What is Global Justice?

Thomas W. Pogge
Oslo 11 September 2003 Morning
If you do a literature search on global justice you will find that this is a newly prominent
expression there are more books and essays on it in this millennium already than in the
preceding one, at least as far as computers can tell. Of course, some of the broad topics
currently debated under the heading of global justice! ha"e been discussed for centuries,
back to the beginnings of ci"ili#ation. $ut they were discussed under different labels, such
as international justice,! international ethics,! and the law of nations.! %nd this shift in
terminology is &uite significant or so I belie"e.
Ob"iously, different users of a new expression may ha"e di"erse moti"es and ideas, some
of which I may not be familiar with. 'hus I must confess to ne"er ha"ing read the book
published already in ()** entitled No More Plastic Jesus: Global Justice and
Christian Lifestyle. %s fellow+philosopher ,lint -astwood pronounced so memorably. %
man!s got to know his limitations. /o I won!t pretend to speak for e"eryone, but will
rather say a little about the e"ol"ing ideas that moti"ated me to use the expression global
justice in the titles of my doctoral dissertation, of my first essay in Philosophy Public
!ffairs, and of six subse&uent publications.
0e can begin with two distinctions. 'he first is between two different ways of looking at
the e"ents of our social world. On the one hand, we can see such e"ents interactionally. as
actions, and effects of actions performed by indi"idual and collecti"e agents. On the other
hand, we can see them institutionally. as effects of how our social world is structured
of our laws and con"entions, practices and social institutions. 'hese two ways of "iewing
entail different descriptions and explanations of social phenomena, and they also lead to
two different kinds of moral analysis or moral diagnostics.
pgg+oslo+gj+(
'ake some morally salient e"ent, for example the fact that some particular child suffers
from malnutrition, that some woman is unemployed, or that some man was hurt in a traffic
accident. 0e can causally trace such e"ents back to the conduct of indi"idual and
collecti"e agents, including the person who is suffering the harm. 1oing so in"ol"es
making counterfactual statements about how things would or might ha"e gone differently if
this or that agent had acted in some other way. 0e can then sort through these
counterfactual statements in order to determine whether any of the causally rele"ant agents
ought to ha"e acted differently and thus is partly or wholly at fault for the regrettable
e"ent. 'his will in"ol"e us in examining whether any such agents could ha"e foreseen that
their conduct would lead to the regrettable e"ent and could also reasonably ha"e averted
the harm without causing substantial costs to themsel"es or third parties. I ha"e referred to
in&uires of this kind as interactional moral analysis or interactional moral diagnostics.
2egrettable e"ents can also be traced back to standing features of the society or social
system in which they occur. to its culture, for example, or to its institutional order. In this
"ein, one might causally trace child malnutrition back to high import duties on foodstuffs,
unemployment to a restricti"e monetary policy, and traffic accidents to the lack of regular
motor "ehicle safety inspections. 1oing so in"ol"es making counterfactual statements
about how things would or might ha"e gone differently if this or that set of social rules had
been different. 0e can then sort through these counterfactual statements in order to
determine whether the causally rele"ant rules ought to ha"e been different and whether
anyone is responsible for defects in these rules that are partly or wholly to blame for the
regrettable e"ents. 'his will in"ol"e us in examining whether those responsible for the
design of the rele"ant rules for instance, members of the parliament could ha"e
foreseen that they would lead to harm and could reasonably ha"e reformulated the rules
without causing substantial harm elsewhere. I ha"e referred to in&uires of this kind as
institutional moral analysis or institutional moral diagnostics.
