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17
gorical imperative Kant emphasizes, and are here called "categorical
imperatives of the first type", but must be distinguished from the
"formula" of the categorical imperatives, which apply only to this
type. Example: "Obey authority".
(c) Conditional categorical imperatives. These are imperatives in cate-
gorical form irrespective of whether they are "practically right" or
not. They may in fact be only elliptical expressions of hypothetical
imperatives, and are here called "categorical imperatives of the second
type." Example: "Shut the door".
(d) Unconditional hypothetical imperatives or apodictic hypothetical im-
peratives. These are here called "hypothetical imperatives of the
second type". Example: "If you make a promise, keep it".
It will be noticed that the "first type" under each of the formal divisions
is the one that Kant considered, and the "second type" is the one whidi
he neglected.
In the next section, we shall be concerned with the distinction between
(b) and (c)
f
between categorical imperatives of the first and second types,
i. e.
f
between categorical imperatives which are apodictic and those which
are not. In the final section \ye shall discuss the distinction between (a)
and (d)
r
between the two modalities of hypothetical imperatives.
r .
Conditional and Unconditional Categorical Imperatives
A recent excellent history of philosophy says: "It is possible to
generalize into universal rules all sorts of maxims which nobody (and
certainly not Kant) wooild hold to be obligatory. For instance, I co'iild
perfectly well hold that every purchaser of a new book shojuld write his
name on the flyleaf when he acquires it. There is nothing selfcontradictory
about this maxim"
34
).
"Write your name on the flyleaf of yoiir book" is a categorical impera-
tive. Why is it not obligatory, and why is it an instance of (c) and not of
(b)? The answer is clear from the fonnula, which applies to case (b) only
(and, s we shall see, to case (d)). The formula is negative, telling us to act
only according to a universalizable maxim; it expresses a necessary bat
not a sufficient condition for the maxim of the action. And in Kants
formula we are commanded to act only on a maxim through which and
at the same time we could will that the maxim should hold for all men
35
).
84
) W. T. Jones, A History of Western Philosovhy (New York, 1952), p. 855.
35
) This should be clear from the familir formula of the Grundlegung, but
if it is not, the Statement in the Metaphysik der Sitten is unmistakable: Der
kategorische Imperativ, der berhaupt nur aussagt, was Verbindlichkeit sei
r
ist:
Handle nach einer Maxime, welche zugleich als ein allgemeines Gesetz gelten
kann! Deine Handlungen mut du also zuerst nach ihrem .subjectiven Grund-
satze betrachten; ob aber dieser Grundsatz auch objektiv gltig sei, kannst du
nur daran erkennen, da, weil deine Vernunft ihn der Probe unterwirft
f
durch
denselben dich zugleich als allgemein gesetzgebend zu denken, er sich zu einer
solchen allgemeinen Gesetzgebung qualifiziere." (Vorlnder ed,, p. 28; Akademie,
VI, 224; italics mine).
18
In Mr. Jones' example, there seem to be two separate volitions which
are independent of each other, while Kant's formula is that in the very
maxim of our action and because of it we must take account of its
universalizability. The maxim holds for my own action, if it is moral,
only in so far s I can will it t Hold s a maxim for others. Any maxim
that passes the test of universalization is legally permissible; there is
nothing wrong or unreasonable in my willing to put my name in my
books, or indeed in willing that others should do so too. But only the
maxim whidi is a principle of action for me because l regard it s bind-
ing on rational beings generally is a maxim having moral Status.
Under conditional categorical imperatives, therefore, we must dist-
inguish two sub-types: (I) An imperative whidi, if followed universally,
would bring no Opposition or antagonism into the relations among per-
sonal beings legal (i. e., legally possible) imperatives, and (II) an
imperative, whidi if followed universally, would bring about such antag-
onism and Opposition illegal imperatives.
Type (b) categorical imperatives are unconditional. They must meet
two tests: (I) the test of universalizability, by. which they are certified s
legally correct, and (II) the test of motive. The latter is the requirement
that the motive foi their fulfilment shall be found in the fact (or belief)
that they are legal. An imperative like "Do not lie" constrains me to a
moral action and is itself apodictic only when it is adressed to my motive
to obey it s valid for and obligatory upon others too. An imperative
may bind me legally, i. e., may validly restrict my freedom of arbitrary
action, regardless of my motive. In this event the imperative is external
and belongs to jurisprudence and not to ethics. Other criteria than uni-
versalizability may be required to certify them s "practically right", but
in the case of negative imperatives such s "Do not commit perjury" the
criterion of universalizability probably suffices. My motive to obey an
imperative like "Write your name in your book" is not expressed in the
imperative, s it might be in a hypothetical imperative: "If you want your
books returned, write your name in them." But certainly in this case,
the universal applicability of the imperative is not my motive for
obedience to it.
It is, I think, safe to say that all categorical imperatives that are in
any sense right, and not mere unreasoned and unreasonable commands,
are either apodictic or are elliptical assertoric hypothetical imperatives.
The categorical imperatives of the second type, therefore, which are of
any philosophical interest, are equivalent to imperatives .of type (a)
36
),
This is because (a) and (c) are modally alike, and their formal differences
are of little or no philosophical .interest
37
).
se
) It is in view of this fact that Kant calls the pragmatic imperative a hypo-
thetical imperative even when the protasis ("Because you want to be happy .. /)
is suppressed. But since 'hypothetical' is normally a formal concept, it would
be better to call such an imperative *assertoric