
!nly the accused testified in their defense.
The 0eopleNs version of the facts as testified to by its witnesses is as
follows)
At around noon of +: April -..-, 2ugenio 3odinez, overseer since -.C+ of
>acienda *ose Anca#as in Medellin, Cebu, and 0edro $roniola, the haciendaNs
booeeper, went to the Medellin %ural $an, located three ilometers from
the hacienda, to withdraw 0C?,CC9.-9 to pay for the wages of the hacienda
worers. The banNs cashier instructed *immy Serafin, #anitor and motorcycle
driver of the ban, to drive 3odinez and $roniola bac to the hacienda on one
of the banNs motorcycles. Serafin drove the motorcycle with 3odinez behind
him and $roniola behind 3odinez. 3odinez carried the money in a money
bag which he hung over his left shoulder.
ECF
As the three were in sitio Lahug, Antipolo, Medellin, Cebu, and nearing the
hacienda, the accused, armed with guns, tried to bloc their path and ordered
them to stop. 3odinez recognized the armed men because 5enito Melvida
and 2merlindo Se&uiGo used to wor in the hacienda while 7icente
TumanganNs parents were 3odinezNs neighbors.
E;F
Serafin drove on, but as the motorcycle went past the accused, he and
3odinez heard a gunshot.
E9F
3odinez noticed that $roniola had fallen off the
motorcycle. Serafin leapt from the motorcycle and ran away. The motorcycle
toppled over 3odinez, pinning him to the ground. Accused Tumangan, with
gun in hand, approached 3odine', too the money from the money bag, and
fled on foot with his co1accused. (ith the assailants gone, 3odinez ran
home, leaving $roniola behind.
E,F
Meanwhile, Serafin had proceeded to the
house of the $roniolasN which was near the crime scene, and informed
$roniolaNs wife of the incident.
E.F
S0! 2lpidio Luna, who was then at the Medellin police head&uarters,
received a report from another policeman about a robbery at sitio
Antipolo. Together with other policemen and some OCafgus,P Luna went to the
crime scene he found an abandoned motorcycle. 0eople who by then had
milled around the site informed Luna Othat the culprit had already fled.P Luna
noticed that the Obushes were compressedP and found Oa piece of paper
utilized as toilet paper with a stool on it EwhichF was somewhat newly
delivered.P The paper was a bio1data sheet
E-?F
with the name OMelvida, 5enitoP
and the entry for the fatherNs name filled in with O2lpidio Melvida.P
E--F
!ne bystander volunteered to tae Luna to 2lpidio MelvidaNs house where,
however, 2lpidio told Luna that 5enito Melvida was not there but was at his
K5enitoNsA brotherNs house. 2lpidio too Luna to the said house where Luna
saw the accused 5enito Melvida playing cards with other persons. Luna
ased Melvida to go with him to the barangay captainNs house. Melvida
hesitated at first, but his companions prevailed upon him to go with Luna.
E-+F
The barangay captain was not home, so Luna too Melvida to the police
station instead. Melvida was ept at the station the whole evening of +: April
-..- for investigation conducted, first, by Luna, then, by his fellow policemen
Sgt. 0ablo "got, Cpl. Alfredo Mondigo and 2liseo Tepait, as Luna had to tae
his supper. Melvida was allowed to go home the ne't day, but only after the
police had filed criminal charges against him and he had posted bail. Melvida
was not assisted by counsel during the police investigation, although Luna
assured the trial #udge that the Municipal Mayor of Medellin, who is a lawyer,
was present, (hile Luna claimed he ased the Mayor to act as MelvidaNs
counsel, he admitted that his re&uest did not appear in the record of the
investigation. LunaNs investigation of Melvida was not reduced into writing.
E-/F
8n the course of LunaNs investigation, Melvida admitted that he ept Ohis
share the lootP in his house. Melvida then was brought to his house where he
got 0.,???.??, in one hundred peso bills, placed inside a shoe which he
delivered to the policemen.
E-:F
4uring the investigation conducted by S0!/ Alfredo Mondigo,
E-CF
Melvida
admitted that his KMelvidaNsA companions during the robbery were 7icente
Tumangan and 2rmelindo Se&uiGo, who were staying in the house of *uanito
>ones in 4aanlungsod, Medellin, Cebu. 8mmediately, Mondigo and
policeman 0roniely Arti&uela proceeded to the house of >ones where they
saw Tumangan and Se&uiGo on the porch. 5oticing something bulging on the
waist of Tumangan, Mondigo and Arti&uela approached Tumangan and ased
him what was that bulging at his waist. Tumangan did not answer. So,
Mondigo patted the bulge which turned out to be a ./, caliber S&uires
$ingham revolver with holster and four bullets.
E-;F
(hen ased if he had a
license for the firearm, Tumangan answered in the negative. Mondigo and
Arti&uela then brought Tumangan and Se&uiGo to the police
station. Tumangan was then investigated in the presence of the Municipal
mayor. Tumangan admitted that he was one of the holdupppers.
E-9F
Mondigo further declared that the police recovered 0++,C+;.??,
E-,F
but could
not e'plain any further how the recovery was made and from whom. As to
this amount, S0!- Mariano %emulta, property custodian of the Medellin 050
station, merely declared that he was entrusted with the 0++,C+;.?? which,
according to the station commander, was Orecovered in connection with the
highway robbery case.P
E-.F
!n the morning of +C April -..-, the sworn statements of 2ugenio
3odinez
E+?F
and *immy Serafin
E+-F
were taen at the 050 >ead&uarters
in Medellin, Cebu, by 0@Cpl. 2liseo Tepait and 0@Sgt. 2lpidio Luna,
respectively. !n the same date, the criminal complaint for highway robbery
with homicide KCriminal Case 5o. :9/.1MA was filed with the Third MCTC of
4aanbantayan1Medellin, Cebu.
0arafin tests were then conducted on the accused by Lt. Myrna Areola,
forensic chemist of the 050 Crime Laboratory
in Camp Cabahug, Cebu City. The tests yielded negative results for the
presence of gunpowder residue on both hands of Tumangan and Melvida,
while Se&ioGoNs left hand tested positive for gunpowder residue.
E++F
4r. Arturo Sormillon conducted the post3mortem e'amination on 0edro
$roniola. >e found a single gunshot wound Oat the upper bac of E$roniolaNsF
head. The entrance of the bullet was at the upper bac of the nape and the
bullet e'ited a the mouth splitting the tongue.P 0robing the wound, 4r.
Sormillon determined that the bullet followed an upward path from the lower
nape and out of the victimNs mouth, thus, he raised the possibility that the gun
used was positioned lower than the e'it wound. >e also advanced that by the
nature of the wound, death was instantaneous.
E+/F
2milio 4aclan, stenographer of $ranch -C of the %TC of Cebu,
authenticated the transcript of stenographic notes of MondigoNs testimony in
0eople vs. Tumangan, Criminal Case 5o. C$L1+++.9.
E+:F
Atty. 0erpetua Socorro $elarmino, $ranch Cler of Court of the aforesaid
trial court, brought the firearm a ./, caliber revolver with serial number
-?++C;?, and four live bullets, allegedly confiscated from accused
Tumangan. Through $elarmino, the prosecution also presented a certification
dated /? May -..+, issued by 050 Cebu 0rovincial 4irector %odolfo L.
2sparagoza, stating that 7icente Tumangan had not been issued a license nor
a permit to possess the firearm described above.
E+CF
Atty. $elarmino, however,
was not the incumbent cler of court when the said e'hibits were presented in
Criminal Case 5o. C$L1+++.9.
E+;F
According to 0resentation vda. de $roniola, her husband 0edro $roniola
earned a monthly salary of 0-,+??.?? from >acienda *ose Anca#as and died
at the age of ;/. At the time of his death, he was already receiving 0,,?.??
from the Social Security System. As a conse&uence of his death, she
suffered OworriesP which she &uantified at 0C?,???.??. she also
ased0-?,???.?? as e'emplary damages.
E+9F
%ebuttal witness !lympio Lozano, Ooperation officer of the Jorever
Security and general services,P testified to disprove accused TumanganNs
claim Othat on April +/, the day before the incident in +: April that was his day
off with Jorever Security Agency.P
E+,F
According to Lozano, Tumangan went on
absence without leave on : April -..-, as evidenced by a spot report dated /
April -..- which he prepared reading as follows)
19 .n or about 0500 more or less ? April 91 at the 'icinity of Asian Arts, ,nc9
$aban!on (ebu (ity, #ecurity @uard 2icente Tuman!an, an out!oin! security
!uard failed to turned o'er ser'ice re'ol'er cal9 ?A "6 serial number 5B9?9A,
local made "6 8rds ammo to the in*comin! security !uard, "hich in'esti!ation
disclosed that #@ Tuman!an hurriedly "ent out of the company carryin! a
medium siCe ba! presumably containin! the said firearm9
E+.F
Lozano also reported to the Cebu City 0olice Station / TumanganNs failure to
return the firearm to the security agency, which was recorded as an O2stafa
AlarmP in the said stationNs blotter.
E/?F
The defense interposed alibi and denial and suggested a frame1up for
their e'culpation.
Accused1appellant 5enito Melvida claims he was at his brotherNs house at
the time of the crime, as his sister1in1law told him to stay there while she was
in Cebu City and her husband was at wor. Later that night, police officer
Luna came to the house and showed Melvida the Soiled bio1data which he
admitted to be his. >e was ased if Owe were the ones responsible for the
robbery and illingP and he said Othat is not true.P Melvida was brought to the
police station where he was ased if he new those persons who #ust arrived
in his barrio. >e identified one those persons as accused1appellant 2rmelindo
Se&uiGo whom he saw in Se&uiGoNs auntNs house as he was fetching water at
around C)?? p.m. >e claims he was ac&uainted only with Se&uiGo and he #ust
met accused1appellant 7icente Tumangan while they had been detained.
E/-F
Accused1appellants Tumangan and Se&uiGo also placed themselves
somewhere alse at the time of the crime. At 9)?? a.m. of +: April -..-,
Tumangan had #ust left his post as a security guard at the Asian Arts, 8nc., in
Labangon, Cebu City, and at -)?? p.m. he went to Medellin together with his
friend, Se&uiGo. They were to procure Se&uiGoNs birth certificate to be used in
the latterNs wedding. The two arrived in Medellin at C)?? p.m. and they stayed
in Se&uiGo auntNs house. They went to sleep early as they were tired from
their long trip from Cebu City.
E/+F
At ,)?? p.m., police officers Mondigo and Arte&uela came and were let in
by Se&uiGoNs aunt. Tumangan and Se&uiGo awoe to find Mondigo and
Arte&uela pointing an armalite and a ./, caliber pistol, respectively, at
Tumangan. !ther policemen searched the house, claiming they were looing
for firearms. Tumangan ased had happened and why the police were
pointing guns at him, but the policemen did not answer. >e said he had no
gun, but the officers said he lied. Tumangan and Se&uiGo were told to go
downstairs, leaving Mondigo and Arte&uela upstairs to continue their
search. (hen they came down the policemen said they had found a gun, ./,
caliber OS&uires $ingham,P which Tumangan recognized Obecause it was the
same as the firearm given to me as a security guard.P
E//F
Tumangan and
Se&uiGo were brought to the police station that same evening. At the station,
Tumangan was interrogated by the police without the assistance of counsel,
while Se&uiGo was left in a cell.
E/:F
The trial court gave weight to the prosecutionNs evidence and in its
decision it found)
($3A4$-, the accused is interposin! the defense of denial "ith traces of alibi and
frame*up9 #o, it behoo'es the (ourt to "ei!h properly the e'idence both "ays9
The testimonies of the accused, e'en collecti'ely considered, do not inspire belief9 ,t
is not )ust because they "ere self*ser'in! but mostly because their assertions, despite
efforts to produce the desired effect, ha'e come out but flimsily skirtin! on "hat
should sDuarely be reasonable or lo!ical and natural9 And these attributes are too
apparent in this (ourts narration of e'idence and the facts they establish, if at all
7supra:9
+irstly, the (ourt must say that the accuseds defense of alibi and frame*up is not
persuasi'e9 The defense theory bares the bad!es of a concoction easy to formulate but
hard to pro'e9 Thus, as bet"een the positi'e declarations of the prosecution "itnesses
7direct eye"itnesses, themsel'es co*participants "ith the homicide 'ictim, Pedro
%roniola, in the s"ift robbery drama: 3u!enio @odineC from "hose shoulder the
money ba! "as snatched by an armed 2icente Tuman!an as @odineC "as pinned
helpless under the "ei!ht of the motorcycle that has fallen to "ayside, and ;immy
#erafin, "ho dro'e the motorcycle on "hich had ridden at his back @odineC and then
%roniola E they sa" the three accused apparently "aitin! for them as they dro'e to the
hacienda houseF they heard shouts from "here the accused "ere for the riders to stop
the motorcycleF they heard the !unfire from the accusedF they "itnessed %roniola hit
and dropped from the 'ehicle by the shootin! from the 'ehicleF they "itnesses #erafin
lea'e the 'ehicle and run a"ay: and the ne!ati'e statements of the accused, the former
deser'es more credence 7People '9 3sDuerra, @949 0o995989, 5 April 199?:9
0eedless to elaborate, there "as homicide in the course of the robbery, and the fact of
this death has been officially recorded9
0o amount of denial, or petty alibi, can shake the solid identifications of the accused
by their o"n robbery 'ictims9 3u!enio @odineC, in particular, "as cate!orical in this,
sayin! that he had lon! kno"n the three accused e'en before the incident 7pa!e
2, supra9:9 and ho" could he E in board dayli!ht and at almost hi!h noon at all E miss
reco!niCin! 2icente Tuman!an "hose face "as hardly a foot a"ay from @odineCs
face "hen Tuman!an !rabbed the money ba! from @odineCs shoulderG
The accused themsel'es "ere one in tellin! the (ourt that they and the police officers
"ho had follo"ed up this case had not had any misunderstandin! or differencesF they
did not e'en kno" each other until after the incident9 Absent any sho"in! that the
la" enforcers "ere mo'ed by ill*moti'e or improper reasons to falsely impute a
serious char!e a!ainst the accused, it is presumed that they had acted in the re!ular
performance of their duties9 7id.:9
To repeat, the (ourt must !rant credibility to the "itnesses for the prosecution9 Their
testimonies, unlike those of the accused, are not illo!ical, inconsistent and contrary to
human eHperience 7People '9 #alaCar, et al9, @949 0o9A4?91, 5 April 199?:9 The (ourt
did closely obser'e each and e'ery "itnesss demeanor "hile testifyin!, disre!ardin!
attendant and eHpected little inconsistencies, usually normal, and must hold that the
prosecution "itnesses "ere definitely more trust"orthy in their pronouncements in
court than those for the defense9 1efense "itnesses no" and then betrayed their
smu!ness "hen they should rather be spontaneous9 ,n fact, the (ourt "as disturbed
"hen there occurred an uneHpected unison by the defense counsel and one of the
accused in "ron!ly surnamin! a relati'e of the accused 7IonesJ from 1iones:9
The mere say*so by 2icente Tuman!an and 3rmelindo #eDuiKo that they left (ebu
(ity at 1:00 in the afternoon of 24 April 1991 and arri'ed in &edellin at 8:00 that
afternoon does not remo'e the possibility, if not the probability, that they had actually
been in &edellin earlier ** "ith their &edellin*based relati'e, 0enito &el'ida ** than
the time of the robbery9 A fe" hours make a lot of difference, dont theyG After all,
the freDuency of the trips of hacienda payroll money from the bank had become of
public kno"led!e, especially amon! the hacienda laborers, and their relati'es of
courseL
,n total, alibi ** denial ** is a "eak defense and becomes "eaker in the face of positi'e
identification of the accused by the prosecution "itnesses 7People '9 3strella, @949
0os9 9280B*05, 2A April 199?:9
Another point must be mentioned no"9
3Hplicit is the e'idence to pro'e that the three accused acted in concert, clearly
pursuin! the same ob)ecti'e9 Thus, from their conduct conspiracy may be
inferred9 +or, as been held, it is not essential that there is proof of a pre'ious
a!reement to commit a crime M9 +rom acts and circumstances may lo!ically be
inferred the eHistence of a common desi!n to commit the offense char!ed 7People '9
%untan, #r9, @949 0o9 905?B, 12 April 199?:9
Thus, "ith conspiracy present, the fact of shootin! from the direction of the three
accused and the fact that the shootin! hit %roniola "ho fell off the motorcycle, and
killed him, are all that matter, irrespecti'e as to "ho of the three had indeed fired the
fatal shot9 +or, after all, the liability of one is the culpability of all in a
conspiracy9 The fin!er of probability, thou!h, stron!ly points to accused 3rmelindo
#eDuiKo as the !unfirin! member of the armed trio upon the forensic chemists findin!
of Ipresence of !unpo"der residue on the left hand of 3rmelindo #eDuiKo,J reliable
that the paraffin tests on the accused could be, they ha'in! been administered )ust
sli!htly more than 24 hours after the fatal shootin! "as done9 Add the follo"in!:
/ndisputed is the fact of police reco'ery of IpartitionsJ of the loot 7cash: not from
one of the three accused but from the three of them in separate Ihidin!J places9
The e'idence has established indubitably the follo"in! material facts:
The motorcycle riders 7named, supra:, "ho "ere carryin! cash )ust "ithdra"n from
the &edellin 4ural %ank for the salaries of employees of the acienda Anca)as "ere
held up by three armed men "ho "ere identified as the accused, about noontime on 24
April 1991 in sitio $ahu!, baran!ay Antipolo, municipality of &edellin, pro'ince of
(ebu, and one of the hacienda trustee, before the three escaped a"ay9 #hortly
momentarily before this, and in the process of the robbery, the hacienda bookkeeper,
another hacienda trustee "ho "as also on the motorcycle, "as shot dead by the
malefactors9 >ithout the shootin! "hich had resulted in homicide, the culprits "ould
not ha'e possibly succeeded in the robbery9
>ithout hesitance no" the (ourt, considerin! the facts pro'ed by the e'idence, must
declare that the crime committed by the accused "as robbery "ith homicide 7robo
con homicido: as pro'ided by Article 29471: of the 4e'ised Penal (ode "hich reads,
thus:
Art9 2949 Robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons- Penalties. **
Any person !uilty of robbery "ith the use of 'iolence a!ainst or intimidation of any
person shall suffer:
19 The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, "hen by reason or on
occasion of the robbery, the crime of homicide shall ha'e been
committed9
The (ourt entertains no doubt "hatsoe'er that the accused did employ 'iolence
a!ainst 7shootin! and killin!: and intimidation of persons 7"hich in fact compelled the
robbery 'ictims, eHcept the killed one, to scamper a"ay fast from the scene of the
crime: to consummate their criminal intent to take a"ay, as they did, for personal
!ain, the personal property of acienda Anca)as 7payroll money under the custodial
trust of the hacienda o'erseer and paymaster:9 7#ee People '9 1e la (ruC, $*10200B?,
20 ;anuary 199?9
E/CF
8t then rendered #udgment as follows)
>343+.43, the (ourt finds 34&3$,01. #3N/,O., 2,(30T3 T/&A0@A0
and 030,T. &3$2,1A !uilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery "ith
homicide as defined and penaliCed by Article 294 71: of the 4e'ised Penal (ode, and
hereby sentences 3A( .+ T3& to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua.
The abo'e*named accused are ordered to indemnify, )ointly and se'erally, the heirs of
killed 'ictim Pedro %roniola, specifically his "ido", Presentacion 'da9 de %rociola,
"ith the amount of +ifty Thousand Pesos 7P80,000:9 They are further ordered to pay,
also )ointly and se'erally, the sum of Ten Thousand Pesos 7P10,000: each to the
aforementioned "ido", 3u!enio @odineC and ;immy #erafin in concept of moral and
eHemplary dama!es9 4eco'ered sums of money, part of the total amount of money
taken in the robbery, are ordered returned to the acienda Anca)as, e'en as the same
accused are ordered to pay back, )ointly and se'erally, to said acienda the balance of
the total loot still unaccounted for9
(osts must like"ise be paid by the three accused9
#. .4134319
E/;F
+orth"ith, the accused appealed to us from the )ud!ment by filin! a notice of appeal9
<?5=
(e accepted the appeal on +? Jebruary -..C.
8n their AppellantNs $rief filed on +- August -..C, the accused contend that
the trial court erred in its findings)
+,4#T A##,@0&30T .+ 344.4
M TAT A((/#31 M A43 @/,$T- %3-.01 43A#.0A%$3 1./%T .+
T3 (4,&3 .+ 4.%%34- >,T .&,(,13, A01 #30T30(,0@ T3&
T. #3423 T3 P30A$T- P+ $,+3 ,&P4,#.0&30T A01 T. PA-
;.,0T$- A01 #3234A$$-, T. T3 3,4# .+ P,$$31 2,(T,& P314.
