Aisporna v CA (1982)

Aisporna v CA (1982)

Facts
Mapalad Aisporna, the wife of one Rodolfo Aisporna, an insurance agent, solicited the
application of Eugenio Isidro in behalf of Perla Compana de Seguros without the
certificate of authority to act from the insurance commissioner. Isidro passed away while
his wife was issued Php 5000 from the insurance policy. After the death, the fiscal
instigated criminal action against Mapalad for violating sec 189 of the Insurance code
for feloniously acting as agent when she solicited the application form.
In the trial court, she claimed that she helped Rodolfo as clerk and that she solicited a
renewal, not a new policy from Isidro through the phone. She did this because her
husband was absent when he called. She only left a note on top of her husbands desk
to inform him of what transpired. (She did not accept compensation from Isidro for her
services)
Aisporna was sentenced to pay Php 500 with subsidiary costs in case of insolvency in
1971 in the Cabanatuan city court.
In the appellate court, she was found guilty of having violating par 1 of sec 189 of the
insurance code.
The OSG kept on repeating that she didnt violate sec 189 of the insurance code.
In seeking reversal of the judgment, Aisporna assigned errors of the appellate court:
1. the receipt of compensation was not a necessary element of the crime in par 1 of sec
189 of the insurance code
2. CA erred in giving due weight to exhibits F, F1, F17 inclusive sufficient to establish
petitioners guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
3. The CA erred in not acquitting the petitioner
Issues: Won a person can be convicted of having violated the 1
st
par of the sec 189 of
the IC without reference to the 2
nd
paragraph of the said section. Or
Is it necessary to determine WON the agent mentioned in the 1
st
paragraph of the
aforesaid section is governed by the definition of an insurance agent found on its
second paragraph

Decision: Aisporna acquitted

Ruling:
Sect 189 of the I.C., par 1 states that No insurance company doing business with the
Philippine Islands nor l any agent thereof shall pay any commission or other
compensation to any person for services in obtaining new insurance unless such person
shall have first procured from the Insurance Commissioner a certificate of authority to
act as an agent of such company as herein after provided.
No person shall act as agent, sub-agent, or broker in the solicitation of procurement of
applications for insurance without obtaining a certificate from the Insurance
Commissioner.
Par2 Any person who for COMPENSATION solicits or obtains insurance for any for any
insurance compna or offers or assumes to act in the negotiating of such insurance shall
be an insurance agent in the intent of this section and shall thereby become liable to all
liabilities to which an insurance agent is subject.
Par 3 500 pseo fine for person or company violating the provisions of the section.
The court held that the 1
st
par prohibited a person to act as agent without certificate of
authority from the commissioner
In the 2
nd
par, the definition of an insurance agent is stipulated
The third paragraph provided the penalty for violating the 1
st
2 rules
The appellate court said that the petitioner was penalized under the1st paragraph and
not the 1nd. The fact that she didnt receive compensation wasnt an excuse for her
acquittal because she was actually punished separately under sec 1 because she did
not have a certificate of authority as under par 1.
The SC held that the definition of an insurance agent was made by CA to be limited to
paragraph 2 and not applicable to the 1
st
paragraph.
The appellate court said that a person was an insurance agent under par 2 if she solicits
insurance for compensation, but in the 1
st
paragraph, there was no necessity that a
person solicits an insurance compensation in order to be called an agent.
The SC said that this was a reversible error.
The CA said that Aisporna didnt receive compensation.
The SC said that the definition of an insurance agent was found in the 2nd par of Sec
189 (check the law) The definition in the 2
nd
paragraph qualified the definition of an
agent used in the 1
st
and third paragraphs.
DOCTRINE: The court held that legislative intent must be ascertained from the
consideration of the statute as a whole. The words shouldnt be studied in isolated
explanations but the whole and every part of the statute must be considered in fixing the
meaning of any of its parts in order to pronounce the harmonious whole.
Noscitur a sociis provides that where a particular word or phrase in a statement is
ambiguous in itself, the true meaning may be made clear in the company it is fixed in. In
applying this, the court held that the definition of an insurance agent in the 2
nd

