October 2010 Philippine Supreme Court

Decisions on Remedial Law (Part III)

Posted on November 29, 2010 by Carlos Roberto Z. Lopez Posted in Remedial Law Tagged
counterclaim, extra-judicial foreclosure, forcible entry, foreclosure, injunction, judgment,
unlawful detainer
Counterclaims; tests to determine if compulsory. Going now to the first assigned error,
petitioner submits that its counterclaim for the rentals collected by Fernando from the CMTC is
in the nature of a compulsory counterclaim in the original action of Fernando against petitioner
for annulment of bid award, deed of absolute sale and TCT No. 76183. Respondents, on the other
hand, alleged that petitioners counterclaim is permissive and its failure to pay the prescribed
docket fees results into the dismissal of its claim.
To determine whether a counterclaim is compulsory or not, the Court has devised the following
tests: (a) Are the issues of fact and law raised by the claim and by the counterclaim largely the
same? (b) Would res judicata bar a subsequent suit on defendants claims, absent the compulsory
counterclaim rule? (c) Will substantially the same evidence support or refute plaintiffs claim as
well as the defendants counterclaim? and (d) Is there any logical relation between the claim and
the counterclaim? A positive answer to all four questions would indicate that the counterclaim is
compulsory.
Tested against the above-mentioned criteria, this Court agrees with the CAs view that
petitioners counterclaim for the recovery of the amount representing rentals collected by
Fernando from the CMTC is permissive.The evidence needed by Fernando to cause the
annulment of the bid award, deed of absolute sale and TCT is different from that required to
establish petitioners claim for the recovery of rentals. The issue in the main action, i.e., the
nullity or validity of the bid award, deed of absolute sale and TCT in favor of CMTC, is entirely
different from the issue in the counterclaim, i.e., whether petitioner is entitled to receive the
CMTCs rent payments over the subject property when petitioner became the owner of the
subject property by virtue of the consolidation of ownership of the property in its
favor. Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) vs. Heirs of Fernando P. Caballero, et
al., G.R. No. 158090, October 4, 2010
Docket fees; GSIS not exempt from payment. Petitioner [GSIS] further argues that assuming
that its counterclaim is permissive, the trial court has jurisdiction to try and decide the same,
considering petitioners exemption from all kinds of fees.
In In Re: Petition for Recognition of the Exemption of the Government Service Insurance
System from Payment of Legal Fees, the Court ruled that the provision in the Charter of the
GSIS, i.e., Section 39 of Republic Act No. 8291, which exempts it from all taxes, assessments,
fees, charges or duties of all kinds, cannot operate to exempt it from the payment of legal fees.
This was because, unlike the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, which empowered Congress to
repeal, alter or supplement the rules of the Supreme Court concerning pleading, practice and
procedure, the 1987 Constitution removed this power from Congress. Hence, the Supreme Court
now has the sole authority to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all
courts.
In said case, the Court ruled that:
The separation of powers among the three co-equal branches of our government has erected an
impregnable wall that keeps the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure
within the sole province of this Court. The other branches trespass upon this prerogative if they
enact laws or issue orders that effectively repeal, alter or modify any of the procedural rules
promulgated by this Court. Viewed from this perspective, the claim of a legislative grant of
exemption from the payment of legal fees under Section 39 of RA 8291 necessarily fails.
Congress could not have carved out an exemption for the GSIS from the payment of legal fees
without transgressing another equally important institutional safeguard of the Courts
independence fiscal autonomy. Fiscal autonomy recognizes the power and authority of the
Court to levy, assess and collect fees, including legal fees. Moreover, legal fees under Rule 141
have two basic components, the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF) and the Special Allowance
for the Judiciary Fund (SAJF). The laws which established the JDF and the SAJF expressly
declare the identical purpose of these funds to guarantee the independence of the Judiciary as
mandated by the Constitution and public policy. Legal fees therefore do not only constitute a
vital source of the Courts financial resources but also comprise an essential element of the
Courts fiscal independence. Any exemption from the payment of legal fees granted by Congress
to government-owned or controlled corporations and local government units will necessarily
reduce the JDF and the SAJF. Undoubtedly, such situation is constitutionally infirm for it
impairs the Courts guaranteed fiscal autonomy and erodes its independence.
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) vs. Heirs of Fernando P. Caballero, et al., G.R.
No. 158090, October 4, 2010
Ejectment; forcible entry and unlawful detainer distinguished. Well settled is the rule that what
determines the nature of the action as well as the court which has jurisdiction over the case are
the allegations in the complaint. In ejectment cases, the complaint should embody such
statement of facts as to bring the party clearly within the class of cases under Section 1, Rule 70
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. Section 1 provides:
SECTION 1. Who may institute proceedings, and when. Subject to the provisions of the next
succeeding section, a person deprived of the possession of any land or building by force,
intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, or a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person against
whom the possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or
termination of the right to hold possession, by virtue of any contract, express or implied, or the
legal representatives or assigns of any such lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person, may, at any
time within one (1) year after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession, bring an
action in the proper Municipal Trial Court against the person or persons unlawfully withholding
or depriving of possession, or any person or persons claiming under them, for the restitution of
such possession, together with damages and costs.
There are two entirely distinct and different causes of action under the aforequoted rule, to wit:
(1) a case for forcible entry, which is an action to recover possession of a property from the
defendant whose occupation thereof is illegal from the beginning as he acquired possession by
force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth; and (2) a case for unlawful detainer, which is an
action for recovery of possession from the defendant whose possession of the property was
inceptively lawful by virtue of a contract (express or implied) with the plaintiff, but became
illegal when he continued his possession despite the termination of his right thereunder.
In forcible entry, the plaintiff must allege in the complaint, and prove, that he was in prior
physical possession of the property in dispute until he was deprived thereof by the defendant by
any of the means provided in Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules either by force, intimidation, threat,
strategy or stealth. In unlawful detainer, there must be an allegation in the complaint of how the
possession of defendant started or continued, that is, by virtue of lease or any contract, and that
defendant holds possession of the land or building after the expiration or termination of the
right to hold possession by virtue of any contract, express or implied. Corazon D. Sarmienta, et
al. vs. Manalite Homeowners Association, Inc., G.R. No. 182953. October 11, 2010
Ejectment; unlawful detainer. An action for forcible entry or unlawful detainer is governed by
Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, Section 1 of which provides:
SECTION 1. Who may institute proceedings, and when. Subject to the provisions of the next
succeeding section, a person deprived of the possession of any land or building by force,
intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, or a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person against
whom the possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or
termination of the right to hold possession, by virtue of any contract, express or implied, or the
legal representatives or assigns of any such lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person, may, at any
time within one (1) year after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession, bring an
action in the proper Municipal Trial Court against the person or persons unlawfully withholding
or depriving of possession, or any person or persons claiming under them, for the restitution of
such possession, together with damages and costs.
Unlawful detainer is an action to recover possession of real property from one who illegally
withholds possession after the expiration or termination of his right to hold possession under any
contract, express or implied. The possession of the defendant in unlawful detainer is originally
legal but became illegal due to the expiration or termination of the right to possess. An unlawful
detainer proceeding is summary in nature, jurisdiction of which lies with the proper municipal
trial court or metropolitan trial court. The action must be brought within one year from the date
of last demand; and the issue in said case is the right to physical possession. Esmeraldo C.
Romullo, et al. vs. Samahang Magkakapitbahay ng Bayanihan Compound Homeowners
Association, Inc. represented by its President, Paquito Quitalig, G.R. No. 180687, October 6,
2010
Ejectment; unlawful detainer; allegations constitute case of unlawful detainer. In the present
case, a thorough perusal of the complaint would reveal that the allegations clearly constitute a
case of unlawful detainer:
x x x x
3. Plaintiff is the registered owner of that certain parcel of land involved in the instant case
covered by TCT No. 222603 containing an area of 9,936 sq.m. situated in Sitio Manalite, Phase
I, Baranggay Sta. Cruz, Antipolo City, which property was place under community mortgage
program (CMP);
4. Other defendants in the instant case are all member and officers of defendant AMARA who,
through force, intimidation, threat, strategy and stealth entered into the premises herein and
constructed their temporary houses and office building respectively, pre-empting plaintiff from
using the premises thus, depriving the same of its prior possession thereof;
5. On September 2, 1992 as an strategy of the cheapest sort defendants, in conspiracy and
collusion with each other, defendants as representative of Heirs of Antonio and Hermogenes
Rodriquez, the alleged owner of the property at bar, filed civil case no. 92-2454 against plaintiff,
lodge before Branch 73 of the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City, seeking to annul plaintiff
title;
6. Immediately upon final dismissal of such groundless, baseless and malicious suit, plaintiff
demanded defendants to vacate the premises, but the latter pleaded with the former to be given a
one (1) year period within which to look for a place to transfer, which period, upon pleas of
defendants, coupled with plaintiffs benevolence was repeatedly extended by said plaintiffs
tolerance of occupancy thereof, but under such terms and conditions. Due to failure to comply
with their undertaking despite repeated demands therefor plaintiffs sent a formal demand letter
upon defendants;
7. Upon receipt of the above-stated demand, defendants propose to become members of
plaintiff, as qualification to acquire portions of the property by sale pursuant to the CMP, to
which plaintiff agreed and tolerated defendants possession by giving the same a period until the
month of December 1999, to comply with all the requirements pre-requisite to the availing of the
CMP benefits but failed and despite repeated demands therefor, thus, the filing of a complaint
with the Baranggay and the issuance of the certificate to file action dated February 8, 2000;
8. As time is of the essence, and the fact that the defendants are mere intruders or usurpers who
have no possessory right whatsoever over the land illegally occupied by them, trifling
technicalities that would tend to defeat the speedy administration of justice formal demand is not
necessary thereto, (Republic vs. Cruz C.A. G.R. No. 24910 R Feb. 7, 1964) however, to afford a
sufficient period of time within which to vacate the premises peacefully another oral and formal
demands were made upon the same to that effect, and demolish the temporary office and
houses they constructed on plaintiffs property and instead defendants again, as representative to
alleged Estate of Julian Tallano filed a complaint for ejectment against plaintiffs former
President, Hon. Marcelino Aben which case, is docketed as civil case no. 4119, lodged, before
branch 11 of this Honorable court, defendants obstinately refused to peacefully turn over the
property they intruded upon in fact they even dared plaintiff to file a case against them boasting
that nobody can order them to vacate the premises;
9. Defendants letter dated August 9, 2000, acknowledged actual receipt of plaintiffs two (2)
formal demands letters. Thus, the issuance of Katibayan Upang Makadulog sa Hukuman
dated September 25, 2000;
10. As a result thereof, plaintiff was compelled to engage the services of the undersigned
counsel in order to immediately institute the instant suit for which services plaintiff agreed to pay
the amount of P35,000.00 plus P3,500.00 per court appearance;
x x x x
A complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action for unlawful detainer if it recites the following:
(1) initially, possession of property by the defendant was by contract with or by tolerance of the
plaintiff; (2) eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by plaintiff to defendant of
the termination of the latters right of possession; (3) thereafter, the defendant remained in
possession of the property and deprived the plaintiff of the enjoyment thereof; and (4) within one
year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the property, the plaintiff instituted the
complaint for ejectment.
Likewise, the evidence proves that after MAHA acquired the property, MAHA tolerated
petitioners stay and gave them the option to acquire portions of the property by becoming
members of MAHA. Petitioners continued stay on the premises was subject to the condition
that they shall comply with the requirements of the CMP. Thus, when they failed to fulfill their
obligations, MAHA had the right to demand for them to vacate the property as their right of
possession had already expired or had been terminated. The moment MAHA required
petitioners to leave, petitioners became deforciants illegally occupying the land. Well settled is
the rule that a person who occupies the land of another at the latters tolerance or permission,
without any contract between them, is necessarily bound by an implied promise that he will
vacate upon demand, failing which, a summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy against
him. Thus, the RTC and the CA correctly ruled in favor of MAHA. Corazon D. Sarmienta, et
al. vs. Manalite Homeowners Association, Inc., G.R. No. 182953. October 11, 2010
Ejectment; unlawful detainer; complaint sufficiently alleges cause of action for unlawful
detainer. Based on the foregoing, we have held that a complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of
action for unlawful detainer if it recites the following:
(1) initially, possession of property by the defendant was by contract with or by tolerance of the
plaintiff;
(2) eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by plaintiff to defendant of the
termination of the latters right of possession;
(3) thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and deprived the plaintiff of
the enjoyment thereof; and
(4) within one year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the property, the plaintiff
instituted the complaint for ejectment.
In this case, respondents allegations in the complaint clearly make a case for unlawful detainer,
essential to confer jurisdiction on the MeTC over the subject matter. Thus, we accord respect to
the CAs findings, to wit:
A review of the Complaint readily reveals that land titles were issued in the name of the
respondent after it purchased the land referred to as the Bayanihan Compound through the
Community Mortgage Program (CMP) of the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation.
The lots allocated to the petitioners formed part of the Bayanihan Compound which they
received as members/beneficiaries of the respondent. However, their refusal to pay the monthly
amortizations despite demands resulted in their expulsion as members and loss of recognition as
beneficiaries of the lots in question. Even when the case was referred to the barangay, no
settlement was reached. Petitioners likewise did not conform to respondents demand to vacate
the premises and return its possession. As such, respondent sought to recover possession of the
said lots by filing a case for ejectment within a year after final demand.
Esmeraldo C. Romullo, et al. vs. Samahang Magkakapitbahay ng Bayanihan Compound
Homeowners Association, Inc. represented by its President, Paquito Quitalig, G.R. No. 180687,
October 6, 2010
Ejectment; unlawful detainer; sole issue is physical or material possession of property,
independent of claim of ownership. As to petitioners argument that MAHAs title is void for
having been secured fraudulently, we find that such issue was improperly raised. In an unlawful
detainer case, the sole issue for resolution is physical or material possession of the property
involved, independent of any claim of ownership by any of the parties. Since the only issue
involved is the physical or material possession of the premises, that is possession de facto and
not possession de jure, the question of ownership must be threshed out in a separate
action. Corazon D. Sarmienta, et al. vs. Manalite Homeowners Association, Inc., G.R. No.
182953. October 11, 2010
Extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage; notice requirement. In Olizon v. Court of Appeals, the
Court expounded on the purpose for giving notice of the foreclosure sale; and if such purpose
could be attained by publication alone, then the absence of actual posting should not nullify the
sale. Thus:
We take judicial notice of the fact that newspaper publications have more far-reaching effects
than posting on bulletin boards in public places. There is a greater probability that an
announcement or notice published in a newspaper of general circulation, which is distributed
nationwide, shall have a readership of more people than that posted in a public bulletin board, no
matter how strategic its location may be, which caters only to a limited few. Hence, the
publication of the notice of sale in the newspaper of general circulation alone is more than
sufficient compliance with the notice-posting requirement of the law. By such publication, a
reasonably wide publicity had been effected such that those interested might attend the public
sale, and the purpose of the law had been thereby subserved.
The object of a notice of sale is to inform the public of the nature and condition of the property to
be sold, and of the time, place and terms of the sale. Notices are given for the purpose of
securing bidders and to prevent a sacrifice of the property. If these objects are attained,
immaterial errors and mistakes will not affect the sufficiency of the notice; but if mistakes or
omissions occur in the notices of sale, which are calculated to deter or mislead bidders, to
depreciate the value of the property, or to prevent it from bringing a fair price, such mistakes or
omissions will be fatal to the validity of the notice, and also to the sale made pursuant thereto.
In the instant case, the aforesaid objective was attained since there was sufficient publicity of the
sale through the newspaper publication. There is completely no showing that the property was
sold for a price far below its value as to insinuate any bad faith, nor was there any showing or
even an intimation of collusion between the sheriff who conducted the sale and respondent
bank. This being so, the alleged non-compliance with the posting requirement, even if true, will
not justify the setting aside of the sale.
Olizon squarely applies in this case. It is not disputed that the Notice of Sale was duly published
in a newspaper of general circulation once a week for three consecutive weeks. Respondents did
not allege, much less prove, any mistake or omission in the published Notice of Sale calculated
to deter or mislead bidders, depreciate the value of the property, or to prevent it from bringing a
fair price; or sale of the mortgaged properties for a price far below their value as to insinuate bad
faith; or collusion between Notary Public Magpantay, who conducted the sale, and
petitioner. Hence, the alleged non-compliance with the posting requirement, even if true, shall
not justify the setting aside of the foreclosure sale. Century Savings Bank vs. Spouses Danilo T.
Samonte and Rosalinda M. Samonte, G.R. No. 176212, October 20, 2010.
Extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage; requirement that debtor be in default. Foreclosure is valid
only when the debtor is in default in the payment of his obligation. It is a necessary consequence
of non-payment of mortgage indebtedness. As a rule, the mortgage can be foreclosed only when
the debt remains unpaid at the time it is due. In a real estate mortgage, when the principal
obligation is not paid when due, the mortgagee has the right to foreclose on the mortgage, to
have the property seized and sold, and to apply the proceeds to the obligation. RCBCs own
Amortization Schedule readily shows the applicability of Article 1176 of the Civil Code, which
states:
Art. 1176. The receipt of the principal by the creditor, without reservation with respect to the
interest, shall give rise to the presumption that the said interest has been paid.
The receipt of a later installment of a debt without reservation as to prior installments, shall
likewise raise the presumption that such installments have been paid.
Respondents passbooks indicate that RCBC continued to receive his payments even after it
made demands for him to pay his past due accounts, and even after the auction sale. RCBC
cannot deny receipt of the payments, even when it claims that the deposits were not
withdrawn. It is not respondents fault that RCBC did not withdraw the money he deposited.
His obligation under the mortgage agreement was to deposit his payment in the savings account
he had opened for that purpose, in order that RCBC may debit the amount of his monthly
liabilities therefrom. He complied with his part of the agreement. This bolsters the conclusion of
the CA that respondent had no unpaid installments and was not in default as would warrant the
application of the acceleration clause and the subsequent foreclosure and auction sale of the
property. Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation vs. Pedro P. Buenaventura, G.R. No. 176479,
October 6, 2010
Factual findings of administrative agencies generally accorded respect and even finality. Factual
findings of administrative agencies are generally respected and even accorded finality because of
the special knowledge and expertise gained by these agencies from handling matters falling
under their specialized jurisdiction. Given that the LMB is the administrative agency tasked with
assisting the Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) in the
management and disposition of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, we defer to
its specialized knowledge on these matters. Pio Modesto and Cirila Rivera-Modesto vs. Carlos
Urbina, substituted by the heirs of Olympia Miguel Vda. de Urbina, et al., G.R. No. 189859,
October 18, 2010.
Injunction; preliminary injunction; nature of remedy and evidence relied on. It must also be
pointed out that there was a preliminary issue that of the parties respective petitions for
injunction that had to be determined before the resolution of the main case. When the case was
transferred from the SEC to the RTC, only the matter of the petitions for preliminary injunctions
had been heard and submitted for resolution. The hearings to resolve the petition to nullify the
Foundations Amended By-laws were yet to be held.
An injunctive writ is not a judgment on the merits of the case. A writ of preliminary injunction
is generally based solely on initial and incomplete evidence. The evidence submitted during the
hearing on an application for a writ of preliminary injunction is not conclusive or complete, for
only a sampling is needed to give the trial court an idea of the justification for the preliminary
injunction pending the decision of the case on the merits.
