DARYL GRACE J. ABAYON, G.R. No.

189466
Petitioner,
Present:

Puno, C.J.,
Carpio,
Corona,
Carpio Morales,
Velasco, Jr.,
Nachura,
- versus - Leonardo-De Castro,
Brion,
Peralta,
Bersamin,
Del Castillo,
Abad,
Villarama, Jr.,
Perez, and
Mendoza, JJ.
THE HONORABLE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL
TRIBUNAL, PERFECTO C. LUCABAN,
JR., RONYL S. DE LA CRUZ
and AGUSTIN C. DOROGA,
Respondents.

x ---------------------------------------------- x

CONGRESSMAN JOVITO S. G.R. No. 189506
PALPARAN, JR.,
Petitioner,

- versus -

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL (HRET),
DR. REYNALDO LESACA, JR.,
CRISTINA PALABAY, RENATO M.
REYES, JR., ERLINDA CADAPAN,
ANTONIO FLORES and Promulgated:
JOSELITO USTAREZ,
Respondents. February 11, 2010
x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
DECISION

ABAD, J.:


These two cases are about the authority of the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal (HRET) to pass upon the eligibilities of the nominees of the party-list
groups that won seats in the lower house of Congress.
The Facts and the Case

In G.R. 189466, petitioner Daryl Grace J. Abayon is the first nominee of
the Aangat Tayo party-list organization that won a seat in the House of Representatives
during the 2007 elections.

Respondents Perfecto C. Lucaban, Jr., Ronyl S. Dela Cruz, and Agustin C. Doroga,
all registered voters, filed a petition forquo warranto with respondent HRET
against Aangat Tayo and its nominee, petitioner Abayon, in HRET Case 07-041. They
claimed that Aangat Tayo was not eligible for a party-list seat in the House of
Representatives, since it did not represent the marginalized and underrepresented
sectors.

Respondent Lucaban and the others with him further pointed out that
petitioner Abayon herself was not qualified to sit in the House as a party-list nominee
since she did not belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors, she being the
wife of an incumbent congressional district representative. She moreover lost her bid as
party-list representative of the party-list organization called An Waray in the
immediately preceding elections of May 10, 2004.

Petitioner Abayon countered that the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) had
already confirmed the status of Aangat Tayo as a national multi-sectoral party-list
organization representing the workers, women, youth, urban poor, and elderly and that
she belonged to the women sector. Abayon also claimed that although she was the
second nominee of An Waray party-list organization during the 2004 elections, she could
not be regarded as having lost a bid for an elective office.

Finally, petitioner Abayon pointed out that respondent HRET had no
jurisdiction over the petition for quo warranto since respondent Lucaban and the others
with him collaterally attacked the registration of Aangat Tayo as a party-list
organization, a matter that fell within the jurisdiction of the COMELEC. It was Aangat
Tayo that was taking a seat in the House of Representatives, and not Abayon who was
just its nominee. All questions involving her eligibility as first nominee, said Abayon,
were internal concerns ofAangat Tayo.

On July 16, 2009 respondent HRET issued an order, dismissing the petition as
against Aangat Tayo but upholding its jurisdiction over the qualifications of petitioner
Abayon.
[1]
The latter moved for reconsideration but the HRET denied the same on
September 17, 2009,
[2]
prompting Abayon to file the present petition for special civil
action of certiorari.

In G.R. 189506, petitioner Jovito S. Palparan, Jr. is the first nominee of
the Bantay party-list group that won a seat in the 2007 elections for the members of the
House of Representatives. Respondents Reynaldo Lesaca, Jr., Cristina Palabay, Renato M.
Reyes, Jr., Erlinda Cadapan, Antonio Flores, and Joselito Ustarez are members of some
other party-list groups.

Shortly after the elections, respondent Lesaca and the others with him filed with
respondent HRET a petition for quowarranto against Bantay and its nominee, petitioner
Palparan, in HRET Case 07-040. Lesaca and the others alleged that Palparan was
ineligible to sit in the House of Representatives as party-list nominee because he did not
belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors that Bantay represented,
namely, the victims of communist rebels, Civilian Armed Forces Geographical Units
(CAFGUs), former rebels, and security guards. Lesaca and the others said that Palparan
committed gross human rights violations against marginalized and underrepresented
sectors and organizations.

Petitioner Palparan countered that the HRET had no jurisdiction over his person
since it was actually the party-list Bantay, not he, that was elected to and assumed
membership in the House of Representatives. Palparan claimed that he was just Bantays
nominee. Consequently, any question involving his eligibility as first nominee was an
internal concern of Bantay. Such question must be brought, he said, before that party-list
group, not before the HRET.

On July 23, 2009 respondent HRET issued an order dismissing the petition
against Bantay for the reason that the issue of the ineligibility or qualification of the
party-list group fell within the jurisdiction of the COMELEC pursuant to the Party-List
System Act. HRET, however, defended its jurisdiction over the question of petitioner
Palparans qualifications.
[3]
Palparan moved for reconsideration but the HRET denied it
by a resolution dated September 10, 2009,
[4]
hence, the recourse to this Court through
this petition for special civil action of certiorari and prohibition.

Since the two cases raise a common issue, the Court has caused their consolidation.

The Issue Presented

The common issue presented in these two cases is:

Whether or not respondent HRET has jurisdiction over the question of
qualifications of petitioners Abayon and Palparan asnominees of Aangat
Tayo and Bantay party-list organizations, respectively, who took the seats at the House of
Representatives that such organizations won in the 2007 elections.

The Courts Ruling

Petitioners Abayon and Palparan have a common theory: Republic Act (R.A.)
7941, the Party-List System Act, vests in the COMELEC the authority to determine which
parties or organizations have the qualifications to seek party-list seats in the House of
Representatives during the elections. Indeed, the HRET dismissed the petitions for quo
warranto filed with it insofar as they sought the disqualifications of Aangat
Tayo and Bantay. Since petitioners Abayon and Palparan were not elected into office but
were chosen by their respective organizations under their internal rules, the HRET has
no jurisdiction to inquire into and adjudicate their qualifications as nominees.

If at all, says petitioner Abayon, such authority belongs to the COMELEC which
already upheld her qualification as nominee of Aangat Tayo for the women sector. For
Palparan, Bantays personality is so inseparable and intertwined with his own person as
its nominee so that the HRET cannot dismiss the quo warranto action
against Bantay without dismissing the action against him.

But, although it is the party-list organization that is voted for in the elections, it
is not the organization that sits as and becomes a member of the House of
Representatives. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution,
[5]
identifies who the members
of that House are:

Sec. 5. (1). The House of Representatives shall be
composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members,
unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from
legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and
the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of
their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and
progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be
elected through a party-list system of registered national,
regional, and sectoral parties or organizations. (Underscoring
supplied)

Clearly, the members of the House of Representatives are of two kinds:
members x x x who shall be elected from legislative districts and those who x x x
shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and
sectoral parties or organizations. This means that, from the Constitutions point of
view, it is the party-list representatives who are elected into office, not their parties or
organizations. These representatives are elected, however, through that peculiar party-
list system that the Constitution authorized and that Congress by law established where
the voters cast their votes for the organizations or parties to which such party-list
representatives belong.

Once elected, both the district representatives and the party-list
representatives are treated in like manner. They have the same deliberative rights,
salaries, and emoluments. They can participate in the making of laws that will directly
benefit their legislative districts or sectors. They are also subject to the same term
limitation of three years for a maximum of three consecutive terms.

It may not be amiss to point out that the Party-List System Act itself recognizes
party-list nominees as members of the House of Representatives, thus:

Sec. 2. Declaration of Policy. - The State shall promote
proportional representation in the election of representatives to
the House of Representatives through a party-list system of
registered national, regional and sectoral parties or
organizations or coalitions thereof, which will enable Filipino
citizens belonging to the marginalized and underrepresented
sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined
political constituencies but who could contribute to the
formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will
benefit the nation as a whole, to become members of the House of
Representatives. Towards this end, the State shall develop and
guarantee a full, free and open party system in order to attain the
broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group
interests in the House of Representatives by enhancing their
chances to compete for and win seats in the legislature, and shall
provide the simplest scheme possible. (Underscoring supplied)

As this Court also held in Bantay Republic Act or BA-RA 7941 v. Commission on
Elections,
[6]
a party-list representative is in every sense an elected member of the House
of Representatives. Although the vote cast in a party-list election is a vote for a party,
such vote, in the end, would be a vote for its nominees, who, in appropriate cases, would
eventually sit in the House of Representatives.

Both the Constitution and the Party-List System Act set the qualifications and
grounds for disqualification of party-list nominees. Section 9 of R.A. 7941, echoing the
Constitution, states:

Sec. 9. Qualification of Party-List Nominees. No person
shall be nominated as party-list representative unless he is a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, a
resident of the Philippines for a period of not less than one (1)
year immediately preceding the day of the election, able to read
and write, bona fide member of the party or organization which
he seeks to represent for at least ninety (90) days preceding the
day of the election, and is at least twenty-five (25) years of age on
the day of the election.

In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least
be twenty-five (25) but not more than thirty (30) years of age on
the day of the election. Any youth sectoral representative who
attains the age of thirty (30) during his term shall be allowed to
continue until the expiration of his term.

In the cases before the Court, those who challenged the qualifications of
petitioners Abayon and Palparan claim that the two do not belong to the marginalized
and underrepresented sectors that they ought to represent. The Party-List System Act
provides that a nominee must be a bona fide member of the party or organization which
he seeks to represent.
[7]


It is for the HRET to interpret the meaning of this particular qualification of a
nomineethe need for him or her to be a bona fide member or a representative of his
party-list organizationin the context of the facts that characterize petitioners Abayon
and Palparans relation to Aangat Tayo and Bantay, respectively, and the marginalized
and underrepresented interests that they presumably embody.

Petitioners Abayon and Palparan of course point out that the authority to
determine the qualifications of a party-list nominee belongs to the party or organization
that nominated him. This is true, initially. The right to examine the fitness of aspiring
nominees and, eventually, to choose five from among them after all belongs to the party
or organization that nominates them.
[8]
But where an allegation is made that the party
or organization had chosen and allowed a disqualified nominee to become its party-list
representative in the lower House and enjoy the secured tenure that goes with the
position, the resolution of the dispute is taken out of its hand.

Parenthetically, although the Party-List System Act does not so state, the
COMELEC seems to believe, when it resolved the challenge to petitioner Abayon, that it
has the power to do so as an incident of its authority to approve the registration of party-
list organizations. But the Court need not resolve this question since it is not raised here
and has not been argued by the parties.

What is inevitable is that Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution
[9]
provides
that the HRET shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to, among other things, the
qualifications of the members of the House of Representatives. Since, as pointed out
above, party-list nominees are elected members of the House of Representatives no
less than the district representatives are, the HRET has jurisdiction to hear and pass
upon their qualifications. By analogy with the cases of district representatives, once the
party or organization of the party-list nominee has been proclaimed and the nominee has
taken his oath and assumed office as member of the House of Representatives, the
COMELECs jurisdiction over election contests relating to his qualifications ends and the
HRETs own jurisdiction begins.
[10]


The Court holds that respondent HRET did not gravely abuse its
discretion when it dismissed the petitions for quo warrantoagainst Aangat Tayo party-
list and Bantay party-list but upheld its jurisdiction over the question of the
qualifications of petitioners Abayon and Palparan.

WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the consolidated petitions
and AFFIRMS the Order dated July 16, 2009 and Resolution 09-183 dated September 17,
2009 in HRET Case 07-041 of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal as well as
itsOrder dated July 23, 2009 and Resolution 09-178 dated September 10, 2009 in HRET
Case 07-040.

SO ORDERED.

PHILIPPINE GUARDIANS BROTHERHOOD, INC.
(PGBI), represented by its Secretary-General
GEORGE FGBF GEORGE DULDULAO,
Petitioner,






- versus -






COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
Respondent.
G.R. No. 190529

Present:

PUNO, C.J.,
CARPIO,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION,
PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO,
ABAD,
VILLARAMA, JR.,
PEREZ, and
MENDOZA, JJ.

Promulgated:

April 29, 2010

x----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x


R E S O L U T I O N

BRION, J.:

The Philippine Guardians Brotherhood, Inc. (PGBI) seeks in this petition
for certiorari
[1]
and in the motion for reconsideration it subsequently filed to nullify
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) Resolution No. 8679 dated October 13, 2009
insofar as it relates to PGBI, and the Resolution dated December 9, 2009 denying PGBIs
motion for reconsideration in SPP No. 09-004 (MP). Via these resolutions, the COMELEC
delisted PGBI from the roster of registered national, regional or sectoral parties,
organizations or coalitions under the party-list system.

BACKGROUND

Section 6(8) of Republic Act No. 7941 (RA 7941), otherwise known as the Party-
List System Act, provides:

Section 6. Removal and/or Cancellation of Registration.
The COMELEC may motu proprio or upon verified complaint of any
interested party, remove or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the
registration of any national, regional or sectoral party, organization or
coalition on any of the following grounds:

x x x x

(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding
elections or fails to obtain at least two per centum (2%) of the votes
cast under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding elections for
the constituency in which it has registered.[Emphasis supplied.]

The COMELEC replicated this provision in COMELEC Resolution No. 2847 the Rules and
Regulations Governing the Election of the Party-List Representatives through the Party-
List System which it promulgated on June 25, 1996.

For the upcoming May 2010 elections, the COMELEC en banc issued on October 13,
2009 Resolution No. 8679 deleting several party-list groups or organizations from the
list of registered national, regional or sectoral parties, organizations or
coalitions. Among the party-list organizations affected was PGBI; it was delisted
because it failed to get 2% of the votes cast in 2004and it did not participate in the
2007 elections. Nevertheless, the COMELEC stated in this Resolution that any national,
regional sectoral party or organizations or coalitions adversely affected can personally
or through its authorized representative file a verified opposition on October 26, 2009.

PGBI filed its Opposition to Resolution No. 8679, but likewise sought, through its
pleading, the admission ad cautelam of its petition for accreditation as a party-list
organization under the Party-List System Act. Among other arguments, PGBI asserted
that:

(1) The assailed resolution negates the right of movant and
those similarly situated to invoke Section 4 of R.A. No. 7941,
which allows any party, organization and coalition already
registered with the Commission to no longer register anew;
the party though is required to file with the Commission, not
later than ninety (90) days before the election, a
manifestation of its desire to participate in the party-list
system; since PGBI filed a Request/Manifestation seeking a
deferment of its participation in the 2007 elections within
the required period prior to the 2007 elections, it has the
option to choose whether or not to participate in the next
succeeding election under the same conditions as to rights
conferred and responsibilities imposed;

(2) The Supreme Courts ruling in G.R. No. 177548 Philippine
Mines Safety Environment Association, also known as
MINERO v. Commission on Elections cannot apply in the
instant controversy for two reasons: (a) the factual milieu of
the cited case is removed from PGBIs; (b) MINERO, prior to
delisting, was afforded the opportunity to be heard, while
PGBI and the 25 others similarly affected by Resolution No.
8679 were not. Additionally, the requirement of Section
6(8) has been relaxed by the Courts ruling in G.R. No.
179271 (Banat v. COMELEC) and the exclusion of PGBI and
the 25 other party-list is a denial of the equal protection of
the laws;

(3) The implementation of the challenged resolution should be
suspended and/or aborted to prevent a miscarriage of
justice in view of the failure to notify the parties in
accordance with the same Section 6(8) or R.A. No. 7941.
[2]


The COMELEC denied PGBIs motion/opposition for lack of merit.

First, the COMELEC observed that PGBI clearly misunderstood the import of
Section 4 of R.A. 7941.
[3]
The provision simply means that without the required
manifestation or if a party or organization does not participate, the exemption from
registration does not arise and the party, organization or coalition must go through the
process again and apply for requalification; a request for deferment would not exempt
PGBI from registering anew.

Second, the MINERO ruling is squarely in point, as MINERO failed to get 2% of
the votes in 2001 and did not participate at all in the 2004 elections.

Third, PGBI was given an opportunity to be heard or to seek the
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of the essence of due process; this is
clear from Resolution No. 8679 which expressly gave the adversely affected parties the
opportunity to file their opposition.

As regards the alternative relief of application for accreditation, the COMELEC
found the motion to have been filed out of time, as August 17, 2009 was the deadline for
accreditation provided in Resolution 8646. The motion was obviously filed months after
the deadline.

PGBI came to us in its petition for certiorari, arguing the same positions it raised
with the COMELEC when it moved to reconsider its delisting.

We initially dismissed the petition in light of our ruling in Philippine Mines Safety
Environment Association, also known as MINERO v. Commission on
Elections (Minero);
[4]
we said that no grave abuse of discretion exists in a ruling that
correctly applies the prevailing law and jurisprudence. Applying Section 6(8) of RA
7941, the Court disqualified MINERO under the following reasoning:

Since petitioner by its own admission failed to get 2% of the
votes in 2001 and did not participate at all in the 2004 elections, it
necessarily failed to get at least two per centum (2%) of the votes cast
in the two preceding elections. COMELEC, therefore, is not duty
bound to certify it.

PGBI subsequently moved to reconsider the dismissal of its petition. Among
other arguments, PGBI claimed that the dismissal of the petition was contrary to law, the
evidence and existing jurisprudence. Essentially, PGBI asserts that Section 6(8) of RA
7941 does not apply if one is to follow the tenor and import of the deliberations inclusive
of the interpellations in Senate Bill No. 1913 on October 19, 1994. It cited the following
excerpts from the Records of the Senate:

Senator Gonzales: On the other hand, Mr. President, under
ground no. (7), Section 5 there are actually two grounds it states:
Failure to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or its
failure to obtain at least ten percent (10%) of the votes case under the
party-list system in either of the last two (2) preceding elections for
the constituency in which it has registered

In short, the first ground is that, it failed to participate in the last two
(2) preceding elections. The second is, failure to obtain at least 10
percent of the votes cast under the party-list system in either of the
last two preceding elections, Mr. President,

Senator Tolentino: Actually, these are two separate grounds.

Senator Gonzales: There are actually two grounds, Mr.
President.

Senator Tolentino: Yes, Mr. President.
[5]
[Underscoring
supplied.]

PGBI thus asserts that Section 6(8) does not apply to its situation, as it is obvious that it
failed to participate in one (1) but not in the two (2) preceding elections. Implied in
this is that it also failed to secure the required percentage in one (1) but not in the two
(2) preceding elections.

Considering PGBIs arguments, we granted the motion and reinstated the petition in
the courts docket.


THE ISSUES

We are called upon to resolve: (a) whether there is legal basis for delisting
PGBI; and (b) whether PGBIs right to due process was violated.

OUR RULING

We find the petition partly impressed with merit.

a. The Minero Ruling

Our Minero ruling is an erroneous application of Section 6(8) of RA 7941; hence, it
cannot sustain PGBIs delisting from the roster of registered national, regional or sectoral
parties, organizations or coalitions under the party-list system.

First, the law is clear the COMELEC may motu proprio or upon verified
complaint of any interested party, remove or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the
registration of any national, regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition if it:
(a) fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections; or (b) fails to obtain at least
two per centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding
elections for the constituency in which it has registered.
[6]
The word or is a disjunctive
term signifying disassociation and independence of one thing from the other things
enumerated; it should, as a rule, be construed in the sense in which it ordinarily
implies, as a disjunctive word.
[7]
Thus, the plain, clear and unmistakable language of
the law provides for two (2) separate reasons for delisting.

Second, Minero is diametrically opposed to the legislative intent of Section 6(8)
of RA 7941, as PGBIs cited congressional deliberations clearly show.

Minero therefore simply cannot stand. Its basic defect lies in its
characterization of the non-participation of a party-list organization in an election as
similar to a failure to garner the 2% threshold party-list vote. What Minero effectively
holds is that a party list organization that does not participate in an election necessarily
gets, by default, less than 2% of the party-list votes. To be sure, this is a confused
interpretation of the law, given the laws clear and categorical language and the
legislative intent to treat the two scenarios differently. A delisting based on a mixture or
fusion of these two different and separate grounds for delisting is therefore a strained
application of the law in jurisdictional terms, it is an interpretation not within the
contemplation of the framers of the law and hence is a gravely abusive interpretation of
the law.
[8]


What we say here should of course take into account our ruling in Barangay
Association for Advancement and National Transparency v. COMELEC
[9]
(Banat) where
we partly invalidated the 2% party-list vote requirement provided in RA 7941 as
follows:

We rule that, in computing the allocation of additional
seats, the continued operation of the two percent threshold for the
distribution of the additional seats as found in the second clause
of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 is unconstitutional. This Court
finds that the two percent threshold makes it mathematically
impossible to achieve the maximum number of available party list
seats when the number of available party list seats exceeds 50. The
continued operation of the two percent threshold in the distribution
of the additional seats frustrates the attainment of the permissive
ceiling that 20% of the members of the House of Representatives shall
consist of party-list representatives.

The disqualification for failure to get 2% party-list votes in two (2) preceding elections
should therefore be understood in light of theBanat ruling that party-list groups or
organizations garnering less than 2% of the party-list votes may yet qualify for a seat in
the allocation of additional seats.

We need not extensively discuss Banats significance, except to state that a party-
list group or organization which qualified in the second round of seat allocation cannot
now validly be delisted for the reason alone that it garnered less than 2% in the last two
elections. In other words, the application of this disqualification should henceforth be
contingent on the percentage of party-list votes garnered by the last party-list
organization that qualified for a seat in the House of Representatives, a percentage that is
less than the 2% threshold invalidated in Banat. The disqualification should now
necessarily be read to apply to party-list groups or organizations that did not qualify for a
seat in the two preceding elections for the constituency in which it registered.

To reiterate, (a) Section 6(8) of RA 7941 provides for two separate grounds for
delisting; these grounds cannot be mixed or combined to support delisting; and (b) the
disqualification for failure to garner 2% party-list votes in two preceding elections
should now be understood, in light of the Banat ruling, to mean failure to qualify for a
party-list seat in two preceding elections for the constituency in which it has
registered. This, we declare, is how Section 6(8) of RA 7941 should be understood and
applied. We do so under our authority to state what the law is,
[10]
and as an exception to
the application of the principle of stare decisis.

The doctrine of stare decisis et non quieta movere (to adhere to precedents and
not to unsettle things which are established) is embodied in Article 8 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines which provides, thus:

ART. 8. Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or
the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of
the Philippines.


The doctrine enjoins adherence to judicial precedents. It requires courts in a country
to follow the rule established in a decision of its Supreme Court. That decision
becomes a judicial precedent to be followed in subsequent cases by all courts in the
land. The doctrine of stare decisis is based on the principle that once a question of law
has been examined and decided, it should be deemed settled and closed to further
argument.
[11]
The doctrine is grounded on the necessity for securing certainty and
stability of judicial decisions, thus:

Time and again, the court has held that it is a very desirable
and necessary judicial practice that when a court has laid down a
principle of law as applicable to a certain state of facts, it will adhere
to that principle and apply it to all future cases in which the facts are
substantially the same. Stare decisis et non quieta movere. Stand by
the decisions and disturb not what is settled. Stare decisis simply
means that for the sake of certainty, a conclusion reached in one
case should be applied to those that follow if the facts are
substantially the same, even though the parties may be different. It
proceeds from the first principle of justice that, absent any powerful
countervailing considerations, like cases ought to be decided
alike. Thus, where the same questions relating to the same event
have been put forward by the parties similarly situated as in a
previous case litigated and decided by a competent court, the rule
of stare decisis is a bar to any attempt to relitigate the same
issue.
[12]


The doctrine though is not cast in stone for upon a showing that circumstances
attendant in a particular case override the great benefits derived by our judicial system
from the doctrine of stare decisis, the Court is justified in setting it aside.
[13]


As our discussion above shows, the most compelling reason to
abandon Minero exists; it was clearly an erroneous application of the law an application
that the principle of stability or predictability of decisions alone cannot
sustain. Minero did unnecessary violence to the language of the law, the intent of the
legislature, and to the rule of law in general. Clearly, we cannot allow PGBI to be
prejudiced by the continuing validity of an erroneous ruling. Thus, we now
abandon Minero and strike it out from our ruling case law.

We are aware that PGBIs situation a party list group or organization that failed to
garner 2% in a prior election and immediately thereafter did not participate in the
preceding election is something that is not covered by Section 6(8) of RA 7941. From
this perspective, it may be an unintended gap in the law and as such is a matter for
Congress to address. We cannot and do not address matters over which full
discretionary authority is given by the Constitution to the legislature; to do so will offend
the principle of separation of powers. If a gap indeed exists, then the present case should
bring this concern to the legislatures notice.

b. The Issue of Due Process

On the due process issue, we agree with the COMELEC that PGBIs right to due
process was not violated for PGBI was given an opportunity to seek, as it did seek, a
reconsideration of Resolution No. 8679. The essence of due process, we have
consistently held, is simply the opportunity to be heard; as applied to administrative
proceedings, due process is the opportunity to explain ones side or the opportunity to
seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. A formal or trial-type
hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential. The requirement is satisfied
where the parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the
controversy at hand. What is frowned upon is absolute lack of notice and
hearing x x x.
[14]
We find it obvious under the attendant circumstances that PGBI was
not denied due process. In any case, given the result of this Resolution, PGBI has no
longer any cause for complaint on due process grounds.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we GRANT the petition and
accordingly ANNUL COMELEC Resolution No. 8679 dated October 13, 2009 insofar as
the petitioner PGBI is concerned, and the Resolution dated December 9, 2009 which
denied PGBIs motion for reconsideration in SPP No. 09-004 (MP). PGBI is qualified to be
voted upon as a party-list group or organization in the coming May 2010 elections.

SO ORDERED.

MILAGROS E. AMORES,
Petitioner,






- versus -






HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL
TRIBUNAL and EMMANUEL JOEL J.
VILLANUEVA,
Respondents.

G.R. No. 189600

Present:

CORONA,
*
C.J.,
CARPIO,
CARPIO MORALES,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
*

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, BRION,
PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO,
ABAD,
VILLARAMA., JR.,
PEREZ, and
MENDOZA, JJ.

Promulgated:


June 29, 2010
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
D E C I S I O N
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Via this petition for certiorari, Milagros E. Amores (petitioner) challenges the
Decision of May 14, 2009 and Resolution No. 09-130 of August 6, 2009 of the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (public respondent), which respectively dismissed
petitioners Petition for Quo Warranto questioning the legality of the assumption of office
of Emmanuel Joel J. Villanueva (private respondent) as representative of the party-list
organization Citizens Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC) in the House of Representatives,
and denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.
In her Petition for Quo Warranto
[1]
seeking the ouster of private respondent,
petitioner alleged that, among other things, private respondent assumed office without a
formal proclamation issued by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC); he was
disqualified to be a nominee of the youth sector of CIBAC since, at the time of the filing of
his certificates of nomination and acceptance, he was already 31 years old or beyond the
age limit of 30 pursuant to Section 9 of Republic Act (RA) No. 7941, otherwise known as
the Party-List System Act; and his change of affiliation from CIBACs youth sector to its
overseas Filipino workers and their families sector was not effected at least six months
prior to the May 14, 2007 elections so as to be qualified to represent the new sector
under Section 15 of RA No. 7941.
Not having filed his Answer despite due notice, private respondent was deemed to
have entered a general denial pursuant to public respondents Rules.
[2]

As earlier reflected, public respondent, by Decision of May 14, 2009,
[3]
dismissed
petitioners Petition for Quo Warranto, finding that CIBAC was among the party-list
organizations which the COMELEC had partially proclaimed as entitled to at least one
seat in the House of Representatives through National Board of Canvassers (NBC)
Resolution No. 07-60 dated July 9, 2007. It also found the petition which was filed
on October 17, 2007 to be out of time, the reglementary period being 10 days from
private respondents proclamation.
Respecting the age qualification for youth sectoral nominees under Section 9 of
RA No. 7941, public respondent held that it applied only to those nominated as such
during the first three congressional terms after the ratification of the Constitution or
until 1998, unless a sectoral party is thereafter registered exclusively as representing the
youth sector, which CIBAC, a multi-sectoral organization, is not.
In the matter of private respondents shift of affiliation from CIBACs youth
sector to its overseas Filipino workers and their families sector, public respondent held
that Section 15 of RA No. 7941 did not apply as there was no resultant change in party-
list affiliation.
Her Motion for Reconsideration having been denied by Resolution No. 09-130
dated August 6, 2009,
[4]
petitioner filed the present Petition for Certiorari.
[5]

Petitioner contends that, among other things, public respondent created
distinctions in the application of Sections 9 and 15 of RA No. 7941 that are not found in
the subject provisions, fostering interpretations at war with equal protection of the laws;
and NBC Resolution No. 07-60, which was a partial proclamation of winning party-list
organizations, was not enough basis for private respondent to assume office on July 10,
2007, especially considering that he admitted receiving his own Certificate of
Proclamation only on December 13, 2007.
In his Comment,
[6]
private respondent avers in the main that petitioner has not
substantiated her claims of grave abuse of discretion against public respondent; and that
he became a member of the overseas Filipinos and their families sector years before the
2007 elections.
It bears noting that the term of office of party-list representatives elected in the
May, 2007 elections will expire on June 30, 2010. While the petition has, thus, become
moot and academic, rendering of a decision on the merits in this case would still be of
practical value.
[7]

The Court adopts the issues framed by public respondent, to wit: (1) whether
petitioners Petition for Quo Warranto was dismissible for having been filed
unseasonably; and (2) whether Sections 9 and 15 of RA No. 7941 apply to private
respondent.
On the first issue, the Court finds that public respondent committed grave abuse of
discretion in considering petitioners Petition for Quo Warranto filed out of time. Its
counting of the 10-day reglementary period provided in its Rules
[8]
from the issuance of
NBC Resolution No. 07-60 on July 9, 2007 is erroneous.
To be sure, while NBC Resolution No. 07-60 partially proclaimed CIBAC as a winner
in the May, 2007 elections, along with other party-list organizations,
[9]
it was by no
measure a proclamation of private respondent himself as required by Section 13 of RA
No. 7941.
Section 13. How Party-List Representatives are Chosen. Party-
list representatives shall be proclaimed by the COMELEC based on the
list of names submitted by the respective parties, organizations, or
coalitions to the COMELEC according to their ranking in said list.
AT ALL EVENTS, this Court set aside NBC Resolution No. 07-60 in Barangay
Association for National Advancement and Transparency v. COMELEC
[10]
after revisiting
the formula for allocation of additional seats to party-list organizations.
Considering, however, that the records do not disclose the exact date of private
respondents proclamation, the Court overlooks the technicality of timeliness and rules
on the merits. Alternatively, since petitioners challenge goes into private respondents
qualifications, it may be filed at anytime during his term.
Qualifications for public office are continuing requirements and
must be possessed not only at the time of appointment or election or
assumption of office but during the officer's entire tenure. Once any
of the required qualifications is lost, his title may be seasonably
challenged.
[11]

On the second and more substantial issue, the Court shall first discuss the age
requirement for youth sector nominees under Section 9 of RA No. 7941 reading:
Section 9. Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. No person
shall be nominated as party-list representative unless he is a natural-
born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, a resident of the
Philippines for a period of not less than one (1)year immediately
preceding the day of the election, able to read and write, a bona fide
member of the party or organization which he seeks to represent for
at least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the election, and is at
least twenty-five (25) years of age on the day of the election.
In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least
be twenty-five (25) but not more than thirty (30) years of age on
the day of the election. Any youth sectoral representative who
attains the age of thirty (30) during his term shall be allowed to
continue in office until the expiration of his term. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied.)