%4.0,.$A, #P3(,+,(A$$- T3 >,1.>, P43#30TA(,.0 21A9 13
%4.0,.$A, T3 A&./0T .+ P80,000, A01 +/4T34 T. PA- ;.,0T$-
A01 #3234A$$-, T3 #/& .+ P10,000 3A( T. T3 A+.430A&31
>,1.>, 3/@30,. @.1,03Q, A01 ;,&&- #34A+,0 ,0 T3 (.0#3PT
.+ &.4A$ A01 3R3&P$A4- 1A&A@3#9
#3(.01 A##,@0&30T .+ 344.4
M TAT A((/#31 M A43 @/,$T- .+ T3 (4,&3 (A4@31, 13#P,T3
T3 $A(P .+ ,130T,T- .+ T3 P34#.0 >. +,431 T3 A$$3@31
#.T TAT ,T A01 P,$$31 T3 2,(T,& P314. %4.0,.$A9
T,41 A##,@0&30T .+ 344.4
M TAT T343 >A# (.0#P,4A(-, T3 P4.#3(/T,.0 0.T A2,0@
P4.231 .+ A0- 32,130(3 #.>,0@ (.0#P,4A(-9
+./4T A##,@0&30T .+ 344.4
M >30 ,T +A,$31 T. (.0#,134 T3 0.0*.%#342A0(3 .+ T3
(.0#T,T/T,.0 ,0 T3 ,023#T,@AT,.0 >,T T3 A((/#31 %- T3
P.$,(3, A# >30 T3 (./4T #A-# IT3 (./4T, .>3234, &/#T
3RP43## ,T# 1,#&A- .234 T3 N/3#T,.0A%$3 &3T.1# %- T3
P.$,(3 .++,(34# (.0(34031 &.(P31 T3 (.0#T,T/T,.0, >,(
T3- T3&#3$23# A23 #>.40 T. .0.4 A01 432343, >30
T3- 1,1 0.T 43&,01 T3 A((/#31 .+ T3,4 4,@T T. 43&A,0
#,$30T A01 T. %3 A##,#T31 %- (./0#3$M
The disposition of the first assigned error depends on whether the
accused were properly found guilty of the crime charged, hence, it shall be
discussed last. The second and third errors may be resolved together s they
pertain to the same issue of conspiracy.
(e shall first tae up the fourth assigned error as it raises a constitutional
problem deserving of primary consideration.
The fourth assigned error is self1contradictory. (hile it starts with a claim
that the trial court failed to consider the non1observance by the police of the
constitutional safeguards during the investigation of the accused, it &uoted the
trial courtNs statement precisely e'pressing its dismay over the &uestionable
method used by the police in such investigation and considered it a mocery
of the Constitution which the police had sworn to honor and revere. (e &uote
what the trial court said)
The (ourt, ho"e'er, must eHpress its dismay o'er the Duestionable means employed
by the police in in'esti!atin! the accused9 The police officers concerned mocked the
(onstitution, "hich they themsel'es ha'e s"orn to honor and re'ere, "hen they did
not remind the accused of their ri!ht to remain silent and to be assisted by
counsel9 They must be instructed by their superiors in no uncertain terms to respect
the (onstitution at all times in the performance of their duties9 %e that as it may, this
unconstitutional act may not benefit the cause of the accused9 After all, nothin! in the
e'idence for the prosecution "as taken from the police in'esti!ation in Duestion ** no
fruit, as it "ere, from the Ipoisoned free9J
E/,F
Also, in the course of his testimony, police officer 2lpidio Luna was
rebued by the trial court for his violation of the constitutional rights of
accused Melvida. Thus)
Court)
So, you investigated 5enito MelvidaI
A 8 investigated 5enito Melvida.
Court)
"ou investigated him after you arrested himI (hy did you arrest himI
A 8 believed that he was a suspect of that robbery.
Court)
(as your belief sufficient to arrest himI
A 8 only invite him for investigation. 8 did not arrest him.
Court)
That is the enertia EsicF of martial law. O5o we did not arrest him, we only invited
him.P
Court to witness)
(as he assisted by a lawyer when you investigated himI
A 5o there was none because in our place we can seldom find lawyers.
Court)
So, since there are no lawyers you go on arresting and investigating without even
sufficient ground for such arrestI
A (e did not arrest him we only invite him.
Court)
>owI
A 8 told him, O0lease, go with us because we have something to as from you.P
Court)
(hy did you not as him right thereI (hy did you have to mae him go with youI
A because the $arangay captain was not around 8 should have ased him thereI
Court)
"ou were earlier set to investigate him that is why you brought him to your
head&uartersI
A "es sir.
Court)
4o you have the right to investigate someone whom you have not arrestedI
A 8n our police wor we can do the interrogation and investigation as long as we will
not violate the human rights.
Court)
4id you violate the human rights of 5enito MelvidaI
A 8 did not violate "our >onor.
E/.F
>owever, while the trial court found a mocery of the Constitution and in
fact declared that Onothing in the evidence for the prosecution was taen from
the police investigation in &uestion 11 no fruit, as it were, from the Qpoisoned
tree,NP we do not find incongruous the following statement of the trial court)
/ndisputed is the fact of police reco'ery of IpartitionsJ of the loot 7cash: not from
one of the three of them in separate Ihidin!J places9
E:?F
(hat was OrecoveredP from accused Melvida was 0.,???.?? which, he
admitted, was his share of the loot.
E:-F
As to the difference between 0++,C+;.??
and 0.,???.??, no evidence was adduced how and from whom it was
recovered. 0olice officer Mariano %emulta merely declared that
the 0+;,C+;.?? was entrusted to him by the station commander who told him
that the amount was Qrecovered in connection with the highway robbery
case.P
E:+F
Since the OrecoveryP of 0.,???.?? from Melvida was due to his OadmissionP
in the course of the custodial interrogation made in violation of paragraph K-A
of Section -+, Article 888 of the Constitution and therefore inadmissible in
evidence pursuant to paragraph K/A of the said section then the 0.,???.??
cannot also be admitted in evidence as a Ofruit of the poisonous tree.P The
rule is settled that once the primary so!rce Kthe OtreePA is shown to have been
unlawfully obtained 11 as the admission of Melvida in this case 11
any secondary or deriatie eidence Kthe OfruitPA derived from it 1 1
the 0.,???.?? obtained from Melvida as a conse&uence of his OadmissionP 1 1
is also inadmissible.
E:/F
The above statement of the trial court may, however, be considered mere
surplusage since, in the final analysis, it did not tae into account against the
accused whatever admission they made during police interrogation. (e need
to elaborate, however, why such admissions are inadmissible in evidence.
%egardless of LunaNs claim to the contrary, accused 5enito Melvida was
arrested. An arrest Ois the taing of a person into custody in order that he may
be bound to answer for the commission of an offense,P
E::F
and it is made Oby an
actual restraint of the person to be arrested, or by his submission to the
custody of the person maing the arrest.P
E:CF
MelvidaNs voluntarily going with
Luna upon the latterNs OinvitationP was a submission to LunaNs custody, and
Luna believed that Melvida was a suspect in the robbery charged herein,
hence, Melvida was being held to answer for the commission of the said
offense.
Since he was arrested without a warrant, the in&uiry must now be whether
a valid warrantless arrest was effected. %ule --/ of the %ules on Criminal
0rocedure provides)
#ection 89 Arrest without warrant; when lawful . ** A peace officer or a pri'ate person
may, "ithout a "arrant, arrest a person:
7a: >hen, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committin!, or is attemptin! to commit an offenseF
7b: >hen an offense has in fact )ust been committed, and he has personal
kno"led!e of facts indicatin! that the person to be arrested has committed
itF
7c: >hen the person to be arrested is a prisoner "ho has escaped from a penal
establishment or place "here he is ser'in! final )ud!ment or temporarily
confined "hile his case is pendin!, or has escaped "hile bein! transferred
from one confinement to another9
The first and last conditions enumerated above are not applicable in this
caseB and under the facts herein, neither does the second condition
apply. LunaNs basis for arresting Melvida was the bio1data sheet with
MelvidaNs name on it found at the crime scene. $y no means can this indicate
that Melvida committed the offense charged. 8t does not even connote that
Melvida was at the crime scene for the bio1data sheet could have been
obtained by anyone and left at the crime scene long before or after the crime
was committed. Luna, therefore, had no personal nowledge of facts
indicating MelvidaNs guiltB at best, he had an unreasonable
suspicion. MelvidaNs arrest was thus illegal.
After his unlawful arrest, Melvida underwent custodial investigation. The
custodial investigation commenced when the police pinpointed Melvida as one
of the authors of the crime or had focused on him as a suspect thereof.
E:;F
This
brought into operation paragraph K-A of Section -+, Article 888 of the
Constitution guaranteeing the accusedNs rights to remain silent and to counsel.
And his right to be informed of these rights.
E:9F
The said paragraph provides)
#3(9 12 71: Any person under in'esti!ation for the commission of an offense shall
ha'e the ri!ht to be informed of his ri!ht to remain silent and to ha'e competent and
independent counsel preferably of his o"n choice9 ,f the person cannot afford the
ser'ices of counsel he must be pro'ided "ith one9 These ri!hts cannot be "ai'ed
eHcept in "ritin! and in the presence of counsel9
There was no showing that Melvida was ever informed of these rights, and
Luna admitted that Melvida was not assigned by counsel during the
investigation. 8ndisputably, the police officers concerned flouted these
constitutional rights of Melvida and Tumangan and deliberately disregarded
the rule regarding an investigatorNs duties prior to and during custodial
interrogation laid down in Morales vs. 2nrile
E:,F
and reiterated in a catena of
subse&uent cases.
E:.F
The ne't tas is to determine whether the crime charged under the
information was sufficiently established. To sustain a conviction for the crime
of robbery with homicide, it is necessary that the essential elements of the
crime be conclusively proved.
EC?F
Taing, with the intent to gain, of personal
property belonging to another by means of violence against or intimidation of
any person, or using force upon things maes one liable for robbery.
EC-F
8ntimidation is present in the taing when Oacts are performed which, in their
own nature or by reason of the circumstances under which they are e'ecuted,
restrict or hinder the free e'ercise of the will of the victim or inspire him with
fear.P
EC+F
8n this case, Tumangan, with gun in hand and while 3odinez was
helplessly pinned under the motorcycle, dispossessed the latter of the money
he was carrying. That Tumangan was armed and had in fact already fired it,
causing in#ury to $roniola which caused his death, and that 3odinez was
defenseless naturally impaired the latterNs free will, producing the intimidation
element in robbery.
The crime becomes robbery with homicide when by reason or on occasion
of a robbery with the use of violence against or intimidation of person, the
crime of homicide shall have been committed.
EC/F
The term OhomicideP is
understood in its generic sense, hence, it includes the commission of murder
or slight physical in#uries during the robbery.
EC:F
Since the robbery in this case was accompanied by the illing of 0edro
$roniola, the crime becomes robbery with homicide, as the trial court correctly
ruled.
The trial court was liewise correct in finding conspiracy in this
case. There is conspiracy when two or more persons come to an agreement
concerning the commission of a felony of a felony and decide to commit it. 8t
is not re&uired that there be an agreement for an appreciable period prior to
be occurrenceB rather, it is sufficient that at the time of the commission of the
offense, the accused had the same purpose and were united in its
e'ecution. The agreement to commit a crime may be gleaned from the mode
and manner of the commission of the offense or inferred from the acts of the
accused which point to a #oint purpose and design, concerted action, and
community of intent.
ECCF
8n this case, the three accused were one in blocing the motorcycle of
3odinez, Serafin, and $roniola, and commanding their victims to stop. They
were also unanimous in fleeing the crime scene, taing a single route to
4aang Lungsod. These concerted acts indicate a community of criminal
intent which is the essence of conspiracy. Conspiracy having been
established, it matters not who among the accused actually shot and illed
0edro $roniola, for that criminal act is attributable to all three accused.
Thus are the second and third assigned errors settled. The final tas is to
determine the appropriate penalty against the accused. The %evised 0enal
Code prescribes the penalty ofrecl!sion perpet!a to death for the crime of
robbery with homicide,
EC;F
but since the offense in this case was committed on
+: April -..-, or while the imposition of the death penalty had been
suspended
EC9F
and before its reimposition under %.A. 5o. 9;C., the trial court
correctly imposed the penalty of recl!sion perpet!a. (e do not, however,
agree with its awards of moral and e'emplary damages of 0-?,???.?? each to
2ugenio 3odinez, *immy Serafin, and 0resentacion vda de $roniola. There is
no factual basis therefor insofar as 3odinez and Serafin are concerned since
they did not as for and testify thereon. !nly 0resentacion vda. de $roniola
ased for moral damages of 0C?,???.?? for her OworriesP due to the death of
her husband.
EC,F
As to e'emplary damages, the law is clear that they can be
recovered in criminal cases only when the crime was committed with one or
more aggravating circumstances,
EC.F
none of which was proven in this
case. The award then of 0-?,???.?? in favor of 0resentacion vda. de
$roniola must be deemed as for moral damages only.
Also, the trial court should have ordered the accusedRappellants to
indemnify, #ointly and severally, the >acienda *ose Anca#as in the amount
of 0C?,C99.-9, representing the amount withdrawn from the ban and taen
by them from 2ugenio 3odinez, since it was never established by admissible
evidence that any portion of this amount had been recovered.
BHERE3ORE, the instant appeal is 48SM8SS24 and the challenged
decision of $ranch +- of the %egional Trial Court of Cebu City of +: Jebruary
-..: in Criminal Case 5o. C$L1++:,; is hereby AJJ8%M24, sub#ect to the
following modifications, viz., the award of 0-?,???.?? each to 2ugenio
3odinez and *immy Serafin are deleted, while that for 0resentacion vda de
$roniola shall only be considered as moral damages, and that the accused1
appellants are hereby ordered, #ointly and severally, to indemnify the
>acienda *ose Anca#as of Medellin, Cebu, the sum of Jifty Thousand Jive
>undred and Seventy1Seven 0esos and Seventeen Centavos K0C?,C99.-9A,
with interest thereon at the legal rate reconed from +: April -..- and until it
shall have been fully paid.
Costs against the accused1appellants.
SO OR!ERE!.
&arasa, ..J. 4.hairman5, Melo, /rancisco, and Pangani"an, JJ., concur.
G.R. Nos. 99:>9-91 -an.ar) :7, 1993
"IRIA" !E3ENSOR-SANTIAGO, petitioner,
vs.
CONRA!O ". 5AS@#EZ, Omb.+smanC G#AL0ERTO -. !E LA LLANA, S'e&%a *rose&.(orC
SAN!IGAN0A7AN an+ REGIONAL TRIAL CO#RT O3 "ANILA, respondents.
Marciano P. #efensor for petitioner.
&estor P. If!rong for Maria S. Tatoy.
#anilo .. .!nanan for respondents.
% 2 S ! L L T 8 ! 5

REGALA!O, J.:
Jiled directly with the Court, ostensibly as an incident in the present special civil action, is petitionerDs
so1called 6Motion to %estrain the Sandiganbayan from 2nforcing its >old 4eparture !rder with
0rayer for the 8ssuance of a Temporary %estraining !rder and@or 0reliminary 8n#unction, with Motion
to Set 0ending 8ncident for >earing.6 4espite the impropriety of the mode adopted in elevating the
issue to us, as will hereinafter be discussed, we will disregard the procedural gaffe in the interest of
an early resolution hereof.
The chronology of events preceding the instant motion is best summarized to readily provide a clear
understanding and perspective of our disposition of this matter, thus)
-. !n May -/, -..-, an information dated May ., -..- and doceted as Criminal Case 5o. -;;.,
was filed against petitioner with the Sandiganbayan for alleged violation of Section /KeA, %epublic Act
5o. /?-., otherwise nown as the Anti13raft and Corrupt 0ractices Act.
+. !n May -:, -..-, an order of arrest was issued in said case against herein petitioner by 0residing
*ustice Jrancis 2. 3architorena of the Sandiganbayan, with bail for the release of the accused fi'ed
at 0-C,???.??.
1
/. !n even date, petitioner filed an 6Lrgent E%3parte Motion for Acceptance of Cash $ail $ond for
and in $ehalf of 4r. Miriam 4efensor1Santiago,6
:
which pertinently states in part)
''' ''' '''
/. As a result of the vehicular collision, she suffered e'tensive physical in#uries which
re&uired surgical intervention. As of this time, her in#uries, specifically in the #aw or
gum area of the mouth, prevents her to spea KsicA because of e'treme pain. Jurther,
she cannot for an e'tended period be on her feet because she is still in physical pain.
. . . .
:. !n the other hand, the accused Miriam 4efensor Santiago sees leave of this
>onorable Court that she be considered as having placed herself under the
#urisdiction of this >onorable Court, for purposes of the re&uired trial and other
proceedings and further sees leave of this >onorable Court that the recommended
bail bond of 0-C,???.?? that she is posting in cash be accepted.
''' ''' '''
(>2%2J!%2, it is respectfully prayed of this >onorable Court that the bail bond she
is posting in the amount of 0-C,???.?? be duly accepted, and that by this motion, she
be considered as having placed herself under the custody of this >onorable Court
and dispensing of her personal appearance for now until such time she will KsicA have
recovered sufficiently from her recent near fatal accident.
Jurther, on the above basis, it is also respectfully prayed that the warrant for her
arrest be immediately recalled.
''' ''' '''
:. Also on the same day, the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution
3
authorizing petitioner to post a cash
bond for her provisional liberty without need for her physical appearance until *une C, -..- at the latest,
unless by that time her condition does not yet permit her physical appearance before said court. !n May
-C, -..-, petitioner filed a cash bond in the amount of 0-C,???.??, aside from the other legal fees.
;
C. !n May +-, -..-, respondent !mbudsman Conrado M. 7as&uez filed with the Sandiganbayan a
manifestation 6that accused Miriam 4efensor1Santiago appeared in his office in the second floor of
the !ld 5A(ASA $uilding located in Arroceros Street, 2rmita, Manila at around /)/? oDcloc in the
afternoon of May +?, -..-. She was accompanied by a brother who represented himself to be Atty.
Arthur 4efensor and a lady who is said to be a physician. She came and left unaided, after staying
for about fifteen minutes.
<
;. Acting on said manifestation, the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution also on May +-, -..-,
setting the arraignment of the accused for May +9, -..-, and setting aside the courtDs resolution of
May -:, -..- which ordered her appearance before the deputy cler of the Jirst 4ivision of said
court on or before *une C, -..-.
=
9. 8n a motion dated May ++, -..-, petitioner ased that her cash bond be cancelled and that she be
allowed provisional liberty upon a recognizance. She contended that for her to continue remaining
under bail bond may imply to other people that she has intentions of fleeing, an intention she would
lie to prove as baseless.
7
,. Liewise on May +:, -..-, petitioner filed with this Court a petition for certiorari and prohibition
with preliminary in#unction, and a subse&uent addendum thereto, seeing to en#oin the
Sandiganbayan and the %egional Trial Court of Manila from proceeding with Criminal Cases 5os.
-++., Kfor violation of Section /EeF of %epublic Act 5o. /?-.A, .-1.:CCC Kviolation of 0residential
4ecree 5o. :;A, and .-1.:,.9 Kfor libelA, respectively. Conse&uently, a temporary restraining order
was issued by this Court on May +:, -..-, en#oining the Sandiganbayan and the %egional Trial
Court of Manila, $ranch /, from proceeding with the criminal cases pending before them. This Court,
in issuing said order, too into consideration the fact that according to petitioner, her arraignment,
originally set for *une C, -..-, was ine'plicably advanced to May +9, -..-, hence the advisability of
conserving and affording her the opportunity to avail herself of any remedial right to meet said
contingency.
.. !n May +9, -..-, the Sandiganbayan issued an order deferring) KaA the arraignment of petitioner
until further advice from the Supreme CourtB and KbA the consideration of herein petitionerDs motion to
cancel her cash bond until further initiative from her through counsel.
>
-?. !n *anuary -,, -..+, this Court rendered a decision dismissing the petition for certiorari and
lifting and setting aside the temporary restraining order previously issued.
9
The motion for
reconsideration filed by petitioner was eventually denied with finality in this CourtDs resolution dated
September -?, -..+.
--. Meanwhile, in a resolution adopted on *uly ;, -..+, the Sandiganbayan issued a hold departure
order against petitioner which reads as follows)
Considering the information in media to the effect that accused Santiago intends to
leave the country soon for an e'tended stay abroad for study purposes, considering
the recent decision of the Supreme Court dismissing her petition promulgated on
*anuary -/, -..+, although the same is still sub#ect of a Motion for %econsideration
from the accused, considering that the accused has not yet been arraigned, nor that
she has not KsicA even posted bail the same having been by reason of her earlier
claim of being seriously indisposed, all of which were overtaen by a restraining
order issued by the Supreme Court in 3.%. 5o. ..+,. and 5o. ..+.? dated May +:,
-..-, the accused is ordered not to leave the country and the Commission on
8mmigration and 4eportation is ordered not to allow the departure of the accused
unless authorized from KsicA this Court.
11
The hold departure order was issued by reason of the announcement made by petitioner, which was
widely publicized in both print and broadcast media, that she would be leaving for the Lnited States
to accept a fellowship supposedly offered by the *ohn J. <ennedy School of 3overnment at >arvard
Lniversity. 0etitioner liewise disclosed that she would be addressing Jilipino communities in the
Lnited States in line with her crusade against election fraud and other aspects of graft and
corruption.
8n the instant motion submitted for our resolution, petitioner argues that)
-. The Sandiganbayan acted without or in e'cess of #urisdiction and with grave
abuse of discretion in issuing the hold departure order considering that it had not
ac&uired #urisdiction over the person of the petitioner.
+. The Sandiganbayan blatantly disregarded basic principles of #udicial comity and
due deference owing to a superior tribunal when it issued the hold departure order
despite the pendency of petitionerDs motion for reconsideration with this >onorable
Court.
/. The right to due process of law, the right to travel and the right to freedom of
speech are preferred, pre1eminent rights enshrined not only in the Constitution but
also in the Lniversal 4eclaration of >uman %ights which can be validly impaired only
under stringent criteria which do not obtain in the instant case.
:. The hold departure order in the instant case was issued under disturbing
circumstances which suggest political harassment and persecution.
C. !n the basis of petitionerDs creditable career in the bench and bar and her
characteristic transparency and candor, there is no reasonable ground to fear that
petitioner will surreptitiously flee the country to evade #udicial processes.