An order granting a preliminary injunction is not a final resolution or decision disposing of the
case. It is based on a preliminary determination of the status quo and on petitioners entitlement
to the Writ. Thus, the findings of fact and opinion of a court when issuing the writ of
preliminary injunction are interlocutory in nature and made before the trial on the merits is
commenced or terminated. There may be vital facts to be presented at trial which may not be
obtained or presented during the hearing on the application for the injunctive writ. The trial
court needs to conduct substantial proceedings in order to put the main controversy to rest. As
such, even as respondents claim that the RTC correctly ruled that the Amended By-laws are not
valid, they are still contesting the latters finding on the number of qualified apostles. This only
further underscores the need for trial to determine which of the parties claims are true and
relevant. There are other questions raised that cannot be answered in the present petition, and
nothing less than a full-blown trial is needed in order to test the conflicting claims of the
parties. Manuel D. Recto, et al. vs. Bishop Federico O. Escaler, S.J., et al., G.R. No. 173179,
October 20, 2010.
Judgment; finality. Elemental is the rule of procedure that the nature of a pleading is to be
determined by the averments in it and not by its title. Hence, while petitioners Motion (to Recall
the April 19, 2000 Order) was so denominated, it is not difficult to see that the remedy it was
seeking was actually a reconsideration of the dismissal of the Receivership Case. This Motion,
to reiterate, does not appear to have been acted upon by the hearing officer at any time during the
interim that the subject order was issued and the two cases were eventually transferred to
Branches 138 and 142 of the RTC of Makati. In particular, when the Receivership Case was
transferred to Branch 138, petitioners Motion to Recall was still a pending incident in the
case. With the transfer of the records to the said court, the accompanying duty to resolve the
motion likewise had devolved on the said court. In other words, contrary to the findings of the
Court of Appeals, the Receivership Case has not yet attained finality, as indeed the motion
seeking reconsideration of its dismissal had not been acted upon by the hearing officer himself
and had not yet, in fact, been acted upon by Branch 138 of the RTC of Makati. Moreover, the
November 23, 2000 Order of the SEC En Banc reads in full:
Under the Revised Rules of Procedure of the Securities and Exchange Commission, parties in an
intra-corporate dispute are allowed to file a petition for certiorari questioning interlocutory orders
of the Hearing Officer based on grave abuse of discretion. Such remedy was allowed by the
Commission in order for it to have oversight power over the acts of the Hearing Officer. With
the passage [of] Republic Act 8799 otherwise known as the Securities Regulation Code, the
jurisdiction of the Commission over intra-corporate dispute was transferred to the regular
courts. With the transfer of this function to the regular courts, the oversight power of the
Commission en banc over the acts of their Hearing Officers, has now become functus
officius. Therefore, the present petition for certiorari herein shall no longer be acted upon by the
Commission and denied due course. A copy of this order, together with the records of the case,
[is] hereby forwarded to the Regional Trial Court where the main case shall be heard for their
consideration.
SO ORDERED.
As can be gleaned from the aforequoted order, the SEC En Banc has chosen not to act on
the Certiorari Petition which principally assailed the October 22 and December 16, 1999 Orders
of Hearing Officer Bacalla respectively accepting the Committee Report and denying
reconsideration, precisely because it acknowledged that it has lost jurisdiction over the petition
as a result of the supervening transfer of jurisdiction over the case to the trial court. This is
evident in its recognition of the fact that by virtue of the enactment of R.A. No. 8799, it has
thereby also lost the oversight power to correct abuses of discretion in the issuance of
interlocutory orders by its hearing officers. More to the point, it likewise ordered the transfer of
the records of the case to the trial court where it may supposedly be heard for further
consideration. On these observations, it is clear that this Order could not have written finis to
the Certiorari Petition for the basic reason that the SEC En Banc, at that given point, could no
longer validly act on the same much less to rule on the merits of the petition. Bank of
Commerce vs. Hon. Estela Perlas-Bernabe, etc., et al. G.R. No. 172393, October 20, 2010.
Judgment; finality. Once a decision attains finality, it becomes the law of the case irrespective of
whether the decision is erroneous or not and no court not even the Supreme Court has the
power to revise, review, change or alter the same. The basic rule of finality of judgment is
grounded on the fundamental principle of public policy and sound practice that, at the risk of
occasional error, the judgment of courts and the award of quasi-judicial agencies must become
final at some definite date fixed by law.
Admittedly, the rule that a judgment that has become final and executory can no longer be
disturbed, altered or modified admits of exceptions in special cases. In filing the petition at
hand, however, ZFMC has once again hindered the proper appreciation of the facts of the case by
failing to submit copies of the BFD Directors orders dated 8 May 1974 and 11 November 1974,
a complete copy of the 25 June 1985 decision in MNR Case No. 4023 and the pleadings the
parties filed before the MNR and the Office of the President. Even if we were, therefore, to
excuse ZFMCs procedural lapses before the CA, there would still be a paucity of bases for the
reversal of the 30 June 2003 decision in O.P. Case No. 5613. Zamboanga Forest Managers
Corporation vs. New Pacific Timber and Supply Company, et al., G.R. No. 173342. October 13,
2010.
Judgment; finality; party cannot re-litigate claims already resolved with finality. In their
Memorandum, respondents claim that CMTC cannot purchase real estate or invest its funds in
any purpose other than its primary purpose for which it was organized in the absence of a
corporate board resolution; the bid award, deed of absolute sale and TCT No. T-76183, issued in
favor of the CMTC, should be nullified; the trial court erred in concluding that GSIS personnel
have regularly performed their official duty when they conducted the public bidding; Fernando,
as former owner of the subject property and former member of the GSIS, has the preemptive
right to repurchase the foreclosed property. These additional averments cannot be taken
cognizance by the Court, because they were substantially respondents arguments in their
petition for review on certiorari earlier filed before Us and docketed as G.R. No. 156609.
Records show that said petition was denied by the Court in a Resolution dated April 23, 2003,
for petitioners (respondents herein) failure to sufficiently show that the Court of Appeals
committed any reversible error in the challenged decision as to warrant the exercise by this Court
of its discretionary appellate jurisdiction. [The petition was also denied for lack of proof of the
petition on the adverse party and its failure to attach the affidavit of service of copy of the
petition on the adverse parties. (Id. at 190.)] Said resolution became final and executory on June
9, 2003. Respondents attempt to re-litigate claims already passed upon and resolved with
finality by the Court in G.R. No. 156609 cannot be allowed. Government Service Insurance
System (GSIS) vs. Heirs of Fernando P. Caballero, et al., G.R. No. 158090, October 4, 2010
Judgment; immutability; exceptions. As a rule, a final judgment may no longer be altered,
amended or modified, even if the alteration, amendment or modification is meant to correct what
is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law and regardless of what court, be it the
highest Court of the land, rendered it. In the past, however, we have recognized exceptions to
this rule by reversing judgments and recalling their entries in the interest of substantial justice
and where special and compelling reasons called for such actions.
Notably, in San Miguel Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission, Galman v.
Sandiganbayan, Philippine Consumers Foundation v. National Telecommunications
Commission, and Republic v. de los Angeles, we reversed our judgment on the second motion
for reconsideration, while in Vir-Jen Shipping and Marine Services v. National Labor Relations
Commission, we did so on a third motion for reconsideration. In Cathay Pacific v.
Romillo and Cosio v. de Rama, we modified or amended our ruling on the second motion for
reconsideration. More recently, in the cases of Munoz v. Court of Appeals, Tan Tiac Chiong v.
Hon. Cosico, Manotok IV v. Barque, and Barnes v. Padilla, we recalled entries of judgment after
finding that doing so was in the interest of substantial justice. In Barnes, we said:
x x x Phrased elsewise, a final and executory judgment can no longer be attacked by any of the
parties or be modified, directly or indirectly, even by the highest court of the land.
However, this Court has relaxed this rule in order to serve substantial justice considering
(a) matters of life, liberty, honor or property, (b) the existence of special or compelling
circumstances, (c) the merits of the case, (d) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or
negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules, (e) a lack of any showing that the
review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory, and (f) the other party will not be unjustly
prejudiced thereby.
Invariably, rules of procedure should be viewed as mere tools designed to facilitate the
attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in technicalities that
tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must always be eschewed. Even the
Rules of Court reflects this principle. The power to suspend or even disregard rules can be so
pervasive and compelling as to alter even that which this Court itself had already declared to be
final.
That the issues posed by this case are of transcendental importance is not hard to discern from
these discussions. A constitutional limitation, guaranteed under no less than the all-important Bill
of Rights, is at stake in this case: how can compensation in an eminent domain be just when
the payment for the compensation for property already taken has been unreasonably delayed? To
claim, as the assailed Resolution does, that only private interest is involved in this case is to
forget that an expropriation involves the government as a necessary actor. It forgets, too, that
under eminent domain, the constitutional limits or standards apply to government who carries the
burden of showing that these standards have been met. Thus, to simply dismiss this case as a
private interest matter is an extremely shortsighted view that this Court should not leave
uncorrected. As duly noted in the above discussions, this issue is not one of first impression in
our jurisdiction; the consequences of delay in the payment of just compensation have been
settled by this Court in past rulings. Our settled jurisprudence on the issue alone accords this case
primary importance as a contrary ruling would unsettle, on the flimsiest of grounds, all the
rulings we have established in the past. More than the stability of our jurisprudence, the matter
before us is of transcendental importance to the nation because of the subject matter involved
agrarian reform, a societal objective that the government has unceasingly sought to achieve in
the past half century. This reform program and its objectives would suffer a major setback if the
government falters or is seen to be faltering, wittingly or unwittingly, through lack of good faith
in implementing the needed reforms. Truly, agrarian reform is so important to the national
agenda that the Solicitor General, no less, pointedly linked agricultural lands, its ownership and
abuse, to the idea of revolution. This linkage, to our mind, remains valid even if the landowner,
not the landless farmer, is at the receiving end of the distortion of the agrarian reform program.
As we have ruled often enough, rules of procedure should not be applied in a very rigid,
technical sense; rules of procedure are used only to help secure, not override, substantial
justice. As we explained in Ginete v. Court of Appeals:
Let it be emphasized that the rules of procedure should be viewed as mere tools designed to
facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in
technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must always be
eschewed. Even the Rules of Court reflect this principle. The power to suspend or even disregard
rules can be so pervasive and compelling as to alter even that which this Court itself has already
declared to be final, as we are now constrained to do in the instant case.
x x x x
The emerging trend in the rulings of this Court is to afford every party litigant the amplest
opportunity for the proper and just determination of his cause, free from the constraints of
technicalities. Time and again, this Court has consistently held that rules must not be applied
rigidly so as not to override substantial justice.
Similarly, in de Guzman v. Sandiganbayan, we had occasion to state:
The Rules of Court was conceived and promulgated to set forth guidelines in the dispensation of
justice but not to bind and chain the hand that dispenses it, for otherwise, courts will be mere
slaves to or robots of technical rules, shorn of judicial discretion. That is precisely why courts in
rendering justice have always been, as they ought to be, conscientiously guided by the norm
that when on the balance, technicalities take a backseat against substantive rights, and not the
other way around. Truly then, technicalities, in the appropriate language of Justice Makalintal,
should give way to the realities of the situation.
We made the same recognition in Barnes, on the underlying premise that a courts primordial
and most important duty is to render justice; in discharging the duty to render substantial justice,
it is permitted to re-examine even a final and executory judgment.
Based on all these considerations, particularly the patently illegal and erroneous conclusion that
the petitioners are not entitled to 12% interest, we find that we are duty-bound to re-examine and
overturn the assailed Resolution. We shall completely and inexcusably be remiss in our duty as
defenders of justice if, given the chance to make the rectification, we shall let the opportunity
pass. Apo Fruits Corporation, et al. vs. Land Bank of the Philippines, G.R. No. 164195, October
12, 2010.
Judgment on the pleadings. At the outset, we lay stress on the Courts policy that cases should be
promptly and expeditiously resolved. The Rules of Court seeks to abbreviate court procedure in
order to allow the swift disposition of cases. Specifically, special strategies like demurrer to
evidence, judgment on the pleadings, and summary judgment were adopted to attain this avowed
goal. Full-blown trial is dispensed with and judgment is rendered on the basis of the pleadings,
supporting affidavits, depositions, and admissions of the parties. In the instant petition, the Court
is confronted with the propriety of the judgment on the pleadings rendered by the Makati City
RTC. Petitioners claim such adjudication on said papers and attachments is proper. The
petitioners position is impressed with merit.
Rule 34 of the Rules of Court provides that where an answer fails to tender an issue or
otherwise admits the material allegations of the adverse partys pleading, the court may, on
motion of that party, direct judgment on such pleading. Judgment on the pleadings is, therefore,
based exclusively upon the allegations appearing in the pleadings of the parties and the annexes,
if any, without consideration of any evidence aliunde. When what is left are not genuinely issues
requiring trial but questions concerning the proper interpretation of the provisions of some
written contract attached to the pleadings, judgment on the pleadings is proper.
From the pleadings, the parties admitted the following facts:
(1) EIB is the stockbroker of petitioners.
(2) Petitioners and EIB entered into a SDAA, Annex 1 of EIBs answer, which governed the
relationship between petitioners as clients and EIB as stockbroker. Sec. 7 of the SDAA provides:
7. Lien
The client agrees that all monies and/or securities and/or all other property of the Client
(plaintiffs) in the Companys (defendant) custody or control held from time to time shall be
subject to a general lien in favour of Company for the discharge of all or any indebtedness
of the Client to the Company. The Client shall not be entitled to withdraw any monies or
securities held by the Company pending the payment in full to the Company of any
indebtedness of the Client to the Company. The company shall be entitled at any time and
without notice to the Client to retain, apply, sell or dispose of all or any of the [clients] property
if any such obligation or liability is not discharged in full by the client when due or on demand in
or towards the payment and discharge of such obligation or liability and the Company shall be
under no duty to the client as to the price obtained or any losses or liabilities incurred or arising
in respect of any such sale or disposal. Subject to the relevant law and regulation on the matter,
the client hereby authorizes the Company, on his/its behalf, at any time and without notice to the
clients property if any such obligation or liability is not discharged. (Emphasis supplied.)
It is clear from the SDAA that all monies, securities, and other properties of petitioners in EIBs
custody or control shall be subject to a general lien in favor of the latter solely for the discharge
of all or any indebtedness to EIB.
(3) From June 2003 to March 2004, petitioners, through their broker, EIB, bought 60,790,000
KKP shares of stock at the Philippine Stock Exchange (PSE).
(4) On various dates in July and August 2003, petitioners bought 16,180,000 DMCI shares of
stock through EIB likewise at the PSE, while 16,000,000 DMCI shares of petitioners were
transferred to EIB by Westlink Global Equities, Inc. Thus, a total of 32,180,000 DMCI shares of
stock owned by petitioners were placed in the custody or control of EIB.
(5) On April 1, 2004, petitioners ordered the sale of 60,790,000 KPP shares to any buyer at the
price of PhP 0.14 per share. The KPP shares were eventually sold at PhP 0.14 per share to
interested buyers.
(6) Petitioners failed to reacquire or buy back the KPP shares at PhP 0.18 per share after 30 days
from date of transaction.
(7) As petitioners failed to deliver funds to EIB to honor the buy-back obligation, not to mention
the cash account obligations of petitioners in the amount of PhP 70 million to EIB, EIB had no
recourse but to sell the DMCI shares of petitioners to reacquire the KPP shares.
(8) Thus, on various dates in June 2004, EIB, without petitioners knowledge and consent, sold
petitioners 32,180,000 DMCI shares at the controlling market price. EIB later sent sales
confirmation receipts to petitioners regarding the sale of their DMCI shares, said receipts
containing the common notice, which reads:
All transaction[s] are subject to the rules and customs of the Exchange and its Clearing House. It
is agreed that all securities shall secure all my/our liabilities to e.securities and is authorized
in their discretion to sell all or any of them without notice to we/us whenever in the opinion of
e.securities my/our account is not properly secured. (Emphasis supplied.)
(9) EIB sent statements of accounts to petitioners showing the sale of the DMCI shares which
uniformly contained the following notice:
This statement will be considered correct unless we receive notice in writing of any exceptions
within 5 days from receipt. Please address all correspondence concerning exceptions to our
OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT. Kindly notify us in writing of any changes in your address.
(10) On January 12, 2005, petitioners wrote EIB demanding the return of the 32,180,000 DMCI
shares.
(11) On January 12, 2005, EIB rejected petitioners demand for the return of the DMCI shares, as
those were already sold to cover the buy back of the KPP shares.
(12) Petitioners prayer is the return of the 32,180,000 DMCI shares by EIB to them.
The principal issue in petitioners complaint is whether EIB can be compelled to return DMCI
shares to petitioners based on the alleged unauthorized disposal or sale of said shares to comply
with the buy back of the KKP shares. The threshold issue raised in the answer is the lack of
jurisdiction over the complaint due to the alleged nonpayment of the proper docket fees.
Affirmative defenses presented are that EIB disposed of the DMCI shares pursuant to Sec. 7 of
the SDAA, and the notices of sale, ratification and laches.
Based on the admissions in the pleadings and documents attached, the Court finds that the issues
presented by the complaint and the answer can be resolved within the four corners of said
pleadings without need to conduct further hearings. As explained by the Court in Philippine
National Bank v. Utility Assurance & Surety Co., Inc., when what remains to be done is the
proper interpretation of the contracts or documents attached to the pleadings, then
judgment on the pleadings is proper. In the case at bar, the issue of whether the sale of DMCI
shares to effectuate the buy back of the KKP shares is valid can be decided by the trial court
based on the SDAA, Notices of Sale, Sales Confirmation Receipts, the letters of the parties, and
other appendages to the pleadings in conjunction with the allegations or admissions contained in
the pleadings without need of trial. The Makati City RTC is, therefore, correct in issuing the
October 18, 2005 Resolution granting the Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings.
The CA nullified the October 18, 2005 Resolution on the ground that there are other issues that
must be resolved during a full-blown trial, ratiocinating this way:
While it may be true that the Appellant has already admitted that the sale of the DMCI shares
was for the purpose of buying back the KPP shares and that such admission strengthened
Appellees claim that the sale of the DMCI shares is a nullity, there were other issues raised by
the Appellant that can only be threshed out during a full blown trial, viz: the average price of the
KPP shares of stock, the scope of the collaterals stated in the Notices of Sale and the monetary
claims of the Appellant against the Appellees.
To the mind of the Court, these matters are not genuinely triable issues but actually minor issues
or mere incidental questions that can be resolved by construing the statements embodied in the
appendages to the pleadings. The facts that gave rise to the side issues are undisputed and were
already presented to the trial court rendering trial unnecessary. Pacific Rehouse Corporation, et
al. vs. EIB Securities, Inc., G.R. No. 184036, October 13, 2010.
Jurisdiction; bar by laches. For the first time in the entire proceedings of this case, petitioners
raise the trial courts alleged lack of jurisdiction over the subject-matter in light of the effectivity
of the IPRA at the time that the complaint was filed in 1998. They maintain that, under the
IPRA, it is the NCIP which has jurisdiction over land disputes involving indigenous cultural
communities and indigenous peoples.