The Court finds no textual support for public respondents interpretation that
Section 9 applied only to those nominated during the first three congressional terms
after the ratification of the Constitution or until 1998, unless a sectoral party is
thereafter registered exclusively as representing the youth sector.

A cardinal rule in statutory construction is that when the law is clear and free
from any doubt or ambiguity, there is no room for construction or interpretation. There
is only room for application.
[12]

As the law states in unequivocal terms that a nominee of the youth
sector must at least be twenty-five (25) but not more than thirty (30) years of age
on the day of the election, so it must be that a candidate who is more than 30 on
election day is not qualified to be a youth sector nominee. Since this mandate is
contained in RA No. 7941, the Party-List System Act, it covers ALL youth sector nominees
vying for party-list representative seats.
As petitioner points out, RA No. 7941 was enacted only in March, 1995. There
is thus no reason to apply Section 9 thereof only to youth sector nominees nominated
during the first three congressional terms after the ratification of the Constitution in
1987. Under this interpretation, the last elections where Section 9 applied were held in
May, 1995 or two months after the law was enacted. This is certainly not sound
legislative intent, and could not have been the objective of RA No. 7941.
There is likewise no rhyme or reason in public respondents ratiocination that
after the third congressional term from the ratification of the Constitution, which expired
in 1998, Section 9 of RA No. 7941 would apply only to sectoral parties registered
exclusively as representing the youth sector. This distinction is nowhere found in the
law. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguire debemus. When the law does not
distinguish, we must not distinguish.
[13]

Respecting Section 15 of RA No. 7941, the Court fails to find even an iota of
textual support for public respondents ratiocination that the provision did not apply to
private respondents shift of affiliation from CIBACs youth sector to its overseas Filipino
workers and their families sector as there was no resultant change in party-list
affiliation. Section 15 reads:
Section 15. Change of Affiliation; Effect. Any elected party-list
representative who changes his political party or sectoral
affiliationduring his term of office shall forfeit his seat: Provided,
That if he changes his political party or sectoral affiliation within
six (6) months before an election, he shall not be eligible for
nomination as party-list representative under his new party or
organization. (emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
What is clear is that the wording of Section 15 covers changes in both political
party and sectoral affiliation. And the latter may occur within the same party since
multi-sectoral party-list organizations are qualified to participate in the Philippine party-
list system. Hence, a nominee who changes his sectoral affiliation within the same party
will only be eligible for nomination under the new sectoral affiliation if the change has
been effected at least six months before the elections. Again, since the statute is clear
and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without
attempted interpretation. This is the plain meaning rule orverba legis, as expressed in
the maxim index animi sermo or speech is the index of intention.
[14]


It is, therefore, beyond cavil that Sections 9 and 15 of RA No. 7941 apply to
private respondent.
The Court finds that private respondent was not qualified to be a nominee of either
the youth sector or the overseas Filipino workers and their families sector in the May,
2007 elections.
The records disclose that private respondent was already more than 30 years
of age in May, 2007, it being stipulated that he was born in August, 1975.
[15]
Moreover,
he did not change his sectoral affiliation at least six months before May, 2007, public
respondent itself having found that he shifted to CIBACs overseas Filipino workers and
their families sector only on March 17, 2007.
[16]

That private respondent is the first nominee of CIBAC, whose victory was later
upheld, is of no moment. A party-list organizations ranking of its nominees is a mere
indication of preference, their qualifications according to law are a different matter.
It not being contested, however, that private respondent was eventually proclaimed
as a party-list representative of CIBAC and rendered services as such, he is entitled to
keep the compensation and emoluments provided by law for the position until he is
properly declared ineligible to hold the same.
[17]

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated May 14, 2009 and
Resolution No. 09-130 dated August 6, 2009 of the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal are SET ASIDE. Emmanuel Joel J. Villanueva is declared ineligible to hold office
as a member of the House of Representatives representing the party-list organization
CIBAC.
SO ORDERED.

ANG LADLAD LGBT PARTY G.R. No. 190582
represented herein by its Chair,
DANTON REMOTO,
Petitioner, Present:

PUNO, C. J.,
CARPIO,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
- versus - BRION,
PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO,
ABAD,
VILLARAMA, JR.,
PEREZ, and
MENDOZA, JJ.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Promulgated:
Respondent. April 8, 2010
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

D E C I S I O N

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

... [F]reedom to differ is not limited to things that do not matter much.
That would be a mere shadow of freedom. The test of its substance is
the right to differ as to things that touch the heart of the existing
order.

Justice Robert A. Jackson
West Virginia State Board of Education v.
Barnette[1]

One unavoidable consequence of everyone having the freedom to choose is that
others may make different choices choices we would not make for ourselves, choices
we may disapprove of, even choices that may shock or offend or anger us. However,
choices are not to be legally prohibited merely because they are different, and the right
to disagree and debate about important questions of public policy is a core value
protected by our Bill of Rights. Indeed, our democracy is built on genuine recognition of,
and respect for, diversity and difference in opinion.

Since ancient times, society has grappled with deep disagreements about the
definitions and demands of morality. In many cases, where moral convictions are
concerned, harmony among those theoretically opposed is an insurmountable goal. Yet
herein lies the paradox philosophical justifications about what is moral are
indispensable and yet at the same time powerless to create agreement. This Court
recognizes, however, that practical solutions are preferable to ideological stalemates;
accommodation is better than intransigence; reason more worthy than rhetoric. This will
allow persons of diverse viewpoints to live together, if not harmoniously, then, at least,
civilly.

Factual Background

This is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, with an
application for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, filed by Ang Ladlad LGBT
Party (Ang Ladlad) against the Resolutions of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
dated November 11, 2009[2] (the First Assailed Resolution) and December 16,
2009[3] (the Second Assailed Resolution) in SPP No. 09-228 (PL) (collectively, the
Assailed Resolutions). The case has its roots in the COMELECs refusal to accredit Ang
Ladlad as a party-list organization under Republic Act (RA) No. 7941, otherwise known
as the Party-List System Act.[4]

Ang Ladlad is an organization composed of men and women who identify
themselves as lesbians, gays, bisexuals, or trans-gendered individuals (LGBTs).
Incorporated in 2003, Ang Ladlad first applied for registration with the COMELEC in
2006. The application for accreditation was denied on the ground that the organization
had no substantial membership base. On August 17, 2009, Ang Ladlad again filed a
Petition[5] for registration with the COMELEC.

Before the COMELEC, petitioner argued that the LGBT community is a
marginalized and under-represented sector that is particularly disadvantaged because of
their sexual orientation and gender identity; that LGBTs are victims of exclusion,
discrimination, and violence; that because of negative societal attitudes, LGBTs are
constrained to hide their sexual orientation; and that Ang Ladlad complied with the 8-
point guidelines enunciated by this Court in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v.
Commission on Elections.[6] Ang Ladlad laid out its national membership base
consisting of individual members and organizational supporters, and outlined its
platform of governance.[7]

On November 11, 2009, after admitting the petitioners evidence, the COMELEC
(Second Division) dismissed the Petition on moral grounds, stating that:
x x x This Petition is dismissible on moral grounds.
Petitioner defines the Filipino Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender
(LGBT) Community, thus:

x x x a marginalized and under-
represented sector that is particularly
disadvantaged because of their sexual orientation
and gender identity.

and proceeded to define sexual orientation as that which:

x x x refers to a persons capacity for profound
emotional, affectional and sexual attraction to, and
intimate and sexual relations with, individuals of a
different gender, of the same gender, or more than
one gender.

This definition of the LGBT sector makes it crystal clear that
petitioner tolerates immorality which offends religious beliefs. In
Romans 1:26, 27, Paul wrote:

For this cause God gave them up into vile
affections, for even their women did change the
natural use into that which is against nature: And
likewise also the men, leaving the natural use of the
woman, burned in their lust one toward another;
men with men working that which is unseemly, and
receiving in themselves that recompense of their
error which was meet.

In the Koran, the hereunder verses are pertinent:

For ye practice your lusts on men in
preference to women ye are indeed a people
transgressing beyond bounds. (7.81) And we
rained down on them a shower (of brimstone):
Then see what was the end of those who indulged
in sin and crime! (7:84) He said: O my Lord! Help
Thou me against people who do mischief (29:30).

As correctly pointed out by the Law Department in its
Comment dated October 2, 2008:

The ANG LADLAD apparently advocates
sexual immorality as indicated in the Petitions par.
6F: Consensual partnerships or relationships by
gays and lesbians who are already of age. It is
further indicated in par. 24 of the Petition which
waves for the record: In 2007,Men Having Sex with
Men or MSMs in the Philippines were estimated as
670,000 (Genesis 19 is the history
of Sodom and Gomorrah).

Laws are deemed incorporated in every
contract, permit, license, relationship, or
accreditation. Hence, pertinent provisions of the
Civil Code and the Revised Penal Code are deemed
part of the requirement to be complied with for
accreditation.

ANG LADLAD collides with Article 695 of
the Civil Code which defines nuisance as Any act,
omission, establishment, business, condition of
property, or anything else which x x x (3) shocks,
defies; or disregards decency or morality x x x

It also collides with Article 1306 of the
Civil Code: The contracting parties may establish
such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as
they may deem convenient, provided they are not
contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order
or public policy. Art 1409 of the Civil Code provides
that Contracts whose cause, object or purpose is
contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order
or public policy are inexistent and void from the
beginning.

Finally to safeguard the morality of the Filipino community,
the Revised Penal Code, as amended, penalizes Immoral doctrines,
obscene publications and exhibitions and indecent shows as follows:

Art. 201. Immoral doctrines, obscene
publications and exhibitions, and indecent shows.
The penalty of prision mayor or a fine ranging
from six thousand to twelve thousand pesos, or
both such imprisonment and fine, shall be imposed
upon:

1. Those who shall publicly expound or
proclaim doctrines openly contrary to public
morals;

2. (a) The authors of obscene literature,
published with their knowledge in any form; the
editors publishing such literature; and the
owners/operators of the establishment selling the
same;

(b) Those who, in theaters, fairs,
cinematographs or any other place, exhibit
indecent or immoral plays, scenes, acts or shows, it
being understood that the obscene literature or
indecent or immoral plays, scenes, acts or shows,
whether live or in film, which are prescribed by
virtue hereof, shall include those which: (1) glorify
criminals or condone crimes; (2) serve no other
purpose but to satisfy the market for violence,lust
or pornography; (3) offend any race or religion; (4)
tend to abet traffic in and use of prohibited drugs;
and (5) are contrary to law, public order, morals,
good customs, established policies, lawful orders,
decrees and edicts.

3. Those who shall sell, give away or
exhibit films, prints, engravings, sculpture or
literature which are offensive to morals.

Petitioner should likewise be denied accreditation not only
for advocating immoral doctrines but likewise for not being truthful
when it said that it or any of its nominees/party-list representatives
have not violated or failed to comply with laws, rules, or regulations
relating to the elections.

Furthermore, should this Commission grant the petition, we will be
exposing our youth to an environment that does not conform to the
teachings of our faith. Lehman Strauss, a famous bible teacher and
writer in the U.S.A. said in one article that older practicing
homosexuals are a threat to the youth. As an agency of the
government, ours too is the States avowed duty under Section 13,
Article II of the Constitution to protect our youth from moral and
spiritual degradation.[8]


When Ang Ladlad sought reconsideration,[9] three commissioners voted to
overturn the First Assailed Resolution (Commissioners Gregorio Y. Larrazabal, Rene V.
Sarmiento, and Armando Velasco), while three commissioners voted to deny Ang
Ladlads Motion for Reconsideration (Commissioners Nicodemo T. Ferrer, Lucenito N.
Tagle, and Elias R. Yusoph). The COMELEC Chairman, breaking the tie and speaking for
the majority in his Separate Opinion, upheld the First Assailed Resolution, stating that:

I. The Spirit of Republic Act No. 7941

Ladlad is applying for accreditation as a sectoral party in the
party-list system. Even assuming that it has properly proven its
under-representation and marginalization, it cannot be said
that Ladlads expressed sexual orientations per se would benefit the
nation as a whole.

Section 2 of the party-list law unequivocally states that the
purpose of the party-list system of electing congressional
representatives is to enable Filipino citizens belonging to
marginalized and under-represented sectors, organizations and
parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies but who
could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate
legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole, to become members
of the House of Representatives.

If entry into the party-list system would depend only on the
ability of an organization to represent its constituencies, then all
representative organizations would have found themselves into the
party-list race. But that is not the intention of the framers of the law.
The party-list system is not a tool to advocate tolerance and
acceptance of misunderstood persons or groups of persons.
Rather, the party-list system is a tool for the realization of aspirations
of marginalized individuals whose interests are also the nations
only that their interests have not been brought to the attention of the
nation because of their under representation. Until the time comes
when Ladlad is able to justify that having mixed sexual orientations
and transgender identities is beneficial to the nation, its application
for accreditation under the party-list system will remain just that.

II. No substantial differentiation

In the United States, whose equal protection doctrine
pervades Philippine jurisprudence, courts do not recognize lesbians,
gays, homosexuals, and bisexuals (LGBT) as a special class of
individuals. x x x Significantly, it has also been held that
homosexuality is not a constitutionally protected fundamental right,
and that nothing in the U.S. Constitution discloses a comparable
intent to protect or promote the social or legal equality of homosexual
relations, as in the case of race or religion or belief.

x x x x

Thus, even if societys understanding, tolerance, and
acceptance of LGBTs is elevated, there can be no denying
that Ladlad constituencies are still males and females, and they will
remain either male or female protected by the same Bill of Rights that
applies to all citizens alike.

x x x x

IV. Public Morals

x x x There is no question about not imposing
on Ladlad Christian or Muslim religious practices. Neither is there any
attempt to any particular religious groups moral rules on Ladlad.
Rather, what are being adopted as moral parameters and precepts are
generally accepted public morals. They are possibly religious-based,
but as a society, the Philippines cannot ignore its more than 500 years
of Muslim and Christian upbringing, such that some moral precepts
espoused by said religions have sipped [sic] into society and these are
not publicly accepted moral norms.

V. Legal Provisions

But above morality and social norms, they have become part
of the law of the land. Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code imposes
the penalty ofprision mayor upon Those who shall publicly expound
or proclaim doctrines openly contrary to public morals. It penalizes
immoral doctrines, obscene publications and exhibition and indecent
shows. Ang Ladlad apparently falls under these legal provisions.
This is clear from its Petitions paragraph 6F:Consensual
partnerships or relationships by gays and lesbians who are already of
age It is further indicated in par. 24 of the Petition which waves for
the record: In 2007, Men Having Sex with Men or MSMs in
the Philippines were estimated as 670,000. Moreoever, Article 694 of
the Civil Code defines nuisance as any act, omission x x x or anything
else x x x which shocks, defies or disregards decency or morality x x
x. These are all unlawful.[10]


On January 4, 2010, Ang Ladlad filed this Petition, praying that the Court annul
the Assailed Resolutions and direct the COMELEC to grant Ang Ladlads application for
accreditation. Ang Ladlad also sought the issuance ex parte of a preliminary mandatory
injunction against the COMELEC, which had previously announced that it would begin
printing the final ballots for the May 2010 elections by January 25, 2010.

On January 6, 2010, we ordered the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to file
its Comment on behalf of COMELEC not later than12:00 noon of January 11,
2010.[11] Instead of filing a Comment, however, the OSG filed a Motion for Extension,
requesting that it be given until January 16, 2010 to Comment.[12] Somewhat
surprisingly, the OSG later filed a Comment in support of petitioners
application.[13] Thus, in order to give COMELEC the opportunity to fully ventilate its
position, we required it to file its own comment.[14] The COMELEC, through its Law
Department, filed its Comment on February 2, 2010.[15]

In the meantime, due to the urgency of the petition, we issued a temporary
restraining order on January 12, 2010, effective immediately and continuing until further
orders from this Court, directing the COMELEC to cease and desist from implementing
the Assailed Resolutions.[16]

Also, on January 13, 2010, the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) filed
a Motion to Intervene or to Appear as Amicus Curiae,attaching thereto its Comment-in-
Intervention.[17] The CHR opined that the denial of Ang Ladlads petition on moral
grounds violated the standards and principles of the Constitution, the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), and the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR). On January 19, 2010, we granted the CHRs motion to intervene.

On January 26, 2010, Epifanio D. Salonga, Jr. filed his Motion to
Intervene[18] which motion was granted on February 2, 2010.[19]

The Parties Arguments

Ang Ladlad argued that the denial of accreditation, insofar as it justified the
exclusion by using religious dogma, violated the constitutional guarantees against the
establishment of religion. Petitioner also claimed that the Assailed Resolutions
contravened its constitutional rights to privacy, freedom of speech and assembly, and
equal protection of laws, as well as constituted violations of thePhilippines international
obligations against discrimination based on sexual orientation.

The OSG concurred with Ang Ladlads petition and argued that the COMELEC erred
in denying petitioners application for registration since there was no basis for
COMELECs allegations of immorality. It also opined that LGBTs have their own special
interests and concerns which should have been recognized by the COMELEC as a
separate classification. However, insofar as the purported violations of petitioners
freedom of speech, expression, and assembly were concerned, the OSG maintained that
there had been no restrictions on these rights.

In its Comment, the COMELEC reiterated that petitioner does not have a
concrete and genuine national political agenda to benefit the nation and that the petition
was validly dismissed on moral grounds. It also argued for the first time that the LGBT
sector is not among the sectors enumerated by the Constitution and RA 7941, and that
petitioner made untruthful statements in its petition when it alleged its national
existence contrary to actual verification reports by COMELECs field personnel.

Our Ruling

We grant the petition.

Compliance with the
Requirements of the
Constitution and Republic Act
No. 7941


The COMELEC denied Ang Ladlads application for registration on the ground
that the LGBT sector is neither enumerated in the Constitution and RA 7941, nor is it
associated with or related to any of the sectors in the enumeration.

Respondent mistakenly opines that our ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani stands for
the proposition that only those sectors specifically enumerated in the law or related to
said sectors (labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities,
elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals) may
be registered under the party-list system. As we explicitly ruled in Ang Bagong Bayani-
OFW Labor Party v. Commission on Elections,[20] the enumeration of marginalized and
under-represented sectors is not exclusive. The crucial element is not whether a sector
is specifically enumerated, but whether a particular organization complies with the
requirements of the Constitution and RA 7941.

Respondent also argues that Ang Ladlad made untruthful statements in its
petition when it alleged that it had nationwide existence through its members and
affiliate organizations. The COMELEC claims that upon verification by its field personnel,
it was shown that save for a few isolated places in the country, petitioner does not exist
in almost all provinces in the country.[21]
This argument that petitioner made untruthful statements in its petition when
it alleged its national existence is a new one; previously, the COMELEC claimed that
petitioner was not being truthful when it said that it or any of its nominees/party-list
representatives have not violated or failed to comply with laws, rules, or regulations
relating to the elections. Nowhere was this ground for denial of petitioners
accreditation mentioned or even alluded to in the Assailed Resolutions. This, in itself, is
quite curious, considering that the reports of petitioners alleged non-existence were
already available to the COMELEC prior to the issuance of the First Assailed Resolution.
At best, this is irregular procedure; at worst, a belated afterthought, a change in
respondents theory, and a serious violation of petitioners right to procedural due
process.

Nonetheless, we find that there has been no misrepresentation. A cursory
perusal of Ang Ladlads initial petition shows that it never claimed to exist in each
province of the Philippines. Rather, petitioner alleged that the LGBT community in
the Philippines was estimated to constitute at least 670,000 persons; that it had 16,100
affiliates and members around the country, and 4,044 members in its electronic
discussion group.[22] Ang Ladlad also represented itself to be a national LGBT umbrella
organization with affiliates around the Philippines composed of the following LGBT
networks:

Abra Gay Association
Aklan Butterfly Brigade (ABB) Aklan
Albay Gay Association
Arts Center of Cabanatuan City Nueva Ecija
Boys Legion Metro Manila
Cagayan de Oro People Like Us (CDO PLUS)
Cant Live in the Closet, Inc. (CLIC) Metro Manila
Cebu Pride Cebu City
Circle of Friends
Dipolog Gay Association Zamboanga del Norte
Gay, Bisexual, & Transgender Youth Association
(GABAY)
Gay and Lesbian Activists Network for Gender Equality
(GALANG) Metro Manila
Gay Mens Support Group (GMSG) Metro Manila
Gay United for Peace and Solidarity (GUPS) Lanao del
Norte
Iloilo City Gay Association Iloilo City
Kabulig Writers Group Camarines Sur
Lesbian Advocates Philippines, Inc. (LEAP)
LUMINA Baguio City
Marikina Gay Association Metro Manila
Metropolitan Community Church (MCC)
Metro Manila
Naga City Gay Association Naga City
ONE BACARDI
Order of St. Aelred (OSAe) Metro Manila
PUP LAKAN
RADAR PRIDEWEAR
Rainbow Rights Project (R-Rights), Inc. Metro Manila
San Jose del Monte Gay Association Bulacan
Sining Kayumanggi Royal Family Rizal
Society of Transexual Women of
the Philippines (STRAP) Metro Manila
Soul Jive Antipolo, Rizal
The Link Davao City
Tayabas Gay Association Quezon
Womens Bisexual Network Metro Manila
Zamboanga Gay Association Zamboanga City[23]


Since the COMELEC only searched for the names ANG LADLAD LGBT
or LADLAD LGBT, it is no surprise that they found that petitioner had no presence in any
of these regions. In fact, if COMELECs findings are to be believed, petitioner does not
even exist in Quezon City, which is registered as Ang Ladlads principal place of business.
Against this backdrop, we find that Ang Ladlad has sufficiently demonstrated
its compliance with the legal requirements for accreditation. Indeed, aside from
COMELECs moral objection and the belated allegation of non-existence, nowhere in the
records has the respondent ever found/ruled that Ang Ladlad is not qualified to register
as a party-list organization under any of the requisites under RA 7941 or the guidelines
in Ang Bagong Bayani. The difference, COMELEC claims, lies in Ang Ladlads morality, or
lack thereof.

Religion as the Basis for Refusal
to Accept Ang Ladlads Petition
for Registration


Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that [n]o law shall be made
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. At
bottom, what our non-establishment clause calls for is government neutrality in
religious matters.[24] Clearly, governmental reliance on religious justification is
inconsistent with this policy of neutrality.[25] We thus find that it was grave violation
of the non-establishment clause for the COMELEC to utilize the Bible and the Koran to
justify the exclusion of Ang Ladlad.

Rather than relying on religious belief, the legitimacy of the Assailed
Resolutions should depend, instead, on whether the COMELEC is able to advance some
justification for its rulings beyond mere conformity to religious doctrine. Otherwise
stated, government must act for secular purposes and in ways that have primarily
secular effects. As we held in Estrada v. Escritor:[26]

x x x The morality referred to in the law is public and
necessarily secular, not religious as the dissent of Mr. Justice Carpio
holds. "Religious teachings as expressed in public debate may
influence the civil public order but public moral disputes may be
resolved only on grounds articulable in secular terms." Otherwise, if
government relies upon religious beliefs in formulating public policies
and morals, the resulting policies and morals would require
conformity to what some might regard as religious programs or
agenda. The non-believers would therefore be compelled to conform
to a standard of conduct buttressed by a religious belief, i.e., to a
"compelled religion," anathema to religious freedom. Likewise, if
government based its actions upon religious beliefs, it would tacitly
approve or endorse that belief and thereby also tacitly disapprove
contrary religious or non-religious views that would not support the
policy. As a result, government will not provide full religious freedom
for all its citizens, or even make it appear that those whose beliefs are
disapproved are second-class citizens.
In other words, government action, including its proscription
of immorality as expressed in criminal law like concubinage, must
have a secular purpose. That is, the government proscribes this
conduct because it is "detrimental (or dangerous) to those conditions
upon which depend the existence and progress of human society" and
not because the conduct is proscribed by the beliefs of one religion or
the other. Although admittedly, moral judgments based on religion
might have a compelling influence on those engaged in public
deliberations over what actions would be considered a moral
disapprobation punishable by law. After all, they might also be
adherents of a religion and thus have religious opinions and moral
codes with a compelling influence on them; the human mind
endeavors to regulate the temporal and spiritual institutions of
society in a uniform manner, harmonizing earth with heaven.
Succinctly put, a law could be religious or Kantian or Aquinian or
utilitarian in its deepest roots, but it must have an articulable and
discernible secular purpose and justification to pass scrutiny of the
religion clauses. x x x Recognizing the religious nature of the Filipinos
and the elevating influence of religion in society, however, the
Philippine constitution's religion clauses prescribe not a strict but a
benevolent neutrality. Benevolent neutrality recognizes that
government must pursue its secular goals and interests but at the
same time strive to uphold religious liberty to the greatest extent
possible within flexible constitutional limits. Thus, although the
morality contemplated by laws is secular, benevolent neutrality could
allow for accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it
does not offend compelling state interests.[27]


Public Morals as a Ground to
Deny Ang Ladlads Petition for
Registration


Respondent suggests that although the moral condemnation of homosexuality
and homosexual conduct may be religion-based, it has long been transplanted into
generally accepted public morals. The COMELEC argues:

Petitioners accreditation was denied not necessarily because
their group consists of LGBTs but because of the danger it poses to the
people especially the youth. Once it is recognized by the government,
a sector which believes that there is nothing wrong in having sexual
relations with individuals of the same gender is a bad example. It will
bring down the standard of morals we cherish in our civilized society.
Any society without a set of moral precepts is in danger of losing its
own existence.[28]


We are not blind to the fact that, through the years, homosexual conduct, and
perhaps homosexuals themselves, have borne the brunt of societal disapproval. It is not
difficult to imagine the reasons behind this censure religious beliefs, convictions about
the preservation of marriage, family, and procreation, even dislike or distrust of
homosexuals themselves and their perceived lifestyle. Nonetheless, we recall that
the Philippines has not seen fit to criminalize homosexual conduct. Evidently, therefore,
these generally accepted public morals have not been convincingly transplanted into
the realm of law.[29]

The Assailed Resolutions have not identified any specific overt immoral act performed
by Ang Ladlad. Even the OSG agrees that there should have been a finding by the
COMELEC that the groups members have committed or are committing immoral
acts.[30] The OSG argues:

x x x A person may be sexually attracted to a person of the
same gender, of a different gender, or more than one gender, but mere
attraction does not translate to immoral acts. There is a great divide
between thought and action. Reduction ad absurdum. If immoral
thoughts could be penalized, COMELEC would have its hands full of
disqualification cases against both the straights and the gays.
Certainly this is not the intendment of the law.[31]


Respondent has failed to explain what societal ills are sought to be prevented,
or why special protection is required for the youth. Neither has the COMELEC
condescended to justify its position that petitioners admission into the party-list system
would be so harmful as to irreparably damage the moral fabric of society. We, of course,
do not suggest that the state is wholly without authority to regulate matters concerning
morality, sexuality, and sexual relations, and we recognize that the government will and
should continue to restrict behavior considered detrimental to society. Nonetheless, we
cannot countenance advocates who, undoubtedly with the loftiest of intentions, situate
morality on one end of an argument or another, without bothering to go through the
rigors of legal reasoning and explanation. In this, the notion of morality is robbed of all
value. Clearly then, the bare invocation of morality will not remove an issue from our
scrutiny.