11
8. 0etitioner initially postulates that respondent court never ac&uired #urisdiction over her person
considering that she has neither been arrested nor has she voluntarily surrendered, aside from the
fact that she has not validly posted bail since she never personally appeared before said court. (e
re#ect her thesis for being factually and legally untenable.
8t has been held that where after the filing of the complaint or information a warrant for the arrest of
the accused is issued by the trial court and the accused either voluntarily submitted himself to the
court or was duly arrested, the court thereby ac&uires #urisdiction over the person of the
accused.
1:
The voluntary appearance of the accused, whereby the court ac&uires #urisdiction over his
person, is accomplished either by his pleading to the merits Ksuch as by filing a motion to &uash or other
pleadings re&uiring the e'ercise of the courtDs #urisdiction thereover, appearing for arraignment, entering
trialA or by filing bail. !n the matter of bail, since the same is intended to obtain the provisional liberty of
the accused, as a rule the same cannot be posted before custody of the accused has been ac&uired by
the #udicial authorities either by his arrest or voluntary surrender.
13
8n the case at bar, it becomes essential, therefore, to determine whether respondent court ac&uired
#urisdiction over the person of herein petitioner and, correlatively, whether there was a valid posting
of bail bond.
(e find and so hold that petitioner is deemed to have voluntarily submitted herself to the #urisdiction
of respondent court upon the filing of her afore&uoted 6Lrgent E%3parte Motion for Acceptance of
Cash $ail $ond for and in behalf of 4r. Miriam 4efensor1Santiago6 wherein she e'pressly sought
leave 6that she be considered as having placed herself under the #urisdiction of Kthe SandiganbayanA
for purposes of the re&uired trial and other proceedings,6 and categorically prayed 6that the bail bond
she is posting in the amount of 0-C,???.?? be duly accepted6 and that by said motion 6she be
considered as having placed herself under the custody6 of said court. 0etitioner cannot now be
heard to claim otherwise for, by her own representations, she is effectively estopped from asserting
the contrary after she had earlier recognized the #urisdiction of the court and caused it to e'ercise
that #urisdiction over the aforestated pleadings she filed therein.
8t cannot be denied that petitioner has posted a cash bail bond of 0-C,???.?? for her provisional
release as evidenced by !fficial %eceipt 5o. :+.+.+C dated May -C, -..- and which is even
attached as Anne' C1+ to her own motion now under consideration. This is further buttressed by the
fact that petitioner thereafter also filed a motion for the cancellation of said cash bond and for the
court to allow her provisional liberty upon the security of a recognizance. (ith the filing of the
foregoing motions, petitioner should accordingly and necessarily admit her ac&uiescence to and
acnowledgment of the propriety of the cash bond she posted, instead of adopting a stance which
ignores the in#unction for candor and sincerity in dealing with the courts of #ustice.
0etitioner would also lie to mae capital of the fact that she did not personally appear before
respondent court to file her cash bond, thereby rendering the same ineffectual. Suffice it to say that
in this case, it was petitioner herself, in her motion for the acceptance of the cash bond, who
re&uested respondent court to dispense with her personal appearance until she shall have
recovered sufficiently from her vehicular accident. 8t is distressing that petitioner should now turn
around and fault respondent court for taing a compassionate stand on the matter and
accommodating her own re&uest for acceptance of the cash bond posted in her absence.
88. 0etitioner argues that the Sandiganbayan disregarded the rule of #udicial comity when it issued
the hold departure order despite the pendency of her motion for reconsideration of the decision of
this Court which dismissed her petition. She claims that if the principle of #udicial comity applies to
prevent a court from interfering with the proceedings undertaen by a coordinate court, with more
reason should it operate to prevent an inferior court, such as the Sandiganbayan, from interfering
with the instant case where a motion for reconsideration was still pending before this Court. She
contends further that the hold departure order contravenes the temporary restraining order
previously issued by this court en#oining the Sandiganbayan from proceeding with the criminal case
pending before it.
8t will be remembered that the Court rendered a decision in the present case on *anuary -,, -..+
dismissing the petition for certiorari filed in this case and lifting and setting aside the temporary
restraining order it previously issued. 8t is petitionerDs submission that the filing of her motion for
reconsideration stayed the lifting of the temporary restraining order, hence respondent court
continued to be en#oined from acting on and proceeding with the case during the pendency of the
motion for reconsideration. (e liewise re#ect this contention which is bereft of merit.
Section :, %ule /. of the %ules of Court provides that, unless otherwise ordered by the court, a
#udgment in an action for in#unction shall not be stayed after its rendition and before an appeal is
taen or during the pendency of an appeal. And, the rule is that the e'ecution of a #udgment
decreeing the dissolution of a writ of preliminary in#unction shall not be stayed before an appeal is
taen or during the pendency of an appeal,
1;
and we see no reason why the foregoing considerations
should not apply to a temporary restraining order. The rationale therefor is that even in cases where an
appeal is taen from a #udgment dismissing an action on the merits, the appeal does not suspend the
#udgment, hence the general rule applies that a temporary in#unction terminates automatically on the
dismissal of the action.
1<
8t has similarly been held that an order of dissolution of an in#unction may be immediately effective,
even though it is not final.
1=
A dismissal, discontinuance, or non1suit of an action in which a restraining
order or temporary in#unction has been granted operates as a dissolution of the restraining order or
temporary in#unction
17
and no formal order of dissolution is necessary to effect such
dissolution.
1>
Conse&uently, a special order of the court is necessary for the reinstatement of an
in#unction.
19
There must be a new e'ercise of .#udicial power.
:1
The reason advanced in support of the general rule has long since been duly e'plained, to wit)
. . . The court of this State, relying upon the last of the two clauses &uoted, held that
an appeal from an order dissolving an in#unction continued the in#unction in force.
The evils which would result from such a holding are forcibly pointed out by *udge
Mitchell in a dissenting opinion. >e said) 6Although a plaintiffDs papers are so
insufficient on their face or so false in their allegations that if he should apply on
notice for an in#unction, any court would, on a hearing, promptly refuse to grant one,
yet, if he can find anywhere in the State a #udge or court commissioner who will
improvidently grant one e% parte, which the court on the first and only hearing ever
had dissolves, he can, by appealing and filing a bond, mae the e% parte in#unction
impervious to all #udicial interference until the appeal is determined in this court.6 . . .
Such a result is so un#ust and so utterly inconsistent with all nown rules of e&uity
practice that no court should adopt such a construction unless absolutely shut up to it
by the clear and une&uivocal language of the statute. . . . .
:1
This ruling has remained undisturbed over the decades and was reiterated in a case s&uarely in
point and of more recent vintage)
The S2CDs orders dated *une +9, -.,. and *uly +-, -.,. Kdirecting the secretary of
L4MC to call a stocholdersD meeting, etc.A are not premature, despite the
petitioners then pending motion for reconsideration of the decision of the Court of
Appeals. The lifting by the Court of Appeals of its writ of preliminary in#unction in
C.A.13.%. S0 5o. -9:/C cleared the way for the implementation by the S2CDs en
"anc resolution in S2C 2$ Case 5o. -.-. The S2C need not wait for the Court of
Appeals to resolve the petitionerDs motion for reconsideration for a #udgment
decreeing the dissolution of a preliminary in#unction is immediately e'ecutory. 8t shall
not be stayed after its rendition and before an appeal is taen or during the pendency
of an appeal. . . . .
::
!n the bases of the foregoing pronouncements, there is no &uestion that with the dismissal of the
petition forcertiorari and the lifting of the restraining order, nothing stood to hinder the
Sandiganbayan from acting on and proceeding with the criminal cases filed against herein petitioner.
At any rate, as we have earlier mentioned, the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner was
denied with finality in our resolution dated September -?, -..+.
0etitioner further posits, however, that the filing of the instant special civil action
for certiorari divested the Sandiganbayan of its #urisdiction over the case therein. (hether generated
by misconception or design, we shall address this proposition which, in the first place, had no reason
for being and should not hereafter be advanced under lie or similar procedural scenarios.
The original and special civil action filed with this Court is, for all intents and purposes, an invocation
for the e'ercise of its supervisory powers over the lower courts. 8t does not have the effect of
divesting the inferior courts of #urisdiction validly ac&uired over the case pending before them. 8t is
elementary that the mere pendency of a special civil action for certiorari, commenced in relation to a
case pending before a lower court, does not even interrupt the course of the latter when there is no
writ of in#unction restraining it.
:3
The inevitable conclusion is that for as long as no writ of in#unction or
restraining order is issued in the special civil action for certiorari, no impediment e'ists and there is
nothing to prevent the lower court from e'ercising its #urisdiction and proceeding with the case pending
before it. And, even if such in#unctive writ or order is issued, the lower court nevertheless continues to
retain its #urisdiction over the principal action.
888. 8t is further submitted by petitioner that the hold departure order violates her right to due process,
right to travel and freedom of speech.
Jirst, it is averred that the hold departure order was issued without notice and hearing. Much is
made by petitioner of the fact that there was no showing that a motion to issue a hold departure
order was filed by the prosecution and, instead, the same was issued e% mero mot! by the
Sandiganbayan. 0etitioner is in error.
Courts possess certain inherent powers which may be said to be implied from a general grant of
#urisdiction, in addition to those e'pressly conferred on them.
:;
These inherent powers are such
powers as are necessary for the ordinary and efficient e'ercise of #urisdictionB
:<
or essential to the
e'istence, dignity and functions of the courts,
:=
as well as to the due administration of #usticeB
:7
or are
directly appropriate, convenient and suitable to the e'ecution of their granted powersB
:>
and include the
power to maintain the courtDs #urisdiction and render it effective in behalf of the litigants.
:9
Therefore, while a court may be e'pressly granted the incidental powers necessary to effectuate its
#urisdiction, a grant of #urisdiction, in the absence of prohibitive legislation, implies the necessary and
usual incidental powers essential to effectuate it, and, sub#ect to e'isting laws and constitutional
provisions, every regularly constituted court has the power to do all things that are reasonably
necessary for the administration of #ustice within the scope of its #urisdiction. >ence, demands,
matters, or &uestions ancillary or incidental to, or growing out of, the main action, and coming within
the above principles, may be taen cognizance of by the court and determined, since such
#urisdiction is in aid of its authority over the principal matter, even though the court may thus be
called on to consider and decide matters which, as original causes of action, would not be within its
cognizance.
Jurthermore, a court has the inherent power to mae interlocutory orders necessary to protect its
#urisdiction.
31
Such being the case, with more reason may a party litigant be sub#ected to proper coercive
measures where he disobeys a proper order, or commits a fraud on the court or the opposing party, the
result of which is that the #urisdiction of the court would be ineffectual. (hat ought to be done depends
upon the particular circumstances.
31
Turning now to the case at bar, petitioner does not deny and, as a matter of fact, even made a public
statement that she had every intention of leaving the country allegedly to pursue higher studies
abroad. (e uphold the course of action adopted by the Sandiganbayan in taing #udicial notice of
such fact of petitionerDs plan to go abroad and in thereafter issuing s!a sponte the hold departure
order, in #ustified consonance with our preceding dis&uisition. To reiterate, the hold departure order is
but an e'ercise of respondent courtDs inherent power to preserve and to maintain the effectiveness of
its #urisdiction over the case and the person of the accused.
Second, petitioner asseverates that considering that she is leaving for abroad to pursue further
studies, there is no sufficient #ustification for the impairment of her constitutional right to travelB and
that under Section ;, Article 888 of the -.,9 Constitution, the right to travel may be impaired only
when so re&uired in the interest of national security, public safety or public health, as may be
provided by law.
8t will be recalled that petitioner has posted bail which we have declared legally valid and complete
despite the absence of petitioner at the time of filing thereof, by reason of the peculiar circumstances
and grounds hereinbefore enunciated and which warrant a rela'ation of the aforecited doctrine
in /eliciano. 0erforce, since under the obligations assumed by petitioner in her bail bond she holds
herself amenable at all times to the orders and processes of the court, she may legally be prohibited
from leaving the country during the pendency of the case. This was the ruling we handed down
in Manotoc, Jr. s. .o!rt of $ppeals, et al.,
3:
to the effect that)
A court has the power to prohibit a person admitted to bail from leaving the
0hilippines. This is a necessary conse&uence of the nature and function of a bail
bond.
%ule --:, Section - of the %ules of Court defines bail as the security re&uired and
given for the release of a person who is in custody of the law, that he will appear
before any court in which his appearance may be re&uired as stipulated in the bail
bond or recognizance.
8ts ob#ect is to relieve the accused of imprisonment and the state of the burden of
eeping him, pending the trial, and at the same time, to put the accused as much
under the power of the court as if he were in custody of the proper officer, and to
secure the appearance of the accused so as to answer the call of the court and do
what the law may re&uire of him.
The condition imposed upon petitioner to mae himself available at all times
whenever the court re&uires his presence operates as a valid restriction on his right
to travel. As we have held in 0eople vs. Ly Tuising, ;- 0hil. :?: K-./CA)
. . . the result of the obligation assumed by appellee KsuretyA to hold
the accused amenable at all times to the orders and processes of the
lower court, was to prohibit said accused from leaving the #urisdiction
of the 0hilippines, because, otherwise, said orders and processes will
be nugatory, and inasmuch as the #urisdiction of the courts from
which they issued does not e'tend beyond that of the 0hilippines
they would have no binding force outside of said #urisdiction.
8ndeed, if the accused were allowed to leave the 0hilippines without sufficient
reason, he may be placed beyond the reach of the courts.
This was reiterated in a more recent case where we held)
0etitioner thus theorizes that under the -.,9 Constitution, Courts can impair the right
to travel only on the grounds of 6national security, public safety, or public health.6
The submission is not well taen.
Article 888, Section ; of the -.,9 Constitution should be interpreted to mean that while
the liberty of travel may be impaired even without Court !rder, the appropriate
e'ecutive officers or administrative authorities are not armed with arbitrary discretion
to impose limitations. They can impose limits only on the basis of 6national security,
public safety, or public health6 and 6as may be provided by law,6 a limitive phrase
which did not appear in the -.9/ te't KThe Constitution, $ernas, *oa&uin, 3., S.*.,
7ol. 8, Jirst 2dition, -.9, p. +;/A. Apparently, the phraseology in the -.,9 Constitution
was a reaction to the ban on international travel imposed under the previous regime
when there was a Travel 0rocessing Center, which issued certificates of eligibility to
travel upon application of an interested party KSee Salonga v. >ermoso S Travel
0rocessing Center, 5o. C/;++, +C April -.,?, .9 SC%A -+-A.
Article 888, Section ; of the -.,9 Constitution should by no means be construed as
delimiting the inherent power of the Courts to use all means necessary to carry their
orders into effect in criminal cases pending before them. (hen by law #urisdiction is
conferred on a Court or #udicial officer, all au'iliary writs, processes and other means
necessary to carry it into effect may be employed by such Court or officer K%ule -/C,
Section ;, %ules of CourtA.
''' ''' '''
. . . >olding an accused in a criminal case within the reach of the Courts by
preventing his departure from the 0hilippines must be considered as a valid
restriction on his right to travel so that he may be dealt with in accordance with law.
The offended party in any criminal proceeding is the 0eople of the 0hilippines. 8t is to
their best interest that criminal prosecutions should run their course and proceed to
finality without undue delay, with an accused holding himself amenable at all times to
Court !rders and processes.
33
!ne final observation. (e discern in the proceedings in this case a propensity on the part of
petitioner, and, for that matter, the same may be said of a number of litigants who initiate recourses
before us, to disregard the hierarchy of courts in our #udicial system by seeing relief directly from
this Court despite the fact that the same is available in the lower courts in the e'ercise of their
original or concurrent #urisdiction, or is even mandated bylaw to be sought therein. This practice
must be stopped, not only because of the imposition upon the precious time of this Court but also
because of the inevitable and resultant delay, intended or otherwise, in the ad#udication of the case
which often has to be remanded or referred to the lower court as the proper forum under the rules of
procedure, or as better e&uipped to resolve the issues since this Court is not a trier of facts. (e,
therefore, reiterate the #udicial policy that this Court will not entertain direct resort to it unless the
redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts or where e'ceptional and compelling
circumstances #ustify availment of a remedy within and calling for the e'ercise of our primary
#urisdiction.
Jor the guidance of the bench and the bar, we elucidate that such policy includes the matter of
petitions or motions involving hold departure orders of the trial or lower courts. 0arties with pending
cases therein should apply for permission to leave the country from the very same courts which, in
the first instance, are in the best position to pass upon such applications and to impose the
appropriate conditions therefor since they are conversant with the facts of the cases and the
ramifications or implications thereof. (here, as in the present case, a hold departure order has been
issued e% parte or mot! propio by said court, the party concerned must first e'haust the appropriate
remedies therein, through a motion for reconsideration or other proper submissions, or by the filing
of the re&uisite application for travel abroad. !nly where all the conditions and re&uirements for the
issuance of the e'traordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition or mandamus indubitably obtain against a
disposition of the lower courts may our power of supervision over said tribunals be invoed through
the appropriate petition assailing on #urisdictional or clearly valid grounds their actuations therein.
(>2%2J!%2, with respect to and acting on the motion now before us for resolution, the same is
hereby 425824 for lac of merit.
S! !%42%24.
G.R. No. 113=31 "a) <, 199;
!IOS!A!O -OSE ALLA!O an+ RO0ERTO L. "EN!OZA, petitioners,
vs.
HON. RO0ERTO C. !IO4NO, *res%+%n, -.+,e, 0r. =:, Re,%ona Tr%a Co.r(, "aDa(%, "e(ro
"an%a, an+ *RESI!ENTIAL ANTI-CRI"E CO""ISSION, respondents.
0ELLOSILLO, J.:
!n balance at the fulcrum once again are the intrinsic right of the State to prosecute perceived
transgressors of the law, which can be regulated, and the innate value of human liberty, which can
hardly be weighed.
Some twelve years ago we were confronted with a similar problem when former Senator *ovito %.
Salonga invoed before this Court his 6right to life and liberty guaranteed by the due process clause,
alleging that no prima faciecase has been established to warrant the filing of an information for
subversion against him.6
1
(e resolved the issue then and sustained him. >e is now bac before us, this
time as counsel pleading the cause of petitioners herein who, he claims, are in a situation far worse than
his predicament twelve K-+A years ago. >e postulates that no probable cause liewise e'ists in this case,
and what is worse is that no bail is recommended.
This petition gives us an opportunity to revisit the concept and implication of probable cause, the
e'istence of which is necessary for the prosecutor to have an accused held for trial and for a trial
#udge to issue a warrant for his arrest. 8t is mandatory therefore that there be probable cause before
an information is filed and a warrant of arrest issued. Lnfortunately, however, at times a criminal
case is filed, a warrant of arrest issued and a person conse&uently incarcerated on unsubstantiated
allegations that only feign probable cause.
0etitioners 4iosdado *ose Allado and %oberto L. Mendoza, alumni of the College of Law, Lniversity
of the 0hilippines, are partners of the Law Jirm of Salonga, >ernandez and Allado. 8n the practice of
their profession, and on the basis of an alleged e'tra#udicial confession of a security guard, they
have been accused of the heinous crime of idnapping with murder by the 0residential Anti1Crime
Commission K0ACCA and ordered arrested without bail by respondent #udge.
The focal source of the information against petitioners is the sworn statement dated -; September
-../ of Security 3uard 2scolastico Lmbal, a discharge of the 0hilippine Constabulary, implicating
them as the brains behind the alleged idnapping and slaying of one 2ugen Ale'ander 7an Twest, a
3erman national.
:
8n that e'tra#udicial confession, Lmbal claimed that he and his companions were met
by petitioners at Silahis >otel and in e'change for 0+.CM the former undertoo to apprehend 7an Twest
who allegedly had an international warrant of arrest against him. Thus, on -; *une -..+, after placing him
under surveillance for nearly a month, Lmbal, 2'1policeman %olando 3amatero, AJ0C83 Agent %oberto
Santiago and S0!+ Sergio Antonino abducted 7an Twest. They bloced his blue 5issan 0athfinder under
the Alabang overpass and forced him into their car. They brought him to a 6safe house6 #ust behind the
5ew $ilibid 0risons. Lmbal was tased to watch over their &uarry. After four K:A days, 3amatero, Santiago
and Antonino returned to the 6safe house6 together with petitioners and S0!+ %oger $ato, nown to
Lmbal also as 6$ato.6 S0!+ $ato faed the interrogation of 7an Twest, pretending it was official, and
then made him sign certain documents. The following day, 3amatero shot 7an Twest in the chest with a
baby armalite, after which Antonino stabbed him repeatedly, cut off his private part, and later burned his
cadaver into fine ashes using gasoline and rubber tires. Lmbal could not recall the e'act date when the
incident happened, but he was certain it was about a year ago.
A day after Lmbal e'ecuted his e'tra#udicial confession, the operatives of the 0ACC, armed with a
search warrant issued by *udge %oberto A. $arrios of the %egional Trial Court of Manila, $r.
--,
3
separately raided the two K+A dwellings of Santiago, one located at 5o. 9 Sangley Street, and the
other, along Amalingan Street, both in 3reen >eights Subdivision, 0araGa&ue. The raiders recovered a
blue 5issan 0athfinder and assorted firearms and ammunition and placed Santiago and his trusted aide,
2fren Madolid, under arrest. Also arrested later that day were Antonio and $ato who were found to have
in their possession several firearms and ammunition and 7an TwestDs Cartier sunglasses.
After evaluating the pieces of evidence gathered by 0ACC operatives, Sr., Supt. 0anfilo Lacson,
Chief of 0ACC Tas Jorce >abagat, referred the case to the 4epartment of *ustice for the institution
of criminal proceedings against AJ0C83 Agent %oberto Santiago, S0!- Sergio Antonino, S0!+
%oger $ato, 2'1policeman %olando 3amatero, 2fren Madolid, and petitioners herein, Atty. 4iosdado
*ose Allado and Atty. %oberto L. Mendoza, for illegal possession of firearms and ammunition,
carnapping, idnapping for ransom with murder, and usurpation of authority.
