Spouses Huguete vs Spouses Embudo, GR No.

49554, July 1, 2003

Facts: Petitioner spouses filed a complaint for the annulment of deed of sale an
d partition of the 50-square meter portion of land against respondent spouses in
the RTC.
Respondent spouses filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack
of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case, arguing that the action is
one for annulment of title and the total assessed value of the subject land was
only P15,000.00 which falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the MTC, pursu
ant to Sec 33(3) of BP Blg 129, as amended by RA 7691.
Petitioner spouses filed an Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss alleging that th
e subject matter of the action is incapable of pecuniary estimation and, therefo
re, is cognizable by the RTC, as provided by Sec 19(1) of BP 129, as amended.
Issue: WON the civil action is one in which the subject matter is incapable of p
ecuniary estimation.
Held: No. The argument that the present action is one incapable of pecuniary est
imation considering that it is for annulment of deed of sale and partition is no
t well-taken.
What determines the nature of an action as well as which court has jurisdiction
over it are the allegations of the complaint and the character of the relief sou
ght (Caiza vs CA).
And in Singsong vs Isabela Sawmill, the Supreme Court ruled that:
In determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not capab
le of pecuniary estimation this Court has adopted the criterion of first ascerta
ining the nature of the principal action or remedy sought. If it is primarily f
or the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary
estimation, and whether the jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in the co
urts of first instance would depend on the amount of the claim. However, where
the basic issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of money, whe
re the money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal r
elief sought, this Court has considered such actions as cases where the subject
of the litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, and are cognizable exc
lusively by courts of first instance (now Regional Trial Courts).
The principal purpose of the petitioners in filing the complaint was to secure t
itle to the 50-square meter portion of the property which they purchased from th
e respondents. Their cause of action is based on their right as purchaser of the
subject land from respondents. They pray that they be declared owners of the pr
operty sold. Thus, their complaint involved title to real property or any inter
est therein. The alleged value of the land which they purchased was P15,000.00,
which was within the jurisdiction of MTC.
The annulment of the deed of sale, were prayed for in the complaint because they
were necessary before the lot may be partitioned and the 50-square meter portio
n subject thereof may be conveyed to petitioners.
De Leon vs Court of Appeals, 287 SCRA 94; GR No. 104796, March 6, 1998
Facts: Private respondents filed in the RTC of Quezon City a complaint for annul
ment or rescission of a contract of sale of two parcels of land against petition
ers. Private respondents paid the docket fee of a flat rate of P400.00 as provid
ed in Rule 141, par 7 (b)(1) of the Rules of Court.
Petitioners moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground of lack of ju
risdiction by the trial court by reason of private respondents non-payment of the
correct amount of docket fees. Petitioners argue that an action for annulment o
r rescission of a contract of sale of real property is a real action and, theref
ore, the amount of the docket fees to be paid by private respondent should be ba
sed either on the assessed value of the property, subject matter of the action,
or its estimated value as alleged in the complaint, pursuant to the last paragra
ph of par 7(b) of Rule 141, as amended.
On the other hand, private respondents counter that an action for annulment or r
escission of a contract of sale of real property is incapable of pecuniary estim
ation and, so, the docket fees should be the fixed amount of P400.00 in Rule 141
, par 7(b)(1).
The trial court denied petitioners motion to dismiss but required private respond
ents to pay the amount of docket fees based on the estimated value of the parcel
s of land in litigation as stated in the complaint.
The Court of Appeals held that an action for rescission or annulment of contrac
t is not susceptible of pecuniary estimation and, therefore, the docket fees sho
uld not be based on the value of the real property, subject matter of the contra
ct sought to be annulled or rescinded
Issue: WON in assessing the docket fees to be paid for the filing of an action f
or annulment or rescission of a contract of sale, the value of the real property
, should be used as basis.
Held: No. The action for annulment or rescission is considered as one which is n
ot capable of pecuniary estimation.
A review of the jurisprudence of this Court indicates that in determining whethe
r an action is one the subject matter of which is not capable of pecuniary estim
ation, this Court has adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the nature of
the principal action or remedy sought. If it is primarily for the recovery of a
sum of money, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and whet
her jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in the courts of first instance w
ould depend on the amount of the claim. However, where the basic issue is somet
hing other than the right to recover a sum of money, or where the money claim is
purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief sought, like in
suits to have the defendant perform his part of the contract (specific performa
nce) and in actions for support, or for annulment of a judgment or to foreclose
a mortgage, this Court has considered such actions as cases where the subject of
the litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, and are cognizable excl
usively by courts of first instance.
Russel vs. Vestil, 304 SCRA 738; GR No. 119347, March 17, 1999
(Civil Procedures Jurisdiction; Civil actions in which the subject of the litiga
tion is incapable of pecuniary estimation)
Facts: Petitioners discovered a public document, which is a declaration of heirs
and deed of confirmation of a previous oral agreement, of partition, affecting
the land executed by and among the respondents whereby respondents divided the p
roperty among themselves to the exclusion of petitioners who are entitled theret
o as legal heirs also.
Petitioners filed a complaint, denominated DECLARATION OF NULLITY AND PARTITION a
gainst defendants with the RTC claiming that the document was false and perjuri
ous as the private respondents were not the only heirs and that no oral partitio
n of the property whatsoever had been made between the heirs. The complaint pra
yed that the document be declared null and void and an order be issued to partit
ion the land among all the heirs.
Private respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint on the ground of lac
k of jurisdiction over the nature of the case as the total assessed value of the
subject land is P5,000.00 which under section 33 (3) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129
, as amended by R.A. No. 7691, falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the MT
C.
Petitioners filed an Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss saying that the RTC has
jurisdiction over the case since the action is one which is incapable of pecuni
ary estimation within the contemplation of Section 19(l) of B.P. 129, as amended
.