We also find the COMELECs reference to purported violations of our penal and
civil laws flimsy, at best; disingenuous, at worst. Article 694 of the Civil Code defines a
nuisance as any act, omission, establishment, condition of property, or anything else
which shocks, defies, or disregards decency or morality, the remedies for which are a
prosecution under the Revised Penal Code or any local ordinance, a civil action, or
abatement without judicial proceedings.[32] A violation of Article 201 of the Revised
Penal Code, on the other hand, requires proof beyond reasonable doubt to support a
criminal conviction. It hardly needs to be emphasized that mere allegation of violation of
laws is not proof, and a mere blanket invocation of public morals cannot replace the
institution of civil or criminal proceedings and a judicial determination of liability or
culpability.

As such, we hold that moral disapproval, without more, is not a sufficient
governmental interest to justify exclusion of homosexuals from participation in the
party-list system. The denial of Ang Ladlads registration on purely moral grounds
amounts more to a statement of dislike and disapproval of homosexuals, rather than a
tool to further any substantial public interest. Respondents blanket justifications give
rise to the inevitable conclusion that the COMELEC targets homosexuals themselves as a
class, not because of any particular morally reprehensible act. It is this selective
targeting that implicates our equal protection clause.


Equal Protection

Despite the absolutism of Article III, Section 1 of our Constitution, which
provides nor shall any person be denied equal protection of the laws, courts have never
interpreted the provision as an absolute prohibition on classification. Equality, said
Aristotle, consists in the same treatment of similar persons.[33] The equal protection
clause guarantees that no person or class of persons shall be deprived of the same
protection of laws which is enjoyed by other persons or other classes in the same place
and in like circumstances.[34]

Recent jurisprudence has affirmed that if a law neither burdens a fundamental
right nor targets a suspect class, we will uphold the classification as long as it bears a
rational relationship to some legitimate government end.[35] In Central Bank
Employees Association, Inc. v. Banko Sentral ng Pilipinas,[36] we declared that [i]n our
jurisdiction, the standard of analysis of equal protection challenges x x x have followed
the rational basis test, coupled with a deferential attitude to legislative classifications
and a reluctance to invalidate a law unless there is a showing of a clear and unequivocal
breach of the Constitution.[37]

The COMELEC posits that the majority of the Philippine population considers
homosexual conduct as immoral and unacceptable, and this constitutes sufficient reason
to disqualify the petitioner. Unfortunately for the respondent, the Philippine electorate
has expressed no such belief. No law exists to criminalize homosexual behavior or
expressions or parties about homosexual behavior. Indeed, even if we were to assume
that public opinion is as the COMELEC describes it, the asserted state interest here that
is, moral disapproval of an unpopular minority is not a legitimate state interest that is
sufficient to satisfy rational basis review under the equal protection clause. The
COMELECs differentiation, and its unsubstantiated claim that Ang Ladlad cannot
contribute to the formulation of legislation that would benefit the nation, furthers no
legitimate state interest other than disapproval of or dislike for a disfavored group.

From the standpoint of the political process, the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and
transgender have the same interest in participating in the party-list system on the same
basis as other political parties similarly situated. State intrusion in this case is equally
burdensome. Hence, laws of general application should apply with equal force to LGBTs,
and they deserve to participate in the party-list system on the same basis as other
marginalized and under-represented sectors.

It bears stressing that our finding that COMELECs act of differentiating LGBTs
from heterosexuals insofar as the party-list system is concerned does not imply that any
other law distinguishing between heterosexuals and homosexuals under different
circumstances would similarly fail. We disagree with the OSGs position that
homosexuals are a class in themselves for the purposes of the equal protection
clause.[38] We are not prepared to single out homosexuals as a separate class meriting
special or differentiated treatment. We have not received sufficient evidence to this
effect, and it is simply unnecessary to make such a ruling today. Petitioner itself has
merely demanded that it be recognized under the same basis as all other groups
similarly situated, and that the COMELEC made an unwarranted and impermissible
classification not justified by the circumstances of the case.

Freedom of Expression and
Association

Under our system of laws, every group has the right to promote its agenda and
attempt to persuade society of the validity of its position through normal democratic
means.[39] It is in the public square that deeply held convictions and differing opinions
should be distilled and deliberated upon. As we held in Estrada v. Escritor:[40]

In a democracy, this common agreement on political and
moral ideas is distilled in the public square. Where citizens are free,
every opinion, every prejudice, every aspiration, and every moral
discernment has access to the public square where people deliberate
the order of their life together. Citizens are the bearers of opinion,
including opinion shaped by, or espousing religious belief, and these
citizens have equal access to the public square. In this representative
democracy, the state is prohibited from determining which
convictions and moral judgments may be proposed for public
deliberation. Through a constitutionally designed process, the people
deliberate and decide. Majority rule is a necessary principle in this
democratic governance. Thus, when public deliberation on moral
judgments is finally crystallized into law, the laws will largely reflect
the beliefs and preferences of the majority, i.e., the mainstream or
median groups. Nevertheless, in the very act of adopting and
accepting a constitution and the limits it specifies including
protection of religious freedom "not only for a minority, however
small not only for a majority, however large but for each of us"
the majority imposes upon itself a self-denying ordinance. It promises
not to do what it otherwise could do: to ride roughshod over the
dissenting minorities.


Freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of a
democratic society, and this freedom applies not only to those that are favorably
received but also to those that offend, shock, or disturb. Any restriction imposed in this
sphere must be proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. Absent any compelling
state interest, it is not for the COMELEC or this Court to impose its views on the
populace. Otherwise stated, the COMELEC is certainly not free to interfere with speech
for no better reason than promoting an approved message or discouraging a disfavored
one.

This position gains even more force if one considers that homosexual conduct is
not illegal in this country. It follows that both expressions concerning ones
homosexuality and the activity of forming a political association that supports LGBT
individuals are protected as well.
Other jurisdictions have gone so far as to categorically rule that even
overwhelming public perception that homosexual conduct violates public morality does
not justify criminalizing same-sex conduct.[41] European and United Nations judicial
decisions have ruled in favor of gay rights claimants on both privacy and equality
grounds, citing general privacy and equal protection provisions in foreign and
international texts.[42] To the extent that there is much to learn from other jurisdictions
that have reflected on the issues we face here, such jurisprudence is certainly
illuminating. These foreign authorities, while not formally binding on Philippine courts,
may nevertheless have persuasive influence on the Courts analysis.

In the area of freedom of expression, for instance, United States courts have
ruled that existing free speech doctrines protect gay and lesbian rights to expressive
conduct. In order to justify the prohibition of a particular expression of opinion, public
institutions must show that their actions were caused by something more than a mere
desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular
viewpoint.[43]

With respect to freedom of association for the advancement of ideas and
beliefs, in Europe, with its vibrant human rights tradition, the European Court of Human
Rights (ECHR) has repeatedly stated that a political party may campaign for a change in
the law or the constitutional structures of a state if it uses legal and democratic means
and the changes it proposes are consistent with democratic principles. The ECHR has
emphasized that political ideas that challenge the existing order and whose realization is
advocated by peaceful means must be afforded a proper opportunity of expression
through the exercise of the right of association, even if such ideas may seem shocking or
unacceptable to the authorities or the majority of the population.[44] A political group
should not be hindered solely because it seeks to publicly debate controversial political
issues in order to find solutions capable of satisfying everyone concerned.[45] Only if a
political party incites violence or puts forward policies that are incompatible with
democracy does it fall outside the protection of the freedom of association
guarantee.[46]

We do not doubt that a number of our citizens may believe that homosexual
conduct is distasteful, offensive, or even defiant. They are entitled to hold and express
that view. On the other hand, LGBTs and their supporters, in all likelihood, believe with
equal fervor that relationships between individuals of the same sex are morally
equivalent to heterosexual relationships. They, too, are entitled to hold and express that
view. However, as far as this Court is concerned, our democracy precludes using the
religious or moral views of one part of the community to exclude from consideration the
values of other members of the community.

Of course, none of this suggests the impending arrival of a golden age for gay rights
litigants. It well may be that this Decision will only serve to highlight the discrepancy
between the rigid constitutional analysis of this Court and the more complex moral
sentiments of Filipinos.We do not suggest that public opinion, even at its most liberal,
reflect a clear-cut strong consensus favorable to gay rights claims and we neither
attempt nor expect to affect individual perceptions of homosexuality through this
Decision.

The OSG argues that since there has been neither prior restraint nor subsequent
punishment imposed on Ang Ladlad, and its members have not been deprived of their
right to voluntarily associate, then there has been no restriction on their freedom of
expression or association. The OSG argues that:

There was no utterance restricted, no publication censored,
or any assembly denied. [COMELEC] simply exercised its authority to
review and verify the qualifications of petitioner as a sectoral party
applying to participate in the party-list system. This lawful exercise of
duty cannot be said to be a transgression of Section 4, Article III of the
Constitution.

x x x x

A denial of the petition for registration x x x does not deprive
the members of the petitioner to freely take part in the conduct of
elections. Their right to vote will not be hampered by said denial. In
fact, the right to vote is a constitutionally-guaranteed right which
cannot be limited.

As to its right to be elected in a genuine periodic election,
petitioner contends that the denial of Ang Ladlads petition has the
clear and immediate effect of limiting, if not outrightly nullifying the
capacity of its members to fully and equally participate in public life
through engagement in the party list elections.

This argument is puerile. The holding of a public office is not
a right but a privilege subject to limitations imposed by law. x x x[47]
The OSG fails to recall that petitioner has, in fact, established its qualifications
to participate in the party-list system, and as advanced by the OSG itself the moral
objection offered by the COMELEC was not a limitation imposed by law. To the extent,
therefore, that the petitioner has been precluded, because of COMELECs action, from
publicly expressing its views as a political party and participating on an equal basis in the
political process with other equally-qualified party-list candidates, we find that there
has, indeed, been a transgression of petitioners fundamental rights.

Non-Discrimination and
International Law


In an age that has seen international law evolve geometrically in scope and
promise, international human rights law, in particular, has grown dynamically in its
attempt to bring about a more just and humane world order. For individuals and groups
struggling with inadequate structural and governmental support, international human
rights norms are particularly significant, and should be effectively enforced in domestic
legal systems so that such norms may become actual, rather than ideal, standards of
conduct.

Our Decision today is fully in accord with our international obligations to
protect and promote human rights. In particular, we explicitly recognize the principle of
non-discrimination as it relates to the right to electoral participation, enunciated in the
UDHR and the ICCPR.

The principle of non-discrimination is laid out in Article 26 of the ICCPR, as
follows:

Article 26

All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without
any discrimination to the equal protection of the law. In this respect,
the law shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons
equal and effective protection against discrimination on any ground
such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion,
national or social origin, property, birth or other status.


In this context, the principle of non-discrimination requires that laws of general
application relating to elections be applied equally to all persons, regardless of sexual
orientation. Although sexual orientation is not specifically enumerated as a status or
ratio for discrimination in Article 26 of the ICCPR, the ICCPR Human Rights Committee
has opined that the reference to sex in Article 26 should be construed to include
sexual orientation.[48] Additionally, a variety of United Nations bodies have declared
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation to be prohibited under various
international agreements.[49]

The UDHR provides:

Article 21.

(1) Everyone has the right to take part in the government of
his country, directly or through freely chosen representatives.

Likewise, the ICCPR states:

Article 25
Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity,
without any of the distinctions mentioned in article 2 and without
unreasonable restrictions:

(a) To take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or
through freely chosen representatives;

(b) To vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections
which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by
secret ballot, guaranteeing the free expression of the will of the
electors;

(c) To have access, on general terms of equality, to public
service in his country.


As stated by the CHR in its Comment-in-Intervention, the scope of the right to
electoral participation is elaborated by the Human Rights Committee in its General
Comment No. 25 (Participation in Public Affairs and the Right to Vote) as follows:

1. Article 25 of the Covenant recognizes and protects the
right of every citizen to take part in the conduct of public affairs, the
right to vote and to be elected and the right to have access to public
service. Whatever form of constitution or government is in force, the
Covenant requires States to adopt such legislative and other measures
as may be necessary to ensure that citizens have an effective
opportunity to enjoy the rights it protects. Article 25 lies at the core of
democratic government based on the consent of the people and in
conformity with the principles of the Covenant.

x x x x

15. The effective implementation of the right and the
opportunity to stand for elective office ensures that persons entitled
to vote have a free choice of candidates. Any restrictions on the right
to stand for election, such as minimum age, must be justifiable on
objective and reasonable criteria. Persons who are otherwise eligible
to stand for election should not be excluded by unreasonable or
discriminatory requirements such as education, residence or descent,
or by reason of political affiliation. No person should suffer
discrimination or disadvantage of any kind because of that person's
candidacy. States parties should indicate and explain the legislative
provisions which exclude any group or category of persons from
elective office.[50]

We stress, however, that although this Court stands willing to assume the
responsibility of giving effect to the Philippines international law obligations, the
blanket invocation of international law is not the panacea for all social ills. We refer now
to the petitioners invocation of theYogyakarta Principles (the Application of
International Human Rights Law In Relation to Sexual Orientation and Gender
Identity),[51] which petitioner declares to reflect binding principles of international law.

At this time, we are not prepared to declare that these Yogyakarta
Principles contain norms that are obligatory on the Philippines. There are declarations
and obligations outlined in said Principles which are not reflective of the current state of
international law, and do not find basis in any of the sources of international law
enumerated under Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of
Justice.[52] Petitioner has not undertaken any objective and rigorous analysis of these
alleged principles of international law to ascertain their true status.

We also hasten to add that not everything that society or a certain segment of
society wants or demands is automatically a human right. This is not an arbitrary
human intervention that may be added to or subtracted from at will. It is unfortunate
that much of what passes for human rights today is a much broader context of needs that
identifies many social desires as rights in order to further claims that international law
obliges states to sanction these innovations. This has the effect of diluting real human
rights, and is a result of the notion that if wants are couched in rights language, then
they are no longer controversial.

Using even the most liberal of lenses, these Yogyakarta Principles, consisting of
a declaration formulated by various international law professors, are at best de lege
ferenda and do not constitute binding obligations on the Philippines. Indeed, so much
of contemporary international law is characterized by the soft law nomenclature, i.e.,
international law is full of principles that promote international cooperation, harmony,
and respect for human rights, most of which amount to no more than well-meaning
desires, without the support of either State practice or opinio juris.[53]

As a final note, we cannot help but observe that the social issues presented by
this case are emotionally charged, societal attitudes are in flux, even the psychiatric and
religious communities are divided in opinion. This Courts role is not to impose its own
view of acceptable behavior. Rather, it is to apply the Constitution and laws as best as it
can, uninfluenced by public opinion, and confident in the knowledge that our democracy
is resilient enough to withstand vigorous debate.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED. The Resolutions of the Commission
on Elections dated November 11, 2009 andDecember 16, 2009 in SPP No. 09-228 (PL)
are hereby SET ASIDE. The Commission on Elections is directed to GRANT petitioners
application for party-list accreditation.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 136781. October 6, 2000]

VETERANS FEDERATION PARTY, ALYANSANG BAYANIHAN NG MGA MAGSASAKA,
MANGGAGAWANG BUKID AT MANGINGISDA, ADHIKAIN AT KILUSAN NG
ORDINARYONG TAO PARA SA LUPA, PABAHAY AT KAUNLARAN, and
LUZON FARMERS PARTY, petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
PAG-ASA, SENIOR CITIZENS, AKAP AKSYON, PINATUBO, NUPA, PRP, AMIN,
PAG-ASA, MAHARLIKA, OCW-UNIFIL, PCCI, AMMA-KATIPUNAN, KAMPIL,
BANTAY-BAYAN, AFW, ANG LAKAS OCW, WOMEN-POWER, INC., FEJODAP,
CUP, VETERANS CARE, 4L, AWATU, PMP, ATUCP, NCWP, ALU, BIGAS,
COPRA, GREEN, ANAKBAYAN, ARBA, MINFA, AYOS, ALL COOP, PDP-LABAN,
KATIPUNAN, ONEWAY PRINT, AABANTE KA PILIPINAS -- All Being Party-
List Parties/Organizations -- and Hon. MANUEL B. VILLAR, JR. in His
Capacity as Speaker of the House of Representatives, respondents.

[G.R. No. 136786. October 6, 2000]

AKBAYAN! (CITIZENS' ACTION PARTY), ADHIKAIN AT KILUSAN NG ORDINARYONG
TAO PARA SA LUPA, PABAHAY AT KAUNLARAN (AKO), and ASSOCIATION
OF PHILIPPINE ELECTRIC COOPERATIVES (APEC), petitioners,
vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (COMELEC), HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES represented by Speaker Manuel B. Villar, PAG-ASA,
SENIOR CITIZENS, AKAP, AKSYON, PINATUBO, NUPA, PRP, AMIN,
MAHARLIKA, OCW, UNIFIL, PCCI, AMMA-KATIPUNAN, KAMPIL, BANTAY-
BAYAN, AFW, ANG LAKAS OCW, WOMENPOWER INC., FEJODAP, CUP,
VETERANS CARE, FOUR "L", AWATU, PMP, ATUCP, NCWP, ALU, BIGAS,
COPRA, GREEN, ANAK-BAYAN, ARBA, MINFA, AYOS, ALL COOP, PDP-
LABAN, KATIPUNAN, ONEWAY PRINT, AABANTE KA
PILIPINAS, respondents.

[G.R. No. 136795. October 6, 2000]

ALAGAD (PARTIDO NG MARALITANG-LUNGSOD), NATIONAL CONFEDERATION OF
SMALL COCONUT FARMERS' ORGANIZATIONS (NCSFCO), and LUZON
FARMERS' PARTY (BUTIL), petitioners, vs.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
SENIOR CITIZENS, AKAP, AKSYON, PINATUBO, NUPA, PRP, AMIN, PAG-ASA,
MAHARLIKA, OCW, UNIFIL, PCCI, AMMA-KATIPUNAN, KAMPIL, BANTAY-
BAYAN, AFW, ANG LAKAS OCW, WOMENPOWER INC., FEJODAP, CUP,
VETERANS CARE, 4L, AWATU, PMP, ATUCP, NCWP, ALU, BIGAS, COPRA,
GREEN, ANAK-BAYAN, ARBA, MINFA, AYOS, ALL COOP, PDP-LABAN,
KATIPUNAN, ONEWAY PRINT, and AABANTE KA PILIPINAS, respondents.

D E C I S I O N
PANGANIBAN, J.:
*

Prologue
To determine the winners in a Philippine-style party-list election, the Constitution
and Republic Act (RA) No. 7941 mandate at least four inviolable parameters. These are:
First, the twenty percent allocation - the combined number of all party-list
congressmen shall not exceed twenty percent of the total membership of the House of
Representatives, including those elected under the party list.
Second, the two percent threshold - only those parties garnering a minimum of
two percent of the total valid votes cast for the party-list system are qualified to have a
seat in the House of Representatives;
Third, the three-seat limit - each qualified party, regardless of the number of votes
it actually obtained, is entitled to a maximum of three seats; that is, one qualifying and
two additional seats.
Fourth, proportional representation - the additional seats which a qualified party
is entitled to shall be computed in proportion to their total number of votes.
Because the Comelec violated these legal parameters, the assailed Resolutions must
be struck down for having been issued in grave abuse of discretion. The poll body is
mandated to enforce and administer election-related laws. It has no power to contravene
or amend them.Neither does it have authority to decide the wisdom, propriety or
rationality of the acts of Congress.
Its bounden duty is to craft rules, regulations, methods and formulas to implement
election laws -- not to reject, ignore, defeat, obstruct or circumvent them.
In fine, the constitutional introduction of the party-list system - a normal feature of
parliamentary democracies - into our presidential form of government, modified by
unique Filipino statutory parameters, presents new paradigms and novel questions,
which demand innovative legal solutions convertible into mathematical formulations
which are, in turn, anchored on time-tested jurisprudence.

The Case

Before the Court are three consolidated Petitions for Certiorari (with applications
for the issuance of a temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction)
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, assailing (1) the October 15, 1998 Resolution
[1]
of
the Commission on Elections (Comelec), Second Division, in Election Matter 98-
065;
[2]
and (2) the January 7, 1999 Resolution
[3]
of the Comelec en banc, affirming the
said disposition. The assailed Resolutions ordered the proclamation of thirty-eight (38)
additional party-list representatives "to complete the full complement of 52 seats in the
House of Representatives as provided under Section 5, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution and R.A. 7941.

The Facts and the Antecedents

Our 1987 Constitution introduced a novel feature into our presidential system of
government -- the party-list method of representation. Under this system, any national,
regional or sectoral party or organization registered with the Commission on Elections
may participate in the election of party-list representatives who, upon their election and
proclamation, shall sit in the House of Representatives as regular members.
[4]
In effect, a
voter is given two (2) votes for the House -- one for a district congressman and another
for a party-list representative.
[5]

Specifically, this system of representation is mandated by Section 5, Article VI of
the Constitution, which provides:
Sec. 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two
hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from
legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila
area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a
uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected by a
party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.
(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number
of representatives including those under the party-list. For three consecutive terms after
the ratification of this Constitution, one half of the seats allocated to party-list
representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor,
peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other
sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector.
Complying with its constitutional duty to provide by law the selection or election
of party-list representatives, Congress enacted RA 7941 on March 3, 1995. Under this
statutes policy declaration, the State shall "promote proportional representation in the
election of representatives to the House of Representatives through a party-list system of
registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof,
which will enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented
sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies but
who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that
will benefit the nation as a whole, to become members of the House of
Representatives. Towards this end, the State shall develop and guarantee a full, free and
open party system in order to attain the broadest possible representation of party,
sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives by enhancing their chances to
compete for and win seats in the legislature, and shall provide the simplest scheme
possible. (italics ours.)
The requirements for entitlement to a party-list seat in the House are prescribed by
this law (RA 7941) in this wise:
Sec. 11. Number of Party-List Representatives. -- The party-list representatives shall
constitute twenty per centum (20%) of the total number of the members of the House of
Representatives including those under the party-list.
For purposes of the May 1998 elections, the first five (5) major political parties on the
basis of party representation in the House of Representatives at the start of the Tenth
Congress of the Philippines shall not be entitled to participate in the party-list system.
In determining the allocation of seats for the second vote, the following procedure shall
be observed:
(a) The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the
lowest based on the number of votes they garnered during the elections.
(b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the
total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one seat each; Provided, That
those garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional
seats in proportion to their total number of votes; Provided, finally, That each party,
organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.
Pursuant to Section 18 of RA 7941, the Comelec en banc promulgated Resolution
No. 2847, prescribing the rules and regulations governing the election of party-list
representatives through the party-list system.

Election of the Fourteen Party-List Representatives

On May 11, 1998, the first election for party-list representation was held
simultaneously with the national elections. A total of one hundred twenty-three (123)
parties, organizations and coalitions participated. On June 26, 1998, the Comelec en banc
proclaimed thirteen (13) party-list representatives from twelve (12) parties and
organizations, which had obtained at least two percent of the total number of votes cast
for the party-list system. Two of the proclaimed representatives belonged to Petitioner
APEC, which obtained 5.5 percent of the votes. The proclaimed winners and the votes
cast in their favor were as follows:
[6]

Party/Organization/ Number of Percentage of Nominees
Coalition Votes Obtained Total Votes
1. APEC 503,487 5.5% Rene M. Silos
Melvyn D. Eballe
2. ABA 321,646 3.51% Leonardo Q. Montemayor
3. ALAGAD 312,500 3.41% Diogenes S. Osabel
4. VETERANS 304,802 3.33% Eduardo P. Pilapil
FEDERATION
5. PROMDI 255,184 2.79% Joy A.G. Young
6. AKO 239,042 2.61% Ariel A. Zartiga
7. NCSCFO 238,303 2.60% Gorgonio P. Unde
8. ABANSE! PINAY 235,548 2.57% Patricia M. Sarenas
9. AKBAYAN 232,376 2.54% Loreta Ann P. Rosales
10. BUTIL 215,643 2.36% Benjamin A. Cruz
11. SANLAKAS 194,617 2.13% Renato B. Magtubo
12. COOP-NATCCO 189,802 2.07% Cresente C. Paez
After passing upon the results of the special elections held on July 4, 18, and 25,
1998, the Comelec en banc further determined that COCOFED (Philippine Coconut
Planters Federation, Inc.) was entitled to one party-list seat for having garnered 186,388
votes, which were equivalent to 2.04 percent of the total votes cast for the party-list
system. Thus, its first nominee, Emerito S. Calderon, was proclaimed on September 8,
1998 as the 14th party-list representative.
[7]

On July 6, 1998, PAG-ASA (Peoples Progressive Alliance for Peace and Good
Government Towards Alleviation of Poverty and Social Advancement) filed with the
Comelec a "Petition to Proclaim [the] Full Number of Party-List Representatives
provided by the Constitution." It alleged that the filling up of the twenty percent
membership of party-list representatives in the House of Representatives, as provided
under the Constitution, was mandatory. It further claimed that the literal application of
the two percent vote requirement and the three-seat limit under RA 7941 would defeat
this constitutional provision, for only 25 nominees would be declared winners, short of
the 52 party-list representatives who should actually sit in the House.
Thereafter, nine other party-list organizations
[8]
filed their respective Motions for
Intervention, seeking the same relief as that sought by PAG-ASA on substantially the
same grounds. Likewise, PAG-ASAs Petition was joined by other party-list organizations
in a Manifestation they filed on August 28, 1998. These organizations were COCOFED,
Senior Citizens, AKAP, AKSYON, PINATUBO, NUPA, PRP, AMIN, PCCI, AMMA-
KATIPUNAN, OCW-UNIFIL, KAMPIL, MAHARLIKA, AFW, Women Power, Inc., Ang Lakas
OCW, FEJODAP, CUP, Veterans Care, Bantay Bayan, 4L, AWATU, PMP, ATUCP, ALU and
BIGAS.
On October 15, 1998, the Comelec Second Division promulgated the present
assailed Resolution granting PAG-ASA's Petition. It also ordered the proclamation of
herein 38 respondents who, in addition to the 14 already sitting, would thus total 52
party-list representatives. It held that "at all times, the total number of
congressional
[9]
seats must be filled up by eighty (80%) percent district representatives
and twenty (20%) percent party-list representatives." In allocating the 52 seats, it
disregarded the two percent-vote requirement prescribed under Section 11 (b) of RA
7941. Instead, it identified three "elements of the party-list system," which should
supposedly determine "how the 52 seats should be filled up." First, "the system was
conceived to enable the marginalized sectors of the Philippine society to be represented
in the House of Representatives." Second, "the system should represent the broadest
sectors of the Philippine society." Third, "it should encourage [the] multi-party system.
(Boldface in the original.) Considering these elements, but ignoring the two percent
threshold requirement of RA 7941, itconcluded that "the party-list groups ranked Nos. 1
to 51 x x x should have at least one representative. It thus disposed as follows:
"WHEREFORE, by virtue of the powers vested in it by the Constitution, the Omnibus
Election Code (B.P. 881), Republic Act No. 7941 and other election laws, the Commission
(Second Division) hereby resolves to GRANT the instant petition and motions for
intervention, to include those similarly situated.
ACCORDINGLY, the nominees from the party-list hereinbelow enumerated based on the
list of names submitted by their respective parties, organizations and coalitions are
PROCLAIMED as party-list representatives, to wit:
1. SENIOR CITIZENS
2. AKAP
3. AKSYON
4. PINATUBO
5. NUPA
6. PRP
7. AMIN
8. PAG-ASA
9. MAHARLIKA
10. OCW-UNIFIL
11. FCL
12. AMMA-KATIPUNAN
13. KAMPIL
14. BANTAY BAYAN
15. AFW
16. ANG LAKAS OCW
17. WOMENPOWER, INC.
18. FEJODAP
19. CUP
20. VETERANS CARE
21. 4L
22. AWATU
23. PMP
24. ATUCP
25. NCWP
26. ALU
27. BIGAS
28. COPRA
29. GREEN
30. ANAKBAYAN
31. ARBA
32. MINFA
33. AYOS
34. ALL COOP
35. PDP-LABAN
36. KATIPUNAN
37. ONEWAY PRINT
38. AABANTE KA PILIPINAS
to complete the full complement of 52 seats in the House of Representatives as provided
in Section 5, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and R.A. 7941.
The foregoing disposition sums up a glaring bit of inconsistency and flip-
flopping. In its Resolution No. 2847 dated June 25, 1996, the Comelec en banc had
unanimously promulgated a set of Rules and Regulations Governing the Election of x x x
Party-List Representatives Through the Party-List System. Under these Rules and
Regulations, one additional seat shall be given for every two percent of the vote, a
formula the Comelec illustrated in its Annex A. It apparently relied on this method
when it proclaimed the 14 incumbent party-list solons (two for APEC and one each for
the 12 other qualified parties). However, for inexplicable reasons, it abandoned said
unanimous Resolution and proclaimed, based on its three elements, the Group of 38
private respondents.
[10]

The twelve (12) parties and organizations, which had earlier been proclaimed
winners on the basis of having obtained at least two percent of the votes cast for the
party-list system, objected to the proclamation of the 38 parties and filed separate
Motions for Reconsideration. They contended that (1) under Section 11 (b) of RA 7941,
only parties, organizations or coalitions garnering at least two percent of the votes for
the party-list system were entitled to seats in the House of Representatives; and (2)
additional seats, not exceeding two for each, should be allocated to those which had
garnered the two percent threshold in proportion to the number of votes cast for the
winning parties, as provided by said Section 11.