;
8n his letter to the State
0rosecutor dated -9 September -../, Sr. Supt. Lacson charged that M
Atty. %oberto L. Mendoza and Atty. Allado of Salonga, >ernandez and Allado Law
!ffices . . . planned and conspired with other suspects to abduct and ill the 3erman
national Ale'ander 7an Twest in order to eliminate him after forcing the victim to sign
several documents transferring ownership of several properties amounting to several
million pesos and caused the withdrawal of 0CM deposit from the victimDs ban
account.
Thereafter, Senior State 0rosecutor Jerdinand prosecutor Jerdinand %. Abesamis issued a
subpoena to petitioners informing them that a complaint
was filed against them by 0ACC TJ1>abagat, directing them to appear on
/? September -../ at the Multi10urpose >all of the 4epartment of *ustice and to submit their
counter1affidavits. Attached to the subpoena were copies of the affidavits e'ecuted by Lmbal and
members of the team who raided the two K+A dwellings of Santiago.
<
5ot satisfied merely with the affidavits attached to the subpoena, petitioner Mendoza moved for the
production of other documents for e'amination and copying to enable him to fully prepare for his
defense and to submit an intelligible counter1affidavit.
=
Specifically, petitioner Mendoza was interested
in KaA the 6several documents transferring ownership of several properties amounting to several million
pesos and the withdrawal of 0CM deposits from the victimDs ban account,6 as stated in the complaintB KbA
the complete records of the 0ACCDs investigation, including investigations on other suspects and their
disposition, 0ACCDs !rder of $attle for -..+ and early -../B and, KcA such other written statements issued
in the above1entitled case, and all other documents intended to be used in this case.
7
0etitioners liewise
sought the inhibition of the members of the panel of prosecutors, which was created to conduct the
preliminary investigation, on the ground that they were members of the legal staff assigned to 0ACC and
thus could not act with impartiality.
8n its !rder of -- !ctober -../,
>
the new panel of prosecutors composed of Senior State 0rosecutor
$ernelito %. Jernandez as Chairman, with %ogelio J. 7ista and 0urita M. 4eynata as Members, confirmed
that the motion for inhibition of the members of the old panel as well as the appeal to the Secretary of
*ustice was resolved on , !ctober -../ resulting in the creation of a new panel. Thereafter, the new
panel granted the prayer of petitioner Mendoza for the production of additional documents used or
intended to be used against him. Meanwhile, Tas Jorce >abagat, in compliance with the order,
submitted only copies of the re&uest for verification of the firearms seized from the accused, the result of
the re&uest for verification, and a Philippine Times Jo!rnal article on the case with a marginal note of
0resident Jidel 7. %amos addressed to the Chief of the 0hilippine 5ational 0olice directing the
submission of a report and summary of actions taen thereon.
5ot having been provided with the re&uested documents, petitioners nevertheless submitted their
respective counter1affidavits denying the accusations against them.
9
After a preliminary hearing where clarificatory &uestions were additionally propounded, the case was
deemed submitted for resolution. $ut before the new panel could resolve the case, S0!+ $ato filed
a manifestation stating that he was reconsidering the earlier waiver of his right to file counter1
affidavit,
11
and 6in the greater interest of truth, #ustice and fair play6 moved for the admissions of his
counter1affidavit
11
confessing participation in the abduction and slaying of 7an Twest and implicating
petitioners Allado and Mendoza. Sometime in *anuary -..:, however, before petitioners could refute
$atoDs counter1affidavit, he moved to suppress it on the ground that it was e'tracted through intimidation
and duress.
!n / Jebruary -..:, with the new penal failing to act on the twin motions of S0!+ $ato, petitioners
heard over the radio that the panel had issued a resolution finding a prima facie case against them
and that an information had already been filed in court. Lpon verification with the 4epartment of
*ustice, however, petitioners were informed that the resolution was not yet ready for release, but
later that afternoon they were able to secure a copy of the information for idnapping with murder
against them
1:
and the -C1page undated resolution under the letterhead of 0ACC, signed by the panel of
prosecutors, with the >ead of the 0ACC Tas Jorce recommending approval thereof.
13
That same day,
the information was filed before the %egional Trial Court of Maati and raffled off to $ranch ;+ presided by
respondent *udge %oberto C. 4iono.
!n : Jebruary -..:, respondent #udge, in response to petitionersD re&uest, gave them until ,
Jebruary -..: to submit their opposition to the issuance of a warrant of arrest against all the
accused.
1;
!n 9 Jebruary -..:, petitioners complied with the order of respondent #udge.
1<
The following
day,
, Jebruary -..:, petitioner Allado filed an appeal with the Secretary of *ustice seeing review and
reversal of the undated resolution of the panel
of prosecutors,
1=
which appeal was adopted by petitioner Mendoza.
17
!n
-- Jebruary -..:, petitioner Allado moved to defer the proceedings before the trial court pending
resolution of his appeal before the Secretary of *ustice.
1>
>owever, on even date, respondent #udge
issued the assailed warrant of arrest against petitioners.
19
>ence, on -C Jebruary -..:, petitioners filed
with us the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for a temporary restraining order.
!n -; Jebruary -..:, we re&uired respondents to comment on the petition and set the case for
hearing on +, Jebruary -..:. After the hearing, we issued a temporary restraining order en#oining
0ACC from enforcing the warrant of arrest and respondent #udge from conducting further
proceedings on the case and, instead, to elevate the records to us. Meanwhile, on +9 Jebruary
-..:, petitioners voluntarily surrendered at the >ead&uarters of the Capital Command KCA0C!MA,
0hilippine 5ational 0olice K050A, Camp $agong 4iwa, $icutan, Metro Manila, and on +. Jebruary
-..:, they were released on the basis of our temporary restraining order.
0etitioners, in their //C1page petition, inclusive of anne'es, principally contend that respondent
#udge acted with grave abuse of discretion and in e'cess of #urisdiction in 6whimsically holding that
there is probable cause against petitioners without determining the admissibility of the evidence
against petitioners and without even stating the basis of his findings,6
:1
and in 6relying on the
%esolution of the 0anel and their certification that probable cause e'ists when the certification is
flawed.6
:1
0etitioners maintain that the records of the preliminary investigation which respondent #udge
solely relied upon failed to establish probable cause against them to #ustify the issuance of the warrant of
arrest. 0etitioners liewise assail the prosecutorsD 6clear sign of bias and impartiality KsicA.6
::
!n the other hand, the !ffice of the Solicitor 3eneral argues that the determination of probable
cause is a function of the #udge who is merely re&uired to personally appreciate certain facts to
convince him that the accused probably committed the crime charged.
Section +, Art. 888, of the -.,9 Constitution, lays down the re&uirements for the issuance of a warrant
of arrest, i.e., a warrant of arrest shall issue only upon probable cause to be determined personally
by the #udge after e'amination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce.
As early as -.-C, in B!chanan . 2i!da de Este"an,
:3
this Court speaing through Associate *ustice
Sherman Moreland defined probable cause as 6the e'istence of such facts and circumstances as would
e'cite the belief, in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the nowledge of the prosecutor, that the
person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted.6 This definition is still relevant today
as we continue to cite it in recent cases.
:;
>ence, probable cause for an arrest or for the issuance of a
warrant of arrest has been defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonable
discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed by the person sought to be
arrested.
:<
And as a protection against false prosecution and arrest, it is the nowledge of facts, actual or
apparent, strong enough to #ustify a reasonable man in the belief that he was lawful grounds for arresting
the accused.
:=
Pilapil . Sandigan"ayan
:7
sets a standard for determining the e'istence of probable cause. (hile it
appears in that case that we have granted the prosecutor and the trial #udge seemingly unlimited latitude
in determining the e'istence of absence of probable cause by affirming the long1standing procedure that
they can base their findings merely on their personal opinion and reasonable belief, yet, this
permissiveness should not be interpreted as giving them arbitrary powers and letting them loose in the
determination of the e'istence of probable cause, a delicate legal &uestion which can result in the
harassment and deprivation of liberty of the person sought to be charged or arrested. There we said M
0robable cause is a reasonable ground of presumption that a matter is, or may be,
well founded, such a state of facts in the mind of the prosecutor as would lead a
person of ordinary caution and prudence to believe, or entertain an honest or strong
suspicion, that a thing is so. The term does not mean 6actual and positive cause6 nor
does it import absolute certainty. 8t is merely based on opinion and reasonable belief.
Thus, a finding of probable cause does not re&uire an in&uiry into whether there is
sufficient evidence to procure a conviction. 8t is enough that it is it believed that the
act or omission complained of constitutes the offense charged. 0recisely, there is a
trial for the reception of evidence of the prosecution in support of the charge.
(hether an act was done causing undue in#ury to the government and whether the
same was done with manifest partiality or evident bad faith can only be made out by
proper and sufficient testimony. 5ecessarily, a conclusion can be arrived at when the
case has already proceeded on sufficient proof.
:>
Accordingly, before issuing a warrant of arrest, the #udge must satisfy himself that based on the
evidence submitted there is sufficient proof that a crime has been committed and that the person to
be arrested is probably guilty thereof. 8n the !rder of respondent #udge dated -- Jebruary -..:, it is
e'pressly stated that 6EtFhis court after careful evaluation of the evidence on record, believes and
rules that probable cause e'istsB and therefore, a warrant of arrest should be issued.6 >owever, we
are unable to see how respondent #udge arrived at such ruling. (e have painstaingly e'amined the
records and we cannot find any support for his conclusion. !n the contrary, we discern a number of
reasons why we consider the evidence submitted to be insufficient for a finding of probable cause
against petitioners.
The 0residential Anti1Crime Commission relies heavily on the sworn statement of Security 3uard
Lmbal who supposedly confessed his participation in the alleged idnapping and murder of 7an
Twest. Jor one, there is serious doubt on 7an TwestDs reported death since the corp!s delicti has not
been established, nor have his remains been recovered. Lmbal claims that 7an Twest was
completely burned into ashes with the use of gasoline and rubber tires from around ten oDcloc in the
evening to si' oDcloc the ne't morning.
:9
This is highly improbable, if not ridiculous. A human body
cannot be pulverized into ashes by simply burning it with the use of gasoline and rubber tires in an open
field. 2ven crematoria use entirely closed incinerators where the corpse is sub#ected to intense
heat.
31
Thereafter, the remains undergo a process where the bones are completely ground to dust.
8n the case of 7an Twest, there is not even any insinuation that earnest efforts were e'erted to
recover traces of his remains from the scene of the alleged cremation.
31
Could it be that the
government investigators did to the place of cremation but could not find anyI !r could it be that they did
not go at all because they new that there would not be any as no burning ever too placeI To allege then
that the body of 7an Twest was completely burned to ashes in an open field with the use merely of tires
and gasoline is a tale too tall to gulp.
Strangely, if not awwardly, after 7an TwestDs reported abduction on
-; *une -..+ which culminated in his decimation by cremation, his counsel continued to represent
him before #udicial and &uasi1#udicial proceedings. Thus on /- *uly -..+, his counsel filed in his
behalf a petition for review before this Court, doceted as 3.%. 5os. -?;+C/, and on -, March -../,
a memorandum before the Securities and 2'change Commission in S2C Case 5o. /,.;. !n
+; 5ovember -../, during the preliminary investigation conducted by the panel of prosecutors,
counsel again manifested that 6even then and even as of this time, 8 stated in my counter1affidavit
that until the matter of death is to be established in the proper proceedings, 8 shall continue to
pursue my duties and responsibilities as counsel for Mr. 7an Twest.6
3:
>ence, even Asst. Solicitor
3eneral 2stoesta believes that counsel of 7an Twest doubted the latterDs
death.
33
!bviously, counsel himself does not believe that his client is in fact already dead otherwise his
obligation to his client would have ceased e'cept to comply with his duty 6to inform the court promptly of
such death . . . and to give the name and residence of his e'ecutor, administrator, guardian or other legal
representative,6
3;
which he did not.
Lnder the circumstances, we cannot discount petitionersD theory that the supposed death of 7an
Twest who is reportedly an international fugitive from #ustice, a fact substantiated by petitioners and
never refuted by 0ACC, is a liely story to stop the international manhunt for his arrest. 8n this
regard, we are reminded of the leading case of+.S. . Samarin
3<
decided ninety1two years ago where
this Court ruled that when the supposed victim is wholly unnown, his body not found, and there is but
one witness who testifies to the illing, the corp!s delicti is not sufficiently proved.
Then, the e'tra#udicial statement of Lmbal suffers from material inconsistencies. 8n his sworn
statement, he said that he together with his cohorts was met by petitioners in Silahis >otel where
they hatched the plan to abduct 7an Twest.
3=
>owever, during the preliminary investigation, he stated
that he was not part of the actual meeting as he only waited outside in the car for his companions who
supposedly discussed the plan inside Silahis >otel.
37
Lmbal also said that petitioners arrived with $ato and conducted a moc interrogation of 7an Twest
who thereafter signed various documents upon being compelled to do so.
3>
4uring the clarificatory
&uestioning, however, Lmbal changed his story and said that he was ased to go outside of the 6safe
house6 at the time 7an Twest was interrogated and thus did not see if 7an Twest indeed signed certain
documents. (hy Lmbal had to be sent out of the 6safe house,6
no e'planation was offered. 4id these documents really e'istI !r could the
non1e'istence of these documents be the reason why 0ACC was not able to comply with the order of the
prosecutors to produce them during the preliminary investigationI And then, what happened to the 0+.CM
that was supposedly offered by petitioners in e'change for the abduction of 7an TwestI These and more
remain unanswered.
Most perple'ing however is that while the whole investigation was supposedly triggered off by
LmbalDs confession of -; September -../, the application of the 0ACC operatives for a search
warrant to be served in the
two K+A dwellings of Santiago was filed and granted by the %egional Trial Court of Manila on -C
September -../, a day before Lmbal e'ecuted his sworn statement. 8n support of the application,
the 0ACC agents claimed that Lmbal had been in their custody since -? September -../.
Significantly, although he was said to be already under their custody, Lmbal claims he was never
interrogated until -; September -../ and only at the security barracs of 7alle 7erde 7, 0asig,
where he was a security guard.
39
The alleged counter1affidavit of S0!+ $ato, which the panel of prosecutors also considered in filing
the charges against petitioners, can hardly be credited as its probative value has tremendously
waned. The records show that the alleged counter1affidavit, which is self1incriminating, was filed after
the panel had considered the case submitted for resolution. And before petitioners could refute this
counter1affidavit, $ato moved to suppress the same on the ground that it was e'tracted through
duress and intimidation.
Jor sure, the credibility of Lmbal is badly battered. Certainly, his bare allegations, even if the State
invoes its inherent right to prosecute, are insufficient to #ustify sending two lawyers to #ail, or
anybody for that matter. More importantly, the 0ACC operatives who applied for a warrant to search
the dwellings of Santiago never implicated petitioners. 8n fact they claimed that according to Lmbal,
it was Santiago, and not petitioners, who masterminded the whole affair.
;1
(hile there may be bits of
evidence against petitionersD
co1accused, i.e., referring to those seized from the dwellings of Santiago, these do not in the least prove
petitionersD complicity in the crime charged. $ased on the evidence thus far submitted there is nothing
indeed, much less is there probable cause, to incriminate petitioners. Jor them to stand trial and be
deprived in the meantime of their liberty, however brief, the law appropriately e'acts much more to sustain
a warrant for their arrest M facts and circumstances strong enough in themselves to support the belief
that they are guilty of a crime that in fact happened. Huite obviously, this has not been met.
7erily, respondent #udge committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the warrant for the arrest of
petitioners it appearing that he did not personally e'amine the evidence nor did he call for the
complainant and his witnesses in the face of their incredible accounts. 8nstead, he merely relied on
the certification of the prosecutors that probable cause e'isted. Jor, otherwise, he would have found
out that the evidence thus far presented was utterly insufficient to warrant the arrest of petitioners. 8n
this regard, we restate the procedure we outlined in various cases we have already decided.
8n Solien . Makasiar,
;1
we said that the #udge KaA shall personally evaluate the report and the
supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the e'istence of probable cause and, on the basis
thereof, issue a warrant of arrestB or, KbA if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, may disregard
the fiscalDs report and re&uire the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at
a conclusion on the e'istence of probable cause.
8n People . Inting,
;:
we emphasized the important features of the constitutional mandate) KaA The
determination of probable cause is a function of the #udgeB it is not for the provincial fiscal or prosecutor to
ascertain. !nly the #udge and the #udge alone maes this determinationB KbA The preliminary in&uiry made
by a prosecutor does not bind the #udge. 8t merely assists him in maing the determination of probable
cause. The #udge does not have to follow what the prosecutor presents to him. $y itself, the prosecutorDs
certification of probable cause is ineffectual. 8t is the report, the affidavits, the transcript of stenographic
notes Kif anyA, and all other supporting documents behind the prosecutorDs certification which are material
in assisting the #udge in his determination of probable causeB and, KcA *udges and prosecutors alie
should distinguish the preliminary in&uiry which determines probable cause for the issuance of a warrant
of arrest from the preliminary investigation proper which ascertains whether the offender should be held
for trial or released. 2ven if the two in&uiries be conducted in the course of one and the same proceeding,
there should be no confusion about their ob#ectives. The determination of probable cause for the warrant
is made by the #udge. The preliminary investigation
proper M whether or not there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused is guilty of the offense
charged and therefore, whether or not he should be sub#ected to the e'pense, rigors and embarrassment
of trial M is a function of the prosecutor.
8n 6im . /eli%,
;3
where we reiterated Solien . Makasiar and People . Inting, we said M
ETFhe *udge does not have to personally e'amine the complainant and his witnesses.
The 0rosecutor can perform the same functions as a commissioner for the taing of
the evidence. >owever, there should be a report and necessary documents
supporting the JiscalDs bare certification. All these should be before the *udge.
The e'tent of the *udgeDs personal e'amination of the report and its anne'es
depends on the circumstances of each case. (e cannot determine beforehand how
cursory or e'haustive the *udgeDs e'amination should be. The *udge has to e'ercise
sound discretion for, after all, the personal determination is vested in the *udge by
the Constitution. 8t can be as brief or as detailed as the circumstances of each case
re&uire. To be sure, the #udge must go beyond the 0rosecutorDs certification and
investigation report whenever necessary. >e should call for the complainant and
witnesses themselves to answer the courtDs probing &uestions when the
circumstances of the case so re&uire.
Clearly, probable cause may not be established simply by showing that a trial #udge sub#ectively
believes that he has good grounds for his action. 3ood faith is not enough. 8f sub#ective good faith
alone were the test, the constitutional protection would be demeaned and the people would be
6secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects6 only in the fallible discretion of the #udge.
;;
!n
the contrary, the probable cause test is an ob#ective one, for in order that there be probable cause the
facts and circumstances must be such as would warrant a belief by a reasonably discreet and prudent
man that the accused is guilty of the crime which has #ust been committed.
;<
This, as we said, is the
standard. >ence, if upon the filing of the information in court the trial #udge, after reviewing the information
and the documents attached thereto, finds that no probable cause e'ists must either call for the
complainant and the witnesses themselves or simply dismiss the case. There is no reason to hold the
accused for trial and further e'pose him to an open and public accusation of the crime when no probable
cause e'ists.
$ut then, it appears in the instant case that the prosecutors have similarly misappropriated, if not
abused, their discretion. 8f they really believed that petitioners were probably guilty, they should have
armed themselves with facts and circumstances in support of that beliefB for mere belief is not
enough. They should have presented sufficient and credible evidence to demonstrate the e'istence
of probable cause. Jor the prosecuting officer 6is the representative not of an ordinary party to a
controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its
obligation to govern allB and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win
a case, but that #ustice shall be done. As such, he is in a peculiar and very definite sense the servant
of the law, the twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer. >e may
prosecute with earnestness and vigor M indeed, he should do so. $ut, while he may strie hard
blows, he is not at liberty to strie foul ones. 8t is as much his duty to refrain from improper methods
calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring about a
#ust one6
;=
8n the case at bench, the undue haste in the filing of the information and the inordinate interest of the
government cannot be ignored. Jrom the gathering of evidence until the termination of the
preliminary investigation, it appears that the state prosecutors were overly eager to file the case and
secure a warrant for the arrest of the accused without bail and their conse&uent detention. LmbalDs
sworn statement is laden with inconsistencies and improbabilities. $atoDs counter1affidavit was
considered without giving petitioners the opportunity to refute the same. The 0ACC which gathered
the evidence appears to have had a hand in the determination of probable cause in the preliminary
in&uiry as the undated resolution of the panel not only bears the letterhead of 0ACC but was also
recommended for approval by the head of the 0ACC Tas Jorce. Then petitioners were given the
runaround in securing a copy of the resolution and the information against them.
8ndeed, the tas of ridding society of criminals and misfits and sending them to #ail in the hope that
they will in the future reform and be productive members of the community rests both on the
#udiciousness of #udges and the prudence of prosecutors. And, whether it is a preliminary
investigation by the prosecutor, which ascertains if the respondent should be held for trial, or a
preliminary in&uiry by the trial #udge which determines if an arrest warrant should issue, the
bottomline is that there is a standard in the determination of the e'istence of probable cause, i.e.,
there should be facts and circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a prudent and
cautious man to believe that the accused is guilty of the crime with which he is charged. *udges and
prosecutors are not off on a frolic of their own, but rather engaged in a delicate legal duty defined by
law and #urisprudence.
