1

UNIFILs Mandate and Rules of Engagement

by Eugene Yukin


Ever since the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) was
established in 1978, the force has received countless accusations of ineffectiveness and
inability to fulfill its mandate. Though revised on a few occasions, UNIFILs mandate
has directed the force to oversee Israels complete withdrawal from Lebanese territory
and to ensure the state of Lebanons constitutional and military control in the south of the
country. Analysts and critics have attributed various factors to explain UNIFILs failure
to accomplish its mandated goals. Some blame UN bureaucracy, others blame UNIFILs
command structure and there are continuing accusations of bias of UNIFIL troops
towards Israeli or Lebanese parties involved in the conflict. However, to truly understand
what hinders a peace keeping force to accomplish its objectives one must take a careful
look at the forces mandate and its rules of engagement (ROE).Certain questions must be
asked. Do the rules given to the force allow it to properly enforce its mandate? Is the
force properly equipped to do its job? Finally is the force free to use all available means
to enforce its mandate? Answering these questions will quickly prove that often there is a
large discrepancy between the mandate and the ROE given to implement it. This essay
will argue, that while the aforementioned causes do have influence on UNIFILs
performance, the underlying cause of the forces failure has been an inadequate mandate
and equally problematic ROE, which unless adjusted, will continue to undermine
UNIFIL's credibility and effectiveness in South Lebanon.
Nowhere is the juxtaposition between mandate and ROE made clearer than in the
newly restructured UNIFIL currently serving in south Lebanon since 2006. Even though
the enhanced UNIFIL has been praised for new and robust ROE, its performance has not
been without criticism. Despite the increased robustness of the force, it has received the
same accusations of ineffectuality as all the preceding UN troops before it. Nevertheless,
2
before taking a look at the new force's mandate and rules of engagement one must take a
brief look at UNIFILs history.
UNIFIL was established in 1978 after Israel launched an invasion into Lebanon to
battle Palestinian militant groups. Resolution 425 was passed on 19 March 1978 and
stated that UNIFIL should confirm the withdrawal of Israeli forces, restore international
peace and security, and assist the government of Lebanon in ensuring the return of its
effective authority in the area.
1
UNIFILs size at first was mandated to be 5,000 lightly
armed soldiers and was later enlarged to 6,000 troops. The first force was structured as a
traditional peace keeping mission. This meant several things, namely that UNIFIL was
supposed to have the consent of all warring parties, was to be very lightly armed and
could use force only in cases of self defense. In theory of traditional peace keeping, if you
have the consent of all parties you should not become a military target.
Nonetheless, UNIFIL arrived to Lebanon in a civil war situation when having the
consent of all parties was impossible. Thus the rules of engagement were a far cry from
the reality on the ground and the force soon became a target for various groups. Brian
Urquhart, who was at the time the UN-Undersecretary General, was reluctant to send a
UN force because of those exact circumstances. Later he wrote, Government authority,
an important condition for successful peacekeeping, did not exist in southern Lebanon,
where a tribal, inter-confessional guerilla war was ragingSouthern Lebanon would
almost certainly be a peacekeepers nightmare.
2
Urquhart was correct in his assessment;
Southern Lebanon in the time of Civil War was not a place to send a traditional
peacekeeping mission.
Traditional peacekeeping missions differ from the peace enforcement missions
that are widespread in the world today. According to Frederick H. Fleitz, traditional
peacekeeping missions are a mechanism to manage conflict and facilitate and supervise
truces. Traditional peacekeeping forces are unarmed or lightly armed multilateral troops
deployed with the consent of state-party disputants. They are impartial and use force only

1
Patrick Clawson and Michael Eisenstadt ed. Implications of an Israeli Withdrawal from Lebanon,
(Washington: The Washington Institute for Near Eastern Policy, 2000), 48.