As a rule, an objection over subject-matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time of the
proceedings. This is because jurisdiction cannot be waived by the parties or vested by the
agreement of the parties. Jurisdiction is vested by law, which prevails at the time of the filing of
the complaint.
An exception to this rule has been carved by jurisprudence. In the seminal case of Tijam v.
Sibonghanoy, the Court ruled that the existence of laches will prevent a party from raising the
courts lack of jurisdiction. Laches is defined as the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and
unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have
been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time,
warranting the presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned or declined to
assert it. Wisely, some cases have cautioned against applying Tijam, except for the most
exceptional cases where the factual milieu is similar to Tijam.
In Tijam, the surety could have raised the issue of lack of jurisdiction in the trial court but failed
to do so. Instead, the surety participated in the proceedings and filed pleadings, other than a
motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. When the case reached the appellate court, the surety
again participated in the case and filed their pleadings therein. It was only after receiving the
appellate courts adverse decision that the surety awoke from its slumber and filed a motion to
dismiss, in lieu of a motion for reconsideration. The CA certified the matter to this Court, which
then ruled that the surety was already barred by laches from raising the jurisdiction issue.
In case at bar, the application of the Tijam doctrine is called for because the presence of laches
cannot be ignored. If the surety in Tijam was barred by laches for raising the issue of jurisdiction
for the first time in the CA, what more for petitioners in the instant case who raised the issue for
the first time in their petition before this Court. At the time that the complaint was first filed in
1998, the IPRA was already in effect but the petitioners never raised the same as a ground for
dismissal; instead they filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the value of the property did
not meet the jurisdictional value for the RTC. They obviously neglected to take the IPRA into
consideration. When the amended complaint was filed in 1998, the petitioners no longer raised
the issue of the trial courts lack of jurisdiction. Instead, they proceeded to trial, all the time
aware of the existence of the IPRA as evidenced by the cross-examination conducted by
petitioners lawyer on the CSTFAL Chairman Guillermo Fianza. In the cross-examination, it
was revealed that the petitioners were aware that the DENR, through the CSTFAL, had lost its
jurisdiction over ancestral land claims by virtue of the enactment of the IPRA. They assailed the
validity of the CSTFAL resolution favoring respondent on the ground that the CSTFAL had been
rendered functus officio under the IPRA. Inexplicably, petitioners still did not question the trial
courts jurisdiction.
When petitioners recoursed to the appellate court, they only raised as errors the trial courts
appreciation of the evidence and the conclusions that it derived therefrom. In their brief, they
once again assailed the CSTFALs resolution as having been rendered functus officio by the
enactment of IPRA. But nowhere did petitioners assail the trial courts ruling for having been
rendered without jurisdiction.
It is only before this Court, eight years after the filing of the complaint, after the trial court had
already conducted a full-blown trial and rendered a decision on the merits, after the appellate
court had made a thorough review of the records, and after petitioners have twice encountered
adverse decisions from the trial and the appellate courts that petitioners now want to expunge
all the efforts that have gone into the litigation and resolution of their case and start all over
again. This practice cannot be allowed. Thus, even assuming arguendo that petitioners theory
about the effect of IPRA is correct (a matter which need not be decided here), they are already
barred by laches from raising their jurisdictional objection under the circumstances. Delfin
Lamsis, et al. vs. Margarita Semon Dong-e, G.R. No. 173021, October 20, 2010.
Jurisdiction; determined by allegations in complaint. Settled is the rule that jurisdiction in
ejectment cases is determined by the allegations pleaded in the complaint. It cannot be made to
depend on the defenses set up in the answer or pleadings filed by the defendant. Neither can it be
made to depend on the exclusive characterization of the case by one of the parties. The test for
determining the sufficiency of those allegations is whether, admitting the facts alleged, the court
can render a valid judgment in accordance with the prayer of the plaintiff. Esmeraldo C.
Romullo, et al. vs.. Samahang Magkakapitbahay ng Bayanihan Compound Homeowners
Association, Inc. represented by its President, Paquito Quitalig, G.R. No. 180687, October 6,
2010
Jurisdiction; jurisdiction by estoppel. Considering the foregoing discussion, we find no need to
remand the case to the trial court for the resolution of Bayerphils counterclaim. In Metromedia
Times Corporation v. Pastorin, we discussed the rule as to when jurisdiction by estoppel applies
and when it does not, thus:
Lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit is yet another matter. Whenever it appears
that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, the action shall be dismissed (Section 2,
Rule 9, Rules of Court). This defense may be interposed at any time, during appeal (Roxas vs.
Rafferty, 37 Phil. 957) or even after final judgment (Cruzcosa vs. Judge Concepcion, et al., 101
Phil. 146). Such is understandable, as this kind of jurisdiction is conferred by law and not within
the courts, let alone the parties, to themselves determine or conveniently set aside. In People vs.
Casiano (111 Phil. 73, 93-94), this Court, on the issue of estoppel, held:
The operation of the principle of estoppel on the question of jurisdiction seemingly depends
upon whether the lower court actually had jurisdiction or not. If it had no jurisdiction, but the
case was tried and decided upon the theory that it had jurisdiction, the parties are not barred, on
appeal, from assailing such jurisdiction, for the same must exist as a matter of law, and may not
be conferred by consent of the parties or by estoppel (5 C.J.S., 861-863). However, if the lower
court had jurisdiction, and the case was heard and decided upon a given theory, such, for
instance, as that the court had no jurisdiction, the party who induced it to adopt such theory will
not be permitted, on appeal, to assume an inconsistent position that the lower court had
jurisdiction. Here, the principle of estoppel applies. The rule that jurisdiction is conferred by
law, and does not depend upon the will of the parties, has no bearing thereon.
In this case, the trial court had jurisdiction over the counterclaim although it erroneously ordered
its automatic dismissal. As already discussed, the trial court should have instead directed
Bayerphil to pay the required docket fees within a reasonable time. Even then, records show that
the trial court heard the counterclaim although it again erroneously found the same to be
unmeritorious. Besides, it must also be mentioned that Bayerphil was lulled into believing that
its counterclaim was indeed compulsory and thus there was no need to pay docket fees by virtue
of Judge Claravalls October 24, 1990 Resolution. Petitioners also actively participated in the
adjudication of the counterclaim which the trial court adjudge to be unmeritorious. Calibre
Traders Inc., Mario Sison Sebastian and Minda Blanco Sebastian vs. Bayer Philippines, Inc.,
G.R. No. 161431, October 13, 2010.
Jurisdiction; payment of docket fees. EIB asserts that the trial court has no jurisdiction over the
complaint on account of insufficient dockets fees. Although petitioners paid a total of PhP
120,758.80 in legal fees with the RTC, EIB argues that what was paid is based merely on
petitioners prayer for moral damages of PhP 3 million, exemplary damages of PhP 3 million,
and attorneys fees of PhP 2 million, but not including petitioners claim for PhP 4.5 million as
actual damages as averred in paragraph 9 of the complaint. Thus, EIB, relying on Manchester
Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals (Manchester) and Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. v.
Asuncion, maintains that the RTC should not have entertained the case.
It is hornbook law that courts acquire jurisdiction over a case only upon payment of the
prescribed docket fee. A plain reading of the prayer does not show that petitioners asked for the
payment of actual damages of PhP 4.5 million. The reliefs asked by petitioners in the prayer are:
1. Upon the filing of the Complaint, a writ of preliminary attachment be issued ex
parte against defendant pursuant to Section 2, Rule 57 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure;
2. After trial, judgment rendered in favor of plaintiffs and against defendant as
follows:
On the FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION declaring void the sale by defendant of the 32,180,000
DMCI shares of stock of plaintiffs and directing defendant to return to plaintiffs the latters
32,180,000 DMCI shares of stock, or in the event the return thereof is not possible, holding
defendant liable under Articles 1888,1889,1909 and other pertinent provisions of the Civil Code.
On the SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION directing defendant to pay plaintiffs moral damages in
the amount of at least P3,000,000.00;
On the THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION directing defendant to pay plaintiffs exemplary damages
in the amount of at least P3,000,000.00; and
On the FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION directing defendant to pay plaintiffs attorneys fees in
the amount of P2,000,000.00 and such amounts as may be proven at the trial as litigation
expenses.
Other just and equitable relief are likewise prayed for.
Since the prayer did not ask for the payment of actual damages of PhP 4.5 million, the clerk of
court correctly assessed the amount of PhP 120,758.80 as docket fees based on the total amount
of PhP 8 million consisting of PhP 3 million as moral damages, PhP 3 million as exemplary
damages, and PhP 2 million as attorneys fees.
In disputing the fees paid by petitioners, respondent relies on our ruling in Manchester, where we
said that all complaints, petitions, answers and other similar pleadings should specify the
amount of damages being prayed for not only in the body of the pleading but also in the prayer,
and said damages shall be considered in the assessment of the filing fees in any case.
EIB insinuates that petitioners, by alleging the substantial loss of PhP 4.5 million from the sale of
the DMCI shares but not specifying the amount in their prayer, circumvented the Manchester
ruling to evade the payment of the correct filing fees. This postulation is incorrect. It is clear that
petitioners demanded the return of the DMCI shares in the prayer of the complaint and NOT the
alleged loss in the value of the shares. If the DMCI shares are returned, then no actual damages
are suffered by petitioners. A recall of the averment in par. 9 of the complaint shows that the
alleged loss of PhP 4.5 million to petitioners resulted from the sale of DMCI shares at PhP 0.24
per share when they acquired it at PhP 0.38 per share. More importantly, the court was
proscribed by the Manchester ruling from granting actual damages of PhP 4.5 million to
petitioners, because precisely the alleged damages were never sought in the prayer. Ergo, EIBs
attack on the trial courts assumption of jurisdiction must fail. Pacific Rehouse Corporation, et
al. vs. EIB Securities, Inc., G.R. No. 184036, October 13, 2010.
Jurisdiction; Supreme Courts certiorari jurisdiction over rulings of Commission on Elections
(COMELEC). First, both the COMELEC and the private respondents posit that the Court
improperly exercised its limited certiorari jurisdiction; they theorize that Mitras petition failed
to allege and show errors of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
COMELEC. They also stress that the Court should respect and consider the COMELECs
findings of fact to be final and non-reviewable. The COMELECs submission in this regard
that the extraordinary remedy of certiorari is limited to corrections of questions of law and that
the factual issues raised in the present petition are not appropriate for a petition for review on
certiorari is wholly erroneous. This submission appears to have confused the standards of the
Courts power of review under Rule 65 and Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, leading the
COMELEC to grossly misread the import of Mitras petition before the Court.
To recall, Mitra brought his case before us via a petition for certiorari, pursuant to Section 2,
Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, of the Rules of Court. Thus, in our July 2, 2010 Decision, we
emphasized that our review (under the Rule 65 standard of grave abuse of discretion, and not
under the Rule 45 question of law standard) is based on a very limited ground, i.e., on the
jurisdictional issue of whether the COMELEC acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The basis for the
Courts review of COMELEC rulings under the standards of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is
Section 7, Article IX-A of the Constitution which provides that [U]nless otherwise provided by
[the] Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought
to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a
copy thereof. For this reason, the Rules of Court provide for a separate rule (Rule 64)
specifically applicable only to decisions of the COMELEC and the Commission on Audit. This
Rule expressly refers to the application of Rule 65 in the filing of a petition for certiorari,
subject to the exception clause except as hereinafter provided.
In Aratuc v. Commission on Elections and Dario v. Mison, the Court construed the above-cited
constitutional provision as relating to the special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65
(although with a different reglementary period for filing) and not to an appeal by certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Thus, Section 2 of Rule 64 of the Rules of Court now
clearly specifies that the mode of review is the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65,
except as therein provided. In Ocate v. Commission on Elections, we further held that:
The purpose of a petition for certiorari is to determine whether the challenged tribunal has acted
without or in excess of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction. Thus, any resort to a petition for certiorari under Rule 64 in relation
to Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is limited to the resolution of jurisdictional
issues.
The COMELEC should likewise be aware that the Constitution itself, in defining judicial power,
pointedly states that
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government.

This provision, more than anything else, identifies the power and duty of this Court in grave
abuse of discretion situations, and differentiates this authority from the power of review by
appeal that Rule 45 of the Rules of Court defines.

Based on these considerations, we cannot accept the COMELECs position that patently
confuses the mode of review in election cases under Rules 64 and 65 of the Rules of Court, with
the appellate review that Rule 45 of the same Rules provides. Abraham Kahlil B. Mitra vs.
Commission on Elections, Antonio V. Gonzales and Orlando R. Balbon, Jr., G.R. No. 191938,
October 19, 2010.
Jurisdiction; Supreme Courts certiorari jurisdiction over rulings of COMELEC; review of
factual issues. We likewise reject the COMELEC and the private respondents proposition that
the Court erred in exercising its limited certiorari jurisdiction. Although the COMELEC is
admittedly the final arbiter of all factual issues as the Constitution and the Rules of Court
provide, we stress that in the presence of grave abuse of discretion, our constitutional duty is to
intervene and not to shy away from intervention simply because a specialized agency has been
given the authority to resolve the factual issues. As we emphasized in our Decision, we have in
the past recognized exceptions to the general rule that the Court ordinarily does not review in a
certiorari case the COMELECs appreciation and evaluation of evidence. One such exception is
when the COMELECs appreciation and evaluation of evidence go beyond the limits of its
discretion to the point of being grossly unreasonable. In this situation, we are duty bound under
the Constitution to intervene and correct COMELEC errors that, because of the attendant grave
abuse of discretion, have mutated into errors of jurisdiction.
Our Decision clearly pointed out Mitras submissions and arguments on grave abuse of
discretion, namely, that the COMELEC failed to appreciate that the case is a cancellation of a
COC proceeding and that the critical issue is the presence of deliberate false material
representation to deceive the electorate. In fact, Mitras petition plainly argued that the
COMELECs grave abuse of discretion was patent when it failed to consider that the ground to
deny a COC is deliberate false representation. We completely addressed this issue and, in the
process, analyzed the reasoning in the assailed COMELEC decision. At every step, we found
that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of the evidence.
Second, the private respondents contend that the COMELEC did not use subjective non-legal
standards (i.e., interior decoration of the room) in arriving at its decision; it merely stated how it
perceived Mitras alleged residence. The private respondents additionally claim that the
quantum of evidence necessary to overturn the findings of the COMELEC should be clear and
convincing evidence, which level of evidence does not obtain in the present case. The assailed
COMELEC ruling speaks for itself on the matter of the standards the COMELEC used. We
found that the COMELEC plainly used a subjective non-legal standard in its analysis and
thereby, the COMELEC used wrong considerations in arriving at the conclusion that Mitras
residence at the Maligaya Feedmill is not the residence contemplated by law. We reiterate that
the COMELEC based its ruling that Mitra did not take up residence in Aborlan largely on the
photographs of Mitras Aborlan premises; it concluded that the photographed premises could not
have been a residence because of its assessment of the interior design and furnishings of the
room. Thus, the COMELEC Second Divisions Resolution (which the COMELEC en banc fully
supported) did not merely conclude that Mitra does not live in the photographed premises; more
than this, it ruled that these premises cannot be considered a home or a residence, for lack of the
qualities of a home that the Second Division wanted to see. To quote:
The pictures presented by Mitra of his supposed residence are telling. The said pictures show
a small, sparsely furnished room which is evidently unlived in and which is located on the
second floor of a structure that appears like a factory or a warehouse. These pictures likewise
show that the residence appears hastily set-up, cold, and utterly devoid of any [personality]
which would have imprinted Mitras personality thereto such as old family photographs and
memorabilia collected through the years. In fact, an appreciation of Mitras supposed
residence raises doubts whether or not he indeed lives there. Verily, what is lacking therein
are the loving attention and details inherent in every home to make it ones residence. Perhaps,
at most, and to this Commissions mind, this small room could have served as Mitras resting
area whenever he visited the said locality but nothing more.
This observation coupled with the numerous statements from former employees and customers
of Maligaya Feed Mill and Farm that Mitras residence is located in an unsavory location,
considering the noise and pollution of being in a factory area, and that the same, in fact, had been
Maligaya Feed Mills office just a few months back, militates against Mitras claim that the same
has been his residence since early 2008. These information make it clear to this Commission
that this room is not a home.
Thus presented, the COMELECs requirement of what should be considered a residence
cannot but be a highly subjective one that finds no basis in law, in jurisprudence, or even in fact.
Third, we cannot likewise agree with the private respondents theory that the quantum of
evidence necessary to overturn the factual findings of the COMELEC should be clear and
convincing evidence, as it misappreciates that we nullified the COMELECs findings because it
used the wrong considerations in arriving at its conclusions. The private respondents fail to
realize that the important considerations in the present case relate to questions bearing on the
cancellation of the COC that they prayed for; the main critical points are the alleged deliberate
misrepresentation by Mitra and the underlying question of his residency in Aborlan,
Palawan. While it is undisputed that Mitras domicile of origin is Puerto Princesa City, Mitra
adequately proved by substantial evidence that he transferred by incremental process to Aborlan
beginning 2008, and concluded his transfer in early 2009. As our Decision discussed and as
repeated elsewhere in this Resolution, the private respondents failed to establish by sufficiently
convincing evidence that Mitra did not effectively transfer, while the COMELEC not only
grossly misread the evidence but even used the wrong considerations in appreciating the
submitted evidence. To convince us of their point of view, the private respondents point out that
we (1) totally disregarded the other evidence they submitted, which the COMELEC, on the other
hand, properly considered; (2) disregarded the import of the effectivity of the lease contract,
which showed that it was only effective until February 28, 2010; and (3) disregarded the
evidence showing that Mitra failed to abandon his domicile of origin. These issues are not new
issues; we extensively and thoroughly considered and resolved them in our July 2, 2010
Decision. At this point, we only need to address some of the private respondents misleading
points in order to clear the air.
1. The private respondents reliance on the expiration date of the lease contract, to disprove
Mitras claim that the room at the Maligaya Feedmill is his residence, is misplaced. This
argument is flimsy since the contract did not provide that it was completely and fully time-barred
and was only up to February 28, 2010; it was renewable at the option of the parties. That a lease
is fixed for a one-year term is a common practice. What is important is that it is renewable at the
option of the parties. In the absence of any objection from the parties, the lease contract simply
continues and is deemed renewed.
2. In an attempt to show that Mitra considers himself a resident of Puerto Princesa City, the
private respondents submitted in their Motion for Reconsideration a colored certified true copy
of Mitras alleged Puerto Princesa City Community Tax Certificate (CTC) dated February 3,
2009 allegedly showing Mitras signature. To recall, we found that based on the records before
us, the purported February 3, 2009 CTC did not bear the signature of Mitra. Although the
private respondents have belatedly filed this evidence, we carefully examined the recently
submitted colored copy of the February 3, 2009 CTC and saw no reason to reverse our finding;
the alleged signature appears to us to be a mere hazy superimposition that does not bear any
resemblance at all to Mitras signature. We, thus, stand by our ruling that the February 3, 2009
CTC, if at all, carries very little evidentiary value. It did it not at all carry Mitras signature; his
secretarys positive testimony that she secured the CTC for Mitra, without the latters
participation and knowledge, still stands unrefuted.