8n this instance, Salonga . Pa7o
;7
finds application M
The purpose of a preliminary investigation is to secure the innocent against hasty,
malicious and oppressive prosecution, and to protect him from an open and public
accusation of crime, from the trouble, e'pense and an'iety of a public trial, and also
to protect the state from useless and e'pensive trial KTrocio v. Manta, --, SC%A
+:-, citing >ashim v. $oncan, 9- 0hil. +-;A. The right to a preliminary investigation is
a statutory grant, and to withhold it would be to transgress constitutional due process
K0eople v. !andasa, +C SC%A +99A. ,o'eer, in order to satisfy the d!e process
cla!se it is not eno!gh that the preliminary inestigation is cond!cted in the sense of
making s!re that the transgressor shall not escape 'ith imp!nity. $ preliminary
inestigation seres not only for the p!rposes of the State. More importantly, it is a
part of the g!arantees of freedom and fair play 'hich are "irthrights of all 'ho lie in
the co!ntry. It is therefore imperatie !pon the fiscal or the -!dge as the case may
"e, to reliee the acc!sed from the pain of going thr! a trial once it is ascertained
that the eidence is ins!fficient to s!stain a prima facie case or that no pro"a"le
ca!se e%ists to form a s!fficient "elief as to the g!ilt of the acc!sed Kemphasis
suppliedA.
The facts of this case are fatefully distressing as they showcase the seeming immensity of
government power which when uncheced becomes tyrannical and oppressive. >ence the
Constitution, particularly the $ill of %ights, defines the limits beyond which lie unsanctioned state
actions. $ut on occasion, for one reason or another, the State transcends this parameter. 8n
conse&uence, individual liberty unnecessarily suffers. The case before us, if uncurbed, can be
illustrative of a dismal trend. 5eedless in#ury of the sort inflicted by government agents is not
reflective of responsible government. *udges and law enforcers are not, by reason of their high and
prestigious office, relieved of the common obligation to avoid deliberately inflicting unnecessary
in#ury.
The sovereign power has the inherent right to protect itself and its people from vicious acts which
endanger the proper administration of #usticeB hence, the State has every right to prosecute and
punish violators of the law. This is essential for its self1 preservation, nay, its very e'istence. $ut this
does not confer a license for pointless assaults on its citizens. The right of the State to prosecute is
not a carte "lanche for government agents to defy and disregard the rights of its citizens under the
Constitution. Confinement, regardless of duration, is too high a price to pay for recless and
impulsive prosecution. >ence, even if we apply in this case the 6multifactor balancing test6 which
re&uires the officer to weigh the manner and intensity of the interference on the right of the people,
the gravity of the crime committed and the circumstances attending the incident, still we cannot see
probable cause to order the detention of petitioners.
;>
The purpose of the $ill of %ights is to protect the people against arbitrary and discriminatory use of
political power. This bundle of rights guarantees the preservation of our natural rights which include
personal liberty and security against invasion by the government or any of its branches or
instrumentalities. Certainly, in the hierarchy of rights, the $ill of %ights taes precedence over the
right of the State to prosecute, and when weighed against each other, the scales of #ustice tilt
towards the former. Thus, relief may be availed of to stop the purported enforcement of criminal law
where it is necessary to provide for an orderly administration of #ustice, to prevent the use of the
strong arm of the law in an oppressive and vindictive manner, and to afford ade&uate protection to
constitutional rights.
;9
0erhaps, this case would not have reached this Court if petitioners were ordinary people submissive
to the dictates of government. They would have been illegally arrested and detained without bail.
Then we would not have the opportunity to rectify the in#ustice. Jortunately, the victims of in#ustice
are lawyers who are vigilant of their rights, who fight for their liberty and freedom not otherwise
available to those who cower in fear and sub#ection.
Let this then be a constant reminder to #udges, prosecutors and other government agents tased
with the enforcement of the law that in the performance of their duties they must act with
circumspection, lest their thoughtless ways, methods and practices cause a disservice to their office
and maim their countrymen they are sworn to serve and protect. (e thus caution government
agents, particularly the law enforcers, to be more prudent in the prosecution of cases and not to be
oblivious of human rights protected by the fundamental law. (hile we greatly applaud their
determined efforts to weed society of felons, let not their impetuous eagerness violate constitutional
precepts which circumscribe the structure of a civilized community.
(>2%2J!%2, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is 3%A5T24. The temporary restraining
order we issued on +, Jebruary -..: in favor of petitioners, Atty. 4iosdado *ose Allado and Atty.
%oberto L. Mendoza, is made permanent. The warrant of arrest issued against them is S2T AS842
and respondent *udge %oberto C. 4iono is 25*!8524 from proceeding any further against herein
petitioners in Crim. Case 5o. .:1-9C9 of the %egional Trial Court of Maati.
S! !%42%24
.r!*, #aide, Jr., 1!iason and 8ap!nan, JJ., conc!r.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and ALYNN PLEZETTE DY, petitioners,
vs. COURT OF APPEALS, BILLY CERBO and JONATHAN
CERBO, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
PANGANIBAN, J.:
,n our criminal )ustice system, the public prosecutor has the Duasi*)udicial discretion to
determine "hether or not a criminal case should be filed in court9 (ourts must respect the
eHercise of such discretion "hen the information filed a!ainst the accused is 'alid on its face,
and no manifest error, !ra'e abuse of discretion or pre)udice can be imputed to the public
prosecutor9
The Case
%efore us is a Petition for 4e'ie" under 4ule 48, seekin! to re'erse the ;une 2A, 199B
1ecision and the Au!ust 25, 199B 4esolution if the (ourt of Appeals
<1=
in (A* @4 #P 0o9 ?B01A9
<2=
The assailed 1ecision dismissed the Petition for Certiorari filed by the petitioners, "hich
sou!ht to annul and set aside t"o .rders of the 4e!ional Trial (ourt of 0abunturan, 1a'ao: the
;une 2A, 1994 .rder dismissin! the ,nformation for murder filed a!ainst Pri'ate 4espondent
%illy (erbo and the Au!ust 1A, 1994 .rder denyin! petitioners motion for reconsideration9
The assailed Au!ust 25, 199B (ourt of Appeals 7(A: 4esolution like"ise denied petitioners
motion for reconsideration9
The Facs
The case belo" arose from the fatal shootin! of Petitioner 1ys mother, 4osalinda 1y, in
"hich the primary suspect "as Pri'ate 4espondent ;onathan (erbo, son of Pri'ate 4espondent
%illy (erbo9
The procedural and factual antecedents of the case "ere summariCed in the challen!ed
1ecision of the (ourt of Appeals as follo"s:
I.n Au!ust ?0, 199?, 4osalinda 1y, accordin! to the petition, "as shot at pointblank
ran!e by pri'ate respondent ;onathan (erbo in the presence and at the office of his
father, pri'ate respondent %illy (erbo at Purok 9, Poblacion, 0abunturan, 1a'ao9
I.n #eptember 2, 199?, eye"itness 3lsa %9 @umban eHecuted an affida'it positi'ely
identifyin! pri'ate respondent ;onathan (erbo as the assailant9 7AnneH (, 4ollo, p9
?4:9
I.n #eptember 20, 199?, pri'ate respondents ;onathan (erbo eHecuted a counter*
affida'it interposin! the defense that the shootin! "as accidental 7AnneH 1: 4ollo, pp9
?8*?B:9
I.n .ctober B, 199?, the ?
rd
&unicipal (ircuit Trial (ourt of 0abunturan*&a"ab, 1a'ao, after a
preliminary in'esti!ation, found Isufficient !round to en!ender a "ell*founded beliefJ that the
crime of murder has been committed by pri'ate respondent ;onathan (erbo and resol'ed to
for"ard the entire records of the case to the pro'incial prosecutor at Ta!um, 1a'ao 7AnneH 3,
4ollo, pp9 ?5*?A:9
IAfter <an= information for murder "as filed a!ainst ;onathan (erbo, petitioner Alynn
PleCette 1y, dau!hter of the 'ictim 4osalinda 1y, eHecuted an affida'it*complaint
char!in! pri'ate respondent %illy (erbo of conspiracy in the killin! 7AnneH +, 4ollo,
p9 ?9:, supported by a supplemental affida'it of 3lsa %9 @umban, alle!in! Iin
additionJ to her pre'ious statement that:
S?9 ,n addition to my said s"orn statement, , 'oluntarily and freely a'er as follo"s:
Sa: , 'i'idly recall that "hile my mistress 4osalinda @o and , "ere in the office of
%illy (erbo at about 11:48 a9m9 on Au!ust ?0, 199?, &r9 (erbo personally instructed
me to fetch the food from the kitchen <and to brin! it= to the office instead of the
dinin! room9
Sb: >hile brin!in! the food, &r9 (erbo a!ain instructed me to place the food <o=n a
corner table and commanded me to sit behind the entrance door and at the same time
&r9 (erbo positioned 4osalinda <on= a chair facin! the entrance door for an easy
tar!et9
Sc: ,mmediately after 4osalinda "as shot, &r9 %illy (erbo called his son ;onathan
"ho "as runnin!, but did not and ha<s= ne'er bothered to brin! 4osalinda to a hospital
or e'en apply first aid9
Sd: To my surprise, &r9 %illy (erbo, instead of brin!in! 4osalinda to the hospital,
brou!ht her to the funeral parlor and immediately ordered her to be embalmed "ithout
e'en informin! her children or any of her immediate relati'es HHH9 AnneH @, 4ollo,
p9 409:
IPri'ate respondent %illy (erbo #ubmitted a counter*affida'it denyin! the alle!ations
of both petitioner Alynn PleCette 1y and 3lsa %9 @umban 7AnneH , 4ollo, pp9 41*
42:9
I.n or about April A, 1994, Prosecutor Protacio $uman!tad filed a I&otion for lea'e
of court to rein'esti!ate the caseJ 7AnneH ,9 4ollo, pp4?*44: "hich "as !ranted by the
respondent )ud!e in an order dated April 2A, 1994 7AnneH ;, 4ollo, p9 48:9
I,n his resolution dated &ay 8, 1994, Prosecutor $uman!tad recommended the filin!
of an amended information includin! %illy (erbo SHHH as one of the accused in the
murder case HHH 7AnneH P: rollo, pp9 4B*49:9
IAccordin!ly, the prosecution filed an amended information includin! %illy (erbo in
the murder case9 A "arrant for his arrest "as later issued on &ay 25, 1994 74ollo, p9
25:9
IPri'ate respondent %illy (erbo then filed a motion to Duash "arrant of arrest ar!uin!
that the same "as issued "ithout probable cause 74ollo, p9 25:9
I.n ;une 2A, 1994, respondent ;ud!e issued the first assailed order dismissin! the
case a!ainst %illy (erbo and recallin! the "arrant for his arrest<F= the dispositi'e
portion of <the order= reads:
T,0 T3 $,@T .+ A$$ T3 +.43@.,0@, <an= order is hereby issued
1,#&,##,0@ the case as a!ainst %illy (erbo only9J
S$et, therefore, the "arrant of arrest, dated may 25, 1994, be 43(A$$319
SThe prosecution is hereby ordered to "ithdra" its Amended ,nformation and file a
ne" one char!in! ;onathan (erbo only9
S#. .4134319 74ollo, pp9 29*?0:9
IPri'ate Prosecutor 4omeo Ta!ra filed a motion for reconsideration "hich "as denied by the
respondent )ud!e in his second assailed order dated Au!ust 1A, 1994 7AnneH %, 4ollo, pp9 ?1*
??:9J
<?=
The R!"#n$ %& he C%!' %& A((ea"s
,n its 10*pa!e 1ecision, the (ourt of Appeals debunked petitioners assertion that the trial
)ud!e committed !ra'e abuse of discretion in recallin! the "arrant of arrest and subseDuently
dismissin! the case a!ainst %illy (erbo, (itin! )urisprudence,
<4=
the appellate court held as
follo"s:
IThe rulin! is eHplicit9 ,f upon the filin! of the information in court, the trial )ud!e,
after re'ie"in! the information and the documents attached thereto, finds that no
probable cause eHist must either call for the complainant and the "itnesses or simply
dismiss the case9
IPetitioners Duestion the applicability of the doctrine laid do"n in the
abo'e<*=mentioned case, alle!in! that the facts therein are different from the instant
case9 >e rule that the disparity of facts does not pre'ent the application of the
principle9
I>e ha'e !one o'er the supplemental affida'it of 3lsa %9 @umban and takin! into
account the additional facts and circumstance alle!ed therein, "e cannot say that
respondent )ud!e !ra'ely abused his discretion in dismissin! the case as a!ainst
pri'ate respondent %illy (erbo for lack of probable cause
HHH HHH HHH
UThe prosecution, if it really belie'ed that %illy (erbo is probably !uilty by
conspiracy, should ha'e presented additional e'idence sufficiently and credibly
demonstratin! the eHistence of probable cause9
HHH HHH HHHJ
<8=
,n sum, the (ourt of Appeals held that ;ud!e 3u!enio 2alles did not commit !ra'e abuse of
discretion in recallin! the "arrant of arrest issued a!ainst Pri'ate 4espondent %illy (erbo and
subseDuently dismissin! the ,nformation for murder filed a!ainst the pri'ate respondent, because
the e'idence presented thus far did not substantiate such char!e9
ence, this petition9
<B=
The Ass#$ned E''%'s
Petitioner 1y a'ers:
I1: The (ourt of Appeals !ra'ely erred in holdin! that the 4e!ional Trial (ourt
;ud!e had the authority to re'erse <the public prosecutors= findin! of probable
cause to prosecute accused HHH and thus dismiss the case filed by the latter on the
basis of a motion to Duash "arrant of arrest9
I2: The (ourt of Appeals !ra'ely erred in fully and unDualifiedly applyin! the case of
Allado, et9 al9 's9 PA((, et9 al9 @949 0o9 11?B?0, <to= the case at bench despite <the= clear
difference in their respecti'e factual backdrop<s= and the contrary earlier )urisprudence on
the matter9J
<5=
.n the other hand, the solicitor !eneral posits this sole issue:
I>hether the (ourt of Appeals erred in findin! that no probable cause eHists to merit the filin!
of char!es a!ainst pri'ate respondents %illy (erbo9J
<A=
3ssentially, the petitioners are Duestionin! the propriety of the trial courts dismissal, for
"ant of e'idence, of the ,nformation for murder a!ainst Pri'ate 4espondent %illy (erbo9
,n resol'in! this petition, the discussion of the (ourt "ill re'ol'e t"o points: first, the
determination of probable cause as an eHecuti'e and )udicial function and, second, the
applicability of Allado and Salonga to the case at bar9
The C%!')s R!"#n$
The petition is meritorious9 The trial court erred in dismissin! the ,nformation filed a!ainst
the pri'ate respondent9 (onseDuently, the (ourt of Appeals "as like"ise in error "hen it upheld
such rulin!9
Executive Determination of Probable Cause
The determination of probable cause durin! a preliminary in'esti!ation is a function that
belon!s to the public prosecutor9 ,t is an executive function,
<9=
the correctness of the eHercise of
"hich is a matter that the trial court itself does not and may not be compelled to pass upon9 The
#eparate 7(oncurrin!: .pinion of former (hief ;ustice Andres 49 0ar'asa in 4oberts '9 (ourt of
Appeals
<10=
succinctly elucidates such point in this "ise:
IHHH HHH HHH
I,n this special ci'il action, this (ourt is bein! asked to assume the function of a
public prosecutor9 ,t is bein! asked to determine "hether probable cause eHists as
re!ards petitioners9 &ore concretely, the (ourt is bein! asked to eHamine and assess
such e'idence as has thus far been submitted by the parties and, on the basis thereof,
make a conclusion as to "hether or not it suffices Sto en!ender a "ell founded belief
that a crime has been committed and that the respondent is probably !uilty thereof and
should be held for trial9
I,t is a function that this (ourt should not be called upon to perform9 t is a function
that properly pertains to the public prosecutor! one that! as far as crimes cogni"able
by a Regional #rial Court are concerned! and notwithstanding that it involves an
ad$udicative process of a sort! exclusively pertains! by law! to said executive officer!
the public prosecutor. t is moreover a function that in the established scheme of
things! is supposed to be performed at the very genesis of! indeed! prefatorily to! the
formal commencement of a criminal action. #he proceedings before a public
prosecutor! it may well be stressed! are essentially preliminary! prefatory and cannot
lead to a final! definite and authoritative ad$udgment of the guilt or innocence of the
persons charged with a felony or crime.
%&hether or not that function has been correctly discharged by the public prosecutor
' i. e.! whether or not he has made a correct ascertainment of the existence of
probable cause in a case! is a matter that the trial court itself does not and may not be
compelled to pass upon. ,t is not for instance permitted for an accused, upon the filin!
of the information a!ainst him by the public prosecutor, to preempt trial by filin! a
motion "ith the Trial (ourt prayin! for the Duashal or dismissal of the indictment on
the ground that the evidence upon which the same is based is inade(uate. 0or is it
permitted, on the antipodal theory that the e'idence is in truth inadeDuate, for the
complainin! party to present a petition before the (ourt prayin! that the public
prosecutor be compelled to file the correspondin! information a!ainst the accused9
HHH HHH HHHJ
,ndeed, the public prosecutor has broad discretion to determine "hether probable cause
exist and to charge those whom be or she believes to have committed the crime as defined by
law. .ther"ise stated, such official has the Duasi*)udicial authority to determine "hether or not a
criminal case must be filed in court9
<11=
Thus, in Crespo v. )ogul!
<12=
"e ruled:
I,t is a cardinal principle that all criminal actions either commenced by complaint or
by information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the fiscal. #he
institution of a criminal action depends upon the sound discretion of the fiscal. e
may or may not file the complaint or information, follo" or not follo" that presented
by the offended party, accordin! to "hether the e'idence , in his opinion, is sufficient
or not to establish the !uilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt9 The reason for
placin! the criminal prosecution under the direction and control of the fiscal is to
pre'ent malicious or unfounded prosecutions by pri'ate persons9 HHH Prosecutin!
officers under the po"er 'ested in them by la", not only ha'e the authority but also
the duty of prosecutin! persons "ho, accordin! to the e'idence recei'ed from the
complainant, are sho"n to be !uilty of a crime committed "ithin the )urisdiction of
their office9 They ha'e eDually the duty not to prosecute "hen the e'idence adduced
is not sufficient to establish a prima facie case9J
This broad prosecutorial po"er is ho"e'er not unfettered, because )ust as public prosecutors
are obli!ed to brin! forth before the la" those "ho ha'e trans!ressed it, they are also constrained
to be circumspect in filin! criminal char!es a!ainst the innocent9 Thus, for crimes co!niCable by
re!ional trial courts preliminary in'esti!ations are usually conducted9 ,n *edesma v. Court of
Appeals!
<1?=
"e discussed the purposes and nature of a preliminary in'esti!ation in this manner:
IThe primary ob)ecti'e of a preliminary in'esti!ation is to free respondent from the
incon'enience, eHpense, i!nominy and stress of defendin! himself6herself in the
course of a formal trial, until the reasonable probability of his or her !uilt in a more
or less summary proceedin! by a competent office desi!nated by la" for that
purpose9 #econdarily, such summary proceedin! also protects the state from the
burden of the unnecessary eHpense an effort in prosecutin! alle!ed offenses and in
holdin! trials arisin! from false, fri'olous or !roundless char!es9
U#uch in'esti!ation is not part of the trial9 A full and eHhausti'e presentation of the
parties e'idence is not reDuired, but only such as may en!ender a "ell*!rounded
belief than an offense has been committed and that the accused is probably !uilty
thereof9 %y reason of the abbre'iated nature of preliminary in'esti!ations, a dismissal
of the char!es as a result thereof is not eDui'alent to a )udicial pronouncement of
acDuittal9 ence, no double )eopardy attaches9J
Judicial Determination of Probable Cause
The determination of probable cause to hold a person for trial must be distin!uished from
the determination of probable cause to issue a "arrant of arrest, "hich is $udicial function9 The
)udicial determination of probable cause in the issuance of arrest "arrants has been emphasiCed
in numerous cases9 ,n o '9 People,
<14=
the (ourt summariCed the pertinent rulin!s on the sub)ect,
as follo"s:
IThe abo'e rulin!s in Soliven! nting and *im! #r9 "ere iterated in Allado v.
+io,no! "here "e eHplained a!ain "hat probable cause means9 Probable cause for
the issuance of a "arrant of arrest is the eHistence of such facts and circumstances that
"ould lead a reasonably discreet and prudent person to belie'e that an offense has
been committed by the person sou!ht to be arrested9 ence, the )ud!e, before issuin!
a "arrant of arrest, Imust satisfy himself that based on the e'idence submitted, there
is sufficient proof that a crime has been committed and that the person to be arrested
is probably !uilty thereof9J At this sta!e of the criminal proceedin!, the $udge is not
yet tas,ed to review in detail the evidence submitted during the preliminary
investigation. t is sufficient that he personally evaluates such evidence in
determining probable cause. n &ebb v. +e *eon! we stressed that the $udge merely
determines the probability! not the certainty! of guilt of the accused and! in doing so!
he need not conduct a de novo hearing9 e simply personally re'ie"s the
prosecutors initial determination findin! probable cause to see if it is supported by
substantial e'idence9
HHH HHH HHH
I,n li!ht of the aforecited decisions of this (ourt, such )ustification cannot be
upheld9 $est "e be too repetiti'e, "e only emphasiCe three 'ital matters once
more: -irst! as held in nting! the determination of probable cause by the prosecutor
is for the purpose different from that which is to be made by the $udge. &hether there
is reasonable ground to believe that the accused is guilty of the offense charged and
should be held for trial is what the prosecutor passes upon. #he $udge! on the other
hand! determines whether a warrant of arrest should be issued against the accused!
i.e.! whether there is a necessity for placing him under immediate custody in order not
to frustrate the ends of $ustice. #hus! even if both should base their findings on one
and the same proceedings or evidence! there should be no confusion as to their
distinct ob$ectives.