Ruling of the Comelec En Banc

Noting that all the parties -- movants and oppositors alike - had agreed that the
twenty percent membership of party-list representatives in the House "should be filled
up, the Comelec en banc resolved only the issue concerning the apportionment or
allocation of the remaining seats.In other words, the issue was: Should the remaining 38
unfilled seats allocated to party-list solons be given (1) to the thirteen qualified parties
that had each garnered at least two percent of the total votes, or (2) to the Group of 38 -
herein private respondents - even if they had not passed the two percent threshold?
The poll body held that to allocate the remaining seats only to those who had
hurdled the two percent vote requirement "will mean the concentration of
representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives to
thirteen organizations representing two political parties, three coalitions and four
sectors: urban poor, veterans, women and peasantry x x x. Such strict application of the
2% 'threshold' does not serve the essence and object of the Constitution and the
legislature -- to develop and guarantee a full, free and open party system in order to
attain the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the
House of Representatives x x x. Additionally, it "will also prevent this Commission from
complying with the constitutional and statutory decrees for party-list representatives to
compose 20% of the House of Representatives.
Thus, in its Resolution dated January 7, 1999, the Comelec en banc, by a razor-thin
majority -- with three commissioners concurring
[11]
and two members
[12]
dissenting --
affirmed the Resolution of its Second Division. It, however, held in abeyance the
proclamation of the 51
st
party (AABANTE KA PILIPINAS), "pending the resolution of
petitions for correction of manifest errors.
Without expressly declaring as unconstitutional or void the two percent vote
requirement imposed by RA 7941, the Commission blithely rejected and circumvented
its application, holding that there were more important considerations than this
statutory threshold.
Consequently, several petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, with
prayers for the issuance of temporary restraining orders or writs of preliminary
injunction, were filed before this Court by the parties and organizations that had
obtained at least two per cent of the total votes cast for the party-list system.
[13]
In the
suits, made respondents together with the Comelec were the 38 parties, organizations
and coalitions that had been declared by the poll body as likewise entitled to party-list
seats in the House of Representatives. Collectively, petitioners sought the proclamation
of additional representatives from each of their parties and organizations, all of which
had obtained at least two percent of the total votes cast for the party-list system.
On January 12, 1999, this Court issued a Status Quo Order directing the Comelec to
CEASE and DESIST from constituting itself as a National Board of Canvassers on 13
January 1999 or on any other date and proclaiming as winners the nominees of the
parties, organizations and coalitions enumerated in the dispositive portions of its 15
October 1998 Resolution or its 7 January 1999 Resolution, until further orders from this
Court.
On July 1, 1999, oral arguments were heard from the parties. Atty. Jeremias U.
Montemayor appeared for petitioners in GR No. 136781; Atty. Gregorio A. Andolana, for
petitioners in GR No. 136786; Atty. Rodante D. Marcoleta for petitioners in GR No.
136795; Attys. Ricardo Blancaflor and Pete Quirino Quadra, for all the private
respondents; Atty. Porfirio V. Sison for Intervenor NACUSIP; and Atty. Jose P. Balbuena
for Respondent Comelec. Upon invitation of the Court, retired Comelec Commissioner
Regalado E. Maambong acted as amicus curiae.Solicitor General Ricardo P. Galvez
appeared, not for any party but also as a friend of the Court.
Thereafter, the parties and the amici curiae were required to submit their
respective Memoranda in amplification of their verbal arguments.
[14]


The Issues

The Court believes, and so holds, that the main question of how to determine the
winners of the subject party-list election can be fully settled by addressing the following
issues:
1. Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives mentioned in Section 5
(2), Article VI of the Constitution, mandatory or is it merely a ceiling? In other words,
should the twenty percent allocation for party-list solons be filled up completely and all
the time?
2. Are the two percent threshold requirement and the three-seat limit provided in
Section 11 (b) of RA 7941 constitutional?
3. If the answer to Issue 2 is in the affirmative, how should the additional seats of a
qualified party be determined?

The Courts Ruling

The Petitions are partly meritorious. The Court agrees with petitioners that the
assailed Resolutions should be nullified, but disagrees that they should all be granted
additional seats.
First Issue: Whether the Twenty Percent Constitutional Allocation Is Mandatory
The pertinent provision
[15]
of the Constitution on the composition of the House of
Representatives reads as follows:
Sec. 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two
hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from
legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila
area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a
uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected by a
party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.
(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number
of representatives including those under the party-list. For three consecutive terms after
the ratification of this Constitution, one half of the seats allocated to party-list
representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor,
peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other
sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector.

Determination of the Total Number of Party-List Lawmakers

Clearly, the Constitution makes the number of district representatives the
determinant in arriving at the number of seats allocated for party-list lawmakers, who
shall comprise "twenty per centum of the total number of representatives including
those under the party-list." We thus translate this legal provision into a mathematical
formula, as follows:
No. of district representatives
---------------------------------- x .20 = No. of party-list
.80 representatives
This formulation
[16]
means that any increase in the number of district
representatives, as may be provided by law, will necessarily result in a corresponding
increase in the number of party-list seats. To illustrate, considering that there were 208
district representatives to be elected during the 1998 national elections, the number of
party-list seats would be 52, computed as follows:
208
-------- x .20 = 52
.80
The foregoing computation of seat allocation is easy enough to comprehend. The
problematic question, however, is this: Does the Constitution require all such allocated
seats to be filled up all the time and under all circumstances? Our short answer is No.
Twenty Percent Allocation a Mere Ceiling
The Constitution simply states that "[t]he party-list representatives shall constitute
twenty per centum of the total number of representatives including those under the
party-list.
According to petitioners, this percentage is a ceiling; the mechanics by which it is to
be filled up has been left to Congress. In the exercise of its prerogative, the legislature
enacted RA 7941, by which it prescribed that a party, organization or coalition
participating in the party-list election must obtain at least two percent of the total votes
cast for the system in order to qualify for a seat in the House of Representatives.
Petitioners further argue that the constitutional provision must be construed
together with this legislative requirement. If there is no sufficient number of
participating parties, organizations or coalitions which could hurdle the two percent vote
threshold and thereby fill up the twenty percent party-list allocation in the House, then
naturally such allocation cannot be filled up completely. The Comelec cannot be faulted
for the "incompleteness," for ultimately the voters themselves are the ones who, in the
exercise of their right of suffrage, determine who and how many should represent them.
On the other hand, Public Respondent Comelec, together with the respondent
parties, avers that the twenty percent allocation for party-list lawmakers is mandatory,
and that the two percent vote requirement in RA 7941 is unconstitutional, because its
strict application would make it mathematically impossible to fill up the House party-list
complement.
We rule that a simple reading of Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, easily
conveys the equally simple message that Congress was vested with the broad power to
define and prescribe the mechanics of the party-list system of representation. The
Constitution explicitly sets down only the percentage of the total membership in the
House of Representatives reserved for party-list representatives.
In the exercise of its constitutional prerogative, Congress enacted RA 7941. As said
earlier, Congress declared therein a policy to promote "proportional representation" in
the election of party-list representatives in order to enable Filipinos belonging to the
marginalized and underrepresented sectors to contribute legislation that would benefit
them. It however deemed it necessary to require parties, organizations and coalitions
participating in the system to obtain at least two percent of the total votes cast for the
party-list system in order to be entitled to a party-list seat. Those garnering more than
this percentage could have "additional seats in proportion to their total number of
votes. Furthermore, no winning party, organization or coalition can have more than
three seats in the House of Representatives. Thus the relevant portion of Section 11(b) of
the law provides:
(b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the
total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one seat each; Provided, That
those garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional
seats in proportion to their total number of votes; Provided, finally, That each party,
organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.
Considering the foregoing statutory requirements, it will be shown presently that
Section 5 (2), Article VI of the Constitution is not mandatory.It merely provides a ceiling
for party-list seats in Congress.
On the contention that a strict application of the two percent threshold may result
in a mathematical impossibility, suffice it to say that the prerogative to determine
whether to adjust or change this percentage requirement rests in Congress.
[17]
Our task
now, as should have been the Comelecs, is not to find fault in the wisdom of the law
through highly unlikely scenarios of clinical extremes, but to craft an innovative
mathematical formula that can, as far as practicable, implement it within the context of
the actual election process.
Indeed, the function of the Supreme Court, as well as of all judicial and quasi-
judicial agencies, is to apply the law as we find it, not to reinvent or second-guess
it. Unless declared unconstitutional, ineffective, insufficient or otherwise void by the
proper tribunal, a statute remains a valid command of sovereignty that must be
respected and obeyed at all times. This is the essence of the rule of law.

Second Issue: The Statutory Requirement and Limitation

The Two Percent Threshold

In imposing a two percent threshold, Congress wanted to ensure that only those
parties, organizations and coalitions having a sufficient number of constituents
deserving of representation are actually represented in Congress. This intent can be
gleaned from the deliberations on the proposed bill. We quote below a pertinent portion
of the Senate discussion:
SENATOR GONZALES: For purposes of continuity, I would want to follow up a point that
was raised by, I think, Senator Osmea when he said that a political party must have
obtained at least a minimum percentage to be provided in this law in order to qualify for
a seat under the party-list system.
They do that in many other countries. A party must obtain at least 2 percent of the votes
cast, 5 percent or 10 percent of the votes cast. Otherwise, as I have said, this will actually
proliferate political party groups and those who have not really been given by the people
sufficient basis for them to represent their constituents and, in turn, they will be able to
get to the Parliament through the backdoor under the name of the party-list system, Mr.
President."
[18]

A similar intent is clear from the statements of the bill sponsor in the House of
Representatives, as the following shows:
MR. ESPINOSA. There is a mathematical formula which this computation is based at,
arriving at a five percent ratio which would distribute equitably the number of seats
among the different sectors. There is a mathematical formula which is, I think, patterned
after that of the party list of the other parliaments or congresses, more particularly the
Bundestag of Germany.
[19]

Moreover, even the framers of our Constitution had in mind a minimum-vote
requirement, the specification of which they left to Congress to properly
determine. Constitutional Commissioner Christian S. Monsod explained:
MR. MONSOD. x x x We are amenable to modifications in the minimum percentage of
votes. Our proposal is that anybody who has two-and-a-half percent of the votes gets a
seat. There are about 20 million who cast their votes in the last elections. Two-and-a-half
percent would mean 500,000 votes. Anybody who has a constituency of 500,000 votes
nationwide deserves a seat in the Assembly. If we bring that down to two percent, we are
talking about 400,000 votes. The average vote per family is three. So, here we are talking
about 134,000 families. We believe that there are many sectors who will be able to get
seats in the Assembly because many of them have memberships of over 10,000. In effect,
that is the operational implication of our proposal. What we are trying to avoid is this
selection of sectors, the reserve seat system. We believe that it is our job to open up the
system and that we should not have within that system a reserve seat. We think that
people should organize, should work hard, and should earn their seats within that
system.
[20]

The two percent threshold is consistent not only with the intent of the framers of
the Constitution and the law, but with the very essence of "representation." Under a
republican or representative state, all government authority emanates from the people,
but is exercised by representatives chosen by them.
[21]
But to have meaningful
representation, the elected persons must have the mandate of a sufficient number of
people. Otherwise, in a legislature that features the party-list system, the result might be
the proliferation of small groups which are incapable of contributing significant
legislation, and which might even pose a threat to the stability of Congress. Thus, even
legislative districts are apportioned according to "the number of their respective
inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio"
[22]
to ensure meaningful
local representation.
All in all, we hold that the statutory provision on this two percent requirement is
precise and crystalline. When the law is clear, the function of courts is simple application,
not interpretation or circumvention.
[23]


The Three-Seat-Per-Party Limit

An important consideration in adopting the party-list system is to promote and
encourage a multiparty system of representation. Again, we quote Commissioner
Monsod:
MR. MONSOD. Madam President, I just want to say that we suggested or proposed the
party list system because we wanted to open up the political system to a pluralistic
society through a multiparty system. But we also wanted to avoid the problems of
mechanics and operation in the implementation of a concept that has very serious
shortcomings of classification and of double or triple votes. We are for opening up the
system, and we would like very much for the sectors to be there. That is why one of the
ways to do that is to put a ceiling on the number of representatives from any single party
that can sit within the 50 allocated under the party list system. This way, we will open it
up and enable sectoral groups, or maybe regional groups, to earn their seats among the
fifty. x x x.
[24]

Consistent with the Constitutional Commission's pronouncements, Congress set the
seat-limit to three (3) for each qualified party, organization or coalition. "Qualified"
means having hurdled the two percent vote threshold. Such three-seat limit ensures the
entry of various interest-representations into the legislature; thus, no single group, no
matter how large its membership, would dominate the party-list seats, if not the entire
House.
We shall not belabor this point, because the validity of the three-seat limit is not
seriously challenged in these consolidated cases.
Third Issue: Method of Allocating Additional Seats
Having determined that the twenty percent seat allocation is merely a ceiling, and
having upheld the constitutionality of the two percent vote threshold and the three-seat
limit imposed under RA 7941, we now proceed to the method of determining how many
party-list seats the qualified parties, organizations and coalitions are entitled to. The
very first step - there is no dispute on this - is to rank all the participating parties,
organizations and coalitions (hereafter collectively referred to as "parties") according to
the votes they each obtained. The percentage of their respective votes as against the total
number of votes cast for the party-list system is then determined. All those that garnered
at least two percent of the total votes cast have an assured or guaranteed seat in the
House of Representatives. Thereafter, "those garnering more than two percent of the
votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of
votes." The problem is how to distribute additional seats "proportionally," bearing in
mind the three-seat limit further imposed by the law.

One Additional Seat Per Two Percent Increment

One proposed formula is to allocate one additional seat for every additional
proportion of the votes obtained equivalent to the two percent vote requirement for the
first seat.
[25]
Translated in figures, a party that wins at least six percent of the total votes
cast will be entitled to three seats; another party that gets four percent will be entitled to
two seats; and one that gets two percent will be entitled to one seat only. This proposal
has the advantage of simplicity and ease of comprehension. Problems arise, however,
when the parties get very lop-sided votes -- for example, when Party A receives 20
percent of the total votes cast; Party B, 10 percent; and Party C, 6 percent. Under the
method just described, Party A would be entitled to 10 seats; Party B, to 5 seats and
Party C, to 3 seats. Considering the three-seat limit imposed by law, all the parties will
each uniformly have three seats only. We would then have the spectacle of a party
garnering two or more times the number of votes obtained by another, yet getting the
same number of seats as the other one with the much lesser votes. In effect, proportional
representation will be contravened and the law rendered nugatory by this suggested
solution. Hence, the Court discarded it.

The Niemeyer Formula

Another suggestion that the Court considered was the Niemeyer formula, which
was developed by a German mathematician and adopted by Germany as its method of
distributing party-list seats in the Bundestag. Under this formula, the number of
additional seats to which a qualified party would be entitled is determined by
multiplying the remaining number of seats to be allocated by the total number of votes
obtained by that party and dividing the product by the total number of votes garnered by
all the qualified parties. The integer portion of the resulting product will be the number
of additional seats that the party concerned is entitled to. Thus:
No. of remaining seats
to be allocated No. of additional
--------------------------- x No. of votes of = seats of party
Total no. of votes of party concerned concerned
qualified parties (Integer.decimal)
The next step is to distribute the extra seats left among the qualified parties in the
descending order of the decimal portions of the resulting products. Based on the 1998
election results, the distribution of party-list seats under the Niemeyer method would be
as follows:
Party Number of Guaranteed Additional Extra Total
Votes Seats Seats Seats
1. APEC 503,487 1 5.73 1 7
2. ABA 321,646 1 3.66 1 5
3. ALAGAD 312,500 1 3.55 4
4. VETERANS 304,802 1 3.47 4
FEDERATION
5. PROMDI 255,184 1 2.90 1 4
6. AKO 239,042 1 2.72 1 4
7. NCSCFO 238,303 1 2.71 1 4
8. ABANSE! PINAY 235,548 1 2.68 1 4
9. AKBAYAN 232,376 1 2.64 1 4
10. BUTIL 215,643 1 2.45 3
11. SANLAKAS 194,617 1 2.21 3
12. COOP-NATCCO 189,802 1 2.16 3
13. COCOFED 186,388 1 2.12 3
Total 3,429,338 13 32 7 52
However, since Section 11 of RA 7941 sets a limit of three (3) seats for each party,
those obtaining more than the limit will have to give up their excess seats. Under our
present set of facts, the thirteen qualified parties will each be entitled to three seats,
resulting in an overall total of 39. Note that like the previous proposal, the Niemeyer
formula would violate the principle of "proportional representation," a basic tenet of our
party-list system.
The Niemeyer formula, while no doubt suitable for Germany, finds no application in
the Philippine setting, because of our three-seat limit and the non-mandatory character
of the twenty percent allocation. True, both our Congress and the Bundestag have
threshold requirements -- two percent for us and five for them. There are marked
differences between the two models, however. As ably pointed out by private
respondents,
[26]
one half of the German Parliament is filled up by party-list
members. More important, there are no seat limitations, because German law
discourages the proliferation of small parties. In contrast, RA 7941, as already
mentioned, imposes a three-seat limit to encourage the promotion of the multiparty
system. This major statutory difference makes the Niemeyer formula completely
inapplicable to the Philippines.
Just as one cannot grow Washington apples in the Philippines or Guimaras
mangoes in the Arctic because of fundamental environmental differences, neither can the
Niemeyer formula be transplanted in toto here because of essential variances between
the two party-list models.

The Legal and Logical Formula for the Philippines

It is now obvious that the Philippine style party-list system is a unique paradigm
which demands an equally unique formula. In crafting a legally defensible and logical
solution to determine the number of additional seats that a qualified party is entitled to,
we need to review the parameters of the Filipino party-list system.
As earlier mentioned in the Prologue, they are as follows:
First, the twenty percent allocation - the combined number of all party-list
congressmen shall not exceed twenty percent of the total membership of the House of
Representatives, including those elected under the party list.
Second, the two percent threshold - only those parties garnering a minimum of
two percent of the total valid votes cast for the party-list system are qualified to have a
seat in the House of Representatives;
Third, the three-seat limit - each qualified party, regardless of the number of votes
it actually obtained, is entitled to a maximum of three seats; that is, one qualifying and
two additional seats.
Fourth, proportional representation - the additional seats which a qualified party
is entitled to shall be computed in proportion to their total number of votes.
The problem, as already stated, is to find a way to translate proportional
representation into a mathematical formula that will not contravene, circumvent or
amend the above-mentioned parameters.
After careful deliberation, we now explain such formula, step by step.
Step One. There is no dispute among the petitioners, the public and the private
respondents, as well as the members of this Court, that the initial step is to rank all the
participating parties, organizations and coalitions from the highest to the lowest based
on the number of votes they each received. Then the ratio for each party is computed by
dividing its votes by the total votes cast for all the parties participating in the system.All
parties with at least two percent of the total votes are guaranteed one seat each. Only
these parties shall be considered in the computation ofadditional seats. The party
receiving the highest number of votes shall thenceforth be referred to as the first party.
Step Two. The next step is to determine the number of seats the first party is
entitled to, in order to be able to compute that for the other parties. Since the
distribution is based on proportional representation, the number of seats to be allotted
to the other parties cannot possibly exceed that to which the first party is entitled by
virtue of its obtaining the most number of votes.
For example, the first party received 1,000,000 votes and is determined to be
entitled to two additional seats. Another qualified party which received 500,000 votes
cannot be entitled to the same number of seats, since it garnered only fifty percent of the
votes won by the first party.Depending on the proportion of its votes relative to that of
the first party whose number of seats has already been predetermined, the second party
should be given less than that to which the first one is entitled.
The other qualified parties will always be allotted less additional seats than the
first party for two reasons: (1) the ratio between said parties and the first party will
always be less than 1:1, and (2) the formula does not admit of mathematical rounding off,
because there is no such thing as a fraction of a seat. Verily, an arbitrary rounding off
could result in a violation of the twenty percent allocation. An academic mathematical
demonstration of such incipient violation is not necessary because the present set of
facts, given the number of qualified parties and the voting percentages obtained, will
definitely not end up in such constitutional contravention.
The Court has previously ruled in Guingona Jr. v. Gonzales
[27]
that a fractional
membership cannot be converted into a whole membership of one when it would, in
effect, deprive another party's fractional membership. It would be a violation of the
constitutional mandate of proportional representation. We said further that "no party
can claim more than what it is entitled to x x x.
In any case, the decision on whether to round off the fractions is better left to the
legislature. Since Congress did not provide for it in the present law, neither will this
Court. The Supreme Court does not make the law; it merely applies it to a given set of
facts.

Formula for Determining Additional Seats for the First Party

Now, how do we determine the number of seats the first party is entitled to? The
only basis given by the law is that a party receiving at least two percent of the total votes
shall be entitled to one seat. Proportionally, if the first party were to receive twice the
number of votes of the second party, it should be entitled to twice the latter's number of
seats and so on. The formula, therefore, for computing the number of seats to which
thefirst party is entitled is as follows:
Number of votes
of first party Proportion of votes of
-------------------- = first party relative to
Total votes for total votes for party-list system
party-list system
If the proportion of votes received by the first party without rounding it off is equal
to at least six percent of the total valid votes cast for all the party list groups, then the
first party shall be entitled to two additional seats or a total of three seats overall. If the
proportion of votes without a rounding off is equal to or greater than four percent, but
less than six percent, then the first party shall have one additional or a total of two
seats.And if the proportion is less than four percent, then the first party shall not be
entitled to any additional seat.
We adopted this six percent bench mark, because the first party is not always
entitled to the maximum number of additional seats. Likewise, it would prevent the
allotment of more than the total number of available seats, such as in an extreme case
wherein 18 or more parties tie for the highest rank and are thus entitled to three seats
each. In such scenario, the number of seats to which all the parties are entitled may
exceed the maximum number of party-list seats reserved in the House of
Representatives.
Applying the above formula, APEC, which received 5.5% of the total votes cast, is
entitled to one additional seat or a total of two seats.
Note that the above formula will be applicable only in determining the number of
additional seats the first party is entitled to. It cannot be used to determine the number
of additional seats of the other qualified parties. As explained earlier, the use of the same
formula for all would contravene the proportional representation parameter. For
example, a second party obtains six percent of the total number of votes cast.According
to the above formula, the said party would be entitled to two additional seats or a total of
three seats overall. However, if the first party received a significantly higher amount of
votes -- say, twenty percent -- to grant it the same number of seats as the second party
would violate the statutory mandate of proportional representation, since a party getting
only six percent of the votes will have an equal number of representatives as the one
obtaining twenty percent. The proper solution, therefore, is to grant the first party a total
of three seats; and the party receiving six percent, additional seats in proportion to those
of the first party.

Formula for Additional Seats of Other Qualified Parties

Step Three The next step is to solve for the number of additional seats that the other
qualified parties are entitled to, based on proportional representation. The formula is
encompassed by the following complex fraction:
No. of votes of
concerned party
------------------
Total no. of votes
Additional seats for party-list system No. of additional
for concerned = ----------------------- x seats allocated to
party No. of votes of the first party
first party
------------------
Total no. of votes
for party list system
In simplified form, it is written as follows:
No. of votes of
Additional seats concerned party No. of additional
for concerned = ------------------ x seats allocated to
party No. of votes of the first party
first party
Thus, in the case of ABA, the additional number of seats it would be entitled to is
computed as follows:
No. of votes of
Additional seats ABA No. of additional
for concerned = -------------------- x seats allocated to
party (ABA) No. of votes of the first party
first party (APEC)
Substituting actual values would result in the following equation:
Additional seats 321,646
for concerned = ----------- x 1 = .64 or 0 additional seat, since
party (ABA) 503,487 rounding off is not to be applied
Applying the above formula, we find the outcome of the 1998 party-list election to
be as follows:
Organization Votes %age of Initial No. Additional Total
Garnered Total Votes of Seats Seats
1. APEC 503,487 5.50% 1 1 2
2. ABA 321,646 3.51% 1 321,646 / 503,487 * 1 = 0.64 1
3. ALAGAD 312,500 3.41% 1 312,500 / 503,487 * 1 = 0.62 1
4. VETERANS 304,802 3.33% 1 304,802 / 503,487 * 1 = 0.61 1
FEDERATION
5. PROMDI 255,184 2.79% 1 255,184 / 503,487 * 1 = 0.51 1
6. AKO 239,042 2.61% 1 239,042 / 503,487 * 1 = 0.47 1
7. NCSFO 238,303 2.60% 1 238,303 / 503,487 * 1 = 0.47 1
8. ABANSE! 235,548 2.57% 1 321,646 / 503,487 * 1 = 0.47 1
PINAY
9. AKBAYAN! 232,376 2.54% 1 232,376 / 503,487 * 1 = 0.46 1
10. BUTIL 215,643 2.36% 1 215,643 / 503,487 * 1 = 0.43 1
11. SANLAKAS 194,617 2.13% 1 194,617 / 503,487 * 1 = 0.39 1
12. COOP- 189,802 2.07% 1 189,802 / 503,487 * 1 = 0.38 1
NATCCO
13. COCOFED 186,388 2.04% 1 186,388 / 503,487 * 1 = 0.37 1
Incidentally, if the first party is not entitled to any additional seat, then the ratio of
the number of votes for the other party to that for the first one is multiplied by zero. The
end result would be zero additional seat for each of the other qualified parties as well.
The above formula does not give an exact mathematical representation of the
number of additional seats to be awarded since, in order to be entitled to one additional
seat, an exact whole number is necessary. In fact, most of the actual mathematical
proportions are not whole numbers and are not rounded off for the reasons explained
earlier. To repeat, rounding off may result in the awarding of a number of seats in excess
of that provided by the law. Furthermore, obtaining absolute proportional
representation is restricted by the three-seat-per-party limit to a maximum of
two additional slots. An increase in the maximum number of additional representatives a
party may be entitled to would result in a more accurate proportional
representation. But the law itself has set the limit: only two additional seats. Hence, we
need to work within such extant parameter.
The net result of the foregoing formula for determining additional seats happily
coincides with the present number of incumbents; namely, two for the first party (APEC)
and one each for the twelve other qualified parties. Hence, we affirm the legality of the
incumbencies of their nominees, albeit through the use of a different formula and
methodology.
In his Dissent, Justice Mendoza criticizes our methodology for being too strict. We
say, however, that our formula merely translated the Philippine legal parameters into a
mathematical equation, no more no less. If Congress in its wisdom decides to modify RA
7941 to make it less strict, then the formula will also be modified to reflect the changes
willed by the lawmakers.