3. The private respondents likewise belatedly submitted a Certification, dated July 17, 2010,
from the Municipal Agriculturist of Aborlan, stating that its office does not have any record of
the supposed pineapple plantation in Barangay Isaub, Aborlan, Palawan. This late submission
was made to show that Mitra has no established business interests in Aborlan. The Certification
pertinently states:
This is to certify that as of this date, there is no existing records/registration in our office
regarding the alleged pineapple plantation in Barangay Isaub, Aborlan, Palawan. However, the
Office of the Municipal Agriculturist is on the process of gathering data on the Master list
of Farmers engaged in growing High Value Commercial Crops in Aborlan.
This certification is issued to MR. BENJAMIN KATON a resident in Penida Subdivision, Puerto
Princesa City for whatever legal purposes may serve him best.
We cannot give any evidentiary value to this submission for two reasons. First, it was filed only
on reconsideration stage and was not an evidence before us when the case was submitted for
resolution. Second, even if it had not been filed late, the Certification does not prove anything; it
is, on its face, contradictory. On the one hand, it categorically states that there are no existing
records of any pineapple plantation in Barangay Isaub, Aborlan, Palawan; on the other hand, it
also expressly states that its records are not yet complete since it is on the process of gathering
data on the Master list of Farmers engaged in growing High Value Commercial Crops in
Aborlan. Under what law or regulation the certifying office has the obligation to prepare a list
of agricultural business interests in Aborlan has not even been alleged.
At the risk of repetition, we reiterate that Mitras business interests in Aborlan stand undisputed
in the present case. Not only was Mitra able to present photographs of his experimental
pineapple plantation; his claim of ownership was also corroborated by the statements of Dr.
Carme Caspe, Ricardo Temple and other witnesses. Abraham Kahlil B. Mitra vs. Commission
on Elections, Antonio V. Gonzales and Orlando R. Balbon, Jr., G.R. No. 191938, October 19,
2010.
Litis pendentia; requisites. Moreover, this Court rejects the contention of petitioners that the
RTC and the CA erred in not dismissing the complaint of respondent on the ground of litis
pendentia, in view of the pendency of the HLURB case. The requisites of litis pendentia are the
following: (a) identity of parties, or at least such as representing the same interests in both
actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same
facts; and (c) identity of the two cases such that judgment in one, regardless of which party is
successful, would amount to res judicata in the other. The causes of action and, logically, the
issues in the two cases, are clearly different, each requiring divergent adjudication. In short,
while there is identity of parties, there are different issues, causes of action, and reliefs prayed for
between them. Contrary to petitioners posture, not all the elements of litis pendentia are
present. Appropos is the CAs ruling:
The suit filed with the HLURB involves: (1) the reinstatement of the petitioners as members of
the respondent, which was their community association; (2) a call for regular annual meetings;
(3) elections for board of directors; ([4]) an accounting of funds; and ([5]) the annulment of the
board resolutions which expelled them as members and disqualified them to be beneficiaries of
the housing program. On the other hand, the ejectment case has in issue the better right of the
petitioners or of the respondent to the physical possession of the lots occupied by petitioners.
Clearly, therefore, no identity of the rights asserted and the reliefs prayed for exist in both
cases. Esmeraldo C. Romullo, et al. vs. Samahang Magkakapitbahay ng Bayanihan Compound
Homeowners Association, Inc. represented by its President, Paquito Quitalig, G.R. No. 180687,
October 6, 2010
Mediation; effect of failure to appear. In Senarlo v. Judge Paderanga, this Court accentuated that
mediation is part of pre-trial and failure of the plaintiff to appear thereat merits sanction on the
part of the absent party. This court held:
A.M. No. 01-10-5-SC-PHILJA dated 16 October 2001, otherwise known as the Second Revised
Guidelines for the Implementation of Mediation Proceedings and Section 5, Rule 18 of the Rules
of Court grant judges the discretion to dismiss an action for failure of the plaintiff to appear at
mediation proceedings.
A.M. No. 01-10-5-SC-PHILJA considers mediation a part of pre-trial and provides sanctions for
the absent party:
12. Sanctions.
Since mediation is part of Pre-Trial, the trial court shall impose the appropriate sanction
including but not limited to censure, reprimand, contempt and such sanctions as are provided
under the Rules of Court for failure to appear for pre-trial, in case any or both of the parties
absent himself/themselves, or for abusive conduct during mediation proceedings.
Under Rule 18, Section 5 of the Rules of Court, failure of the plaintiff to appear at pre-trial shall
be cause for dismissal of the action:
Sec. 5. Effect of failure to appear. The failure of the plaintiff to appear when so required
pursuant to the next preceding section shall be cause for dismissal of the action. The dismissal
shall be with prejudice, unless otherwise ordered by the court. A similar failure on the part of the
defendant shall be cause to allow the plaintiff to present his evidence ex parte and the court to
render judgment on the basis thereof.
Real Bank Inc. vs. Samsung Mabuhay Corporation, et al., G.R. No. 175862, October 13, 2010.
Mootness. Certainly, with the dismissal of the non-bailable case against accused Guisande, she is
no longer under peril to be confined in a jail facility, much less at the NCMH. Effectively,
accused Guisandes person, and treatment of any medical and mental malady she may or may not
have, can no longer be subjected to the lawful processes of the RTC Mandaluyong City. In short,
the cases have now been rendered moot and academic which, in the often cited David v.
Macapagal-Arroyo, is defined as one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue
of supervening events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or
value. David E. So, on behalf of his daughter Maria Elena So Guisande vs. Hon. Esteban A.
Tacla, Jr. etc., et al. / Hon. Esteban A. Tacla, Jr., etc., et al. vs. David E. So, on behalf of his
daughter Maria Elena So Guisande, G.R. Nos. 190108, 190473. October 19, 2010.
Motions; motion for reconsideration. We note at the outset that the COMELEC and private
respondents arguments are mere rehashes of their previous submissions; they are the same
arguments addressing the issues we already considered and passed upon in our July 2, 2010
Decision. Thus, both the COMELEC and private respondents failed to raise any new and
substantial argument meriting reconsideration. The denial of the motion for oral arguments
proceeds from this same reasoning; mere reiterations of the parties original submissions on
issues our Decision has sufficiently covered, without more, do not merit the time, effort and
attention that an oral argument shall require. Abraham Kahlil B. Mitra vs. Commission on
Elections, Antonio V. Gonzales and Orlando R. Balbon, Jr., G.R. No. 191938, October 19, 2010.
Motions; period to file motion for reconsideration is non-extendible. The appellate court was
correct in denying petitioners motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration
considering that the reglementary period for filing the said motion for reconsideration is non-
extendible. As pronounced in Apex Mining Co., Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
The rule is and has been that the period for filing a motion for reconsideration is non-
extendible. The Court has made this clear as early as 1986 in Habaluyas Enterprises vs. Japzon.
Since then, the Court has consistently and strictly adhered thereto.
Given the above, we rule without hesitation that the appellate courts denial of petitioners
motion for reconsideration is justified, precisely because petitioners earlier motion for extension
of time did not suspend/toll the running of the 15-day reglementary period for filing a motion for
reconsideration. Under the circumstances, the CA decision has already attained finality when
petitioner filed its motion for reconsideration. It follows that the same decision was already
beyond the review jurisdiction of this Court. Cynthia S. Bolos vs. Danilo T. Bolos, G.R. No.
186400, October 20, 2010.
Oral argument. We note at the outset that the COMELEC and private respondents arguments are
mere rehashes of their previous submissions; they are the same arguments addressing the issues
we already considered and passed upon in our July 2, 2010 Decision. Thus, both the COMELEC
and private respondents failed to raise any new and substantial argument meriting
reconsideration. The denial of the motion for oral arguments proceeds from this same reasoning;
mere reiterations of the parties original submissions on issues our Decision has sufficiently
covered, without more, do not merit the time, effort and attention that an oral argument shall
require. Abraham Kahlil B. Mitra vs. Commission on Elections, Antonio V. Gonzales and
Orlando R. Balbon, Jr., G.R. No. 191938, October 19, 2010.
Parties; foreign corporation; capacity to sue; estoppel. The determination of a corporations
capacity is a factual question that requires the elicitation of a preponderant set of facts. As a rule,
unlicensed foreign non-resident corporations doing business in the Philippines cannot file suits in
the Philippines. This is mandated under Section 133 of the Corporation Code, which reads:
Sec. 133. Doing business without a license. No foreign corporation transacting business in the
Philippines without a license, or its successors or assigns, shall be permitted to maintain or
intervene in any action, suit or proceeding in any court or administrative agency of the
Philippines, but such corporation may be sued or proceeded against before Philippine courts or
administrative tribunals on any valid cause of action recognized under Philippine laws.
A corporation has a legal status only within the state or territory in which it was organized. For
this reason, a corporation organized in another country has no personality to file suits in the
Philippines. In order to subject a foreign corporation doing business in the country to the
jurisdiction of our courts, it must acquire a license from the Securities and Exchange
Commission and appoint an agent for service of process. Without such license, it cannot institute
a suit in the Philippines.
The exception to this rule is the doctrine of estoppel. Global is estopped from challenging
Surecomps capacity to sue. A foreign corporation doing business in the Philippines without
license may sue in Philippine courts a Filipino citizen or a Philippine entity that had contracted
with and benefited from it. A party is estopped from challenging the personality of a corporation
after having acknowledged the same by entering into a contract with it. The principle is applied
to prevent a person contracting with a foreign corporation from later taking advantage of its
noncompliance with the statutes, chiefly in cases where such person has received the benefits of
the contract. Global Business Holdings, Inc. vs. Surecomp Software B.V., G.R. No. 173463.
October 13, 2010
Pleadings; certification on forum shopping; authority of President to execute on behalf of
corporation even without board authorization. In Hutama-RSEA/Super Max Phils., J.V. v. KCD
Builders Corporation, Hutama as petitioner therein questioned the verification and certification
on non-forum shopping of respondent KCD which the latter attached to its Complaint for Sum of
Money filed before the RTC. According to Hutama, KCDs president did not present any proof
that he is authorized by the corporation to sign the verification and certification of non-forum
shopping. In explaining the requirement of verification and certification against forum-shopping
and upholding the authority of the president of the corporation to execute the same sans proof of
authority, this Court has this to say:
A pleading is verified by an affidavit that an affiant has read the pleading and that the allegations
therein are true and correct as to his personal knowledge or based on authentic records. The
party does not need to sign the verification. A partys representative, lawyer, or any person who
personally knows the truth of the facts alleged in the pleading may sign the verification.
On the other hand, a certification of non-forum shopping is a certification under oath by the
plaintiff or principal party in the complaint or other initiatory pleading, asserting a claim for
relief, or in a sworn certification annexed thereto and simultaneously filed therewith, that (a) he
has not theretofore commenced any action or filed any claim involving the same issues in any
court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his knowledge, no such other action or
claim is pending therein; (b) if there is such other pending action or claim, a complete statement
of the present status thereof; and (c) if he should thereafter learn that the same or similar action
or claim has been filed or is pending, he shall report that fact within five days therefrom to the
court wherein his aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has been filed.
It is true that the power of a corporation to sue and be sued is lodged in the board of directors
that exercises its corporate powers. However, it is settled and we have so declared in
numerous decisions that the president of a corporation may sign the verification and the
certification of non-forum shopping.
In Ateneo de Naga University v. Manalo, we held that the lone signature of the University
President was sufficient to fulfill the verification requirement, because such officer had sufficient
knowledge to swear to the truth of the allegations in the petition.
In Peoples Aircargo and Warehousing Co., Inc. v. CA, we held that in the absence of a charter
or by-law provision to the contrary, the president of a corporation is presumed to have the
authority to act within the domain of the general objectives of its business and within the scope
of his or her usual duties. Moreover, even if a certain contract or undertaking is outside the usual
powers of the president, the corporations ratification of the contract or undertaking and the
acceptance of benefits therefrom make the corporate presidents actions binding on the
corporation. (Citations omitted.)
Moreover, this Courts pronouncement in Cagayan Valley Drug Corporation v. Commissioner of
Internal Revenue, reiterated in PNCC Skyway Traffic Management and Security Division
Workers Organization v. PNCC Skyway Corporation and Mid-Pasig Land Development
Corporation v. Tablante, on the authority of certain officers and employees of the corporation to
sign the verification and certification of non-forum shopping is likewise significant, to wit:
It must be borne in mind that Sec. 23, in relation to Sec. 25 of the Corporation Code, clearly
enunciates that all corporate powers are exercised, all business conducted, and all properties
controlled by the board of directors. A corporation has a separate and distinct personality from
its directors and officers and can only exercise its corporate powers through the board of
directors. Thus, it is clear that an individual corporate officer cannot solely exercise any
corporate power pertaining to the corporation without authority from the board of directors. This
has been our constant holding in cases instituted by a corporation.
In a slew of cases, however, we have recognized the authority of some corporate officers to sign
the verification and certification against forum shopping. In Mactan-Cebu International Airport
Authority v. CA, we recognized the authority of a general manager or acting general manager to
sign the verification and certificate against forum shopping; in Pfizer v. Galan, we upheld the
validity of a verification signed by an employment specialist who had not even presented any
proof of her authority to represent the company; in Novelty Philippines Inc., v. CA, we ruled that
a personnel officer who signed the petition but did not attach the authority from the company is
authorized to sign the verification and non-forum shopping certificate; and in Lepanto
Consolidated Mining Company v. WMC Resources International Pty. Ltd. (Lepanto), we ruled
that the Chairperson of the Board and President of the Company can sign the verification and
certificate against non-forum shopping even without the submission of the boards authorization.
In sum, we have held that the following officials or employees of the company can sign the
verification and certification without need of a board resolution: (1) the Chairperson of the Board
of Directors, (2) the President of a corporation, (3) the General Manager or Acting General
Manager, (4) Personnel Officer, and (5) an Employment Specialist in a labor case.
While the above cases do not provide a complete listing of authorized signatories to the
verification and certification required by the rules, the determination of the sufficiency of the
authority was done on a case to case basis. The rationale applied in the foregoing cases is to
justify the authority of corporate officers or representatives of the corporation to sign the
verification or certificate against forum shopping, being in a position to verify the truthfulness
and correctness of the allegations in the petition. (Citations omitted.)
From the foregoing, it is clear that Albao, as President and Manager of Cebu Metro, has the
authority to sign the verification and certification of non-forum shopping even without the
submission of a written authority from the board. As the corporations President and Manager,
she is in a position to verify the truthfulness and correctness of the allegations in the petition. In
addition, such an act is presumed to be included in the scope of her authority to act within the
domain of the general objectives of the corporations business and her usual duties in the absence
of any contrary provision in the corporations charter or by-laws. Having said this, there is
therefore no more need to discuss whether the authority granted to Albao under Board
Resolution No. 2001-06 is only limited to representing Cebu Metro in the court hearings before
the MTCC or extends up to signing of the verification and certification of non-forum shopping
on appeal. Again, even without such proof of authority, Albao, as Cebu Metros President and
Manager, is justified in signing said verification and certification. Thus, the CA should not have
considered as fatal Cebu Metros failure to attach a Secretarys Certificate attesting to Albaos
authority to sign the verification and certification of non-forum shopping and dismissed the
petition or should have reinstated the same after Cebu Metros submission of the Secretarys
Certificate showing that Board Resolution No. 2001-06 confirmed the election of Albao as the
corporations President and Manager. Moreover, the fact that the Board of Directors of Cebu
Metro ratified Albaos authority to represent the corporation in the appeal of the MTCC Decision
in Civil Case No. R-44430 before the RTC, CA, and this Court, and consequently to sign the
verification and certification on its behalf by the passage of Resolution No. 2004-05 confirming
and affirming her authority only gives this Court more reason to uphold such authority. Cebu
Metro Pharmacy, Inc. vs. Euro-Med Laboratories, Inc., G.R. No. 164757, October 18, 2010.
Pleadings; certification on forum shopping; necessity of board resolution; subsequent compliance
does not excuse failure to comply with requirement in first instance. In particular, on the matter
of the certificate of non-forum shopping that was similarly at issue, Tible pointedly said:
x x x the requirement under Administrative Circular No. 04-94 for a certificate of non-forum
shopping is mandatory. The subsequent compliance with said requirement does not excuse a
partys failure to comply therewith in the first instance. In those cases where this Court excused
the non-compliance with the requirement of the submission of a certificate of non-forum
shopping, it found special circumstances or compelling reasons which made the strict application
of said Circular clearly unjustified or inequitable. x x x [Emphasis supplied.]
This same rule was echoed in Mediserv v. Court of Appeals where we said in the course of
allowing a liberal justification:
It is settled that liberal construction of the rules may be invoked in situations where there may be
some excusable formal deficiency or error in a pleading, provided that the same does not subvert
the essence of the proceeding and connotes at least a reasonable attempt at compliance with the
rules. After all, rules of procedure are not to be applied in a very rigid, technical sense; they are
used only to help secure substantial justice. [Emphasis supplied.]
To be sure, BPIs cited Shipside case also involved the absence of proof attached to the petition
that the filing officer was authorized to sign the verification and non-forum shopping
certification. In the Motion for Reconsideration that followed the dismissal of the case, the
movant attached a certificate issued by its board secretary stating that ten (10) days prior to the
filing of the petition, the filing officer had been authorized by petitioners board of directors to
file said petition. Thus, proper authority existed but was simply not attached to the petition. On
this submission, the petitioner sought and the Court positively granted relief.
In the present case, we do not see a situation comparable to the cited Shipside. BPI did not
submit any proof of authority in the first instance because it did not believe that a board
resolution evidencing such authority was necessary. We note that instead of immediately
submitting an appropriate board resolution after the First Union and Linda filed their motion to
dismiss BPI argued that it was not required to submit one and even argued that:
The Complaint can only be dismissed under Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure if there was no certification against forum shopping. The Complaint has. The
provision cited does not even require that the person certifying show proof of his authority to do
so x x x.
In fact, BPI merely attached to its opposition a special power of attorney issued by Mr.
Kabigting, a bank vice-president, granting Asis and Ong the authority to file the
complaint. Thus, no direct authority to file a complaint was initially ever given by BPI the
corporate entity in whose name and behalf the complaint was filed. Only in its Reply to the
Comment to plaintiffs Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss did BPI beg the kind indulgence of
the Honorable Court as it inadvertently failed to submit with the Special Power of Attorney the
Corporate Secretarys Certificate which authorized Mr. Zosimo Kabigting to appoint his
substitutes. Even this submission, however, was a roundabout way of authorizing the filing
officers to file the complaint.
BPI, interestingly, never elaborated nor explained its belatedly claimed inadvertence in failing to
submit a corporate secretarys certificate directly authorizing its representatives to file the
complaint; it particularly failed to specify the circumstances that led to the claimed inadvertence.
Under the given facts, we cannot but conclude that, rather than an inadvertence, there was an
initial unwavering stance that the submission of a specific authority from the board was not
necessary. In blunter terms, the omission of the required board resolution in the complaint was
neither an excusable deficiency nor an omission that occurred through inadvertence. In the usual
course in the handling of a case, the failure was a mistake of counsel that BPI never cared to
admit but which nevertheless bound it as a client. From this perspective, BPIs case is different
from Shipside so that the ruling in this cited case cannot apply.