'his was the first distinction. between interactional and institutional causal explanation
and, correspondingly, between interactional and institutional moral analysis.
pgg+oslo+gj+3
'he second distinction I want to put before you is that between intranational and
international relations. 'hese were traditionally seen as constituting distinct worlds, the
former inhabited by persons, households, corporations and associations within one
territorially bounded society, the latter inhabited by a small number of actors. so"ereign
states. 4ational go"ernments pro"ided the link between these two worlds. On the inside
such a go"ernment was a uni&uely important actor within the state, interacting with
persons, households, corporations and associations and dominating these other actors by
"irtue of its special power and authority its so+called internal sovereignty. On the
outside, the go"ernment was the state, recogni#ed as entitled to act in its name, to make
binding agreements in its behalf, and so on its so+called external sovereignty. 'hough
linked in this way, the two worlds were seen as separate, and normati"e assessments
un&uestioningly took this separation for granted, sharply distinguishing two separate
domains of moral theori#ing. justice within a state, and international ethics.
Interactional moral analysis presumably emerged &uite early in the e"olution of moral
thought. Institutional moral analysis is more demanding, presupposing an understanding of
the conventional nature of social rules as well as of their, often statistical, comparati"e
effects. -"en a mere eighty years ago, the poor and unemployed were still often seen as
la#y and delin&uent merely on the grounds that others of e&ually humble birth had risen
from dishwasher to millionaire. 5any people then did not understand the structural
constraints on social mobility. that the pathways to riches are limited and that the structure
of pre"ailing markets for capital and labor una"oidably produced certain threshold rates of
unemployment and po"erty. 4or did they understand that existing rates of unemployment
and po"erty could be influenced through intelligent redesign of the rules. 'oday, after
6eynes and after the 7/ 4ew 1eal and "arious similar national transformations, these
matters are &uite well understood, and go"ernments are held responsible for their decisions
regarding institutional design and for the effects of such decisions on the fulfillment or
frustration of human needs. 'his understanding has been belatedly, yet "ery admirably
articulated in philosophy through 8ohn 2awls!s classic ! Theory of Justice. In this
grand work, 2awls has firmly established social institutions as a separate domain of moral
pgg+oslo+gj+9
assessment and has marked this domain terminologically by associating it with the terms
"ustice and social "ustice. 'his terminological inno"ation has taken hold, by and large, at
least in %nglophone philosophy, so the term "ustice is now predominantly used in the moral
assessment of social rules :laws, practices, social con"entions and institutions; and only
rarely in the moral assessment of the conduct and character of indi"idual and collecti"e
agents. In the wake of 2awls, then, the distinction between institutional and interactional
moral analysis has come to be marked as a distinction between justice and ethics.
0e are &uite familiar today with the focus of 2awls!s book. with institutional moral
analysis applied to the internal organi#ation of one state. 0hat is still missing, howe"er, or
just beginning to emerge in the last few years, is institutional moral analysis extended to
the realm of international relations. 'his time lag is hardly surprising, seeing that the realm
of international relations is traditionally concei"ed as so much smaller and more sur"eyable
than the "ast and highly complex inner workings of a modern national society. 0e don!t
need institutional moral analysis, it seems, for a world of a few do#en rele"ant actors in
which, when bad things happen, it is usually pretty clear whose conduct is at fault.
'he enduring grip of this traditional framework is nicely displayed by 2awls!s late book on
international relations The La# of Peoples which was published only four years ago
and fully 3< years after ! Theory of Justice. 'he earlier book exemplifies institutional
moral analysis applied to the intranational realm. 2awls offers there a proposal for the
comparati"e moral assessment of alternati"e ways in which a society!s social order might
be designed. 'he later book exemplifies interactional moral analysis applied to the
international realm. 2awls offers there a proposal for what the rules go"erning state
conduct should be. Institutional moral analysis the idea of a comparati"e assessment of
alternati"e such rule systems in light of the morally significant effects each would ha"e
is absent from the later theory.
8ust for 2awls buffs, let me add that the asymmetry is nicely apparent in the structure of
the two theories. 2awls!s international theory is two+tiered. It has an original+position
thought experiment on one le"el and then a list of rules applying directly to the conduct of
pgg+oslo+gj+=
states on the other. >is domestic theory is three+tiered. It has an original+position thought
experiment on ?e"el One, then the two principles of justice :2awls!s standard for
assessing the comparati"e effects of alternati"e social institutions; on ?e"el 'wo, and
finally on ?e"el 'hree concrete institutional arrangements which do not howe"er exhaust
themsel"es in rules for the conduct of indi"idual and collecti"e agents, but importantly
include so+called constitutive rules, rules that create and define certain agents, roles, and
relationships rather than merely guide preexisting actors within a preexisting option space.