paragraph was applicable in the 1
st
paragraph.
To receive compensation be the agent is an essential element for violation of the 1
st

paragraph.
The appellate court said that she didnt receive compensation by the receipt of
compensation wasnt an essential element for violation of the 1
st
paragraph.
The SC said that this view wasnt correct owing to the American insurance laws which
qualified compensation as a qualifying factor in penalizing unauthorized persons who
solicited insurance (Texas code and snyders law)
CHINA BANKING CORPORATION and TAN KIM LIONG vs. HON. WENCESLAO
ORTEGA, as Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch VIII,
and VICENTE G. ACABAN
G.R. No. L-34964
January 31, 1973
En banc
FACTS:
On December 17, 1968 Vicente Acaban filed a complaint in the court a quo against
Bautista Logging Co., Inc., B & B Forest Development Corporation and Marino Bautista
for the collection of a sum of money. Upon motion of the plaintiff the trial court declared
the defendants in default for failure to answer within the reglementary period, and
authorized the Branch Clerk of Court and/or Deputy Clerk to receive the plaintiffs
evidence. On January 20, 1970 judgment by default was rendered against the
defendants.
To satisfy the judgment, the plaintiff sought the garnishment of the bank deposit of the
defendant B & B Forest Development Corporation with the China Banking Corporation.
Accordingly, a notice of garnishment was issued by the Deputy Sheriff of the trial court
and served on said bank through its cashier, Tan Kim Liong. In reply, the bank cashier
invited the attention of the Deputy Sheriff to the provisions of Republic Act No. 1405
which, it was alleged, prohibit the disclosure of any information relative to bank
deposits. Thereupon the plaintiff filed a motion to cite Tan Kim Liong for contempt of
court.
In an order dated March 4, 1972 the trial court denied the plaintiffs motion. However,
Tan Kim Liong was ordered to inform the Court within five days from receipt of this
order whether or not there is a deposit in the China Banking Corporation of defendant B
& B Forest Development Corporation, and if there is any deposit, to hold the same intact
and not allow any withdrawal until further order from this Court. Tan Kim Liong moved
to reconsider but was turned down by order of March 27, 1972. In the same order he
was directed to comply with the order of this Court dated March 4, 1972 within ten (10)
days from the receipt of copy of this order, otherwise his arrest and confinement will be
ordered by the Court. Resisting the two orders, the China Banking Corporation and Tan
Kim Liong instituted the instant petition.
The pertinent provisions of Republic Act No. 1405 relied upon by the petitioners reads:
Sec. 2. All deposits of whatever nature with banks or banking institutions in the
Philippines including investments in bonds issued by the Government of the Philippines,
its political subdivisions and its instrumentalities, are hereby considered as of absolutely
confidential nature and may not be examined, inquired or looked into by any person,
government official, bureau or office, except upon written permission of the depositor, or
in cases of impeachment, or upon order of a competent court in cases of bribery or
dereliction of duty of public officials, or in cases where the money deposited or invested
is the subject matter of the litigation.
Sec 3. It shall be unlawful for any official or employee of a banking institution to disclose
to any person other than those mentioned in Section two hereof any information
concerning said deposits.
Sec. 5. Any violation of this law will subject offender upon conviction, to an
imprisonment of not more than five years or a fine of not more than twenty thousand
pesos or both, in the discretion of the court.
The petitioners argue that the disclosure of the information required by the court does
not fall within any of the four (4) exceptions enumerated in Section 2, and that if the
questioned orders are complied with Tan Kim Liong may be criminally liable under
Section 5 and the bank exposed to a possible damage suit by B & B Forest
Development Corporation. Specifically referring to this case, the position of the
petitioners is that the bank deposit of judgment debtor B & B Forest Development
Corporation cannot be subject to garnishment to satisfy a final judgment against it in
view of the aforequoted provisions of law.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a banking institution may validly refuse to comply with a court process
garnishing the bank deposit of a judgment debtor, by invoking the provisions of Republic
Act No. 1405.
HELD:
We do not view the situation in that light. The lower court did not order an examination
of or inquiry into the deposit of B & B Forest Development Corporation, as contemplated