Under the circumstances, what applies to the present case is the second paragraph of Section 5,
Rule 7 of the Rules of Court which states:
Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by mere amendment of
the complaint or other initiatory pleading but shall be cause for the dismissal of the case without
prejudice, unless otherwise provided, upon motion and after hearing.
We thus hold that the dismissal of the case is the appropriate ruling from this Court, without
prejudice to its refiling as the Rules allow.
We end this Decision by quoting our parting words in Melo v. Court of Appeals:
We are not unmindful of the adverse consequence to private respondent of a dismissal of her
complaint, nor of the time, effort, and money spent litigating up to this Court solely on a so-
called technical ground. Nonetheless, we hold that compliance with the certification requirement
on non-forum shopping should not be made subject to a partys afterthought, lest the policy of
the law be undermined.
Bank of the Philippine Islands vs. Hon. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 168313. October 6,
2010
Pleadings; failure to state cause of action. We likewise agree with the Court of Appeals that the
RTC-Branch 227 should not have dismissed respondents complaint for damages on the ground
of failure to state a cause of action. According to Rule 2, Section 2 of the Rules of Court, a cause
of action is the act or omission by which a party violates a right of another. When the ground for
dismissal is that the complaint states no cause of action, such fact can be determined only from
the facts alleged in the complaint and from no other, and the court cannot consider other matters
aliunde. The test, therefore, is whether, assuming the allegations of fact in the complaint to be
true, a valid judgment could be rendered in accordance with the prayer stated therein.
Respondent made the following allegations in support of his claim for damages against
petitioners:
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
28. After the promulgation of the Metropolitan Trial Court of its Decision dated August 3,
1999, ordering the [herein respondent] and all person claiming rights under him to
(a) Vacate the leased premises;
(b) pay the [herein petitioners] the sum of P306,000.00 as unpaid rentals from May 23, 1997
to November 22, 1998; and
(c) pay the sum of P5,000.00 as attorneys fees;
But while said Decision was still pending appeal with the Regional Trial Court, the [petitioners],
through [petitioner] Manaloto, already distributed copies of said Decision to some of the
homeowners of Horseshoe Village, who personally know the [respondent]. This act is a direct
assault or character assassination on the part of the [respondent] because as stated in the said
decision, [respondent] has been staying in the premises but did not or refused to pay his monthly
rentals for a long period of time when in truth and in fact was untrue.
29. That from the time the said decision was distributed to said members homeowners, the
[respondent] became the subject of conversation or talk of the town and by virtue of which
[respondents] good name within the community or society where he belongs was greatly
damaged; his reputation was besmirched; [respondent] suffered sleepless night and serious
anxiety. [Respondent], who is the grandson of the late Senator Jose Veloso and Congressman
Ismael Veloso, was deprived of political career and to start with was to run as candidate for
Barangay Chairman within their area which was being offered to him by the homeowners but
this offer has started to fade and ultimately totally vanished after the distribution of said
Decision. Damages to his good names and reputations and other damages which he suffered as a
consequence thereof, may be reasonably compensated for at least P1,500,000.00 as moral and
consequential damages.
30. In order to deter [petitioners] and others from doing as abovementioned, [petitioners]
should likewise be assessed exemplary damages in the amount of P500,000.00.
A cause of action (for damages) exists if the following elements are present: (1) a right in favor
of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created; (2) an
obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and (3) an
act or omission on the part of such defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff or constituting
a breach of the obligation of defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an action
for recovery of damages. We find that all three elements exist in the case at bar. Respondent
may not have specifically identified each element, but it may be sufficiently determined from the
allegations in his complaint.
First, respondent filed the complaint to protect his good character, name, and reputation. Every
man has a right to build, keep, and be favored with a good name. This right is protected by law
with the recognition of slander and libel as actionable wrongs, whether as criminal offenses or
tortuous conduct.
Second, petitioners are obliged to respect respondents good name even though they are opposing
parties in the unlawful detainer case. As Article 19 of the Civil Code requires, [e]very person
must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give
everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith. A violation of such principle constitutes
an abuse of rights, a tortuous conduct. We expounded in Sea Commercial Company, Inc. v.
Court of Appeals that:
XXX XXX XXX
Petitioners are also expected to respect respondents dignity, personality, privacy and peace of
mind under Article 26 of the Civil Code, which provides:
XXX XXX XXX
Thus, Article 2219(10) of the Civil Code allows the recovery of moral damages for acts and
actions referred to in Article 26, among other provisions, of the Civil Code.
And third, respondent alleged that the distribution by petitioners to Horseshoe Village
homeowners of copies of the MeTC decision in the unlawful detainer case, which was adverse to
respondent and still on appeal before the RTC-Branch 88, had no apparent lawful or just purpose
except to humiliate respondent or assault his character. As a result, respondent suffered damages
becoming the talk of the town and being deprived of his political career.
Petitioners reason that respondent has no cause of action against them since the MeTC decision
in the unlawful detainer case was part of public records.
It is already settled that the public has a right to see and copy judicial records and
documents. However, this is not a case of the public seeking and being denied access to judicial
records and documents. The controversy is rooted in the dissemination by petitioners of the
MeTC judgment against respondent to Horseshoe Village homeowners, who were not involved
at all in the unlawful detainer case, thus, purportedly affecting negatively respondents good
name and reputation among said homeowners. The unlawful detainer case was a private dispute
between petitioners and respondent, and the MeTC decision against respondent was then still
pending appeal before the RTC-Branch 88, rendering suspect petitioners intentions for
distributing copies of said MeTC decision to non-parties in the case. While petitioners were free
to copy and distribute such copies of the MeTC judgment to the public, the question is whether
they did so with the intent of humiliating respondent and destroying the latters good name and
reputation in the community. Ermelinda Manaloto, et al. vs. Ismael Veloso III, G.R. No. 171365,
October 6, 2010.
Pleadings; failure to state cause of action; hypothetical admission. We cannot subscribe to
respondents argument that there is no more need for the presentation of evidence by the parties
since petitioners, in moving for the dismissal of respondents complaint for damages,
hypothetically admitted respondents allegations. The hypothetical admission of respondents
allegations in the complaint only goes so far as determining whether said complaint should be
dismissed on the ground of failure to state a cause of action. A finding that the complaint
sufficiently states a cause of action does not necessarily mean that the complaint is meritorious;
it shall only result in the reinstatement of the complaint and the hearing of the case for
presentation of evidence by the parties. Ermelinda Manaloto, et al. vs. Ismael Veloso III, G.R.
No. 171365, October 6, 2010.
Procedural rules; cannot be discarded with mere expediency of claiming substantial merit. There
is no basis for petitioners assertion either that the tenets of substantial justice, the novelty and
importance of the issue and the meritorious nature of this case warrant a relaxation of the Rules
in her favor. Time and again the Court has stressed that the rules of procedure must be faithfully
complied with and should not be discarded with the mere expediency of claiming substantial
merit. As a corollary, rules prescribing the time for doing specific acts or for taking certain
proceedings are considered absolutely indispensable to prevent needless delays and to orderly
and promptly discharge judicial business. By their very nature, these rules are regarded as
mandatory. Cynthia S. Bolos vs. Danilo T. Bolos, G.R. No. 186400, October 20, 2010.
Procedural rules; instance where strict application is unwarranted. Herein respondent Samsung
instituted Civil Case No. 97-86265 before the RTC, to recover the amount it claims to have lost
due to the negligence of petitioner Real Bank, Inc., clearly a property right. The substantive
right of respondent Samsung to recover a due and demandable obligation cannot be diminished
by an unwarranted strictness in the application of a rule of procedure. In Calalang v. Court of
Appeals, this Court underscored that unless a partys conduct is so negligent, irresponsible,
contumacious or dilatory as to provide substantial grounds for dismissal for non-appearance, the
court should consider lesser sanctions which would still amount into achieving the desired
end. In Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Court of Appeals, we ruled that in the absence of a
pattern or scheme to delay the disposition of the case or a wanton failure to observe the
mandatory requirement of the rules, courts should decide to dispense rather than wield their
authority to dismiss.
While not at the fore of this case, it may be stated that the state of the court docket cannot justify
injudicious case dismissals. Inconsiderate dismissals, even without prejudice, do not constitute a
panacea or a solution to the congestion of court dockets; while they lend a deceptive aura of
efficiency to records of individual judges, they merely postpone the ultimate reckoning between
the parties. In the absence of clear lack of merit or intention to delay, justice is better served by a
brief continuance, trial on the merits, and final disposition of cases before the court.
Accordingly, the ends of justice and fairness would be best served if the parties in Civil Case No.
97-86265 are given the full opportunity to thresh out the real issues in a full blown trial. Besides,
petitioner Real Bank, Inc. would not be prejudiced should the RTC proceed with Civil Case No.
97-86265 as it is not stripped of any affirmative defenses nor deprived of due process of law.
Real Bank Inc. vs. Samsung Mabuhay Corporation, et al., G.R. No. 175862, October 13, 2010.
Procedural rules; liberal application must be justified by ample reasons. This Court has
repeatedly emphasized the need to abide by the Rules of Court and the procedural requirements
it imposes. The verification of a complaint and the attachment of a certificate of non-forum
shopping are requirements that as pointed out by the Court, time and again are basic,
necessary and mandatory for procedural orderliness. Thus, we cannot simply and in a general
way apply given the factual circumstances of this case the liberal jurisprudential exception in
Shipside and its line of cases to excuse BPIs failure to submit a board resolution. While we may
have excused strict compliance in the past, we did so only on sufficient and justifiable grounds
that compelled a liberal approach while avoiding the effective negation of the intent of the rule
on non-forum shopping. In other words, the rule for the submission of a certificate of non-forum
shopping, proper in form and substance, remains to be a strict and mandatory rule; any liberal
application has to be justified by ample and sufficient reasons that maintain the integrity of, and
do not detract from, the mandatory character of the rule. The rule, its relaxation and their
rationale were discussed by the Court at length in Tible & Tible Company, Inc. v. Royal Savings
and Loan Association where we said:
Much reliance is placed on the rule that Courts are not slaves or robots of technical rules, shorn
of judicial discretion. In rendering justice, courts have always been, as they ought to be,
conscientiously guided by the norm that on balance, technicalities take a backseat against
substantive rights, and not the other way around. This rule must always be used in the right
context, lest injustice, rather than justice would be its end result.
It must never be forgotten that, generally, the application of the rules must be upheld, and the
suspension or even mere relaxation of its application, is the exception. This Court previously
explained:
The Court is not impervious to the frustration that litigants and lawyers alike would at times
encounter in procedural bureaucracy but imperative justice requires correct observance of
indispensable technicalities precisely designed to ensure its proper dispensation. It has long
been recognized that strict compliance with the Rules of Court is indispensable for the
prevention of needless delays and for the orderly and expeditious dispatch of judicial business.
Procedural rules are not to be disdained as mere technicalities that may be ignored at will to
suit the convenience of a party. Adjective law is important in ensuring the effective enforcement
of substantive rights through the orderly and speedy administration of justice. These rules are
not intended to hamper litigants or complicate litigation but, indeed to provide for a system under
which a suitor may be heard in the correct form and manner and at the prescribed time in a
peaceful confrontation before a judge whose authority they acknowledge.
It cannot be overemphasized that procedural rules have their own wholesome rationale in the
orderly administration of justice. Justice has to be administered according to the Rules in order
to obviate arbitrariness, caprice, or whimsicality. We have been cautioned and reminded in
Limpot v. Court of Appeals, et al., that:
Rules of procedure are intended to ensure the orderly administration of justice and the protection
of substantive rights in judicial and extrajudicial proceedings. It is a mistake to propose that
substantive law and adjective law are contradictory to each other or, as often suggested, that
enforcement of procedural rules should never be permitted if it will result in prejudice to the
substantive rights of the litigants. This is not exactly true; the concept is much
misunderstood. As a matter of fact, the policy of the courts is to give both kinds of law, as
complementing each other, in the just and speedy resolution of the dispute between the
parties. Observance of both substantive rights is equally guaranteed by due process, whatever
the source of such rights, be it the Constitution itself or only a statute or a rule of court.
x x x x
x x x (T)hey are required to be followed except only when for the most persuasive of reasons
them may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with the degree of his
thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure prescribed. x x x While it is true that a
litigation is not a game of technicalities, this does not mean that the Rules of Court may be
ignored at will and at random to the prejudice of the orderly presentation and assessment of the
issues and their just resolution. Justice eschews anarchy.
Bank of the Philippine Islands vs. Hon. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 168313. October 6,
2010
Procedural rules; strict and rigid application avoided to secure substantial justice. As we have
ruled often enough, rules of procedure should not be applied in a very rigid, technical sense;
rules of procedure are used only to help secure, not override, substantial justice. As we
explained in Ginete v. Court of Appeals:
Let it be emphasized that the rules of procedure should be viewed as mere tools designed to
facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in
technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must always be
eschewed. Even the Rules of Court reflect this principle. The power to suspend or even disregard
rules can be so pervasive and compelling as to alter even that which this Court itself has already
declared to be final, as we are now constrained to do in the instant case.
x x x x
The emerging trend in the rulings of this Court is to afford every party litigant the amplest
opportunity for the proper and just determination of his cause, free from the constraints of
technicalities. Time and again, this Court has consistently held that rules must not be applied
rigidly so as not to override substantial justice. [Emphasis supplied.]
Similarly, in de Guzman v. Sandiganbayan, we had occasion to state:
The Rules of Court was conceived and promulgated to set forth guidelines in the dispensation of
justice but not to bind and chain the hand that dispenses it, for otherwise, courts will be mere
slaves to or robots of technical rules, shorn of judicial discretion. That is precisely why courts in
rendering justice have always been, as they ought to be, conscientiously guided by the norm that
when on the balance, technicalities take a backseat against substantive rights, and not the
other way around. Truly then, technicalities, in the appropriate language of Justice Makalintal,
should give way to the realities of the situation. [Emphasis supplied.]
We made the same recognition in Barnes, on the underlying premise that a courts primordial
and most important duty is to render justice; in discharging the duty to render substantial justice,
it is permitted to re-examine even a final and executory judgment. Apo Fruits Corporation, et al.
vs. Land Bank of the Philippines, G.R. No. 164195, October 12, 2010.
Writ of possession; issuance not ministerial where third party holds property adversely to
judgment debtor. This rule, however, is not without exception. Under Section 33, Rule 39 of the
Rules of Court, which is made to apply suppletorily to the extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate
mortgages by Section 6, Act 3135, as amended, the possession of the mortgaged property may be
awarded to a purchaser in the extrajudicial foreclosure unless a third party is actually holding the
property adversely to the judgment debtor. Section 33 provides:
Sec. 33. Deed and possession to be given at expiration of redemption period; by whom executed
or given.
If no redemption be made within one (1) year from the date of the registration of the certificate
of sale, the purchaser is entitled to a conveyance and possession of the property; or, if so
redeemed whenever sixty (60) days have elapsed and no other redemption has been made, and
notice thereof given, and the time for redemption has expired, the last redemptioner is entitled to
the conveyance and possession; but in all cases the judgment obligor shall have the entire period
of one (1) year from the date of the registration of the sale to redeem the property. The deed shall
be executed by the officer making the sale or by his successor in office, and in the latter case
shall have the same validity as though the officer making the sale had continued in office and
executed it.
Upon the expiration of the right of redemption, the purchaser or redemptioner shall be
substituted to and acquire all the rights, title, interest and claim of the judgment obligor to the
property as of the time of the levy. The possession of the property shall be given to the purchaser
or last redemptioner by the same officer unless a third party is actually holding the property
adversely to the judgment obligor.
The same issue had been raised in Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Icot, Development Bank of
the Philippines v. Prime Neighborhood Association, Dayot v. Shell Chemical Company (Phils.),
Inc., and Philippine National Bank v. Court of Appeals, and we uniformly held that the
obligation of the court to issue an ex parte writ of possession in favor of the purchaser in an
extrajudicial foreclosure sale ceases to be ministerial once it appears that there is a third party in
possession of the property who is claiming a right adverse to that of the debtor/mortgagor. The
purchasers right of possession is recognized only as against the judgment debtor and his
successor-in-interest but not against persons whose right of possession is adverse to the latter. In
this case, petitioner opposed the issuance of the writ of possession on the ground that he is in
actual possession of the mortgaged property under a claim of ownership. He explained that his
title to the property was cancelled by virtue of a falsified deed of donation executed in favor of
spouses Pearedondo. Because of this falsification, he filed civil and criminal cases against
spouses Pearedondo to nullify the deed of donation and to punish the party responsible for the
falsified document. Petitioners claim that he is in actual possession of the property is not
challenged, and he has come to court asserting an ownership right adverse to that of the
mortgagors, the spouses Pearedondo.
The third partys possession of the property is legally presumed to be based on a just title, a
presumption which may be overcome by the purchaser in a judicial proceeding for recovery of
the property. Through such a judicial proceeding, the nature of the adverse possession by the
third party may be determined, after such third party is accorded due process and the opportunity
to be heard. The third party may be ejected from the property only after he has been given an
opportunity to be heard, conformably with the time-honored principle of due process. The Civil
Code protects the actual possessor of a property, as Article 433 thereof provides:
Art. 433. Actual possession under claim of ownership raises disputable presumption of
ownership. The true owner must resort to judicial process for the recovery of the property.
One who claims to be the owner of a property possessed by another must bring the appropriate
judicial action for its physical recovery. The judicial process could mean no less than an
ejectment suit or a reivindicatory action, in which the ownership claims of the contending parties
may be properly heard and adjudicated. The ex parte petition for the issuance of a writ of
possession filed by respondent, strictly speaking, is not the kind of judicial process contemplated
in Article 433 of the Civil Code. Even if the same may be considered a judicial proceeding for
the enforcement of ones right of possession as purchaser in a foreclosure sale, it is not an
ordinary suit filed in court, by which one party sues another for the enforcement or protection of
a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong. Unlike a judicial foreclosure of real estate
mortgage under Rule 68 of the Rules of Court where an action for foreclosure is filed before the
RTC where the mortgaged property or any part thereof is situated, any property brought within
the ambit of Act 3135 is foreclosed by the filing of a petition, not with any court of justice, but
with the office of the sheriff of the province where the sale is to be made. As such, a third person
in possession of an extrajudicially foreclosed property, who claims a right superior to that of the
original mortgagor, is given no opportunity to be heard on his claim. It stands to reason,
therefore, that such third person may not be dispossessed on the strength of a mere ex parte
possessory writ, since to do so would be tantamount to his summary ejectment, in violation of
the basic tenets of due process.
The Court cannot sanction a procedural shortcut. To enforce the writ against petitioner, an
unwitting third party possessor who took no part in the foreclosure proceedings, would amount
to the taking of real property without the benefit of proper judicial intervention. Hence, it was
not a ministerial duty of the trial court under Act 3135 to issue a writ of possession for the ouster
of petitioner from the lot subject of this instant case, particularly in light of the latters
opposition, claim of ownership and rightful possession of the disputed properties.
