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This document discusses several cases related to legal ethics and the conduct of lawyers. It addresses duties of lawyers to their clients including honesty, candor and avoiding conflicts of interest. It also discusses issues like a lawyer being bound by the acts of their counsel, a prohibition on lawyers buying a client's property, and standards for substitution and withdrawal of lawyers from a case. The document emphasizes that lawyers must uphold high ethical standards to maintain public trust in the legal profession.
This document discusses several cases related to legal ethics and the conduct of lawyers. It addresses duties of lawyers to their clients including honesty, candor and avoiding conflicts of interest. It also discusses issues like a lawyer being bound by the acts of their counsel, a prohibition on lawyers buying a client's property, and standards for substitution and withdrawal of lawyers from a case. The document emphasizes that lawyers must uphold high ethical standards to maintain public trust in the legal profession.
This document discusses several cases related to legal ethics and the conduct of lawyers. It addresses duties of lawyers to their clients including honesty, candor and avoiding conflicts of interest. It also discusses issues like a lawyer being bound by the acts of their counsel, a prohibition on lawyers buying a client's property, and standards for substitution and withdrawal of lawyers from a case. The document emphasizes that lawyers must uphold high ethical standards to maintain public trust in the legal profession.
of thepeopleintheadministration of justiceisasolemndutyincum- bent uponall and every lawyer for as longas heis a part of the profession. Henry S. Drinker sums up suchduty in this wise: "To his client he owesabsolutecandor, unswerving fidelity and un- dividedallegiance, furthering his cause with entire devotion, warmzeal, andhis utmost ability and learning but without using means other than thoseaddressedtoreasonandunderstanding; employingandcountenancing no formof fraud, trickery or deceit, which if brought to light would shamehis conscienceor bring discredit to his profes,sion."1 Thepractice of lawis a privilegeaccordedonlyto thosewho measureupto certain rigid standards of mental and moral fitness. For theadmissionof acandidateto thebar the Rulesof Court not onlyprescribes atest of academicpreparation but requires satisfac- tory testimonials of good moral character. These standards are neither dispensedwithnor loweredafter admission; thelawyer must continueto adhereto themor elseincur the risk of suspensionor remova1. 2 A. PARTY BOUNDBY ACTS OF COUNSEL It iswell settledthat aparty isboundbytheacts of hiscounsel, evenif thelatter hadbeennegligent inthe dischargeof his duties. ThusheldtheSupremeCourt inthecaseof Beatriz et oJ,v. Cederia. 3 Inthis case,theCourtturned downthedefendant's motionfor relief of judgment holding that the allegation made in said motio~of fraud, collusion, accident and excusable.negligenceon the part of their former counsel is but a mere conclusionof the defendants, without anyfact tosubstantiate it. Moreover,it appears that coun- sel for plaintiffs met defendant Martin Cederiaabout ten (10) days * Member, Student Editorial Board, Philippt"ne Law Journal, 1962-63. 1DRINKER, HENRY S., LEGAL ETHICS, 3-7. 2In re Gutierrez, Adm. CaseNo. 363,July 31, 1962. 3 G.R. No. L-17703,February 28, 1962. after receipt of copyof thedecisionandinformedhimof therendi- tion of said decisionagainst the defendants. B. LIABILITY OF COUNSEL FOR FAILURE OF HIS CLIENT TO COMPLY WITH ORDER OF COURT In Special Proceedings No. Q-453entitled Intestate Es"bate -of Marcelo de Castro, the respondent judge issuedan order requiring theexecutrixto explainwhyshehadsecuredasmall loanfromthe DevelopmentBankof thePhilippineswithout previouscourt author- ity, andwhyshe'hadfailedto includeinher accountingtheincome fromsomeproperties of theestate. Not satisfiedwiththeexplana- tiongivenby theexecutrix inconnectiontherewith, therespondent judge, inopencourt,foundher guiltyof contemptandorderedtocom- plystrictly withtheorder. Theexecutrix,t'hroughher counsel,peti- tioner herein, filedher "compliance"with theorder. Therespond- ent judgeruledthat thesamewasnot inconformitywithhis order, without, however, specifying in what respects