2awls thus complements his domestic theory of justice with an international theory :not
of justice but; of ethics.
'he concept of global justice breaks down the traditional separation of intranational and
international relations and extends institutional moral analysis to the whole field. 0hat
moti"ates this dramatic reorientation@ One important moti"e is the reali#ation that the
traditional conception of the world of international relations as inhabited only by states is
unsatisfactory. 0e all know that this conception is rapidly losing its explanatory ade&uacy
through the emergence and increasing stature of other agents on the international stage,
such as multinational corporations, international organi#ations, regional associations. 5ore
important for our topic, howe"er, is the reali#ation that the moral ade&uacy of this
traditional conception has always been lacking. It has never been plausible that the
interests of states that is, the interests of go"ernments should furnish the only
considerations that are morally rele"ant in international relations.
,onsider an example a long+term contract concerning the exportation of crude oil from
4igeria to the 7nited 6ingdom, entered into without coercion by 4igeria!s military dictator
/ani %bacha and the $ritish go"ernment :or a $ritish oil company;. 0ithin the traditional
intellectual framework, it is self+e"ident that such an agreement must be honored. Aeople
are to obser"e treaties and undertakings says 2awls!s second principle of state conduct,
and the third one adds. Aeoples are e&ual and are parties to the agreements that bind
them.
(
$ut here is the reality. 'he 4igerian go"ernment is extremely corrupt and
oppressi"e, and its continuation in power depends to a considerable extent on the military.
(
8ohn 2awls. The La# of Peoples :,ambridge 5%. >ar"ard 7ni"ersity Aress ()));, 9*.
pgg+oslo+gj+B
'he oil sales it conducts impose en"ironmental harms and ha#ards on the 4igerian people
but bring them no tangible benefits because the re"enues are partly siphoned off by the
small political elite and partly spent on weapons needed for military repression
weapons that are supplied by the 7nited /tates in accordance with another contract
executed, without coercion, between the go"ernments of the 7/ and 4igeria.
'here is an ob"ious &uestion here. $y what right can a free and fair agreement between a
military strongman in 4igeria and the $ritish go"ernment or some $ritish oil company
entitle these two parties to depri"e the 4igerian people of their natural resources and to
despoil their en"ironment@
'his &uestion is in"isible so long as we think of international relations as a separate realm
in which each state is identified with its go"ernment. ,on"ersely, once we see the
&uestion, the old intellectual framework becomes manifestly untenable. 0e cannot fail to
recogni#e that it is a "ery substantial disad"antage of the existing international order that it
recogni#es rulers, merely because they exercise effecti"e power within a state, as entitled
to confer legally "alid property rights in this state!s resources and to borrow money in its
name. /uch recognition accords international borrowing and resource pri"ileges to many
go"ernments that are unworthy of the name. 'hese pri"ileges are impoverishing, because
their exercise often dispossesses a country!s people who are excluded from political
participation as well as from the benefits of their go"ernment!s borrowing or resource
sales. 'hese pri"ileges are moreo"er oppressive because they often gi"e dictatorial rulers
access to the funds they need to keep themsel"es in power e"en against near+uni"ersal
popular opposition. %nd these pri"ileges are disruptive because they pro"ide strong
incenti"es toward the undemocratic ac&uisition and exercise of political power, resulting in
the kinds of coups and ci"il wars that are so common in the de"eloping countries.
'he concept of global justice, I ha"e said, breaks down the traditional separation of
intranational and international relations and extends institutional moral analysis to the
whole field. It makes "isible how we citi#ens of affluent countries are potentially
pgg+oslo+gj+C
implicated in the horrors so many must endure in the so+called less de"eloped countries,
potentially implicated in the "iolence and hunger inflicted upon them.