In granting respondents petition, the appellate court cited Ancheta v. Metropolitan Bank and
Trust Company, Inc. and PNB v. Sanao Marketing Corporation. The invocation of these cases is
misplaced. These cases involved the propriety of the issuance of a writ of possession pending
the determination of the validity of the mortgage or foreclosure proceedings filed by the
mortgagor or by at least one of the mortgagors who was a party to the foreclosure proceedings.
We held then that the pendency of such determination is not a bar to the issuance of the
possessory writ as no discretion is left to the issuing judge. The above-cited cases have different
factual milieu which makes them inapplicable to the present case. In Ancheta and PNB, the
oppositors were parties to the mortgage and the foreclosure proceedings; in the present case, the
oppositor was a third party who was a stranger to the mortgage and who did not participate in the
foreclosure proceedings. Moreover, in Ancheta and PNB, the oppositors objected to the issuance
of the writ because of the pendency of a case for the annulment of the real estate mortgage and
the foreclosure proceedings; while petitioner herein objected because he is in actual possession
of the foreclosed property and he is claiming the right of ownership adverse to that of the
mortgagor, the spouses Pearedondo. These factual circumstances in the instant case call for the
application not of Ancheta and PNB but of the other set of cases thoroughly discussed above
declaring that the issuance of the possessory writ is not a ministerial duty of the RTC
judge. Emmanuel C. Villanueva vs. Cherdan Lending Investors Corporation, G.R. No. 177881.
October 13, 2010
Writ of possession; nature and instances of issuance. A writ of possession is an order of the court
commanding the sheriff to place a person in possession of a real or personal property. It may
be issued in an extrajudicial foreclosure of a real estate mortgage under Section 7 of Act 3135, as
amended by Act 4118, either 1) within the one-year redemption period, upon the filing of a bond,
or 2) after the lapse of the redemption period, without need of a bond or of a separate and
independent action. It is settled that the buyer in a foreclosure sale becomes the absolute owner
of the property purchased if it is not redeemed within one year after the registration of the sale.
As such, he is entitled to the possession of the property and can demand that he be placed in
possession at any time following the consolidation of ownership in his name and the issuance to
him of a new TCT. Time and again, we have held that it is ministerial upon the court to issue a
writ of possession after the foreclosure sale and during the period of redemption. Upon the filing
of an ex parte motion and the approval of the corresponding bond, the court issues the order for a
writ of possession. The writ of possession issues as a matter of course even without the filing and
approval of a bond after consolidation of ownership and the issuance of a new TCT in the name
of the purchaser. Emmanuel C. Villanueva vs. Cherdan Lending Investors Corporation, G.R. No.
177881. October 13, 2010

Special Proceedings
Writ of Habeas Corpus. As correctly pointed out by the OSG, the petition for the writs of habeas
corpus and amparo was based on the criminal case for Qualified Theft against petitioner Sos
daughter, Guisande. To recall, petitioner So claimed that the conditions and circumstances of his
daughters, accused Guisandes, confinement at the NCMH was life threatening; although
Guisande was accused of a non-bailable offense, the NCMH could not adequately treat
Guisandes mental condition. Thus, to balance the conflicting right of an accused to medical
treatment and the right of the prosecution to subject to court processes an accused charged with a
non-bailable offense, the CA directed the transfer of Guisande from the NCMH to St. Clares
Medical Center, while noting that because of the peculiarities of this case, there was a deviation
from the regular course of procedure, since accused Guisande should have been confined in jail
because she was charged with a non-bailable offense. Notably, nowhere in the transcript of the
CA hearing on December 3, 2009, nor in the Order recited in open court by Justice Pizarro, is
there an affirmation of petitioner Sos claim that the confinement of accused Guisande at the
NCMH was illegal. Neither were the respective acts performed by respondents Judge Tacla and
Dr. Vicente in ascertaining the mental condition of accused Guisande to withstand trial declared
unlawful. On the contrary, the NCMH, a well-reputed government forensic facility, albeit not
held in high regard by petitioner Sos and accused Guisandes family, had assessed Guisande fit
for trial.
The Rules on the Writs of Habeas Corpus and Amparo are clear; the act or omission or the
threatened act or omission complained of confinement and custody for habeas corpus and
violations of, or threat to violate, a persons life, liberty, and security for amparo cases should
be illegal or unlawful.
Rule 102 of the Rules of Court on Habeas Corpus provides:
Sec. 1. To what habeas corpus extends. Except as otherwise expressly provided by law, the
writ of habeas corpus shall extend to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any
person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from
the person entitled thereto.
while the Rule on the Writ of Amparo states:
Section 1. Petition. The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person
whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act
or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity.
The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof.
Our decisions on the propriety of the issuance of these writs reiterate the foregoing rules. In
Lourdes D. Rubrico, Jean Rubrico Apruebo, and Mary Joy Rubrico Carbonel v. Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo, Gen. Hermogenes Esperon, P/Dir. Gen. Avelino Razon, Maj. Darwin Sy
a.k.a Darwin Reyes, Jimmy Santana, Ruben Alfaro, Capt. Angelo Cuaresma, a certain Jonathan,
P/Supt. Edgar B. Roquero, Arsenio C. Gomez, and Office of the Ombudsman, we qualified:
The privilege of the writ of amparo is envisioned basically to protect and guarantee the rights to
life, liberty, and security of persons, free from fears and threats that vitiate the quality of this life.
It is an extraordinary writ conceptualized and adopted in light of and in response to the
prevalence of extra-legal killings and enforced disappearances. Accordingly, the remedy ought
to be resorted to and granted judiciously, lest the ideal sought by the Amparo Rule be
diluted and undermined by the indiscriminate filing of amparo petitions for purposes less
than the desire to secure amparo reliefs and protection and/or on the basis of
unsubstantiated allegations.
In the recent Nurhida Juhuri Ampatuan v. Judge Virgilio V. Macaraig, RTC, Manila, Branch 37,
Director General Avelino Razon, Jr., Director Geary Barias, PSSupt. Co Yee M. Co, Jr., and
Police Chief Inspector Agapito Quimson, we intoned:
The most basic criterion for the issuance of the writ, therefore, is that the individual seeking such
relief is illegally deprived of his freedom of movement or place under some form of illegal
restraint. If an individuals liberty is restrainted via some legal process, the writ of habeas corpus
is unavailing. Fundamentally, in order to justify the grant of the writ of habeas corpus, the
restraint of liberty must be in the nature of an illegal and involuntary deprivation of freedom of
action.
In general, the purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to determine whether or not a particular
person is legally held. A prime specification of an application for a writ of habeas corpus, in
fact, is an actual and effective, and not merely nominal or moral, illegal restraint of liberty. The
writ of habeas corpus was devised and exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons
from unlawful restraint, and as the best and only sufficient defense of personal freedom. xxx The
essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of
involuntary restraint as distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a person therefrom if such
restraint is illegal. Any restraint which will preclude freedom of action is sufficient.
In passing upon a petition for habeas corpus, a court or judge must first inquire into whether the
petitioner is being restrained of his liberty. If he is not, the writ will be refused. Inquiry into the
cause of detention will proceed only where such restraint exists. If the alleged cause is thereafter
found to be unlawful, then the writ should be granted and the petitioner discharged. Needless to
state, if otherwise, again the writ will be refused.
While habeas corpus is a writ of right, it will not issue as a matter of course or as a mere
perfunctory operation on the filing of the petition. Judicial discretion is called for in its issuance
and it must be clear to the judge to whom the petition is presented that, prima facie, the petitioner
is entitled to the writ. It is only if the court is satisfied that a person is being unlawfully restrained
of his liberty will the petition for habeas corpus be granted. If the respondents are not detaining
or restraining the applicant of the person in whose behalf the petition is filed, the petition should
be dismissed.
In the cases at bar, the question before the CA was correctly limited to which hospital, the
NCMH or a medical facility of accuseds own choosing, accused Guisande should be referred for
treatment of a supposed mental condition. In addition, we note that it was procedurally proper
for the RTC to ask the NCMH for a separate opinion on accuseds mental fitness to be arraigned
and stand trial. Be that as it may, the CA allowed the transfer of accused to St. Clares Medical
Center under the custody of Dr. Rene Yat, who was required periodically to report on his
evaluation, every fifteen (15) days, to the RTC Mandaluyong City, although in the same breath,
the CA also ordered the continuation of the arraignment and trial of the accused for Qualified
Theft before the same trial court. In other words, Guisande remained in custody of the law to
answer for the non-bailable criminal charge against her, and was simply allowed to pursue
medical treatment in the hospital and from a doctor of her choice.
Certainly, with the dismissal of the non-bailable case against accused Guisande, she is no longer
under peril to be confined in a jail facility, much less at the NCMH. Effectively, accused
Guisandes person, and treatment of any medical and mental malady she may or may not have,
can no longer be subjected to the lawful processes of the RTC Mandaluyong City. In short, the
cases have now been rendered moot and academic which, in the often cited David v. Macapagal-
Arroyo, is defined as one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of
supervening events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value.
Finally, the Resolutions of the CA and Assistant City Prosecutor Escobar-Pilares, unmistakably
foreclose the justiciability of the petitions before this Court. In CA-G.R. SP No. 00039, the CA
said:
We are also not swayed by [David Sos] argument that [petitioners] advanced lies to this Court
when they stated in their petition that Elena was facing two (2) non-bailable offenses. During the
hearing on the petition for habeas corpus/writ of amparo, the counsel for [David So] stated that
Elena was facing only one (1) non-bailable offense to which [petitioners] did not anymore
object. Besides, the number of non-bailable offenses is not even material in the instant case for
habeas corpus/writ of amparo as the only issue to be determined here was whether or not Elenas
confinement at NCMH was lawful.
Finally, the issue in the verified petition, of whether [petitioners] were in contempt of court, is
rendered moot and academic considering that this Court had already rendered its open court
Order on December 8, 2009, which was favorable to [David So], and it was only later that the
latter raised the issue of contempt.
Finding no merit in [David Sos] verified petition for contempt against [Judge Tacla, Dr. Vicente
and the NCMH], and there being no other objections made by the parties against Our March 17,
2010 Resolution, the instant petition for habeas corpus/writ of amparo is declared CLOSED and
TERMINATED.
SO ORDERED.
David E. So, on behalf of his daughter Maria Elena So Guisande vs. Hon. Esteban A. Tacla, Jr.
etc., et al. / Hon. Esteban A. Tacla, Jr., etc., et al. vs. David E. So, on behalf of his daughter
Maria Elena So Guisande, G.R. Nos. 190108, 190473. October 19, 2010.

Other Proceedings
Appeal; petition for review is correct mode of appeal from decisions of Special Agrarian Courts.
Petitioners contend that the proper mode or remedy that should have been taken by the LBP in
assailing the Decision of the RTC, acting as a Special Agrarian Court, is a petition for review
and not an ordinary appeal. The Court does not completely agree. This same issue was squarely
addressed and settled by the Court in Land Bank of the Philippines v. De Leon, wherein it was
ruled that a petition for review is indeed the correct mode of appeal from decisions of Special
Agrarian Courts. Therein, the Court held that Section 60 of Republic Act No. 6657 clearly and
categorically states that the said mode of appeal should be adopted.
However, in a Resolution issued by the Court en banc, dated March 20, 2003, which ruled on the
motion for reconsideration filed by the LBP, the Court clarified that its decision in De Leon shall
apply only to cases appealed from the finality of the said Resolution. The Court held:
x x x LBP pleads that the subject Decision should at least be given prospective application
considering that more than 60 similar agrarian cases filed by LBP via ordinary appeal before the
Court of Appeals are in danger of being dismissed outright on technical grounds on account of
our ruling herein. This, according to LBP, will wreak financial havoc not only on LBP as the
financial intermediary of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program but also on the national
treasury and the already depressed economic condition of our country. Thus, in the interest of
fair play, equity and justice, LBP stresses the need for the rules to be relaxed so as to give
substantial consideration to the appealed cases.
x x x x
On account of the absence of jurisprudence interpreting Sections 60 and 61 of RA 6657
regarding the proper way to appeal decisions of Special Agrarian Courts, as well as the
conflicting decisions of the Court of Appeals thereon, LBP cannot be blamed for availing of the
wrong mode. Based on its own interpretation and reliance on [a ruling issued by the CA holding
that an ordinary appeal is the proper mode], LBP acted on the mistaken belief that an ordinary
appeal is the appropriate manner to question decisions of Special Agrarian Courts.
Hence, in the light of the aforementioned circumstances, we find it proper to emphasize the
prospective application of our Decision dated September 10, 2002. A prospective application of
our Decision is not only grounded on equity and fair play, but also based on the constitutional
tenet that rules of procedure shall not impair substantive rights.
x x x x
We hold that our Decision, declaring a petition for review as the proper mode of appeal from
judgments of Special Agrarian Courts, is a rule of procedure which affects substantive rights. If
our ruling is given retroactive application, it will prejudice LBPs right to appeal because
pending appeals in the Court of Appeals will be dismissed outright on mere technicality thereby
sacrificing the substantial merits thereof. It would be unjust to apply a new doctrine to a pending
case involving a party who already invoked a contrary view and who acted in good faith thereon
prior to the issuance of said doctrine.
x x x x
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration dated October 16, 2002 and the supplement to the
motion for reconsideration dated November 11, 2002 are PARTIALLY GRANTED. While we
clarify that the Decision of this Court dated September 10, 2002 stands, our ruling therein that a
petition for review is the correct mode of appeal from decisions of Special Agrarian Courts shall
apply only to cases appealed after the finality of this Resolution.
SO ORDERED.
In the present case, the LBP filed its Notice of Appeal on September 1, 1998. Thus, pursuant to
the ruling that De Leon shall be applied prospectively from the finality of this Courts Resolution
dated March 20, 2003, the appeal of the LBP, which was filed prior to that date, could, thus, be
positively acted upon. Jorge L. Tiangco, et al. vs. Land Bank of the Philippines, G.R. No.
153998, October 6, 2010
Intra-Corporate Controversies; motion for reconsideration is a prohibited pleading. Rule 1 of the
Interim Rules of Procedure for Intra-Corporate Controversies specifically prohibits the filing of
motions for reconsideration, to wit:
Sec. 8. Prohibited pleadings. The following pleadings are prohibited:
(1) Motion to dismiss;
(2) Motion for a bill of particulars;
(3) Motion for new trial, or for reconsideration of judgment or order, or for re-opening of
trial;
(4) Motion for extension of time to file pleadings, affidavits or any other paper, except those
filed due to clearly compelling reasons. Such motion must be verified and under oath; and
(5) Motion for postponement and other motions of similar intent, except those filed due to clearly
compelling reasons. Such motion must be verified and under oath. (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied.)
With the above proscription, the RTC in the first place should not have issued the December 3,
2003 Order denying the UOB Groups motion for reconsideration, which WINCORP adopted.
The remedy of an aggrieved party like WINCORP is to file a petition for certiorari within sixty
(60) days from receipt of the assailed order and not to file a motion for reconsideration, the latter
being a prohibited pleading. Here, WINCORP should have filed the petition for certiorari before
the CA on or before January 12, 2004. It was, however, filed only on February 13, 2004. With
that, the CA should have dismissed the petition outright for being filed late. Westmont
Investment Corporation vs. Farmix Fertilizer Corporation, et al., G.R. No. 165876, October 4,
2010
Intra-Corporate Controversies; pre-trial and judgment before pre-trial. Further, the conduct of a
pre-trial is mandatory under the Interim Rules of Procedure for Intra-Corporate Controversies.
Rule 4, Section 1 of the Interim Rules provides:
Section 1. Pre-trial conference; mandatory nature. Within five (5) days in Rule 3 hereof,
whichever comes later, the court shall issue and serve an order immediately setting the case for
pre-trial conference and directing the after the period for availment of, and compliance with, the
modes of discovery prescribed parties to submit their respective pre-trial briefs. The parties shall
file with the court and furnish each other copies of their respective pre-trial brief in such manner
as to ensure its receipt by the court and the other party at least five (5) days before the date set
for pre-trial.
Rule 4, Section 4 further states:
Sec. 4. Judgment before pre-trial. If, after submissionof the pre-trial briefs, the court
determines that, upon consideration of the pleadings, the affidavits and other evidence submitted
by the parties, a judgment may be rendered, the court may order the parties to file simultaneously
their respective memoranda within a non-extendible period of twenty (20) days from receipt of
the order. Thereafter, the court shall render judgment, either full or otherwise, not later than
ninety (90) days from the expiration of the period to file the memoranda.
However, the RTC never ordered the submission of the parties pre-trial briefs. Neither were
they made to submit their memoranda. Earlier in the proceedings, both parties were ordered to
submit their memoranda on the issue of whether the RTC should proceed with the hearing of the
case on the merits. Both parties agreed that it should. They believed that the case was not yet
ripe for final disposition and that the RTC should proceed to hear the case on the principal prayer
for the nullification of the Amended By-laws of the Foundation. Thus, petitioners said:
Therefore, in so far as the Petitioners [herein respondents] are concerned, there appears to be
three remaining matters that needs (sic) to be resolved: the nullification of the by-laws, the
proscription from the enforcement of the recently amended by-laws by the respondents and the
matter of the attorneys fees. Petitioners [herein respondents] may have presented evidence on
the first two but the third cause of action does not appear to have been ventilated as yet. There is
also the matter of the compulsory counterclaim of the Respondents [herein petitioners], which
was not yet likewise heard. This would verily take this case out of that classification of being
ready for final resolution or disposition of the intra-corporate dispute.
On the other hand, respondents said:
However, the SEC has not ruled yet on the parties respective formal offer of Exhibits relative to
the injunction issue; and was yet to hear the main case where one of the main reliefs prayed for
was the declaration of the nullity of the assailed amended By-laws.
Likewise, the Judgment of the RTC is bereft of any justification for dispensing with the pre-trial
and trial. There was no discussion of any agreement by the parties to dispense with the trial and
submit the case for resolution based on the pleadings filed. In fact, because there was no pre-
trial, it remains unclear exactly what issues are to be resolved by the trial court. Manuel D.
Recto, et al. vs. Bishop Federico O. Escaler, S.J., et al., G.R. No. 173179, October 20, 2010.
Registration proceeding (application for issuance of Certificate of Ancestral Land Title); does
not constitute litis pendentia over reivindicatory case. The application for issuance of a
Certificate of Ancestral Land Title pending before the NCIP is akin to a registration
proceeding. It also seeks an official recognition of ones claim to a particular land and is also in
rem. The titling of ancestral lands is for the purpose of officially establishing ones land as an
ancestral land. Just like a registration proceeding, the titling of ancestral lands does not vest
ownership upon the applicant but only recognizes ownership that has already vested in the
applicant by virtue of his and his predecessor-in-interests possession of the property since time
immemorial. As aptly explained in another case:
It bears stressing at this point that ownership should not be confused with a certificate of
title. Registering land under the Torrens system does not create or vest title because
registration is not a mode of acquiring ownership. A certificate of title is merely an evidence of
ownership or title over the particular property described therein. Corollarily, any question
involving the issue of ownership must be threshed out in a separate suit x x x The trial court
will then conduct a full-blown trial wherein the parties will present their respective evidence on
the issue of ownership of the subject properties to enable the court to resolve the said issue. x x x
(Emphasis supplied)
Likewise apropos is the following explanation:
The fact that the [respondents] were able to secure [TCTs over the property] did not operate to
vest upon them ownership of the property. The Torrens system does not create or vest title. It
has never been recognized as a mode of acquiring ownership x x x If the [respondents] wished
to assert their ownership, they should have filed a judicial action for recovery of possession
and not merely to have the land registered under their respective names. x x x Certificates of title
do not establish ownership. (Emphasis supplied)
A registration proceeding is not a conclusive adjudication of ownership. In fact, if it is later on
found in another case (where the issue of ownership is squarely adjudicated) that the registrant is
not the owner of the property, the real owner can file a reconveyance case and have the title
transferred to his name.