Issue: WON the RTC has jurisdiction over the nature of the civil case.
Held: Yes. The complaint filed before the Regional Trial Court is one incapable
of pecuniary estimation and therefore within the jurisdiction of said court.
In Singsong vs. Isabela Sawmill, the Supreme Court ruled that:
In determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not capab
le of pecuniary estimation this Court has adopted the criterion of first ascerta
ining the nature of the principal action or remedy sought. If it is primarily f
or the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary
estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in the courts
of first instance would depend on the amount of the claim. However, where the
basic issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of money, where t
he money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relie
f sought, this Court has considered such actions as cases where the subject of t
he litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, and are cognizable exclusi
vely by courts of first instance (now Regional Trial Courts).
The main purpose of petitioners in filing the complaint is to declare null and v
oid the document in question. While the complaint also prays for the partition
of the property, this is just incidental to the main action, which is the declar
ation of nullity of the document above-described. It is axiomatic that jurisdic
tion over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law and is determined by
the allegations in the complaint and the character of the relief sought, irrespe
ctive of whether the plaintiff is entitled to all or some of the claims asserted
therein.
Copioso vs Copioso, 391 SCRA 325; GR No. 149243, October 28, 2002
(Civil Procedures Jurisdiction; Civil actions in which the subject of the litiga
tion is incapable of pecuniary estimation)
Facts: Respondents filed with the RTC an action for specific performance of reco
nveyance of two parcels of land having an assessed value of P3,770.00.
Respondents alleged that they together with their deceased brother were co-owner
s of the subject property having inherited the same from their parents, and that
through fraud and machination the deceased had the property transferred to his
name and that of spouses Doria who subsequently sold the same to third parties.
Thus, they are praying for the reconveyance of the property by virtue of their
being co-owners thereof.
Petitioners moved to dismiss the complaint on that ground that it was the MTC an
d not the RTC that had jurisdiction considering that the assessed value of the p
roperty was lower than P20,000.00 (Section 33 [3] of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as
amended by R.A. No. 7691). Petitioners argue that the complaint for reconveyanc
e cannot be resolved unless the trial court delves upon the issues of title, poss
ession and interests of each of the stakeholders over the subject parcels of land
.
Respondents claim that the instant complaint for reconveyance is a case of joind
er of causes of action which include the annulment of sale and other instruments
of false conveyance incapable of pecuniary estimation thus within the legal com
petence of the RTC ( Section 19(l) of B.P. 129, as amended).
The trial court denied the motion to dismiss holding that since the subject matt
er of the action was beyond pecuniary estimation it was properly within its juri
sdiction.
Issue: WON denial of the motion to dismiss was correct.
Held: Yes. Although the assessed value of the two parcels of land involved is P3
,770.00, which is within the jurisdiction of the MTC, the action filed by the re
spondents is for specific performance of reconveyance, annulment of contracts an
d claim for damages, which are incapable of pecuniary estimation and thus proper
ly within the jurisdiction of the RTC.
If the action affects the title to or possession of real property then it is a r
eal action and jurisdiction is determined by the assessed value of the property.
It is within the jurisdiction therefore of the Metropolitan Trial Court.
Municipal Corporation Eminent Domain Expropriation BP 129
Facts:In 1997, Brgy. San Roque filed for an expropriation suit before the MTC of
Talisay. The MTC denied the suit because apparently under BP 129, MTCs do not h
ave jurisdiction over expropriation cases as it is the RTCs that are lodged with
the power to try such cases. So Brgy. San Roque filed it before RTC Talisay but
then Judge Pastor denied the suit arguing that the action for eminent domain af
fected title to real property; hence, the value of the property to be expropriat
ed would determine whether the case should be filed before the MTC or the RTC. C
oncluding that the action should have been filed before the MTC since the value
of the subject property was less than P20,000.
ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC should take cognizance of the expropriation case.
HELD: Yes. Under Section 19 (1) of BP 129, which provides that RTCs shall exerci
se exclusive original jurisdiction over all civil actions in which the subject of
the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation; . . . . . The present actio
n involves the exercise of the right to eminent domain, and that such right is i
ncapable of pecuniary estimation.
What are the two phases of expropriation cases?
The first is concerned with the determination of the authority of the plaintiff
to exercise the power of eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise in the
context of the facts involved in the suit. It ends with an order, if not of dis
missal of the action, of condemnation declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful r
ight to take the property sought to be condemned, for the public use or purpose
described in the complaint, upon the payment of just compensation to be determin
ed as of the date of the filing of the complaint. An order of dismissal, if this
be ordained, would be a final one, of course, since it finally disposes of the a
ction and leaves nothing more to be done by the Court on the merits. So, too, wo
uld an order of condemnation be a final one, for thereafter as the Rules express
ly state, in the proceedings before the Trial Court, no objection to the exercise
of the right of condemnation (or the propriety thereof) shall be filed or heard
.
The second phase of the eminent domain action is concerned with the determinatio
n by the court of the just compensation for the property sought to be taken. This
is done by the Court with the assistance of not more than three (3) commissioner
s. The order fixing the just compensation on the basis of the evidence before, a
nd findings of, the commissioners would be final, too. It would finally dispose
of the second stage of the suit, and leave nothing more to be done by the Court
regarding the issue. . . .
It should be stressed that the primary consideration in an expropriation suit is
whether the government or any of its instrumentalities has complied with the re
quisites for the taking of private property. Hence, the courts determine the aut
hority of the government entity, the necessity of the expropriation, and the obs
ervance of due process. In the main, the subject of an expropriation suit is th
e governments exercise of eminent domain, a matter that is incapable of pecuniary
estimation.