%Second! since their ob)ecti'es are different, the )ud!e cannot rely solely on the report
of the prosecutor in findin! probable cause to )ustify the issuance of a "arrant of
arrest9 .b'iously and understandably, the contents of the prosecutors report "ill
support his o"n conclusion that there is reason to char!e the accused of an offense
and hold him for trial9 o"e'er, the )ud!e must decide independently9 ence, he
must ha'e supportin! e'idence, other than the prosecutors bare report upon "hich to
le!ally sustain his o"n findin!s on the eHistence or non*eHistence of probable cause to
issue an arrest order9 This responsibility of determinin! personally and independently
the eHistence of non*eHistence of probable cause is lod!e in him by no less than the
most basic la" of the land9 Parenthetically, the prosecutor could ease the burden of
the )ud!e and speed up the liti!ation process by for"ardin! to the latter not only the
information and his bare resolution, but also so much of the records and the e'idence
on hand as to enable is onor to make his personal and separate )udicial findin! on
"hether to issue a "arrant of arrest9
I*astly! it is not reDuired that the complete or entire records of the case durin! the
preliminary in'esti!ation be submitted to and eHamined by the )ud!e9 >e do not
intend to unduly burden trial courts by obli!in! them to eHamine the complete records
of e'ery case all the time simply for the purpose of orderin! the arrest of the
accused9 >hat is reDuired, rather, is that the )ud!e must ha'e sufficient supportin!
documents 7such as the complaint, affida'its, counter*affida'its, s"orn statements of
"itnesses or transcript of steno!raphic notes, if any: upon "hich to make his
independent )ud!ment, or at the 'ery least, upon "hich to 'erify the findin!s of the
prosecutor as to the eHistence of probable cause9 The point is: he cannot rely solely
and entirely on the prosecutors recommendation, as the 4espondent (ourt did in this
case9 Althou!h the prosecutor en)oys the le!al presumption of re!ularity in the
performance of his duties and functions "hich in turn !i'es his report the presumption
of accuracy, the (onstitution, "e repeat, commands the )ud!e to personally determine
probable cause in the issuance of "arrants of arrest9 This (ourt has consistently held
that a )ud!e fails in his bounden duty if he relies merely on the certification or the
report of the in'esti!atin! officer9
HHH HHH HHHJ
2erily, a )ud!e cannot be compelled to issue a "arrant of arrest if he or she deems that there
is no probable cause for doin! so9 (orollary to this principle, the )ud!e should not o'erride the
public prosecutors determination of probable cause to hold an accused for trial, on the !round
that the e'idence presented to substantiate the issuance of an arrest "arrant insufficient, as in the
present case9
,ndeed, it "ould be unfair to eHpect the prosecution to present all the e'idence needed to
secure the con'iction of the accused upon the filin! of the information a!ainst the latter9 The
reason is found in the nature and the ob)ecti'e of a preliminary in'esti!ation9 ere, the public
prosecutors do not decide "hether there is e'idence beyond reasonable doubt of the !uilt of the
person char!edF they merely determine I"hether there is sufficient !round to en!ender a "ell*
founded belief that a crime H H H has been committed and that the respondent is probably !uilty
thereof, and should be held for trial9J
<18=
3'identiary matters must be presented and heard durin!
the trial9
<1B=
Therefore, if the information is 'alid on its face, and there is no sho"in! of manifest
error, !ra'e abuse of discretion and pre)udice on the part of public prosecutor, the trial court
should respect such determination9
Inapplicability of A""ad% and Sa"%n$a
The (ourt of Appeals anchored its rulin! on the pronouncement made in Allado v.
+io,no. IHHH <,=f, upon the filin! of the information in court, the trial )ud!e, after re'ie"in! the
information and the documents attached thereto, must either call for the complainant and the
"itnesses themsel'es or simply dismiss the case9 there is no reason to hold the accused for trial
and further eHpose him to an open and public accusation of the crime "hen no probable cause
eHists9J
<15=
,n Allado, Petitioners 1iosdado ;ose Allado and 4oberto $9 &endoCa, practicin! la"yers,
"ere accused by the Presidential Anti*(rime (ommission 7PA((: of kidnappin! "ith murder
and ordered by ;ud!e 4oberto (9 1iokno to be arrested "ithout bail9 The petitioners Duestioned
the issuance of the "arrants for their arrest, contendin! that the respondents )ud!e acted "ith
!ra'e abuse of discretion and in eHcess of his )urisdiction in holdin! that there "as probable
cause a!ainst them9 They contended that the trial court relied merely on the resolution of the
in'esti!atin! panel and its certification that probable cause eHisted, "ithout personally
determinin! the admissibility and sufficiency of the e'idence for such findin! and "ithout statin!
the basis thereof9 they maintained that the records of the preliminary in'esti!ation, "hich "as
the sole basis of the )ud!es rulin!, failed to establish probable cause a!ainst them that "ould
)ustify the issuance of the "arrants for their arrest9
The (ourt declared that ;ud!e 1iokno had indeed committed !ra'e abuse of discretion in
issuin! the arrest "arrants9 (ontrary to the constitutional mandate and establish )urisprudence,
he merely relied on the certification of the prosecutors as to the eHistence of probable cause,
instead of personally eHaminin! the e'idence, the complainant and his "itnesses9 I+or
other"ise,J the (ourt said, Ihe "ould ha'e found out that the e'idence thus far presented "as
utterly insufficient to "arrant the arrest of the petitioners9J
<1A=
,n cate!orically statin! that the e'idence so far presented did not meet the standard of
probable cause and subseDuently !rantin! the petition, the (ourt noted the follo"in!
circumstances: first! the corpus delicti "as not established, and there "as serious doubt as to the
alle!ed 'ictims deathF second, the eHtra)udicial statement of the principal "itness, "ho had
priorly confessed his participation in the crime, "as full of material inconsistenciesF and third,
the PA(( operati'es "ho in'esti!ated the case ne'er implicated the petitioners9
(itin! Salonga v. Cru"-Pa/o! the (ourt of Appeals pointed out that "hen there "as
no prima facie case a!ainst a person sou!ht to be char!ed "ith a crime,J the )ud!e or fiscal,
therefore, should not !o on "ith the prosecution in the hope that some credible e'idence mi!ht
later turn out durin! trial, for this "ould be a fla!rant 'iolation of a basic ri!ht "hich the courts
are created to uphold9J
<19=
,n the aforecited case, Petitioner ;o'ito 49 #alon!a sou!ht to bar the filin! of an ,nformation
for 'iolation of the 4e'ised Anti*#ub'ersion Act, "hich ;ud!e 3rnani (ruC*Pano had ordered to
be filed a!ainst him9 ,n sustainin! the petitioner, the (ourt held that the e'idence upon "hich the
,nformation "as based "as not sufficient to char!e him for a 'iolation of the 4e'ised Anti*
#ub'ersion Act9
,n all, the (ourt decreed in both cases that there "as no basis in la" and in fact for the
)udicial and eHecuti'e determination of probable cause9 The (ourt also held that the
!o'ernment, "hile 'ested "ith the ri!ht and the duty to protect itself and its people a!ainst
trans!ressors of the la", must perform the same in a manner that "ould not infrin!e the
percei'ed 'iolators ri!hts as !uaranteed by the constitution9
o"e'er, the present case is not at all fours "ith Allado and Salonga. -irst! 3lsa @umban,
the principal eye"itness to the killin! of 4osalinda 1y, "as not a participant or conspirator in the
commission of said crime9 ,n Allado and Salonga! ho"e'er, the main "itness "ere the
confessed perpetrators of the crimes, "hose testimonies the (ourt deemed Stainted9
<20=
Second, in
the case at bar the pri'ate respondent "as accorded due process, and no precipitate haste or bias
durin! the in'esti!ation of the case can be imputed to the public prosecutor9 .n the other hand,
the (ourt noted in Allado the Uundue haste in the filin! of the ,nformation and the inordinate
interest of the !o'ernmentJ in pursuin! the caseF
<21=
and in Salonga, IHHH the failure of the
prosecution to sho" that the petitioner "as probably !uilty of conspirin! to commit the crime,
the initial disre!ard of petitioners constitutional ri!hts <and= the massi'e and dama!in! publicity
made a!ainst him9J
<22=
,n other "ords, "hile the respecti'e sets of e'idence before the prosecutors
in Allado and Salonga "ere Iutterly insufficientJ to support a findin! of probable cause, the
same cannot be said of the present case9
>e stress that Allado and Salonga constitute eHceptions to the !eneral rule and may be
in'oke only if similar circumstances are clearly sho"n to eHist9 %ut as the fore!oin!
comparisons sho", such similarities are absent in the instant case9 ence, the rulin!s in the t"o
aforementioned cases cannot apply to it9
Motion Without e!uisite "otice
.ne more thin!9 Petitioners a'er that Pri'ate 4espondents (erbo did not !i'e them a copy
of the motion to Nuash the >arrant of Arrest, "hich had been issued a!ainst him, or a notice of
the schedule hearin!9 Thus, they contend, ;ud!e 2alles should not ha'e entertained such motion9
,t is settled that e'ery "ritten motion in a trial court must be set for hearin! by the applicant
and ser'ed "ith the notice of hearin! thereof, in such a manner as to ensure its receipt by the
other party9 The pro'isions on this matter in #ections 4 and 8, 4ule 18 of the 4ules of (ourt,
<2?=
are cate!orical and mandatory in character9
<24=
/nder #ection B of the said rule, no motion shall
be acted upon by the court "ithout proof of ser'ice thereof9 The rationale for this is
simple: unless the mo'ants set the time and the place of hearin!, the court "ill be unable to
determine "hether the ad'erse parties a!ree or ob)ect to the motions, since the rules themsel'es
do not fiH any period "ithin "hich they may file their replies or oppositions9
<28=
The motion to Duash the "arrant of arrest in the present case bein! pro forma, inasmusch as
the reDuisite copy and notice "ere not duly ser'ed upon the ad'erse party, the trial court had no
authority to act on it9
Epilo#ue
,n !rantin! this petition, "e are not pre)ud!in! the criminal case or !uilt or innocence of
Pri'ate 4espondent %illy (erbo9 >e are simply sayin! that, as a !eneral rule, if the information
is 'alid on its face and there is no sho"in! of manifest error, !ra'e abuse of discretion or
pre)udice on the part of the public prosecutor, courts should not dismiss it for S"ant of e'idence,
because e'identiary matters should be presented and heard durin! the trial9 The functions and
duties of both the trial court and the public prosecutor in Ithe proper scheme of thin!sJ in our
criminal )ustice system should be clearly understood9
The ri!hts of the people from "hat could sometimes be an Ioppressi'e eHercise of
!o'ernment prosecutorial po"ers do need to be protected "hen circumstance so reDuire9 %ut
)ust as "e reco!niCe this need, "e also ackno"led!e that the #tate must like"ise be accorded due
process9 Thus, "hen there is no sho"in! of nefarious irre!ularity or manifest error in the
performance of a public prosecutors duties, courts ou!ht to refrain from interferin! "ith such
la"fully and )udicially mandated duties9
,n any case, if there "as palpable error or !ra'e abuse of discretion in the public
prosecutors findin! of probable cause, the accused can appeal such findin! to the )ustice
secretary
<2B=
and mo'e for the deferment or suspension of the proceedin!s until such appeal is
resol'ed9
*HEREFORE, the petition is 0RA1#2+9 The assailed 1ecision of the (ourt of Appeals is
hereby R232RS2+ and S2# AS+29 The case is R2)A1+2+ to the 4e!ional Trial (ourt of
0abunturan, 1a'ao, "hich is ordered to reinstate the amended ,nformation a!ainst Pri'ate
4espondent %illy (erbo and to proceed "ith )udicious speed in hearin! the case9 0o costs9
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-=>9<< Se'(ember ;, 19>=
*EO*LE O3 THE *HILI**INES, plaintiff1appellee,
vs.
R#0EN 0#RGOS ) TITO, defendant1appellant.

G#TIERREZ, -R., J.:
This is an appeal from the decision of the %egional Trial Court of 4avao del Sur, -- th *udicial
%egion, 4igos, 4avao del Sur convicting defendant1 appellant %uben $urgos y Tito of The crime of
8llegal 0ossession of Jirearms in Jurtherance of Subversion. The dispositive portion of the decision
reads)
(>2%2J!%2, finding the guilt of accused %uben $urgos sufficiently established
beyond reasonable doubt, of the offense charges , pursuant to 0residential 4ecree
5o. ., in relation to 3eneral !rder 5o. ;, dated September ++, -.9+, and 3eneral
!rder 5o. 9, dated September +/, -.9+, in relation further to 0residential 4ecree 5o.
,,C, and considering that the firearm sub#ect of this case was not used in the
circumstances as embraced in paragraph 8 thereof, applying the provision of
indeterminate sentence law, accused %uben $urgos is hereby sentenced to suffer an
imprisonment of twenty K+?A years of reclusion temporal ma'imum, as minimum
penalty, to reclusion perpetua, as ma'imum penalty, pursuant to sub1paragraph $, of
0residential 4ecree 5o. ., as aforementioned, with accessory penalties, as provided
for by law.
As a result of this #udgment, the sub#ect firearm involved in this case K>omemade
revolver, caliber ./,, Smith and (esson, with Serial 5o. ,.;.++-A is hereby ordered
confiscated in favor of the government, to be disposed of in accordance with law.
Liewise, the subversive documents, leaflets and@or propaganda seized are ordered
disposed of in accordance with law.
The information charged the defendant1appellant with the crime of illegal possession of firearm in
furtherance of subversion in an information which reads as follows)
That in the afternoon of May -/, -.,+ and thereabout at Tiguman, 4igos, 4avao del
Sur, 0hilippines, within the #urisdiction of this Court, the above1 named accused with
intent to possess and without the necessary license, permit or authority issued by the
proper government agencies, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
eep, possess, carry and have in his possession, control and custody one K-A
homemade revolver, caliber ./,, mae Smith and (esson, with Serial 5o. ,.;.++-,
which firearm was issued to and used by the accused at Tiguman, 4igos, 4avao del
Sur, his area of operations by one Alias Commander 0ol for the 5ew 0eopleDs Army
K50AA, a subversive organization organized for the purpose of overthrowing the
3overnment of the %epublic of the 0hilippines through lawless and violent means, of
which the accused had nowledge, and which firearm was used by the accused in
the performance of his subversive tass such as the recruitment of 5ew Members to
the 50A and collection of contributions from the members.
C!5T%A%" T! LA(.
The evidence for the prosecution is summarized in the decision of the lower court as follows)
''' ''' '''
. . . Through the testimony of 0at. 0epito $ioco, and Sgt. %omeo Taroy, it appears
that by virtue of an intelligent information obtained by the Constabulary and 850
units, stationed at 4igos, 4avao del Sur, on May -+, -.,+, one Cesar Masamlo
personally and voluntarily surre?ndered to the authorities at about .)?? oDcloc A.M.
at 4igos, 4avao del Sur Constabulary >ead&uarters, stating that he was forcibly
recruited by accused %uben $urgos as member of the 50A, threatening him with the
use of firearm against his life, if he refused.
Along with his recruitment, accused was ased to contribute one K-A chopa of rice
and one peso K0-.??A per month, as his contribution to the 50A TS5, page C,
>earing1!ctober -:, -.,+A.
8mmediately, upon receipt of said information, a #oint team of 0C1850 units,
composed of fifteen K-CA members, headed by Captain Melchesidec $argio, K0CA,
on the following day, May -/, -.,+, was dispatched at TigumanB 4avao del Sur, to
arrest accused %uben $urgos. The team left the head&uarter at -)/? 0.M., and
arrived at Tiguman, at more or less +)?? oDcloc 0M where through the help of 0edro
$urgos, brother of accused, the team was able to locate accused, who was plowing
his field. KTS5, pages ;19, >earing1!ctober -:, -.,+A.
%ight in the house of accused, the latter was caned by the team and 0at. $ioco
ased accused about his firearm, as reported by Cesar Masamlo. At first accused
denied possession of said firearm but later, upon &uestion profounded by Sgt.
Ale#andro $uncalan with the wife of the accused, the latter pointed to a place below
their house where a gun was buried in the ground. KTS5, page ,, >earing1!ctober
-:, -.,+A.
0at. $ioco then verified the place pointed by accusedDs wife and dug the grounds,
after which he recovered the firearm, Caliber ./, revolver, mared as 2'hibit 6A6 for
the prosecution.
After the recovery of the firearm, accused liewise pointed to the team, subversive
documents which he allegedly ept in a stoc pile of &&&cogon at a distance of three
K/A meters apart from his house. Then Sgt. Taroy accordingly verified beneath said
cogon grass and liewise recovered documents consisting of noteboo colored
maroon with spiral bound, 2'hibit 6$6 for the prosecutionB a pamphlet consisting of
eight K,A leaves, including the front and bac covers entitled Ang $ayan, 0ahayagan
ng 0artido <omunista ng 0ilipinas, 0inapatnubayan ng Mar'ismo, Leninismo
<aisipang Mao &&&=edong dated 4ecember /-, -.,?, mared as 2'hibit 6C6, and
another pamphlet Asdang 0amantalaang Masa sa >abagatang Mindanao, March
and April -.,- issue, consisting of ten K-?A pages, mared as 2'hibit 646 for the
prosecution.
Accused, when confronted with the firearm 2'hibit 6A6, after its recovery, readily
admitted the same as issued to him by 5estor *imenez, otherwise nown as a
certain Alias 0edipol, allegedly team leader of the sparrow unit of 5ew 0eopleDs
Army, responsible in the li&uidation of target personalities, opposed to 50A
8deological movement, an e'ample was the illing of the late Mayor Llanos and
$arangay Captain of Tienda Aplaya 4igos, 4avao del Sur. KTS5, pages -1-;,
>earing1!ctober -:,-.,+A.
To prove accusedDs subversive activities, Cesar Masamlo, a former 50A convert
was presented, who declared that on March 9, -.9+, in his former residence at
Tiguman 4igos, 4avao del Sur, accused %uben $urgos, accompanied by his
companions Landrino $urgos, !scar 3omez and Antonio $urgos, went to his house
at about C)?? oDcloc 0.M. and called him downstair. Thereupon, accused told
Masamlo, their purpose was to as rice and one K-A peso from him, as his
contribution to their companions, the 50A of which he is now a member. KTS5, pages
9?, 9-, 9+, >earing1*anuary :, -.,/A.
Accused and his companions told Masamlo, he has to #oin their group otherwise, he
and his family will be illed. >e was also warned not to reveal anything with the
government authorities. $ecause of the threat to his life and family, Cesar Masamlo
#oined the group. Accused then told him, he should attend a seminar scheduled on
April -., -.,+. Along with this invitation, accused pulled gut from his waistline a ./,
caliber revolver which Masamlo really saw, being only about two K+A meters away
from accused, which mae him easily 8dentified said firearm, as that mared as
2'hibit 6A6 for the prosecution. KTS5, pages 9+, 9/, and 9:, >earing1*anuary :,
-.,/A.
!n April -., -.,+, as previously invited, Masamlo, accompanied by his father,
Matuguil Masamlo, 8sabel 8lan and Ayo 8des went to the house of accused and
attended the seminar, Those present in the seminar were) accused %uben $urgos,
Antonio $urgos, !scar 3omez, Landrino $urgos, alias 0edipol and one alias
*amper.
The first speaer was accused %uben $urgos, who said very distinctly that he is an
50A together with his companions, to assure the unity of the civilian. That he
encouraged the group to overthrow the government, emphasizing that those who
attended the seminar were already members of the 50A, and if they reveal to the
authorities, they will be illed.
Accused, while taling, showed to the audience pamphlets and documents, then
finally shouted, the 50A will be victorious. Masamlo liewise 8dentified the
pamphlets as those mared as 2'h. e'hibits 6$6, 6C6, and 646 for the prosecution.
KTS5, pages 9C, 9; and 99, >earing1*anuary :, -.,/A
!ther speaers in said meeting were 0edipol, *amper and !scar 3omez, who
liewise e'pounded their own opinions about the 50A. 8t was also announced in said
seminar that a certain Tonio $urgos, will be responsible for the collection of the
contribution from the members. KTS5, pages 9,19., >earing1 *anuary :, -.,/A
!n May -+, -.,+, however, Cesar Masamlo surrendered to Captain $argio of the
0rovincial >ead&uarters of the 0hilippine Constabulary, 4igos, 4avao del Sur.
Assistant 0rovincial Jiscal 0anfilo Lovitos was presented t prove that on May -.,
-.,+, he administered the subscription of th e'tra1#udicial confession of accused
%uben $urgos, mared as 2'hibit 62 6 for the prosecution, consisting of five KCA
pages.
Appearing voluntarily in said office, for the subscription of his confession, Jiscal
Lovitos, realizing that accused was not represented by counsel, re&uested the
services of Atty. Anyog, whose office is ad#acent to the JiscalDs !ffice, to assist
accused in the subscription of his e'tra1#udicial statement.
Atty. Anyog assisted accused in the reading of his confession from 2nglish to
7isayan language, resulting to the deletion of &uestion 5o. -. of the document, by an
inserted certification of Atty. Anyog and signature of accused, indicating his having
understood, the allegations of his e'tra1#udicial statement.
Jiscal Lovitos, before accused signed his statement, e'plained to him his
constitutional rights to remain silent, right to counsel and right to answer any &uestion
propounded or not.
(ith the aid of Atty. Anyog, accused signed his confession in the presence of Atty.