the statement was defective. In viewof this, petitioner, as counsel for the executrix inquired fromthe respondent judge in what particulars the com- pliancewas defective, to which the judge replied that petitioner had no right to makesuchan inquiry and heldhimguilty of con tempt for which'hewas orderedto pay aline of twenty (P20.00) pesos. Hence,petitioner filedapetitiontoset asidetheorder declar- ing himin contempt. H etd: It is thus obviousthat the oneunder obligationto complywith the order of the Court requiring thead- ministratrix (petitioner's client) to explainwhy shehad secureda loanwithout previouscourt authority andwhyshehadnot included inher accountingthe incomefromcertain properties of theestate was not petitioner but his client who had already beenfinedfor contempt. Hence, counsel cannot beheld liablefor contempt for failure of his client to complywith the order of the Court. 4 C. LAWYERS ARE PROHIBITED FROM REPRESENTING CONFLICT- ING INTEREST IN A CASE In Mejia et al. v. Reyes,S respondent, apracticing lawyer, was in 1947appointedbank attorney and notary publicfor the Baguio Branch of the Philippine National Bank. Whilestill holdingsuch position, his professional services were engaged by complainants, residents of Baguio City, to bring an action in court against the Philippine National Bank and the Rehabilitation Finance Corpora- tion for the cancellationof a mortgage ona parcel of land. The 4Consulta v. Yatco et al., G.R. No. L-15964, January 30, 1962. 5Adm. Case No. 378, March 30, 1962. Court held: Lawyers are prohibited fromrepresenting conflicting interests in a case. Sotherespondent's act of appearing and act- ing as counsel for the complainants in the civil caseagainst the PhilippineNational Bankthat hadappointed'himbankattorney and notary public, constitutesmalpractice. D. BREACH OF PROFESSIONAL DUTY Asalreadyaforesaid, totheclientalawyer owes"absolutecan- dor, unswerving fidelity and undividedallegiance." This duty, a lawyer shouldholduphighif heweretoenjoythecontinuedrespect andtrust, hencepatronage, of hisclients. But inonecase,6thelaw- yer-respondentdisregardedandviolatedthisduty. It thus'happened that petitioner engagedthe services of respondent lawyer to find waysbywhichthelandsshehadsoldcouldberedeemed. Respond- ent succeededin redeemingthe lands but the salewas executedin his name. Afterwards, hesoldeight lots at a profit and kept the two lots for himself as his attorney's fees. He.ld: Respondent is guilty of malpractice. It isnot onlyirregular but abreachof pro- fessional duty towards petitioner client whose trust respondent- lawyer disregarded and violated. E. PROHIBITION AGAINST COUNSEL TO BUY CLIENT'S PROP- ERTY. Theconveyanceof the property in litigation madeby the liti- gant tohis counsel during theexistenceof attorney-and-client rela- tionshipisvoid,thereasonbeingthat becauseof their client-attorney relationship, petitioner-counsel wasdisqualifiedtobuyunder Article 1941of theNewCivil Code. Insuchacase, perhaps theperiodof prescriptionshouldbecountedonlyfromtheseveranceof theattor- ney-clientbond,becauseit isonlythenthat thecontrollinginfluence of the attorney has ceased. Nonetheless, the litigant may not be allowedto unjustly profit at the expenseof her attorney by retain- ingtheconsiderationof thesale. Whenasaleisavoided,theseller shall return the purchaseprice, together with interest. 7 A. SUBSTITUTION Whenalawyer voluntarily withdraws as counsel after another lawyer had entered his appearance for the sameclient, the filing almost simultaneouslyby the former of a motionfor the payment of his attorney's fees, amountstoanacquiescencetotheappearance 6Imbuido v. Mafigonon, Adm. Case No. 200, March 31, 1962. 7 Sotto v. Samson, G.R. No. L-169.17, July 31, 1962. of the latter as counsel for the client. This consideration came up in one administrative case. S In said case petitioner was retained by Nieves Rillas Vda. de Barrera to handle the settlement of the testate estate of her husband. Preparatory to the closing of the administration proce~dings, petitioner prepared two pleadings but Mrs. Barrera refused to countersign said pleadings and instead ad- vised petitioner not to filethem. Sometime later, petitioner found that respondent Atty. Patalinghug had filedon January 11, 1955 a written appearance as newcounsel for Mrs. Barrera. OnFebruary 7, 1955, the other respondent