Given that a registration proceeding (such as the certification of ancestral lands) is not a
conclusive adjudication of ownership, it will not constitute litis pendentia on a reivindicatory
case where the issue is ownership. or litis pendentia to be a ground for the dismissal of an
action, the following requisites must concur: (a) identity of parties, or at least such parties who
represent the same interests in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for,
the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity with respect to the two preceding
particulars in the two cases is such that any judgment that may be rendered in the pending case,
regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the other case. The
third element is missing, for any judgment in the certification case would not constitute res
judicata or be conclusive on the ownership issue involved in the reivindicatory case. Since there
is no litis pendentia, there is no reason for the reivindicatory case to be suspended or dismissed
in favor of the certification case.
Moreover, since there is no litis pendentia, we cannot agree with petitioners contention that
respondent committed forum-shopping. Settled is the rule that forum shopping exists where the
elements of litis pendentia are present or where a final judgment in one case will amount to res
judicata in the other. Delfin Lamsis, et al. vs. Margarita Semon Dong-e, G.R. No. 173021,
October 20, 2010.
Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages; scope. Petitioner insists that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC governs this case. Her stance is
unavailing. The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages as contained in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which the Court promulgated on
March 15, 2003, is explicit in its scope. Section 1 of the Rule, in fact, reads:
Section 1. Scope This Rule shall govern petitions for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriages and annulment of voidable marriages under the Family Code of the Philippines.
The Rules of Court shall apply suppletorily.
The categorical language of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC leaves no room for doubt. The coverage
extends only to those marriages entered into during the effectivity of the Family Code which
took effect on August 3, 1988. The rule sets a demarcation line between marriages covered by
the Family Code and those solemnized under the Civil Code.
The Court finds Itself unable to subscribe to petitioners interpretation that the phrase under the
Family Code in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC refers to the word petitions rather than to the word
marriages. A cardinal rule in statutory construction is that when the law is clear and free from
any doubt or ambiguity, there is no room for construction or interpretation. There is only room
for application. As the statute is clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal
meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. This is what is known as the plain-
meaning rule or verba legis. It is expressed in the maxim, index animi sermo, or speech is the
index of intention. Furthermore, there is the maxim verba legis non est recedendum, or from
the words of a statute there should be no departure. Cynthia S. Bolos vs. Danilo T. Bolos, G.R.
No. 186400, October 20, 2010.
Writ of Amparo. As correctly pointed out by the OSG, the petition for the writs of habeas corpus
and amparo was based on the criminal case for Qualified Theft against petitioner Sos daughter,
Guisande. To recall, petitioner So claimed that the conditions and circumstances of his
daughters, accused Guisandes, confinement at the NCMH was life threatening; although
Guisande was accused of a non-bailable offense, the NCMH could not adequately treat
Guisandes mental condition. Thus, to balance the conflicting right of an accused to medical
treatment and the right of the prosecution to subject to court processes an accused charged with a
non-bailable offense, the CA directed the transfer of Guisande from the NCMH to St. Clares
Medical Center, while noting that because of the peculiarities of this case, there was a deviation
from the regular course of procedure, since accused Guisande should have been confined in jail
because she was charged with a non-bailable offense. Notably, nowhere in the transcript of the
CA hearing on December 3, 2009, nor in the Order recited in open court by Justice Pizarro, is
there an affirmation of petitioner Sos claim that the confinement of accused Guisande at the
NCMH was illegal. Neither were the respective acts performed by respondents Judge Tacla and
Dr. Vicente in ascertaining the mental condition of accused Guisande to withstand trial declared
unlawful. On the contrary, the NCMH, a well-reputed government forensic facility, albeit not
held in high regard by petitioner Sos and accused Guisandes family, had assessed Guisande fit
for trial.
The Rules on the Writs of Habeas Corpus and Amparo are clear; the act or omission or the
threatened act or omission complained of confinement and custody for habeas corpus and
violations of, or threat to violate, a persons life, liberty, and security for amparo cases should
be illegal or unlawful.
Rule 102 of the Rules of Court on Habeas Corpus provides:
Sec. 1. To what habeas corpus extends. Except as otherwise expressly provided by law, the
writ of habeas corpus shall extend to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any
person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from
the person entitled thereto.
while the Rule on the Writ of Amparo states:
Section 1. Petition. The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person
whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act
or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity.
The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof.
Our decisions on the propriety of the issuance of these writs reiterate the foregoing rules. In
Lourdes D. Rubrico, Jean Rubrico Apruebo, and Mary Joy Rubrico Carbonel v. Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo, Gen. Hermogenes Esperon, P/Dir. Gen. Avelino Razon, Maj. Darwin Sy
a.k.a Darwin Reyes, Jimmy Santana, Ruben Alfaro, Capt. Angelo Cuaresma, a certain Jonathan,
P/Supt. Edgar B. Roquero, Arsenio C. Gomez, and Office of the Ombudsman, we qualified:
The privilege of the writ of amparo is envisioned basically to protect and guarantee the rights to
life, liberty, and security of persons, free from fears and threats that vitiate the quality of this life.
It is an extraordinary writ conceptualized and adopted in light of and in response to the
prevalence of extra-legal killings and enforced disappearances. Accordingly, the remedy ought
to be resorted to and granted judiciously, lest the ideal sought by the Amparo Rule be
diluted and undermined by the indiscriminate filing of amparo petitions for purposes less
than the desire to secure amparo reliefs and protection and/or on the basis of
unsubstantiated allegations.
In the recent Nurhida Juhuri Ampatuan v. Judge Virgilio V. Macaraig, RTC, Manila, Branch 37,
Director General Avelino Razon, Jr., Director Geary Barias, PSSupt. Co Yee M. Co, Jr., and
Police Chief Inspector Agapito Quimson, we intoned:
The most basic criterion for the issuance of the writ, therefore, is that the individual seeking such
relief is illegally deprived of his freedom of movement or place under some form of illegal
restraint. If an individuals liberty is restrainted via some legal process, the writ of habeas corpus
is unavailing. Fundamentally, in order to justify the grant of the writ of habeas corpus, the
restraint of liberty must be in the nature of an illegal and involuntary deprivation of freedom of
action.
In general, the purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to determine whether or not a particular
person is legally held. A prime specification of an application for a writ of habeas corpus, in
fact, is an actual and effective, and not merely nominal or moral, illegal restraint of liberty. The
writ of habeas corpus was devised and exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons
from unlawful restraint, and as the best and only sufficient defense of personal freedom. xxx The
essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of
involuntary restraint as distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a person therefrom if such
restraint is illegal. Any restraint which will preclude freedom of action is sufficient.
In passing upon a petition for habeas corpus, a court or judge must first inquire into whether the
petitioner is being restrained of his liberty. If he is not, the writ will be refused. Inquiry into the
cause of detention will proceed only where such restraint exists. If the alleged cause is thereafter
found to be unlawful, then the writ should be granted and the petitioner discharged. Needless to
state, if otherwise, again the writ will be refused.
While habeas corpus is a writ of right, it will not issue as a matter of course or as a mere
perfunctory operation on the filing of the petition. Judicial discretion is called for in its issuance
and it must be clear to the judge to whom the petition is presented that, prima facie, the petitioner
is entitled to the writ. It is only if the court is satisfied that a person is being unlawfully restrained
of his liberty will the petition for habeas corpus be granted. If the respondents are not detaining
or restraining the applicant of the person in whose behalf the petition is filed, the petition should
be dismissed.
In the cases at bar, the question before the CA was correctly limited to which hospital, the
NCMH or a medical facility of accuseds own choosing, accused Guisande should be referred for
treatment of a supposed mental condition. In addition, we note that it was procedurally proper
for the RTC to ask the NCMH for a separate opinion on accuseds mental fitness to be arraigned
and stand trial. Be that as it may, the CA allowed the transfer of accused to St. Clares Medical
Center under the custody of Dr. Rene Yat, who was required periodically to report on his
evaluation, every fifteen (15) days, to the RTC Mandaluyong City, although in the same breath,
the CA also ordered the continuation of the arraignment and trial of the accused for Qualified
Theft before the same trial court. In other words, Guisande remained in custody of the law to
answer for the non-bailable criminal charge against her, and was simply allowed to pursue
medical treatment in the hospital and from a doctor of her choice.
Certainly, with the dismissal of the non-bailable case against accused Guisande, she is no longer
under peril to be confined in a jail facility, much less at the NCMH. Effectively, accused
Guisandes person, and treatment of any medical and mental malady she may or may not have,
can no longer be subjected to the lawful processes of the RTC Mandaluyong City. In short, the
cases have now been rendered moot and academic which, in the often cited David v. Macapagal-
Arroyo, is defined as one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of
supervening events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value.
Finally, the Resolutions of the CA and Assistant City Prosecutor Escobar-Pilares, unmistakably
foreclose the justiciability of the petitions before this Court. In CA-G.R. SP No. 00039, the CA
said:
We are also not swayed by [David Sos] argument that [petitioners] advanced lies to this Court
when they stated in their petition that Elena was facing two (2) non-bailable offenses. During the
hearing on the petition for habeas corpus/writ of amparo, the counsel for [David So] stated that
Elena was facing only one (1) non-bailable offense to which [petitioners] did not anymore
object. Besides, the number of non-bailable offenses is not even material in the instant case for
habeas corpus/writ of amparo as the only issue to be determined here was whether or not Elenas
confinement at NCMH was lawful.
Finally, the issue in the verified petition, of whether [petitioners] were in contempt of court, is
rendered moot and academic considering that this Court had already rendered its open court
Order on December 8, 2009, which was favorable to [David So], and it was only later that the
latter raised the issue of contempt.
Finding no merit in [David Sos] verified petition for contempt against [Judge Tacla, Dr. Vicente
and the NCMH], and there being no other objections made by the parties against Our March 17,
2010 Resolution, the instant petition for habeas corpus/writ of amparo is declared CLOSED and
TERMINATED.
SO ORDERED.
David E. So, on behalf of his daughter Maria Elena So Guisande vs. Hon. Esteban A. Tacla, Jr.
etc., et al. / Hon. Esteban A. Tacla, Jr., etc., et al. vs. David E. So, on behalf of his daughter
Maria Elena So Guisande, G.R. Nos. 190108, 190473. October 19, 2010.

Evidence
Actual damages; evidence required. As to Rudlins counterclaim for reimbursement of its
expenses in repairing the defective waterproofing, not a single receipt was presented by Rudlin
to prove that such expense was actually incurred by it. Under the Civil Code, one is entitled to
an adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly
proved. The award of actual damages must be based on the evidence presented, not on the
personal knowledge of the court; and certainly not on flimsy, remote, speculative and
nonsubstantial proof. The testimony of Rodolfo J. Lagera on the total cost allegedly spent by
Rudlin in repairing the waterproofing works does not suffice. A court cannot rely on
speculations, conjectures or guesswork as to the fact of damage but must depend upon competent
proof that they have indeed been suffered by the injured party and on the basis of the best
evidence obtainable as to the actual amount thereof. It must point out specific facts that could
provide the gauge for measuring whatever compensatory or actual damages were
borne. Financial Building Corporation vs.. Rudlin International Corporation, et al./Rudlin
International Corporation, et al. vs. Financial Building Corporation, G.R. No. 164186/G.R. No.
164347. October 4, 2010
Burden of proof in action to annul foreclosure proceedings. It is an elementary rule that the
burden of proof is the duty of a party to present evidence on the facts in issue necessary to
establish his claim or defense by the amount of evidence required by law. In Cristobal v. Court
of Appeals, the Court explicitly ruled that foreclosure proceedings enjoy the presumption of
regularity and that the mortgagor who alleges absence of a requisite has the burden of proving
such fact, to wit:
Further, as respondent bank asserts, a mortgagor who alleges absence of a requisite has the
burden of establishing that fact. Petitioners failed in this regard. Foreclosure proceedings have in
their favor the presumption of regularity and the burden of evidence to rebut the same is on the
petitioners. As well said by the respondent appellate court:
. . . Under the circumstances, there is a basis for presuming that official duty has been regularly
performed by the sheriff. Being a disputable presumption, the same is valid unless controverted
by evidence. The presumption has not been rebutted by any convincing and substantial evidence
by the appellee who has the onus to present evidence that appellant has not complied with the
posting requirement of the law. In the absence therefore of any proof to the contrary, the
presumption that official duty has been regularly performed stays. (Emphases supplied.)
In this case, it was respondents who instituted Civil Case No. 01-1564 seeking the annulment of
the extrajudicial foreclosure of their mortgaged properties on the ground of non-compliance with
the requirements of the law on the posting of the notices of sale. Thus, the burden falls upon
respondents to prove the fact of non-compliance; but respondents miserably failed in this
regard. Respondents did not present any evidence at all to establish that the notices of sale were
not posted as required under Section 3 of Act No. 3135, as amended. Instead, respondents
merely focused on how Notary Public Magpantays Certificate of Posting was worded, and
emphasized on technicalities and semantics. Respondents insist that the phrase on the 15
th
day
of November 1999, I have caused the posting of three (3) copies of Notice of Sale in the
Certificate of Posting meant that Notary Public Magpantay posted the notices for only one day,
i.e., on November 15, 1999. This is a rather specious interpretation of the aforequoted phrase. It
is more logical and reasonable to understand the same phrase as to mean that the notices were
posted beginning November 15, 1999 until the issuance of the certificate on December 9,
1999. There is also no basis to require the notary publics certificate to exactly state that the
notices of sale were posted at public places. Notary Public Magpantays use of the words
conspicuous places in his certificate already satisfactorily complies with the legal requirement
for posting. The adjective public may refer to that which is exposed to general view, and
conspicuous is a synonym thereof.
Moreover, it bears to stress that the Certificate of Posting is actually evidence presented by the
petitioner to establish that copies of the Notice of Sale were indeed posted as required by Act No.
3135, as amended. Without presenting their own evidence of the alleged lack of posting,
respondents contented themselves with challenging the contents of said certificate. As plaintiffs
in Civil Case No. 01-1564, respondents must rely on the strength of their own evidence and not
upon the weakness of the petitioners. In addition, despite any defect in the posting of the Notice
of Sale, the Court reiterates its ruling in previous jurisprudence that the publication of the same
notice in a newspaper of general circulation is already sufficient compliance with the
requirement of the law. Century Savings Bank vs. Spouses Danilo T. Samonte and Rosalinda M.
Samonte, G.R. No. 176212, October 20, 2010.
Burden of proof in civil case. Nevertheless, we further declare that the Court of Appeals erred in
already awarding moral and exemplary damages in respondents favor when the parties have not
yet had the chance to present any evidence before the RTC-Branch 227. In civil cases, he who
alleges a fact has the burden of proving it by a preponderance of evidence. It is incumbent upon
the party claiming affirmative relief from the court to convincingly prove its claim. Bare
allegations, unsubstantiated by evidence are not equivalent to proof under our Rules. In short,
mere allegations are not evidence.
At this point, the finding of the Court of Appeals of bad faith and malice on the part of
petitioners has no factual basis. Good faith is presumed and he who alleges bad faith has the
duty to prove the same. Good faith refers to the state of the mind which is manifested by the acts
of the individual concerned. It consists of the intention to abstain from taking an unconscionable
and unscrupulous advantage of another. Bad faith, on the other hand, does not simply connote
bad judgment to simple negligence. It imports a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and
conscious doing of a wrong, a breach of known duty due to some motive or interest or ill will
that partakes of the nature of fraud. Malice connotes ill will or spite and speaks not in response
to duty. It implies an intention to do ulterior and unjustifiable harm.
We cannot subscribe to respondents argument that there is no more need for the presentation of
evidence by the parties since petitioners, in moving for the dismissal of respondents complaint
for damages, hypothetically admitted respondents allegations. The hypothetical admission of
respondents allegations in the complaint only goes so far as determining whether said complaint
should be dismissed on the ground of failure to state a cause of action. A finding that the
complaint sufficiently states a cause of action does not necessarily mean that the complaint is
meritorious; it shall only result in the reinstatement of the complaint and the hearing of the case
for presentation of evidence by the parties. Ermelinda Manaloto, et al. vs. Ismael Veloso III,
G.R. No. 171365, October 6, 2010.
Foreign law; burden of proof; processual presumption. As to petitioners contentions that
Philippine labor laws on probationary employment are not applicable since it was expressly
provided in respondents employment contract, which she voluntarily entered into, that the terms
of her engagement shall be governed by prevailing Kuwaiti Civil Service Laws and Regulations
as in fact POEA Rules accord respect to such rules, customs and practices of the host country,
the same was not substantiated. Indeed, a contract freely entered into is considered the law
between the parties who can establish stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may
deem convenient, including the laws which they wish to govern their respective obligations, as
long as they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy. It is
hornbook principle, however, that the party invoking the application of a foreign law has the
burden of proving the law, under the doctrine of processual presumption which, in this case,
petitioners failed to discharge. The Courts ruling in EDI-Staffbuilders Intl., v. NLRC
illuminates:
In the present case, the employment contract signed by Gran specifically states that Saudi Labor
Laws will govern matters not provided for in the contract (e.g. specific causes for termination,
termination procedures, etc.). Being the law intended by the parties (lex loci intentiones) to apply
to the contract, Saudi Labor Laws should govern all matters relating to the termination of the
employment of Gran.
In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law applied to a dispute or case has
the burden of proving the foreign law. The foreign law is treated as a question of fact to be
properly pleaded and proved as the judge or labor arbiter cannot take judicial notice of a foreign
law. He is presumed to know only domestic or forum law.
Unfortunately for petitioner, it did not prove the pertinent Saudi laws on the matter; thus, the
International Law doctrine of presumed-identity approach or processual presumption comes into
play. Where a foreign law is not pleaded or, even if pleaded, is not proved, the presumption is
that foreign law is the same as ours. Thus, we apply Philippine labor laws in determining the
issues presented before us. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
ATCI Overseas Corporation, et al. vs. Ma. Josefa Echin, G.R. No. 178551. October 11, 2010
Foreign law; no judicial notice of foreign law. The Philippines does not take judicial notice of
foreign laws, hence, they must not only be alleged; they must be proven. To prove a foreign law,
the party invoking it must present a copy thereof and comply with Sections 24 and 25 of Rule
132 of the Revised Rules of Court which reads:
SEC. 24. Proof of official record. The record of public documents referred to in paragraph (a)
of Section 19, when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication
thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his
deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that such
officer has the custody. If the office in which the record is kept is in a foreign country, the
certificate may be made by a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice
consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in
the foreign country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office.