in the law. It merely required Tan Kim Liong to inform the court whether or not the
defendant B & B Forest Development Corporation had a deposit in the China Banking
Corporation only for purposes of the garnishment issued by it, so that the bank would
hold the same intact and not allow any withdrawal until further order. It will be noted
from the discussion of the conference committee report on Senate Bill No. 351 and
House Bill No. 3977, which later became Republic Act 1405, that it was not the intention
of the lawmakers to place bank deposits beyond the reach of execution to satisfy a final
judgment. Thus:
Mr. MARCOS. Now, for purposes of the record, I should like the Chairman of the
Committee on Ways and Means to clarify this further. Suppose an individual has a tax
case. He is being held liable by the Bureau of Internal Revenue for, say, P1,000.00
worth of tax liability, and because of this the deposit of this individual is attached by the
Bureau of Internal Revenue.
Mr. RAMOS. The attachment will only apply after the court has pronounced sentence
declaring the liability of such person. But where the primary aim is to determine whether
he has a bank deposit in order to bring about a proper assessment by the Bureau of
Internal Revenue, such inquiry is not authorized by this proposed law.
Mr. MARCOS. But under our rules of procedure and under the Civil Code, the
attachment or garnishment of money deposited is allowed. Let us assume, for instance,
that there is a preliminary attachment which is for garnishment or for holding liable all
moneys deposited belonging to a certain individual, but such attachment or garnishment
will bring out into the open the value of such deposit. Is that prohibited by this
amendment or by this law?
Mr. RAMOS. It is only prohibited to the extent that the inquiry is limited, or rather, the
inquiry is made only for the purpose of satisfying a tax liability already declared for the
protection of the right in favor of the government; but when the object is merely to
inquire whether he has a deposit or not for purposes of taxation, then this is fully
covered by the law.
Mr. MARCOS. And it protects the depositor, does it not?
Mr. RAMOS. Yes, it protects the depositor.
Mr. MARCOS. The law prohibits a mere investigation into the existence and the amount
of the deposit.
Mr. RAMOS. Into the very nature of such deposit.
Mr. MARCOS. So I come to my original question. Therefore, preliminary garnishment or
attachment of the deposit is not allowed?
Mr. RAMOS. No, without judicial authorization.
Mr. MARCOS. I am glad that is clarified. So that the established rule of procedure as
well as the substantive law on the matter is amended?
Mr. RAMOS. Yes. That is the effect.
Mr. MARCOS. I see. Suppose there has been a decision, definitely establishing the
liability of an individual for taxation purposes and this judgment is sought to be executed
in the execution of that judgment, does this bill, or this proposed law, if approved,
allow the investigation or scrutiny of the bank deposit in order to execute the judgment?
Mr. RAMOS. To satisfy a judgment which has become executory.
Mr. MARCOS. Yes, but, as I said before, suppose the tax liability is P1,000,000 and the
deposit is half a million, will this bill allow scrutiny into the deposit in order that the
judgment may be executed?
Mr. RAMOS. Merely to determine the amount of such money to satisfy that obligation to
the Government, but not to determine whether a deposit has been made in evasion of
taxes.
xxx xxx xxx
Mr. MACAPAGAL. But let us suppose that in an ordinary civil action for the recovery of
a sum of money the plaintiff wishes to attach the properties of the defendant to insure
the satisfaction of the judgment. Once the judgment is rendered, does the gentleman
mean that the plaintiff cannot attach the bank deposit of the defendant?
Mr. RAMOS. That was the question raised by the gentleman from Pangasinan to which
I replied that outside the very purpose of this law it could be reached by attachment.
Mr. MACAPAGAL. Therefore, in such ordinary civil cases it can be attached?
Mr. RAMOS. That is so.
(Vol. II, Congressional Record, House of Representatives, No. 12, pp. 3839-3840, July
27, 1955).
It is sufficiently clear from the foregoing discussion of the conference committee report
of the two houses of Congress that the prohibition against examination of or inquiry into
a bank deposit under Republic Act 1405 does not preclude its being garnished to insure
satisfaction of a judgment. Indeed there is no real inquiry in such a case, and if the
existence of the deposit is disclosed the disclosure is purely incidental to the execution
process. It is hard to conceive that it was ever within the intention of Congress to enable
debtors to evade payment of their just debts, even if ordered by the Court, through the
expedient of converting their assets into cash and depositing the same in a bank.