Atty. Remotigue entered his appear- ance. Held: Petitioner's voluntary withdrawal as counsel for Mrs. Barrera after Atty. Pa1alinghug had entered his appearance, and his (petitioner's) filing almost simultaneously of a motion for the payment of his attorney's fees, amounted to an acquiescense to the appearance of respondent, Atty. Patalinghug, as counsel for Mrs. Barrera. This should estop petitioner from now complaining that the appearance of Atty. Pataling1lUgwas unprofessional. Moreover, the Solicitor General found that before respondent Attorney Pata- linghug entered his appearance, Mrs. Barrera had already filedwith the court a pleading discharging petitioner. If she did not furnish petitioner with a copy of said pleading, it was not the fault of Atty. Patalinghug but that of Mrs. Barrera. It appears that the reason why Mrs. Barrera dismissed petitioner was that she did not trust him any longer. Much less could respondent Atty. Remotigue be held guilty of unprofessional conduct inasmuch as he entered his appearance only onFebruary 7, 1955, and after petitioner hadvolun- tarily withdrawn appearance on February 5, 1955. B. WITHDRAWAL An attorney retained in a case the trial of which is set for a date which he knows he cannot appear because of his engagement in another trial set previously on the same date, has no right to presume that the court will necessarily grant himcontinuance. The most ethical thing for him to do in such a situation is to inform the prospective client of all the facts so that the latter may retain another attorney. If the client, having full knowledge of all the facts, still retains the attorney, heassumes the risk and cannot com- plain of the consequences if the postponement is denied and finds himself without attorney at the trial. But an attorney who has not made any formal withdrawal from the case is still considered his client's attorney.9 S La.put v. Remotigue, Adm. Case No. 219, September 29, 1962. 9 Gutierrez v. Medel, G.R. No. L-14455, April 26, 1962. IV. ATTORNEY-TO-ATTORNEYRELATIONSHIP In Administrative CaseNo. 434 10 -a sequel to Administrative Case No. 219 11 -an original complaint was filed with the court charging the respondent lawyer with malice, bad faith, and mis- representation whenthe latter allegedlyfiledmotionsincourt with- out notice to the complainant lawyer, thereby committing unfair andunethical practices bordering ondishonesty, all totheprejudice of said complainant. Thecomplainant alleges that by virtue of a duly recorded "Attorney's Lien," he has in his lawful possesion transfer certificatesof titletoall real properties of theestateunder administration; that therespondent, without noticetothe complain- ant, filedwith theprobatecourt motionspraying that thecomplain- ant bedirectedto surrender the aforementionedcertificatesof title, andanother motionprayingthat hebeissuedowner'sduplicatecopies of the certificates of title on the ground that the samewere lost. Therespondent knowingall alongthat thecomplainant is inlawful possessionof said certificatesof title; and that with the duplicate titles, therespondentandhisclientMrs. Barrera (formerlytheclient of the complainant) soldwithout noticethe lots coveredthereby, all of which, asidefrombeingunfair andunethical, wereprejudicial tothecomplainant'srecordedlientothe saidlots. Onthequestion whether the respondent had committedunfair and unethical prac- ticesborderingondishonesty,theCourt .heZd: TheSolicitor General, towhomthis casewasreferred tofor investigationfoundthat since January 11, 1955, Mrs. Barrera had askedthe complainant herein toturn over all therecords andpapers of theestateunder adminis- tration toher but despitemotionsandorders of thecourt, thecom- plainant stubbornly kept tohimself thetransfer certificates of title inquestion. It wouldseemthat thecomplainantwastheoneat fault. Hence,therecommendationof theSolicitor General for therespond- ent's completeexoneration shouldbe approved. A. ATTORNEY'S LIENS Incidental to and as a measure of protection of the right of lawyerstorecover professional feesfor servicesrendered, theRules of Court 12 provides for two kinds of liens: (1) general, retaining, or possessinglien; and (2) charging lien. Theformer istheattor- ney's right to retain the funds, documentsand papers of his client whichcomeintohispossessionandcontrol anduntil his lawful fees 10 Laput v. Remotigue, September 29, 1962. 