(emphasis supplied)
SEC. 25. What attestation of copy must state. Whenever a copy of a document or record is
attested for the purpose of the evidence, the attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a
correct copy of the original, or a specific part thereof, as the case may be. The attestation must
be under the official seal of the attesting officer, if there be any, or if he be the clerk of a court
having a seal, under the seal of such court.
To prove the Kuwaiti law, petitioners submitted the following: MOA between respondent and
the Ministry, as represented by ATCI, which provides that the employee is subject to a
probationary period of one (1) year and that the host countrys Civil Service Laws and
Regulations apply; a translated copy (Arabic to English) of the termination letter to respondent
stating that she did not pass the probation terms, without specifying the grounds therefor, and a
translated copy of the certificate of termination, both of which documents were certified by Mr.
Mustapha Alawi, Head of the Department of Foreign Affairs-Office of Consular Affairs Inslamic
Certification and Translation Unit; and respondents letter of reconsideration to the Ministry,
wherein she noted that in her first eight (8) months of employment, she was given a rating of
Excellent albeit it changed due to changes in her shift of work schedule.
These documents, whether taken singly or as a whole, do not sufficiently prove that respondent
was validly terminated as a probationary employee under Kuwaiti civil service laws. Instead of
submitting a copy of the pertinent Kuwaiti labor laws duly authenticated and translated by
Embassy officials thereat, as required under the Rules, what petitioners submitted were mere
certifications attesting only to the correctness of the translations of the MOA and the termination
letter which does not prove at all that Kuwaiti civil service laws differ from Philippine laws and
that under such Kuwaiti laws, respondent was validly terminated. Thus the subject certifications
read:
x x x x
This is to certify that the herein attached translation/s from Arabic to English/Tagalog and or
vice versa was/were presented to this Office for review and certification and the same was/were
found to be in order. This Office, however, assumes no responsibility as to the contents of the
document/s.
This certification is being issued upon request of the interested party for whatever legal purpose
it may serve. (emphasis supplied)
ATCI Overseas Corporation, et al. vs. Ma. Josefa Echin, G.R. No. 178551. October 11, 2010
Formal Offer of evidence; not required in proceedings before Bureau of Legal Affairs of
Intellectual Property Office. Preliminarily, it must be noted that the BLA ruled that Shen Dar
failed to adduce evidence in support of its allegations as required under Office Order No. 79,
Series of 2005, Amendments to the Regulations on Inter Partes Proceedings, having failed to
formally offer its evidence during the proceedings before it. The BLA ruled:
At the outset, we note petitioners failure to adduce any evidence in support of its allegations in
the Petition for Cancellation. Petitioner did not file nor submit its marked evidence as required in
this Bureaus Order No. 2006-157 dated 25 January 2006 in compliance with Office Order No.
79, Series of 2005, Amendments to the Regulations on Inter Partes Proceedings. x x x
In reversing such finding, the CA cited Sec. 2.4 of BLA Memorandum Circular No. 03, Series of
2005, which states:
Section 2.4. In all cases, failure to file the documentary evidences in accordance with Sections 7
and 8 of the rules on summary proceedings shall be construed as a waiver on the part of the
parties. In such a case, the original petition, opposition, answer and the supporting documents
therein shall constitute the entire evidence for the parties subject to applicable rules.
The CA concluded that Shen Dar needed not formally offer its evidence but merely needed to
attach its evidence to its position paper with the proper markings, which it did in this case.
The IP Code provides under its Sec. 10.3 that the Director General of the IPO shall establish the
procedure for the application for the registration of a trademark, as well as the opposition to it:
Section 10. The Bureau of Legal Affairs. The Bureau of Legal Affairs shall have the following
functions:
x x x x
10.3. The Director General may by Regulations establish the procedure to govern the
implementation of this Section.
Thus, the Director General issued Office Order No. 79, Series of 2005 amending the regulations
on Inter Partes Proceedings, Sec. 12.1 of which provides:
Section 12. Evidence for the Parties
12.1. The verified petition or opposition, reply if any, duly marked affidavits of the witnesses,
and the documents submitted, shall constitute the entire evidence for the petitioner or opposer.
The verified answer, rejoinder if any, and the duly marked affidavits and documents submitted
shall constitute the evidence for the respondent. Affidavits, documents and other evidence not
submitted and duly marked in accordance with the preceding sections shall not be admitted as
evidence.
The preceding sections referred to in the above provision refer to Secs. 7.1, 8.1 and 9 which, in
turn, provide:
Section 7. Filing of Petition or Opposition
7.1. The petition or opposition, together with the affidavits of witnesses and originals of the
documents and other requirements, shall be filed with the Bureau, provided, that in case of public
documents, certified copies shall be allowed in lieu of the originals. The Bureau shall check if
the petition or opposition is in due form as provided in the Regulations particularly Rule 3,
Section 3; Rule 4, Section 2; Rule 5, Section 3; Rule 6, Section 9; Rule 7, Sections 3 and 5; Rule
8, Sections 3 and 4. For petition for cancellation of layout design (topography) of integrated
circuits, Rule 3, Section 3 applies as to the form and requirements. The affidavits, documents and
other evidence shall be marked consecutively as Exhibits beginning with the letter A.
Section 8. Answer
8.1. Within three (3) working days from receipt of the petition or opposition, the Bureau shall
issue an order for the respondent to file an answer together with the affidavits of witnesses and
originals of documents, and at the same time shall notify all parties required to be notified in the
IP Code and these Regulations, provided, that in case of public documents, certified true copies
may be submitted in lieu of the originals. The affidavits and documents shall be marked
consecutively as Exhibits beginning with the number 1.
Section 9. Petition or Opposition and Answer must be verified Subject to Rules 7 and 8 of
these regulations, the petition or opposition and the answer must be verified. Otherwise, the same
shall not be considered as having been filed.
In other words, as long as the petition is verified and the pieces of evidence consisting of the
affidavits of the witnesses and the original of other documentary evidence are attached to the
petition and properly marked in accordance with Secs. 7.1 and 8.1 abovementioned, these shall
be considered as the evidence of the petitioner. There is no requirement under the
abovementioned rules that the evidence of the parties must be formally offered to the BLA. In
any case, as a quasi-judicial agency and as stated in Rule 2, Sec. 5 of the Regulations on Inter
Partes Proceedings, the BLA is not bound by technical rules of procedure. The evidence attached
to the petition may, therefore, be properly considered in the resolution of the case. E.Y.
Industrial Sales, Inc. and Engracio Yap vs. Shen Dar Electricity Machinery Co., Ltd., G.R. No.
184850, October 20, 2010.
Judicial Notice. BAYAN, GABRIELA, KMP, MCCCL, COURAGE, KADAMAY, SCW,
LFS, Anakbayan, PAMALAKAYA, ACT, Migrante, HEAD and Agham, petitioner-
organizations in G.R. No. 178581, would like the Court to take judicial notice of respondents
alleged action of tagging them as militant organizations fronting for the Communist Party of the
Philippines (CPP) and its armed wing, the National Peoples Army (NPA). The tagging,
according to petitioners, is tantamount to the effects of proscription without following the
procedure under the law. The petition of BAYAN-ST, et al. in G.R. No. 179461 pleads the same
allegations. The Court cannot take judicial notice of the alleged tagging of petitioners.
Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have three material requisites: (1) the matter must
be one of common and general knowledge; (2) it must be well and authoritatively settled
and not doubtful or uncertain; and (3) it must be known to be within the limits of the
jurisdiction of the court. The principal guide in determining what facts may be assumed to be
judicially known is that of notoriety. Hence, it can be said that judicial notice is limited to facts
evidenced by public records and facts of general notoriety. Moreover, a judicially noticed fact
must be one not subject to a reasonable dispute in that it is either: (1) generally known within
the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court; or (2) capable of accurate and ready
determination by resorting to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questionable.
Things of common knowledge, of which courts take judicial matters coming to the knowledge
of men generally in the course of the ordinary experiences of life, or they may be matters which
are generally accepted by mankind as true and are capable of ready and unquestioned
demonstration. Thus, facts which are universally known, and which may be found in
encyclopedias, dictionaries or other publications, are judicially noticed, provided, they are of
such universal notoriety and so generally understood that they may be regarded as forming part
of the common knowledge of every person. As the common knowledge of man ranges far and
wide, a wide variety of particular facts have been judicially noticed as being matters of common
knowledge. But a court cannot take judicial notice of any fact which, in part, is dependent
on the existence or non-existence of a fact of which the court has no constructive
knowledge. (emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
No ground was properly established by petitioners for the taking of judicial notice. Petitioners
apprehension is insufficient to substantiate their plea. That no specific charge or proscription
under RA 9372 has been filed against them, three years after its effectivity, belies any claim of
imminence of their perceived threat emanating from the so-called tagging. Southern Hemisphere
Engagement Network, Inc. etc., et al. vs. Anti-Terrorism council, et al./Kilusang Mayo Uno etc.,
et al. Vs. Hon. Eduardo Ermita, et al./Bagong Alyansang Makabayan (Bayan), et al. vs. Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo, etc., et al./Karapatan, et al. vs. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, etc., et al./The
Integrated Bar of the Philippines etc. et al. vs. Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita, et
al./Bagong Alyansang Makabayan-Southern Tagalog, et al. vs. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, etc.,
et al., G.R. Nos. 178552, 178554, 178581, 178890, 179157, 179461.October 5, 2010
Parol Evidence Rule; evidence of written agreement. On the issue of the correct total contract
price, we hold that Rudlin failed to substantiate its claim that the contract price stated in the
Construction Agreement (P6,933,268.00) was not the true contract price because it had an
understanding with FBCs Jaime B. Lo that they would decrease said amount to a mutually
acceptable amount. Under the general rule in Section 9 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, when
the terms of an agreement were reduced in writing, as in this case, it is deemed to contain all the
terms agreed upon and no evidence of such terms can be admitted other than the contents
thereof. Rudlin argues that under Section 9, Rule 130, a party may present evidence to modify,
explain or add to the terms of the written agreement if it is put in issue in the pleading, [t]he
failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and the agreement of the parties
thereto. Assuming as true Rudlins claim that Exhibit 7 failed to accurately reflect an intent
of the parties to fix the total contract price at P6,006,965.00, Rudlin failed to avail of its right to
seek the reformation of the instrument to the end that such true intention may be expressed.
Evidence of a prior or contemporaneous verbal agreement is generally not admissible to vary,
contradict or defeat the operation of a valid contract. Section 9 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court
states:
SEC. 9. Evidence of written agreements.When the terms of an agreement have been reduced to
writing, it is considered as containing all the terms agreed upon and there can be, between the
parties and their successors-in-interest, no evidence of such terms other than the contents of the
written agreement.
However, a party may present evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms of the written
agreement if he puts in issue in his pleading:
(a) An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in the written agreement;
(b) The failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and agreement of the parties
thereto;
(c) The validity of the written agreement; or
(d) The existence of other terms agreed to by the parties or their successors-in-interest after the
execution of the written agreement.
The term agreement includes wills.
Rudlin cannot invoke the exception under (a) or (b) of the above provision. Such exception
obtains only where the written contract is so ambiguous or obscure in terms that the contractual
intention of the parties cannot be understood from a mere reading of the instrument. In such a
case, extrinsic evidence of the subject matter of the contract, of the relations of the parties to
each other, and of the facts and circumstances surrounding them when they entered into the
contract may be received to enable the court to make a proper interpretation of the
instrument. Under the fourth exception, however, Rudlins evidence is admissible to show the
existence of such other terms agreed to by the parties after the execution of the contract. But
apart from the Bar Chart and Cash Flow Chart prepared by FBC, and the testimony of Rodolfo J.
Lagera, no competent evidence was adduced by Rudlin to prove that the amount of
P6,006,965.00 stated therein as contract price was the actual decreased amount that FBC and
Rudlin found mutually acceptable. As to the affidavits executed by Architect Quezon and his
associate Roberto R. Antonio, the same do not serve as competent proof of the purported actual
contract price as they did not testify thereon. Significantly, the June 5, 1986 Letter-Agreement
did not at all mention the total contract price. Likewise, there is nothing in the various letters
sent by Rudlin to FBC while construction was in progress and even subsequent to the execution
of the said Letter-Agreement indicating that Rudlin corrected the contract price of P6,933,268.00
which FBC had repeatedly mentioned in its letters and documents. Financial Building
Corporation vs.. Rudlin International Corporation, et al./Rudlin International Corporation, et
al. vs. Financial Building Corporation, G.R. No. 164186/G.R. No. 164347. October 4, 2010
Positive testimony stronger than negative testimony. Contrary to the dissents view, the sworn
statements of Maligaya Feedmills customers and former employees that Mitra did not and could
not have resided at the mezzanine portion of the Feedmill cannot be given full evidentiary
weight, since these statements are in nature of negative testimonies that do not deserve weight
and credence in the face of contrary positive evidence, particularly, Carme E. Caspes testimony,
cited above, that Mitra did indeed transfer residence in a process that was accomplished, not in a
single move, but through an incremental process that started in early 2008. It is well-settled in
the rules of evidence that positive testimony is stronger than negative testimony. Abraham
Kahlil B. Mitra vs. Commission on Elections, Antonio V. Gonzales and Orlando R. Balbon, Jr.,
G.R. No. 191938, October 19, 2010.
Presumptions; conclusive presumption; tenant estopped from denying title of landlord. Finally,
the Court agrees with the RTC that respondents are already estopped from challenging the
validity of the foreclosure sale, after entering into a Contract of Lease with petitioner over one of
the foreclosed properties. The title of the landlord is a conclusive presumption as against the
tenant or lessee. According to Section 2(b), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, [t]he tenant is not
permitted to deny the title of his landlord at the time of the commencement of the relation of
landlord and tenant between them. The juridical relationship between petitioner as lessor and
respondents as lessees carries with it a recognition of the lessors title. As lessees, then
respondents are estopped to deny their landlords title, or to assert a better title not only in
themselves, but also in some third person while they remain in possession of the leased premises
and until they surrender possession to the landlord. This estoppel applies even though the lessor
had no title at the time the relation of lessor and lessee was created, and may be asserted not only
by the original lessor, but also by those who succeed to his title. The Court quotes with
approval the following findings of the RTC:
Further, this Court upholds the validity of the extrajudicial foreclosure proceeding under the
equitable principle of estoppel. [Herein respondents] admitted execution of the Contract of
Lease alone establishes that they do not have any cause of action or are estopped from
impugning the validity of the subject extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings. In the Contract of
Lease, [respondents] clearly acknowledge that the subject extrajudicial foreclosure sale was
conducted in accordance with Act No. 3135, as amended; that they failed to redeem the
foreclosed properties within the redemption period; and that [petitioner] has valid and legal right
and title as absolute owner of the foreclosed properties. [Respondents] failed to mention or
question the validity of the Contract of Lease in their Complaint. There being no evidence
presented that [respondents] executed the Contract of Lease by mistake or through violence,
intimidation, undue influence, or fraud, [respondents] are bound by the stipulations therein and to
the consequences thereof. Century Savings Bank vs. Spouses Danilo T. Samonte and Rosalinda
M. Samonte, G.R. No. 176212, October 20, 2010.
Presumptions; disputable presumption; suppression of evidence. Incidentally, the dissents
invocation of the adverse presumption of suppression of evidence is erroneous, since it does not
arise when the evidence is at the disposal of both parties. In the present case, the required proofs
of commercial transactions the dissent cites are public documents which are at the disposal of
both parties; they are not solely under the custody of Mitra and can be easily obtained from the
municipal offices of Aborlan had the private respondents been minded to do so. The bottom line
is that no such evidence was ever presented in this case, and none can and should be considered
at this point. Abraham Kahlil B. Mitra vs. Commission on Elections, Antonio V. Gonzales and
Orlando R. Balbon, Jr., G.R. No. 191938, October 19, 2010.
Question of law distinguished from question of fact. And in Leoncio v. De Vera, this Court has
differentiated a question of law from a question of fact. A question of law arises when there is
doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, while there is a question of fact when the
doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. For a question to be one of law, the
same must not involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the
litigants or any of them. The resolution of the issue must rest solely on what the law provides on
the given set of circumstances. Once it is clear that the issue invites a review of the evidence
presented, the question posed is one of fact. Thus, the test of whether a question is one of law or
of fact is not the appellation given to such question by the party raising the same; rather, it is
whether the appellate court can determine the issue raised without reviewing or evaluating the
evidence, in which case, it is a question of law; otherwise it is a question of fact. Republic of the
Philippines vs. Angelo B. Malabanan, et al., G.R. No. 169067, October 6, 2010
Question of law distinguished from question of fact. In Microsoft Corporation v. Maxicorp, Inc.,
the Court elucidated on the distinction between questions of law and fact:
The distinction between questions of law and questions of fact is settled. A question of law
exists when the doubt or difference centers on what the law is on a certain state of facts. A
question of fact exists if the doubt centers on the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. Though this
delineation seems simple, determining the true nature and extent of the distinction is sometimes
problematic. For example, it is incorrect to presume that all cases where the facts are not in
dispute automatically involve purely questions of law.
There is a question of law if the issue raised is capable of being resolved without need of
reviewing the probative value of the evidence. The resolution of the issue must rest solely on
what the law provides on the given set of circumstances. Once it is clear that the issue invites a
review of the evidence presented, the question posed is one of fact. If the query requires a re-
evaluation of the credibility of witnesses, or the existence or relevance of surrounding
circumstances and their relation to each other, the issue in that query is factual. Our ruling in
Paterno v. Paterno [G.R. No. 63680, 23 March 1990, 183 SCRA 630] is illustrative on this
point:
Such questions as whether certain items of evidence should be accorded probative value or
weight, or rejected as feeble or spurious, or whether or not the proofs on one side or the other are
clear and convincing and adequate to establish a proposition in issue, are without doubt questions
of fact. Whether or not the body of proofs presented by a party, weighed and analyzed in relation
to contrary evidence submitted by adverse party, may be said to be strong, clear and convincing;
whether or not certain documents presented by one side should be accorded full faith and credit
in the face of protests as to their spurious character by the other side; whether or not
inconsistencies in the body of proofs of a party are of such gravity as to justify refusing to give
said proofs weight all these are issues of fact.
It is true that Maxicorp did not contest the facts alleged by petitioners. But this situation does
not automatically transform all issues raised in the petition into questions of law. The issues must
meet the tests outlined in Paterno.
The main issue in the case at bar is whether the extrajudicial foreclosure sale of respondents
mortgaged properties was valid. The resolution of said issue, however, is dependent on the
answer to the question of whether the legal requirements on the notice of sale were complied
with. Necessarily, the Court must review the evidence on record, most especially, Notary Public
Magpantays Certificate of Posting, to determine the weight and probative value to accord the
same. Non-compliance with the requirements of notice and publication in an extrajudicial
foreclosure sale is a factual issue. The resolution thereof by the lower courts is binding and
conclusive upon this Court. However, this rule is subject to exceptions, as when the findings of
the trial court and the Court of Appeals are in conflict. Also, it must be noted that non-
compliance with the statutory requisites could constitute a jurisdictional defect that would
invalidate the sale. Century Savings Bank vs. Spouses Danilo T. Samonte and Rosalinda M.
Samonte, G.R. No. 176212, October 20, 2010.