Anyog and Jiscal Lovitos, without the presence of military authorities, who escorted
the accused, but were sent outside the cubicle of Jiscal Lovitos while waiting for the
accused. KTS5, pages /;1:?, nearing 5ovember -C, -.,+A
Jinally, in order to prove illegal possession by accused of the sub#ect firearm, Sgt.
2pifanio Comabig in1charge of firearms and e'plosives, 5C! >ead&uarter, 0hilippine
Constabulary, 4igos, 4avao del Sur, was presented and testified, that among the
lists of firearm holders in 4avao del Sur, nothing was listed in the name of accused
%uben $urgos, neither was his name included among the lists of persons who
applied for the licensing of the firearm under 0residential 4ecree 5o. -9:C.
After the above1testimony the prosecution formally closed its case and offered its
e'hibits, which were all admitted in evidence, despite ob#ection interposed by
counsel for accused, which was accordingly overruled.
!n the other hand, the defendant1appellantDs version of the case against him is stated in the decision
as follows)
Jrom his farm, the military personnel, whom he said he cannot recognize, brought
him to the 0C $arracs at 4igos, 4avao del Sur, and arrived there at about /)??
oDcloc, on the same date. At about ,)?? oDcloc 0.M., in the evening, he was
investigated by soldiers, whom he cannot 8dentify because they were wearing a
civilian attire. KTS5, page -: -, >earing1*une -C, -.,/A
The investigation was conducted in the 0C barracs, where he was detained with
respect to the sub#ect firearm, which the investigator, wished him to admit but
accused denied its ownership. $ecause of his refusal accused was mauled, hitting
him on the left and right side of his body which rendered him unconscious. Accused
in an atmosphere of tersed solemnity, crying and with emotional attachment,
described in detail how he was tortured and the ordeals he was sub#ected.
>e said, after recovery of his consciousness, he was again confronted with sub#ect
firearm, 2'hibit 6A6, for him to admit and when he repeatedly refused to accept as his
own firearm, he was sub#ected to further prolong KsicA torture and physical agony.
Accused said, his eyes were covered with wet blac cloth with pungent effect on his
eyes. >e was undressed, with only blindfold, pungent water poured in his body and
over his private parts, maing his entire body, particularly his penis and testicle,
terribly irritating with pungent pain.
All along, he was investigated to obtain his admission, The process of beating,
mauling, pain and@or ordeal was repeatedly done in similar cycle, from May -/ and
-:, -.,+. intercepted only whenever he fell unconscious and again repeated after
recovery of his senses,
Jinally on May -C, -.,+, after undergoing the same torture and physical ordeal he
was seriously warned, if he will still adamantly refuse to accept ownership of the
sub#ect firearm, he will be salvaged, and no longer able to bear any further the pain
and agony, accused admitted ownership of sub#ect firearm.
After his admission, the mauling and torture stopped, but accused was made to sign
his affidavit mared as 2'hibit 626 for the prosecution, consisting of five KCA pages,
including the certification of the administering officer, KTS5, pages -:-1-:,, >earing1
*une -C, -.,/A
8n addition to how he described the torture inflicted on him, accused, by way of
e'planation and commentary in details, and going one by one, the allegations and@or
contents of his alleged e'tra#udicial statement, attributed his answers to those
&uestions involuntarily made only because of fear, threat and intimidation of his
person and family, as a result of unbearable e'cruciating pain he was sub#ected by
an investigator, who, unfortunately he cannot 8dentify and was able to obtain his
admission of the sub#ect firearm, by force and violence e'erted over his person.
To support denial of accused of being involved in any subversive activities, and also
to support his denial to the truth of his alleged e'tra1#udicial confession, particularly
&uestions 5os. /C, /,, :-, :+, :/, ::, :C, :; and :9, along with &&&s answers to
those &uestions, involving >onorata Arellano ahas 8nday Arellano, said >onorata
Arellano appeared and declared categorically, that the above1&uestions embraced in
the numbers allegedly stated in the e'tra#udicial confession of accused, involving her
to such 50A personalities, as *amper, 0ol, Anthony, etc., were not true because on
the date referred on April +,, -.,+, none of the persons mentioned came to her
house for treatment, neither did she meet the accused nor able to tal with him.
KTS5, pages --,1 -+-, >earing1May -,, -.,/A
She, however, admitted being familiar with one !scar 3omez, and that she was
personally charged with subversion in the !ffice of the 0rovincial Commander,
0hilippine Constabulary, 4igos, 4avao del Sur, but said charge was dismissed
without reaching the Court. She liewise stated that her son, %ogelio Arellano, was
liewise charged for subversion filed in the Municipal Trial Court of 4igos, 4avao del
Sur, but was liewise dismissed for lac of sufficient evidence to sustain his
conviction. KTS5, pages -+-1-++, in relation to her cross1e'amination, >earing1May
-,, -.,/A
To support accusedDs denial of the charge against him, $arangay Captain of
Tiguman, 4igos, 4avao del Sur, Salvador &&&3alaraga was presented, who
declared, he was not personally aware of any subversive activities of accused, being
his neighbor and member of his barrio. !n the contrary, he can personally attest to
his good character and reputation, as a law abiding citizen of his barrio, being a
carpenter and farmer thereat. KTSl pages -+,1-+., >earing1May -,, -.,/A
>e however, admitted in cross1e'amination, that there were a lot of arrests made by
the authorities in his barrio involving subversive activities but they were released and
were not formally charged in Court because they publicly too their oath of allegiance
with the government. KTS5, pages -//1-/:, in relation to page -/;, >earing1May -,,
-.,/A
Jinally, to support accusedDs denial of the sub#ect firearm, his wife, Lrbana $urgos,
was presented and who testified that the sub#ect firearm was left in their house by
Cesar Masamlo and one 0edipol on May -?, -.,+. 8t was night time, when the two
left the gun, alleging that it was not in order, and that they will leave it behind,
temporarily for them to claim it later. They were the ones who buried it. She said, her
husband, the accused, was not in their house at that time and that she did not inform
him about said firearm neither did she report the matter to the authorities, for fear of
the life of her husband. KTS5, page +:, 5ovember ++, -.,/A
!n cross1e'amination, she said, even if Masamlo during the recovery of the firearm,
was wearing a mas, she can still 8dentify him. KTS5, page ;, >earing15ovember ++,
-.,/A
After the above1testimony, accused through counsel formally rested his case in
support of accusedDs through counsel manifestation for the demurrer to evidence of
the prosecution, or in the alternative for violation merely of simple illegal possession
of firearm, Dunder the %evised Administrative Code, as amended by %epublic Act 5o.
:, reflected in the manifestation of counsel for accused. KTS5, pages --/1--:,
>earing1May -,, -.,/A
Accused1appellant %uben $urgos now raises the following assignments of error, to wit)
8 T>2 T%8AL C!L%T 2%%24 85 >!L4853 T>AT KS8CA T>2 A%%2ST !J
ACCLS241A002LLA5T (8T>!LT 7AL84 (A%%A5T T! $2 LA(JLL.
88 T>2 T%8AL C!L%T 2%%24 85 >!L4853 T>2 S2A%C> 85 T>2 >!LS2 !J
ACCLS241A002LLA5T J!% J8%2A%M (8T>!LT 7AL84 (A%%A5T T! $2
LA(JLL.
888 T>2 T%8AL C!L%T 2%%24 85 >!L4853 ACCLS241A002LLA5T 3L8LT"
$2"!54 %2AS!5A$L2 4!L$T J!% 78!LAT8!5 !J 0.4. 5o. . 85 %2LAT8!5 T!
3252%AL !%42%S 5!S. ; A54 9
(as the arrest of %uben $urgos lawfulI (ere the search of his house and the subse&uent
confiscation of a firearm and documents allegedly found therein conducted in a lawful and valid
mannerI 4oes the evidence sustaining the crime charged meet the test of proving guilt beyond
reasonable doubtI
The records of the case disclose that when the police authorities went to the house of %uben $urgos
for the purpose of arresting him upon information given by Cesar Masamlo that the accused
allegedly recruited him to #oin the 5ew 0eopleDs Army K50AA, they did not have any warrant of arrest
or search warrant with them KTS5, p. +C, !ctober -:, -.,+B and TS5, p. ;-, 5ovember -C, -.,+A.
Article 87, Section / of the Constitution provides)
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose
shall not be violated, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue e'cept
upon probable cause to be determined by the #udge, or such other responsible officer
as may be authorized by law, after e'amination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
The constitutional provision is a safeguard against wanton and unreasonable invasion of the privacy
and liberty of a citizen as to his person, papers and effects. This Court e'plained in 2illan!ea s.
1!er!"in K:, SC%A /:CA why this right is so important)
8t is deference to oneDs personality that lies at the core of this right, but it could be
also looed upon as a recognition of a constitutionally protected area, primarily oneDs
home, but not necessarily thereto confined. KCf. >offa v. Lnited States, /,C LS +./
E-.;;-A (hat is sought to be guarded is a manDs prerogative to choose who is
allowed entry to his residence. 8n that haven of refuge, his individuality can assert
itself not only in the choice of who shall be welcome but liewise in the ind of
ob#ects he wants around him. There the state, however powerful, does not as such
have access e'cept under the circumstances above noted, for in the traditional
formulation, his house, however humble, is his castle. Thus is outlawed any
unwarranted intrusion by government, which is called upon to refrain from any
invasion of his dwelling and to respect the privacies of his life, KCf. Schmerber v.
California, /,: LS 9C9 E-.;;F, $rennan, *. and $oyd v. Lnited States, --; LS ;-;,
;/? E-,,;FA. 8n the same vein, Landynsi in his authoritative wor KSearch and
Seizure and the Supreme Court E-.;;F, could fitly characterize this constitutional
right as the embodiment of a Dspiritual concept) the belief that to value the privacy of
home and person and to afford its constitutional protection against the long reach of
government is no legs than to value human dignity, and that his privacy must not be
disturbed e'cept in case of overriding social need, and then only under stringent
procedural safeguards.D KI"id, p. :9A.
The trial court #ustified the arrest of the accused1appelant without any warrant as falling under one of
the instances when arrests may be validly made without a warrant. %ule --/, Section ; T of the
%ules of Court, provides the e'ceptions as follows)
aA (hen the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is about to commit an
offense in his presenceB
bA (hen an offense has in fact been committed, and he has reasonable ground to believe that the
person to be arrested has committed itB
cA (hen the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or
place where he is serving final #udgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending or has
escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
The Court stated that even if there was no warrant for the arrest of $urgos, the fact that 6the
authorities received an urgent report of accusedDs involvement in subversive activities from a reliable
source Kreport of Cesar MasamloA the circumstances of his arrest, even without #udicial warrant, is
lawfully within the ambit of Section ;1A of %ule --/ of the %ules of Court and applicable
#urisprudence on the matter.6
8f the arrest is valid, the conse&uent search and seizure of the firearm and the alleged subversive
documents would become an incident to a lawful arrest as provided by %ule -+;, Section -+, which
states)
A person charged with an offense may be searched for dangerous weapons or
anything which may be used as proof of the commission of the offense.
The conclusions reached by the trial court are erroneous.
Lnder Section ;KaA of %ule --/, the officer arresting a person who has #ust committed, is committing,
or is about to commit an offense must have personal nowledge of that fact. The offense must also
be committed in his presence or within his view. KSayo v. Chief of 0olice, ,? 0hil. ,C.A.
There is no such personal nowledge in this case. (hatever nowledge was possessed by the
arresting officers, it came in its entirety from the information furnished by Cesar Masamlo. The
location of the firearm was given by the appellantDs wife.
At the time of the appellantDs arrest, he was not in actual possession of any firearm or subversive
document. 5either was he committing any act which could be described as subversive. >e was, in
fact, plowing his field at the time of the arrest.
The right of a person to be secure against any unreasonable seizure of his body and any deprivation
of his liberty is a most basic and fundamental one. The statute or rule which allows e'ceptions to the
re&uirement of warrants of arrest is strictly construed. Any e'ception must clearly fall within the
situations when securing a warrant would be absurd or is manifestly unnecessary as provided by the
%ule. (e cannot liberally construe the rule on arrests without warrant or e'tend its application
beyond the cases specifically provided by law. To do so would infringe upon personal liberty and set
bac a basic right so often violated and so deserving of full protection.
The Solicitor 3eneral is of the persuasion that the arrest may still be considered lawful under Section
;KbA using the test of reasonableness. >e submits that. the information given by Cesar Masamlo
was sufficient to induce a reasonable ground that a crime has been committed and that the accused
is probably guilty thereof.
8n arrests without a warrant under Section ;KbA, however, it is not enough that there is reasonable
ground to believe that the person to be arrested has committed a crime. A crime must in fact
or act!ally have been committed first. That a crime has actually been committed is an essential
precondition. 8t is not enough to suspect that a crime may have been committed. The fact of the
commission of the offense must be undisputed. The test of reasonable ground applies only to the
identity of the perpetrator.
8n this case, the accused was arrested on the sole basis of MasamloDs verbal report. Masamlo led
the authorities to suspect that the accused had committed a crime. They were still fishing for
evidence of a crime not yet ascertained. The subse&uent recovery of the sub#ect firearm on the basis
of information from the lips of a frightened wife cannot mae the arrest lawful, 8f an arrest without
warrant is unlawful at the moment it is made, generally nothing that happened or is discovered
afterwards can mae it lawful. The fruit of a poisoned tree is necessarily also tainted.
More important, we find no compelling reason for the haste with which the arresting officers sought
to arrest the accused. (e fail to see why they failed to first go through the process of obtaining a
warrant of arrest, if indeed they had reasonable ground to believe that the accused had truly
committed a crime. There is no showing that there was a real apprehension that the accused was on
the verge of flight or escape. Liewise, there is no showing that the whereabouts of the accused
were unnown,
The basis for the action taen by the arresting officer was the verbal report made by Masamlo who
was not re&uired to subscribe his allegations under oath. There was no compulsion for him to state
truthfully his charges under pain of criminal prosecution. KTS5, p. +:, !ctober -:, -.,+A.
Conse&uently, the need to go through the process of securing a search warrant and a warrant of
arrest becomes even more clear. The arrest of the accused while he was plowing his field is illegal.
The arrest being unlawful, the search and seizure which transpired afterwards could not liewise be
deemed legal as being mere incidents to a valid arrest.
5either can it be presumed that there was a waiver, or that consent was given by the accused to be
searched simply because he failed to ob#ect. To constitute a waiver, it must appear first that the right
e'istsB secondly, that the person involved had nowledge, actual or constructive, of the e'istence of
such a rightB and lastly, that said person had an actual intention to relin&uish the right K0asion 7da.
de 3arcia v. Locsin, ;C 0hil. ;,.A. The fact that the accused failed to ob#ect to the entry into his
house does not amount to a permission to mae a search therein KMagoncia v. 0alacio, ,? 0hil.
99?A. As pointed out by *ustice Laurel in the case of Pasion 2da. de Garcia 2. 6ocsin 4s!pra5
''' ''' '''
. . . As the constitutional guaranty is not dependent upon any affirmative act of the
citizen, the courts do not place the citizen in the position of either contesting an
officerDs authority by force, or waiving his constitutional rightsB but instead they hold
that a peaceful submission to a search or seizure is not a consent or an invitation
thereto, but is merely a demonstration of regard for the supremacy of the law. KC;
C.*., pp. --,?, --,-A.
(e apply the rule that) 6courts indulge every reasonable presumption against 'aier of fundamental
constitutional rights and that we do not presume ac&uiescence in the loss of fundamental rights.6
K*ohnson v. =erbst /?: L.S. :C,A.
That the accused1appellant was not apprised of any of his constitutional rights at the time of his
arrest is evident from the records)
A CALAM$A)
H (hen you went to the area to arrest %uben $urgos, you were not
armed with an arrest warrantI
A 5one Sir.
H 5either were you armed with a search warrantI
A 5o Sir.
H As a matter of fact, $urgos was not present in his house when you
went thereI
A $ut he was twenty meters away from his house.
H %uben $urgos was then plowing his fieldI
A "es Sir.
H (hen you called for %uben $urgos you interviewed himI
A "es Sir.
H And that you told him that Masamlo implicated himI
A 5o Sir.
H (hat did you tell himI
A That we received information that you have a firearm, you
surrender that firearm, first he denied but when Sgt. $uncalan
interviewed his wife, his wife told him that it is buried, 8 dug the
firearm which was wrapped with a cellophane.
H 8n your interview of $urgos you did not remind him of his rights
under the constitution considering that he was purposely under
arrestI
A 8 did not.
H As a matter of fact, he denied that he has ever a gunI
A "es Sir.
H As a matter of fact, the gun was not in his possessionI
A 8t was buried down in his horse.
H As a matter of fact, $urgos did not point to where it was buriedI
A "es Sir.
KTS5, pp. +C1+;, >earing1!ctober -:, -.,+A
Considering that the &uestioned firearm and the alleged subversive documents were obtained in
violation of the accusedDs constitutional rights against unreasonable searches and seizures, it follows
that they are inadmissible as evidence.
There is another aspect of this case.
8n proving ownership of the &uestioned firearm and alleged subversive documents, the prosecution
presented the two arresting officers who testified that the accused readily admitted ownership of the
gun after &&&s wife pointed to the place where it was buried. The officers stated that it was the
accused himself who voluntarily pointed to the place where the alleged subversive documents were
hidden.
Assuming this to be true, it should be recalled that the accused was never informed of his
constitutional rights at the time of his arrest. So that when the accused allegedly admitted ownership
of the gun and pointed to the location of the subversive documents after &uestioning, the admissions
were obtained in violation of the constitutional right against self1incrimination under Sec. +? of Art. 87
of the $ill of %ights winch provides)
5o person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. Any person under
investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent
and to counsel, and to be informed of such right.. . .
The Constitution itself mandates that any evidence obtained in violation of this right is inadmissible in
evidence. Conse&uently, the testimonies of the arresting officers as to the admissions made by the
appellant cannot be used against him.
The trial court validly re#ected the e'tra1#udicial confession of the accused as inadmissible in
evidence. The court stated that the appellantDs having been e'haustively sub#ected to physical terror,
violence, and third degree measures may not have been supported by reliable evidence but the
failure to present the investigator who conducted the investigation gives rise to the 6provocative
presumption6 that indeed torture and physical violence may have been committed as stated.
The accused1appellant was not accorded his constitutional right to be assisted by counsel during the
custodial interrogation. The lower court correctly pointed out that the securing of counsel, Atty.
Anyog, to help the accused when he subscribed under oath to his statement at the JiscalDs !ffice
was too late. 8t could have no palliative effect. 8t cannot cure the absence of counsel at the time of
the custodial investigation when the e'tra#udicial statement was being taen.
(ith the e'tra1#udicial confession, the firearm, and the alleged subversive documents inadmissible in
evidence against the accused1appellant, the only remaining proof to sustain the charge of 8llegal
0ossession of Jirearm in Jurtherance of Subversion is the testimony of Cesar Masamlo.
(e find the testimony of Masamlo inade&uate to convict $urgos beyond reasonable doubt. 8t is true
that the trial court found MasamloDs testimony credible and convincing. >owever, we are not
necessarily bound by the credibility which the trial court attaches to a particular witness. As stated
in People s.. .a"rera K-?? SC%A :+:A)
''' ''' '''
. . .Time and again we have stated that when it comes to &uestion of credibility the
findings of the trial court are entitled to great respect upon appeal for the obvious
reason thUat it was able to observe the demeanor, actuations and deportment of the
witnesses during the trial. $ut we have also said that this rule is not absolute for
otherwise there would be no reversals of convictions upon appeal. (e must re#ect
the findings of the trial court where the record discloses circumstances of weight and
substance which were not properly appreciated by the trial court.
The situation under which Cesar Masamlo testified is analogous to that found in People s.
.apadocia K-9 SC%A ., -A)
. . . The case against appellant is built on TernuraDs testimony, and the issue hinges
on how much credence can be accorded to him. The first consideration is that said
testimony stands uncorroborated. Ternura was the only witness who testified on the
mimeographing incident. . . .
''' ''' '''
. . .>e was a confessed >u under detention at the time. >e new his fate depended
upon how much he cooperated with the authorities, who were then engaged in a
vigorous anti1dissident campaign. As in the case of %odrigo de *esus, whose
testimony (e discounted for the same reason, that of Ternura cannot be considered
as proceeding from a totally unbiased source. . . .
8n the instant case, MasamloDs testimony was totally uncorroborated. Considering that Masamlo
surrendered to the military certainly his fate depended on how eagerly he cooperated with the
authorities. !therwise, he would also be charged with subversion. The trade1off appears to be his
membership in the Civil >ome 4efense Jorce. KTS5, p. ,/, *anuary :, -.,/A. Masamlo may be
considered as an interested witness. 8t can not be said that his testimony is free from the opportunity
and temptation to be e'aggerated and even fabricated for it was intended to secure his freedom.
4espite the fact that there were other persons present during the alleged 50A seminar of April -.,
-.,+ i.e., MasamloDs father ,Matuguil Masamlo, 8sabel 8lan and Ayo 8des KTS5, p. 9:, *anuary :,
-.,/A who could have corroborated Cesar MasamloDs testimony that the accused used the gun in
furtherance of subversive activities or actually engaged in subversive acts, the prosecution never
presented any other witness.
This Court is, therefore, constrained to rule that the evidence presented by the prosecution is
insufficient to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.