11Supra, note No.8. 12Rules of Court, Rule 127, Sec. 33. and disbursements havebeenpaid and to apply suchfunds to the sa.tisfactionthereof. Thelatter isthat whichtheattorney has upon all judgment for thepayment of moneyandexecutionissuedinpur- suance of such judgment.l.'l These liens are deemednecessary to preserve the decorumand respectability of the profession,14and courts, in the exerciseof their exclusiveand supervisory authority over attorneys, are boundto respect and protect them. 15 ChJarging lien; partakes of the nature of collateral s,ecurity wh.en established on the property of the deceased in litigation to secure payment of attorney's fees. Tosecurepayment of attorney's feesfor servicesrenderedtoa deceasedduring his lifetime, which court shall entertain the pay- ment of theclaimfor attorney's fees, theprobatecourt or theordi- nary courts? Thisquestioncameupfor determinationinthecaseof T~stamentariJ(J,de Don Amadeo MaJtute Olave v. Paterno R. Canlas, et alY:; It appears that AmadeoMatuteOlavediedin the City of Manilain 1955 and forthwith testamentary proceedingswereinsti- tuted beforetheCourt of First Instanceof saidcityfor theprobate of his will and the settlement of his estate. During his lifetime Matutewasmadeparty defendant inacivil caseandto defendhim heengagedtheservicesof respondent Paterno R. Canlas,theformer agreeing to pay the latter twenty per cent (20%) of the market value of the property in litigation. After the termination of the case, Atty. Canlasfiledin saidcivil caseamotionpraying that his claimfor attorney's fees beestablishedas a charging lien onthe properties under litigation. The court granted themotion. Coun- sel was able to secure fifty thousand (P50,OOO.OO) pesos partial payment. Whenhefiledan urgent motionfor thepayment to him of the balanceof eighty-fivethousand (P85,OOO.OO) pesos remain- ing in posessionof the clerk of court in full payment of his fees, the administrator of the estate filedan oppositionthereto alleging lackof jurisdiction onthepart of thetrial court andclaimingthat, it, involvingmoneyclaim,thesameshouldbesubmittedtotheprob- atecourt. 'Thetrial court sustainedits jurisdiction. Henceapeti- tion for certiorari was filed. TheCourt held: Under the Rulesof Court,l7a creditor holdinga claimagainst the deceasedsecuredby mortgage or other collateral security may foredose his mortgage or realizeuponhis securityby ordinary actionincourt makingthe 13 5 Am. Jur. 387. 14Rustia v. Abeto, 72Phil. 133 (1941). 15 DeJesus-Alano v. Tan and Hoxas, G.R. No. L-9437,November28, 1939. 16 G.R. No. L-12709,February 28, 1962. 1\7 Rulesof Court, Ruk 87, Sec. 7. executor or administrator a party defendant, and neednot filehis claimbeforetheprobate court to share in the general distribution of the assets of the estate. Under the sametheory, an action to recover real or personal property fromthe estate or to enforcea lien thereon, may be prosecutedby the interested person against theexecutor or administrator independentlyof thetestate or intes- tate procedings. And it Ctannot be gainsaid that a charging lien established on the property in litigation to secure the paymem;,tof the attorney's fees partakes of the nature 'Ofa (JQllateralsecurity or of a lien on real or persorl!alproperty w'ithin the mooning of the provisions of the rules. The reason behindthis rule is that such claimscannot beconsideredclaimsagainst theestate, but theright tosubject specificproperty to theclaimarises fromthecontract of thedebtor wherebyhehas duringhislifetimeset asidecertainprop- ertyfor itspayment,andsuchproperty doesnot, exceptinsofar asits valueexceedsthedebt belongtotheestate, andtheinstrument being of record or the property being in the possessionof the creditor is noticeto all the world of the contract. 