Epilogue

In sum, we hold that the Comelec gravely abused its discretion in ruling that the
thirty-eight (38) herein respondent parties, organizations and coalitions are each
entitled to a party-list seat, because it glaringly violated two requirements of RA
7941: the two percent threshold and proportional representation.
In disregarding, rejecting and circumventing these statutory provisions, the
Comelec effectively arrogated unto itself what the Constitution expressly and wholly
vested in the legislature: the power and the discretion to define the mechanics for the
enforcement of the system. The wisdom and the propriety of these impositions, absent
any clear transgression of the Constitution or grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction, are beyond judicial review.
[28]

Indeed, the Comelec and the other parties in these cases - both petitioners and
respondents - have failed to demonstrate that our lawmakers gravely abused their
discretion in prescribing such requirements. By grave abuse of discretion is meant such
capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.
[29]

The Comelec, which is tasked merely to enforce and administer election-related
laws,
[30]
cannot simply disregard an act of Congress exercised within the bounds of its
authority. As a mere implementing body, it cannot judge the wisdom, propriety or
rationality of such act. Its recourse is to draft an amendment to the law and lobby for its
approval and enactment by the legislature.
Furthermore, a reading of the entire Constitution reveals no violation of any of its
provisions by the strict enforcement of RA 7941. It is basic that to strike down a law or
any of its provisions as unconstitutional, there must be a clear and unequivocal showing
that what the Constitution prohibits, the statute permits.
[31]

Neither can we grant petitioners prayer that they each be given additional seats
(for a total of three each), because granting such plea would plainly and simply violate
the proportional representation mandated by Section 11 (b) of RA 7941.
The low turnout of the party-list votes during the 1998 elections should not be
interpreted as a total failure of the law in fulfilling the object of this new system of
representation. It should not be deemed a conclusive indication that the requirements
imposed by RA 7941 wholly defeated the implementation of the system. Be it
remembered that the party-list system, though already popular in parliamentary
democracies, is still quite new in our presidential system. We should allow it some time
to take root in the consciousness of our people and in the heart of our tripartite form of
republicanism. Indeed, the Comelec and the defeated litigants should not despair.
Quite the contrary, the dismal result of the first election for party-list
representatives should serve as a challenge to our sectoral parties and organizations. It
should stir them to be more active and vigilant in their campaign for representation in
the State's lawmaking body. It should also serve as a clarion call for innovation and
creativity in adopting this novel system of popular democracy.
With adequate information dissemination to the public and more active sectoral
parties, we are confident our people will be more responsive to future party-list
elections. Armed with patience, perseverance and perspicacity, our marginalized sectors,
in time, will fulfill the Filipino dream of full representation in Congress under the aegis of
the party-list system, Philippine style.
WHEREFORE, the Petitions are hereby partially GRANTED. The assailed
Resolutions of the Comelec are SET ASIDE and NULLIFIED.The proclamations of the
fourteen (14) sitting party-list representatives - two for APEC and one each for the
remaining twelve (12) qualified parties - are AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 147589. June 26, 2001]

ANG BAGONG BAYANI-OFW LABOR PARTY (under the acronym OFW), represented
herein by its secretary-general, MOHAMMAD OMAR FAJARDO, petitioner,
vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; CITIZENS DRUG WATCH; MAMAMAYAN
AYAW SA DROGA; GO! GO! PHILIPPINES; THE TRUE MARCOS LOYALIST
ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES; PHILIPPINE LOCAL AUTONOMY;
CITIZENS MOVEMENT FOR JUSTICE, ECONOMY, ENVIRONMENT AND
PEACE; CHAMBER OF REAL ESTATE BUILDERS ASSOCIATION; SPORTS &
HEALTH ADVANCEMENT FOUNDATION, INC.; ANG LAKAS NG OVERSEAS
CONTRACT WORKERS (OCW); BAGONG BAYANI ORGANIZATION and
others under Organizations/Coalitions of Omnibus Resolution No. 3785;
PARTIDO NG MASANG PILIPINO; LAKAS NUCD-UMDP; NATIONALIST
PEOPLES COALITION; LABAN NG DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO; AKSYON
DEMOKRATIKO; PDP-LABAN; LIBERAL PARTY; NACIONALISTA PARTY;
ANG BUHAY HAYAANG YUMABONG; and others under Political Parties of
Omnibus Resolution No. 3785. respondents.

[G.R. No. 147613. June 26, 2001]

BAYAN MUNA, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; NATIONALIST PEOPLES
COALITION (NPC); LABAN NG DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO (LDP);
PARTIDO NG MASANG PILIPINO (PMP); LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP; LIBERAL
PARTY; MAMAMAYANG AYAW SA DROGA; CREBA; NATIONAL
FEDERATION OF SUGARCANE PLANTERS; JEEP; and BAGONG BAYANI
ORGANIZATION, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The party-list system is a social justice tool designed not only to give more law to
the great masses of our people who have less in life, but also to enable them to become
veritable lawmakers themselves, empowered to participate directly in the enactment of
laws designed to benefit them. It intends to make the marginalized and the
underrepresented not merely passive recipients of the States benevolence, but active
participants in the mainstream of representative democracy. Thus, allowing all
individuals and groups, including those which now dominate district elections, to have
the same opportunity to participate in party-list elections would desecrate this lofty
objective and mongrelize the social justice mechanism into an atrocious veneer for
traditional politics.

The Case

Before us are two Petitions under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, challenging
Omnibus Resolution No. 3785
[1]
issued by the Commission on Elections (Comelec) on
March 26, 2001. This Resolution approved the participation of 154 organizations and
parties, including those herein impleaded, in the 2001 party-list elections. Petitioners
seek the disqualification of private respondents, arguing mainly that the party-list
system was intended to benefit the marginalized and underrepresented; not the
mainstream political parties, the non-marginalized or overrepresented.

The Factual Antecedents

With the onset of the 2001 elections, the Comelec received several Petitions for
registration filed by sectoral parties, organizations and political parties. According to the
Comelec, [v]erifications were made as to the status and capacity of these parties and
organizations and hearings were scheduled day and night until the last party w[as]
heard. With the number of these petitions and the observance of the legal and
procedural requirements, review of these petitions as well as deliberations takes a
longer process in order to arrive at a decision and as a result the two (2) divisions
promulgated a separate Omnibus Resolution and individual resolution on political
parties. These numerous petitions and processes observed in the disposition of these
petition[s] hinder the early release of the Omnibus Resolutions of the Divisions which
were promulgated only on 10 February 2001.
[2]

Thereafter, before the February 12, 2001 deadline prescribed under Comelec
Resolution No. 3426 dated December 22, 2000, the registered parties and organizations
filed their respective Manifestations, stating their intention to participate in the party-list
elections. Other sectoral and political parties and organizations whose registrations
were denied also filed Motions for Reconsideration, together with Manifestations of their
intent to participate in the party-list elections. Still other registered parties filed their
Manifestations beyond the deadline.
The Comelec gave due course or approved the Manifestations (or accreditations) of
154 parties and organizations, but denied those of several others in its assailed March
26, 2001 Omnibus Resolution No. 3785, which we quote:
We carefully deliberated the foregoing matters, having in mind that this system of
proportional representation scheme will encourage multi-partisan [sic] and enhance the
inability of small, new or sectoral parties or organization to directly participate in this
electoral window.
It will be noted that as defined, the party-list system is a mechanism of proportional
representation in the election of representatives to the House of Representatives from
national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof registered
with the Commission on Elections.
However, in the course of our review of the matters at bar, we must recognize the fact
that there is a need to keep the number of sectoral parties, organizations and coalitions,
down to a manageable level, keeping only those who substantially comply with the rules
and regulations and more importantly the sufficiency of the Manifestations or evidence
on the Motions for Reconsiderations or Oppositions.
[3]

On April 10, 2001, Akbayan Citizens Action Party filed before the Comelec a
Petition praying that the names of [some of herein respondents] be deleted from the
Certified List of Political Parties/Sectoral Parties/Organizations/Coalitions Participating
in the Party List System for the May 14, 2001 Elections and that said certified list be
accordingly amended. It also asked, as an alternative, that the votes cast for the said
respondents not be counted or canvassed, and that the latters nominees not be
proclaimed.
[4]
On April 11, 2001, Bayan Muna and Bayan Muna-Youth also filed a Petition
for Cancellation of Registration and Nomination against some of herein respondents.
[5]

On April 18, 2001, the Comelec required the respondents in the two
disqualification cases to file Comments within three days from notice. It also set the date
for hearing on April 26, 2001,
[6]
but subsequently reset it to May 3, 2001.
[7]
During the
hearing, however, Commissioner Ralph C. Lantion merely directed the parties to submit
their respective memoranda.
[8]

Meanwhile, dissatisfied with the pace of the Comelec, Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW
Labor Party filed a Petition
[9]
before this Court on April 16, 2001. This Petition, docketed
as GR No. 147589, assailed Comelec Omnibus Resolution No. 3785. In its Resolution
dated April 17, 2001,
[10]
the Court directed respondents to comment on the Petition
within a non-extendible period of five days from notice.
[11]

On April 17, 2001, Petitioner Bayan Muna also filed before this Court a
Petition,
[12]
docketed as GR No. 147613, also challenging Comelec Omnibus Resolution
No. 3785. In its Resolution dated May 9, 2001,
[13]
the Court ordered the consolidation of
the two Petitions before it; directed respondents named in the second Petition to file
their respective Comments on or before noon of May 15, 2001; and called the parties to
an Oral Argument on May 17, 2001. It added that the Comelec may proceed with the
counting and canvassing of votes cast for the party-list elections, but barred the
proclamation of any winner therein, until further orders of the Court.
Thereafter, Comments
[14]
on the second Petition were received by the Court and, on
May 17, 2001, the Oral Argument was conducted as scheduled. In an Order given in open
court, the parties were directed to submit their respective Memoranda simultaneously
within a non-extendible period of five days.
[15]

Issues:
During the hearing on May 17, 2001, the Court directed the parties to address the
following issues:
1. Whether or not recourse under Rule 65 is proper under the premises. More
specifically, is there no other plain, speedy or adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law?
2. Whether or not political parties may participate in the party-list elections.
3. Whether or not the party-list system is exclusive to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors and organizations.
4. Whether or not the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in promulgating
Omnibus Resolution No. 3785.
[16]

The Courts Ruling
The Petitions are partly meritorious. These cases should be remanded to the
Comelec which will determine, after summary evidentiary hearings, whether the 154
parties and organizations enumerated in the assailed Omnibus Resolution satisfy the
requirements of the Constitution and RA 7941, as specified in this Decision.

First Issue:
Recourse Under Rule 65

Respondents contend that the recourse of both petitioners under Rule 65 is
improper because there are other plain, speedy and adequate remedies in the ordinary
course of law.
[17]
The Office of the Solicitor General argues that petitioners should have
filed before the Comelec a petition either for disqualification or for cancellation of
registration, pursuant to Sections 19, 20, 21 and 22 of Comelec Resolution No. 3307-
A
[18]
dated November 9, 2000.
[19]

We disagree. At bottom, petitioners attack the validity of Comelec Omnibus
Resolution 3785 for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion, insofar as it
allowed respondents to participate in the party-list elections of 2001. Indeed, under
both the Constitution
[20]
and the Rules of Court, such challenge may be brought before
this Court in a verified petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
Moreover, the assailed Omnibus Resolution was promulgated by Respondent
Commission en banc; hence, no motion for reconsideration was possible, it being a
prohibited pleading under Section 1 (d), Rule 13 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure.
[21]

The Court also notes that Petitioner Bayan Muna had filed before the Comelec a
Petition for Cancellation of Registration and Nomination against some of herein
respondents.
[22]
The Comelec, however, did not act on that Petition. In view of the
pendency of the elections, Petitioner Bayan Muna sought succor from this Court, for
there was no other adequate recourse at the time. Subsequent events have proven the
urgency of petitioners action; to this date, the Comelec has not yet formally resolved the
Petition before it. But a resolution may just be a formality because the Comelec, through
the Office of the Solicitor General, has made its position on the matter quite clear.
In any event, this case presents an exception to the rule that certiorari shall lie only
in the absence of any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy.
[23]
It has been held
that certiorari is available, notwithstanding the presence of other remedies, where the
issue raised is one purely of law, where public interest is involved, and in case of
urgency.
[24]
Indeed, the instant case is indubitably imbued with public interest and with
extreme urgency, for it potentially involves the composition of 20 percent of the House of
Representatives.
Moreover, this case raises transcendental constitutional issues on the party-list
system, which this Court must urgently resolve, consistent with its duty to formulate
guiding and controlling constitutional principles, precepts, doctrines, or rules.
[25]

Finally, procedural requirements may be glossed over to prevent a miscarriage of
justice, when the issue involves the principle of social justice x x x when the decision
sought to be set aside is a nullity, or when the need for relief is extremely urgent
and certiorari is the only adequate and speedy remedy available.
[26]


Second Issue:
Participation of Political Parties

In its Petition, Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party contends that the inclusion of
political parties in the party-list system is the most objectionable portion of the
questioned Resolution.
[27]
For its part, Petitioner Bayan Muna objects to the
participation of major political parties.
[28]
On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor
General, like the impleaded political parties, submits that the Constitution and RA No.
7941 allow political parties to participate in the party-list elections. It argues that the
party-list system is, in fact, open to all registered national, regional and sectoral parties
or organizations.
[29]

We now rule on this issue. Under the Constitution and RA 7941, private
respondents cannot be disqualified from the party-list elections, merely on the ground
that they are political parties. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution provides that
members of the House of Representatives may be elected through a party-list system of
registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.
Furthermore, under Sections 7 and 8, Article IX (C) of the Constitution, political
parties may be registered under the party-list system.
Sec. 7. No votes cast in favor of a political party, organization, or coalition shall be valid,
except for those registered under the party-list system as provided in this Constitution.
Sec. 8. Political parties, or organizations or coalitions registered under the party-list
system, shall not be represented in the voters' registration boards, boards of election
inspectors, boards of canvassers, or other similar bodies. However, they shall be entitled
to appoint poll watchers in accordance with law.
[30]

During the deliberations in the Constitutional Commission, Comm. Christian S.
Monsod pointed out that the participants in the party-list system may be a regional
party, a sectoral party, a national party, UNIDO,
[31]
Magsasaka, or a regional party in
Mindanao."
[32]
This was also clear from the following exchange between Comms. Jaime
Tadeo and Blas Ople:
[33]

MR. TADEO. Naniniwala ba kayo na ang party list ay pwedeng paghati-hatian ng
UNIDO, PDP-Laban, PNP, Liberal at Nacionalista?
MR. OPLE. Maaari yan sapagkat bukas ang party list system sa lahat ng mga partido.
Indeed, Commissioner Monsod stated that the purpose of the party-list provision
was to open up the system, in order to give a chance to parties that consistently place
third or fourth in congressional district elections to win a seat in Congress.
[34]
He
explained: The purpose of this is to open the system. In the past elections, we found out
that there were certain groups or parties that, if we count their votes nationwide, have
about 1,000,000 or 1,500,000 votes. But they were always third or fourth place in each
of the districts. So, they have no voice in the Assembly. But this way, they would have
five or six representatives in the Assembly even if they would not win individually in
legislative districts. So, that is essentially the mechanics, the purpose and objectives of
the party-list system.
For its part, Section 2 of RA 7941 also provides for a party-list system of registered
national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, x x x.
Section 3 expressly states that a party is either a political party or a sectoral party or
a coalition of parties. More to the point, the law defines political party as an organized
group of citizens advocating an ideology or platform, principles and policies for the
general conduct of government and which, as the most immediate means of securing
their adoption, regularly nominates and supports certain of its leaders and members as
candidates for public office.
Furthermore, Section 11 of RA 7941 leaves no doubt as to the participation
of political parties in the party-list system. We quote the pertinent provision below:
x x x x x x x x x
For purposes of the May 1998 elections, the first five (5) major political parties on the
basis of party representation in the House of Representatives at the start of the Tenth
Congress of the Philippines shall not be entitled to participate in the party-list system.
x x x x x x x x x
Indubitably, therefore, political parties even the major ones -- may participate in
the party-list elections.

Third Issue:
Marginalized and Underrepresented

That political parties may participate in the party-list elections does not mean,
however, that any political party -- or any organization or group for that matter -- may do
so. The requisite character of these parties or organizations must be consistent with the
purpose of the party-list system, as laid down in the Constitution and RA 7941. Section
5, Article VI of the Constitution, provides as follows:
(1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and
fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative
districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in
accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a
uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected
through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations.
(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number
of representatives including those under the party list. For three consecutive terms after
the ratification of this Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated to party-list
representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor,
peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other
sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector. (Emphasis supplied.)
Notwithstanding the sparse language of the provision, a distinguished member of
the Constitutional Commission declared that the purpose of the party-list provision was
to give genuine power to our people in Congress. Hence, when the provision was
discussed, he exultantly announced: On this first day of August 1986, we shall,
hopefully, usher in a new chapter to our national history, by giving genuine power to our
people in the legislature.
[35]

The foregoing provision on the party-list system is not self-executory. It is, in fact,
interspersed with phrases like in accordance with law or as may be provided by law;
it was thus up to Congress to sculpt in granite the lofty objective of the
Constitution. Hence, RA 7941 was enacted. It laid out the statutory policy in this wise:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. -- The State shall promote proportional representation in
the election of representatives to the House of Representatives through a party-list
system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions
thereof, which will enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined political
constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of
appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole, to become members of the
House of Representatives. Towards this end, the State shall develop and guarantee a full,
free and open party system in order to attain the broadest possible representation of
party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives by enhancing their
chances to compete for and win seats in the legislature, and shall provide the simplest
scheme possible.

The Marginalized and
Underrepresented to Become
Lawmakers Themselves

The foregoing provision mandates a state policy of promoting proportional
representation by means of the Filipino-style party-list system, which will enable the
election to the House of Representatives of Filipino citizens,
1. who belong to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations
and parties; and
2. who lack well-defined constituencies; but
3. who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate
legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole.
The key words in this policy are proportional representation, marginalized and
underrepresented, and lack [of] well-defined constituencies.
Proportional representation here does not refer to the number of people in a
particular district, because the party-list election is national in scope. Neither does it
allude to numerical strength in a distressed or oppressed group. Rather, it refers to the
representation of the marginalized and underrepresented as exemplified by the
enumeration in Section 5 of the law; namely, labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans,
overseas workers, and professionals.
However, it is not enough for the candidate to claim representation of the
marginalized and underrepresented, because representation is easy to claim and to
feign. The party-list organization or party must factually and truly represent the
marginalized and underrepresented constituencies mentioned in Section
5.
[36]
Concurrently, the persons nominated by the party-list candidate-organization must
be Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors,
organizations and parties.
Finally, lack of well-defined constituenc[y] refers to the absence of a traditionally
identifiable electoral group, like voters of a congressional district or territorial unit of
government. Rather, it points again to those with disparate interests identified with the
marginalized or underrepresented.
In the end, the role of the Comelec is to see to it that only those Filipinos who are
marginalized and underrepresented become members of Congress under the party-list
system, Filipino-style.
The intent of the Constitution is clear: to give genuine power to the people, not
only by giving more law to those who have less in life, but more so by enabling them to
become veritable lawmakers themselves. Consistent with this intent, the policy of the
implementing law, we repeat, is likewise clear: to enable Filipino citizens belonging to
marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, x x x, to become
members of the House of Representatives. Where the language of the law is clear, it
must be applied according to its express terms.
[37]

The marginalized and underrepresented sectors to be represented under the party-
list system are enumerated in Section 5 of RA 7941, which states:
SEC. 5. Registration. -- Any organized group of persons may register as a party,
organization or coalition for purposes of the party-list system by filing with the
COMELEC not later than ninety (90) days before the election a petition verified by its
president or secretary stating its desire to participate in the party-list system as a
national, regional or sectoral party or organization or a coalition of such parties or
organizations, attaching thereto its constitution, by-laws, platform or program of
government, list of officers, coalition agreement and other relevant information as the
COMELEC may require: Provided, that the sector shall include labor, peasant, fisherfolk,
urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth,
veterans, overseas workers, and professionals.
While the enumeration of marginalized and underrepresented sectors is not
exclusive, it demonstrates the clear intent of the law that not all sectors can be
represented under the party-list system. It is a fundamental principle of statutory
construction that words employed in a statute are interpreted in connection with, and
their meaning is ascertained by reference to, the words and the phrases with which they
are associated or related. Thus, the meaning of a term in a statute may be limited,
qualified or specialized by those in immediate association.
[38]


The Party-List System
Desecrated by the OSG
Contentions

Notwithstanding the unmistakable statutory policy, the Office of the Solicitor
General submits that RA No. 7941 does not limit the participation in the party-list
system to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors of society.
[39]
In fact, it
contends that any party or group that is not disqualified under Section 6
[40]
of RA 7941
may participate in the elections. Hence, it admitted during the Oral Argument that even
an organization representing the super rich of Forbes Park or Dasmarias Village could
participate in the party-list elections.
[41]

The declared policy of RA 7941 contravenes the position of the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG). We stress that the party-list system seeks to enable certain
Filipino citizens specifically those belonging to marginalized and underrepresented
sectors, organizations and parties to be elected to the House of Representatives. The
assertion of the OSG that the party-list system is not exclusive to the marginalized and
underrepresented disregards the clear statutory policy. Its claim that even the super-rich
and overrepresented can participate desecrates the spirit of the party-list system.
Indeed, the law crafted to address the peculiar disadvantages of Payatas hovel
dwellers cannot be appropriated by the mansion owners of Forbes Park. The interests of
these two sectors are manifestly disparate; hence, the OSGs position to treat them
similarly defies reason and common sense. In contrast, and with admirable candor, Atty.
Lorna Patajo-Kapunan
[42]
admitted during the Oral Argument that a group of bankers,
industrialists and sugar planters could not join the party-list system as representatives
of their respective sectors.
[43]

While the business moguls and the mega-rich are, numerically speaking, a tiny
minority, they are neither marginalized nor underrepresented, for the stark reality is
that their economic clout engenders political power more awesome than their numerical
limitation. Traditionally, political power does not necessarily emanate from the size of
ones constituency; indeed, it is likely to arise more directly from the number and
amount of ones bank accounts.
It is ironic, therefore, that the marginalized and underrepresented in our midst are
the majority who wallow in poverty, destitution and infirmity. It was for them that the
party-list system was enacted -- to give them not only genuine hope, but genuine power;
to give them the opportunity to be elected and to represent the specific concerns of their
constituencies; and simply to give them a direct voice in Congress and in the larger
affairs of the State. In its noblest sense, the party-list system truly empowers the masses
and ushers a new hope for genuine change. Verily, it invites those marginalized and
underrepresented in the past the farm hands, the fisher folk, the urban poor, even
those in the underground movement to come out and participate, as indeed many of
them came out and participated during the last elections. The State cannot now
disappoint and frustrate them by disabling and desecrating this social justice vehicle.
Because the marginalized and underrepresented had not been able to win in the
congressional district elections normally dominated by traditional politicians and vested
groups, 20 percent of the seats in the House of Representatives were set aside for the
party-list system. In arguing that even those sectors who normally controlled 80 percent
of the seats in the House could participate in the party-list elections for the remaining 20
percent, the OSG and the Comelec disregard the fundamental difference between the
congressional district elections and the party-list elections.
As earlier noted, the purpose of the party-list provision was to open up the
system,
[44]
in order to enhance the chance of sectoral groups and organizations to gain
representation in the House of Representatives through the simplest scheme
possible.
[45]
Logic shows that the system has been opened to those who have never
gotten a foothold within it -- those who cannot otherwise win in regular elections and
who therefore need the simplest scheme possible to do so. Conversely, it would be
illogical to open the system to those who have long been within it -- those privileged
sectors that have long dominated the congressional district elections.
The import of the open party-list system may be more vividly understood when
compared to a student dormitory open house, which by its nature allowsoutsiders to
enter the facilities. Obviously, the open house is for the benefit of outsiders only, not
the dormers themselves who can enter the dormitory even without such special
privilege. In the same vein, the open party-list system is only for the outsiders who
cannot get elected through regular elections otherwise; it is not for the non-marginalized
or overrepresented who already fill the ranks of Congress.
Verily, allowing the non-marginalized and overrepresented to vie for the remaining
seats under the party-list system would not only dilute, but also prejudice the chance of
the marginalized and underrepresented, contrary to the intention of the law
to enhance it. The party-list system is a tool for the benefit of the underprivileged; the
law could not have given the same tool to others, to the prejudice of the intended
beneficiaries.
This Court, therefore, cannot allow the party-list system to be sullied and
prostituted by those who are neither marginalized nor underrepresented. It cannot let
that flicker of hope be snuffed out. The clear state policy must permeate every
discussion of the qualification of political parties and other organizations under the
party-list system.

Refutation of the
Separate Opinions

The Separate Opinions of our distinguished colleagues, Justices Jose C. Vitug and
Vicente V. Mendoza, are anchored mainly on the supposed intent of the framers of the
Constitution as culled from their deliberations.
The fundamental principle in constitutional construction, however, is that the
primary source from which to ascertain constitutional intent or purpose is the language
of the provision itself. The presumption is that the words in which the constitutional
provisions are couched express the objective sought to be attained.
[46]
In other
words, verba legis still prevails. Only when the meaning of the words used is unclear and
equivocal should resort be made to extraneous aids of construction and interpretation,
such as the proceedings of the Constitutional Commission or Convention, in order to
shed light on and ascertain the true intent or purpose of the provision being
construed.
[47]

Indeed, as cited in the Separate Opinion of Justice Mendoza, this Court stated
in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary
[48]
that the debates and proceedings of the
constitutional convention [may be consulted] in order to arrive at the reason and
purpose of the resulting Constitution x x x only when other guides fail as said
proceedings are powerless to vary the terms of the Constitution when the meaning is
clear. Debates in the constitutional convention are of value as showing the views of the
individual members, and as indicating the reason for their votes, but they give us no light
as to the views of the large majority who did not talk, much less of the mass or our fellow
citizens whose votes at the polls gave that instrument the force of fundamental law. We
think it safer to construe the constitution from what appears upon its face. The proper
interpretation therefore depends more on how it was understood by the people adopting
it than in the framers understanding thereof.
Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, relative to the party-list system, is couched
in clear terms: the mechanics of the system shall be provided by law. Pursuant thereto,
Congress enacted RA 7941. In understanding and implementing party-list
representation, we should therefore look at the law first. Only when we find its
provisions ambiguous should the use of extraneous aids of construction be resorted to.
But, as discussed earlier, the intent of the law is obvious and clear from its plain
words. Section 2 thereof unequivocally states that the party-list system of electing
congressional representatives was designed to enable underrepresented sectors,
organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies but who
could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will
benefit the nation as a whole x x x. The criteria for participation is well defined. Thus,
there is no need for recourse to constitutional deliberations, not even to the proceedings
of Congress. In any event, the framers deliberations merely express their individual
opinions and are, at best, only persuasive in construing the meaning and purpose of the
constitution or statute.
Be it remembered that the constitutionality or validity of Sections 2 and 5 of RA
7941 is not an issue here. Hence, they remain parts of the law, which must be applied
plainly and simply.

Fourth Issue:
Grave Abuse of Discretion

From its assailed Omnibus Resolution, it is manifest that the Comelec failed to
appreciate fully the clear policy of the law and the Constitution. On the contrary, it
seems to have ignored the facet of the party-list system discussed above. The OSG as its
counsel admitted before the Court that any group, even the non-marginalized and
overrepresented, could field candidates in the party-list elections.
When a lower court, or a quasi-judicial agency like the Commission on Elections,
violates or ignores the Constitution or the law, its action can be struck down by this
Court on the ground of grave abuse of discretion.
[49]
Indeed, the function of all judicial
and quasi-judicial instrumentalities is to apply the law as they find it, not to reinvent or
second-guess it.
[50]

In its Memorandum, Petitioner Bayan Muna passionately pleads for the outright
disqualification of the major political parties Respondents Lakas-NUCD, LDP, NPC, LP
and PMP on the ground that under Comelec Resolution No. 4073, they have been
accredited as the five (six, including PDP-Laban) major political parties in the May 14,
2001 elections. It argues that because of this, they have the advantage of getting official
Comelec Election Returns, Certificates of Canvass, preferred poll watchers x x x. We
note, however, that this accreditation does not refer to the party-list election, but, inter
alia, to the election of district representatives for the purpose of determining which
parties would be entitled to watchers under Section 26 of Republic Act No. 7166.
What is needed under the present circumstances, however, is a factual
determination of whether respondents herein and, for that matter, all the 154 previously
approved groups, have the necessary qualifications to participate in the party-list
elections, pursuant to the Constitution and the law.
Bayan Muna also urges us to immediately rule out Respondent Mamamayan Ayaw
sa Droga (MAD), because it is a government entity using government resources and
privileges. This Court, however, is not a trier of facts.
[51]
It is not equipped to receive
evidence and determine the truth of such factual allegations.
Basic rudiments of due process require that respondents should first be given an
opportunity to show that they qualify under the guidelines promulgated in this Decision,
before they can be deprived of their right to participate in and be elected under the
party-list system.