'he old framework was comfortable. 0e share responsibility for the institutional order of
our own society and for any harms this order may inflict upon our fellow citi#ens. %nd we
also share responsibility for our go"ernment!s acting honorably abroad by complying with
reasonable international laws and con"entions, especially those relating to warfare, and by
honoring its contracts and treaties. In this traditional framework, we generally bear no
responsibility for the "iolence and po"erty inflicted upon foreigners within the black box of
their own state.
'he new intellectual framework, associated with the expression global justice, may not
be so comfortable. ,entral to this framework is the causal impact of the design of the
global institutional order upon the conditions under which human beings worldwide are
li"ing. /ince the end of the ,old 0ar, major components of this global institutional order
such as the global trading system and the rules go"erning military inter"entions ha"e
been substantially redesigned while other components such as the international resource
and borrowing pri"ileges discussed earlier ha"e been left in place. 'here were many
alternati"e ways in which the global institutional order could ha"e been shaped and
reshaped when, after the end of the ,old 0ar, the 4orth %tlantic powers found themsel"es
in control. %nd the &uestion is then. >ow would other paths of globali#ation ha"e been
different in their effects upon people worldwide, in their effects upon the incidence of
"iolence, oppression, and extreme po"erty for example@ %nd how, in light of such a
comparati"e+impact assessment, is the existing global institutional order to be judged in
moral terms@
'he global institutional order is causally related to the incidence of morally significant
harms in two main ways. Dirst, its rules may affect people &uite directly. ,onsider for
example the current 0'O treaty system which permits the affluent countries to protect
their markets against cheap imports :agricultural products, textiles, steel, and so on;
through &uotas, tariffs, anti+dumping duties, and subsidies to domestic producers. /uch
pgg+oslo+gj+*
protectionist measures reduce the export opportunities of firms in the de"eloping countries
by constraining their exports into the affluent countries and also, in the case of subsidies,
by allowing less efficient rich+country producers to undersell more efficient poor+country
producers in world markets. In the absence of these constraints, the de"eloping countries
could reali#e, according to 74,'%1, an additional E*FF billion annually in export
re"enues, which is (9 times the annual amount of all official de"elopment assistance
worldwide. 'his particular aspect of the existing 0'O treaty system may thus ha"e a
rather large impact on the incidence of se"ere po"erty in the de"eloping countries,
understanding impact here in a counterfactually comparati"e way. If the 0'O treaty
system did not allow the protectionist measures in &uestion, there would be a great deal
less po"erty in the world today. 'his example illustrates the more direct impact of the
global institutional order on the li"ing conditions of people worldwide.
'he rules of the global institutional order may also affect people indirectly, by co+shaping
the national institutional order under which they li"e. 'he international resource and
borrowing pri"ileges accorded to despotic rulers pro"ide an ob"ious example. $y enabling
tyrannical rulers and juntas to entrench themsel"es in power and by gi"ing potential such
oppressors a strong incenti"e to try to take power by force, these pri"ileges facilitate and
foster oppressi"e and corrupt go"ernment in many de"eloping countries where the
resource sector is a large part of the national economy and where ordinary citi#ens ha"e
few means to resist their oppression.
5uch more could and should be said about these two examples. $ut my objecti"e here is
not to demonstrate injustice, but merely to illustrate what institutional moral analysis
applied to the global institutional order would look like.
4ow, insofar as the current global institutional order does turn out to entail substantially
more "iolence and se"ere po"erty than would exist under a better designed alternati"e
order, we might go on to ask who bears responsibility for this order ha"ing been shaped
the way it was shaped and whether these responsible parties could ha"e foreseen and
could reasonably ha"e a"oided that excess in "iolence and se"ere po"erty.
pgg+oslo+gj+<
'he dominant role in shaping the post+,old+0ar global institutional order was played by
the go"ernments of the more powerful de"eloped countries, the so+called G+* in particular.