1S Moreover, a probate court, beingof limitedjurisdiction, has no authority to enforcea lienunlessconferredby a statute. Thestatutory jurisdiction of a probatecourt isexclusive,19andsincethelienreferred to inSection 1, Rule88is not amongthosementionedin Section5, Rule87, all moneyclaimssecuredwithalienareoutsidethejurisdiction of the probate court. Petition dismissed. B. WHEN ORDER TO ANNOTATE LIEN CONSTITUTES ABUSE OF DISCRETION In Candelario v. Caiiizares et al.,2 oneAttorney Canlas pre- senteda motionbeforethe court praying that a charging lienfor attorney's feesbecreatedonwhatever property, right, and interest petitionerswill receiveintheestateof thedeceased. Petitioners ob- jectedtothemotionalleging,amongother things, that respondentat- torneyshadalreadybeenoverpaidandthey hadalready presenteda motionto stopfurther payment of attorney's fees. Thecourt over- ruledtheoppositionandorderedthat thecharginglienof Atty. Can- lasberecorded. Onthepetitionfor certiorari, theCourt held: The lowercourtabuseditsdiscretioninorderingtheannotationof thelien in favor of respondent attorneys notwithstanding the apparently validclaimthat the attorney's fees havebeenfully paid and with- out previoustrial findingthat the claimof petitioners of full pay- ment of feesisnot true or correct. 18 34 C.J.S. 175-177. 19Ibid., 72l. 20 G.R. No. L-17688, March 30, 1962. A. DISBARMENT; CONVICTION OF CRIME INVOLVING MORAL TUR- PITUDE; EFFECT OF ABSOLUTE PARDON Although onehas already been admitted to the practice of law, he does not cease to bebound by the rigid standards of mental and moral fitness required of those accorded the privile.ge to practice law. On the contrary, these standards are neither dispensed with nor lowered after admission. The lawyer must continue to adhere to them or else incur the risk of suspension or removal.21 In order that a pardon granted an attorney after conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude can operate to bar any pro- ceeding for his disbarment, the pardon must beabsolute. This was the holding of the court in In r.e Gutierrez. 22 Respondent Diosdado Q. Gutierrez, a member of the Philippine Bar, was convicted of the murder of Filemon Samaco, former municipal mayor of Calapan, and was sentenced to the penalty of death. The judgment of con- viction was affirmed by the Supreme Court but the penalty was reduced to reclusion perpetua. After serving a portion of the sen- tence, respondent was granted a conditional pardon by the Presi- dent. The unexecuted portion of the prison term was remitted on condition that heshall not again violate any of the penal laws of the Philippines. Thereafter, the widow of the deceased Samaco fileda verified complaint before the Supreme Court praying that respond- ent beremoved fromtheroll of lawyers pursuant to Rule127, Section 5. Respondent pleaded the conditional pardon in defense, onthe au- thority of the decisIonof the Court inthe caseof In re Lontok. 23 The Court rejected respondent's plea and .held: Reliance is placed by respondent on the Lontok case. The respondent therein was con- victed of bigamy and thereafter pardoned by the Governor-General. In a subsequent proceeding for his disbarment onthe ground of such conviction, the Court held that a pardon operates to wipe out the conviction and is a bar to any proceeding for the disbarment of the attorney after the pardon has been granted. This ruling does not govern the question at bar. In making it, the Court proceeded on the assumption that the pardon granted to respondent Lontok was absolute. This is implicit in the ratio decidendi of the case, par- ticularly in the citations to support it. Thus, the portion of the decision in Ex Parte Garland,24 quoted with approval in the Lontok caseisas follows: "A paraon reaches both the punishment prescribed 21In re Gutierrez, supra, note No.2. 22Ibid . 23 43 Phil. 293. 24 4 Wall. 380. PHILIPPINE LAW JOlJ1t.NAt nLECOPY for the offense and the guilt of the offender; and when the pardon is full, it releases the punishment and blolts out of existence Ithe guilt, so that in the eye of the law the offender is as innocent as if he had never committed the offense. If granted before conviction, it prevents any of the penalties and disabilities, consequent UPOy; conviction, from attaching; if granted after conviction, it removes the penalties and disabilities, and restores himto all his civil rights; it makes him, as it were, a new man, and gives him a new credit and capacity." In the instant case, the pardon granted to respond- ent is not absolute but conditional. So it does not reach the offense itself, unlike that in Ex Parte Garland,25 which was a fuIl pardon. Respondent Gutierrez must be judged upon the fact of his convic- tion for murder without regard to the pardon heinvokes in defense. The crime was qualified by treachery and aggravated by its having been committed in band, by taking advantage of his official position (respondent being amunicipal mayor at the time) and with the use of a motor vehicle. The degree of moral turpitude involved is such as to justify his being purged from the profession. B. JUSTICES OF THE PEACE; COHABITATION EVEN WITH CoNSENT OF COMPLAINANT, IMMORAL As a high government official in the community of his assign- ment, aJustice of the Peace ought to beaperson of exemplary char- acter, if not a model citizen.2'6 In the case of Vwj,ron v. Duranr a petition for disbarment was filedby the complainant against Resti- tuto M. Duran, Justice of the Peace of Basey, Samar. The com- plainant claims that Duran had carnal knowledge with her by force. After investigation, the district judge of Samar found that Duran did not commit rape on the complainant because the sexual inter-, course which Duran had with the latter was with her consent. Nevertheless, the district judge found himguilty of immorality and recommended his suspension from the service. Said finding was affirmed by both the Secretary of Justice and the President. In consequence thereof, Duran was suspended from the service without pay for six (6) months. The complainant, however submits that said punishment is too lenient and that Duran ought to be dis- barred from the practice of law. The Solicitor General, on the other hand, recommends dismissal of these proceedings but with a ~5Ibid. 26 Viojan v. Duran, Adm. Case No,. 248, February 26, 1962. 27 Ibid. warning, onthegroundthat respondenthas already beensufficient- ly punished. H,eld: Undoubtedly, respondent's immorality is con- demnable. Heis a Justice of the Peaceand, as such, heis consi- deredahighgovernmentofficialinthecommunityof hisassignment. He ought to be a person of exemplary character, if not a model citizen. By committingthe immoralityin question,the respondent violatedthe trust reposedin his high Qffice,and utterly failedto liveupto thenobleidealsandthe strict standards of morality re- quired of the law profession. However, considering that the respondent had already undergonethe penalty of suspension,and, furthermore, the immorality committedby himwas madepossible partly by the rather equivocal conductof complainant herself, the present disbarment proceedingis dismissed, with a warning that a repetition of a similar offenseby himwouldbedealt witli more severelyby the Court. C. JUDGES; SERIOUS INEFFICIENCY AND IGNORANCE OF LAW In an administrative case/ 8 oneAtty. CandidoSan Luis filed a complaint, against Judge GregorioD. Montejoof the Court of First Instanceof ZamboangaCity chargingthe latter with serious inefficiency,ignoranceof the law, and falsificationof publicdocu- ments allegedlycommittedin connectionwith the performanceof his official duties. Justice Juan P. Enriquez of the Court of Ap- peals, whowas designatedto investigatethecharges, madethefol- lowingfindings: In Civil CaseNo. 256, the defendant therein filed amotionfor bill of particulars but respondent failedto resolveit until after thelapseof seven(7) monthsandthis inactionnotwith- standing, respondent Judgefiledhiscertificateof serviceevery15th day and end of eachmonth. RespondentJudgeexplainedthat he laboredunder the belief that amotionfor bill of particulars is not submitted for resolutionevenafter the filingof plaintiff's objec- tions and defendant's reply thereto until the motionis reset for hearing. In Criminal Case No. 8100for rape, respondent Judge madethis findingin his decision: "The court . . . believesthat there was an attempt madebythe accusedto disrupt thevirginity of the offendedparty, but an attempt is not a crimeof rape as stated in the information," and so he acquitted the accused. In another criminal casefor murder andtriplefrustrated murder, the accusedtherein werefoundguilty as chargedand yet the penalty imposedonthemwasnot theoneprescribedbylaw. Fromthefore- goingfindings,the Court held: That the respondent Judge didnot observethe careand diligencerequiredof a judgeof first instance in the performanceof his duties whichaccount for the errors he has committedin the disposal of the cases subject of the present administrative complaint. For this reason, the Court resolvedto admonishhimto bemorecareful in the future with the warning that a repetition of similar errors will not be countenanced, and will bethesubject of a stern disciplinaryaction.
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