Guidelines for
Screening Party-
List Participants

The Court, therefore, deems it proper to remand the case to the Comelec for the
latter to determine, after summary evidentiary hearings, whether the 154 parties and
organizations allowed to participate in the party-list elections comply with the
requirements of the law. In this light, the Court finds it appropriate to lay down the
following guidelines, culled from the law and the Constitution, to assist the Comelec in its
work.
First, the political party, sector, organization or coalition must represent the
marginalized and underrepresented groups identified in Section 5 of RA 7941. In other
words, it must show -- through its constitution, articles of incorporation, bylaws, history,
platform of government and track record -- that it represents and seeks to uplift
marginalized and underrepresented sectors. Verily, majority of its membership should
belong to the marginalized and underrepresented. And it must demonstrate that in a
conflict of interests, it has chosen or is likely to choose the interest of such sectors.
Second, while even major political parties are expressly allowed by RA 7941 and
the Constitution to participate in the party-list system, they must comply with the
declared statutory policy of enabling Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors x x x to be elected to the House of Representatives. In other
words, while they are not disqualified merely on the ground that they are political
parties, they must show, however, that they represent the interests of the marginalized
and underrepresented. The counsel of Aksyon Demokratiko and other similarly situated
political parties admitted as much during the Oral Argument, as the following quote
shows:
JUSTICE PANGANIBAN: I am not disputing that in my question. All I am saying is,
the political party must claim to represent the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors?
ATTY. KAPUNAN: Yes, Your Honor, the answer is yes.
[52]

Third, in view of the objections
[53]
directed against the registration of Ang Buhay
Hayaang Yumabong, which is allegedly a religious group, the Court notes the express
constitutional provision that the religious sector may not be represented in the party-list
system. The extent of the constitutional proscription is demonstrated by the following
discussion during the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission:
MR. OPLE. x x x
In the event that a certain religious sect with nationwide and even
international networks of members and supporters, in order to circumvent this
prohibition, decides to form its own political party in emulation of those parties
I had mentioned earlier as deriving their inspiration and philosophies from
well-established religious faiths, will that also not fall within this prohibition?
MR. MONSOD. If the evidence shows that the intention is to go around the
prohibition, then certainly the Comelec can pierce through the legal fiction.
[54]

The following discussion is also pertinent:
MR. VILLACORTA. When the Commissioner proposed EXCEPT RELIGIOUS
GROUPS, he is not, of course, prohibiting priests, imams or pastors who may be
elected by, say, the indigenous community sector to represent their group.
REV. RIGOS. Not at all, but I am objecting to anybody who represents the Iglesia ni
Kristo, the Catholic Church, the Protestant Church et cetera.
[55]

Furthermore, the Constitution provides that religious denominations and sects
shall not be registered.
[56]
The prohibition was explained by a member
[57]
of the
Constitutional Commission in this wise: [T]he prohibition is on any religious
organization registering as a political party. I do not see any prohibition here against a
priest running as a candidate. That is not prohibited here; it is the registration of a
religious sect as a political party.
[58]

Fourth, a party or an organization must not be disqualified under Section 6 of RA
7941, which enumerates the grounds for disqualification as follows:
(1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association
organized for religious purposes;
(2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal;
(3) It is a foreign party or organization;
(4) It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign political
party, foundation, organization, whether directly or through any of its
officers or members or indirectly through third parties for partisan
election purposes;
(5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to
elections;
(6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition;
(7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or
(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to
obtain at least two per centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-list
system in the two (2) preceding elections for the constituency in which it
has registered.
[59]

Note should be taken of paragraph 5, which disqualifies a party or group for
violation of or failure to comply with election laws and regulations. These laws include
Section 2 of RA 7941, which states that the party-list system seeks to enable Filipino
citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and
parties x x x to become members of the House of Representatives. A party or an
organization, therefore, that does not comply with this policy must be disqualified.
Fifth, the party or organization must not be an adjunct of, or a project organized or
an entity funded or assisted by, the government. By the very nature of the party-list
system, the party or organization must be a group of citizens, organized by citizens and
operated by citizens. It must be independent of the government. The participation of the
government or its officials in the affairs of a party-list candidate is not only illegal
[60]
and
unfair to other parties, but also deleterious to the objective of the law: to enable citizens
belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors and organizations to be elected
to the House of Representatives.
Sixth, the party must not only comply with the requirements of the law; its
nominees must likewise do so. Section 9 of RA 7941 reads as follows:
SEC. 9. Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. No person shall be nominated as party-
list representative unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered
voter, a resident of the Philippines for a period of not less than one (1) year immediately
preceding the day of the election, able to read and write, a bona fide member of the party
or organization which he seeks to represent for at least ninety (90) days preceding the
day of the election, and is at least twenty-five (25) years of age on the day of the election.
In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five (25) but not
more than thirty (30) years of age on the day of the election. Any youth sectoral
representative who attains the age of thirty (30) during his term shall be allowed to
continue in office until the expiration of his term.
Seventh, not only the candidate party or organization must represent marginalized
and underrepresented sectors; so also must its nominees. To repeat, under Section 2 of
RA 7941, the nominees must be Filipino citizens who belong to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties. Surely, the interests of the youth
cannot be fully represented by a retiree; neither can those of the urban poor or the
working class, by an industrialist. To allow otherwise is to betray the State policy to give
genuine representation to the marginalized and underrepresented.
Eighth, as previously discussed, while lacking a well-defined political constituency,
the nominee must likewise be able to contribute to the formulation and enactment of
appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole. Senator Jose Lina
explained during the bicameral committee proceedings that the nominee of a party,
national or regional, is not going to represent a particular district x x x.
[61]


Epilogue

The linchpin of this case is the clear and plain policy of the law: to enable Filipino
citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and
parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies but who could contribute to
the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a
whole, to become members of the House of Representatives.
Crucial to the resolution of this case is the fundamental social justice principle that
those who have less in life should have more in law. The party-list system is one such
tool intended to benefit those who have less in life. It gives the great masses of our
people genuine hope and genuine power. It is a message to the destitute and the
prejudiced, and even to those in the underground, that change is possible. It is an
invitation for them to come out of their limbo and seize the opportunity.
Clearly, therefore, the Court cannot accept the submissions of the Comelec and the
other respondents that the party-list system is, without any qualification, open to
all. Such position does not only weaken the electoral chances of the marginalized and
underrepresented; it also prejudices them. It would gut the substance of the party-list
system. Instead of generating hope, it would create a mirage. Instead of enabling the
marginalized, it would further weaken them and aggravate their marginalization.
In effect, the Comelec would have us believe that the party-list provisions of the
Constitution and RA 7941 are nothing more than a play on dubious words, a mockery of
noble intentions, and an empty offering on the altar of people empowerment. Surely, this
could not have been the intention of the framers of the Constitution and the makers of
RA 7941.
WHEREFORE, this case is REMANDED to the Comelec, which is
hereby DIRECTED to immediately conduct summary evidentiary hearings on the
qualifications of the party-list participants in the light of the guidelines enunciated in this
Decision. Considering the extreme urgency of determining the winners in the last party-
list elections, the Comelec is directed to begin its hearings for the parties and
organizations that appear to have garnered such number of votes as to qualify for seats
in the House of Representatives. The Comelec is further DIRECTED to submit to this
Court its compliance report within 30 days from notice hereof.
The Resolution of this Court dated May 9, 2001, directing the Comelec to refrain
from proclaiming any winner during the last party-list election, shall remain in force
until after the Comelec itself will have complied and reported its compliance with the
foregoing disposition.
This Decision is immediately executory upon the Commission on Elections receipt
thereof. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

BANTAY REPUBLIC ACT OR BA-RA 7941,
represented by MR. AMEURFINO E. CINCO,
Chairman, AND URBAN POOR FOR LEGAL
REFORMS (UP-LR), represented by MRS. MYRNA
P. PORCARE, Secretary-
General, Petitioners,

- versus -

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, BIYAHENG PINOY,
KAPATIRAN NG MGA NAKAKULONG NA
WALANG SALA (KAKUSA), BARANGAY
ASSOCIATION FOR NATIONAL ADVANCEMENT
AND TRANSPARENCY (BANAT), AHON PINOY,
AGRICULTURAL SECTOR ALLIANCE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, INC. (AGAP), PUWERSA NG
BAYANING ATLETA (PBA), ALYANSA NG MGA
GRUPONG HALIGI NG AGHAM AT TEKNOLOHIYA
PARA SA MAMAMAYAN, INC. (AGHAM), BABAE
PARA SA KAUNLARAN (BABAE KA), AKSYON
SAMBAYANAN (AKSA), ALAY SA BAYAN NG
MALAYANG PROPESYUNAL AT REPORMANG
KALAKAL (ABAY-PARAK), AGBIAG TIMPUYOG
ILOCANO, INC. (AGBIAG!), ABANTE ILONGGO,
INC. (ABA ILONGGO), AANGAT TAYO (AT),
AANGAT ANG KABUHAYAN (ANAK), BAGO
NATIONAL CULTURAL SOCIETY OF THE
PHILIPPINES (BAGO), ANGAT ANTAS-
KABUHAYAN PILIPINO MOVEMENT (AANGAT
KA PILIPINO), ARTS BUSINESS AND SCIENCE
PROFESSIONAL (ABS), ASSOSASYON NG MGA
MALILIIT NA NEGOSYANTENG GUMAGANAP INC.
(AMANG), SULONG BARANGAY MOVEMENT,
KASOSYO PRODUCERS CONSUMER EXCHANGE
ASSOCIATION, INC. (KASOSYO), UNITED
MOVEMENT AGAINST DRUGS (UNI-MAD),
PARENTS ENABLING PARENTS (PEP), ALLIANCE
OF NEO-CONSERVATIVES (ANC), FILIPINOS FOR
PEACE, JUSTICE AND PROGRESS MOVEMENT
(FPJPM), BIGKIS PINOY MOVEMENT (BIGKIS), 1-
UNITED TRANSPORT KOALISYON (1-UNTAK),
ALLIANCE FOR BARANGAY CONCERNS (ABC),
BIYAYANG BUKID, INC., ALLIANCE FOR
NATIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY (ANAD),
AKBAY PINOY OFW-NATIONAL INC., (APOI),
ALLIANCE TRANSPORT SECTOR (ATS), KALAHI
SECTORAL PARTY (ADVOCATES FOR OVERSEAS
G.R. No. 177271

Present:

PUNO, C.J.,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CARPIO,

*
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,

*
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
AZCUNA,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
GARCIA,
VELASCO, JR., and
NACHURA, JJ.


Promulgated:

May 4, 2007

FILIPINO) AND ASSOCIATION OF
ADMINISTRATORS, PROFESSIONALS AND
SENIORS (AAPS),
Respondents.
x--------------------------------------------------x
REP. LORETTA ANN P. ROSALES,
KILOSBAYAN FOUNDATION,
BANTAY KATARUNGAN FOUNDATION,
Petitioners,


- versus -

THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
Respondent.
G.R. No. 177314










X -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
D E C I S I O N
GARCIA, J.:
Before the Court are these two consolidated petitions for certiorari and mandamus
to nullify and set aside certain issuances of the Commission on Elections (Comelec)
respecting party-list groups which have manifested their intention to participate in the
party-list elections on May 14, 2007.
In the first petition, docketed as G.R. No. 177271, petitioners Bantay Republic Act
(BA-RA 7941, for short) and the Urban Poor for Legal Reforms (UP-LR, for short) assail
the various Comelec resolutions accrediting private respondents Biyaheng Pinoyet al., to
participate in the forthcoming party-list elections on May 14, 2007 without
simultaneously determining whether or not their respective nominees possess the
requisite qualifications defined in Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7941, or the Party-List System
Act and belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sector each seeks to
represent. In the second, docketed as G.R. No. 177314, petitioners Loreta Ann P. Rosales,
Kilosbayan Foundation and Bantay Katarungan Foundation impugn Comelec Resolution
07-0724dated April 3, 2007 effectively denying their request for the release or disclosure
of the names of the nominees of the fourteen (14) accredited participating party-list
groups mentioned in petitioner Rosales previous letter-request.
While both petitions commonly seek to compel the Comelec to disclose or publish
the names of the nominees of the various party-list groups named in the petitions,
[1]
the
petitioners in G.R. No. 177271 have the following additional prayers: 1) that the
33private respondents named therein be declare[d] as unqualified to participate in the
party-list elections as sectoral organizations,parties or coalition for failure to comply with
the guidelines prescribed by the [Court] in [Ang Bagong Bayani v. Comelec
[2]
]
and, 2) correspondingly, that the Comelec be enjoined from allowing respondent groups
from participating in the May 2007 elections.
In separate resolutions both dated April 24, 2007, the Court en banc required the
public and private respondents to file their respective comments on the petitions within
a non-extendible period of five (5) days from notice. Apart from respondent Comelec,
seven (7) private respondents
[3]
in G.R. No. 177271 and one party-list group
[4]
mentioned
in G.R. No. 177314 submitted their separate comments. In the main, the separate
comments of the private respondents focused on the untenability and prematurity of
the plea of petitioners BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR to nullify their accreditation as party-list
groups and thus disqualify them and their respective nominees from participating in
the May 14, 2007 party-list elections.
The facts:
On January 12, 2007, the Comelec issued Resolution No. 7804 prescribing rules and
regulations to govern the filing of manifestation of intent to participate and submission
of names of nominees under the party-list system of representation in connection with
the May 14, 2007 elections. Pursuant thereto, a number of organized groups filed the
necessary manifestations. Among these and ostensibly subsequently accredited by the
Comelec to participate in the 2007 elections - are 14 party-list groups, namely:
(1) BABAE KA; (2) ANG KASANGGA; (3) AKBAY PINOY; (4) AKSA; (5) KAKUSA; (6) AHON
PINOY; (7) OFW PARTY; (8) BIYAHENG PINOY; (9) ANAD; (10) AANGAT ANG
KABUHAYAN; (11) AGBIAG; (12) BANAT; (13) BANTAY LIPAD; (14)AGING
PINOY. Petitioners BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR presented a longer, albeit an overlapping, list.
Subsequent events saw BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR filing with the
Comelec an Urgent Petition to Disqualify, thereunder seeking to disqualify the nominees
of certain party-list organizations. Both petitioners appear not to have the names of the
nominees sought to be disqualified since they still asked for a copy of the list of
nominees. Docketed in the Comelec as SPA Case No 07-026, thisurgent petition has yet to
be resolved.
Meanwhile, reacting to the emerging public perception that the individuals behind
the aforementioned 14 party-list groups do not, as they should, actually represent the
poor and marginalized sectors, petitioner Rosales, in G.R. No. 177314, addressed a
letter
[5]
dated March 29, 2007 to Director Alioden Dalaig of the Comelecs Law
Department requesting a list of that groups nominees. Another letter
[6]
of the same
tenor dated March 31, 2007 followed, this time petitioner Rosales impressing upon Atty.
Dalaig the particular urgency of the subject request.
Neither the Comelec Proper nor its Law Department officially responded to
petitioner Rosales requests. The April 13, 2007issue of the Manila
Bulletin, however, carried the front-page banner headline COMELEC WONT BARE
PARTY-LIST NOMINEES,
[7]
with the following sub-heading: Abalos says party-list polls
not personality oriented.
On April 16, 2007, Atty. Emilio Capulong, Jr. and ex-Senator Jovito R. Salonga, in
their own behalves and as counsels of petitioner Rosales, forwarded a letter
[8]
to the
Comelec formally requesting action and definitive decision on Rosales earlier plea for
information regarding the names of several party-list nominees. Invoking their
constitutionally-guaranteed right to information, Messrs. Capulong and Salonga at the
same time drew attention to the banner headline adverted to earlier, with a request for
the Comelec, collectively or individually, to issue a formal clarification, either confirming
or denying the banner headline and the alleged statement of Chairman Benjamin Abalos,
Sr. xxx Evidently unbeknownst then to Ms. Rosales, et al., was the issuance of Comelec en
banc Resolution 07-0724
[9]
under date April 3, 2007 virtually declaring the nominees
names confidential and in net effect denying petitioner Rosales basic disclosure
request. In its relevant part, Resolution 07-0724 reads as follows:
RESOLVED, moreover, that the Commission
will disclose/publicize the names of party-list nominees in
connection with the May 14, 2007Elections only after 3:00
p.m. on election day.
Let the Law Department implement this resolution and reply to all
letters addressed to the Commission inquiring on the party-list
nominees.(Emphasis added.)
According to petitioner Rosales, she was able to obtain a copy of the April 3,
2007 Resolution only on April 21, 2007. Shewould later state the observation that the
last part of the Order empowering the Law Department to implement this resolution and
reply to all letters inquiring on the party-list nominees is apparently a fool-proof
bureaucratic way to distort and mangle the truth and give the impression that the
antedated Resolution of April 3, 2007 is the final answer to the two formal requests of
Petitioners.
[10]

The herein consolidated petitions are cast against the foregoing factual setting,
albeit petitioners BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR appear not to be aware, when they filed their
petition on April 18, 2007, of the April 3, 2007 Comelec Resolution 07-0724.
To start off, petitioners BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR would have the Court cancel the
accreditation accorded by the Comelec to the respondent party-list groups named in
their petition on the ground that these groups and their respective nominees do not
appear to be qualified. In the words of petitioners BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR, Comelec -

xxx committed grave abuse of discretion when it granted
the assailed accreditations even without simultaneously determining
whether the nominees of herein private respondents are qualified or
not, or whether or not the nominees are likewise belonging to the
marginalized and underrepresented sector they claim to represent in
Congress, in accordance with No. 7 of the eight-point guidelines
prescribed by the Honorable Supreme in the Ang Bagong
Bayani
[11]
case which states that, not only the candidate party or
organization must represent marginalized and
underrepresented sectors; so also must its nominees. In the case of
private respondents, public respondent Comelec granted
accreditations without the required simultaneous determination of the
qualification of the nominees as part of the accreditation process of
the party-list organization itself.(Words in bracket added; italization
in the original)
[12]

The Court is unable to grant the desired plea of petitioners BA-RA 7941
and UP-LR for cancellation of accreditation on the grounds thus advanced in their
petition. For, such course of action would
entail going over and evaluating the qualities of the sectoral groups or parties in
question, particularly whether or not they indeed represent
marginalized/underrepresented groups. The exercise would require the Court to
make a factual determination, a matter which is outside the office of judicial review
by way of special civil action for certiorari. In certiorari proceedings, the Court is not
called upon to decide factual issues and the case must be decided on the undisputed
facts on record.
[13]
The sole function of a writ of certiorari is to address issues of
want of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion and does not include a review of
the tribunals evaluation of the evidence.
[14]


Not lost on the Court of course is the pendency before the Comelec of SPA
Case No. 07-026 in which petitioners BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR themselves seek to
disqualify the nominees of the respondent party-list groups named in their
petition.

Petitioners BA-RA 7941s and UP-LRs posture that the Comelec committed
grave abuse of discretion when it granted the assailed accreditations
without simultaneously determining the qualifications of their nominees is without
basis. Nowhere in R.A. No. 7941 is there a requirement that the qualification of a
party-list nominee be determined simultaneously with the accreditation of an
organization. And as aptly pointed out by private respondent Babae Para sa
Kaunlaran (Babae Ka), Section 4 of R.A. No. 7941 requires a petition for registration
of a party-list organization to be filed with the Comelec not later than ninety (90)
days before the election whereas the succeeding Section 8 requires the submission
not later than forty-five (45) days before the election of the list of names whence
party-list representatives shall be chosen.

Now to the other but core issues of the case. The petition in G.R. No.
177314 formulates and captures the main issues tendered by the petitioners in these
consolidated cases and they may be summarized as follows:

1. Whether respondent Comelec, by refusing to reveal the
names of the nominees of the various party-list groups,
has violated the right to information and free access
to documents as guaranteed by the Constitution; and
2. Whether respondent Comelec is mandated by the
Constitution to disclose to the public the names of said
nominees.
While the Comelec did not explicitly say so, it based its refusal to disclose
the names of the nominees of subject party-list groups on Section 7 of R.A. 7941.
This provision, while commanding the publication and the posting in polling places
of acertified list of party-list system participating groups, nonetheless tells the
Comelec not to show or include the names of the party-list nominees in
said certified list. Thus:

SEC. 7. Certified List of Registered Parties.- The COMELEC
shall, not later than sixty (60) days before election, prepare a
certified list of national, regional, or sectoral parties, organizations or
coalitions which have applied or who have manifested their desire to
participate under the party-list system and distribute copies thereof
to all precincts for posting in the polling places on election
day. The names of the party-list nominees shall not be shown on
the certified list. (Emphasis added.)
And doubtless part of Comelecs reason for keeping the names of the party
list nominees away from the public is deducible from the following excerpts of the
news report appearing in the adverted April 13, 2007 issue of the Manila Bulletin:

The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) firmed up
yesterday its decision not to release the names of nominees of
sectoral parties, organizations, or coalitions accredited to participate
in the party-list election which will be held simultaneously with the
May 14 mid-term polls.

COMELEC Chairman Benjamin S. Abalos, Sr. said he and
[the other five COMELEC] Commissioners --- believe that the party
list elections must not be personality oriented.

Abalos said under [R.A.] 7941 , the people are to vote for
sectoral parties, organizations, or coalitions, not for their nominees.

He said there is nothing in R.A. 7941 that requires the
Comelec to disclose the names of nominees. xxx (Words in brackets
and emphasis added)

Insofar as the disclosure issue is concerned, the petitions are impressed
with merit.

Assayed against the non-disclosure stance of the Comelec and the given
rationale therefor is the right to information enshrined in the self-
executory
[15]
Section 7, Article III of the Constitution, viz:

Sec.7. The right of the people to information on matters of
public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to
documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or
decisions, as well to government research data used as basis for policy
development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations
as may be provided by law.


Complementing and going hand in hand with the right to information is
another constitutional provision enunciating the policy of full disclosure and
transparency in Government. We refer to Section 28, Article II of the Constitution
reading:
Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law,
the State adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all
its transactions involving public interest.

The right to information is a public right where the real parties in interest are
the public, or the citizens to be precise. And for every right of the people recognized
as fundamental lies a corresponding duty on the part of those who govern to respect and
protect that right. This is the essence of the Bill of Rights in a constitutional
regime.
[16]
Without a governments acceptance of the limitations upon it by the
Constitution in order to uphold individual liberties, without an acknowledgment on its
part of those duties exacted by the rights pertaining to the citizens, the Bill of Rights
becomes a sophistry.
By weight of jurisprudence, any citizen can challenge any attempt to obstruct the
exercise of his right to information and may seek its enforcement by mandamus.
[17]
And
since every citizen by the simple fact of his citizenship possesses the right to be
informed, objections on ground of locus standi are ordinarily unavailing.
[18]

Like all constitutional guarantees, however, the right to information and its
companion right of access to official records are not absolute. As articulated
in Legaspi, supra, the peoples right to know is limited to matters of public concern and
is further subject to such limitation as may be provided by law. Similarly, the policy of
full disclosure is confined to transactions involving public interest and is subject to
reasonable conditions prescribed by law. Too, there is also the need of preserving a
measure of confidentiality on some matters, such as military, trade, banking and
diplomatic secrets or those affecting national security.
[19]

The terms public concerns and public interest have eluded precise definition.
But both terms embrace, to borrow fromLegaspi, a broad spectrum of subjects which the
public may want to know, either because these directly affect their lives, or simply
because such matters naturally whet the interest of an ordinary citizen. At the end of the
day, it is for the courts to determine, on a case to case basis, whether or not at issue is of
interest or importance to the public.
If, as in Legaspi, it was the legitimate concern of a citizen to know if certain
persons employed as sanitarians of a health department of a city are civil service
eligibles, surely the identity of candidates for a lofty elective public office should be a
matter of highest public concern and interest.
As may be noted, no national security or like concerns is involved in the
disclosure of the names of the nominees of the party-list groups in question. Doubtless,
the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in refusing the legitimate demands of
the petitioners for a list of the nominees of the party-list groups subject of their
respective petitions. Mandamus, therefore, lies.
The last sentence of Section 7 of R.A. 7941 reading: [T]he names of the party-
list nominees shall not be shown on the certified list is certainly not a justifying card for
the Comelec to deny the requested disclosure. To us, the prohibition imposed on the
Comelec under said Section 7 is limited in scope and duration, meaning, that it extends
only to the certified list which the same provision requires to be posted in the polling
places on election day. To stretch the coverage of the prohibition to the absolute is to
read into the law something that is not intended. As it were, there is
absolutely nothing in R.A. No. 7941 that prohibits the Comelec from disclosing or even
publishing through mediums other than the Certified List the names of the party-list
nominees. The Comelec obviously misread the limited non-disclosure aspect of the
provision as an absolute bar to public disclosure before the May 2007 elections. The
interpretation thus given by the Comelec virtually tacks an unconstitutional dimension
on the last sentence of Section 7 of R.A. No. 7941.
The Comelecs reasoning that a party-list election is not an election of
personalities is valid to a point. It cannot be taken, however, to justify its assailed non-
disclosure stance which comes, as it were, with a weighty presumption of invalidity,
impinging, as it does, on a fundamental right to information.
[20]
While the vote cast in a
party-list elections is a vote for a party, such vote, in the end, would be a vote for
its nominees, who, in appropriate cases, would eventually sit in the House of
Representatives.
The Court is very much aware of newspaper reports detailing the purported
reasons behind the Comelecs disinclination to release the names of party-list nominees.
It is to be stressed, however, that the Court is in the business of dispensing justice on the
basis of hard facts and applicable statutory and decisional laws. And lest it be
overlooked, the Court always assumes, at the first instance, the presumptive validity and
regularity of official acts of government officials and offices.

It has been repeatedly said in various contexts that the people have the right to
elect their representatives on the basis of an informed judgment. Hence the need for
voters to be informed about matters that have a bearing on their choice. The ideal cannot
be achieved in a system of blind voting, as veritably advocated in the assailed resolution
of the Comelec. The Court, since the 1914 case of Gardiner v. Romulo,
[21]
has consistently
made it clear that it frowns upon any interpretation of the law or rules that would hinder
in any way the free and intelligent casting of the votes in an election.
[22]
So it must be
here for still other reasons articulated earlier.

In all, we agree with the petitioners that respondent Comelec has a
constitutional duty to disclose and release the names of the nominees of the party-list
groups named in the herein petitions.
WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 177271 is partly DENIED insofar as it seeks to
nullify the accreditation of the respondents named therein. However, insofar as it seeks
to compel the Comelec to disclose or publish the names of the nominees of party-list
groups, sectors or organizations accredited to participate in the May 14, 2007 elections,
the same petition and the petition inG.R. No. 177314 are GRANTED. Accordingly, the
Comelec is hereby ORDERED to immediately disclose and release the names of the
nominees of the party-list groups, sectors or organizations accredited to participate in
the May 14, 2007 party-list elections. The Comelec is further DIRECTED to submit to the
Court its compliance herewith within five (5) days from notice hereof.

This Decision is declared immediately executory upon its receipt by the Comelec.
No pronouncement as to cost. SO ORDERED.
BARANGAY ASSOCIATION FOR G.R. No. 179271
NATIONAL ADVANCEMENT
AND TRANSPARENCY (BANAT),
Petitioner,

- versus -

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
(sitting as the National Board of
Canvassers),
Respondent.

ARTS BUSINESS AND SCIENCE
PROFESSIONALS,
Intervenor.

AANGAT TAYO,
Intervenor.

COALITION OF ASSOCIATIONS
OF SENIOR CITIZENS IN THE
PHILIPPINES, INC. (SENIOR
CITIZENS),
Intervenor.
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
BAYAN MUNA, ADVOCACY FOR G.R. No. 179295
TEACHER EMPOWERMENT
THROUGH ACTION, COOPERATION Present:
AND HARMONY TOWARDS
EDUCATIONAL REFORMS, INC., PUNO, C.J.,
and ABONO, QUISUMBING,
Petitioners, YNARES-SANTIAGO,
CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,
- versus - CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, JR.,

NACHURA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION,
PERALTA, and
BERSAMIN, JJ.


COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Promulgated:
Respondent.
_______________________

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x


D E C I S I O N

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

Petitioner in G.R. No. 179271 Barangay Association for National Advancement
and Transparency (BANAT) in a petition for certiorari and mandamus,
[1]
assails the
Resolution
[2]
promulgated on 3 August 2007 by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
in NBC No. 07-041 (PL). The COMELECs resolution in NBC No. 07-041 (PL) approved
the recommendation of Atty. Alioden D. Dalaig, Head of the National Board of Canvassers
(NBC) Legal Group, to deny the petition of BANAT for being moot. BANAT filed before
the COMELEC En Banc, acting as NBC, a Petition to Proclaim the Full Number of Party-List
Representatives Provided by the Constitution.

The following are intervenors in G.R. No. 179271: Arts Business and Science
Professionals (ABS), Aangat Tayo (AT), and Coalition of Associations of Senior Citizens in
the Philippines, Inc. (Senior Citizens).