In shaping that order, these go"ernments ha"e gi"en much weight to the interests of their
domestic business elites and rather little weight to the interests of the poor and "ulnerable
populations of the poor countries. 'he resulting global institutional order is arguably unjust
insofar as the incidence of "iolence and se"ere po"erty occurring under it is much greater
than would ha"e been the case under an alternati"e global institutional order whose design
would ha"e gi"en greater weight to the interests of the poor and "ulnerable. Insofar as the
G+* countries are reasonably democratic, their citi#ens share responsibility for the global
order their go"ernments ha"e wrought as well as for the comparati"e impact of this order
upon human li"es. %t least this is the kind of moral diagnosis that would mo"e center+stage
if normati"e debates about international relations were to shift from the international
ethics to the global justice paradigm, if institutional moral analysis were extended beyond
the state.
?et me conclude by considering two objections that someone still hea"ily in"ested in the
old international+ethics framework might want to put forward against the new intellectual
paradigm.
Objection One holds that the global institutional order is immune from moral criticism
insofar as it has been freely consented to also by the poorer and less powerful states. 'he
objector would allow that, in some cases, the consent gi"en to the 0'O treaty system, for
example, was perhaps problematic. >e would be willing to entertain the possibility that
some weak states were negotiating under considerable duress and also lacked the expertise
to work out whether the asymmetrical market access rules they were being offered were
better or worse for them than remaining outside the 0'O. Our objector might e"en be
willing to consider that perhaps the bargaining power of states entering the negotiations
was inappropriately affected by historical crimes, such as colonialism. /till, the objector
would insist, insofar as states ha"e freely and competently consented to common rules,
these rules are morally acceptable. $olenti non fit iniuria.
pgg+oslo+gj+)
'he proponent of the new global+justice framework could reject this reasoning on three
mutually independent grounds. Dirst, the consent in &uestion was gi"en by governments.
/uch go"ernment consent cannot be considered consent by the governed unless the
go"ernment in &uestion is minimally representati"e of the interests of those it rules. 5any
go"ernments in the poor countries lack such minimal representati"eness. %nd their consent
to the 0'O treaty system or, more generally, to the present global institutional order
cannot then shield this order from moral criticism in behalf of those they go"erned. 'he
consent of the 5obutos, /ani %bachas, and /uhartos of the de"eloping world, howe"er
freely and competently gi"en, could not ha"e gi"en away the rights of their badly
oppressed subjects.
/econd, the proponent of global justice could point out that a go"ernment, e"en if it is
minimally representati"e of the people it rules, cannot through its freely and competently
gi"en consent gi"e away the inalienable rights of its subjects. 0hat these inalienable
rights are, is contro"ersial to some extent. $ut it is widely accepted that persons cannot
gi"e up their rights not to be tortured or ensla"ed and their rights to the most basic
necessities of human sur"i"al. Insofar as the current global institutional order foreseeably
causes such inalienable rights to be more widely unfulfilled than would be reasonably
a"oidable, this order cannot be defended by appeal to the direct or indirect consent of
those whose inalienable rights are now unfulfilled.
'hird, e"en if persons could gi"e up e"en their most fundamental rights and could
authori#e their go"ernment to gi"e up these rights in their behalf, such persons would ha"e
to be of some minimal age. /e"ere po"erty and "iolence in our world disproportionately
affect children. 4either children, nor their parents or go"ernments can "alidly consent to
the imposition upon these children of an institutional order under which their most
fundamental rights are foreseeably and a"oidably unfulfilled.
Objection One therefore fails. % global institutional order that foreseeably and
a"oidably produces a large excess of "iolence and se"ere po"erty, such an order cannot
be justified by e"en the unanimous consent of all go"ernments.
pgg+oslo+gj+(F
Objection 'wo holds that it is the "ery point and purpose of go"ernments to represent and
promote the interests of their people. It is therefore entirely appropriate and permissible for
rich countries! go"ernments to do their utmost to shape the global institutional order in the
best interest of their citi#ens.
'here is e"idently some truth in this objection. /urely a go"ernment is not re&uired to gi"e
e&ual weight to the interests of all human beings worldwide, but rather is permitted to be
partial by showing special concern for the interests of its own people, present and future.