As held in the case of People s. Baia K/: SC%A /:9A)
8t is evident that once again, reliance can be placed on People . #ramayo K:+ SC%A
C.A, where after stressing that accusation is not, according to the fundamental law,
synonymous with guilt, it was made clear) D!nly if the #udge below and the appellate
tribunal could arrive at a conclusion that the crime had been committed precisely by
the person on trial under such an e'acting test should the sentence be one of
conviction. 8t is thus re&uired that every circumstance favoring his innocence be duly
taen into account. The proof against him must survive the test of reasonB the
strongest suspicion must not be permitted to sway #udgment. The conscience must
be satisfied that on the defendant could be laid the responsibility for the offense
chargedB that not only did he perpetrate the act but that it amounted to a crime. (hat
is re&uired then is moral certainty.D KI"id, ;:. Cf. 0eople v. Alvarez, CC SC%A ,-B
0eople v. *oven, ;: SC%A -+;B 0eople vs. %amirez, ;. SC%A -::B 0eople vs.
3odov 9+ SC%A ;.B 0eople v. Lopez, 9: SC%A +?CB 0eople v. 0oblador, 9; SC%A
;/:B 0eople v. Huiazon, 9, SC%A C-/B 0eople v. 5azareno, ,? SC%A :,:B 0eople
vs. 3abilan --C SC%A -B 0eople v. 3abiana, --9 SC%A +;?B and 0eople vs. 8banga
-+: SC%A ;.9A.
(e are aware of the serious problems faced by the military in 4avao del Sur where there appears to
be a well1organized plan to overthrow the 3overnment through armed struggle and replace it with an
alien system based on a foreign ideology. The open defiance against duly constituted authorities has
resulted in unfortunate levels of violence and human suffering publicized all over the country and
abroad. 2ven as we reiterate the need for all freedom loving citizens to assist the military authorities
in their legitimate efforts to maintain peace and national security, we must also remember the dictum
in Morales s. Enrile K- +- SC%A C/,, C;.A when this Court stated)
(hile the government should continue to repel the communists, the subversives, the
rebels, and the lawless with an the means at its command, it should always be
remembered that whatever action is taen must always be within the framewor of
our Constitution and our laws.
7iolations of human rights do not help in overcoming a rebellion. A cavalier attitude towards
constitutional liberties and protections will only fan the increase of subversive activities instead of
containing and suppressing them.
(>2%2J!%2, the #udgment of conviction rendered by the trial court is %272%S24 and S2T
AS842. The accused1appellant is hereby ACHL8TT24, on grounds of reasonable doubt, of the crime
with which he has been charged.
The sub#ect firearm involved in this case Khomemade revolver, caliber ./,, Smith and (esson, with
Serial 5o. ,.;.++-A and the alleged subversive documents are ordered disposed of in accordance
with law.
Cost de oficio.
S! !%42%24.
/eria 4.hairman5, /ernan, $lampay and Paras, JJ., conc!r.

3oo(no(es
T The -.,C %ules on Criminal 0rocedure have made clearer the e'ceptions when an
arrest may be made without warrant. %ule --/, Section C provides)
$rrest 'itho!t 'arrant 'hen la'f!l. A peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person)
KaA (hen, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense,
KbA (hen an offense has in fact #ust been committed, and he has personal
nowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed itB and
KcA (hen the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final #udgment or temporarily confined
while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.
8n cases falling under paragraphs KaA and KbA hereof, the person arrested without a
warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest 0olice station or i #ail and he shall
be proceeded against in accordance with %ule -- +, Section 9. ;a -9aA.

G.R. No. 1:<311 "ar&h 17, 1999
*EO*LE O3 THE *HILI**INES plaintiff1appellee,
vs.
ON7OT "AHINA7 an+ @#IRINO CA6ETE, a&&.se+, @#IRINO CA6ETE, accused1appellant.

5IT#G, J.:
Huirino CaGete appeals from the decision
1
in Criminal Case 5o. ./?: of the %egional Trial court of
5egros !riental, $ranch /., stationed at 4umaguete City, finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of murder for the illing of Manolo Mission and imposing upon him the penalty of recl!sion
perpet!a and the payment of indemnity to the heirs of the victim in the amount of 0C?,???.??.
The information, filed on -, May -..?, charging Huirino CaGete and one !nyot Mahinay with the
crime of murder, reads)
That on or about -+)/? oDcloc dawn of March -,, -..?, at Crossing Cawayan,
$arangay Tadlong, Mabinay, 5egros !riental, 0hilippines, and within the #urisdiction
of this >onorable Court, the above1named accused, conspiring, confederating and
mutually helping one another, with intent to ill, evident premeditation and treachery,
did, then and them willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attac, assault and stab one
MA5!L! M8SS8!5 with the use of a hunting nife and icepic, with which the said
accused were then armed and provided, thereby inflicting upon said MA5!L!
M8SS8!5 the following wounds or in#uries, to wit)
-. Stab wound about ; cm. long epigastric area with
evisceration of intestineB
+. Stab wound about + cm. long lower lateral side of
right chestB
/. Stab wound about -.C cm. long right armB
which wounds caused the death of said MA5!L! M8SS8!5 shortly thereafter.
Contrary to Article +:, of the %evised 0enal Code.
:
Huirino CaGete was apprehended by the authorities on -9 May -..? in $arangay Ambayao,
7alencia, $uidnon. >is co1accused, !nyot Mahinay, remained at large. The trial proceeded only
against accused CaGete who, upon arraignment, entered a plea of not guilty.
The prosecution first presented its evidence.
!n -, March -..?, the eve of the $arangay Tadlong fiesta, in 5egros Mabinay, 5egros !riental, a
public dance was held. Among those who were in attendance were Huirino CaGete, !nyot Mahinay
and Manolo Mission. Later that evening, *oel Mission saw his uncle, Manolo Mission, arguing with
CaGete outside the dance hall. At about -+)/? a.m., *oel and his uncle decided that it was time to
leave. !n the way home, at a street fronting the barangay hall, Manolo noticed that they were being
followed by CaGete. Manolo stopped and turned to face CaGete. Soon, the two figured in an
argument. Suddenly, !nyot Mahinay came from behind Manolo and stabbed the latter, hitting him on
the stomach. !nyot Mahinay started to flee but Manolo made an attempt to chase him. Then, once
again, !nyot Mahinay faced Manolo. The latter received another stab thrust, this time hitting him on
his right hand. (hen Manolo started to wal away, CaGete followed and stabbed the already in#ured
victim on the right side of his body and on his chest.
*oel witnessed the entire episode. Jear, however, too the better part of him, and he was unable to
e'tend help to his uncle during the critical moments. >is pro'imity enabled him to hear Manolo
remar, 68 was hit "o, and Huirino CaGete was chasing me.6
3
The fluorescent lamps in the area
illuminated the place. 8n the vicinity were %oman $ucog and *ose Mait. *oel dared approach Manolo only
when the two malefactors had fled. >is other uncle, 0eter 0eras, and he brought the wounded Manolo,
using a cargo truc owned by *oelDs grandfather, $asilio, to the Medicare Lnit in Mabinay and, later, to the
5egros !riental 0rovincial >ospital where Manolo succumbed to his wounds at around seven oDcloc in
the morning of -. March -..?.
;
Another eyewitness was %oman $ucog who, together with his wife, had also come from the dance
party at #ust about the same time as the others. >e and his wife saw at a short distance of about four
arms length, !nyot Mahinay and Manolo first engaged, evident by their gestures, in an argument.
CaGete, who was wearing a shirt with green stripes, was beside !nyot Mahinay, *oel Mission and
*ose Mait. There were other people at the opposite side of the road. The fluorescent lamps and the
moonlight that sufficiently illuminated the area helped %oman recognize !nyot Mahinay in the act of
stabbing Manolo. After he was stabbed, Manolo was still able to turn around in an attempt to go after
his attacer. %oman thereupon saw CaGete stab Manolo on his chest causing the latter to fall to the
ground. According to %oman, CaGete was armed with an icepic while !nyot had with him a hunting
nife.
*ose Mait testified that he was waling towards the house of $asilio Mission, *oelDs grandfather, after
coming from the dance when he too saw stabbing incident. *ose first saw !nyot Mahinay strie
Manolo and Manolo attempted to get to !nyot Mahinay, CaGete stabbed Manolo the right side of his
body. !nyot Mahinay and CaGete scampered. *ose assisted *oel and %oman in getting Manolo onto
a cargo truc to tae him to a hospital.
Manolo was in a state of shoc when brought to the 5egros 0rovincial hospital. >enrissa
Calumpang, a resident physician of the hospital e'amined the stab wounds inflicted on the patient.
4espite the prompt medical assistance administered to him, Manolo died appro'imately three hours
later. The 4eath Certificate,
<
issued by 4r. Calumpang, indicated that Manolo had died of 6hypovolemic
shoc, irreversibleB stab wound about ; cm. long epigastric area with evisceration of intestineB stab wound
about + cm. long lower lateral side of right chestB stab wound about -.C cm. long right arm.6 4r.
CalumpangDs e'amination revealed that the stab wound in the epigastric area, about ; cms. long, was
caused by the penetration of a sharp1pointed instrument with clean cut edges. According to the physician,
there was a possibility that two sharp1pointed bladed weapons were used in inflicting ManoloDs wounds.
She opined that from the nature and location of the wounds, the relative position of the assailant could
have been in front of the victim.
$asilio Mission, the older brother of Manolo, testified that prior to his death, Manolo, who had three
children, was an employee of their father woring as a truc driver and receiving a monthly salary of
0:,C??.??. Their father shouldered the e'penses of 0-C,???.?? for ManoloDs wae and 09,;??.??
for his coffin. The family spent 0-?,???.?? for attorneyDs fees.
The defense interposed denial when its turn to present evidence followed.
CaGete admitted having been in the vicinity when the crime was penetrated but he denied any
participation in the incident. >e said that he had long resided in $uidnon and went bac to Mabinay,
5egros !riental, at around four oDcloc in the afternoon of -, March -..? only to get some tools.
Since it was the day of fiesta in Tadlong, his girlfriends, 3ina and 2lsie whose surnames he could not
recall, invited him to attend the dance. >e later met the girls at the dance hall. >e and the two girls
left party at around midnight. After a while, he saw from a distance of about five arms1length, Manolo
and !nyot Mahinay having an argument. 5earby were *oel and about twenty other people. A
fluorescent lamp lighted the area. After !nyot Mahinay was heard to remar, 6so you are hereI,6 he
stabbed Manolo. The latter shouted, 6!el, helpV6 !nyot Mahinay ran away.
=
CaGete spent the rest of
the night in Mabinay at the house of his parents. At around four oDcloc in the morning of -. March -..?,
after slept for about three and a half hours, CaGete too a 6Ceres6 passenger bus. >e alighted from the
bus in Tampi, San *ose, 5egros en route to Cebu City where he too a boat for Cagayan. The boat Cebu
City at about seven oDcloc in the evening. >e was met by his parent at the pier in Cagayan and, from
there, they all proceeded to 7alencia, $uidnon.
CaGete was apprehended by police authorities at $arangay, Lumbayao, 7alencia, $uidnon, on -9
May -..-. >e was taen to Mabinay, 5egros !riental, where he was first confined at the municipal
#ail transferred, three days later, to the provincial #ail. >e admitted having nown Manolo &uite well
before he was illed since he had wored in the Mission farm for about si' years prior to taing up
residence in $uidnon. >e also wored before that in the Manolo residence for si'teen years from
-.9+ to -.,,. %oman, with whom !nyot Mahinay stayed, was CaGeteDs neighbor in 5apasuan.
CaGete denied that he was with !nyot Mahinay at the dance party.
The defense presented a certificate of good moral character
7
issued by the 0unong $arangay of
Lumbayao, 7alencia, $uidnon, stating that the accused was a resident of that locality. The trial court,
allowed its admission 6for whatever it may be worth.6
>
After the parties had rested their respective cases, the trial court, on /- *anuary -..;, rendered its
#udgment finding accused Huirino CaGete guilty of murder. 8t ad#udged)
(>2%2J!%2, in view of the foregoing considerations, #udgment is rendered finding
the herein accused Huirino CaGete 3L8LT" beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Murder defined under the provisions of Article +:, of the %evised 0enal Code. There
being no attendant mitigating circumstance, the said accused is sentenced to suffer
the penalty of 0E.6+SIO& PE0PET+$ and ordered to indemnify the heirs of the
victim the sum of J8JT" T>!LSA54 K0C?,???.??A 02S!S.
S! !%42%24.
9
8n this appeal from the #udgment, the convicted accused pleads for his ac&uittal, arguing that)
8
T>2 C!L%T $ 1+O 2%%24 85 J854853 T>AT C!5S08%AC" ATT25424 T>2
<8LL853 !J 78CT8M.
88
T>2 C!L%T $ 1+O 2%%24 85 J854853 T>2 ACCLS241A002LLA5T 3L8LT"
$2"!54 %2AS!5A$L2 4!L$T !J T>2 C%8M2 !J ML%42%.
888
T>2 C!L%T A HL! 2%%24 85 !%42%853 ACCLS241A002LLA5T T!
8542M58J" T>2 >28%S !J T>2 78CT8M T>2 SLM !J J8JT" T>!LSA54
02S!S.
11
The Court finds the appeal devoid of merit.
The plea of innocence asserted by appellant brings the Court, once again, to the crucial &uestion of
credibility of witnesses and the weight that should be given to testimonial evidence. !n this issue,
the Court has almost invariably ruled that the matter of assigning value to the declaration witnesses
is best done by trial courts which, unlie appellate courts, can assess such testimony in the light of
the demeanor, conduct and attitude of the witnesses at the trial stage and thus, unless cogent
reasons are shown, findings of the trial court are accorded great respect and credit.
11
Appellant would pound on the alleged inconsistencies in the testimony of the prosecution witnessesB
thus) KaA %omanDs testimony that !nyot Mahinay and Manolo were the ones arguing was contrary to
the statement of *oel that appellant was the one conversing with Manolo while *ose, in his case,
even failed to testify on the pointB KbA the statement that left the dance hall alone and later went with
*oel contradicted the latterDs testimony that he was with his uncle in going homeB KcA according to
*oel, %oman was very near, in fact, #ust in front of Manolo and appellant trying to pacify them, and
yet %oman declared having hidden behind a fishbo',
1:
and KdA whereas *oel claimed that he was &uite
close to his uncle, he, however, did not do anything to help him when he needed it most.
8nconsistencies, even if true, on negligible details do not destroy the veracity of testimony. 7ariations
in the declaration of witnesses in respect of collateral or incidental matters do not impair the weight
of testimony, taen in its entirety, to the prominent facts,
13
nor per se preclude the establishment of the
crime and the positive identification of the malefactor.
1;
Antithetically, minor incoherences can even serve
to strengthen the credibility of witnesses and often are taen to be badges of truth rather than indicia of
falsehood. 7ariance in the statement of witnesses substantially erases suspicion that the testimony given
has been rehearsed.
1<
8t is, in fact, when the testimony appears to be totally flawless that a court can
rightly have some misgivings on its veracity.
1=
$esides, different persons have different refle'es that may
produce varying reactions, impressions and recollections since no two individuals are alie in terms of
powers of perception and recollection.
17
!ne testimony may be replete with details not found in the other
but, taen as a whole, the versions can well concur on material points.
3reatly significant was the fact that prosecution witnesses *oel, %oman and *ose had all positively
attested to having actually seen !nyot Mahinay and appellant CaGete stab Manolo. The conditions
of visibility appeared to be favorable even according to appellant himself. 5othing was shown to
indicate that the witnesses were biased. 5either could their relationship with the victim derail their
credibility for it should not be lightly supposed that a relative of the deceased would callously violate
his conscience to avenge the death of a dear one by blaming it on somebody nown by him to be
innocent.
*oelDs failure to help his uncle in the face of danger certainly would not, in conse&uence, negate the
value of his eyewitness account nor imply that he deviated from the truth. 5o standard form of
behavioral response, &uite often said, could be e'pected from everyone when confronted with a
startling or frightful occurrence.
1>
*oel was apparently terrified by what he saw, and fear had been
nown to render people immobile and helpless particularly, such as here, in life and death situations.
19
The congruence between the testimonial and the physical evidence leads to the inevitable
conclusion that the prosecution did not prevaricate its case.
:1
Mere denial by an accused, particularly
when not properly corroborated or substantiated by clear and convincing evidence, cannot prevail over
the testimony of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters.
:1
4enial being in the nature of
negative and self1serving evidence is seldom given weight in law.
::
0ositive and forthright declarations of
witnesses are often held to be worthier of credence than the self1serving denial of an accused.
:3
The trial court correctly held that the Crime committed was murder under Article +:, of the %evised
0enal Code. The victim was unarmed and defenseless when appellant attaced him. Although
appellantDs co1accused was the one who stabbed him first, Manolo was already in a defenseless
position. >e might have realized the danger confronting him but counter attac from his end was
simply unliely M he was effectively made defenseless by the initial assault of !nyot Mahinay that
caused the evisceration of his intestines. There could be treachery even when the victim had been
warned of danger or initially assaulted frontally, but was attaced again after being rendered helpless
with no means to defend himself or to retaliate
:;
Treachery was correctly appreciated, its two
conditions having concurredB i.e., K-A the employment of means of e'ecution that gave the person
attaced no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate, and K+A the means of e'ecution were deliberately
and consciously adopted.
:<
Conspiracy need not be established by direct evidence, for it may be inferred from the conduct of the
accused before, during, and after the commission of the crime, which, if all taen together, would
reasonably be strong enough to show a community of criminal design.
:=
The concerted action of the appellant and !nyot Mahinay evinced the presence of conspiracy. There
was an overt act on the part of the appellant showing that he #oined !nyot Mahinay in his intent to
perpetrate the crime. After !nyot Mahinay had rendered the victim helpless, appellant himself
stabbed him as if wanting to be sure that !nyot MahinayDs criminal act would be so pursued to its
intended culmination, i.e., the victimDs death. 5evertheless, even if it were to be assumed that
conspiracy was not established, appellantDs liability would not be less than that ad#udged by the
court a 9!o since his own overt act of stabbing the victim had put him under the law to be himself a
principal by direct participation.
:7
The Court finds, however, the &ualifying circumstance of evident premeditation alleged in the
information not to have been sufficiently proven. The premeditation to ill should be plain and
notorious. 8n the absence of clear and positive evidence proving this aggravating circumstance,
mere presumptions and inferences thereon, no matter how logical and probable, would not be
enough.
:>
The trial court has thus correctly imposed recl!sion perpet!a, the medium period of recl!sion
temporal in its ma'imum period to death, the penalty imposable for murder at the time of its commission.
The medium period of the penalty is imposed in the absence of any mitigating or aggravating
circumstance.
:9
8n conformity with prevailing #urisprudential law, the trial court correctly awarded the
amount of 0C?,???.?? as death indemnity to the heirs of the victim.
31
%egrettably, however, this court
cannot grant actual damages absent competent and ade&uate proof therefor. 8n People
s. #egoma and Ta"orada
31
reiterated in People s. .ordero,
3:
we held)
. . . !f the e'penses allegedly incurred, the Court can only give credence to those
supported by receipt and which appear to have been genuinely incurred in
connection with the death, wae or burial of the victim. Thus, the Court cannot tae
account of receipts showing e'penses incurred before the date of the slaying of the
victimB those incurred after a considerable lapse of time from the burial of the victim
and which do not have any relation to the death, wae or burial of the victimB those
incurred for purely aesthetic or social purposes, such as the lining with marble of the
tomb of the victimB those which appear to have been modified to show an increase in
the amount of e'penditure . . .B those e'penditures which could not be reasonably
itemized or determined to have been incurred in connection with the death, wae or
burial of the victimB those which, nonetheless, would have been incurred despite the
death, wae and burial of the victim, the death, wae and burial being merely
incidentalB and those which were not in fact shouldered by the immediate heirs of the
victim, such as plane ticets by relatives or in1laws . . . .
33
8n People s. $lero, Jr.,
3;
this Court deleted the award by the trial court of unearned income to
the heirs of the victim, i*)
Anent the %TCDs award of 0;??,???.?? to cover the victimDs unearned income, we
hereby rule that the same should be deleted. The trial court arrived at this amount
as . . . it has been established that 7ictor Alvaran at the time he was illed, was only
+- years old, single, a seaman, employed by the 8nternational Shipping Corporation,
earning 0+,???.?? a month. After C? years, or at the age of 9?, which is the average
span of life of men in our country, he would have earned 0-,+??,???.?? or a net
income Kafter e'pensesA of 0;??,???.??, but for his untimely death. K!%, -C:, 0ollo,
/-.A S!ch a concl!sion is rather s'eeping, to say the least. There is no evidence to
prove that at the time of his death, Alvaran had an e'isting contract with the
8nternational Shipping Corporation, his alleged employer. (hile 7ictoria Alvaran,
KTS5, +. August -.,:, C.A the victimDs sister, testified on the matter of 7ictorDs
employment, she did not, however, testify as to whether the latter was a seaman
serving on a domestic vessel or a vessel engaged in foreign tradeB whether such
employment was probationary or regularB or whether the contract of employment was
still e'isting at the time of his death. There is, as well, no competent proof to show
that the victim was on vacation. The Prosec!tion sho!ld hae therefore presented
the latter:s contract of employment or any eidence that may hae proen the nat!re
and d!ration of his employment. The rule in this #urisdiction is that the measure of the
loss or damage that dependents and intestate heirs of the deceased may sustain by
reason of the latterDs death is not the full amount of the deceasedDs earnings, but the
support they received or would have received from him had he not died.
3<
(>2%2J!%2, the herein assailed decision finding appellant Huirino CaGete guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of murder, imposing on him the penalty of recl!sion perpet!a, and
ordering him to pay civil indemnity e% delicto in the amount of 0C?,???.?? is AJJ8%M24. Costs
against appellant.
S! !%42%24.
0omero, Pangani"an, P!risima and Gon*aga30eyes, JJ., conc!r.
3oo(no(es