2
Clawson p.48
3
in self-defense.
3
Beginning in the 1990s and following the collapse of the Soviet
Union, the United Nations, the United States as well as other European countries became
fond of the idea that world conflicts, especially those in third world countries, could be
solved by peacekeeping missions. This led to what was called second generation or
expanded peacekeeping, whose mandate did not demand the consent of both parties and
whose rules of engagement allowed the use of more force than that allotted to traditional
peacekeeping missions.
UNIFILs failure to acquire the consent of all warring parties was the cause of its
earlier disappointments. Sent as a traditional peacekeeping mission, the forces ROE
prevented the force from properly defending itself against combatants. In his article
entitled, The Role of UNIFIL after an Israeli Withdrawal from Southern Lebanon, John
Hillen wrote that UNIFIL was given unrealizable objectives as a peacekeeping force
operating with a traditional peacekeeping modus operandi.
4
As a result by 1999, 222
UNIFIL soldiers had lost their lives and UNIFIL had become the UNs second costliest
mission. Two examples among many particularly show how UNIFILs rules of
engagement and lack of necessary equipment hindered it.
A year after the force was established in 1979, UNIFIL headquarters in Naqoura
came under direct attack from Major Hadads militia. Later known as the South Lebanon
Army, the militia consisted of Christians who were under direct Israeli control. The
attack on the headquarters was repeated a year later in April 1980. As mortar after mortar
came flying into the Naqoura camp, UNIFIL commanders were paralyzed despite having
the full authority to implement force. Even if UNIFIL did respond militarily it would
have lacked the equipment and arms needed. So afraid were UNIFIL force commanders
to involve themselves militarily, they took no action to protect themselves and were
almost overrun.
When Israel launched another major invasion into south Lebanon in 1982,
UNIFILs mandate stipulated that it was to stop the advancing Israeli army. According to
its rules of engagement, UNIFIL was allowed to use force not only in self-defense but
also when attempts are made to prevent them from performing their duties under the

3
Frederick H. Fleitz, Peacekeeping Fiascoes of the 1990s, (Westport: Praeger, 2002), 3.
4
Clawson p.50
4
mandate of the Security Council. But the force was so poorly equipped that most
battalions simply stood by and watched as the Israeli army came marching in. A few
attempts were made by Nepalese troops to blockade Israeli soldiers from crossing certain
roads. Other units attempted to stop the advancing Israeli tanks. Apart from several
attempts here and there, Israels 1982 invasion completely overrun UN troops,
demonstrating the futility of its mandate. In this case UNIFIL was impotent and if its
mandate was taken seriously, the force should have been provided better equipment and
should have been heavily armed.
The new enhanced UNIFIL force in place today with its heavy armor, well trained
troops, tanks and anti aircraft weapons is a far cry away from the old UNIFIL.
Established following the 2006 summer war between Hizbullah and Israel, UNIFIL was
charged with additional tasks and was given a new set of engagement rules. By the time
the war had started in July 2006, UN troops on the ground had already dwindled down to
about 2,000 soldiers. The 33 day war was sparked when Hizbullah captured two Israeli
soldiers in a cross border raid. In response Israel embarked on a massive aerial
bombardment campaign, inflicting enormous infrastructure damage. Once again Israeli
troops occupied large swathes of southern Lebanon, but suffered many casualties and
failed in destroying Hizbullah. The failure of Israels military strategy in the war forced it
to quickly settle for UN resolution 1701 which called for a cessation of hostilities and a
plan to stop the violence.
The new mandate required UNIFIL to carry out its previous mandate under
Resolutions 425 and 426 as well as enforcing the new mandate under Resolution 1701.
Apart from ensuring the IDFs complete withdrawal from Lebanese territory, assisting
the Lebanese Army in taking control of the South, the new UNIFIL is now to prevent any
Hizbullah armed presence south of the Litani river. However, the mandate also
authorized UNIFIL to:

Take all necessary action in areas of deployment of its forces and as it deems within it
capabilities, to ensure that its area of operations in not utilized for hostile activities of any kind, to
resist by forceful means to prevent it from discharging its dutiesand to protect United National
personnel to ensure the security and freedom of movement of United Nations personnel,
5
humanitarian workers and, without prejudice to the responsibility of the Government of Lebanon,
to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence;
5