Petitioners in G.R. No. 179295 Bayan Muna, Abono, and Advocacy for Teacher
Empowerment Through Action, Cooperation and Harmony Towards Educational
Reforms (A Teacher) in a petition for certiorari with mandamus and
prohibition,
[3]
assails NBC Resolution No. 07-60
[4]
promulgated on 9 July 2007. NBC No.
07-60 made a partial proclamation of parties, organizations and coalitions that obtained
at least two percent of the total votes cast under the Party-List System. The COMELEC
announced that, upon completion of the canvass of the party-list results, it would
determine the total number of seats of each winning party, organization, or coalition in
accordance with Veterans Federation Party v. COMELEC
[5]
(Veterans).

Estrella DL Santos, in her capacity as President and First Nominee of the Veterans
Freedom Party, filed a motion to intervene in both G.R. Nos. 179271 and 179295.

The Facts

The 14 May 2007 elections included the elections for the party-list
representatives. The COMELEC counted 15,950,900 votes cast for 93 parties under the
Party-List System.
[6]

On 27 June 2002, BANAT filed a Petition to Proclaim the Full Number of Party-List
Representatives Provided by the Constitution, docketed as NBC No. 07-041 (PL) before the
NBC. BANAT filed its petition because [t]he Chairman and the Members of the
[COMELEC] have recently been quoted in the national papers that the [COMELEC] is duty
bound to and shall implement the Veterans ruling, that is, would apply the Panganiban
formula in allocating party-list seats.
[7]
There were no intervenors in BANATs petition
before the NBC. BANAT filed a memorandum on 19 July 2007.

On 9 July 2007, the COMELEC, sitting as the NBC, promulgated NBC Resolution No.
07-60. NBC Resolution No. 07-60 proclaimed thirteen (13) parties as winners in the
party-list elections, namely: Buhay Hayaan Yumabong (BUHAY), Bayan Muna, Citizens
Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC), Gabrielas Women Party (Gabriela), Association of
Philippine Electric Cooperatives (APEC), A Teacher, Akbayan! Citizens Action Party
(AKBAYAN), Alagad, Luzon Farmers Party (BUTIL), Cooperative-Natco Network Party
(COOP-NATCCO), Anak Pawis, Alliance of Rural Concerns (ARC), and Abono. We quote
NBC Resolution No. 07-60 in its entirety below:

WHEREAS, the Commission on Elections sitting en banc as
National Board of Canvassers, thru its Sub-Committee for Party-List,
as of 03 July 2007, had officially canvassed, in open and public
proceedings, a total of fifteen million two hundred eighty three
thousand six hundred fifty-nine (15,283,659) votes under the
Party-List System of Representation, in connection with the National
and Local Elections conducted last 14 May 2007;

WHEREAS, the study conducted by the Legal and Tabulation
Groups of the National Board of Canvassers reveals that the
projected/maximum total party-list votes cannot go any higher
than sixteen million seven hundred twenty three thousand one
hundred twenty-one (16,723,121) votes given the following
statistical data:

Projected/Maximum Party-List Votes for May 2007
Elections

i. Total party-list votes already canvassed/tabulated 15,283,659
ii. Total party-list votes remaining uncanvassed/
untabulated (i.e. canvass deferred)

1,337,032
iii. Maximum party-list votes (based on 100% outcome)
from areas not yet submitted for canvass (Bogo, Cebu;
Bais City; Pantar, Lanao del Norte; and Pagalungan,
Maguindanao)



102,430
Maximum Total Party-List Votes 16,723,121

WHEREAS, Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7941 (Party-List
System Act) provides in part:

The parties, organizations, and coalitions
receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes
cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one
seat each: provided, that those garnering more than
two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to
additional seats in proportion to their total number
of votes: provided, finally, that each party,
organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not
more than three (3) seats.

WHEREAS, for the 2007 Elections, based on the above projected
total of party-list votes, the presumptive two percent (2%) threshold
can be pegged at three hundred thirty four thousand four hundred
sixty-two (334,462) votes;

WHEREAS, the Supreme Court, in Citizens Battle Against
Corruption (CIBAC) versus COMELEC, reiterated its ruling in Veterans
Federation Party versus COMELEC adopting a formula for the
additional seats of each party, organization or coalition receving more
than the required two percent (2%) votes, stating that the same shall
be determined only after all party-list ballots have been completely
canvassed;

WHEREAS, the parties, organizations, and coalitions that have
thus far garnered at least three hundred thirty four thousand four
hundred sixty-two (334,462) votes are as follows:

RANK PARTY/ORGANIZATION/
COALITION
VOTES
RECEIVED
1 BUHAY 1,163,218
2 BAYAN MUNA 972,730
3 CIBAC 760,260
4 GABRIELA 610,451
5 APEC 538,971
6 A TEACHER 476,036
7 AKBAYAN 470,872
8 ALAGAD 423,076
9 BUTIL 405,052
10 COOP-NATCO 390,029
11 BATAS 386,361
12 ANAK PAWIS 376,036
13 ARC 338,194
14 ABONO 337,046

WHEREAS, except for Bagong Alyansang Tagapagtaguyod ng
Adhikaing Sambayanan (BATAS), against which an URGENT PETITION
FOR CANCELLATION/REMOVAL OF REGISTRATION AND
DISQUALIFICATION OF PARTY-LIST NOMINEE (With Prayer for the
Issuance of Restraining Order) has been filed before the Commission,
docketed as SPC No. 07-250, all the parties, organizations and
coalitions included in the aforementioned list are therefore entitled to
at least one seat under the party-list system of representation in the
meantime.

NOW, THEREFORE, by virtue of the powers vested in it by the
Constitution, the Omnibus Election Code, Executive Order No. 144,
Republic Act Nos. 6646, 7166, 7941, and other election laws, the
Commission on Elections, sitting en banc as the National Board of
Canvassers, hereby RESOLVES to PARTIALLY PROCLAIM, subject to
certain conditions set forth below, the following parties, organizations
and coalitions participating under the Party-List System:

1 Buhay Hayaan Yumabong BUHAY
2 Bayan Muna BAYAN MUNA
3 Citizens Battle Against Corruption CIBAC
4 Gabriela Womens Party GABRIELA
5 Association of Philippine Electric Cooperatives APEC
6 Advocacy for Teacher Empowerment Through
Action, Cooperation and Harmony Towards
Educational Reforms, Inc.
A TEACHER
7 Akbayan! Citizens Action Party AKBAYAN
8 Alagad ALAGAD
9 Luzon Farmers Party BUTIL
10 Cooperative-Natco Network Party COOP-NATCCO
11 Anak Pawis ANAKPAWIS
12 Alliance of Rural Concerns ARC
13 Abono ABONO

This is without prejudice to the proclamation of other parties,
organizations, or coalitions which may later on be established to have
obtained at least two percent (2%) of the total actual votes cast under
the Party-List System.

The total number of seats of each winning party, organization
or coalition shall be determined pursuant to Veterans Federation Party
versus COMELEC formula upon completion of the canvass of the party-
list results.

The proclamation of Bagong Alyansang Tagapagtaguyod ng
Adhikaing Sambayanan (BATAS) is hereby deferred until final
resolution of SPC No. 07-250, in order not to render the proceedings
therein moot and academic.

Finally, all proclamation of the nominees of concerned parties,
organizations and coalitions with pending disputes shall likewise be
held in abeyance until final resolution of their respective cases.

Let the Clerk of the Commission implement this Resolution,
furnishing a copy thereof to the Speaker of the House of
Representatives of the Philippines.

SO ORDERED.
[8]
(Emphasis in the original)


Pursuant to NBC Resolution No. 07-60, the COMELEC, acting as NBC, promulgated
NBC Resolution No. 07-72, which declared the additional seats allocated to the
appropriate parties. We quote from the COMELECs interpretation of
the Veteransformula as found in NBC Resolution No. 07-72:

WHEREAS, on July 9, 2007, the Commission on Elections
sitting en banc as the National Board of Canvassers proclaimed
thirteen (13) qualified parties, organization[s] and coalitions based on
the presumptive two percent (2%) threshold of 334,462 votes from
the projected maximum total number of party-list votes of
16,723,121, and were thus given one (1) guaranteed party-list seat
each;

WHEREAS, per Report of the Tabulation Group and Supervisory
Committee of the National Board of Canvassers, the projected
maximum total party-list votes, as of July 11, 2007, based on the votes
actually canvassed, votes canvassed but not included in Report No. 29,
votes received but uncanvassed, and maximum votes expected for
Pantar, Lanao del Norte, is 16,261,369; and that the projected
maximum total votes for the thirteen (13) qualified parties,
organizations and coalition[s] are as follows:

Party-List Projected total number of votes
1 BUHAY 1,178,747
2 BAYAN MUNA 977,476
3 CIBAC 755,964
4 GABRIELA 621,718
5 APEC 622,489
6 A TEACHER 492,369
7 AKBAYAN 462,674
8 ALAGAD 423,190
9 BUTIL 409,298
10 COOP-NATCO 412,920
11 ANAKPAWIS 370,165
12 ARC 375,846
13 ABONO 340,151

WHEREAS, based on the above Report, Buhay Hayaan
Yumabong (Buhay) obtained the highest number of votes among the
thirteen (13) qualified parties, organizations and coalitions, making it
the first party in accordance with Veterans Federation Party versus
COMELEC, reiterated in Citizens Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC)
versus COMELEC;

WHEREAS, qualified parties, organizations and coalitions
participating under the party-list system of representation that have
obtained one guaranteed (1) seat may be entitled to an additional seat
or seats based on the formula prescribed by the Supreme Court
in Veterans;

WHEREAS, in determining the additional seats for the first
party, the correct formula as expressed in Veterans, is:

Number of votes of first party Proportion of votes of first
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - = party relative to total votes for
Total votes for party-list system party-list system

wherein the proportion of votes received by the first party (without
rounding off) shall entitle it to additional seats:

Proportion of votes received
by the first party
Additional seats
Equal to or at least 6% Two (2) additional seats
Equal to or greater than 4% but less than 6% One (1) additional seat
Less than 4% No additional seat

WHEREAS, applying the above formula, Buhay obtained the
following percentage:

1,178,747
- - - - - - - - = 0.07248 or 7.2%
16,261,369

which entitles it to two (2) additional seats.

WHEREAS, in determining the additional seats for the other
qualified parties, organizations and coalitions, the correct formula as
expressed in Veterans and reiterated in CIBAC is, as follows:

No. of votes of
concerned party No. of additional
Additional seats for = ------------------- x seats allocated to
a concerned party No. of votes of first party
first party

WHEREAS, applying the above formula, the results are as
follows:

Party List Percentage Additional Seat
BAYAN MUNA 1.65 1
CIBAC 1.28 1
GABRIELA 1.05 1
APEC 1.05 1
A TEACHER 0.83 0
AKBAYAN 0.78 0
ALAGAD 0.71 0
BUTIL 0.69 0
COOP-NATCO 0.69 0
ANAKPAWIS 0.62 0
ARC 0.63 0
ABONO 0.57 0


NOW THEREFORE, by virtue of the powers vested in it by the
Constitution, Omnibus Election Code, Executive Order No. 144,
Republic Act Nos. 6646, 7166, 7941 and other elections laws, the
Commission on Elections en banc sitting as the National Board of
Canvassers, hereby RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to proclaim
the following parties, organizations or coalitions as entitled to
additional seats, to wit:


Party List Additional Seats
BUHAY 2
BAYAN MUNA 1
CIBAC 1
GABRIELA 1
APEC 1

This is without prejudice to the proclamation of other parties,
organizations or coalitions which may later on be established to have
obtained at least two per cent (2%) of the total votes cast under the
party-list system to entitle them to one (1) guaranteed seat, or to the
appropriate percentage of votes to entitle them to one (1) additional
seat.

Finally, all proclamation of the nominees of concerned parties,
organizations and coalitions with pending disputes shall likewise be
held in abeyance until final resolution of their respective cases.

Let the National Board of Canvassers Secretariat implement this
Resolution, furnishing a copy hereof to the Speaker of the House of
Representatives of the Philippines.

SO ORDERED.
[9]



Acting on BANATs petition, the NBC promulgated NBC Resolution No. 07-88 on 3
August 2007, which reads as follows:

This pertains to the Petition to Proclaim the Full Number of
Party-List Representatives Provided by the Constitution filed by the
Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency
(BANAT).

Acting on the foregoing Petition of the Barangay Association for
National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) party-list, Atty.
Alioden D. Dalaig, Head, National Board of Canvassers Legal Group
submitted his comments/observations and recommendation thereon
[NBC 07-041 (PL)], which reads:

COMMENTS / OBSERVATIONS:

Petitioner Barangay Association for National
Advancement and Transparency (BANAT), in its
Petition to Proclaim the Full Number of Party-List
Representatives Provided by the Constitution
prayed for the following reliefs, to wit:

1. That the full number -- twenty percent
(20%) -- of Party-List representatives as mandated
by Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution shall be
proclaimed.

2. Paragraph (b), Section 11 of RA 7941 which
prescribes the 2% threshold votes, should be
harmonized with Section 5, Article VI of the
Constitution and with Section 12 of the same RA
7941 in that it should be applicable only to the first
party-list representative seats to be allotted on the
basis of their initial/first ranking.

3. The 3-seat limit prescribed by RA 7941 shall
be applied; and

4. Initially, all party-list groups shall be given
the number of seats corresponding to every 2% of
the votes they received and the additional seats
shall be allocated in accordance with Section 12 of
RA 7941, that is, in proportion to the percentage of
votes obtained by each party-list group in relation
to the total nationwide votes cast in the party-list
election, after deducting the corresponding votes of
those which were allotted seats under the 2%
threshold rule. In fine, the formula/procedure
prescribed in the ALLOCATION OF PARTY-LIST
SEATS, ANNEX A of COMELEC RESOLUTION 2847
dated 25 June 1996, shall be used for [the] purpose
of determining how many seats shall be
proclaimed, which party-list groups are entitled to
representative seats and how many of their
nominees shall seat [sic].

5. In the alternative, to declare as
unconstitutional Section 11 of Republic Act No.
7941 and that the procedure in allocating seats for
party-list representative prescribed by Section 12
of RA 7941 shall be followed.

RECOMMENDATION:

The petition of BANAT is now moot and academic.

The Commission En Banc in NBC Resolution No.
07-60 promulgated July 9, 2007 re In the Matter of
the Canvass of Votes and Partial Proclamation of
the Parties, Organizations and Coalitions
Participating Under the Party-List System During
the May 14, 2007 National and Local
Elections resolved among others that the total
number of seats of each winning party, organization
or coalition shall be determined pursuant to
the Veterans Federation Party versus COMELEC
formula upon completion of the canvass of the party-
list results.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the National Board of
Canvassers RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to approve and adopt
the recommendation of Atty. Alioden D. Dalaig, Head, NBC Legal
Group, to DENY the herein petition of BANAT for being moot and
academic.

Let the Supervisory Committee implement this resolution. SO
ORDERED.
[10]


BANAT filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus assailing the ruling in NBC
Resolution No. 07-88. BANAT did not file a motion for reconsideration of NBC
Resolution No. 07-88.

On 9 July 2007, Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher asked the COMELEC, acting as
NBC, to reconsider its decision to use the Veterans formula as stated in its NBC
Resolution No. 07-60 because the Veterans formula is violative of the Constitution and of
Republic Act No. 7941 (R.A. No. 7941). On the same day, the COMELEC denied
reconsideration during the proceedings of the NBC.
[11]


Aside from the thirteen party-list organizations proclaimed on 9 July 2007, the
COMELEC proclaimed three other party-list organizations as qualified parties entitled to
one guaranteed seat under the Party-List System: Agricultural Sector Alliance of the
Philippines, Inc. (AGAP),
[12]
Anak Mindanao (AMIN),
[13]
and An Waray.
[14]
Per the
certification
[15]
by COMELEC, the following party-list organizations have been
proclaimed as of 19 May 2008:

Party-List No. of Seat(s)
1.1 Buhay 3
1.2 Bayan Muna 2
1.3 CIBAC 2
1.4 Gabriela 2
1.5 APEC 2
1.6 A Teacher 1
1.7 Akbayan 1
1.8 Alagad 1
1.9 Butil 1
1.10 Coop-Natco [sic] 1
1.11 Anak Pawis 1
1.12 ARC 1
1.13 Abono 1
1.14 AGAP 1
1.15 AMIN 1

The proclamation of Bagong Alyansang Tagapagtaguyod ng Adhikaing Sambayanan
(BATAS), against which an Urgent Petition for Cancellation/Removal of Registration and
Disqualification of Party-list Nominee (with Prayer for the Issuance of Restraining
Order) has been filed before the COMELEC, was deferred pending final resolution of
SPC No. 07-250.



Issues

BANAT brought the following issues before this Court:

1. Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list
representatives provided in Section 5(2), Article VI of the
Constitution mandatory or is it merely a ceiling?

2. Is the three-seat limit provided in Section 11(b) of RA
7941 constitutional?

3. Is the two percent threshold and qualifier votes prescribed by
the same Section 11(b) of RA 7941 constitutional?

4. How shall the party-list representatives be allocated?
[16]



Bayan Muna, A Teacher, and Abono, on the other hand, raised the following issues
in their petition:

I. Respondent Commission on Elections, acting as National Board
of Canvassers, committed grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it promulgated NBC
Resolution No. 07-60 to implement the First-Party Rule in the
allocation of seats to qualified party-list organizations as said rule:

A. Violates the constitutional principle of
proportional representation.

B. Violates the provisions of RA 7941 particularly:

1. The 2-4-6 Formula used by the First Party Rule
in allocating additional seats for the First
Party violates the principle of proportional
representation under RA 7941.

2. The use of two formulas in the allocation
of additional seats, one for the First Party
and another for the qualifying parties, violates
Section 11(b) of RA 7941.

3. The proportional relationships under the First
Party Rule are different from those required under
RA 7941;

C. Violates the Four Inviolable Parameters of the
Philippine party-list system as provided for under the same
case of Veterans Federation Party, et al. v. COMELEC.

II. Presuming that the Commission on Elections did not commit
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when it implemented the First-Party Rule in the
allocation of seats to qualified party-list organizations, the same
being merely in consonance with the ruling in Veterans
Federations Party, et al. v. COMELEC, the instant Petition is a
justiciable case as the issues involved herein are constitutional in
nature, involving the correct interpretation and implementation
of RA 7941, and are of transcendental importance to our nation.
[17]


Considering the allegations in the petitions and the comments of the parties in these
cases, we defined the following issues in our advisory for the oral arguments set on 22
April 2008:

1. Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives
in Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution mandatory or merely
a ceiling?

2. Is the three-seat limit in Section 11(b) of RA 7941
constitutional?

3. Is the two percent threshold prescribed in Section 11(b) of
RA 7941 to qualify for one seat constitutional?

4. How shall the party-list representative seats be allocated?

5. Does the Constitution prohibit the major political parties
from participating in the party-list elections? If not, can the
major political parties be barred from participating in the party-
list elections?
[18]



The Ruling of the Court

The petitions have partial merit. We maintain that a Philippine-style party-list
election has at least four inviolable parameters as clearly stated in Veterans. For easy
reference, these are:

First, the twenty percent allocation the combined number
of all party-list congressmen shall not exceed twenty percent of the
total membership of the House of Representatives, including those
elected under the party list;

Second, the two percent threshold only those parties
garnering a minimum of two percent of the total valid votes cast for
the party-list system are qualified to have a seat in the House of
Representatives;

Third, the three-seat limit each qualified party, regardless of
the number of votes it actually obtained, is entitled to a maximum of
three seats; that is, one qualifying and two additional seats;

Fourth, proportional representation the additional seats
which a qualified party is entitled to shall be computed in proportion
to their total number of votes.
[19]



However, because the formula in Veterans has flaws in its mathematical interpretation of
the term proportional representation, this Court is compelled to revisit the formula for
the allocation of additional seats to party-list organizations.

Number of Party-List Representatives:
The Formula Mandated by the Constitution


Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution provides:

Section 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed
of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise
fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts
apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila
area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants,
and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as
provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of
registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.

(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per
centum of the total number of representatives including those under
the party-list. For three consecutive terms after the ratification of this
Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated to party-list
representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or
election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be
provided by law, except the religious sector.


The first paragraph of Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941 reads:

Section 11. Number of Party-List Representatives. The party-
list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum (20%) of the
total number of the members of the House of Representatives
including those under the party-list.
x x x


Section 5(1), Article VI of the Constitution states that the House of Representatives
shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise
fixed by law. The House of Representatives shall be composed of district
representatives and party-list representatives. The Constitution allows the legislature to
modify the number of the members of the House of Representatives.

Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution, on the other hand, states the ratio of
party-list representatives to the total number of representatives. We compute the
number of seats available to party-list representatives from the number of legislative
districts. On this point, we do not deviate from the first formula in Veterans, thus:

Number of seats available
to legislative districts

x .20 =
Number of seats available to
party-list representatives
.80


This formula allows for the corresponding increase in the number of seats available for
party-list representatives whenever a legislative district is created by law. Since the
14
th
Congress of the Philippines has 220 district representatives, there are 55 seats
available to party-list representatives.

220 x .20 = 55
.80

After prescribing the ratio of the number of party-list representatives to the total
number of representatives, the Constitution left the manner of allocating the seats
available to party-list representatives to the wisdom of the legislature.

Allocation of Seats for Party-List Representatives:
The Statutory Limits Presented by the Two Percent Threshold
and the Three-Seat Cap


All parties agree on the formula to determine the maximum number of seats
reserved under the Party-List System, as well as on the formula to determine the
guaranteed seats to party-list candidates garnering at least two-percent of the total
party-list votes. However, there are numerous interpretations of the provisions of R.A.
No. 7941 on the allocation of additional seats under the Party-List
System. Veterans produced the First Party Rule,
[20]
and Justice Vicente V. Mendozas
dissent in Veterans presented Germanys Niemeyer formula
[21]
as an alternative.

The Constitution left to Congress the determination of the manner of allocating the
seats for party-list representatives. Congress enacted R.A. No. 7941, paragraphs (a)
and (b) of Section 11 and Section 12 of which provide:

Section 11. Number of Party-List Representatives. x x x

In determining the allocation of seats for the second vote,
[22]
the
following procedure shall be observed:

(a) The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from
the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they garnered
during the elections.

(b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two
percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be
entitled to one seat each: Provided, That those garnering more
than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional
seats in proportion to their total number of votes: Provided,
finally, That each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to
not more than three (3) seats.

Section 12. Procedure in Allocating Seats for Party-List
Representatives. The COMELEC shall tally all the votes for the
parties, organizations, or coalitions on a nationwide basis, rank them
according to the number of votes received and allocate party-list
representatives proportionately according to the percentage of votes
obtained by each party, organization, or coalition as against the total
nationwide votes cast for the party-list system. (Emphasis supplied)


In G.R. No. 179271, BANAT presents two interpretations through three formulas to
allocate party-list representative seats.

The first interpretation allegedly harmonizes the provisions of Section 11(b) on the
2% requirement with Section 12 of R.A. No. 7941. BANAT described this procedure as
follows:

(a) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty percent
(20%) of the total Members of the House of Representatives including
those from the party-list groups as prescribed by Section 5, Article VI
of the Constitution, Section 11 (1
st
par.) of RA 7941 and Comelec
Resolution No. 2847 dated 25 June 1996. Since there are 220 District
Representatives in the 14
th
Congress, there shall be 55 Party-List
Representatives. All seats shall have to be proclaimed.

(b) All party-list groups shall initially be allotted one (1) seat for
every two per centum (2%) of the total party-list votes they obtained;
provided, that no party-list groups shall have more than three (3)
seats (Section 11, RA 7941).

(c) The remaining seats shall, after deducting the seats obtained
by the party-list groups under the immediately preceding paragraph
and after deducting from their total the votes corresponding to those
seats, the remaining seats shall be allotted proportionately to all the
party-list groups which have not secured the maximum three (3) seats
under the 2% threshold rule, in accordance with Section 12 of RA
7941.
[23]



Forty-four (44) party-list seats will be awarded under BANATs first interpretation.

The second interpretation presented by BANAT assumes that the 2% vote
requirement is declared unconstitutional, and apportions the seats for party-list
representatives by following Section 12 of R.A. No. 7941. BANAT states that the
COMELEC:

(a) shall tally all the votes for the parties, organizations, or
coalitions on a nationwide basis;
(b) rank them according to the number of votes received; and,
(c) allocate party-list representatives proportionately according
to the percentage of votes obtained by each party, organization
or coalition as against the total nationwide votes cast for the
party-list system.
[24]


BANAT used two formulas to obtain the same results: one is based on the proportional
percentage of the votes received by each party as against the total nationwide party-list
votes, and the other is by making the votes of a party-list with a median percentage of
votes as the divisor in computing the allocation of seats.
[25]
Thirty-four (34) party-list
seats will be awarded under BANATs second interpretation.

In G.R. No. 179295, Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher criticize both the
COMELECs original 2-4-6 formula and theVeterans formula for systematically
preventing all the party-list seats from being filled up. They claim that both formulas do
not factor in the total number of seats alloted for the entire Party-List System. Bayan
Muna, Abono, and A Teacher reject the three-seat cap, but accept the 2% threshold. After
determining the qualified parties, a second percentage is generated by dividing the votes
of a qualified party by the total votes of all qualified parties only. The number of seats
allocated to a qualified party is computed by multiplying the total party-list seats
available with the second percentage. There will be a first round of seat allocation,
limited to using the whole integers as the equivalent of the number of seats allocated to
the concerned party-list. After all the qualified parties are given their seats, a second
round of seat allocation is conducted. The fractions, or remainders, from the whole
integers are ranked from highest to lowest and the remaining seats on the basis of this
ranking are allocated until all the seats are filled up.
[26]


We examine what R.A. No. 7941 prescribes to allocate seats for party-list
representatives.

Section 11(a) of R.A. No. 7941 prescribes the ranking of the participating parties
from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they garnered during the
elections.



Table 1. Ranking of the participating parties from the highest to the
lowest based on the number of votes garnered during the
elections.
[27]



Rank Party
Votes
Garnered
Rank Party
Votes
Garnered
1 BUHAY 1,169,234 48 KALAHI 88,868
2 BAYAN MUNA 979,039 49 APOI 79,386
3 CIBAC 755,686 50 BP 78,541
4 GABRIELA 621,171 51 AHONBAYAN 78,424
5 APEC 619,657 52 BIGKIS 77,327
6 A TEACHER 490,379 53 PMAP 75,200
7 AKBAYAN 466,112 54 AKAPIN 74,686
8 ALAGAD 423,149 55 PBA 71,544
9 COOP-NATCCO 409,883 56 GRECON 62,220
10 BUTIL 409,160 57 BTM 60,993
11 BATAS 385,810 58 A SMILE 58,717
12 ARC 374,288 59 NELFFI 57,872
13 ANAKPAWIS 370,261 60 AKSA 57,012
14 ABONO 339,990 61 BAGO 55,846
15 AMIN 338,185 62 BANDILA 54,751
16 AGAP 328,724 63 AHON 54,522
17 AN WARAY 321,503 64 ASAHAN MO 51,722
18 YACAP 310,889 65 AGBIAG! 50,837
19 FPJPM 300,923 66 SPI 50,478
20 UNI-MAD 245,382 67 BAHANDI 46,612
21 ABS 235,086 68 ADD 45,624
22 KAKUSA 228,999 69 AMANG 43,062
23 KABATAAN 228,637 70 ABAY PARAK 42,282
24 ABA-AKO 218,818 71 BABAE KA 36,512
25 ALIF 217,822 72 SB 34,835
26 SENIOR
CITIZENS
213,058 73 ASAP 34,098
27 AT 197,872 74 PEP 33,938
28 VFP 196,266 75 ABA ILONGGO 33,903
29 ANAD 188,521 76 VENDORS 33,691
30 BANAT 177,028 77 ADD-TRIBAL 32,896
31 ANG
KASANGGA
170,531 78 ALMANA 32,255
32 BANTAY 169,801 79 AANGAT KA
PILIPINO
29,130
33 ABAKADA 166,747 80 AAPS 26,271
34 1-UTAK 164,980 81 HAPI 25,781
35 TUCP 162,647 82 AAWAS 22,946
36 COCOFED 155,920 83 SM 20,744
37 AGHAM 146,032 84 AG 16,916
38 ANAK 141,817 85 AGING PINOY 16,729
39 ABANSE!
PINAY
130,356 86 APO 16,421
40 PM 119,054 87 BIYAYANG
BUKID
16,241
41 AVE 110,769 88 ATS 14,161
42 SUARA 110,732 89 UMDJ 9,445
43 ASSALAM 110,440 90 BUKLOD
FILIPINA
8,915
44 DIWA 107,021 91 LYPAD 8,471
45 ANC 99,636 92 AA-KASOSYO 8,406
46 SANLAKAS 97,375 93 KASAPI 6,221
47 ABC 90,058 TOTAL 15,950,900


The first clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 states that parties, organizations,
and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list
system shall be entitled to one seat each. This clause guarantees a seat to the two-
percenters. In Table 2 below, we use the first 20 party-list candidates for illustration
purposes. The percentage of votes garnered by each party is arrived at by dividing the
number of votes garnered by each party by 15,950,900, the total number of votes cast for
all party-list candidates.