Board of Administrators of the PVA v. Bautista GR L-37867, 22 February1982 (112 SRCA 59)First Division,
Guerrero (p): 5 concurring

Facts:

Calixto Gasilao was a veteran in good standing during the last World War that took
activeparticipation in theliberation drive against the enemy, and due to his military
service, he wasrendered disabled. The Philippine VeteransAdministration, formerly the
Philippine Veterans Board,(now Philippine Veterans Affairs Office) is an agency of the
Government charged with theadministration of different laws giving various benefits in
favor of veterans andtheir orphans/orwidows and parents. On July 23, 1955, Gasilao
filed a claim for disability pension under Section 9of Republic Act 65, with the Philippine
Veterans Board, alleging that he was suffering from PulmonaryTuberculosis
(PTB), which he incurred in line of duty. Due to Gasilaos failure to complete
hissupporting papers and submit evidence to establish his service-connected illness, his
claim wasdisapproved by the Board on 18 December 1955.On 8 August 1968, Gasilao
was able to complete hissupporting papers and, after due investigation and
processing,the Board of Administrators found outthat his disability was 100% thus he
was awarded the full benefits of section 9of Republic Act 65.Later on, Republic Act
5753 was approved on 22 June 1969, providing for an increase in the Basic pension
and additional pension for the wife and each of the unmarried minor children.
Gasilaosmonthly pension was, however, increased only on 15 January 1971, and by
25% of the increasesprovided by law, due to thefact that it was only on said date that
funds were released for thepurpose, and the amount so released was onlysufficient to
pay only 25% of the increase. On 15January 1972, more funds were released to
implement fullyRepublic Act 5753 and allow payment infull of the benefits thereunder
from said date.In 1973, Gasilao filed anaction against the Board to recover the pension,
which he claims he isentitled to, from July 1955, when he first filedhis application for
pension, up to 1968 when his pensionwas finally approved. The Board contends,
however, basedon Section 15 of Republic Act 65, thatsince the section impliedly
requires that the application filed should first beapproved by the Board of Administrators
before the claimant could receive his pension, therefore, an award of pension
benefitsshould commence from the date of approval of the application. I s

Whether Gasilao is entitled to the pension from 1955 instead of from 1968.

Held:

As it is generally known, the purpose of Congress in granting veteran pensions is to
compensatea class of men whosuffered in the service for the hardships they endured
and the dangers theyencountered, and more particularly, thosewho have become
incapacitated for work owing to sickness,disease or injuries sustained while in line of
duty. Aveteran pension law is, therefore, a governmentalexpression of gratitude to and
recognition of those who renderedservice for the country, especiallyduring times of war
or revolution, by extending to them regular monetary aid. Forthis reason, it is thegeneral
rule that a liberal construction is given to pension statutes in favor of those
entitledtopension. Courts tend to favor the pensioner, but such constructional
preference is to be consideredwith otherguides to interpretation, and a construction of
pension laws must depend on its ownparticular language. In thepresent case, Republic
Act 65 is a veteran pension law which must beaccorded a liberal construction
andinterpretation in order to favor those entitled to rights, privileges,and benefits
granted thereunder, among which arethe right to resume old positions in
government,educational benefits, the privilege to take promotion examinations, alife
pension for the incapacited,pension for widow and children, and hospitalization and
medical benefits. Upholdingthe Board that the pension awards are made effective only
upon approval of the application, this would be dependentupon thediscretion of the
Board which had been abused in this case through inaction extending for 12years. Such
stand,therefore does not appear to be, or simply is not, in consonance with the spirit
andintent of the law. Gasilaos claim was sustained.The Supreme Court modified the
judgment of the court a quo, ordering the Board of Administrators of the Philippine
Veterans Administration (now the Philippine Veterans Affairs Office) to make
Gasilaospension effective 18 December 1955 at the rate of P50.00 per month plus
P10.00 per month for eachof his then unmarriedminor children below 18, and the former
amount increased to P100.00 from 22June 1957 to 7 August 1968; anddeclaring the
differentials in pension to which said Gasilao, his wifeand his unmarried minor children
below 18 areentitled for the period from 22 June 1969 to 14January 1972 by virtue of
Republic Act 5753 subject to theavailability of Government fundsappropriated for the
purpose.

ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF MANILA vs. SOCIAL SECURITY
COMMISSION

Facts:

Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, thru counsel, filed a request with the respondent
Social SecurityCommission a request that they be exempted from coverage of RA No.
1161, otherwise known as theSocial Security Law of 1954 because said act is a labor
law and does not cover religious and charitableinstitutions.

Appellant contends that the term "employer" as defined in the law should following the
principle of ejusdem generis be limited to those who carry on "undertakings or activities
which have the element of profit or gain, or which are pursued for profit or gain,"
because the phrase ,activity of any kind" in thedefinition is preceded by the words "any
trade, business, industry, undertaking."

Respondent denied the request and the petitioners motion for reconsideration.
Act provides in the System shall be compulsory upon all members between the age of
sixteen and sixty years inclusive, if they have been for at least six months at the service
of an employer who is a member of the System, Provided,that the Commission may not
compel any employer to become member of the System unless he shall have been in
operation for at least two years and has at the time of admission, if admitted for
membership during thefirst year of the System's operation at least fifty employees, and
if admitted for membership the following year of operation and thereafter, at least six
employees
employer any person, natural or juridical, domestic or foreign, who carries in the
Philippines any trade, business, industry, undertaking, or activity of any kind and uses
the services of another person who is under hisorders as regards the employment,
except the Government and any of its political subdivisions, branches
or instrumentalities, including corporations owned or controlled by the Government"

(par. [c], see. 8)employee any person who performs services for an 'employer' in which
either or both mental and physicalefforts are used and who receives compensation for
such services"
(par. [d], see. 8).Employment covers any service performed by an employer except
those expressly enumerated thereunder,like employment under the Government, or any
of its political subdivisions, branches or instrumentalitiesincluding corporations owned
and controlled by the Government, domestic service in a private home,employment
purely casual, etc.

(paragraph [i] of said section 8)

Issue:

Whether or not the term employer following the principle of ejusdem generis be limited
to those who carry onactivities for gain.

Held:

No

Ratio:


ejusdem generis applies only where there is uncertainty. It is not controlling where the
plain purpose andintent of the Legislature would thereby be hindered and defeated.

Contributions are intended for the protection of said employees against the hazards of
disability, sickness, old age and death in line with the constitutional mandate to promote
social justice to in sure the well-being and economic security of all the people.