The resolution also emphasized that UNIFIL should coordinate its activities with both
Lebanon and Israel, and should assist the Lebanese Army and State at its request.
The new mandate given under resolution 1701 was expected to give the force
more aggressive rules of engagement. Knowing that UNIFIL was largely unable to carry
out its mandate in the previous two decades, Israel and other countries pressed hard to
make the new UNIFIL force more robust and to give it teeth. Member states who were
concerned to send their peacekeeping troops into a volatile area wanted to ensure that
these troops would not be inhibited in any way by traditional peace keeping rules. Israel
especially looked forward to operational rules that would allow UNIFIL to forcefully
engage Hizbullah militants and disarm them at will.
6
Many desired the new force to be an
expanded peacekeeping force. Therefore the new UNIFIL now numbering around 13,000
military personnel arrived into Lebanon well armed and with a new set of ROE.
The enhanced forces operational rules made it clearer that military force should
be used in any case where peace keepers were hindered in the course of enforcing their
mandate. One senior diplomatic official said that the new ROE would allow UN troops to
freely open fire at Hizbullah and called it the most explicit expression of the upgrade to
the UNIFIL force that has yet been received.
7
Till now the whole list of the
peacekeepers operational rules remains a secret, in part to prevent any party in the
conflict from exploiting the peacekeeping force. However, a UNIFIL press report dating
to October 2006 reads as follows:

Should the situation present any risk of resumption of hostile activities, UNIFIL rules of
engagement allow UN forces to respond as required. UNIFIL commanders have
sufficient authority to act forcefully when confronted with hostile activity of any kind.
UNIFIL has set up temporary checkpoints at key locations within its area of operations
In case specific information is available regarding movement of unauthorized
weapons or equipment, the LAF will take required action. However, in situations where

5
Resolution 1701 (2006): 11 August, 2006
6
According to the Jerusalem Post article, Israel expected UN Secretary General to have rules of
engagement that would allow the force to open fire on Hizbullah where necessary.
7
Herb Keinon "Annan to give UNIFIL teeth," Jerusalem Post, 21 August 2006.
6
the LAF are not in a position to do so, UNIFIL will do everything necessary to fulfill its
mandate in accordance with Security Council resolution 1701.

In implementing their mandate, all UNIFIL personnel may exercise the inherent right of
self-defense. In addition, the use of force beyond self-defense may be applied to ensure
that UNIFILs area of operations is not utilized for hostile activities
8


Due to the fact that the enhanced UNIFIL came well armed with certain units boasting
anti aircraft weapons and tanks, one could assume that the UN troops who arrived in
Lebanon following the 2006 summer war were prepared to use force decisively to carry
out their mandate.
Despite the hope that a robust force would be able to disarm Hizbullah and
effectively deal with the crisis, it was easier for those with more experience in the region
to see that disarming Hizbullah would not be an option. After all, even if UNIFILs rules
of engagement allowed the UN to use arms to disarm Hizbullah, what would have been
the result? Richard Norton noted correctly in his speech in front of the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee that it is completely unrealistic that the new international
contingents will succeed either in disarming Hezbollah or in diminishing its appealIf
UNIFIL is going to succeed, it will need the cooperation, not the animosity of
Hezbollah.
9

Two and a half years later this new robust armed force is facing the exact same
accusations of ineffectiveness and inability to accomplish its mandate. Israeli forces still
occupy pieces of Lebanese land, its aircraft violate Lebanese airspace, and Hizbullahs
strength is reported to be three times that of what it was before the 2006 war. The
question that remains to be asked is why is UNIFIL still unable to enforce its mandate
despite its new engagement rules and armed strength? A look at three recent situations in
which UNIFIL soldiers have found themselves will shed light on some of the flaws
inherent in both the Mandate and the rules of engagement.
On the night of the 30
th
of March, 2008 a UNIFIL patrol detected a truck which
was towing a trailer in UNIFILs area of operations. According to the Secretary-