Table 2. The first 20 party-list candidates and their respective
percentage of votes garnered over the total votes for the party-list.
[28]


Rank Party
Votes
Garnered
Votes Garnered
over Total
Votes for Party-
List, in %
Guaranteed
Seat
1 BUHAY 1,169,234 7.33% 1
2 BAYAN MUNA 979,039 6.14% 1
3 CIBAC 755,686 4.74% 1
4 GABRIELA 621,171 3.89% 1
5 APEC 619,657 3.88% 1
6 A TEACHER 490,379 3.07% 1
7 AKBAYAN 466,112 2.92% 1
8 ALAGAD 423,149 2.65% 1
9 COOP-NATCCO 409,883 2.57% 1
10 BUTIL 409,160 2.57% 1
11 BATAS
[29]
385,810 2.42% 1
12 ARC 374,288 2.35% 1
13 ANAKPAWIS 370,261 2.32% 1
14 ABONO 339,990 2.13% 1
15 AMIN 338,185 2.12% 1
16 AGAP 328,724 2.06% 1
17 AN WARAY 321,503 2.02% 1
Total 17
18 YACAP 310,889 1.95% 0
19 FPJPM 300,923 1.89% 0
20 UNI-MAD 245,382 1.54% 0


From Table 2 above, we see that only 17 party-list candidates received at least 2%
from the total number of votes cast for party-list candidates. The 17 qualified party-list
candidates, or the two-percenters, are the party-list candidates that are entitled to one
seat each, or the guaranteed seat. In this first round of seat allocation, we distributed 17
guaranteed seats.
The second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 provides that those garnering
more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in
proportion to their total number of votes. This is where petitioners and intervenors
problem with the formula in Veterans lies. Veterans interprets the clause in proportion
to their total number of votes to be in proportion to the votes of the first party. This
interpretation is contrary to the express language of R.A. No. 7941.

We rule that, in computing the allocation of additional seats, the continued
operation of the two percent threshold for the distribution of the additional seats as
found in the second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 is unconstitutional. This
Court finds that the two percent threshold makes it mathematically impossible to
achieve the maximum number of available party list seats when the number of available
party list seats exceeds 50. The continued operation of the two percent threshold in the
distribution of the additional seats frustrates the attainment of the permissive ceiling
that 20% of the members of the House of Representatives shall consist of party-list
representatives.

To illustrate: There are 55 available party-list seats. Suppose there are 50 million
votes cast for the 100 participants in the party list elections. A party that has two
percent of the votes cast, or one million votes, gets a guaranteed seat. Let us further
assume that the first 50 parties all get one million votes. Only 50 parties get a seat
despite the availability of 55 seats. Because of the operation of the two percent
threshold, this situation will repeat itself even if we increase the available party-list seats
to 60 seats and even if we increase the votes cast to 100 million. Thus, even if the
maximum number of parties get two percent of the votes for every party, it is always
impossible for the number of occupied party-list seats to exceed 50 seats as long as the
two percent threshold is present.

We therefore strike down the two percent threshold only in relation to the
distribution of the additional seats as found in the second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A.
No. 7941. The two percent threshold presents an unwarranted obstacle to the full
implementation of Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution and prevents the
attainment of the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests
in the House of Representatives.
[30]


In determining the allocation of seats for party-list representatives under Section
11 of R.A. No. 7941, the following procedure shall be observed:

1. The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to
the lowest based on the number of votes they garnered during the elections.

2. The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%)
of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one guaranteed seat
each.

3. Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to the ranking in
paragraph 1, shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of
votes until all the additional seats are allocated.

4. Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three
(3) seats.

In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats shall no longer be included
because they have already been allocated, at one seat each, to every two-
percenter. Thus, the remaining available seats for allocation as additional
seats are the maximum seats reserved under the Party List System less the guaranteed
seats. Fractional seats are disregarded in the absence of a provision in R.A. No. 7941
allowing for a rounding off of fractional seats.

In declaring the two percent threshold unconstitutional, we do not limit our
allocation of additional seats in Table 3 below to the two-percenters. The percentage of
votes garnered by each party-list candidate is arrived at by dividing the number of votes
garnered by each party by 15,950,900, the total number of votes cast for party-list
candidates. There are two steps in the second round of seat allocation. First, the
percentage is multiplied by the remaining available seats, 38, which is the difference
between the 55 maximum seats reserved under the Party-List System and the 17
guaranteed seats of the two-percenters. The whole integer of the product of the
percentage and of the remaining available seats corresponds to a partys share in the
remaining available seats. Second, we assign one party-list seat to each of the parties
next in rank until all available seats are completely distributed. We distributed all of the
remaining 38 seats in the second round of seat allocation. Finally, we apply the three-
seat cap to determine the number of seats each qualified party-list candidate is
entitled. Thus:


Table 3. Distribution of Available Party-List Seats

Ran
k
Party
Votes
Garnere
d
Votes
Garnere
d over
Total
Votes for
Party
List, in %



(A)
Guarantee
d Seat





(First
Round)

(B)
Additiona
l
Seats





(Second
Round)

(C)
(B) plus
(C), in
whole
integer
s






(D)
Applyin
g the
three
seat cap






(E)
1 BUHAY 1,169,234 7.33% 1 2.79 3 N.A.
2 BAYAN
MUNA
979,039 6.14% 1 2.33 3 N.A.
3 CIBAC 755,686 4.74% 1 1.80 2 N.A.
4 GABRIELA 621,171 3.89% 1 1.48 2 N.A.
5 APEC 619,657 3.88% 1 1.48 2 N.A.
6 A Teacher 490,379 3.07% 1 1.17 2 N.A.
7 AKBAYAN 466,112 2.92% 1 1.11 2 N.A.
8 ALAGAD 423,149 2.65% 1 1.01 2 N.A.
9
[31]
COOP-
NATCCO
409,883 2.57% 1 1 2 N.A.
10 BUTIL 409,160 2.57% 1 1 2 N.A.
11 BATAS 385,810 2.42% 1 1 2 N.A.
12 ARC 374,288 2.35% 1 1 2 N.A.
13 ANAKPAWI
S
370,261 2.32% 1 1 2 N.A.
14 ABONO 339,990 2.13% 1 1 2 N.A.
15 AMIN 338,185 2.12% 1 1 2 N.A.
16 AGAP 328,724 2.06% 1 1 2 N.A.
17 AN WARAY 321,503 2.02% 1 1 2 N.A.
18 YACAP 310,889 1.95% 0 1 1 N.A.
19 FPJPM 300,923 1.89% 0 1 1 N.A.
20 UNI-MAD 245,382 1.54% 0 1 1 N.A.
21 ABS 235,086 1.47% 0 1 1 N.A.
22 KAKUSA 228,999 1.44% 0 1 1 N.A.
23 KABATAAN 228,637 1.43% 0 1 1 N.A.
24 ABA-AKO 218,818 1.37% 0 1 1 N.A.
25 ALIF 217,822 1.37% 0 1 1 N.A.
26 SENIOR
CITIZENS
213,058 1.34% 0 1 1 N.A.
27 AT 197,872 1.24% 0 1 1 N.A.
28 VFP 196,266 1.23% 0 1 1 N.A.
29 ANAD 188,521 1.18% 0 1 1 N.A.
30 BANAT 177,028 1.11% 0 1 1 N.A.
31 ANG
KASANGGA
170,531 1.07% 0 1 1 N.A.
32 BANTAY 169,801 1.06% 0 1 1 N.A.
33 ABAKADA 166,747 1.05% 0 1 1 N.A.
34 1-UTAK 164,980 1.03% 0 1 1 N.A.
35 TUCP 162,647 1.02% 0 1 1 N.A.
36 COCOFED 155,920 0.98% 0 1 1 N.A.
Tota
l
17 55


Applying the procedure of seat allocation as illustrated in Table 3 above, there are
55 party-list representatives from the 36 winning party-list organizations. All 55
available party-list seats are filled. The additional seats allocated to the parties with
sufficient number of votes for one whole seat, in no case to exceed a total of three seats
for each party, are shown in column (D).

Participation of Major Political Parties in Party-List Elections

The Constitutional Commission adopted a multi-party system that allowed all
political parties to participate in the party-list elections. The deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission clearly bear this out, thus:

MR. MONSOD. Madam President, I just want to say that we
suggested or proposed the party list system because we wanted to
open up the political system to a pluralistic society through a
multiparty system. x x x We are for opening up the system, and
we would like very much for the sectors to be there. That is why
one of the ways to do that is to put a ceiling on the number of
representatives from any single party that can sit within the 50
allocated under the party list system. x x x.

x x x

MR. MONSOD. Madam President, the candidacy for the 198
seats is not limited to political parties. My question is this: Are we
going to classify for example Christian Democrats and Social
Democrats as political parties? Can they run under the party list
concept or must they be under the district legislation side of it only?

MR. VILLACORTA. In reply to that query, I think these parties
that the Commissioner mentioned can field candidates for the Senate
as well as for the House of Representatives. Likewise, they can also
field sectoral candidates for the 20 percent or 30 percent,
whichever is adopted, of the seats that we are allocating under
the party list system.

MR. MONSOD. In other words, the Christian Democrats can
field district candidates and can also participate in the party list
system?

MR. VILLACORTA. Why not? When they come to the party
list system, they will be fielding only sectoral candidates.

MR. MONSOD. May I be clarified on that? Can UNIDO
participate in the party list system?

MR. VILLACORTA. Yes, why not? For as long as they field
candidates who come from the different marginalized sectors
that we shall designate in this Constitution.

MR. MONSOD. Suppose Senator Taada wants to run under
BAYAN group and says that he represents the farmers, would he
qualify?

MR. VILLACORTA. No, Senator Taada would not qualify.

MR. MONSOD. But UNIDO can field candidates under the party
list system and say Juan dela Cruz is a farmer. Who would pass on
whether he is a farmer or not?

MR. TADEO. Kay Commissioner Monsod, gusto ko lamang
linawin ito. Political parties, particularly minority political
parties, are not prohibited to participate in the party list election
if they can prove that they are also organized along sectoral lines.

MR. MONSOD. What the Commissioner is saying is that all
political parties can participate because it is precisely the contention
of political parties that they represent the broad base of citizens and
that all sectors are represented in them. Would the Commissioner
agree?

MR. TADEO. Ang punto lamang namin, pag pinayagan mo ang
UNIDO na isang political party, it will dominate the party list at
mawawalang saysay din yung sector. Lalamunin mismo ng political
parties ang party list system. Gusto ko lamang bigyan ng diin ang
reserve. Hindi ito reserve seat sa marginalized sectors. Kung
titingnan natin itong 198 seats, reserved din ito sa political parties.

MR. MONSOD. Hindi po reserved iyon kasi anybody can run
there. But my question to Commissioner Villacorta and probably also
to Commissioner Tadeo is that under this system, would UNIDO be
banned from running under the party list system?

MR. VILLACORTA. No, as I said, UNIDO may field sectoral
candidates. On that condition alone, UNIDO may be allowed to
register for the party list system.

MR. MONSOD. May I inquire from Commissioner Tadeo if he
shares that answer?

MR. TADEO. The same.

MR. VILLACORTA. Puwede po ang UNIDO, pero sa sectoral
lines.

x x x x

MR. OPLE. x x x In my opinion, this will also create the
stimulus for political parties and mass organizations to seek common
ground. For example, we have the PDP-Laban and the UNIDO. I see
no reason why they should not be able to make common goals with
mass organizations so that the very leadership of these parties can be
transformed through the participation of mass organizations. And if
this is true of the administration parties, this will be true of others like
the Partido ng Bayan which is now being formed. There is no
question that they will be attractive to many mass organizations. In
the opposition parties to which we belong, there will be a stimulus for
us to contact mass organizations so that with their participation, the
policies of such parties can be radically transformed because this
amendment will create conditions that will challenge both the mass
organizations and the political parties to come together. And the
party list system is certainly available, although it is open to all the
parties. It is understood that the parties will enter in the roll of the
COMELEC the names of representatives of mass organizations
affiliated with them. So that we may, in time, develop this excellent
system that they have in Europe where labor organizations and
cooperatives, for example, distribute themselves either in the Social
Democratic Party and the Christian Democratic Party in Germany, and
their very presence there has a transforming effect upon the
philosophies and the leadership of those parties.

It is also a fact well known to all that in the United States, the
AFL-CIO always vote with the Democratic Party. But the
businessmen, most of them, always vote with the Republican Party,
meaning that there is no reason at all why political parties and mass
organizations should not combine, reenforce, influence and interact
with each other so that the very objectives that we set in this
Constitution for sectoral representation are achieved in a wider, more
lasting, and more institutionalized way. Therefore, I support this
[Monsod-Villacorta] amendment. It installs sectoral representation as
a constitutional gift, but at the same time, it challenges the sector to
rise to the majesty of being elected representatives later on through a
party list system; and even beyond that, to become actual political
parties capable of contesting political power in the wider
constitutional arena for major political parties.

x x x
[32]
(Emphasis supplied)
R.A. No. 7941 provided the details for the concepts put forward by the
Constitutional Commission. Section 3 of R.A. No. 7941 reads:

Definition of Terms. (a) The party-list system is a mechanism of
proportional representation in the election of representatives to the
House of Representatives from national, regional and sectoral parties
or organizations or coalitions thereof registered with the Commission
on Elections (COMELEC). Component parties or organizations of a
coalition may participate independently provided the coalition of
which they form part does not participate in the party-list system.

(b) A party means either a political party or a sectoral party or a
coalition of parties.

(c) A political party refers to an organized group of citizens
advocating an ideology or platform, principles and policies for the
general conduct of government and which, as the most immediate
means of securing their adoption, regularly nominates and supports
certain of its leaders and members as candidates for public office.

It is a national party when its constituency is spread over the
geographical territory of at least a majority of the regions. It is a
regional party when its constituency is spread over the geographical
territory of at least a majority of the cities and provinces comprising
the region.

(d) A sectoral party refers to an organized group of citizens
belonging to any of the sectors enumerated in Section 5 hereof whose
principal advocacy pertains to the special interests and concerns of
their sector,

(e) A sectoral organization refers to a group of citizens or a
coalition of groups of citizens who share similar physical attributes or
characteristics, employment, interests or concerns.

(f) A coalition refers to an aggrupation of duly registered
national, regional, sectoral parties or organizations for political
and/or election purposes.

Congress, in enacting R.A. No. 7941, put the three-seat cap to prevent any party from
dominating the party-list elections.

Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 prohibits major political parties from
participating in the party-list system. On the contrary, the framers of the Constitution
clearly intended the major political parties to participate in party-list elections through
their sectoral wings. In fact, the members of the Constitutional Commission voted down,
19-22, any permanent sectoral seats, and in the alternative the reservation of the party-
list system to the sectoral groups.
[33]
In defining a party that participates in party-list
elections as either a political party or a sectoral party, R.A. No. 7941 also clearly
intended that major political parties will participate in the party-list elections. Excluding
the major political parties in party-list elections is manifestly against the Constitution,
the intent of the Constitutional Commission, and R.A. No. 7941. This Court cannot
engage in socio-political engineering and judicially legislate the exclusion of major
political parties from the party-list elections in patent violation of the Constitution and
the law.

Read together, R.A. No. 7941 and the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission state that major political parties are allowed to establish, or form coalitions
with, sectoral organizations for electoral or political purposes. There should not be a
problem if, for example, the Liberal Party participates in the party-list election through
the Kabataang Liberal ng Pilipinas (KALIPI), its sectoral youth wing. The other major
political parties can thus organize, or affiliate with, their chosen sector or sectors. To
further illustrate, the Nacionalista Party can establish a fisherfolk wing to participate in
the party-list election, and this fisherfolk wing can field its fisherfolk
nominees. Kabalikat ng Malayang Pilipino (KAMPI) can do the same for the urban poor.

The qualifications of party-list nominees are prescribed in Section 9 of R.A. No.
7941:


Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. No person shall be
nominated as party-list representative unless he is a natural born
citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, a resident of the
Philippines for a period of not less than one (1) year immediately
preceding the day of the elections, able to read and write, bona
fide member of the party or organization which he seeks to represent
for at least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the election, and is at
least twenty-five (25) years of age on the day of the election.

In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be
twenty-five (25) but not more than thirty (30) years of age on the day
of the election. Any youth sectoral representative who
attains the age of thirty (30) during his term shall be allowed to
continue until the expiration of his term.

Under Section 9 of R.A. No. 7941, it is not necessary that the party-list organizations
nominee wallow in poverty, destitution and infirmity
[34]
as there is no financial status
required in the law. It is enough that the nominee of the sectoral
party/organization/coalition belongs to the marginalized and underrepresented
sectors,
[35]
that is, if the nominee represents the fisherfolk, he or she must be a fisherfolk,
or if the nominee represents the senior citizens, he or she must be a senior citizen.

Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 mandates the filling-up of the entire 20%
allocation of party-list representatives found in the Constitution. The Constitution, in
paragraph 1, Section 5 of Article VI, left the determination of the number of the members
of the House of Representatives to Congress: The House of Representatives shall be
composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by
law, x x x. The 20% allocation of party-list representatives is merely a ceiling; party-list
representatives cannot be more than 20% of the members of the House of
Representatives. However, we cannot allow the continued existence of a provision in the
law which will systematically prevent the constitutionally allocated 20% party-list
representatives from being filled. The three-seat cap, as a limitation to the number of
seats that a qualified party-list organization may occupy, remains a valid statutory device
that prevents any party from dominating the party-list elections. Seats for party-list
representatives shall thus be allocated in accordance with the procedure used in Table 3
above.

However, by a vote of 8-7, the Court decided to continue the ruling
in Veterans disallowing major political parties from participating in the party-list
elections, directly or indirectly. Those who voted to continue disallowing major political
parties from the party-list elections joined Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno in his separate
opinion. On the formula to allocate party-list seats, the Court is unanimous in
concurring with this ponencia.

WHEREFORE, we PARTIALLY GRANT the petition. We SET ASIDE the Resolution
of the COMELEC dated 3 August 2007 in NBC No. 07-041 (PL) as well as the Resolution
dated 9 July 2007 in NBC No. 07-60. We declare unconstitutional the two percent
threshold in the distribution of additional party-list seats. The allocation of additional
seats under the Party-List System shall be in accordance with the procedure used in
Table 3 of this Decision. Major political parties are disallowed from participating in
party-list elections. This Decision is immediately executory. No pronouncement as to
costs.

SO ORDERED.


[G.R. No. 162203. April 14, 2004]
AKLAT-ASOSASYON PARA SA KAUNLARAN NG LIPUNAN AT ADHIKAIN PARA SA
TAO, INC., petitioner, vs.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
(COMELEC), respondent.
R E S O L U T I O N
TINGA, J.:
For resolution is the Petition
[1]
for certiorari and mandamus filed by Aklat-
Asosasyon Para Sa Kaunlaran Ng Lipunan At Adhikain Para Sa Tao, Inc. (Aklat) assailing
the Commission on Elections (Comelec) Resolution
[2]
dated January 8, 2004, which
dismissed its Petition
[3]
for re-qualification as a party-list organization, and
the Resolution
[4]
dated February 13, 2004, which denied its Motion for Reconsideration.
[5]

Briefly, the facts are as follows:
On November 20, 2003, Aklat filed a Petition for declaration of re-qualification as a
party-list organization for purposes of the May 2004 elections. It alleged in its petition
that it participated in the 2001 elections but was disqualified by the Comelec as it was
found not to have complied with the guidelines set by the Court in the case of Ang
Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Comelec (Bagong Bayani case)
[6]
for party-list
organizations to qualify and participate as such in the party-list elections. Accordingly,
Aklat re-organized itself in order that it will comply with the 8-point guidelines
enunciated by the Supreme Court
[7]
in the said case.
In its assailed Resolution dated January 8, 2004, the Comelec dismissed the petition
stating that Aklat cannot be considered as an organization representing the marginalized
and underrepresented groups as identified under Section 5 of Republic Act No. 7941
(R.A. 7941). According to the Comelec, Aklats statement that it has re-organized itself
does not cure this defect as there is nothing in the petition which will help us identify
what particular marginalized and underrepresented group AKLAT is now
representing.
[8]
Further, the Comelec held that AKLAT lumped all the sectoral groups
imaginable under the classification of regular members just to convince us that it is now
cured of its defect.
[9]

On January 15, 2004, Aklat filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated January 14,
2004, substantially averring that it has reorganized itself and taken the necessary steps
to make it an organization of, by and for the marginalized and underrepresented groups
of society, particularly the indigenous cultural communities and the youth. To this end, it
has allegedly effected a fundamental change in its purposes as an organization, nature of
its membership and focus of its programs.
[10]

The Comelec denied the motion in its questioned Resolution dated February 13,
2004, on three grounds, namely: the petition was filed beyond the deadline set by the
Comelec in Resolution No. 6320 for registration of party-list organizations; the petition
was not one for re-qualification as Aklat was never a registered party-list organization
having failed to meet the eight-point guidelines set by the Court in theBagong
Bayani case; and that its decision not to extend the deadline for registration of party-list
organizations is valid, the Comelec being in the best position to make such a
determination.
[11]

In the instant Petition, Aklat asserts that under Section 5 of R.A. 7941, petitions for
registration as a party-list organization may be filed not later than ninety (90) days
before the elections. It therefore had until February 10, 2004, the ninetieth (90
th
) day
before the elections on May 10, 2004, within which to file its petition. Hence, its petition,
which was filed on November 20, 2003, was filed within the allowed period. Section 5 of
Resolution No. 6320
[12]
which requires the filing of such petitions not later
than September 30, 2003, is null and void as it amends R.A. 7941.
It further maintains that it has complied with the eight-point guidelines set in
the Bagong Bayani case. Allegedly, Aklat has a total membership of over 4,000 persons
who belong to the marginalized and underrepresented groups. It has established
information and coordination centers throughout the country for the benefit and in
representation of indigenous cultural communities, farm and factory workers including
fisherfolk and the youth. Aklat also asserts that it is different from Asosasyon Para sa
Kaunlaran ng Industria ng Aklat (A.K.L.A.T.) which was previously de-registered by the
Comelec. Because of all these, Aklat contends that the Comelec gravely abused its
discretion when it denied its petition for re-qualification.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Comment dated March 26, 2004,
stating that the Comelec did not commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing the
assailed Resolutions. According to the OSG, Resolution No. 6320 is not in conflict with
and is, in fact, germane to the purpose of R.A. 7941. It was within the scope of the
authority granted to the Comelec that it issued Resolution No. 6320 setting the deadline
for filing petitions for registration under the party-list system on September 30, 2003. In
line with the purpose of R.A. 7941 to enable marginalized sectors to actively participate
in legislation, the Comelec must be given sufficient time to evaluate all petitions for
registration, at the same time allowing oppositions to be filed to the end that only those
truly qualified may be accredited under the party-list system. Besides, Republic Act No.
8436
[13]
allows the Comelec to change the periods and dates prescribed by law for
certain pre-election acts to ensure their accomplishment.
The OSG further maintains that the petition for re-qualification failed to comply
with the provisions of Resolution No. 6320. According to the OSG, the petition was not
properly verified there being no showing that Mr. Dominador Buhain, the signatory of
the verification and certification of non-forum shopping, was duly authorized by Aklat to
verify or cause the preparation and filing of the petition on its behalf. Moreover, Aklat
was registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission only on October 20, 2003, a
month before it filed its petition for re-qualification. Hence, it has not existed for a period
of at least one (1) year prior to the filing of the petition as required by Section 6 of
Resolution No. 6320. The OSG also points out that Aklat failed to support its petition with
the documents required under Section 7 of Resolution No. 6320, namely: a list of its
officers and members particularly showing that the majority of its membership belongs
to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors it seeks to represent, and a track
record or summary showing that it represents and seeks to uplift the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors of society.
Moreover, the OSG notes that the incorporators and directors of Aklat are
invariably known as pillars of the book publishing industry or authors. Hence, even as re-
organized, Aklat remains to be an association of authors, book publishers, and publishing
companies, rather than the organization of indigenous cultural communities, farm and
factory workers, fisherfolk and youth it claims to be.
For its part, the Comelec filed a Comment dated March 29, 2004, stating that the
period of ninety (90) days prescribed in R.A. 7941 refers to the prohibitive period
beyond which petitions for registration may no longer be filed. Furthermore, the
documents submitted by Aklat do not prove that its members belong to the marginalized
and underrepresented sectors of society.
Aklats contention that Resolution No. 6320 is null and void as it amends and
amplifies R.A. 7941 deserves scant consideration. R.A. 7941 provides:
Sec. 5. Registration.Any organized group of persons may register as a party,
organization or coalition for purposes of the party-list system by filing with the
COMELEC not later than ninety (90) days before the election a petition verified by its
president or secretary stating its desire to participate in the party-list system as a
national, regional or sectoral party or organization or a coalition of such parties or
organizations, attaching thereto its constitution, by-laws, platform or program of
government, list of officers, coalition agreement and other relevant information as the
COMELEC may require: Provided, That the sectors shall include labor, peasant, fisherfolk,
urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth,
veterans, overseas workers, and professionals[Italics supplied.]
By its wording, R.A. 7941 itself supports the Comelecs position that the period
stated therein refers to the prohibitive period beyond which petitions for registration
should no longer be filed nor entertained. Put elsewise, it is simply the minimum
countback period which is not subject to reduction since it is prescribed by law, but it is
susceptible of protraction on account of administrative necessities and other exigencies
perceived by the poll body.
Verily, the Comelec has the power to promulgate the necessary rules and
regulations to enforce and administer election laws. This power includes the
determination, within the parameters fixed by law, of appropriate periods for the
accomplishment of certain pre-election acts like filing petitions for registration under the
party-list system. This is exactly what the Comelec did when it issued its Resolution No.
6320 declaringSeptember 30, 2003, as the deadline for filing petitions for registration
under the party-list system. Considering these, as well as the multifarious pre-election
activities that the Comelec is mandated to undertake, the issuance of its Resolution No.
6320 cannot be considered tainted with grave abuse of discretion.
Neither is there grave abuse of discretion in the Comelecs denial of Aklats petition
on the ground that it failed to substantiate its claim that it represents the marginalized
and underrepresented sectors of society. It should be noted that it was Aklat which
asserted in its petition before the poll body that it has re-organized and is now applying
for re-qualification after its de-registration for failure to comply with the guidelines set
forth in the Bagong Bayani case. Thus, the Comelec cannot be faulted for relying on its
earlier finding, absent any evidence in Aklats petition to the contrary, that Aklat is not an
organization representing the marginalized and underrepresented sectors, but is
actually a business interest or economic lobby group which seeks the promotion and
protection of the book publishing industry.
Significantly, Aklat and A.K.L.A.T. have substantially the same incorporators. In fact,
four (4) of Aklats six (6) incorporators
[14]
are also incorporators of A.K.L.A.T.
[15]
This
substantial similarity is hard to ignore and bolsters the conclusion that the supposed re-
organization undertaken by Aklat is plain window-dressing as it has not really changed
its character as a business interest of persons in the book publishing industry.
The Court observes that Aklats articles of incorporation and document entitled The
Facts About Aklat which were attached to its petition for re-qualification contain general
averments that it supposedly represents marginalized groups such as the youth,
indigenous communities, urban poor and farmers/fisherfolk. These general statements
do not measure up to the first guideline set by the Bagong Bayani case for screening
party-list participants, i.e., that the political party, sector, organization or coalition must
represent the marginalized and underrepresented groups identified in Section 5 of R.A.
7941. In other words, it must showthrough its constitution, articles of incorporation,
bylaws, history, platform of government and track recordthat it represents and seeks
to uplift marginalized and underrepresented sectors. Verily, majority of its membership
should belong to the marginalized and underrepresented. And it must demonstrate that
in a conflict of interests, it has chosen or is likely to choose the interest of such
sectors.
[16]

In this regard, the Court notes with approval the OSGs contention that Aklat has no
track record to speak of concerning its representation of marginalized and
underrepresented constituencies considering that it has been in existence for only a
month prior to the filing of its petition for re-qualification.
It should finally be emphasized that the findings of fact by the Comelec, or any
other administrative agency exercising particular expertise in its field of endeavor, are
binding on the Supreme Court.
[17]

In view of the foregoing, the Comelec can, by no means, be held to have committed
grave abuse of discretion to justify the setting aside of the assailed Resolutions.
ACCORDINGLY, the Petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.