The law explicitly states those which are not covered by the contribution and the
petitioner is not among those cited.

significant to note that when Republic Act No. 1161 was enacted, services performed in
the employ of institutions organized for religious or charitable purposes were by express
provisions of said Act excludedfrom coverage thereof (sec. 8, par. [j] subpars. 7 and 8).
That portion of the law, however, has been deletedby express provision
of Republic Act No. 1792, which took effect in 1957. This is clear indication that the
Legislature intended to include charitable and religious institutions within the scope of
the law.

David v COMELEC
Panganiban, 1997
FACTS:

David, in his capacity as barangay chairman and as president of the Liga ng mga
Barangay sa Pilipinas, filed apetition to prohibit the holding of the barangay election
scheduled on the second Monday of May 1997.Meanwhile, Liga ng mga Barangay
Quezon City Chapter also filed a petition to seek a judicial review by certiorari
to declare as unconstitutional:
(1) Section 43(c) of R.A. 7160;
(2) COMELEC Resolution Nos. 2880 and 2887fixing the date of the holding of the
barangay elections on May 12, 1997 and other activities related thereto; and,
(3) The budgetary appropriation of P400 million contained in Republic Act No. 8250
(General AppropriationsAct of 1997) intended to defray the costs and expenses in
holding the 1997 barangay elections.

Petitioners contend that under RA 6679, the term of office of barangay officials is 5
years. Although the LGCreduced the term of office of all local elective officials to three
years, such reduction does not apply to barangayofficials.

As amicus curiae,former Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. urges the Court to deny the
petitions.

ISSUES & HELD:
Which law governs the term of office of barangay officials: RA 7160 or RA 6679? (RA
7160 3 years)
Is RA 7160 insofar as it shortened such term to only three years constitutional? (YES)

Are petitioners estopped from claiming a term other than that provided under RA 7160?
(YES)

RATIO:
Clear Legislative Intent and Design to Limit Term to Three Years
RA 7160 was enacted later than RA 6679. It is basic that in case of an irreconciliable
conflict between two laws,the later enactment prevails. ( Legis posteriores priores
contrarias abrogant .)

During the barangay elections held on May 9, 1994 (second Monday), the voters
actually and directly electedone punong barangay and seven kagawads (as in the
Code).

In enacting the general appropriations act of 1997, Congress appropriated the amount
of P400 million to coverexpenses for the holding of barangay elections this year.
Likewise, under Sec. 7 of RA 8189, Congress ordained
that a general registration of voters shall be held immediately after the barangay elections in 1997.
These areclear and express contemporaneous statements of Congress that barangay
officials shall be elected this May, inaccordance with Sec. 43-c of RA 7160.

In
Paras vs. Comelec,,this Court said that the next regular election involving the barangay office
concerned isbarely 7 months away, the same having been scheduled in May,
1997. This judicial decision is part of the legal system of the Philippines (NCC 8)
RA 7160 is a codified set of laws that specifically applies to local government units. It
specifically and definitivelyprovides in its Sec. 43-c that the term of office of barangay officials
shall be for three years. It is a special provision that applies only to the term of barangay
officials who were elected on the second Monday of May1994. With such particularity,
the provision cannot be deemed a general law.

Three-Year Term Not Repugnant to Constitution
barangay officials. It merely left the determination of such term to the lawmaking body,
without any specific limitation or prohibition,thereby leaving to the lawmakers full
discretion to fix such term in accordance with the exigencies of publicservice. It must be
remembered that every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality.
Thepetitioners have miserably failed to discharge this burden and to show clearly the
unconstitutionality they aver.

As may be determined by law; moreprecisely, as provided for in the Local Autonomy Code
(Sec 43-c limits their term to 3 years)
.
Petitioners Estopped From Challenging Their Three-Year Terms
ran for and were elected to,under the law governing their very claim to such offices:
namely, the LGC.
Petitioners belated claim of ignoranceas to what law governed their election to office in
1994 is unacceptable because under NCC 3
, ignorance of thelaw excuses no one from compliance therewith.