8
UNIFIL Press Statement: Naqoura October 3, 2006 www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unifil/PS3oct.pdf
9
Hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee: September 13, 2006 Opening Statement of
Augustus Richard Norton Lebanon: Securing A Lasting Peace
7
Generals report on 1701,As the patrol turned around and started to follow the truck, two
cars with five armed elements arrived at the scene and blocked the road.
10
When the
peacekeeping troops challenged the men in the car, they did not respond. After three
minutes the two cars left, but when the patrol attempted to pursue the truck and the
trailer, they were not able to locate them. The UN troops immediately contacted the
Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF), but when both the UN troops and the LAF tried to find
the perpetrators they were also unsuccessful. In this event there were two obstructions of
UN resolution 1701. One was the presence of armed groups other than UNIFIL and the
LAF below the Litani river. The other was the fact that the two armed cars not only
presented a threat to the UN patrol, but also prohibited it from exercising its freedom of
movement.
UNIFILs Rules of Engagement as well as its mandate address situations of this
kind. According to the press release statement from the UN, peacekeeping troops have
the authority to apply force beyond self defense, if their freedom of movement is blocked
or if their area of operation is being utilized for possible hostile actions. Accordingly, the
UN patrol if it was to exercise its ROE properly could have engaged the armed elements,
tracked down the truck and trailer and launched an investigation into the identity of the
armed elements and the contents of the trailer.
Another incident that shed light on the reality of UNIFIL operations on the
ground took place on the 12
th
of May 2008 in South Eastern Lebanon. A UN patrol
passed by a construction site where suspicious cables were being laid in the ground.
After photographing them UNIFIL troops were accosted by local civilians at the site, who
blocked the road with two of their vehicles. The civilians threw rocks at the peacekeeping
troops and the situation was tense until UNIFIL troops agreed to destroy the pictures they
had taken.
11
Yet again UN resolution 1701 was violated as UN troops were denied
freedom of movement and the right to investigate what could have very possibly been
some kind of military apparatus belonging to Hizbullah.

10
Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) June
27
th
, 2008 p.5-6
11
Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) June
27
th
, 2008 p.6
8
UNIFILs Rules of Engagement would have allowed the patrol to use more force
to properly handle this situation. Its mandate would have dictated to the patrol to properly
investigate the cables and make sure they were not being used for any malicious or
hostile intent. Short of engaging the civilians militarily, UN peacekeepers could have
used mob control and isolated the site from civilians.
Another incident happened shortly after the enhanced UNIFIL began its operation
in south Lebanon. On the 31
st
of October, 2006 Israeli warplanes violated Lebanese
airspace and proceeded to nosedive over French peacekeeping positions. The French
troops felt threatened by the Israeli F-15 fighter jets and were seconds away from
shooting them down.
12
However the French troops practiced restraint despite Israels
threatening behavior and did not fire at the jets. Though the incident was not reported for
ten days, the French government put a lot of pressure on the Israeli government to cease
its mock raids, especially over UNIFIL positions. This incident is but one example of
how Israel has continued to defy UN resolution 1701 by violating Lebanese airspace.
According to its mandate and ROE, UNIFIL has the right to defend itself against these
aerial infringements and could use force to shoot down any Israeli manned or unmanned
aircraft. Nevertheless, UN troops have so far taken no forceful action to stop Israeli
flights over Lebanese territory which happen on a daily basis, and have instead resorted
to verbal protestation such as the Secretary-Generals complaint that such violations are
undermining the credibility of UNIFIL
13

What all of these incidents demonstrate is UNIFILs inability to use force
effectively despite its rules of engagement allowing it do so when facing violations of its
mandate. UNIFIL failed to exercise force in the first two incidents because it is dealing
with an unconventional army and cannot afford to lose the trust of the common people.
The last incident involving Israeli flyovers illustrates that UNIFIL commanders are often
unable to make urgent decisions without previously clearing it with their home
governments, despite having a UN mandate to do so.