$ut such permissible partiality has its limits.
'here are ob"ious ethical or interactional limits to a go"ernment!s partiality. Insofar as it
is impermissible for us citi#ens to kill innocent people in order to ad"ance our own
interests, it is likewise impermissible for our go"ernment to do the same in our behalf.
'he limits on permissible go"ernment partiality with regard to the shaping of the global
institutional order are less familiar but no less indisputable. Huite generally, partiality is
legitimate only in the context of a le"el playing field, broadly concei"ed as including fair
rules impartially administered. 'his idea is familiar and widely accepted in many contexts.
It is perfectly all right for persons to concentrate on promoting the interests of themsel"es
or of their group, sports team, or relati"es, pro"ided they do so in the context of a fair
competition. Because such a fair setting is a moral precondition for permissible partiality,
such partiality cannot permissibly extend to the sub"ersion of the le"el playing field. 'o the
contrary, those who are partial in fa"or of their own group must, as a condition of the
permissibility of such partiality, also be impartially concerned for preser"ing the fairness of
the larger social setting. In a domestic setting, for example, it is entirely permissible for
you to concentrate your time and money on securing a good education for your own
children, at the expense of other children whose education you might also promote. Iet it
would be morally wrong for you to seek to promote your children!s prospects by using
your political influence to oppose e&ual access to education for children whose gender,
color, or class differs from that of your own children. In short. partiality of concern is
alright within a minimally fair setting, but not alright when it seeks to undermine the
pgg+oslo+gj+((
minimal fairness of this setting itself. 'he minimal fairness of the terms of the competition
must not itself become an object of this competition. %nd the justice limit, the institutional
limit, to a go"ernment!s partiality in fa"or of its own citi#ens is then that its partial conduct
must not undermine the minimal fairness of the global institutional order. %n appeal to
permissible partiality cannot justify the imposition, by the most powerful go"ernments on
the rest of the world, of an unjust global institutional order under which a majority of
humankind are foreseeably and a"oidably depri"ed of anything resembling a fair start in
life.
I ha"e tried to gi"e you a sense of the intellectual framework associated with the
increasingly prominent expression global justice. 1istincti"e of this framework is the
focus on the causal and moral analysis of the global institutional order against the
background of its feasible alternati"es. 0ithin this general global+justice approach, distinct
conceptions of global justice will differ in the specific criteria of global justice they
propose. $ut such criteria will coincide in their emphasis on the &uestion how well our
global institutional order is doing, compared to its feasible alternati"es, in regard to the
fundamental human interests that matter from a moral point of "iew. -xtending institutional
moral analysis beyond the state, this &uestion focuses attention on how the massi"e
incidence of extreme po"erty and "iolence in the world today might be alle"iated not
merely through better go"ernment beha"ior, internally and internationally, but also, and
much more effecti"ely, through global institutional reforms that would, among other things,
ele"ate such go"ernment beha"ior by modifying the options go"ernments ha"e and the
incenti"es they face.
'he importance of this global+justice approach reaches well beyond philosophy. It is
crucial for enabling ordinary citi#ens J in the de"eloped countries especially J to come to
an ade&uate understanding of their moral situation and responsibilities. %nd it is "ery
helpful also for pushing social scientists, and de"elopment economists especially, to
o"ercome their bias toward what I ha"e called explanatory nationalism, their tendency to
explain po"erty and hunger in terms of causal factors that are domestic to the societies in
pgg+oslo+gj+(3
which they occur. >owe"er "alid and useful, such nationalist explanations must be
complemented by substantial in&uiries into the comparati"e effects of global institutional
factors upon the incidence of se"ere po"erty worldwide. It is "ery satisfying that the
de"elopment of the global+justice approach for once shows the owl of 5iner"a spreading
its wings well before the falling of dusk, that philosophy can gi"e an important conceptual
impulse to economics, political science, and politics. 0hat effect this impulse will ha"e,
howe"er, remains to be seen.
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