12
Angela Chalton, "French troops came close to shooting down Israeli jets," The Independent, 10
November 2006.
13
Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council Resolution 1701 (2006)
November 18
th
, 2008 p.25
9
Any peacekeeping mission is meant to promote peace between two or more
opposing military factions. In most peacekeeping missions, opposing factions can be
easily marked or identified, yet, what does one do when a military faction is invisible and
is unmarked? Of all guerilla groups, Hizbullah is best known for its ability to hide and
conceal its troops and military equipment among the terrain and civilian population.
Hizbullahs enormous support base in South Lebanon provide it with an incredible
amount of intelligence and cover for any clandestine maneuver being carried out in
UNIFILs area of operation. A civilian blocking UN troops on a road can very possibly
be a Hizbullah member and be acting on orders, but UN troops have no way of arresting
him and proving his relation with the party.
Hizbullahs skill to disguise its military capability was a result of necessity, the
partys military wing had become an expert in clandestine operation in almost twenty
years of battling Israeli troops and the SLA in south Lebanon. In his book Hizbullah: The
Story from Within, the partys deputy leader, Naim Qassem discusses some of the
military tactics the party specializes in. Secrecy he writes, was the key to success on
the jihad battlefieldCombat equipment was easily carried, transported and hidden.
14

Qassem also describes how the partys fighters were able to form secretive circles and
thus function covertly from the enemy. He addresses this when saying, Practical
procedures were taken to build a resistance movement that is different from a formal
army organization This allowed for flexibility and permitted members to resume their
normal daily lives across the various towns and villages, whether these were situated on
front or back lines.
15
While Hizbullah as a party is very visible in South Lebanon, its
military units do not wear uniforms when not engaged in fighting and do not show off
militarily. This is what Qassem refers to when saying that guerilla soldiers could easily
return to their normal lives as civilians at any given time. Hizbullahs expertise in this
area explains why UNIFIL has so far been unable to find any evidence of new
military infrastructure or the smuggling of arms into its area of operations.
16


14
Naim Qassem, Hizbullah: The Story from Within,(London: Saqi, 2005), 69-70.
15
Qassem p.70
16
Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council Resolution 1701 (2006)
November 18
th
, 2008 p.9
10
UNIFILs failure to disarm Hizbullah south of the Litani river reflects not so
much the incompetency of the force (most of the soldiers are well trained), but rather the
fault of the mandate which fails to understand the reality on the ground. When Fleitz
addresses mandate problems in his book, he writes: Expanded peacekeeping missions
often had ambiguous mandates because UN members could not agree on coherent
strategies to address the conflicts these missions were sent to address. Many missions
also had unstated political objectives that contradicted official mission mandates and
goals.
17
Following the 2006 war, Hizbullah did not voice intense opposition to claims
that UNIFIL troops would actively seek to disarm Hizbullah. Quite the opposite,
Hizbullah agreed that any of its members discovered carrying arms can be apprehended
and disarmed.
18
In an interview following the 2006 war, Nasrallah promised that there
would be no armed manifestations at all of Hizbullah south of the Litani river.
19
Israeli
worries that UNIFIL troops are failing to stop the rearmament of Hizbullah can be
understood in this context. Yet the real failure lies ultimately in Resolution 1701 whose
mandate did not take into account that disarming Hizbullah would be impossible in
operational terms.
Unclear rules of engagement and an unclear chain of command is another
problem that continues to plague UNIFIL operations. Why didnt the UN patrol engage
the truck mooring the trailer or the French unit go ahead in firing at the Israeli planes who
were aggressively nose diving at the units? One reason is that UN resolution 1701 states
that only the LAF can take required action against the movement of unauthorized
weapons or equipment. This means that if a UN patrol stumbles into a stock pile of
weapons or has reason to believe that there are armed elements in its area of operations, it
is necessary to notify the LAF first and wait for the Lebanese armys presence before
continuing any investigation. What this amounts to is that despite the fact that the rules of
engagement allow UN troops to use force beyond self defense, peacekeeping troops are
prevented from utilizing that force due to their own mandate.

17
Fleitz p.118
18
Hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee September 13, 2006 Opening Statement of
Augustus Richard Norton Lebanon: Securing A Lasting Peace
19
Nasrallahs interview with New TV on August 27
th
, 2006: Nicholas Noe, ed. Voice of Hezbollah: The
Statements of Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah. (London: Verso, 2007), 386.

11
The tendency of UN officers and commanders to have their orders cleared with
their national government represents another problem plaguing UNIFIL and many other
peacekeeping missions. If a unit is ordered to undertake action which involves the use of
force, the unit commander might hesitate and seek approval from his government before
carrying out the action. The immediate result is an indirect chain of command which
often results in peacekeeping troops hesitant to carry out necessary orders.
Too many national contingents in the enhanced UNIFIL add to the problem of
chain command and as result miscommunication between different contingents has a
negative influence on the ability of UNIFIL to function in unison. It has long been a UN
tradition to have balanced and multi ethnic coalitions of peacekeeping troops. Secretary
General Hammarskjld believed that such wide representation would further a missions
image and reputation of impartiality.
20
Instead, having too many multi ethnic contingents
introduces badly trained troops to a peacekeeping mission. Mixing well trained European
troops with those of African nations can weaken a peacekeeping mission and this has
been a consistent problem with the current troops serving in South Lebanon.
21

The lack of clarity in UNIFILs mandate and rules of engagement have without a
doubt been at the root of the peacekeeping forces inability to achieve its goals. But are
the mandate and the operational rules really that necessary for a peacekeeping forces
success? According to Victoria Holts and Tobias Berkmans book, The Impossible
Mandate, the mandate and the rules of engagement are absolutely essential in
guaranteeing success to a peacekeeping operation. They write: Soldiers must make split
second decisions about whether and how to use force in the face of immediate threats to
themselves or others Political and military leaders use two main tools to guide such
determinations: the mandates provided for the mission and the rules of engagement
(ROE) legally binding instructions on when, where, and how soldiers may use force.
22

They also argue that robust and well-understood rules of engagement can matter

20
Fleitz p.61
21
Fleitz p.61

22
Victoria K Holt and Tobias C. Berkman, The Impossible Mandate? (Washington DC: The Henry L.
Stimson Center, 2006), 79.
12
more to the success of a mission than a properly worded mandate.
23
Holt and Berkman
discuss the major problems that peace enforcement missions experience such as lack of
training and preparation, vaguely worded mandates and unclear ROE. Despite these
difficulties, the authors are convinced that peacekeeping mandates are possible to enforce
as long as there is clear understanding of the mission goals, clear rules of engagement and
well trained troops who are familiar with the realities on the ground and their ROE.
UN troops in southern Lebanon could certainly benefit from some of the
suggestions that Holt and Berkman argue for. UNIFIL troops, even if they have good
knowledge of operational rules, have shown consistent lack of desire to enforce them. A
better worded mandate could give UNIFIL troops a better and more coherent
understanding of their mission goals and do away with some of the hesitation
experienced by commanders in the field when split decisions must be made. Furthermore,
sufficient training of the peacekeeping troops in the ROE prior to serving would greatly
benefit the effectiveness of the troops and could do away with UNIFILs reputation as a
costly and hopeless mission.
On the other hand robust missions with ROE which allow the use of force
beyond self defense, such as UNIFILs can spell disaster for peacekeeping missions. In
his book, Peacekeeping Fiascos of 1990s, Frederick Fleitz argues that expanded peace
keeping missions and peace enforcement missions have been proven to be failures. Fleitz
finds that the only legitimate form of peacekeeping is the traditional peacekeeping
mission. Because expanded peace keeping missions are more robust and are usually
impartial, they alienate the civilian population and often make civilians hostile towards
peacekeeping troops. By bringing up examples of the failures of expanded peace keeping
missions around the world, Fleitz concludes that any mission conducted without a
traditional framework represents a dead end
24
. Even Holt and Berkman admit that
When forces employ a more aggressive approach, they may spawn an increase in
violence against themselves, against international workers, or even against civilians in the
short term.
25


23
Holt and Berkman p.82
24
Fleitz p.8
25
Holt and Berkman p.54
13
Despite the enhanced UNIFIL having robust rules of engagement, it has always
remained a traditional peacekeeping mission in terms of its conduct and use of force.
Furthermore, conditions in South Lebanon have never been better for a traditional
peacekeeping mission than now. Unlike its earlier years, UNIFIL is now accepted by all
parties involved in the conflict and it maintains cordial relations with both parties. Even
though its credibility has been tarnished by inaction and military impotence, UNIFIL can
achieve much more by remaining a traditional peacekeeping mission rather than
becoming more aggressive and utilizing its increased firepower to fulfill its mission
goals.
Perhaps UNIFILs failure to be an effective military force has actually had more
positive than negative influence on the situation in southern Lebanon.
26
By not pursuing
its goals aggressively, UNIFIL has been able to garner understanding and cooperation
from local civilians and has through the process become part of the local economy. A
press statement dating to the 5
th
of October 2006 clearly summarizes the benefits that the
local economy reaps thanks to UNIFIL forces. According to then acting Chief
Administrative Officer Jean-Pierre Ducharme, The soldiers spend a lot of money here,
they visit local attractions, eat out, travel and this, in the end, helps to stimulate the
economy. Over the years 2003-6, UNIFIL spent 60 percent of its budget on getting food
from local companies and in 2006, 40 million dollars went to the Lebanese economy.
27

UNIFILs failure in the medias eyes has not been the forces conduct on the
ground but rather the unachievable goals that are cited in its mandate. In its earlier stages
UNIFIL failed because it was given unachievable goals and rules of engagement that
paralyzed the force, preventing it from even protecting itself properly in the dangerous
environment that was Southern Lebanon during the Civil War. Writing in 2000 Hillen
correctly noted that UNIFIL was created and has survived as a stop-gap political
measure, not as an operational tool for the execution of its mandate on the ground.
28
The
enhanced UNIFIL has tried to overcome its reputation as ineffectual by becoming better
equipped and by adjusting its operational rules to be better protected on the ground.
Despite these improvements UNIFIL has found itself paralyzed yet again because its

26
See Clawson p.47
27
UNIFIL Press Release: [UNIFIL]How it Benefits the Lebanese Economy. 5
th
October, 2006.
28
Clawson p. 46
14
stated goals and operational rules cannot be enacted on the ground in any realistic and
constructive manner. The South Lebanon of today requires a traditional peacekeeping
force to protect the peace and despite its appearance UNIFIL has been playing that role
all along. As long as UNIFILs mandate and rules of engagement mirror that of an
expanded peacekeeping mission, it will forever be seen as ineffectual and useless. Yet, if
its mandate and ROE be adjusted to that of traditional peacekeeping force UNIFIL will
continue to benefit Southern Lebanon while at the same time fulfilling the expectations of
its mandate.

















15
Works Cited:

Qassem, Naim. Hizbullah: The Story from Within.
London: Saqi, 2005.

Noe, Nicholas, ed. Voice of Hezbollah: The Statements of Sayyed Hassan
Nasrallah.
London: Verso, 2007.

Clawson, Patrick and Eisenstadt, Michael ed. Implications of an Israeli
Withdrawal from Lebanon.
Washington: The Washington Institute for Near Eastern Policy, 2000.

Fleitz, Frederick H. Peacekeeping Fiascoes of the 1990s.
Westport: Praeger, 2002.

Holt, Victoria K. and Berkman, Tobias C. The Impossible Mandate?
Washington DC: The Henry L. Stimson Center, 2006.





16
Eugene Narsesyan Yukin
eugeneyukin@yahoo.com
cell: 70182153
American University of Beirut: Center of Arabic and Middle East Studies,
Masters Program.

Theme: South Lebanon and UNIFIL